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MS. WILLIAMS: Okay. Well, good morning, everyone. We're going to go ahead and get started. I know some folks are probably still arriving given the weather this morning. I did hear traffic was pretty bad, but it would have been worse. We don't have freezing rain so that's good.

So, again, good morning. I'm Dee Williams and I'm currently serving as the team leader for the Federal Automated Vehicles Policy Implementation Team.

Oh, sorry about that. I'm echoing a bit.

So I just wanted to thank everyone for joining us this morning. This is the second in a series of public meetings that we're holding since the release of the U.S. Department of Transportation's Federal Automated Vehicles Policy. And that was released on September 20th of this year.

However, before we get started I'd like to introduce Dr. Mark Rosekind, the 15th Administrator for the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, to give some opening remarks.

DR. ROSEKIND: Good morning, everybody.

	Page 5
1	(Chorus of good morning.)
2	DR. ROSEKIND: Do it again, come on. Good
3	morning, everybody.
4	(Chorus of good morning.)
5	DR. ROSEKIND: Okay. It's like if we're
6	going to start that way. So thanks, everybody, for
7	being here today.
8	At NHTSA our mission is all about saving
9	lives on America's roadways. And for over 50 years
10	now we've carried out that mission by writing and
11	enforcing strong regulations to make vehicles safer.
12	Fighting against drunk driving, building a
13	national consensus on seat belt use, and so many other
14	efforts that have already saved hundreds of thousands
15	of American lives, but we have far more work to do.
16	And you know that those that work is being measured
17	by some very alarming numbers.
18	In 2015, we lost I should do this as a
19	test sometime. We lost give me the number.
20	DAVID: 36,000.
21	DR. ROSEKIND: 35,092. Thank you, David.
22	DAVID: You're welcome, Administrator.

DR. ROSEKIND: And we know that exact number because every one of those was a father, a mother, son, or daughter, a colleague, a friend and that's why the folks at NHTSA know that number exactly.

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And unfortunately that problem is getting worse because, as you know, just recently we announced that that number of fatalities is actually going up in the first half of the year by 10.4 percent.

And so it's against this particular backdrop that the Department of Transportation, under the leadership of Secretary Foxx, has been working so hard on our efforts to accelerate the safe deployment of automated vehicle technologies.

Because while automated vehicles really carry enormous potential to transform mobility, reshape our transportation system, it really is their awesome potential to revolutionize roadway safety that has all of us at NHTSA so motivated.

And there's one more number that explains why we are so focused on this area. That number is 94. That's percentage of crashes that can be tied back to human choice or error. And that's the choice

to speed, drive drunk, send a text behind the wheel, or misjudge the stopping distance.

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That 94 percent represents the untold potential of automated vehicle technologies. We envision a future where advanced technologies not only help reduce crashes, but a world with fully self-driving cars that could hold the potential to eliminate traffic fatalities altogether.

The Federal Automated Vehicles Policy which the Department issued on September 20th is the world's first comprehensive government action to guide the safe and efficient development and deployment of these technologies.

In our view this policy's the right tool at the right time. It answers a call from industry, state and local governments, safety and mobility advocates, and many others to lay a clear path forward for the safe deployment of automated vehicles and technologies.

But this policy's not the final word. It is designed to be nimble and flexible, to evolve over time that allows us to stay at the leading edge. To

the end, the policy identifies 23 next steps that will help guide the evolution of the policy.

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The first of those next steps is why we're here today. We've received comments on the entire policy and we've committed to holding a series of public workshops on the individual components of the policy.

We held our first public workshop just last month on policy overall and on the first section specifically. And we heard from a wide ranging group. That means we're getting feedback that's proven helpful in guiding our next iteration of the policy.

Today we're here to discuss two critical components of the policy. The first is the Model State Policy. And for the last 50 years there has been a fairly clear division of responsibility between the federal government and the states for the oversight and regulation of motor vehicles.

Generally speaking, it has been the federal government's responsibility to regulate motor vehicles and equipment safety while the states have regulated drivers and traffic laws.

That division of responsibility may be much less clear in a highly automated vehicle where increasingly the vehicle's automated systems become the driver. The Model State Policy delineates the federal and state roles for the regulation of these vehicles and it outlines the approach we recommend to states as they consider the regulation of testing and operation of automated vehicles on their public roads.

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Our goal is to build a consistent national framework for the development and deployment of automated vehicles so that users can take their vehicles across stateliness just as they can do today and so that developers are building toward a single set of standards rather than 50.

The Model State Policy confirms that states retain their traditional responsibilities for vehicle licensing and registration, traffic laws and enforcement, and motor vehicle insurance and liability regimes.

At the same time the policy reaffirms that the federal government will continue to be responsible for the oversight of vehicle safety and design

including automated features.

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The policy was developed in close coordination with the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators or AAMVA, individual states, and a range of other stakeholders.

It suggests recommend areas for states to consider in the development of their own regulations including testing regimes and registration. It also identifies a number of areas that need to be further discussed and developed including how law enforcement will interact with highly automated vehicles and the development of a consistent approach to insurance and liability challenges.

The second section that we will discuss today is the modern regulatory tools. This section identifies 12 potential new tools, authorities, and resources that could aid the safe deployment of new lifesaving technologies and enable the agency to be more nimble and flexible.

Today's governing statutes and regulations were developed before highly automated vehicles were even a remote notion. And for that reason current

authorities and tools alone may not be sufficient to ensure that highly automated vehicles are introduced safely and to realize their full safety promise.

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This challenge requires NHTSA to examine whether the ways in which the agency has addressed safety for the last several decades should be expanded and supplemented.

The new tools identified in this section include premarket approval, expanded exemption authority, imminent hazard authority, new research and hiring tools, and others that may better equip the agency in the future as more technologies move from the lab to the road.

And just to be clear, these tools are offered for consideration by policymakers, industry, advocates, and the public as we move forward.

The policy is already a product of considerable public input and its evolution will be based on the feedback we continue to receive. Your participation today will help the department to continue to improve this policy in a manner that reflects the ideas and concerns that we hear from you.

We're in an important moment. We have an industry that is rapidly innovating and we have a government that is inspired about what this technology means for the future of safety.

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We view the best path forward as having the entire community from industry to safety and mobility advocates to the general public working together in a committed way with safety at the top of the agenda.

Again, thank you for being here today. We're looking forward to hearing from all of you and what you have to say. Thanks.

MS. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Administrator
Rosekind. So, again, we want to thank Administrator
Rosekind for paying tribute to those lost from roadway
crashes by continuing to drill in the senseless
numbers of lives taken. Again, these are our family,
our friends, our coworkers, our neighbors, the list
goes on; however, also reminding all of us why it's a
truly exciting time to be part of roadway safety.

So now for some additional context for today's event. As the agency has emphasized many times since the release of the policy, it lays a

national framework for the safe testing and deployment of new automotive technologies that have enormous potential for improving safety and mobility for all Americans.

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For today's meeting during the morning session, as Dr. Rosekind detailed, we're seeking specific input on the Model State Policy. As we know, states have already begun passing laws and developing regulations surrounding highly automated vehicles.

A national dialog is necessary to gather additional information on any potential challenges foreseen, suggestions for clarification, and recommended improvements to assist in avoiding a patchwork of inconsistent laws and regulations.

This session is to achieve this objective and will be an opening listening session style whereby I will call out the names of the individuals who have requested to provide oral technical comments in advance, but will also provide an opportunity at the end for open mic.

Our focus is on gathering feedback regarding the states, manufacturers, and other entities and how

they have understood and interpreted the Model State Policy. Then, also as Dr. Rosekind detailed, the afternoon session of the meeting the agency will seek specific input on the Modern Regulatory Tools section, which is Section IV.

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This session will focus on gathering feedback on the new tools and authorities discussed in that section as well as other ideas and suggestions to assist in the safe deployment -- development, testing, and deployment of highly automated vehicles.

It's going to consist of six moderated sessions each lasting about 35 minutes. And you'll get additional details from the moderators during the afternoon session.

So, again, we are very grateful you've chosen to be here with us today and for those that joined us back on November 10th. And following the new year do look out for those other opportunities for the additional meetings and additional sessions for input as we continue to implement the next steps that are laid out in the back of the policy.

So that said, I just want to take a moment

to introduce the rest of my team -- Debbie Sweet, Josh Fikentscher, and Michelle Atwell.

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So for any of our guests if you have any questions during the course of today, please see any of them or any of the other NHTSA staff on hand and they're more than willing to assist you.

And if there are media in the room, we do have a table set up in the back so we do just ask that you check in with Becca and register with her and she'll make sure that you have everything you need.

Just a few other additional housekeeping items. So at this time, if you haven't done so already, I do ask you to silence any devices you have with you.

In the unlikely event of an emergency, of course, see the red exit signs. And your restrooms they're going to be off this doorway to your left.

There's men's and women's right there.

We'll break by noon or sooner. It just depends on the number or oral technical comments that folks request to make. So when we do break there's various businesses around the area that you can grab

lunch or even coffee or snacks.

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This meeting is being live webcasted today so we welcome those watching both virtually and, of course, you all for joining us here in the room as we continue to find ways to collaborate and work together to implement this policy.

We're here to listen and we look forward to continuing the discussion in the days to come. And with that in mind I'm now going to begin calling the names of those who indicated during registration that they wanted to provide oral technical remarks this morning.

So when I do so, I would ask you to come to one of the microphones, speak your name and also the agency or organization you're representing so that our court reporter can definitely get that detail down.

So to get us started, I'd like to ask Mr. Ryan Hageman to start our day. Is Ryan in the room?

And he may not be. I do know he's one of our panelists for this afternoon, as well. He could be stuck in traffic or otherwise so I will go onto the next name.

Federal Automated Vehicles Policy Public Meeting December 12, 2016 Page 17 1 Do we have Emily Frascaroli from the Ford 2 Motor Company? 3 Okay. And I will come back. I'll circle 4 back on some of these names. How about Thomas Karol 5 with Mutual Insurance Companies? 6 Great. 7 MR. KAROL: I guess -- I guess it is 8 important just to show up so. My name is Tom Karol. 9 I'm the general counsel federal with the National 10 Association of Mutual Insurance Companies. 11 We represent -- we represent over 1,400 12 insurance company members providing more than 170 13 million policyholders with 43 percent of the 14 automobile insurance policy market. 15 We applaud the NHTSA commitment and 16 coordination, stakeholder engagement, education and 17 pledge our support in developing this important component. 18 19 The NHTSA policy proposes a Model State 2.0 Policy which confirms that states retain their

traditional responsibility for vehicle licensing and registration, traffic laws enforcement, and motor

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vehicle insurance and liability regimes.

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The NHTSA further reiterates that states are responsible for determining liability rules for highly automated vehicles. States should consider how to allocate liability among highly automated vehicle owners, operators, passengers, manufacturers, and others when a crash occurs.

The NHTSA proposes that in the future the states may identify additional liability issues and seek to development consistent solutions. It may be desirable to create a commission to study liability and insurance issues and make recommendations to the states.

With respect to insurance and liability,

NHTSA suggests convening a commission to study these

particular issues and make recommendations. In

recognition of the overall efforts of the NHTSA -- and

this suggestion, in particular, NAMIC today pledges

its support for further development and will

enthusiastically provide its expertise and experience

to any such group the NHTSA proposes. Thank you.

MS. WILLIAMS: Thank you. Paul Scullion,

1 Association of Global Automakers.

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MR. SCULLION: Good morning. My name is
Paul Scullion, Safety Manager of the Association of
Global Automakers. We're a trade association
representing international motor vehicle manufacturers
and original equipment suppliers. Our OEM members
include Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Hyundai, Kia, and
Subaru.

We welcome the opportunity to provide comment and the intent of these remarks is to reinforce and supplement the detailed written comments provided to NHTSA on November 22nd.

Given the significant benefits of technology, it's important that we have the right policy frameworks in place to foster innovation and investment at both the state and federal level.

NHTSA has taken an important first step in demonstrating leadership with release of its federal policy by consistent national approach for this is critically important as automated vehicles will advance safety, mobility, and sustainability.

In our written comments we noted a number of

unclear and conflicting statement between the guidance and model policy that are already creating significant challenges and questions at the state level.

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Although the agency has indicated its plans to update the guidance in the future, we believe it's critical some of these issues be address expeditiously and the revision or correction to the policy should be published in the near term to address any significant issues or inconsistencies.

These clarifications should be provided as NHTSAs -- as part of NHTSA's planned stakeholder engagement and education on the policy also.

With regards to the specifics off the Model Policy, we agree with NHTSA that the shared objective is to ensure that the establishment of consistent national framework rather than a patchwork of incompatible laws and support many of the statements and recommendations in the Model Policy.

We agree with the basic division of responsibility between NHTSA and the states with NHTSA being responsible for vehicle safety issues and states responsible for driver licensing, registration,

traffic law enforcement, and insurance.

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The division of this responsibility maintains the ability of vehicle manufacturers to produce a single fleet of products for the U.S. market.

Allowing individual states to regulate the design and performance of automated vehicles would lead to a patchwork of different requirements and this would require manufacturers to develop vehicles meeting multiple design targets which would increase costs and divide development resources.

The additional burden of having to meet multiple design targets would also significantly impair and delay efforts to test and deploy technology.

We were encouraged the document included strong statements that this guidance is not intended for states to codify as legal requirements for the development, design, manufacturing, and testing of automated vehicles and that NHTSA strongly encourages states to allow DOT alone to regulate the performance of highly automated vehicle technologies and vehicles.

There are, however, a number of conflicting statements between the operational guidance and the Model Policy on this matter. Specially Section C2D and C2H for the Model Policy includes suggestions that as part of the application for testing states should seek to require manufacturers include a safety and compliance plan for testing vehicles which should include a self-certification of the testing and compliance to NHTSA's vehicle performance guidance.

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States requiring compliance with the guidance for testing or operation would create massive regulatory uncertainty since determinations could be inconsistent with the federal government.

We've already seen this being proposed at the state level and I'm concerned this approach would essentially create a two-step regulatory system.

Other issues of concern include Section 2D which recommends that states require manufacturers and other entities meet all applicable FMBSS for testing.

This conflicts with the intent of the Fact Act which allows manufacturers to test vehicles that are not FMBSS compliant under certain conditions.

Another troubling aspect of the policy is that it includes language that could be read as encouraging states to regulate highly automated vehicle test programs including such measures as the application process, issues -- issuance of permits, and jurisdictional permission to test.

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We do not see it being in the best interest if agency, manufacturers, or the public for states or localities to regulate or prohibit testing of vehicle systems. This would create obstacles to the deployment of such safety technologies.

The Model State Policy should be clarified to explicitly state that the regulation of motor vehicle testing is a federal responsibility.

Some additional comments related to the Model Policy. On the issue of state laws, the vehicle performance guidance discusses compliance with federal, state, and local laws as the agency provides an example of circumstances where human drivers have the ability to temporarily violate certain motor vehicle traffic laws such as the example where crossing the double lines for a broken -- broken down

vehicle that might be in the path.

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And this raises an important question. In the ethical consideration section NHTSA states that vehicles are expected to address potential conflicts within the context of certain ethical objectives of safety, mobility, and legality.

It could be suggested, however, that this issue is not so much related to how the vehicles resolves these conflicts, but rather the way in which the traffic law is drafted.

In the example provided, it would be more straightforward to ensure the traffic laws provide necessary exceptions to address potential conflicts so that rules could be more clearly followed to remove legal uncertainty.

So, for example, in the double lines example there may be an exception written in law where there are circumstances where it's okay to pass.

While a number of states are focused on developing regulations related to the testing or operation of automated vehicles, we believe it'd be appropriate for NHTSA to consider in future revisions

to the guidance a recommendation that states review existing traffic laws to identify reasonable and consistent commonsense exceptions where necessary to reduce potential conflicts of safety mobility and legality.

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Global Automakers strongly recommends that

NHTSA work closely with government stakeholders and

representative organizations to consider the

development and maintenance of a database comprised of

all applicable laws that may be adhered to at the

federal, state, and local level across the United

States.

There's another issue related to the definition of deployment. The guidance defines deployment as the operation of a highly automated vehicle by members of the public who are not employees or agents of the designer, developer, or manufacturers of the highly automated vehicle.

However, this definition may more accurately describe operations, not deployment. We would note that manufacturers do not deploy vehicles in the sense that they, themselves, would not operate the vehicle.

If NHTSA is seeking to use the term deployment, we believed it'd be more suitably defined as something, for example, as making commercially available to the public autonomous vehicle or aftermarket autonomous technology.

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One final point on the issue of the safety assessment letter. Finally, we note the NHTSA has ongoing efforts in the deployment of a safety assessment letter template.

While we are generally supportive of the concept, office safety assessment letter is a mechanism for providing premarket assurance to consumers and policymakers and other stakeholders.

We are concerned that states may seek to mandate the submission of a safety assessment letter as a prerequisite for testing or deployment. We think this would be inconsistent with the model policy.

Additionally, we have significant concerns with regards to the inclusion of potentially sensitive and competitive information on the safety assessment letter and how this information would be protected isn't part of established process. If not addressed,

it could have potential to set back the pace of innovation.

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It's important that we get this right and we reiterate that NHTSA should issue a draft of the safety assessment letter and underlying process prior to its finalization.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments today.

MS. WILLIAMS: Thank you. Eric Williams with Tesla Motors.

Okay. How about Leigh Merino with MEMA?

MS. MERINO: Good morning. My name is Leigh

Merino and I serve as the senior director of

regulatory affairs for the Motor and Equipment

Manufacturer's Association or MEMA.

MEMA represents over 1,000 vehicle suppliers that manufacture original equipment and aftermarket components and systems for passenger and commercial vehicles. Our members lead the way in developing and deploying a wide range of advanced driver assistant systems or ADAS, vehicle-to-vehicle technologies, and other advanced vehicle safety innovations.

Suppliers are critical in the ongoing development and implementation of those technologies which are the building blocks necessary for highly automated vehicles to reach their full potential.

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MEMA supports the iterative process and guidance approach of NHTSA's Federal Automated Vehicle Policy, or I'll call FAVP herein, to create a national framework recognizing that the federal and state governments must work together to establish policies that accelerate deployment of these technologies while also balancing public safety and building trust.

Federal leadership working closely with the states is essential to avoid a potential patchwork of varying state laws and requirements. However, even though voluntary, the federal guidelines essentially become a defect- -- become defective requirements. As such, the current FAVP may lead to various states requiring NHTSA's voluntary guidance as a condition for testing and deploying automated vehicle technologies in their stated.

It's critically important to get the foundational policy as clear as possible in these

early stages to prevent uncertainty among the government and industry stakeholders because misunderstandings may inadvertently delay technology evaluation and development.

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Consequently, MEMA urged NHTSA to clarify key aspects of the policy in the immediate future. We also ask NHTSA to treat systems in vehicles that are being evaluated and tested differently from those that are in production and deployed.

As it relates to the State Model Policy, in the FAVP NHTSA proposes a framework of requirements among which are the assertion that each test vehicle follows the performance guidance set forth by NHTSA and meets all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.

MEMA strongly believes that states should not codify the NHTSA vehicle performance guidance by way of its state laws, policies, and/or the application requirements for automated vehicle testing.

The challenge with FAVP recommendations to the states is that often test vehicles are modified

from their original off-the-lot condition in order to be evaluated and tested. Modifications could include disabling certain features or adding instrumentation to the vehicle.

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This modifications process is a longstanding common industry practice for test vehicles in evaluation. The operators of these test vehicles are highly trained driving professionals indoctrinated in the test protocol and are informed and aware of the modifications.

