IMPLICATIONS

The data presented in the previous section of this report show that more crashes occurred during the program periods in both Marion County and Tucson than in the same six-month periods of the previous year, when no special aggressive driving enforcement was conducted in either community. Marion County’s special enforcement zones experienced 32 percent more crashes than during the same period of the Year 2000; crashes in Tucson’s special enforcement zones increased by ten percent, overall. Further, in Marion County, crashes with primary collision factors associated with aggressive driving increased by 21 percent in the comparison zones and by 41 percent in the special enforcement zones. Based on increases such as these, it would be reasonable to question whether special enforcement has a stimulating, rather than an inhibiting, effect on the incidence of aggressive driving. One interpretation might be that the special enforcement and PI&E programs influenced some motorists to drive more slowly, resulting in increased opportunities for aggressive drivers, whose behavior is less likely to be influenced by the programs, to overtake the slower drivers, with the encounters leading to the increase in crashes.

The Introduction to this report discussed the apparent increase in road rage and aggressive driving, and attributed the increase in observed incidents, largely, to the 27 percent increase in vehicle miles traveled per year that occurred in the U.S. during the final decade of the Twentieth Century. With the addition of only one percent of roadway during that period, one might expect, overall, 26 percent increases in all traffic-related phenomena, or increases of approximately two and a half percent each year in the absence of mitigating factors. However, the relationship between traffic volume and phenomena such as crashes may not be linear, nor are increases in traffic volume uniformly distributed throughout the network of roads and highways. That is, a small increase in traffic volume from one year to the next might result in a disproportionate change in crash incidence. Further, changes in traffic volumes are of greater magnitude on some roadways than on others. Perhaps factors such as these influenced the results of the aggressive driving programs conducted by the Marion County Traffic Safety Partnership and the Tucson Police Department.

Data were obtained from the Department of Public Works of the City of Indianapolis, and the Department of Transportation of the City of Tucson, to determine if any changes in traffic volumes were measured that might help explain the increases in crashes that occurred during the program periods. Traffic counts are not performed every year nor in all locations within a community. For these reasons, in some cases extrapolation was required from 1999 data and in others from sections of roadway adjacent to a special enforcement zone. Table 7 presents the estimated changes in traffic volumes in the Marion County and Tucson special enforcement zones from the Year 2000 to 2001, based on the traffic count data provided by the cities. The table shows that Marion County’s zones experienced estimated increases in traffic volumes ranging from five to ten percent, with an average estimated increase of eight percent. The estimated traffic volume increases in Tucson’s zones ranged from five to 18 percent, with an average estimated increase of nine percent. The actual and estimated traffic count data show that the special enforcement zones of both aggressive driving programs experienced increases in traffic volumes substantially greater than the national average of two and a half percent between the Year 2000 and 2001.

TABLE 9
ESTIMATED CHANGES IN TRAFFIC VOLUMES
IN THE MARION COUNTY AND TUCSON SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT ZONES:
YEAR 2000 TO 2001

Program / Zone
Speed Limit(in mph)
Percent Change
in Traffic Volume
Marion County Special Enforcement Zones
B
40
+5%
C
35
+8%
D
35
+10%
Average Change of Traffic Volume
+8%
 
Tucson Special Enforcement Zones
1
40
+5%
2
45
+2%
3
35
+10%
4
40
+18%
Average Change of Traffic Volume
+9%


The estimated increases in traffic volumes are supported by the anecdotal accounts of officers. Officers of the Marion County program reported that traffic has been increasing steadily for several years, with a noticeable increase in traffic in the special enforcement zones during 2001. Officers attribute the increased traffic in the enforcement zones to two major highway maintenance projects that caused many motorists to take surface streets to avoid delays on the highways; the maintenance work was not anticipated by the research plan. Tucson officers also reported noticeable increases in traffic volumes during 2001. The officers attribute the increases to the recent expansion of activities at a local Air Force base, which is adjacent to one of the special enforcement zones, and the construction of several thousand new houses north of the city. The primary arterial that links the new housing to the city passes through one of the Tucson Police Department’s special enforcement zones.