During a test evaluation of vehicles with automated systems trained drivers are constantly monitoring the driving environment and will take control of the vehicle during critical situations. Furthermore, the trained driver takes due care to comply with all applicable traffic laws just as currently required with drivers operating SAE level 0 to 1 vehicles.

Developers and testers must fully evaluate the test vehicle under a variety of conditions in order to fine tune and enhance the automated system and ultimately prepare the system for production.

Real world exposure on public roads is a critical stage in vehicle and vehicle equipment development which is one of the key reasons MEMA's comments emphasize the need for test vehicles and production vehicles to be addressed differently in the AV policy.

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We would also like to point out that Section 24404 of the Fast Act of 2015 allows for vehicle manufacturers to test and operate vehicles that do not meet FMVSS provided they are not offered for sale.

This provision as currently worded only applies to OEMs and does not include component manufacturers. In a November 15th Congressional hearing on self-driving vehicles, MEMA noted this point and asked the members of Congress to clarify this provision at their first opportunity.

Nevertheless, in the interim NHTSA must explore how this matter can be addressed and clarified in the context of the FAVP and its Model State Policy. Doing so will avoid the impact of unintended consequences that may hinder supplier development and innovation of automated systems and prevent

opportunities for real world testing experiences in various states.

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Therefore, MEMA reinforces our plea to NHTSA to recognize the differences between testing and production vehicles and to amend the FAVPs Model State Policy recommendations to allow for modified test vehicles that are not fully compliant with FMVSS.

These and other clarifications to the FAVP must be addressed by NHTSA at the earliest possible time to avoid confusion for all entities and avert potential delays of current or future test evaluations.

Thank you for your consideration of MEMA's comments.

MS. WILLIAMS: William Wallace, Consumer's Union.

MR. WALLACE: Good morning. I'm William
Wallace with Consumer's Union. And Consumer's Union,
the policy and mobilization arm of Consumer Reports,
thanks you today for the opportunity to share oral
comments on the Model State Policy portion of the
Federal Automated Vehicles Policy. We appreciate the

work done by NHTSA, AAMVA, and other stakeholders to complete this section of the policy.

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With technology rapidly advancing it's appropriate to clearly describe and delineate federal and state roles in regulating automated vehicles. In part, this exercise should be carried out to ensure that as long as a car is safe a motorist can do as NHTSA suggests and drive across stateliness without a worry more complicated than did the speed limit change.

However, we warn against going too far in the name of avoiding a patchwork. As the agency seeks to achieve a reasonable degree of consistency among state laws, NHTSA should not support any policy that would unduly restrict the ability of states to protect safety on public roads.

We would particularly oppose measures that would preempt state authority without strong federal safety standards being in place for automated vehicles.

Like the rest of the AV policy, the Model State Policy is, of course, voluntary guidance. So,

as Administrator Rosekind has said, what the states actually implement is their call. Under current policy this is appropriate.

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With the absence at this time of enforceable standards, citizens and their elected state representatives should retain the right to take action to keep their roads safe. On the details of the Model State Policy, while the policy includes several areas of useful guidance to the states, we are concerned that it may understate the advisory role NHTSA can and should play under this policy to ensure safety.

Under the framework established by the policy states are effectively responsible for deciding whether to grant permission for AVs to be tested, operated, and used on public roads. They have the final call.

We are very concerned that states often lack the technical motor vehicle safety experience -- expertise necessary to make this determination and that this framework will leaves states in an a tenable position unless they extensively consult with a well-informed better resource to NHTSA.

NHTSA seems to somewhat share this concern about states' capabilities recognizing in the next step section of the Model State Policy that states may not have the resources to develop a deep understanding of the technologies being deployed and suggesting that the agency will, in conjunction with vehicle manufacturers, explore a mechanism to help state officials gain a better understanding.

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While this education program could be useful for informing states about technologies that are already on the market, it is no substitute for independent technical expertise. Therefore, if the current framework remains in place, as opposed to having something closer to a premarket approval process, we would strongly encourage NHTSA to take an active role in assisting states with their approval decisions. Including by indicating whether the agency has verified that a vehicle meets the most up-to-date version of NHTSA's performance guidance.

We are also concerned that state governors, motor vehicle administrators, or other executive branch officials may grant permission for an automated

vehicle to be deployed on public roads without its safety having been sufficiently ensured. We urge NHTSA to establish a federal policy that discourages states from making this mistake as it could profoundly jeopardize consumer safety.

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NHTSA should communicate clearly and forcefully with a state governor if it believes safety has not been sufficiently ensured for a vehicle that the state intends to permit on its public roads.

The policy's model framework for states include several areas in which it is appropriate and beneficial to consumer safety for states to regulate the testing, deployment, and operation of AVS.

This includes issues related to requirements for drivers of deployed vehicles, titling of these vehicles, law enforcement considerations, and insurance. However, there are additional steps that NHTSA should recommend the states take.

First, NHTSA should recommend that state require dealers, rental companies and other retailers to clearly communicate the limitations of automated systems to consumers. We are very concerned that the

significant potential for driver confusion over AV capabilities will lead to crashes particularly of cars with the Level 2 and Level 3 systems whose capabilities can most readily be overstated.

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In making this recommendation, NHTSA should urge states to set requirements that ensure retailers work closely with manufacturers, NHTSA, and other stakeholders to determine the appropriate information to communicate to consumers and the most effective method and timing of this communication.

Second, NHTSA should recommend that states prohibit the operation of vehicles automated driving systems if needed equipment has been significantly damaged and not repaired.

We appreciate that the policy's safety assessment already asks entities to prohibit vehicles from operating in HAV mode if sensors or critical safety control systems are damaged. Instead of being voluntary, NHTSA should recommend that this prohibition be a part of state laws nationwide.

Once again, thank you for your work on this policy and for your consideration of our comments.

Federal Automated Vehicles Policy Public Meeting December 12, 2016 Page 38 Thomas Lehner from MEMA. Do 1 MS. WILLIAMS: 2 you also have additional remarks you would like to 3 make? 4 MR. LEHNER: Thank you. No. My colleague, 5 Leigh Merino, covered it. Thank you. MS. WILLIAMS: Great. Peter Kurdock, 6 7 Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety. 8 Okay. Do we have Joan Claybrook, former 9 NHTSA Administrator? I haven't seen her yet this 10 morning. Okay. Catherine Curtis with AAMVA. 11 12 MS. CURTIS: Good morning. I'm Cathy 13 Curtis, Director of Vehicle Programs at the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, also 14 15 known as AAMVA. I'm speaking today on behalf of AAMVA 16 and the AAMVA autonomous vehicle working group. 17 Automated vehicles represent one of the most 18 significant innovations impacting transportation 19 sector since the advent of the motor vehicle. This

technology has the potential for significantly improving safety on our roadways and increasing the mobility of society in general.

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AAMVA applauds the federal government's work to ensure these technologies continue to deliver as consumer protections while at the same time encouraging innovation.

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We believe the Model State Policy provides guidance that creates a framework for consistent regulations across the states. We think this guidance serves as a very good starting point and agree with NHTSA that the guidance must be updated on an ongoing basis.

We also believe that some areas can be approved upon in the short term while other areas need more discussion with government and industry stakeholders.

AAMVA appreciates that NHTSA considered

AAMVA autonomous vehicle working group's input in

formulating the section of the policy as our members'

expertise is an essential resource for the development

of the comprehensive policy.

AAMVA involve -- AAMVA's involvement ensures state interest and vehicle technology innovators work in tandem to provide a level of consistency in AV

testing and deployment across jurisdictional lines.

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AAMVA reiterates that their input towards this section was not just a single organizational consideration, but that multiple states with different interests collaborated on the recommendations made to NHTSA.

Now for a few comments on the details of the Model State Policy. While we understand that there are benefits of grouping SAE Level 3, 4, and 5 vehicles together into a single highly automated vehicle HAV designation, there still will be need -- will be a need for specific level classification to be used by the states and NHTSA when appropriate.

AAMVA believes that this grouping of distinct classifications into one term may cause some confusion. We would also like to point out that Section 1B provides information on the establishment of jurisdictional automated vehicle technology committees in states.

AAMVA members have expressed the committee membership should also include legislative and executive state government representatives as well as

economic development advisers.

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Policy at the state level will be defined by state legislatures and lead executives making their integration into the decision making process essentially.

Also AAMVA notes that the policy does not address the platooning of vehicles, including commercial vehicles. While AAMVA understands that platooned vehicles may be incorporated in aspects of connected vehicle technology working in tandem with autonomous vehicle functionality, AAMVA requests clarification on whether NHTSA intends for this policy to apply to connected vehicles.

Section 5B states that fully automated vehicles are driven entirely by the vehicle, itself, and require no human driver, SAE Levels 4 and 5, at least in certain environments and under certain conditions.

The footnote attached to the statement provides a very important distinction by reference. Some vehicle may be capable of being entirely driven by the vehicle, itself, or by a human driver. For a

dual capable vehicle the states would have jurisdiction to regulate and license the human driver.

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AAMVA believes that this statement is important to the discussion of HAVs and state licensing jurisdictions. AAMVA recommends that NHTSA consider incorporating this footnote directly into the policy, itself, to ensure that there's no confusion regarding the authority of the state to establish the licensing laws associated with autonomous vehicle regulation.

In the glossary, driver is defined as the following: For the purpose of this policy, the human operator of an HAV when not operating in a full automated mode.

AAMVA requests clarification whether it's NHTSA's intent that the person sitting in the driver seat of a Level 3 or 4 vehicle would be responsible for distracted driving or any other rules of the road violations if the vehicle is operating in fully automated mode.

Also operator is defined as an occupant of an automated vehicle who is not responsible for the

driving task, but is still responsible for certain aspects of the journey.

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AAMVA requests clarification on whether this definition is meant to cover those vehicles that may be remotely operated or tracked. If this is the intent, those terms may need to be incorporated into the definition.

Section one of the full policy titled

Vehicle Performance Guidance describes the types of

data that NHTSA will require to be documented and

recorded by manufacturers for retrieval by NHTSA.

While this information will be made available to NHTSA, AAMVA suggests that the Model State Policy also mention the availability of the data to the states. Should this data be only made available to NHTSA, the states may need to request the same information be submitted to them and by any entity conducting testing within that jurisdiction.

A single provision of this data to federal and assess- -- to a federal and assessable source would eliminate redundancies in data collection and reporting between both federal and state

jurisdictions.

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AAMVA supports a suggestion that a commission that includes government and industry stakeholders study liability insurance issues and make recommendations to the states. And AAMVA offers their expertise in this area.

In summary, it is the highest priority of

AAMVA to support our members' work to create a

consistent approach to ensuring vehicles are tested,

deployed, and operated safety -- safely. The Model

State Policy provides the framework for that approach.

AAMVA is energized by the activity in the autonomous vehicle sector and emphasizes that it is important that no single entity dictate the terms of a safe testing and deployment of autonomous vehicle technology.

We believe it'll take a coordinated effort amongst government and industry stakeholders to get this lifesaving technology into the nation's roadways as safely and quickly as possible.

AAMVA thanks NHTSA for the opportunity to comment on this important safety issue and for NHTSA's

Page 45 continued partnership and support as we work 1 2 collaboratively on this potential lifesaving 3 technology. 4 MR. FIKENTSCHER: Thank you. I would just 5 like to go on record with stating that these are voluntary guidelines. NHTSA is not requiring that any 6 7 entity submit anything to us yet. 8 MS. CURTIS: Thank you. 9 Okay. Do I have Sean Kane, MS. WILLIAMS: 10 the Safety Institute representing Consumers for Auto 11 Reliability and Safety, also known as CARS? 12 Hi, good morning. And I'm here MR. KANE: 13 on behalf of CARS and also the Safety Institute. We're 501(c)(3) non-profit organizations that address 14 15 issues around consumer safety and consumer product 16 safety. 17 So with respect to the Model Policy, you 18 know, our concerns really that they are not going to 19 preempt the current state requirements and the laws that are in place for the states. 20 2.1 So one of the issues, you know, we've seen

is this idea that the preemption of some of the

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regulations could come into play and create a significant issue for folks. When you have a Model State Policy overriding some of the concerns, for example, the state laws around what constitutes a safety-related problem, they are dealt with in the state laws so those are real concerns for both of our organizations.

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You know, I was here to really talk about the imminent hazard aspect of it and what those restrictions are that would be addressed in the next panel presumably.

But in terms of the other issues that we want to make sure that are addressed, for example, the -- we have reports from the California DMV, which, you know, requires manufacturers to provide disengagement information about what's happening in those vehicles that are on the road that are having disengagements.

We feel that real-time data is a very important aspect of all of these types of issues that -- we've heard a lot about 94 percent of people are the real problem creating errors, but we have real scant data and that data's not real-time available.

Having available data and information from all the stakeholders would play an important role in understanding what policies are going to work and how they're going to work going forward whether it's the imminent hazard issues, whether it's the safety problems, or whether we're going to end up having regulations that would set the foundation for the safety of these vehicles.

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We have real concerns that the policy that is out there is just that, it's a policy. And I think we've seen over and over again that many of the crisis that have been the underpinnings of the problems that find their way into the enforcement side have their underpinnings in a lack of a solid regulatory framework by the agency.

So we would certainly encourage the agency to look at codifying and having some baseline regulations that ensure the safety of these vehicles as we go forward.

I've heard from others here that, in fact, the states aren't equipped to handle some of the complexities of that and they would be looking to the

agency for that.

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Some of those, you know, have talked about the other models of certification through the FAA, for example. And that may be one way to look at is as we go forward because absent any of the structure or the infrastructure for a regulatory environment we end up with a situation where the agency doesn't have the underpinning, the expertise and they're relying on self-certification which can be a real problem in terms of understanding the complexities as we go forward.

So I think in short, you know, the big concern is what happens absent a regulatory environment. Understanding that everyone's looking for move forward and move forward quickly and not interrupt technology, but at the same time having those protections in place and setting a minimum baseline to ensure that the vehicles that are coming onto the road have met a minimum baseline.

And that can be -- that should happen across the United States. It shouldn't be in some type of patchwork of a model or even some general policy

areas. And that could save, frankly, many of millions if not billions of dollars in the long wrong.

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It may take an additional effort, it may slow some things down. But if we're going to go forward here rather than putting the cart before the horse setting a minimum baseline of safety standards that we all can say, yes, we're on those pages as we move forward so we don't end up with a patchwork as well I think benefits everybody involved and it's all stakeholders involved. Thank you.

MS. WILLIAMS: Thank you. May I have David Strickland, our former NHTSA Administrator, who is now with Venable on behalf of the Safe Driving Coalition.

MR. STRICKLAND: Thank you, Dee, and good morning, everyone. On behalf of the Self-Driving Coalition for Safer Streets I am happy to provide this statement for the record in response to NHTSA's public meeting on the Model State Policy section of the FAVP.

The coalition appreciates NHTSA's commitment to obtaining feedback regarding all aspects of the policy. Self-driving technology has a great potential to enhance public safety and mobility especially for

the elderly and the disabled, reduce traffic congestion, and improve environmental quality.

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The Coalition's mission is to promote the benefits of fully self-driving vehicles and support the safe and rapid deployment of these innovative and potentially lifesaving technologies.

We believe that it is the fully automated levels, that is SAE Levels 4 and 5, where we see the greatest opportunities for safety and mobility.

The discussion of the Model State Policy is timely given the ongoing and expanded state activity in the highly automated vehicle space. Since NHTSA's deadline for comments on the policy, several states have continued to push forward with HAV-related agendas.

For example, just last week the Texas House of Representatives Committee on Transportation held a hearing on automated vehicles. And we suspect that other states will likely explore this matter throughout the 2017 legislative season.

The Coalition believes that it is crucial for NHTSA to take a strong leadership position in

clearly defining the federal and state
responsibilities when it comes to HAVs. The federal
government's exclusive mandate to promulgate and
enforce the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards has
been observed for decades and we do not believe that
HAVs present a reason to deviate from that wellestablished precedent.

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We commend the agency for encouraging states for focus on their traditional areas of jurisdiction such as licensing, traffic enforcement, and setting insurance requirements; however, we are concerned that the policy still provides leeway for states to fill in gaps and build their own regulatory framework for HAVs outside of their normal areas of jurisdictional control.

We encourage NHTSA to signal to state and local entities against rushing into legislating simply because a subject matter is new and novel. The Coalition also calls upon NHTSA to leverage its existing authority and position as a federal vehicle safety authority to safeguard against overlapping regulation by state and local governments.

Inconsistency at the state and local levels will harm innovation and slow the deployment of this technology that has the potential to save thousands of lives. Should state and local governments move to enact disparate regulatory frameworks, it will reduce NHTSA's ability to ensure that this country can move forward on safety.

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The success of automated technologies depends on access to public roads. State municipalities play a great role and we look forward to working with them to achieve scalable solutions.

To the extent states wish to act in this area, the Coalition strongly urges them to examine and address existing laws and regulations that may serve as an impediment to HAV testing and deployment rather than implementing restrictive requirements that may, in fact, lead to move barriers to HAV operations.

Thank you all so very much for you hard work on this policy and to continued transparency in these workshops. And we look forward to working with you in the months and years going ahead. Thank you so much.

MS. WILLIAMS: Thank you. Russ Martin with

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MR. MARTIN: Hi, good morning. My name's
Russ Martin. I'm the manager of states relations for
AAA.

AAA is a not-for-profit member services organization dedicated to advancing road safety.

We've advocated for safer roads and safer mobility for over 100 years and we represent more than -- or server, rather, more than 56 million members in the United States and Canada.

AAA and the motoring public are intensely interested in the possibility of autonomous vehicles and AAA clubs across the states are already working with policymakers on state laws and regulations across a broad swath of mobility and safety issues.

AAA aims to ensure that AV policies designed to safely maximize the benefits of technologies for consumers. So as we turn to the federal level, thank you so much for national leadership on this issue embodied in the Federal Automated Vehicle Policy and the opportunity to provide remarks today.

Today we're suggesting a short set of

improvements of the Model State Policy to promote a more straightforward and consistent consumer experience across the HAV space.

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In its Model State Policy NHTSA recommends that HAVs have the capability to make minor technical violations of state laws in certain situations for safety and expediency. And like some other commentators, we urge NHTSA to recommend that states explore whether and how to formalize this elasticity of laws for HAVs or at least guidelines for how such laws ought to be enforced.

We suggest a collaborative process between states, HAV developers, and researchers to identify common scenarios which may require exemptions to existing state laws.

Once these scenarios are identified, new state laws ought to be considered to provide the appropriate exemptions. But states should only allow HAVs to perform these maneuvers which violate the usual decorum when it's safe to do so and would require HAVs to yield to vehicles and other potential hazards.

Second, NHTSA urges HAV developers to consider ethical programming for HAVS; however, not only can HAV developers anticipate ethical programs in programming, but states can also take action to mitigate these ethical crisis.

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For example, states should consider laws to prevent people from purposely disrupting HAV systems. States could adopt a graduated system of laws criminalizing the intentional disruption of HAV operation.

This could range from misdemeanors to felonies, index to potential and actual safety impact, and exempts safely conducted white hat research.

States should also examine roadways for design flaws that could lead to ethical conflicts.

When we think about the trolley car program they suggest high speed, low visibility, pedestrian dense, single-lane roads where these problems were most likely to arise.

But states could find these locations and deploy solutions to reduce the risk. They could lower speeds, remove sensor obstructions, discourage

pedestrian roadway entrance. They could also ask or require entities testing or deploying HAVs to help to identify these instances before an actual ethical dilemma plays out and risk to life and property.

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And, finally, AAA agrees the federal government is best suited to offer a national framework on AV governance and oriented all the stakeholders in this space in the same direction.

The Division of Regulatory Responsibilities outlined in the policy makes sense, but we would offer one clarification. It's not just the federal government, but states and other entities that are also -- that also share a lot of responsibility for communicating with and educating the public about motor vehicle safety issues.

So AAA urges NHTSA to consider the full range of potential communications channels and partners to distribute safe messages about vehicle automation and safe mobility.

So thank you for the opportunity to provide your comments today and we welcome the opportunity to answer any questions. Thanks.

Page 57 MS. WILLIAMS: Ben Husch with the National 1 2 Conference of State Legislatures. Okay. So that's actually who we had -- who 3 4 signed up in advance. And I'm just going to run 5 through a couple of the names to see if anyone did join us. 6 7 Is Ryan Hagemann here? How about Emily Frascaroli from Ford? 8 9 Eric Williams, Tesla Motors? 10 MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah, pass. 11 MS. WILLIAMS: You're going -- okay. Peter 12 Kurdock. And I didn't see Joan. 13 Okay. Do we have anyone else who is here this morning who would like to offer some oral 14 15 technical remarks on the Model State Policy portion of this program? 16 Silence. Okay. Well, if I could have done 17 18 it differently, I probably would have flipped the 19 sessions to have the Modern Regulatory Tools in the morning and then that way everyone could have been 20

going home early this afternoon, but that said we're

going to break at this time until after lunch.

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1 Okay. Thank you.

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(Off the record.)

MS. WILLIAMS: Okay. So we're just hitting 1 o'clock now so we're going to go ahead and get started. So I just want to welcome or welcome back those who weren't able to join us this morning.

Just a quick recap. So during the morning session of today's meeting we covered the Model State Policy portion of the Federal Automated Vehicles Policy.

So during this session we're actually now going to focus on Section IV of the Policy which is called Modern Regulatory Tools. And if you weren't here this morning, I'll just give also a little detail as to how this session's going to work.

As you can tell, we're going to have very structured panels, six of them to be exact. And we're going to cover the potential authorities that may foster the automated vehicle innovation including safety assurance, premarket approval, imminent hazard, expanded exemptions, and tools related to post sale for the regulation of software updates along with a

variety of others that were -- are proposed.

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So each panel, again, six in total, they're going to last approximately 35 minutes. And during the last five minutes of each we're going to ask the moderators to open up the panel to see if anyone in the audience has questions.

So to facilitate this process and given the limited time for each panel, there are going to be index cards passed out and some pens. And if you want to pose a question to a panelist, we just ask you to write it down and there will be a couple volunteers that are going to come through the aisles and collect those cards.

So we're probably, then, going to pick one or two and any of the other ones we'll try and cover in a different forum or consider otherwise.

So before we get started, again, I would just like to remind everyone if you do have a wireless device, which I think we all do or maybe multiple, if you could take the time and turn them off, silence them, that would be great.

And let's go ahead and get started. Our

Federal Automated Vehicles Policy Public Meeting December 12, 2016 Page 60 first panel this afternoon it's going to be on Safety 1 2 Assurance and it's going to be moderated by Mr. Paul 3 Hemmersbaugh. He's our chief counsel for NHTSA. 4 Paul? 5 MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Thanks. Is this working? 6 MS. WILLIAMS: So --7 MR. HEMEMRSBAUGH: You got to press the button, though. Now it's working. 8 9 Welcome back. I hope we'll have a good 10

discussion to keep the onset of the early afternoon naps away.

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We're going to talk today on this panel about premarket assurance and -- or premarket safety assurance. And one of the things I was thinking is I was hearing her ticking through the topics is that these topics are not necessarily, you know, sort of distinct and hermetically sealed from one another. So you'll excuse us if some of us bleed over into premarket approval on occasion.

The -- what we mean by premarket assurance, premarket safety assurance is testing risk analysis, gathering of data regarding vehicle or equipment that

is conducted by the designer, developer, or manufacturer that's intended to demonstrate that the design and manufacturing process has incorporated standards, testing, and criteria that assure the safe operation of new motor vehicles -- and this is the key -- before they're deployed on public roads.

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So that's kind of the definition that we're using. We're -- it's the -- other definitions are certainly possible and -- but that's the one that I'd like to use as our working definition.

And one more parenthetical about that. I
think that it's in our way of thinking under the
Federal Automated Vehicles Policy it's the intention
is to provide the government agency and consumers some
level of assurance that vehicle design and
manufacturing process have followed industry best
practices, the agency guidance, and other performance
criteria, again, before the vehicles or the equipment
is rolled out for public use, consumer use.

And I'd like to introduce the panel. First we have on my right here Marc Scribner. Marc's a research fellow at the Competitive Enterprise

Institute. He focuses on transportation, land use, and urban growth policy issues.

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Those issues include infrastructure investment in operations, transportation safety and security, risk and regulation, privatization of public finance, urban redevelopment and property rights, and emerging transportation technologies such as automated road vehicles and UAS.

Our second panelist we're privileged to have the chief counsel of the FAA, Reggie Govan. Reggie is chief counsel for the FAA, as I said. The office of chief counsel provides legal support and legal advice in support of the FAA administrator and all agency operations are headquarters, regions, and centers.

Reggie has a diverse legal practice background as corporate counsel, litigator, and legislative counsel. Prior to joining the FAA, he served as managing associate general counsel of Freddie Mac.

And finally we have Peter Kurdock. Peter's the director of regulatory affairs for Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety. Prior to joining the

Advocates in 2013, he served in the legislative departments of several non-profit organizations. He also served as a legislative aide to U.S. Senator Frank Lautenberg and Congressman Bill Pascrell, both of New Jersey. For them he handled transportation issues.

So having introduced our panelists, my first

So having introduced our panelists, my first question is for each of them -- and I think we'll just sort of go down the line and get your views.

As a general matter, does the safety assurance approach offer significant safety benefits over and above those provided by the current manufacturer's self-certification to FMVSS compliance?

Again, this, I should say, doesn't -- as of right now it doesn't provide anything. But does it hold -- I think -- I think I -- well, just because it doesn't exist for us.

But what I meant to say does it hold the potential to provide additional benefits or different benefits or different downsides from the current FMVSS self-certification?

Marc?

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MR. SCRIBNER: Yeah. I think it would -- as a gen- -- whoop. As a general matter, I think it would depend how each tool would be -- would be conceived and implemented.

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And as a general matter, we have two sort of thoughts on this that I thought we could maybe tease out a little bit later. I think before beginning any serious discussions about premarket safety assurance tools, NHTSA would need to articular precisely why the self-certification regime is inadequate.

You know, is the regulatory process too slow making -- updating Federal Motor Vehicle Safety

Standards to reflect this new technology in the context of traditional automotive -- or auto equipment manufacturer self-certification?

Is that -- is that problematic? Does that prevent us realizing some of these safety benefits as early as we could?

If yes, I think NHTSA may wish to consider appealing to Congress to fix the longstanding self-certification regime rather than augmenting it with these premarket safety assurance tools.

But if NHTSA can articulate a basis for these premarket safety assurance tools to augment self-certification, we do believe that the agency needs to carefully weigh the additional potential benefits of a given tool against the potential delay cost and price rises that could result, you know, from these ultimately being deployed to consumers.

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And that's because, you know, these technologies hold great promise in offering massive safety benefits to the future so we think that you need to keep sort of an eye on this. The fact that, you know, this technology as it's being developed and as it's being deployed may offer some of the greatest safety benefits that have -- you know, any technology ever deployed. And that perhaps additional scrutiny could -- could reduce the -- use realizing those benefits as early as we could.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Great. Thanks, Marc. We'll turn to Reggie next. But, Reggie, I'd like you to also comment on the FAA's experience with premarket safety assurance and how you think it may or may not be instructive as to the regulation of automated motor

vehicles and equipment.

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MR. GOVAN: So the aviation framework is fundamentally different than the framework that you're used to and operate in. And just in a very broad outline, the FAA -- the aviation regulatory framework has been very proscriptive and the FAA essentially has controlled all things from almost from the conception in someone's brain like in the Matrix to the rolling off of -- off an assembly line.

And the FAA certifies everything in between -- the aircraft, the component parts, certify the airman, the pilot who's going to be flying it, we certify the mechanics and the maintenance operation, everything is federalized soup to nuts.

And that has actually worked brilliantly.

The FAA's regulatory standards are the platinum

standard for safety regulation in aviation and have

largely been -- have influenced and been adopted

throughout the world.

The reality is that the standards that we've relied upon have really come out of an assessment of accidents. And accidents are far and few these days

and so the agency has been shifting to a very different model. Not that the regulations are going by the wayside, but we are really trying to do two or three different things simultaneously.

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One is to shift from very proscriptive regulations to performance-based standards in which the means of compliance would probably primarily be based upon voluntary consensus standards in the industry.

But that doesn't preclude the innovator or the entrepreneur from coming in with their own means of compliance and being able to satisfy whatever the performance-based safety standard is. So, A, we're really relaxing if you will the regulatory regime.

Secondly, we're relying upon a great deal of voluntary information sharing in the industry. It started off among the commercial air carriers through a twice-a-year meeting where there's just an opening up the books, if you will, on safety issues so that the entire industry can know what each operators experience is on a broad range of matters. And together with the FAA the industry and the FAA can

develop responses.

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Most of the issues that are discussed are not about regulatory compliance. These are safety issues that either don't violate regulations or that there's some latent problems that only manifest themselves in an accident.

If sort of all the holes in Swiss cheese in 10 to 12 different pieces would line up and there's a very low probability that would ever happen and so it's really an attempt to be proactive and preventative and to go well beyond whatever the regulatory compliance requirements are.

And, third, we rely upon a great deal of voluntary reporting programs that industry has for their employees to report to industry and to the FAA collaboratively whatever problem or experience they have. And often times these are, again, not regulatory compliance issues, but they do help identify latent safety issues.

The framework in which a lot of that is happening is a requirement for both air carriers and airports to adopt safety management systems which are

really the aviation equivalent of the financial reporting and disclosure practices that publicly listed companies have with respect to, you know, their earnings and sales releases and all that.

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My own view is that most of industry has probably a more robust set of internal practices than what the FAA would be requiring initially out of the box by way of a regulation, but that's not true across the board.

And so the safety management systems that are being adopted now to meet the initial round of regulatory requirements are setting a floor and programs agency -- industry programs would be more robust over time than what the regulations require. But that's simply the aviation industry has always taken its safety mandate very seriously and often times goes well beyond whatever the federal regulatory requirements are.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Thanks, Reggie. Peter, one of the things I'd be interested in your augmenting whatever you were going to say about this is whether you think -- and just for the audience information, a

pretty good example of what we mean by premarket safety assurance are the -- the vehicle performance guidance safety assessment letter. And so that's the kind of thing we're talking about.

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And what I'm interested in is we've made that voluntary and we certainly have reasons that it's voluntary. But what I'd be interested in, Peter, is whether you think that this sort of premarket safety assurance is necessarily workable only if it's mandatory or if voluntary standards can work in addition to whatever else you were going to say.

MR. KURDOCK: So, first, before I address that question, Paul, thank you to NHTSA and to the folks here for having us.

I think it's important, too, as a safety organization -- and it's something that Marc touched upon -- is we are very, very hopeful that autonomous vehicles has the potential to save significant amount of lives, prevent significant amount of crashes.

Sadly, the last couple years we've seen some significant upticks in the lives lost on highways due to crashes. So we are very, very optimistic that the

technology will save those lives.

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Unfortunately, like the crash that happened in Florida in May, gives us great pause as to what manufacturers are already currently putting on the road. So our public comments did address the fact that the letter is voluntary.

We think it should be mandatory as well as what strikes us quite interestingly about the letter is if it's voluntary and the information that a manufacturer chooses to provide is voluntary they simply can provide whatever information they choose to and the agency has no recourse to require them to submit additional information that they may need.

Now, they may go back to the manufacturer and politely ask them to provide the information they would like and the manufacturer can simply say no thank you and there's nothing that the agency can do at that point and they've already wasted a significant amount of resources. So that's a significant concern for us.

Turning to really what our comments -- to public comments to the docket which you can all see is

we talked a lot about reorganizing this policy around functional safety, the functional safety requirements.

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And functional safety really is the way we define it in our public documents. It's always been if the vehicle's not tested to one test, it's not designed to a series of tests. It's really assured that in any type of situation that the vehicle on a public road is going to encounter they're able -- going to be -- handle that -- that situation safely.

And, frankly, from all we've learned from the public disclosure of what happened back in May with the crash. If that manufacturer engaged in a robust and an appropriate functional safety process, they would have caught that defect that occurred and very likely could have prevented that crash that cost that gentleman his life.

So that's really where we look at it, but and a final thing I would put on for Advocate's, too, is that we're very concerned about it seems to be the stance of the agency that this is somehow -- that all autonomous vehicles and automated vehicles are somehow so different that the -- you know, the regime that's

worked for the agency for 50 years and they talk about, you know, vehicles standards and technology have saved 600,000 lives -- more than 600,000 lives that somehow that doesn't apply here and we don't accept that.

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MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Okay. I think what I'd

-- we've got a common thread here in that there's some

question about are voluntary -- why would you have

voluntary standards and are they in any sense superior

to or do they offer advantages over the FMVSS, which

is slightly different from what we started with.

But, Marc, for example, I think you said that one of the questions NHTSA should ask before embarking on any sort of set of premarket assurance or safety assurance is why are these -- or are these measures necessary.

And one of the things I'd like to throw out and have each of you address or talk about is in light of the fact that very few of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards cover automated vehicle functions and in light of the fact that it has taken us in recent years eight to ten years to issue a final rule FMVSS

standard, the last I think three of four took eight to ten years, is there -- does that give you some feeling or notion that it makes sense as these new technologies are rapidly developing and coming online whether we're making rules or not, does that strike you as an appropriate or reasonable justification for using premarket safety assurance tools as opposed to rules?

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MR. SCRIBNER: I think it could, but, as I said earlier, I think that the question really comes down to what specific benefits is the specific tool going to provide over the -- over the existing Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard and self-certification regime.

I think there's a potential and there may be a case in the future for mandating the safety assessment letter as we said in our public comments, but we also raised a number of concerns with the current safety assessment letter or the elements contained, the 15 point checklist.

And particularly on some of the data and cybersecurity components there and privacy components

there which I think would need to be addressed before moving forward. These are some of the issues that --

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Uh-huh.

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MR. SCRIBNER: -- that I think NHTSA really needs to grapple with before moving forward or really even asking that question of whether or not this should be mandated or not.

So I don't think we're at the stage at least where we are with the safety assessment letter to even really consider mandating it just because I think there's much more work to do in this early voluntary stage before we can move on.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Are you concerned that vehicles are going on the road without -- would otherwise go on the road without standards at least for an interim period?

MR. SCRIBNER: I'm less concerned. I mean, I think the developer have all -- have all taken a fairly cautious approach. Now, we can think of one developer who may not have taken quite as cautious of approach, but it's also important to keep in mind that if we're talking about highly automated vehicles as

NHTSA defines them it's not at all clear that that technology in question would be covered by the Level 3, Level 4, Level 5 SAE levels that cover highly automated vehicles.

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So and that's another thing worth considering, as well. I know other commenters raised that. Should NHTSA be looking more closely right now at some of these lower levels of automation where you're seeing some of the technology's actually being deployed to consumers as opposed to focusing as much on the highly automated vehicles.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Okay. Thanks. I'm going to jump over to Peter for a moment. Skip over Reggie and we'll come back to Reggie.

Peter, similar question to you. Given that rules, our standards, have taken eight to ten years in recent years to promulgate and that there doesn't seem to be -- there may be, but there doesn't seem to be a prospect for reducing that time substantially.

And if you disagree with that you can say.

But, you know, it's not immediately apparent what

could make those -- these more -- if anything, more

technical standards get faster.

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How does that affect your view of whether and to what extent NHTSA should use this premarket safety assurance tools and particularly voluntary tools?

MR. KURDOCK: Yeah. So, first of all, you know, we -- definitely the agency should be using those premarket assurance tools. There's no doubt about that. We can debate all day here long and it's a conversation for another day about the length it takes the agency to issue regulations and there's no need to go down that road now.

But one of -- I think one of the things I want to point out, too -- and I agree with Marc absolutely. He made an excellent point about how we do think the agency should be focusing less on the highly automated vehicles that necessarily may be years, decades away depending on who you talk to and the technology that's already in a lot of these cars.

But one of the things that we outlined in the functional safety approach that we advocate for in our public comments is that it gives the manufacturers

a great deal of leeway on what tests that they want to put their technology to to prove to the agency that the technology that they're putting into these cars right now can perform safely in all types of different situations.

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Now we think the agency very well could at some point in the near future require a certain set of basics tests. But those beyond that the manufacturer can perform whatever tests they want and bring those to the agency and that data to the agency to prove to them that the technology is safe and it gives the manufacturers a great bit of leeway.

I know that's a surprise probably to hear from a safety advocate, but I think that's one of the great benefits of the functional safety analysis.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Are you saying, though, that those standards should or can supplant rule-made standards or they just augment the --

MR. KURDOCK: I think they augment. I think they aug- -- I mean, I think they're certainly -- you can't just have the wild west and have every manufacturing kind of playing by their own rule out

Page 79 there and no standards whatsoever on what is safe and 1 2 what is not safe and everything's voluntary and the market's just going to take care of itself because we 3 4 see where that is right now when we've already had some instances that are of great concern to the safety 5 community. 6 7 MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Right. I guess I would 8 challenge the notion that premarket assurance is no 9 standards whatsoever. I think they are industry 10 practices --11 MR. KURDOCK: No. And I'm not saying that, 12 yeah. 13 MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: -- standard performance 14 criteria that are established by industry. 15 MR. KURDOCK: Right. 16 MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: So it may not be 17 established by a government agency but there are 18 certainly standards --19 MR. KURDOCK: Yes. MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: -- that they would comply 20 2.1 with. 2.2 MR. KURDOCK: Absolutely.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Reggie, recently I think maybe with UAS and some other regulations the FAA has been going a little bit more toward sort of a certification model.

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And I'm curious as to why that is and what advantages the agency sees in the certification model because it sort of seems like FAA is over here looking at it from a premarket assurance standpoint and they're looking over at sort of the other pool which are self-certification.

We're both thinking about that the grass is greener or something. And I'm just curious as to the thought and rationale for that.

MR. GOVAN: I'm perfectly situated in between Marc and Peter and that's pretty much where the agency's moving actually is between the two of you. It's fascinating to listen to it.

Aviation is such a different business and a different community of businesses. There is simply no discussion among the manufacturers, among the carriers about one or another's safety system being to one company or another's competitive advantage.

Sure. There's proprietary and intellectual property, proprietary information and intellectual property and the like, but at the end of the day the books are open when it comes to anything having to do with safety. And I suspect that's not the case among the -- in the automobile industry.

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The reality is that there are very serious

-- several things are motivating a shift. One is that
there is a reality here of new technology. And it's
the pace of the development of new technology, but
also the rapid commercialization of that technology.

Those two things combined simply, to put it bluntly, means the agency has a hard time keeping up with what's going on out there if we're going to rely upon our traditional tools.

Secondly, I think the enlightened view is that the old model of overly prescriptive where you specify each and every thing is ultimately a little anti -- maybe not anti-competitive, but anti-innovation and it does affect the pace of innovation and the commercialization of that innovative technology.

But some forms of self-certification have always been a part of FAA processes. The label we use is different. They're called delegations. We have -- Boeing has some delegations from the FAA where there are Boeing employees who act in the stead of the FAA in ensuring compliance with various manufacturing processes, design standards, and the like.