The estimated increases in traffic volumes between the years 2000 and 2001 provide a partial explanation for the increases in crashes in the special enforcement zones of both communities during their aggressive driving programs. The estimated nine percent increase in traffic volume in Tucson’s zones was accompanied by a ten percent increase in crashes. An increase in crash incidence comparable to the increase in traffic volume is a reasonable expectation. The data from Marion County, however, are not as easily explained.

It was estimated that traffic volume increased by an average of eight percent in Marion County’s special enforcement zones, while the number of crashes increased 32 percent during the aggressive driving program, compared to the number of crashes during the same six-month period one year earlier. That is, crashes increased at a rate four times the increase in traffic volume. The most likely explanation for this difference is that the estimates of traffic volume are inaccurate; in particular, the extrapolations from previous years and neighboring zones were statistical projections that did not take into account any unmeasured increases in traffic volume resulting from the highway maintenance and construction projects that were mentioned by officers as a possible explanation for the increase in crashes.

The number of crashes overall is not the primary figure of merit for evaluating the aggressive driving programs. Increases in traffic volume can result in increased crash incidence, as discussed in the previous paragraphs. More relevant measures of program effect are the numbers of crashes with primary collision factors that are associated with aggressive driving, and the calculated proportions of all crashes that were assigned those PCFs on collision reports. In this regard, the incidence of crashes with aggressive driving PCFs might increase, but to demonstrate program effect the increase cannot be greater than the increase in crashes, overall.

Table 8 presents a summary of the relevant crash data for both Marion County and Tucson. The table shows that the total number of crashes in the Marion County special enforcement zones increased by 32 percent, and the number of those crashes with aggressive driving PCFs increased by 41 percent, as reported previously. That is, the total number of crashes increased substantially, but the crashes with aggressive driving PCFs increased at a greater rate. Crashes with the target PCFs is a more relevant metric than total crashes, but change in the proportion of crashes with the target PCFs provides the best overall measure of program effect because it eliminates the influence of differential traffic volume and other uncontrolled factors that might contribute to an overall increase in crash incidence. In this regard, Table 8 shows that the Marion County zones experienced a six percent increase in the proportion of all crashes with aggressive driving PCFs; that is, total crashes increased by 31 percent, crashes with aggressive driving PCFs increased by 41 percent, but the proportion of total crashes with aggressive driving PCFs increased by six percent.

TABLE 10
SUMMARY OF KEY CRASH MEASURES DURING THE MARION COUNTY AND TUCSON
PROGRAM PERIODS AND THE SAME SIX-MONTH PERIODS ONE YEAR EARLIER

Program / Measure
Year 2000
Comparison Period
Year 2001
Program Period
Percent
Change
Marion County
Total Crashes in Enforcement Zones 259 343 +32%
Total Crashes in Comparison Zones 280 347 +24%
 
Total Target PCFs in Enforcement Zones 160 226 +41%
Total Target PCFs in Comparison Zones 196 238 +21%
 
Percent of Crashes w/ a Target PCF: Enforcement 62% 66% +6%
Percent of Crashes w/ a Target PCF: Comparison 70% 69% 1%
 
Estimated Average Change in Traffic Volume
+8%
 
Tucson
Total Crashes in Enforcement Zones 145 160 +10%
Total Crashes in Comparison Zones 148 145 -2%
 
Total Target PCFs in Enforcement Zones 121 122 +1%
Total Target PCFs in Comparison Zones 104 98 -6%
 
Percent of Crashes w/ a Target PCF: Enforcement 83% 76% -8%
Percent of Crashes w/ a Target PCF: Comparison 70% 68% -3%
Estimated Average Change in Traffic Volume +9%


Table 8 also shows that the number of crashes in Tucson’s special enforcement zones increased by ten percent, but the number of crashes with aggressive driving PCFs increased by less than one percent. Most important, the proportion of all crashes with target PCFs decreased by eight percent. That is, crash incidence increased overall in Tucson’s zones, but the proportion of those crashes with aggressive driving PCFs declined. In the absence of a countermeasure program, it would be reasonable to expect a ten percent increase in aggressive driving PCFs, corresponding to the ten percent increase in crashes, overall, and no change in the proportion of all crashes with the target PCFs. However, the number of crashes increased in Tucson while the proportion of those crashes with the target PCFs declined, which suggests that the Tucson Police Department’s program had an effect on the driving behavior of local motorists.