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The general feeling is that those practices don't go far enough and so there's a live debate in Congress about whether Congress should direct us to do more to rely on self-certification. But the reality is as we shift from prescripted to performance-based standards, and the means of compliance with those standards will primarily be voluntary consensus standards, there is an opportunity, as I said earlier, for kind of a different approach and a new way of thinking about how to comply separate from the consensus.

So that's an area where we're loosening up, but we're also actively considering proposals for some forms of self-certification in some of the new rules primarily around the use of drones. And that's simply

because drones are a fundamental shift in -- it's a new entrant that requires a fundamental shift in how we think about the regulation of a form of aviation that doesn't have a person in the controls.

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MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Thanks. I would be interested -- we had, as probably everybody knows, we had a hearing like this regarding our safety assessment letter. And then this morning, of course, we had the Model State Policy and we had gathered public views on that.

But I would be interested in if each of you could give your thoughts -- to the extent you've taken a look at the -- the safety assessment letter and the criteria that we use there -- are those criteria sufficient to provide the kind of safety assurance that we need for the American public?

And if they are not, where do you think there's room for development or improvement?

20 MR. SCRIBNER: Yeah. As I said, before, you

Marc?

know, I think there's -- I actually think the

categories of how -- that would show how NHTSA is

thinking about these issues are appropriate. I think these are aspects and these reflect industry best practices as they exist right now.

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I think further refinement, however, is needed in a number of these different categories.

And, like I said earlier, as we develop more in our comment letter the data, the privacy, the cybersecurity areas -- areas where NHTSA, frankly, doesn't have a lot of experience and is currently in this -- at the beginning of this learning process.

But fortunately I think as we recommend that NHTSA should turn to other federal expert agencies, namely the Federal Trade Commission, on how they deal with -- how they deal with privacy.

You know, we have the Auto Ice (sic) Act set up right now. Industry is thinking long and hard about this. I mean, this is the beginning for many of them, as well, particularly the OEMS rather than some of the tech companies who've gotten involved.

Cybersecurity is going to be a growing issue, privacy's going to be a growing issue, and data ownership and management's going to be a growing

issue. But, like I said, I think one thing that concerns us or would concern us about mandating the safety assessment letter at this point -- whether at the state level as we've unfortunately seen draft rules from California that go in that direction or at the federal level -- is that, particularly with respect to data ownership, right now there's a lot of concern at this early stage of the technology development where do we drawn that line between what is safety critical data that NHTSA could use versus proprietary information that ought to be -- that ought to be protected by that private developer.

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And I think it's not at all clear where that line is going to be drawn yet and I think that's an important -- going forward, that's going to be an incredibly important discussion that, you know, industry is going to have and NHTSA's going to have.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Lots of questions. We're going -- speaking of questions, we're going to take questions from the audience in just a moment. And I'm going to skip over Reggie and give Peter a shot at that question.

MR. KURDOCK: This is like a lot of flyovers, right. That was a bad joke.

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So I think -- and our public comments reflect this, too -- is that we think that the agency is right in kind of the topics that they have identified in the letter, but they need -- we feel like they need to be more specific to make sure that they're actually getting kind of that subsetted data in each topic that allows them to get some real useful information to see what's out there.

I think we're concerned -- I know especially our engineer on staff is concerned that, you know, if they remain so obtuse that there's just this huge amount of information and it really isn't all that useful why we certainly as a safety organization, you know, are always in favor of, you know, complete and honest disclosure.

We want to make sure that, you know, all the information that the agency is getting -- you know, we understand the agency's -- you know, the agency's limitations. That they're going to be able to -- to be able to analyze this information. It's the type of

information that they necessarily need to make -- make those critical decisions.

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So I think a little bit more detail on those topics would be quite helpful.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: And I think we have indicated both in our public statements and in the guidance, itself, or the policy, itself, that we do regard this as an iterative process.

That we're going to get more information and that we're going to continue to collaborate with some of the agencies that have a little more expertise in cyber privacy and security and so forth.

Although we certainly did collaborate with them in the first instance to develop this. And I think part of what we're seeing here is that cybersecurity and privacy controls and so forth are very much of an emerging issue area and everybody's learning as we go along.

I don't know if we have any questions, do we?

MR. FIKENTSCHER: We have one question. Are motorcycles included in NHTSA's pre-emergent safety

1 | assurance program before HAVs are certified as safe?

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MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Are they included before HAVs are certified as safe? I'm not entirely sure what they mean by that question, but we intend to include in the guidance all automated motor vehicles.

And so if the -- if the question is whether there should be some time to certify all other kinds of vehicles before motorcycles, I -- that's not the intention.

We have a couple minutes in case if anybody out in the audience has a question that they'd like to offer.

MS. SWEET: Hang on a second, Paul, if I can. So that question came from Rick. If you could stand up and hop to a mic for a moment if you don't mind.

Just to clarify, are you looking for whether or not the motorcycle is included as one of the motor vehicles to be -- to have a safety assessment letter or are you looking for motorcycles to be included in what is looked at by the -- by the automated vehicle like as they can see and detect and everything like

	<u> </u>
	Page 89
1	that?
2	So I guess it's
3	(Speaker off mic.)
4	MS. SWEET: Can you do a microphone just for
5	the web folks and the court reporter?
6	So I think that was one of the and since
7	it's also something that's come up in the comments I
8	just would like
9	RICK: Yeah.
10	MS. SWEET: you to clarify that, as well,
11	just for the general public.
12	RICK: We just want to make sure that the
13	automobile manufacturers that design these systems
14	also include motorcycles in the algorithm and software
15	and hardware so that they can be recognized before
16	anything happens.
17	So that's what we want some assurances from
18	NHTSA and also the manufacturers. That's what we're
19	looking for.
20	MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Okay. I obviously can't
21	provide any manufacturer assurance, but, I mean, I
22	think it is our intention to be inclusive and to take

1 the lessons learned with respect to automated 2 technologies and so forth and that they should be equally applicable to motorcycles, as well, to the 3 4 extent they're -- it's a good fit. 5 RICK: All right. Thank you. 6 MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Thank you. 7 MR. FIKENTSCHER: Re FAA airlines and 8 carriers enjoy liability protection in exchange for opening their books on safety. Will NHTSA support the 9 10 same in regards to FAV manufacturers? 11 MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: One of the things our 12 administrator, Marc Rosekind, is fond of saying at 13 these things is don't make new policy. So I'm not 14 going to try to make any policy pronouncement on that 15 and I suspect Congress would have something to say 16 about that before we did that so. 17 MR. GOVEN: I do want to say it's not clear 18 to me that there's a limitation on liability at all. 19 I mean, the agency in exchange for voluntary

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The agency continues to be able to take enforcement action against intentional and reckless misconduct, against falsification, a whole range of matters. But for your less serious matters we do say that the disclosure would protect because our ultimate goal is not a \$25,000 civil penalty, it's to develop the data and the information that then could be spread throughout the industry so that we up everybody's safety game.

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And it's not clear to me that, you know, trying to fine tune these proposals so that they meet some eventuality yet to come is the right approach.

Let's get the conversation stated, let's get the information in, let's figure out what we don't know and then figure out what's the best response when we find out what we don't know.

MR. KURDOCK: Hey, Reggie, I think it would be helpful, especially for me, could you talk more about when you say "less serious matters," what, you know, an example of that would be?

MR. GOVAN: Well, it's the non-intentional, the non-reckless matters that are honest mistakes

rather than falsifications. There's a continuum of misconduct out there or a continuum of non-compliance. And the intention misconduct is the worst form and that is something that the agency will always take an enforcement action.

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And as you go down that list of severity when something is truly an honest mistake and can be remedied with other than a civil penalty action, the agency's more than happy to do it.

Sometimes that's corrective action in terms of a change of manufacturing process or in terms of hiring a different quality of staff in a particular department, hiring a different type of engineer. For an airman it may be going back and getting a refresher training just like they do when you get too many tickets in your car for speeding. There's a whole range of things. But there's -- immunity is not the case.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Thanks, Reggie. And thanks to all of our panel members. And I think I'll try to keep us close to on schedule for the first panel. And, Tim, you've got a challenge to see if you

Page 93 1 can get it done more guickly than I did. 2 Premarket Assurance next -- Approval next. 3 MS. WILLIAMS: So while we set up the second 4 panel I just want to introduce our moderator will be 5 Mr. Timothy Mullens. He's an attorney adviser to the Office of the Secretary of Transportation. 6 7 And this will continue that discussion on Premarket Approval so there will be a little bit of 8 overlap with this panel. 9 10 MR. FIKENTSCHER: Guys, I'd like to clarify 11 a little bit. This is an opportunity to ask questions 12 of the panel, not directly to NHTSA about things 13 inside of the policy. Thank you. 14 MR. MULLENS: Just let me know when we are 15 ready to start. 16 MS. WILLIAMS: Yeah. Go ahead and take it 17 away if you're ready. 18 MR. MULLENS: Okay. Great. So good 19 afternoon. I'm Tim Mullens with the Department's Office of General Counsel. I'm here to discuss the 20

section and policy on Premarket Approval Systems for

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automated vehicles.

As Paul had indicated, there are some significant overlap obviously between premarket assurance and premarket approval, but they are fundamentally different in that premarket approval goes a bit further and requires that the regulator actually affirmatively approve a vehicle before it is allowed for sale.

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And we discussed that a fair amount in our policy document primarily at a preliminary level and sort of more and more for the floating the idea and asking questions about how it could be designed for automated vehicles.

And we requested comment and we received quite a bit of comment on that. And so I'm hoping this panel today will allow us to talk through some of those issues and just sort of the concept, in general.

Before we begin, though, I'd like to introduce our panelists. To my right is David Strickland. David Strickland's currently a partner in Venable's regulatory group where he focuses on transportation policy, consumer protection, Internet privacy, data security, and legislative and government

affairs.

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Prior to joining Venable, Mr. Strickland served as the administrator of NHTSA where he worked on a number of issues, including the first statement that the Department had issues on automated vehicles back in 2013.

Prior to joining NHTSA, Mr. Strickland spent eight years on the staff of the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation as Democratic Senior Counsel.

To David's right is Bryant Walker Smith.

Mr. Smith is an assistant professor in the school of law and the school of engineering at the University of South Carolina. He's also an affiliate scholar at the Center for Internet and Society of Stanford Law School and chair of the Emerging Technology Law Committee of the Transportation Research Board of the National Academy of -- International Academies.

Mr. Smith's research focused on risk, particularly tort law and product liability in technology, including automation and connectivity and mobility including safety regulation.

He has the honor of teaching a first-ever course on self-driving cars and is considered an expert throughout government, industry, and media.

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Our final panelist is Mr. Tom Karol. Mr.

Karol serves as general counsel in the federal -- for

-- in Federal, I think that's how you say it, in the

National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies or

NAMIC.

There Tom represents NAMIC in Washington on issues impacting private property casualty insurance companies and is primary management of NAMIC's response to Dodd-Frank legislation and regulation.

He's also the leader of NAMIC's investment services practice.

So it's in the policy and in -- obviously in the response in the comments we've seen this has been an issue of significant interest and it -- because it raises guite a bit of number of issues.

And I think we want to start it off by starting at the higher level and as the discussion goes on, maybe working our way down. So just for our panelists we can just go, I think, one at a time.

If you want to just quickly describe how you 1 2 think a premarket approval system could work for 3 automated vehicles. And to the extent you find it 4 useful comparing it to the existing systems for vehicles including NHTSA's self-certification system 5 and type approval used by the European Union. 6 7 MR. STRICKLAND: We negotiating on the spot 8 here. 9 MR. SMITH: That's generous of you. 10 you, David. 11 MR. STRICKLAND: Thank you, Professor. 12 MR. SMITH: So as you noted in your 13 introduction, there is not one definition of approval. 14 And, in fact, the range from assurance to approval 15 really is a spectrum. 16 Thanks -- thanks in large part to NHTSA's 17 leadership we now have one unified set of definitions 18 of levels of automation so in no way am I trying to 19 upset that, but I'll note that those levels came in part from Tom Sheridan's earlier levels of automation. 20 2.1 And those levels are actually instructive when we 2.2 think about what approval might be.

So just replace computer with developer and human operator with regulator in those definitions and we have a sense of how a regulator might approach a developer.

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So you could have in the most extreme kind of type approval where the developer needs to present a specific product that the developer, then, approves in that specific form as a one-time approval.

But you can move into much more flexible regimes, including ones that start straddling with assurance where, for example, the developer notifies the regulator what it is doing or where the developer notifies that regulator and the regulator has an opportunity to veto that action rather than require affirmative approval or where the developer presents it and the regulator has the option to say yes or no, but not the obligation and moving lower and lower to the point that the greater control is exercised.

And that's useful in thinking about this because we're encountering a regime where a lot of things are going to be flux. What we mean by a car or a product or a service is going to change. As over-

the-year updates effect more of the fleet, product will not be static. It will be dynamic.

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NHTSA, much like FAA, is seeing a world where a relatively small number of developers could rapidly expand into a much larger and more diverse group of developers, manufacturers, and deployers and that diversity will raise a lot of issues that may be new or difficult for the agency.

Regulating a large automaker may be fundamentally different than regulating a startup and may require new tools.

It will also potentially require a commitment to funding and staffing. And I want to put that out there really not for the -- not for NHTSA or the DOT's ears, but for -- but for Congress's ears that if you ask more you do need to provide more.

And ideally you would see funding tagged to the workload. Conversely you might even see the specific regulatory tools that are used tagged to the funding so that an agency with lots of resources could do a detailed type of approval. An agency with very few would have to rely necessarily and perhaps legally

1 on a different set of tools.

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This is one of the reasons why I have advocated for what I call the public safety case which is returning back to the developer and saying tell us what your safety philosophy is, tell us what safety means to you, how you will define it, measure it, monitor it over the lifetime of the system.

That's similar in some ways to the functional safety that was introduced in the previous session and could provide some of that flexibility within the context of type approval without being such an extreme form of that premarket approval.

MR. MULLENS: Great. So, David, would you like to respond?

MR. STRICKLAND: I knew that Bryant would be very open and thoughtful about the possibilities in regimes of how you structure premarket approval so I could be able to do this.

I don't think a premarket approval scheme works at all on this context. See, I actually up here giving good information. Good negotiation, right?

MR. SMITH: Nice run in, yeah.

MR. STRICKLAND: Yeah, exactly. This is truly a notion of if it's not broken don't fix it. I think ultimately when you're talking about finding a way to leverage resources of an agency that needs, as Bryant alluded to, to be able to grow its resources in this particular regime to be able to put together whatever notion of a premarket approval process may be.

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It will be limited in scope as to what it promises the American public in terms of its safety promise. Ultimately, as Professor Smith was talking about, a more iterative regime which is captured by self-certification where there is an exchange of constant information as things develop and things are in flux.

I think that premarket approval I think in some instances in federal governments and other agencies rings a bit hollow. We could talk about the -- the premarket approval processes in the Federal Drug Administration where, frankly, it is actually used as actually a shield for, frankly, lowest common denominator.

And I think that's probably a concern of many is like how do you speak to a process that make a promise to the American people which, frankly, will never ultimately be fulfilled and the only thing it's going to do is, frankly, slow technologies down that can aim at -- specifically at 35,092 that died last year.

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So I think from a perspective of my coalition members and many the continuation of the self-certification regime, the liability responsibilities that you have for issuing any new technology into the marketplace that never goes away. And having an iterative process with the agency talking about how you sort of -- how -- what is your long-term philosophy on how you sort of deal with safety.

But, more specifically, as you develop new technologies having that, frankly, open process which we've all worked with for a very long time have proven very successful. And I don't think there is a need to go to a premarket approval process for additional assurances.

1 Thank you, David. Mr. Karol, MR. MULLEN: 2 if you'd like to make your introductory remark. MR. KAROL: I'm in the unique position of 3 4 following two brilliant people with different opinions and trying to come up with something new to say so. 5 We have a unique position in that we are a 6 7 highly regulated industry. We report as much as 8 anybody does and we understand the burdens of reporting and pre-reporting and continually reporting. 9 10 On the other side our business is basically based on the continued analysis of the frequency and 11 12 severity of incidents based on historical trend so we 13 need that type of information. So I think that we're -- overall our opinion 14 15 would be that preapproval could have certain benefits, 16 but the key is to focus on the right information. 17 I've been part of other tasks and other organizations 18 where they collect a basket of information that really 19 doesn't tie into safety necessarily. 20 And most of the safety information we have 2.1 is actually responsive, not predictive. It's not a --2.2 we don't predict an accident based upon the

intelligence or the education of a person, but basically get the historical data after it's happened.

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So I think the preapproval -- I think the collection of data and the review of data relevant to actual incidents when something goes wrong that's the really relevant information.

And the -- NHTSA has a number of abilities to enhance advanced data recorders, require further reporting after incidents happen, things like that.

One of the things that the FAA's doing with drones now is after an event -- after an incident has happened more reporting there.

We think that's the type of most valuable information relevant to both safety and our business and that's where we would come down.

MR. MULLENS: Great. Thank you. So I think after everyone's made their initial statements maybe it makes sense since Bryant had a positive -- more positive take and David came down pretty quickly on that so maybe we should have Bryant to kind of -- and you were sort of in the middle, which was good.

MR. KAROL: Thank you.

MR. MULLENS: Focusing on the information which I think is important. I think it goes to maybe where I think people are closer on it. But maybe if you wanted to say why you think maybe it would work or maybe even how -- what David and also Tom described as -- or David iterative process and Tom's focused on information, maybe similar to where you're talking about with your continuum of what approval means.

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MR. SMITH: Sure. Sure. No, I'm happy to be the strawman here. Because, to be clear, I'm not advocating for an extreme form of prior approval so we can talk about what the best approach would be or we can talk about were NHTSA on its own or more likely through Congressional direction to implement one of these more extreme versions, what would be a good way of going about it.

And I would maybe try to selfishly reconcile what we've each said and say that there are a number of tools that are currently or could be available to NHTSA which can be deployed in a way that might mimic premarket approval in some ways.

So the kinds of letters and inquires that

NHTSA is empowered to do and does do today is a way of intervening even before a product might reach the market, mandating particular information, and then setting the agency up to intervene at the point that it might see a problem.

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Now, that's not the same as requiring every developer to go before the agency and get specific approval, but if implemented it may have the same effect.

Likewise, the combination of the 15-point safety assessment that we've seen along with state authorities and NHTSA's other existing regulatory authorities in some ways can function as this premarket approval in a soft form.

So a state might require that a developer file one of these letters as a condition of operating on that state's road. And the policy is a bit of two minds on this possibility depending on the section that you read, but it seems like a possible approach for a state to take.

At the point that such a letter is filed, the NHTSA could, very consistent with existing law,

essentially look a little more favorably on the companies that are complying than the ones that are not in its investigations, in its follow up, in its handling. Not favoritism, but simply recognizing the information that's available and has been presented.

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All of these are ways of providing that shack of constructing some kind of gateway through which developers might pass without setting up the agency for a yes/no assessment on every single design decision or every single product or product iteration that comes out.

I share David's concern particularly with respect to the FDA not only for the floor problem, but also for the capacity problem. When we're talking about real potential safety innovations we do not want a regulatory system where approvals are measured in years or decades rather than months. And unless you fix the resource side that's the reality for these technologies.

MR. STRICKLAND: Just to follow up on what Bryant was saying. I think ultimately, you know, you ask a question of what does premarket approval do what

self -- self-certification does not.

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And the only answer I've been able to call up -- and I turn to my panels or others -- is basically if there is a need that there is some larger and more inherent risk created by the technology or to be able to calm the public about accepting the technology because there's some imprimatur being placed upon this technology by the federal government.

And I, frankly, don't see there being a need. Ultimately it's going to be about the performance of the technology, frankly, in the marketplace in a way that is self-assured.

If you think about other active safety systems that are, frankly, in the status quo right now which are the foundational steps to full self-driving, you didn't need to sell the public on a premarket notion. They basically -- you made basically companies lean view, made the safety case, made the business case and took on their own risk to do so.

And I think ultimately regardless of I think what Bryant is talking about is probably, to be perfectly blunt, is, frankly, a more robust

interaction on the self-certification process which I think fits the regime properly. Some notion of whatever checkmarks that need to be checks I don't think will ever be complete enough. I think we'll always -- you know, it will be an impediment and, again, ultimately what is the question that we're trying to answer with.

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And I am always all ears, you know, if folks decide to go in this direction in advocacy about we need premarket approval because of X, but I remember my time in meeting with my European counterparts when I was serving with the agency.

Premarket approval was basically it was like the David Strickland version of preparing for an exam in college. You cram like hell for one car to get through the premarket approval process in Europe and then it gets left alone, which I think is horrible for safety and I don't think it really does anything.

MR. SMITH: Yeah. But it worked well for you.

MR. STRICKLAND: Well, you know, I just got lucky. But I think that, you know, as Bryant said, I

mean, clearly we're going to have to have some new thinking about the self-certification process and how we evolve in thinking about a performance standard versus maybe a process standard in thinking about software, things of that nature, yes.

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But I think that the regime works for this as well as it does for anything we work in technology.

MR. KAROL: Well, one of the concerns that I have predominantly is, it was touched on by David, is just the pure complexity of this. You're going to have a car or a vehicle built not by one entity, but by probably literally hundreds of entities where these -- this software and the technology has to integrate.

And to be able to be smarter than all of those collectively and have a pre-review process that really provides you some level of comfort is going to require an enormous amount -- as Bryant said, an enormous investment in terms of making the federal -- making NHTSA have the ability internally or externally be smarter than the collective businesses out there creating things every day.

So I'm worried that if you're creating too

high of a standard the public is going to start assuming that that level is provided there without the investment being made.

MR. MULLENS: So -- go ahead.

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MR. KAROL: Oh, just to add two things to this fascinating discussion. First, I would also be concerned at any point that the agency reaches a decision that could then be subject to subsequent challenge by other parties. So that's another level of delay which we might not consider as the regulatory model, but as part of the broader judicial model.

The second is I think we're principally looking at premarket approval as the approval, as the stick, but there are ways that it could be designed as a carrot. So you could have the existing regime complete with existing FMVSS or existing regulatory requirements that might conceivably be inconsistent with some visions for automated driving.

And in alternative to meeting those or another way of meeting those could be what is an essentially a premarket approval process where a developer goes and says, well, here is why our system

is reasonably safe and why we are able to achieve reasonable safety notwithstanding these impediments in the FMVSS.

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This is consistent with the current limited scale exemptions model and also very consistent with the FAA's approach. And so there is -- it's another way of conceiving this that might be less harsh and burdensome while still providing that flexibility.

MR. MULLENS: So one question I had as you guys have been talking about, you know, some struggles with premarket approval or using kind of maybe a beefed up self-certification or kind of more safety assurance is to what extent do you think that the regulatory regime is actually the driving issue and rather following the technology challenges?

So what is sort of inherent in the difficulty in regulating automated vehicles or other sorts of advanced technology that premarket approval, you know, says government says it can -- it's only allowed if we say it's safe, but the other regimes have a little bit more of a back and forth. But they're still fundamentally answering the same

question of when is this vehicle safe.

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MR. STICKLAND: I think ultimately the difficulty is when you're actually have the machine as an operator. And an operator has to basically absorb the multi-variable notion of chaos and how to respond to it.

And there's -- with the FMVSS and the particular performance tests it is a -- wrote here's how we expect this vehicle to perform. It has to brake within a certain number of feet, has to be able execute a J-turn and kick in the electronic stability control to make sure we don't have -- all those things are very much point blank questions about performance.

Where you now have a vehicle that ultimately when it's going to be -- it reaches the higher levels of automation it's going to have to manage the entire driving task and all aspects of it.

And there's no way that you can actually put together a test that, you know, that's going to say, yes, this can handle all operations. Ultimately it's going to have to be some notion of software process and then it's going to be, you know, an attestation to

being able to perform safely on the roads.

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And then ultimately it's going to turn into, then, frankly, reviewing the performance of the fleet, performance of a vehicle, and then if it isn't performing as expected then you go through the defect and recall process.

So I think that's the reason why how do you set up a premarket approval process it's just it impacts self-certification, as well, in terms of the being an operator is not a performance test. It's going to be a long-term observation and making sure that, frankly, those that are put in that vehicle on the road have taken the initial, you know, liability analysis and making sure the vehicle performs as expected.

It's a Sig Sigma way of handling the particular operational domain and I think that's the -- I think that's the reason why it's so difficult.

MR. SMITH: Yeah. Regulatoin should correct market failures. And so we should ask in this case whether there are or are likely to be specific market failures that require reform of or replacement of the

existing regulatory system.

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One potential market failure could be a lack of legal clarity. But here I expect that there is enough incentive within industry to analyze existing law and to determine whether that law is sufficient for the particular vision of automated driving. And if it's not, to seek legal change consistent with that vision.

So unless there are smaller companies or disadvantaged concepts that are going to be ill served by the existing economic verses that might not be something that agencies have to worry all that much about.

What are the market failures? Well, one might be safety. And we've spoken a lot about that. And it's true that the diversification of the industry could present new safety challenges and new failures of the existing model. That's worth looking into.

And the third -- and David really alluded to this -- was trust. Is it possible that the general public will be unable to get the information they want or need about these systems in order to determine the

relative safety or will be unable to understand or process that information in a way that means they trust too much or trust too little in these systems.

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And that's where NHTSA can -- can convey the trust of the federal government -- and I use that very earnestly because I think that there is that trust -- onto new technologies that do have real lifesaving potential.

MR. KAROL: I think the only thing I would add to that is it will never be completely safe.

There will be an accident, there will be a series of accidents. It's basically trying -- from our business we're just calculating what's the likelihood, what's the down side of that.

And I think the conveyance of that to the general public would be also that -- a key part, too, is that we're not going to round all the corners.

We're not going to make everything perfect. There's going to be something that happens.

And no matter how much you disclose to them nobody reads those little things you get for your software updates, nobody reads any of the -- I would

Page 117 1 have -- most people don't read their insurance 2 contract, most people don't read their --3 MR. STRICKLAND: I love my insurance 4 contract, Tom. 5 MR. KAROL: Yeah. The night before you sign But, you know, it's going to be the conveyance 6 7 of, hey, you know, we're doing the best we can. We're 8 reasonably there is all you can expect. 9 MR. MULLENS: All right. Thank you. 10 seems like we've seen -- I've seen a number of index 11 cards coming their way so if you guys want to read 12 whatever one's you've selected. 13 MS. SWEET: Hang on one second. All right. 14 I apologize. Okay. Established safety commitment is 15 not driven by certification requirements whether a self-certification or type approval rather driven by 16 17 reputation, liability, risk aversion, and ethics. 18 Concern seems to be more with startups. Why 19 not consider separate requirements for startups? 20 MR. SMITH: Volkswagen. No. So --2.1 MR. STRICKLAND: Yeah. He went there.

MR. SMITH: It's true. There are a lot of

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forces that will act on established companies that will not act on startups and that's why I talk about market failures.

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There are financial considerations including liability considerations, reputational considerations that certainly effect financial considerations all of which are part of the regulatory picture when we ask whether the market is functioning to achieve goals or not. And in some cases it will and others it will not.

We've seen states that are more comfortable with this approach of asking who's acting rather than what they're doing. Nevada establishing entry barriers, Michigan in legislation that was signed just last week likewise setting up sort of these special categories of privileged actors.

And that makes more sense in some ways as we shift from products to really actors and activities as the locust of regulation.

MR. STRICKLAND: And ultimately especially in the context of testing on public roads when you think -- think the notion of having entry barriers to

entry to make sure that you have companies that are -have a very healthy risk assessment regime are
properly capitalized so that they have financial
responsibility for any mistakes that may happen on the
road that may lead to a crash.

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Those are all incredibly important. And ultimately it's what the agency does to this day which is there is a range of actors which the agency is very familiar with. Some of them are very large and very sophisticated, some of them are very small and occasionally obstreperous and occasionally violative of, frankly, the FMVSS's policies laughing.

And they deal with that right now today.

And the last thing we want to ever do is to be -- be a barrier that's too high so that innovators and innovations that may not necessarily be at the largest most sophisticated companies are there.

But we need to be able, as Bryant said, have those assurances that we protect the entire ecosystem from risks that may not be appropriately dealt with.

And so focusing just on startups and leaving everybody else alone may not necessarily be the right

temperature of the oatmeal, but I think finding sort of that place where, yes, you have particular levels of barriers of entry to make sure that those players are doing the right things in the place. And new entrants having a pathway where there may have to be more of an upfront, I guess, proof to the agency may be a process. But I don't think there should ever be a notion where the agency as a regulator should just simply, you know, write off the largest most sophisticated just because they are.

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MR. FIKENSTSCHER: We have two more questions. I'll give you the less difficult I think of the two first.

This discussion is focused on who does the certification, but what they are certifying is a more important question to consider. Given that precisely defined FMVSS's do not exist in the automation domain, what should be certified?

MR. KAROL: As I said in the first, we think that the post-incident date is the most relevant. We think that, you know, finding out when something is actually happened and doing the post-mortem, the

forensic of that, going back and finding what are the common factors there.

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It's not a -- we think that, you know, whether the states, the federal does it or, frankly, the insurance companies is a backstop that has not been discussed because you can certified everything you want. But if we find that the numbers are wrong your insurance is going to be so high that you probably can't have this thing.

So there's going to be a cooperative effort between the entities there and they'll -- you know, someone will look at, you know, whether the systems work, someone will look at the range ability of the material.

We're going to look at what's the likelihood we're going to lose money.

MR. SMITH: Here I would shift from performance standards in the specific way that the FMVSS implements them to really process standards.

And -- and certify or ask whether the developer and deployer has a reasonable approach to the activity, whether that activity is testing onto deployment.

That is have they presented a plan that shows that they understand the risks? That they have broadly considered not just those risks in the design of their system, but ultimately in the implementation and ongoing monitoring and eventually termination of that system, whether they have the competencies and the care and the credibility to be worthy of trust.

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This is -- this is very similar to functional safety in many ways. And it's less about are you checking boxes are you meeting specific requirements and more about are you making a reasonable good faith effort.

And that's how I would judge any application or proposal or review depending on the regime and ask not is it correct, not is it precisely mapped on a specific requirements, but all things considered, is it reasonable.

And previously at these I've talked about ways that courts and agencies can ask this question and really the case law that's developed to assist them in answering that.

MR. STRICKLAND: I agree with Bryant. It's

going to be some type of a process system to evaluate a self-driving system. I think the 15-point safety assessment letter sort of talks about some of those things like about, you know, identify your operational design domain as an example.

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Not necessarily this is what you need to do, but explain to us your process of what you did.

Because this technology's going to be evolved in multiplications different ways from every designer and manufacturer.

And ultimately the goal is I think, as

Bryant said, making sure that, you know, the deployer

of the technology will stopple and took care of those

basic notions of functional safety I think it going to

-- ultimately where this is going to have to land for

the regulator to be able to have thoughtful and

efficient input in making sure that those reasonable

safety issues are taken care of.

MR. MULLENS: Okay. Do we have one more question?

MR. FIKENTSCHER: We really don't have time for the last question.

Page 124 1 MR. MULLENS: Oh, okay. 2 MR. FIKENTSCHER: So I think we're going to call it as this. 3 4 MR. MULLENS: Great. All right. Well, 5 thank you all so much. It sounds like we hopefully had a good discussion on both premarket approval, but 6 7 also just any sort of process that goes a little 8 beyond the traditional self-certification process that 9 gets a little more involved in the discussions and 10 processes that went into making the vehicle and the 11 software. Thank you. 12 MS. WILLIAMS: So big thanks again to our 13 first panels. And as we're setting up the third 14 panel, this panel's going to be on Imminent Hazard 15 Authority. And it's going to be moderated by Ms. 16 Kerry -- Kerry, can you pronounce your last name for 17 me? 18 MS. KOLODRIEG: Kolodrieg. 19 MS. WILLIAMS: Kolodrieg? 20 MS. KOLODRIEG: Kolodrieg. 2.1 MS. WILLIAMS: Apologize. I didn't want to 22 butcher it. And she serves as a trial attorney for

1 NHTSA. So we're just going to get them set up.

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And for the panelists when you are ready to speak there is a little speaker button that you'll have to hit that'll light up your microphone. Yep. You got it.

So following this panel we will take a 15-minute break. So, Kerry, when you're ready go ahead.

MS. KOLODRIEG: Thank you. My name is Kerry Kolodrieg. I'm the acting assistant chief counsel for litigation and enforcement. And we're here to talk about the Imminent Hazard Authority proposal in the policy.

I think most of my panelists are known to the audience, but I'll take a brief minute here to introduce them.

Next to me is the Honorable Rodney Slater.

He served as the 13th Secretary of Transportation from 1997 to 2001. Secretary Slater previously served as administrator of the Federal Highway Administration from 1993 to 1997.

Secretary Slater currently is a partner at the law firm Squire, Patton, Boggs where his practice

focuses on, no surprise, transportation. He's one of the firm's corporate compliance advice practice leaders.

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Specifically in the area of vehicle safety,

Secretary Slater has led Toyota's Safety Advisory

Panel and he currently serves as the independent

monitor of FCA.

Next we have Sean Kane who is a safety researcher and advocate who founded and serves as the president of Safety Research and Strategies. Mr. Kane has a long history of working on vehicle safety issues having begun work with the Center for Auto Safety in 1991.

He's worked on a wide range of vehicle safety issues including Firestone tires, Toyota unintended acceleration, heater core ruptures, engine fires, failed electronics, and other tire issues.

He's testified before Congress in the National Academy of Sciences and he regularly provides comments, testimony, and data to both NHTSA and the CPSC.

And then we have Erika Jones who is a

partner at the law firm Mayer Brown. Her practice 1 2 focusing on regulatory matters involving vehicle safety and consumer product safety and related 3 4 litigation. Before joining Mayer Brown, Ms. Jones served 5 in a variety of capacities in the federal government 6 7 including as NHTSA's chief counsel from 1985 to 1989 8 and as special counsel to the NHTSA administrator from 9 1981 to 1985. 10 So, as I mentioned, we're here to talk about 11 Imminent Hazard Authority. This authority would 12 enable NHTSA to require manufacturers to take 13 immediate action to mitigate safety risks that are so serious and immediate as to be imminent hazards. 14 15 So the first question is really the foundational one: Should NHTSA have this authority? 16 Is it necessary? Would it be useful? 17 18 Give it over first to Secretary Slater. 19 MR. SLATER: Thank you, Kerry, and thanks for the opportunity to --20 2.1 UNKNOWN SPEAKER: It's the third one in. 22 MR. SLATER: Right there? Very good. I

guess I should have started out by saying that I've always wanted to come to a NHTSA comment hearing so that I could learn about the specifics of making the speakerphones work and that sort of thing.

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But let me say at the outset that I really want to commend NHTSA and the Department of Transportation in playing a leadership role and engaging the industry as we really try to get a grip on this dynamic, frankly, transition and transformation across the automotive industry.

And I think that NHTSA's done a great job providing leadership with it's -- with its principles and with this kind of hearing. And I'm just very pleased to be a part of the effort.

First of all, the Grow America Act, as you know, Kerry, actually had a provision that provided for the Imminent Hazardous Authority -- Imminent Hazard Authority.

You did not -- you mentioned it as a part of the tool book -- tool package, but you didn't necessarily take a position on it in the guidelines.

I think that it's actually something that NHTSA should

have this authority.

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If you look across the Department of
Transportation, frankly, all of the other modes of
transportation have this kind of authority. And when
you look to the premiere role that NHTSA plays in the
safety of the movement of Americans and in the
leadership that it provides to its counterparts across
the globe, this is the kind of authority that it
should have and I think would use wisely.

I know that some of the comments that you've received thus far by the OEMs have not been altogether supportive of that. And the Auto Alliance has also expressed itself on this point, as well.

But one or two of the OEMs, as I recall, did respond positively but wanted some assurance that NHTSA would not exercise, you know, the authority responsibility without some checks and balances and I think over the course of the discussion we can talk a bit about that.

I would say that I think that NHTSA sought to address that issue again in the Grow America Act by saying that it would make this initial determination

and then the OEM would be afforded an opportunity to 1 2 respond before a final decision. So I think that 3 there was, at least in that effort, an attempt to try 4 to balance the considerations, but, frankly, there may be other things that could be considered, as well. 5 And I'm sure, as I've said, that we'll talk a bit 6 7 about that over the course of this session. 8 MS. KOLODRIEG: Thank you. Sean, do you have any thoughts? 9 10 Thank you. And, you know, MR. KANE: Sure. 11 I think right out of the box I'd say in having 12 imminent authority is another tool for the toolbox and 13 we're certainly in favor of that tool for the agency. 14 And I think that serves some purposes. 15 But also I'll be a bit provocative and say, you know, it's really something that has to be 16 17 properly supported and I'd also say that it's far from 18 settled that the agency has the wherewithal right now 19 to do this kind of imminent authority. What I think was alluded to by the Secretary 20 is there needs to be parameters. I mean, what we've 2.1 2.2 already seen is, you know, the -- we're missing some

of the things that need to happen before that. And may -- I think there's the cart before the horse here.

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Ultimately, if you're going to have these

Imminent Hazard Authority, what you should be looking
at first and foremost is preventive. What can be
preventatively?

And I think if we looked back at the crises that have landed us in places like, you know, Takata or even some of these other areas from, you know, General Motors to Toyota going back to Firestone since you mentioned it that many of these things are rooted, in fact, in a lack of robust standards that have been in place to begin with.

The lack of a robust standard, the lack of an agency depth and understanding of the complexities of the issues associated with those things, and their inability to use the tools that are already in their toolbox effectively.

And so, again, I'll be provocative and say that I think a lot of those things need to happen in this cart before the horse is the there, but the -- you know, there is certainly a place for this going

forward. And I think we're going to talk about that next is like what are some of the parameters that we could use it in.

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But at the end of the day, you know, preventing the imminent hazard is really, I think, where we should be focusing first and foremost.

MS. KOLODRIEG: Thank you.

MS. JONES: I'm going to be a bit provocative, too, and say I think you already have it. You already have Imminent Hazard Authority. You have the authority under Section 30118 to order a recall after giving notice to the manufacturer and you have authority under 30163 of the Safety Act to enjoin any violation of that order.

And I don't know what more you get with imminent hazard than you already have. It's a very elegant tool. The Safety Act is -- has proven over the years to empower the agency to compel recalls.

And the fact you haven't needed to use the judicial side of your authority for many years at least against a major manufacturer is a testament to the fact that when there are imminent hazards they are generally

recognized.

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I can't envision an imminent hazard that wouldn't also be a safety-related defect. Well, to Sean's point, perhaps ones that haven't happened yet. But once they're in the market, once there is an imminent hazard arising in a product the -- it's going to overlap with the definition and the judicial construction of safety-related defect.

And the agency has ample authority right now without needing new legislation to order that recall and a court to enjoin a violation of that order and to compel the action by the manufacturer.

So I don't think you need new authority, but I would urge you to take a look at the Consumer Product Safety Act which is a sister agency to NHTSA except that they don't regulate in the motor vehicle space.