Greater crash incidence in the enforcement zones could be expected because those locations were selected on the basis of disproportionate aggressive driving. Enforcement and comparison zones experienced comparable numbers of crashes during the preceding year, but the locations of greatest concern to the officers in both communities were selected to be the enforcement zones. Table 8 also shows that total crashes and crashes with the target PCFs increased in the Marion County comparison zones (24 and 21 percent, respectively), but the increases were not as great as in Marion County’s enforcement zones. The proportion of all crashes with the target PCFs declined by one percent in the comparison zones and increased by six percent in the zones in which Marion County’s special enforcement was conducted. Tucson’s comparison zones experienced two percent fewer crashes during the program, compared to the same six-month period one year earlier, while crashes in Tucson’s enforcement zones increased by ten percent. However, the proportion of all crashes with the target PCFs declined by three percent in Tucson’s comparison zones and by eight percent in the zones that received special enforcement.

The data summarized in Table 5 showed that Marion County’s 32 percent overall increase in crashes is composed of a 39 percent increase in property damage only (PDO) crashes and a 17 percent increase in injury crashes. In contrast, Tucson’s ten percent overall increase in crashes is composed of a 20 percent increase in PDO crashes and a three percent decrease in injury crashes. Higher vehicle speed is a more likely contributing factor to injury crashes than to PDO crashes. Injury crashes increased in Marion County’s special enforcement zones, but declined in Tucson’s zones, which suggests greater effectiveness of Tucson’s countermeasure program. This interpretation of the crash data is supported by the results of the speed samples presented in Tables 3 and 4. Average speeds declined slightly in Marion County, and at a greater rate in Tucson, possibly in response to special enforcement and other programmatic efforts. 10

EXPLANATION
The original purpose of this report was to present, rather than compare, the two aggressive driving programs. However, comparisons are inevitable and the substantially different results of the two programs require an explanation. First, it is important to understand that it is impossible to control all of the variables that could influence the outcome of a study when conducting large-scale, quasi-experiments, such as the programs described in this report. Highway maintenance projects and large residential developments that increase traffic volumes on surface streets are examples of unexpected and uncontrolled variables that can affect dependent measures in a field study involving driver behavior. We have attempted to identify and/or control relevant variables within each program, but the research was not originally designed to support systematic comparisons between the two programs. Marion County, Indiana, and Tucson, Arizona, are different in many ways, and it is possible that some of those differences could be responsible for the differential results reported here.

Despite the differences between Marion County and Tucson, comparisons can be made if it is assumed that any unknown differences are unlikely to influence the incidence of crashes or average vehicle speed, and that known differences have been identified and controlled. For example, a hypothetical difference, such as driving style, or a known difference, such as climate, are rendered irrelevant by comparing percent changes from baseline conditions at each location, rather than comparing actual crash frequencies; this procedure permits comparisons of zones with different baseline crash frequencies within a program, and comparisons of programs. Also, we calculated the proportions of crashes with aggressive driving PCFs to facilitate comparisons by eliminating the confounding effects of increased numbers of crashes, overall. These methods provide reasonable assurance that the only relevant independent variables are the components of the two countermeasure programs.

If the assumptions concerning comparability are accepted, the data presented in this report show that Tucson’s aggressive driving program achieved the intended result of reducing the incidence of aggressive driving, while the Marion County program did not. As described previously, each program received a grant of $200,000, but the managers of the Tucson program devoted considerably more of their resources to enforcement effort than the Marion County managers, and considerably less to conventional paid advertising to publicize their program. Further, the Tucson program assigned two officers full-time and two officers part-time to conduct the special enforcement patrols and deployed the officers nearly every day of the six-month program period. In contrast, special enforcement in the Marion County program was conducted as overtime duty by 42 officers from six different law enforcement agencies, with teams of five officers deploying, on average, one day in three.