They've had Imminent Hazard Authority for decades and they don't use it. They don't use it.

Even when they had exploding Samsung telephones, when they had Bucky Balls that were adhering inside people's intestine, they used the conventional process

of urging a voluntary recall which in those cases one went to a recall and one did not, but that is the process that they've chosen to use.

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And the reasons may vary from chairman to chairman, but it's -- they certainly have not invoked that authority in at least 25 years and it's been on their books.

So I think one has to ask why not and what is it about the tools that you don't have that -- or what is it about the tools you do have that is inconsistent with getting a rapid recall when you need one.

MS. KOLODRIEG: Thank you. Let's assume that Congress does give us additional authority -
Imminent Hazard Authority, under what circumstances -and I'll throw this to Sean first because you mentioned parameters.

What are the parameters? When is there an imminent hazard and the agency should take action?

MR. KANE: You know, that's a great question. And I think that looking at it as a

22 baseline, you know, there has to be something

definable here. And I think this has been one of the significant criticisms of the agency over the years is that there really isn't a defined process particularly in the enforcement side as to how things get handled.

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And so the absence of a process that's definable we've heard about this being art and science and there's no definable way. We've seen criticisms from these -- from the IG, we've seen criticism from the GAO about this and it plays out in real time.

There isn't a process why which certain things get addressed in the same way. And I think I'll give it a real time example of let's take some of the bridge technologies that have led us to the steps that we've been watching that are moving us towards autonomous where we have electronic stability control systems, for example, which we think we can all agree have been, you know, fabulously successful.

But at the same time absent a functional standard in place, okay, what we're seeing is failures within those systems that are taking the loss of control and taking the control away from drivers in the inconsistent application on the enforcement side.

So one manufacturer does a recall to fix that, okay, another manufacturer doesn't. And at what point -- you know, where are these definitions coming into play?

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So, again, I think go back to the cart before the horse. If we're missing some of these core standards, then we can go back and history and look at each of these crisis which have really been rooted in the absence of underlying robust, modern standards in which the agency is -- has a depth of understanding of those standards we're going to continue down this path.

So Imminent, you know, Hazard Authority I do agree is another tool for the toolbox just like EWR was a tool for the toolbox, but it's got to be properly applied and the parameters and definitions need to be put in place in a way that I think the agency has been unwilling to do in the past and has been criticized by many for not doing that.

MS. KOLODRIEG: Thank you. Erika, I'll toss it to you next. You had mentioned CPSC has this authority and doesn't use it. I'd ask you to think

about the automated vehicle context specifically and if you think there's any differences here where it may need to be applied or not.

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MS. JONES: Certainly there are differences when you're dealing with emerging technologies that are not as well understood as conventional technologies and that you may need to use the tools you have and any new ones that Congress gives you to address things that haven't been addressed before. So they don't necessarily have precedence or a set of parameters because at some point you're dealing with it for the first time so you have to make the rules as you go.

mentioned, many of the other -- perhaps all of the other modes at DOT have Imminent Hazard Authority but they are generally directed to an individual taking a plane out of service, a truck out of service, a rail car out of service and they have very rapid -- after that occurs the manufacturer, the operators, the case may be gets a very quick opportunity to get it back into service. It's very laser like targeted to an

individual issue.

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That doesn't fit your regulatory model. You don't regulate the driver, you don't regulate the taxi cab fleet, you don't regulate -- you regulate only one leg of that stool and it's the manufacturer. And your authority generally is not exercised in isolated cases.

You look for a fleet wide problem or a general problem in a number of vehicles where the Imminent Hazard Authority of taking them out of service, which would be the parallel model to the other modes, doesn't really work.

Your tool is a recall if it is out of -- if it's unsafe or in the case of something that hasn't been built yet to regulate against it. And perhaps what you need is more flexibility on that front to be able to prevent something from coming to market which wouldn't really fit imminent hazard, but it might be some form of short-term temporary rule making that you could -- you could pause button on some technology.

I think somebody mentioned to me that Comma

One might -- I think that's what it's called, Comma

One that it was a form of automated technology that could be retrofitted into certain vehicles. And you sent them a special order and they decided to pull out of the market.

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But perhaps if you'd had the ability to block that from coming to market until it was better understood and that would bleed back into last panel's discussion of premarket approval.

But the Imminent Hazard Authority that other modes have doesn't -- doesn't really fit. And I'm not seeing where the recall side is lacking in power in the Safety Act right now.

MS. KOLODRIEG: Secretary Slater, do you have a reaction to that how NHTSA compares to other modes and how their might be an imminent hazard for a NHTSA situation?

MR. SLATER: Sure. Well, first of all, I think Erika raises an interesting point in that the law, frankly, could be read technically to assume that NHTSA already has the authority.

A thought comes to mind when I think about that Thoreau once said that it matters not so much

what you look at, but what you see. And so NHTSA has an opportunity to look at its regulations in new ways as it deals with new situations and I think that there may be something to that.

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I'd also like to maybe lift up here the proactive safety principles. This initiative that NHTSA's now engaged in where it's actually reaching out to the industry to help it sort of see beyond the gray and to bring greater clarity to, say, best practices as it relates to recalls or best practices as it relates to, quote, "the implementation of autonomous vehicle technology".

I mean, all I'm saying is that you could extend it to include some of those kinds of considerations, as well, and especially as you think about maybe looking at the current laws from a different perspective and in a new light. So I think that there is actually something to that.

I will say this, though. There's a difference in clearly having the power and not using it. But a lot of times having the power makes it easier for you not to have to use it because those who

1 know you have the power recognize that.

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MS. JONES: And I'd say the number of recalls that occur each year without exercising the current power is testament to that.

MR. SLATER: Yes. I agree with that.

MR. KANE: You know, and if I could add, too, I think one of the underlying things that you got to look at is real-time data. I think one of the problems you're going to have with imminent authority, especially with these emerging technologies, is how fast and how real the data is.

I think we all know looking at EWR how challenging that can be to really identify problems, you know. And so what are we going to be doing to like, you know, have some type of real type, real time, short-fused type of EWR type of analysis?

I mean, we've studied the EWR data and find that it's a great tool to help us identify where recalls aren't working, okay. That's not really an early warning as much as it is really going back in time.

So, again, looking at what can be done

preventively if we're going to look at imminent hazard, what does that mean?

Well, imminent hazard isn't Takata.

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Imminent -- I mean, Takata's been going on for a decade, okay. That's not an imminent hazard. But we're dealing with modern technologies. These problems -- you know, and I think to your point is, you know, the agency does, in fact, have authority.

But also to your point, Secretary, is that, you know, this is another tool that can really help the agency maybe move things along and, you know, give them that additional piece. But certainly those parameters and the data collection is going to be a big piece of that.

MR. SLATER: Yeah. You know, I'd like to follow up just a little bit on this point. I think that with an agency like NHTSA with all of its responsibility and with, frankly, the limited number of people and sometimes resources that having that stick is sometimes a good thing that allows you to then use the carrot a lot more.

Now, having said that, again, I want to go

back to something that NHTSA's doing now that I just think is quite significant and quite transformative.

And that is the engagement of the industry so that you can be preventative in your approach to dealing with some of these challenges.

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There is a shared value and responsibility to be enjoyed by NHTSA working closely with industry. And I know that Bryant in his comments earlier used the word "trust" probably six or seven times in his comments.

That's really the glue that makes it possible for a regulatory agency that everyone recognizes has to have the stick to actually be in a position working with an industry that is a lot more proactive to really do its work more with the carrot than with the stick.

MR. KANE: You know, and I would add to that I think that, you know, what we're seeing, too, is what you said is what you look at and how you deal with that. And for the agency to be able to do its job properly they also have to have the depth of understanding and the institutional knowledge and

baseline to be able to deal with these kinds of issues.

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We can take Toyota's a very good example of that where for many years we had assertions from Toyota that certain things would not happen with its diagnostic systems that, in fact, were readily disproven.

The agency was unable to do the diagnostics and understand what that really meant in context. So we went up with problems that absolutely continue even after recall scenarios that are occurring.

So, you know, my point of view is it goes back to the idea that robust regulation and modern regulations need to be in place first and foremost to be able to get us to the point where we're going to be eliminating crises or then when they get it the -- or we're not going to just toss them over to the enforcement side.

I think it's a poor use of resources to toss these big crises problems into the enforcement side of the business when, in fact, they can be dealt with on the preventative side through good standard and good

1 rulemaking.

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MS. JONES: An interesting side note to that is that in the Consumer Product Safety Act Imminent Hazard section if they do exercise that authority, they're required to begin rulemaking to address the underlying issue. And it's part of that same provision. Maybe that's why they don't use it.

MR. SLATER: Yeah. That's a good point.

MS. KOLODRIEG: I think we're ready for questions.

MS. SWEET: Actually, I have a question personally.

So you guys have talked about the preventative measures and having requirements and regulations in place. CPCC has jurisdiction over 15,000 different types of products.

Voluntary standards or federal regulations can't cover 15,000 different products so having that as the first step can't always happen. So I guess what is that CPSC has in their box of tools that NHTSA doesn't to make it so that they can have Imminent Hazard Authority that NHTSA doesn't?

And I guess I'm looking at Sean on this one because he said it a couple times. So what does CPSC have in their box that we don't have at NHTSA that gives them an okay for Imminent Hazard Authority that NHTSA does not?

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MR. KANE: You know, I'm not sure that the Imminent Hazard Authority is really the key thing here. I think, you know, with CPSC, as you know, most of the products that fall under their jurisdiction are unregulated products, right. And so they have a wider array of hazards to assess that would I think make the argument that they may need to have an Imminent Hazard Authority justification even more so than the agency here.

That said, you know, with NHTSA I think one of the things that needs to happen is setting the baseline for those regulations that have really lagged where CPSC doesn't have the same level of regulatory authority.

You know, they -- if they have the -- they have to allow the industry to develop a voluntary standard. If the voluntary standard proceeds and can

address problems then -- which can take a very long time, then they don't have the ability to necessarily go forward with the regulation.

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I think in this case what we've been watching is a very slow train. This idea of autonomous vehicles and where we are in the complexity of cars and why we're looking at, you know, imminent hazard now really has its roots in the 1980s where, you know, vehicles started to get more automated.

And what we saw a few years ago was the agency look at a functional safety standard that should have been published in 1989. And if we set these baselines for what can we set it for baseline for functional safety standards, then you start looking at a process approach to ensuring that the control systems that are in our vehicles are, in fact, you know, meeting a baseline of safety.

Then if they're not then you can look at the enforcement side of it easier and then you can also have the underlying institutional knowledge that gets you to the point where you can have imminent authority if you have complex problems that aren't being

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So I don't know if I'm even answering your question as well as I can, but I think there's some real differences between the two agencies and how and what they're having to do especially in context of motor vehicle.

MS. JONES: I believe the reason the CPSA, the Consumer Products Safety Act, has Imminent Hazard Authority is because they can't go directly to court to order a recall the way NHTSA can.

NHTSA can order the recall and take it right into court. The CPSC has to go in front of an administrative law judge. The last time they did that to try to get a recall it took three and a half years.

And so the imminent hazard is to bypass the ALJ authority but -- the ALJ process, but NHTSA doesn't have to do that.

MS. KOLODRIEG: So, Erika, you just mentioned the time it takes. And previously you'd talked about the tools that NHTSA already has, the current tool being the recall.

Are there any other elements -- say Congress

did give us this authority and we found an imminent hazard.

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Are there any other elements that you think should or the agency should put into an order, an imminent hazard order, to really address something that truly is imminent in an emergency situation?

MS. JONES: In the order or in the law? Are you asking what the statute should provide or what the agency should say?

MS. KOLODRIEG: I guess either one, yeah.

MS. JONES: Well, I think the law has to provide for due process protection so that there is no risk of abusing the authority. And that can come in a number of flavors, but most common and the one that you have already is that it would be heard by a district court judge who would make the findings of fact and take the evidence. It can all be done very quickly, but it would not be a unilateral -- seeking it would be unilateral, but it would be -- a judge would make that decision.

As to what would be in the order I think that's going to depend on what the problem is that

you're addressing. The most likely would be you would want to stop sale and have a recall of a product that's presenting an imminent hazard. You would want it off the market and you would want it to be repaired or remedied or repurchased.

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And I don't think that you're contemplating some sort of in-rem seizures. CPSC does have that in their imminent hazard authority. They can seize products that are violative.

I think the stopping sale is the functional equivalent of that and that's most likely the direction I would think you would go.

MS. KOLODRIEG: Secretary Slater, do you have any thoughts on that what either a statute should provide as far as what the review would be or what the order actually would mandate the manufacturer to do or not do?

MR. SLATER: Well, I was listening to Erika. I think she covered it pretty well. I will admit I was thinking about one other point that I wanted to make if I may.

We've talked about the need for the trust

between the industry and the agency and we've also talked about the toolbox and all of those things. And the one thing that we've alluded to but that we really haven't directly addressed is the whole issue of just people and talent.

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I made reference to sort of resources and, you know, how NHTSA can -- has sometimes been, frankly, starved for resources and the like. I think that as we come to better appreciate what is happening across this industry there is the opportunity to make the case not only for improvements in policies and procedures, but also the need for appropriate investment in the work that the agency does.

I mean, we are the most mobile society in the world. And while we have a great mix of transportation, the automobile is still central to the way we move as a society.

And we're talking about an industry that is being revolutionized. We're talking about, you know, we're honoring the life of Senator Glenn. When you think about the power of the equipment, the force that lifted him to the far reaches of space, you have that

kind of power in an automobile that we drive on a daily basis.

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And so much has changed that you can flip the hood and you know hardly where anything is in this moment. That's the reality of a new time in which we live and we need talented people on both sides of that equation to be involved in the process.

So I think that this is a great time, again, for NHTSA to step forward and play this leadership role that you're playing and dealing with this new dynamic. But it's also an opportunity to make the case that the agency really needs the resources that are necessary to do the work that you're doing.

And here we're talking about probably the most significant investment that we can make in the improved safety of the system from an automobile perspective.

And such a timely argument to be made when we're seeing, you know, a slight increase in the number of fatalities and injuries on our roadways on an annual basis. But this can significantly address that issue if we get it -- if we get it right.

And I think at the end of the way much more important than maybe the policy will be an investment in the people I think. And bringing great talent, continuing to bring great talent into the agency, that agency being able to sit across the table from some of the most well-financed OEMs in the world and to, you know, do the necessary back and forth to ensure that there is a balance, an appropriate balance of carrot and stick incentives when it comes to ensuring the safety of the traveling public. So this is a magical moment I think to make that case as we're making the case about new powers and, you know, new dynamics as it relates to the relationship between the industry and the regulator. MS. KOLODRIEG: I think I saw a question come in from the audience. MS. SWEET: Yes. We might only have time for this one. Isn't a public announcement by the Secretary of Transportation that NHTSA is investigating a safety defect that presents an imminent hazard all that is needed? An example, didn't Secretary Hood do that --

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Secretary LaHood do that in the Toyota investigation?

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respond to that?

if the problem isn't resolved.

MS. KOLODRIEG: Sean, would you like to

MR. KANE: Well, you know, and it takes more than that. I mean, at the end of the day an imminent hazard announcement doesn't get us where we need to go

And, you know, I think the context of this, too, can create some tiered effect. What happens if we have an imminent hazard authority as applied to one defect, does -- you know, are we going to have representation that those defect issues that are being investigated that are not considered imminent authority are somehow not as important?

And what kind of tiered system do we set up?
We've already seen this shaking out. And I think, you
know, this is shaking out in context of the issues
around recalls currently where we've seen some
representations by the National Automobile Dealers
Association that, in fact, 6 percent of the recalls
are hazardous. And, you know, this is not something
we need to really be worrying about.

Are we going to set up a tiered system of which ones imminent, which ones are not? How is that going to play its way through?

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And I'm concerned about how that really affects consumers' attitudes around recalls and what that means. So going forward, you know, if there is an imminent hazard authority which, again, we believe there should be a tool that is available to the agency making sure that the parameters are set, that there's good data and collection, there's good parameters that set -- and prescriptive measures that are clear, that are definable, that are based in solid data and science in terms of going forward.

But it also doesn't diminish those things that may not rise to the level of imminent hazard, but that are also safety problems. So, you know, these things are, I think, are really complex issues that have to be juggled within a mix.

And, you know, the idea that, you know, the agency is going to need more resources I think is absolutely the case. But in doing that, you know, this may be the argument why the agency also should be

looking at, you know, something beyond selfcertification so that they are continuing to stay
right there at the forefront of the technology.

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Absent that, you're basically two years out of the industry and you're toast. You don't have that information anymore it's such a rapidly moving environment.

MS. JONES: I think Sean raises a really good point about tiering of recalls. There's a lot of research that shows that consumers who are not responding to a recall notice have self-selected out of thinking that it's important enough to participate.

And if we have a new and a super serious category called imminent hazard, is that going to adversely affect recall participation in non-imminent hazard recalls. I think that's a very valid point.

MS. KOLODRIEG: I think we're out of time, but I wanted to thank all the panelists. This was a great discussion.

MS. WILLIAMS: So we are now at 2:46. We're going to take a break until 3 p.m. and then start promptly with our fourth session. Thank you.

1 (A brief recess was taken.)

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MS. WILLIAMS: Okay. So the break went by just as quick as these panels are. So we're going to go ahead and get started since we have three more to cover this afternoon.

So we've had lots of interesting discussion and I know we're going to have the same for the last three panels.

Our fourth panel is on Expanded Exemptions.

It's going to be moderated by our very own Rebecca

Yoon. She's an attorney adviser for NHTSA. And I'm

going to turn it over to her.

MS. YOON: Okay. Thanks, Dee. And I am thrilled to see so many people still here. I would have figured that exemptions might be a bit of a sleeper compared to some of the other topics, but it is really relevant to my personal interest because I may be the attorney who has to respond to the exemptions that come in. So I'm really looking forward to hearing what folks have to say.

I'm going to start by introducing our panelists and then give a brief overview of the topic

and then we'll head right into questions.

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So we have Jackie Glassman who's a partner at King and Spaulding. Jackie served as both chief counsel and acting administrator of NHTSA spearheading the reform of the corporate average fuel economy program and overseeing scores of rulemaking and enforcement actions.

She counsels clients on compliance, government, relations, litigation strategy, and building robust corporate safety programs. Welcome, Jackie.

We have Dr. Steve Shladover who founded the California Partners for Advanced Transportation

Technology or PATH program, an R&D program at UC

Berkeley, which has been a leader in intelligent

transportation systems since 1986.

His focus at PATH is on cooperative systems and vehicle automation. Welcome, Steve.

And we have Norma Krayem who serves as a senior policy adviser and co-chair of the cybersecurity and privacy team at Holland and Knight.

Norma also served previously as deputy chief of staff

at USDOT as well as the acting deputy administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration.

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And she's been working on issues involving connected and autonomous vehicles including V2V and V2I issues for almost 20 years.

So thanks, everybody, for coming. Expanded Exemption Authority in the context of HAVs was one of the things that NHTSA wanted to look at as a potential future tool.

Our current authority allows us to exempt not more than 2,500 vehicles per year for a two-year period on the basis of equivalent safety. And there's a couple of things with our current authority that we thought might be worth exploring.

One thing is that 2,500 vehicles a pop doesn't give either manufacturers or the agency a lot of data to think about how automation might need to be regulated going forward.

And the other issue is the limited duration of exemptions can require frequent and repeated application renewals which creates uncertainty as to the availability of the exemption over a longer period

makes planning difficult for manufacturers who want to get these vehicles on the road.

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So I think the first question I have for our panelists is -- and this will go for everybody. I think we'll just go down the line -- is whether we think the question of whether to expand the exemption authority is actually ripe.

So we're really interested in anything that can help us gather data on HAV performance, but if the exemption authority were expanded tomorrow which manufacturer's going to be trying to sell more than 2,500 HAVs that can't meet current standards and when.

Or on the other hand, could it be important to expand the exemption authority sooner rather than later to give manufacturers a clear path toward being able to sell these vehicles even if they might not have them on lots tomorrow.

I think, Jackie, let's start with you.

MS. GLASSMAN: Thank you, Rebecca. I am thrilled to be part of this sleeper panel. I think that exemption authority -- the exemption authority that's currently in the statute, like most of the

FMVSS structure, was written in a very different environment at a very different time. And it was written to allow for particular pieces of technology to be evaluated even if they don't meet specific aspects of the FMVSS as they were written. And this is a somewhat different idea.

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But looking at expanding the exemption authority or changing that authority is overripe. First, it's not clear that what we're going to see in terms of deployment is automatic sales to the open marketplace.

Especially when we're talking about highly automated vehicles we may see more controlled fleets being deployed probably in ride sharing programs where they're not testing, they are deployed. That may easily exceed the 2,500 limit. There's no reason to limit it temporally to three years or two years or five years total as is in the statute.

And the concept of saying, well, we're exempting you from a particular provision of the FMVSS might be reconsidered into thinking about we're deeming you to comply with particular provisions.

Because most of the time we're not looking at whether or not we're going to exempt the vehicles from the functional safety consideration of the FMVSS, but rather the means of testing that get us to saying that vehicle complies.

And if we can find a way -- and David and Bryant talked about various ways, various elements that you might consider for either deployers or OEMs or suppliers to be able to maybe through a safety assurance program or a very soft form or premarket review rather than premarket approval -- to say we have enough assurance that we're meeting the functional mechanism, the functional requirements of what the safety standards are there to ensure that that should be our next form of exemption.

MS. YOON: You know what, Steve, I think I'm going to skip you and go to Norma first and then let's come back to you for the last one if that's okay.

19 Norma?

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MS. KRAYEM: I would probably offer this. I think the discussion might be slightly overripe, as well. I do think that we need to be defining maybe

two major buckets.

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The first is that the FMVSS has some basic standards that live beyond and talk about the outcome and the safety of the vehicle and that is still valid today.

I think we need to be identifying -- and we have and you've done a great job at this -- about the aspects of the vehicle that go beyond what the current regulations and law really talk about because we don't have any data.

The other side of this is to take a look at what is the timeline that we think that we're really going to be getting into full adoption whether it's from the OEMs or even from the traveling public.

If you need expanded exemption authority, you have to go to Congress for that. And while they certainly want to I think help advance the integration of the technology, they're going to want to know what problem you're trying to solve.

At the end of the day if we look at the levels of autonomy, we may be starting in the 0 to 3 and then we may straight to 4 or 5. So I think we

need to look at a concurrent structure that says what do we need to update in the FMVSS, what is it that we need to understand, and I think then back our way into whether or not you really need to expand the exemption authority or the industry's going to go beyond where you are much more quickly.

MS. YOON: Yeah. Steve?

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DR. SHLADOVER: Yeah. I don't think the question is so much about the expansion of the exemption authority, but how can you apply the exemption authority given that you need to show comparable safety to what you have today.

And I've heard a lot of comments in the court of the day in which people are implicitly assuming the automated vehicles will improve safety without questioning it. That's by no means proven for the higher levels of automation.

And, indeed, there are some serious technical problems about identifying what would you need to do to be able to assure that in one of those automated vehicles is no less safe than driving today.

The Rand Corporation published a really

interesting analysis of that earlier this year which predicated the number of hours or number of miles of driving you would need to do without crashes in order to be able to show that you were at least as safe as driving today.

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And those are some very, very large numbers that they quickly concluded it would be unaffordable to do the testing that you would have to do in order to be able to show that you had at least the same safety as you had today.

MS. YOON: Yeah. I think I want to come back to that point after awhile. But before we do that I'd like to ask our law firm panelists how do you think, if you think, the Fast Act Provision that allows manufacturers who are already producing FMVSS certified vehicles to test new vehicles and equipment fairly freely would factor in the discussion of expanded exemptions?

MS. GLASSMAN: Well, I think it factors in in two ways. Number one, it goes to testing and not necessarily deployment. So that's one aspect. And, number two, is that the Fast Act Provision applies to

OEMs who have a history of complying with the safety standards.

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And we limit it in that way because there's an assumption of the trust that we've been talking about throughout the day that says if these companies already comply with the safety standards and they are regularly certifying vehicles in good faith as being compliant with the standards, that we have a level of trust that they're going to -- they are going to test in a responsible way.

And testing on the public roads has been with us since the inception of the Safety Act. If you go back to the original legislative history of the Safety Act, you will see considerable amount of testimony from car companies saying, yes, we are -- we do advance safety. We test on the public roads.

There's always been a controlled level of testing on the public roads by responsible, known companies that regularly interact with the agency.

There were a lot of comments to the docket that suggested, well, maybe that's too limited. What about the deployers? What about the suppliers? If

we're tier -- high tier suppliers should we also be able to have that right or that ability to do that?

And there's something to be said for that.

The question is how do you define who should be able to do that and who should not?

MS. YOON: Norma?

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MS. KRAYEM: I would agree with that. I also think that the intent of the Congress was to try and find a way when they knew that they had a vehicle, pun intended, to actually address some of these issues.

They didn't have a lot of time to have an in-depth debate about it when the bill at the end of the day was done, but also knew that a fair amount of time could pass before something came forward.

So, you know, I agree with Jackie's point.

I also think there's a difference in this industry

between the OEMs and people who have been doing this

for quite some time and the technology disrupters.

And we see that in a lot of other sectors.

And I think that the language, at least, in the Fast Act was a way to try and narrow in on a

Page 168 portion of the section that generally people have a 1 2 comfort level with. MS. YOON: Yeah. That's a fair point. 3 4 Okay. So assuming that we are interested in expanding the exemption authority, let's bring a couple of 5 questions together. 6 7 What kinds of terms and conditions of 8 exemptions do panelists think would best help the 9 agency manage safety risks and why? 10 And then also how should manufacturers go 11 about demonstrating equivalent safety to the agency 12 and why? 13 I think this goes to Steve's point a little bit about the how many million miles do you need to 14 15 drive or is that even a good metric. 16 So, Steve, let's start with you for that one and then we'll ... 17 18 DR. SHLADOVER: Okay. I think this is 19 probably the central challenge in defining the regulatory approach not just for exemption authority, 20

What does it take to assure the safety of a

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but more broadly.

system that has to deal with this extremely complicated environment and perform extremely complicated functions?

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What combination of on-road testing, test track testing, functional safety analysis and simulations could be put together to produce a package that then says, yes, this particular vehicle design will meet a comparable safety to what we have today?

As far as I know, nobody knows how to do that at this point. And I'd flag that as one of the highest priority actions.

The German government has recently initiated a project to try to make some progress on that bringing together the research institutions and the automotive industry within Germany. They're spending over 40 million euros over the next four years trying to find an approach that they can follow to gain that level of safety assurance.

I think this would be a good thing for the U.S. to either follow or to join with the activity in Germany so that we can develop some technical methods that are actually valid.

MS. YOON: We would love 40 million euros 1 2 for sure. Norma, you want to take the next? 3 MS. KRAYEM: Just three quick points and 4 building on what Steven said. First, there is a tremendous amount of work being done at the 5 international level and we do need to be cognizant 6 7 that whatever we do there is an international approach 8 to standardization or harmonization, whatever terms 9 makes us happy today. That's hugely important. 10 There is a discussion in the EU about a 11 little bit what we're talking about here today. I 12 think that's important. 13 The second big issue, again, is that identification of what is it that is inherently 14 15 different about the use of fully autonomous vehicles. We are potentially looking at not just the awareness 16 and the testing of the vehicle, itself, but the 17 18 interaction of the fully autonomous vehicle with the 19 human driver still in the other vehicle on the road. Those are different things than just testing whether 20 2.1 or not the vehicle meets certain safety standards. 2.2 The third big issue I'll just mention is

cybersecurity issues. And, again, I think we've heard it from every panel that this is a very different scenario. And I think it's something that maybe DOT and DHS people need to come together on and talk about what that means because we don't have standards for cybersecurity in other sectors.

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We do use different terms about what reliability means, but in very few instances are we talking about the safety and the lives of the traveling public. And, again, those are inherently different than I think what we've done at DOT and NHTSA in the past.

MS. YOON: Just to follow up on that. So you would recommend that sort of some kind of cyber requirement go along with terms and conditions for exemption.

I mean, if you're thinking in the context of equivalent safety, how would you compare a highly automated vehicle and the cyber requirements you would want to put on that to, say, I don't even know what vehicle? It's the comparable vehicle that you will be demonstrating equivalent safety against.

MS. KRAYEM: I think on the cyber side I'm not necessarily articulat- -- or advocating specific standards per se. We're still talking about safety and securities and the outcome, which is something that we're used to in the automotive industry.

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You just have to identify where the -- which aspects of the vehicle are vulnerable to outside influence whether it's taking over the vehicle and putting in place or understanding what safety considerations the OEM has decided to offer to meet those risks.

I think that's going to depend on each vehicle. And we see that in other sectors.

DR. SHLADOVER: I think we need to keep in mind that the cyber threats to the automated vehicles are not fundamentally different from the cyber threats to all of the vehicles that are out on the road right now. So that's with us here and now with virtually any modern vehicle. This is not really fundamentally different.

But what is fundamentally different is that we now have technology embedded in the vehicles that

is making really, really complicated decisions about the driving environment. And when we think about the standards that are currently in place, things like FMVSS, they deal with very narrow aspects of vehicle performance and things that can be tested objectively in very carefully measured ways.

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When we look at the behavior of a vehicle in the full complexity of traffic it's virtually impossible to construct a test scenario that will represent the complexity of that environment in a way analogous to what you would do for testing FMVSS compliance.

MS. YOON: Jackie, what do you think about terms and conditions of exemptions and equivalent safety? What would you say?

MS. GLASSMAN: Well, I think what we're hearing and listening to the conversation is the question of whether we ought to be trying to look at this as a comparative.

Do we pick a current vehicle and say we're comparing the level of safety to a traditional vehicle or do we try to undertake the question of how do we

define safety in this environment knowing that the highly automated vehicles have to share the road with traditional vehicles?

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And should be -- and maybe that means we move more towards a functional safety definition as opposed to the very limited and narrow system component approaches of the FMVSS.

And maybe then if we do move towards a functional safety approach, how do we embed that into a program where the government has some role in the regulation?

But it takes us away from the strict and narrow consideration of whether we're comparing this to another -- the other thing I'll just say about the statistics in my recent experience trying to prove out a technology through the exemption process the technology worked very well, but just due to the statistics it was impossible to statistically prove any difference or a value to technology using this.

So even the original requirements, the original purpose of the exemption authority is almost impossible to prove given the statistics today.

MS. YOON: So, okay. Let's go with that. I'm hearing a couple people say statistics maybe don't work for proving equivalent safety. And, Jackie, you started in functional safety. Maybe that's how you start to get at how safe is safe, right? But given the agency's authority is currently written, equivalent safety does seem to have some quantitative element. How would we tie these things together? MS. GLASSMAN: Well, first we have to think about how we want to tie them together so that when that conversation takes place at Congress we have an approach that might last not four or six months and not be based only on the past, but can move us forward for another 10 or 20 years as this new environment develops. Looking at what is equivalent safety you've got to look at what is the purpose. You first look at what is the purpose of each requirement. The purpose is to stop, make sure the vehicle stops when appropriate and an appropriate stopping distance.

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It's to steer appropriately and not lose control of

the steering. It's to not -- it's to not turn over under certain events.

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If we can meet those kind of functional requirements, those kind of functional purposes, the methodology of how we test the vehicles to get to that point may be less significant.

So if we can focus more on the function and less on the testing methodology, it's not completely consistent with the original concept of self-certification but it's -- somehow we have to build off of the self-certification system to allow this to take place.

MS. YOON: Norma, you want to take that?

MS. KRAYEM: I just want to add one piece.

The current structure is that the vehicle must perform to certain standards and then it's up to the human driver to make decisions about how they operate the vehicle safely.

And when we look at the different levels of autonomous vehicles, we're talking about the scaling where the vehicle, itself, it making almost 100 -- well, ultimately 100 percent of the decisions. And

within that it has to communicate in some way to the human driver or give the human driver that ability to take the control of the vehicle back over.

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When you go to Level 5 and it's highly autonomous, then -- and we're talking about on-demand vehicles and other things -- we still have to look at what that interaction is and even training, then, the human driver who's no longer used to operating the vehicle when they have to take back over, what they have to do. And, again, that just means a different level of outcome that the vehicle needs to meet.

Now, I'm not saying we have to decide all of that today because I don't think that we can. But I think as we talk about whether it's new regulatory authorities for NHTSA, we're trying to come up with a concurrent regulatory structure where we can move innovation forward, manage safety issues, but still allow the industry to bring innovation to us which is hugely important.

MS. GLASSMAN: Yeah. And remember, too, that the FMVSS apply at the point of sale. The point of for sale. On road safety risks are still handled

1 by the defects process.

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DR. SHLADOVER: One thing I also wanted to bring up that we've talked about interacting with other vehicles. Remember our vulnerable road users. These vehicles also need to interact with pedestrians and bicyclists, not just with the other vehicles on the road.

And now we're dealing with another level of complexity in terms of how do they interact, how do they communicate with each other in a way that's going to ensure safety and proper coexistence on our limited road infrastructure.

MS. YOON: So, Steve, that's a good point.

And I was thinking about what Jackie said about instead of thinking about automated vehicles or highly automated vehicles meeting the test that's in the FMVSS, maybe we go back to the purpose behind the test.

Why is the test there? Is the automated vehicle meeting the purpose?

But that's for when you have tests. In some of the cases interaction with vulnerable road users

and some of the stuff that Norma was talking about it's not just -- it's not just how does the vehicle perform in a limited context of what the FMVSS currently cover, but how does the vehicle perform, period, out there on the road making all the decisions that the human driver potentially would be making.

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So if you're going back to the purpose, how do you define the purpose in sort of that outside the FMVSS context?

And Steve's reaching for it.

DR. SHLADOVER: I think if we try going too far in that direction we'll just run around in circles and we won't -- we won't really get very far because of the complexity of the problem.

I think it's going to be necessary to go back to something that came up in some of the earlier sessions which is about the functional safety process. How do you make sure that the process that the system developer followed has shown proper cognizance of the threats that are going to be encountered and that they've managed to deal with those threats?

You can't possibly go through all the

scenarios that'll be encountered with all the other road users. You couldn't possibly incorporate them in a test because the test would take forever to execute. And crashes will always occur in the corner cases. Those really rare cases that you probably didn't think about when you designed the system or that you couldn't fit into the test program. So the notion that we can test our way to proving safety I think is a fallacious one. MS. GLASSMAN: It's interesting to see the -- all three conversations morph together. The safety assurances, the premarket approval or premarket review, and the exemption or deemed to comply conversations fundamentally are the same conversation which is how do we define safety, how do we account for it, and how do we if not measure it -- how do we have a program that at least assures that everybody's taking the same considerations into account, developing them into the vehicles and putting on the roads vehicles that the government can have some level of objective oversight over? DR. SHLADOVER: Government and consumers and

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insurance industry and the political leadership all levels that need to have a level of comfort that we're actually not going to be degrading safety, but at least hopefully improving it, but certainly not making it any less than it is today.

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MS. KRAYEM: The last piece I'll add is the whole discussion about machine learning and artificial intelligence is hugely important to the future of this industry. It's not something that the normal consumer understands. It's not something that every member of Congress understands.

And while we're saying 94 percent of all crashes in the United States are because of human error, we have to think ahead to what that -- and you mentioned this in your documents -- the ethical consideration about machine learning and artificial intelligence and the decisions that the vehicle will make.

These are much harder things to deal with on the right here and the now and how to test. But I do think from a public acceptance standpoint that's something I know that NHTSA's looking at trying to

1 manage and it's hugely important. Again, not 2 something we're going to fix today, but that's a factor that's going to be challenging to test against 3 4 as we go forward. MS. YOON: Absolutely. I think it's 5 interesting how far maybe the discussion has veered 6 7 from the original expanded exemption authority 8 question so I'm going to bring it back around at the 9 end, which is fine. 10 But this is -- no. This is better. But given everything that we've discussed I asked at the 11 12 beginning do you think the expanded exemption 13 authority question is ripe. It sounds like a lot of folks are leaning 14 15 more towards, sure, that's fine, but maybe we need something like functional safety instead. 16 17 Do you view expanded exemption authority as sort of a gap filler under we get to something else? 18 19 I mean, given, Norma, what you brought up in the first place about Congress needs to provide us 20 2.1 with this authority anyway would this be the thing 2.2 that you would go for if you were in charge or would

you sort of -- you know, it's worth asking.

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MS. KRAYEM: It's so much fun to be in charge, but then you have to make a decision. You know, before I would do that with the Congress I would very clearly articulate which aspects of the problem I was trying to solve with expanded exemption authority.

If it is intended to be a gap filler, well, we identify all the issues that we've all talked about and the other panels. If it's intended to work at some point concurrently with updating the FMVSS, then I think holistically that might make sense.

But to simply go to Congress right now and say, well, you know, we need to give the sector a little more room to wriggle so we figure out what's what. You know, that probably won't get you so far, but if you put it all together then I would make the decision if it's worth going forward.

DR. SHLADOVER: I think the central question is what process are you going to have to go through to issue the exemption if you're going to issue the exemption. Whether it's expanded or within the existing exemption authority you still need to have a

good process for saying this one deserves the 1 2 exemption, this other one doesn't. Where do you draw 3 the line in terms of what's acceptable or not based on 4 safety? 5 MS. GLASSMAN: And you're going to need 6 that, as Steve says, regardless of what process you 7 If you go to Congress you don't get to go to 8 Congress all that often so you want to --9 No kidding. MS. YOON: 10 MS. GLASSMAN: -- you know, you want to ask 11 for what you really -- you really need. If you go to 12 Congress and say we want, you know, we want to 13 eliminate the temporal or expand the temporal limitation, we want to eliminate or expand the volume 14 15 expectation, at some point you're going to move beyond 16 whatever the next level is. If we still have this question if you leave 17 18 the substantive elements alone, what is an equivalent 19 level of safety? If you eliminate those temporal and volume limitations, you modify or eliminate the 20 2.1 concept that you have to prove out an equivalent level

of safety and you say when appropriate NHTSA can

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exempt, that would be okay. But it would overwhelm the agency.

MS. YOON: And thank you for thinking of that. We appreciate it. I didn't see, were there any cards?

MS. SWEET: All right. We did not receive any question cards. Does anyone in the audience have a question for our panelists?

No. Okay. You guys covered it. Okay.

MS. YOON: It's done.

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MS. SWEET: Okay. So let's go ahead and then thank our fourth panel.

Okay. So as we set up for our fifth panel this one will be on Post Sale Tools to Regulate

Software Updates. It's going to be moderated by Mr.

Steve Wood, our assistant chief counsel for NHTSA.

And just give us a minute or so here to set up. I would remind folks if you do have a question, there are index cards that can be handed out and some pens. And just look for the NHTSA staff and then they'll collect them from you.

We have one other panel after this.