This comparison of the Marion County and Tucson aggressive driving programs suggests that limited resources might be better spent on officer labor than on publicity. It also appears that focusing enforcement responsibility on a small team assigned full-time to the special enforcement patrols is probably more effective than sharing the responsibility among a large number of officers as occasional overtime duty.

WHY AREN’T THE PROGRAMS MORE EFFECTIVE?
The proportion of all crashes with aggressive driving primary collision factors increased by six percent in Marion County’s special enforcement zones and decreased by eight percent in Tucson’s zones. Why didn’t the considerable efforts of both programs have greater inhibiting effects on driving behavior, as measured by speed samples and crashes with aggressive driving PCFs? No positive effect of the Marion County program was measured, and there was only an eight percent decline in the proportion of aggressive driving crashes in Tucson. It is possible that the programs were more effective than indicated by the data presented here, but our measures are insensitive to the change in driving behavior. Or, perhaps we expect too much.
The Introduction to this report identified the driving behaviors and primary collision factors that are associated with aggressive driving, and used in the current analysis as measures of program effect. As noted in that discussion, those driving behaviors and the associated PCFs are imperfect dependent measures because they are not always the results of conscious decisions to drive aggressively. Rather, unknown proportions of crashes assigned the “aggressive driving” PCFs clearly are attributable to inattention and errors in judgment, rather than volitional aggressive driving. For this reason, programs intended to reduce the incidence of crashes caused by these driving behaviors can be expected to influence only the portion of those crashes that results from volitional acts, rather than human error and misjudgment.

Both programs were well planned and conducted by skilled and highly-motivated professionals. It is quite likely that at least Tucson’s countermeasure program achieved as much success as reasonably can be expected based on the actual, rather than the news media-inflated, magnitude of the “aggressive driving problem.” Further, Tucson’s eight percent decline in the proportion of crashes with aggressive driving PCFs is a considerable accomplishment. The eight percent decline represents approximately 13 fewer crashes in the special enforcement zones during the six-month program period than would have occurred had the program not been conducted (i.e., five injury crashes and eight property damage only crashes). Some portion, if not all of those prevented crashes, could be attributable to the Tucson program. Although statistical tests were not conducted, all measures are consistent with the hypothesis that a program that combines special enforcement with publicity about the enforcement can change driver behavior. Economists have calculated the overall costs resulting from crashes of different severity. The savings to society from preventing eight PDO crashes and five crashes with only moderate injuries to one person per crash greatly exceeds the cost of Tucson’s aggressive driving program.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The current study used direct, unobtrusive measures of vehicle speed, and indirect, archival measures of crash incidence to assess program effects. Both of these methods produce quantifiable data that are easily obtained and linked to the behavior of interest. However, not all incidents of aggressive driving result in crashes, and not all crashes with “aggressive driving” PCFs are caused by aggressive driving. As stated previously, the methods used in this evaluation are imperfect and might be insensitive to the accurate measurement of aggressive driving.

Based on the experiences of the current study, it is recommended that observational methods also be used in future evaluations of aggressive driving countermeasure programs. In particular, trained data collectors, positioned unobtrusively at roadside or at intersections, could record observed incidents of aggressive driving on paper or electronic forms. The observers would have the advantage of actually seeing the drivers and the surrounding traffic and, thus, be able to discriminate, in most cases, whether the behavior was intentional or the result of human error or misjudgment. Observations conducted according to a systematic sampling plan, involving time of day, day of week, and location, could provide robust data sets for comparing baseline to treatment conditions. Direct observation of the behaviors in question would help interpret and allow greater confidence in study results.


10 Baseline speeds were generally faster in Marion County than in Tucson. Average baseline speeds in 35 mph zones were 6.1 mph over the limit in Marion County, compared to 3.7 mph in Tucson; average speeds in 40 mph zones were 5.3 mph over the limit in Marion County, compared to 2 mph in Tucson. The causes and possible effects of the apparent differences in baseline speeds are unknown.