(Brief pause). And I would just remind the 1 2 panelists that when you go to turn your microphone on you're going to see a face with it looks like words 3 4 coming out. So you'll just tap that and that'll 5 activate your microphone. (Brief pause). And, Steve, we're ready, 6 7 then, whenever you are. 8 MR. WOOD: Good afternoon. My name is Steve 9 Wood, Assistant Chief Counsel for Vehicle Rulemaking 10 and International Harmonization. 11 Our panel topic here is on the subject of 12 Post Sale Software Updates, one of the topics 13 discussed in the Federal Automated Vehicle Policy. I think all of us have consumer products 14 15 that are getting updates -- your iPhones, your iPads, or similar products offered by other manufacturers. 16 17 Sometimes the consequences of those changes are 18 sometimes the loss of data or maybe simply irritation 19 that previous types of functionality may have been lost by an update or you simply don't understand the 20 2.1 new one. 22 In the case of motor vehicles, the

consequences may include those, but they may also be much more significant, in fact, even affecting life and -- life and limb.

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I think if you look at the public comments if you had a chance to do that on this issue there are a number of different perceptions of the post-sale dates and even, indeed, just the basic issue of software.

Some see a history of, say, 25 years of the agency's issuing standards mandating installation of a variety of safety systems whose performance is dependent equally upon their software and hardware components.

Some of the better examples -- some of the better known examples of these are -- were actually mandated by Congress so the advanced air bag, the electronic stability control systems, the recent rule on alert sound for hybrid and electric vehicles.

And although these standards were drafted in terms of how the hardware is to perform, if you think about it in how these systems work, these standards were as much drafted to regulate the software of these

systems as the hardware.

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The only way in which manufacturers can comply, indeed, is by writing the software to command that the hardware perfor- -- command that the hardware perform in the desired ways.

And without the software to interpret the data, to identify risk to make decisions and to direct the hardware components when and how to perform these systems couldn't function.

Indeed without the software you wouldn't have systems. You'd have an assemblage of non-functional hardware. But there is another point of view that hard -- that software being intangible is actually not even subject to regulation under the Vehicle Safety Act which as part of the original vehicle and I think they even more strongly believe not part of -- not regulatable as a separate item.

But before we start asking questions, let's introduce the panel. Let me start with Christine.

Christine -- and unfortunately I have a very short biography. Actually I only have a single sentence so if you could fill in so we know more about you, that

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You're a legislative director, as I understand, at the National Association of Consumer Advocates. And in that capacity or part of that or what would you like to fill in?

MS. HINES: I'm legislative director of the National Association of Consumer Advocates where I advocate on behalf of consumers for strong consumer rights and consumer protections.

Before I was at NACA I was at -- spent seven years a public citizen where I did pretty much the same thing, but advocated before the Consumer Product Safety Commission and before Congress.

MR. WOOD: And next to Christine is Michael,
Michael Clamann, senior research scientist at the
Humans and Autonomy Lab at Duke University.

Among his research interests include human automation interaction and haptic control. And can you offer a few additional words?

MR. CLAMANN: So, excuse me, thank you. In addition to my duties within the Humans and Autonomy Lab where I teach coursework in human factors and the

effects of humans working with advanced automated systems, I'm also the lead robotics editor for the Science Policy Tracking website at Duke University called SciPol.

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I'm also a contract human factors engineer.

I've done work with the FAA, with the FRA, and with

the military on issues related to humans and system

operations.

MR. WOOD: And finally, Adam. Adam Thierer, senior research fellow with the Technology Policy

Program and Mercatus Center at George Mason.

Specializes in technology, media, Internet, free speech policies, particular focus on online safety and digital privacy.

You've also written on permissions lists innovation which is appropriate for this topic -- general topic. Can you supplement that?

MR. THIERER: Well, I generally write about and think about the public policy implications of a wide variety of emerging technologies including autonomous systems and driverless cars, but also robotics, AI, sharing economy, bit coin, advanced

medical device technology, and so on and so forth and attempt to tease out the privacy, safety, and security implications of all these emergency technologies as the old and new worlds collide.

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MR. WOOD: I wonder if, Michael, we might start first before jumping into policy questions and sort of why should we care about post sale updates? What opportunities and challenges do they pose or create for safety in cybersecurity or other considerations?

MR. CLAMANN: Sure. Glad to. So this is an interesting time of the day to be talking about this because I think a lot of the issues that we've talked about in some of the earlier sessions having to do with the preapproval process also relate to the update issue.

So where essentially in the advanced automated systems where the AI -- where the automation becomes the driver you are -- you run the potential risk or opportunity to actually be replacing the driver with your automation after the sale.

So in that sense, you know, any of the thing

-- you can pretty much change any of the oper- -- any of the operations as long as it doesn't have to do specifically with the hardware.

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So when we talk about things like how the cars going to behave in certain accident conditions or how it's going to treat pedestrians and so on any of those things can be effected after the fact. So it comes to a question of whether or not those things should be modified, you know, after the car is sold.

So basically I've looked at some of the comments and one of the things that you see if there is a range, there's a continuum of the types of updates that occur.

It could be something very simple. On the one hand of being, you know, maybe a branding update or maybe information being pushed to the owner of the vehicle about when their next, you know -- when their maintenance is going to be coming up due, could be just simple color or font change to their display, or it go much farther to the point where you actually are changing some of the fundamental aspects of the control of the vehicle.

And when we start talking about some of the futuristic ideas of, you know, ethics and the driver, some of these choices that the operator -- the owner might have made at the time of the sale, they might actually change in the post-sale about how the vehicle, for example, is going to behave in an accident.

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Another issue on the flip -- so those -- and those issues I think the communication to the owner becomes a really big issue. I mean, I think this came up in one of the earlier sessions.

I mean, we don't all read our privacy policies. We don't read those recall notices. And so when you're moving, when you're pushing forth an update that has to do with the control of the vehicle how then -- it's a huge challenge how you keep the driver informed of what the new behavior of the vehicle is. And if that involves some new training, how, then, do you train the driver to deal with this update.

On the flip side you have the issue of cybersecurity which has also come up. Now, this one,

you know, with the design of autonomous vehicles you -- you know, the more updates you get the better and better -- the better the driving becomes.

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And with cybersecurity the longer these vehicles on the road -- are on the road, the better the hackers are going to be. And so with cybersecurity it becomes essential at that point in order to keep up with some of these issues and some of the problems that may come up due to, you know, these vehicles behind hacked you want to be right on top of it. Like if a hack comes in you want to get an update out as soon as possible to be able to deal with those issues.

The last thing that I want to mention on this one is with pedestrians. I'm glad -- this came up in the last panel discussion. That in addition to the driver or the owner of the vehicle being affected by these updates, the pedestrians are going to be affected by these updates, as well.

You know, where we have road signs that we look at now that there's a lot of consistency in the way pedestrian traffic rules work. If individual

vehicles, then, become determined pedestrian safety, how, then, do the pedestrians behave when these updates occur especially when we have different manufacturers who may be having different displays across their vehicles.

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We have several manufacturers right now that are proposing different vehicle to pedestrian displays and there's not -- I haven't seen any consistency among those. If those, then, change with these overthe-air updates, it makes it even more complicated for the pedestrians to be able to handle these changes.

MR. WOOD: Can I -- Christine, from a consumer standpoint why should they be concerned and what rights of theirs might be potentially affected such as right to be warned, right of privacy, right or need to be educated about, as Michael was saying, the practical effects of a sudden perhaps overnight change in the software of your vehicle so that it does not perform the same way on today as it did yesterday?

MS. HINES: So -- sorry. So there are a lot of consumer rights at stake with the technology. But I think, you know, the first -- the first concern with

automated vehicles is to have proper standards before

-- before they enter the market so that, you know,

we're not risking lives for the sake of pushing out

really exciting technology, but technology without

having the appropriate safety information. So I think

that's the first. The first consumer right is a right

to safety.

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And so as far as that goes, you know, the policy has -- has recommended a guidance which may be insufficient for consumers and consumer protection and safety. We think that there should be proper notice and rulemaking for these standards.

It is a complicated technology and I respect that. I'm not here as an expert of the science behind the automated vehicles not by any means, but as someone who has paid attention to standards for consumers in other sectors they're really only effective if they are mandatory.

Voluntary standards means that, well, they're voluntary and people -- and whatever the motivations of manufacturers are to push the exciting technology out there, but they can pick and choose

what they comply with and what they don't comply with I think.

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I think this -- there's so much unknown with this -- with this technology that we need to just before -- I think Sean Kane said something about the cart before the horse or something like that and I completely agree with that in that there should be sufficient -- we're talking about the post, but the pre is what we're really concerned about. And to have enough information beforehand before we rush into things.

And then as far post there is the issue of, you know, privacy and cybersecurity are very important issues. And, again, we need standards for those, too. And somebody mentioned in the previous panel about DHS and that is -- seems worthwhile because they have a lot of knowledge in cybersecurity.

So but all of that needs to be -- we need more information and detail and transparency about those issues before we just kind of rush -- you know, rush everything out there. That's it.

MR. WOOD: Thank you, Christine. Adam, do

you want to jump in at this point?

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MR. THIERER: Sure. I'd be happy to. And I should have said earlier, thank you, Steve, and thank you to NHTSA for inviting me here today. I've already learned a lot. This is a really interesting workshop.

And I think what we're seeing in our conversations today and definitely we see in the topic of this panel is a struggle with what I alluded to a moment ago about worlds colliding, about old sectors being revolutionized by new technologies.

The Silicon Valley venture capitalist Marc Andressen has this famous phrase that "software is eating the world" and that we're seeing the sort of softwarization (sic), if you will, of everything.

And clearly that's been the case in recent years for a whole host of various consumer devices starting with our phones, right, but most obviously now our cars which is about as important of a consumer device as you can get in your life. And it's being completely digitized to the point where it's becoming a rolling computer.

As that happens there's going to be a

significant challenge to traditional policies and frameworks that we put in place for these things we call cars traditionally as they evolve into rolling code and rolling computers.

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And it's particularly a challenge when it comes to the question of what constitutes adequate safety and security. It is something we struggle with mightily in every single other sector that's being disintermediate or disrupted by technology in some way, shape, or form.

I spent a lot of time on medical device issues like this and other things and it's a challenge for every single agency. I've been in many workshops like this, same exact discussion playing out.

I was in an FDA workshop where someone literally held up a phone, "This is a smartphone or is this a medical device?"

And it was a sort of metaphysical discussion that followed about what is this thing and the reality is it's both. And it creates enormous challenges for policies that were established at an age when you could have very clear sort of top down directives that

said, well, you can do this, but thou shall not do that.

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And now we live in a very different world.

It's a world that's going to be one where we need to be a lot more nimble and flexible and roll with the changes because they're happening faster than ever.

We've heard it alluded to multiple times here this morning the so-calling pacing problem, as philosophers of technology call it. A pacing problem refers to the fact that policy evolves sort of incrementally but technology evolves exponentially. And that problem's growing every day.

And so what this means for NHTSA is that we're going to have to come up with a playbook including for post-sale modifications. It's a lot different than the old sort of thou shall not playbook and one that probably has sort of best practices or some guidance but understands that there is no such thing as perfectly safe or secure code. That it's an ongoing process. There's no end point or perfect security and that we'll have to devise fixes in real time to account for this.

This is exactly what innovators are doing with real time OTA update, over-the-air updates.

Every automotive company and everybody out there is going to be used to the idea that just as you're getting constant updates on your phone you're going to get constant updates on your car -- updates in your car.

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That's a good thing, but it creates a fundamental insecurity I think among all of us -- consumers, the public, and regulators -- about, well, how do we know what's happening at all times?

And the answer is we don't. We have to sort of take a leap into the great unknown in saying a lot of this is literally going to be learning by doing, making it up as we're going along. Finding these problems and experimenting through trial and error.

I totally recognize the discomfort that creates for agencies and industry that value certainty. And yet certainty in the form of sort of thou shall not directives or preemptive, prescriptive types of traditional reviews of post-sale modifications I just don't think they're going to work

in this new world.

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MR. WOOD: So you mentioned FDA. I mean, you must be familiar, then, with other agencies such as the Federal Railroad Administration dealing with positive train control, FAA dealing with commercial aircraft, FDA for the medical devices. All of them have guidance on validation of software for new vehicles, forgetting about the updates presumably.

And I think the policy we issued addresses this. There's some need to validate the software for vehicles as originally manufactured and then presumably the same concerns, then, applied to the updates.

As you mentioned, they have corrective value, they are introducing new capabilities, in the case as in Tesla it changed the amount of importance given to different types of sensor data.

But how would you balance providing a degree of -- and this is a question for all of you. How would you balance getting the updates in there which is partly experimentation, there is improvement, but it may introduce new problems.

How do you provide a measure of assurance to the public without interfering overly with the whole process of correction and refinement?

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MR. THIERER: Well, the common framework across all these agencies and technology topics you've just discussed comes back to a word you used which is guidance. And I think we're seeing the emergence of what some political scientists call sort of soft law for a lot of these emerging technologies as opposed to traditional sort of hard or fixed law.

Soft law being more flexible, dynamic, sort of a little bit of make it up as you go along. And a lot of its agencies being nimble and responding to concerns as they develop in the form of guidance.

Sometimes it's called best practices. We've seen a lot of these sorts of things come out of the Federal Trade Commission lately for various technologies -- NTIA, FDA, FAA.

I had to develop an entire spreadsheet of just all the multi-stakeholder soft law processes that are going on for emerging technologies today to keep track of them all.

And what they share in common is sort of these best practices being hammered out as we go along with a little bit of post market -- well, not a little bit, a lot of post market sort of rigorous surveillance of what's happened by the agencies.

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And then a determination of do we need to take action. What NHTSA would do, of course, would be recall action. Other agencies have different powers as we heard earlier today.

And then we've forgotten about a big part of what the agencies can do in terms of public education and educating not just industry, but consumers, themselves, about a lot of these changes or potential dangers.

The FDA's doing a lot more on risk education now in the context of mobile medical devices on your smartphone. And they've basically given up on a whole class of emerging technologies like mobile medical dictionaries they're uploaded every day and updated and FDA just says, okay. We just can't keep up with that.

But if you want to stick like a hypodermic

needle like on the end of your phone and put it in your arm, you better go through the FDA and get approval. So they have got a spectrum of how to deal with those technologies.

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And then one final thing I'll mention beyond those other tools that we haven't discussed here today is the role of torts, product liability, and product defects law. There's a whole nother way of regulating technology that exists beyond the confines of this beltway.

And that's a very, very important thing in many other sectors, but we haven't thought about it as much in this one I guess which is kind of strange because carmakers are being sued -- you know, they get sued quite a bit.

But driverless carmakers and the makers of the code that powers them in the future people will be litigating these things, too, when cases and controversies develop.

MR. WOOD: Michael?

MR. CLAMANN: I think one thing that's very important to remember when we look across these

different agencies, when we look at the FDA, the FRA, and the FAA, with all of those systems we're dealing with highly trained operators. Ones that seek out updates on a very regular basis.

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So when you're looking at pilots, when you're looking at engineers, when you're looking at doctors and nurses these are people who on a daily basis are going to find out, okay, what new regulations do I have to deal with that have just come out.

With drivers we're dealing with a very different audience. You're dealing with the general public. You know, we go in, we've got our drivers licenses, you know, when we're 16 or 17 and then we go in for a periodic eye test.

And there are -- it remains a challenge for a number of organizations to try to reach out to these people to try to say these are some of the safety issues. And we see these campaigns all the time and they vary in their effectiveness.

So one of the things that is definitely going to be an issue here is, you know, we can look to

these other agencies to see, okay, how do they send out these update, how do they communicate these updates. We should look to those, as well, to see, okay, what do we need to put in place for drivers to make sure that these same types of updates are being communicated to them, as well.

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MR. WOOD: Christine, do you --

MS. HINES: So I just wanted to start with one statement. And just the rise of technology is inevitable, but don't risk lives to go from unknown to the known.

And I think, you know, this is particularly important here. You know, it's different from the iPhones which I think iPhone apps still there's a risk of cybersecurity issues and privacy issues. But when we're talking about software updates on -- in cars that could lead to serious harm it's a little different.

Just in regards to some of the other, you know, tort laws were mentioned and product liability.

And that's really interesting as far as post sale is concerned. Which brings up the broad -- broad

preemption statement that was in the policy. I wasn't thinking about it in terms of tort law necessarily, but I think that there are state consumer protection laws that -- and NHTSA has a very broad preemption statement in the policy which was very concerning.

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And, you know, we -- the states -- the National Conference of State Legislatures they have a list of the -- of I think 15 or 16 states that have some sort of legislation on the self-driving cars.

And they want to be careful. I mean, these states are concerned about their residents and their residents' safety and their own standards, as well.

And it's fair that NHTSA should have -- certainly have minimum standards of what -- of what performance is and what safety is.

But we should be concerned about consumer protection rights under their own state's laws.

MR. WOOD: Thank you. Michael, both you and Adam mentioned the industry differences. You were talking about the professional user in products regulated by some other agencies and, Michael, you were talking about the range of significance in some

of the updates or types of software involved whether it's your medical encyclopedia or the needle assembly fixed to or connected to the -- your iPhone.

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So in the case of the automotive industry compared to the other industries you can think of like the train industry with positive train control and the medical device, et cetera, how is the automotive industry and its products different if they are and what implications do those have on how we monitor post sale updates and provide guidance?

How should that guidance differ? And what

-- what are the automotive analogs to the types of

examples you gave about encyclopedia versus the

hypodermic needle?

MR. THIERER: Well, that's a good question, Steve. And I think one thing that I've seen not just from the FDA, but these other agencies that I monitor is that they've learned that they have to pick their battles. They have to figure out maybe like here's the threat scenario for this particular technology or its software updates or whatever else that would be most risky and here are the ones that we can live

with.

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So that FDA example is, you know, a pretty stark one of just a dictionary saying please don't lie about things and if you do it's fraudulent behavior, but then there's the more serious invasive types of technologies that cause serious potential harm to life and limb.

And so, you know, that's the FDA and its officials making a choice about where to draw some lines understanding that we live in a world of limited resources including regulatory resources.

For a car that's a little bit more complicated because, you know, how do you unbundle the code part versus the mechanical part and there's that relationship between them in order to make the machine work.

And it seems like NHTSA's really struggling with this in the comments and a lot of people that commented to the agency talked about this. You know, can you make that broad line distinction? It's going to be hard.

But I do think there's no doubt that the

soft -- the pace of innovation at the code level is going to be happening at a much, much faster clip than at the mechanical -- the physical one. And, you know, with NHTSA's recall authority you have the ability to address both ex-post.

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The question is can you do it preemptively?

And what I'm suggesting is on the software side of things that's going to be extraordinarily difficult.

That it's better to rigorously monitor the market performance of the vehicle as a whole and figure out what went wrong afterwards and determine if that could be corrected, if it needs a recall, or something else or if there's some other remedy.

But that real world experimentation is going to be happening at a faster clip I think whether we like it or not. I've written about that in other contexts about how we're not doing this in the vacuum of just the United States of America.

This is happening internationally and we live in a world now characterized by global innovation arbitrage where innovators are saying, well, we're not getting the flexibility to do it here, we're going to

go somewhere else and do it. And so that's another uncomfortable reality we have to live with here.

MR. WOOD: Michael?

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MR. CLAMANN: No. I agree that the rapid evolution of software is going to make this a huge challenge just to be able to keep up with the changes that are going to be happening.

I think as we look across agencies we're seeing that these advances in technology are affecting all of them and everybody's kind of looking back to see, you know, what changes they have to be making.

So you have the FAA, which is dealing with their own guidelines at this point for the -- for effecting drones. So while right now you're allowed to go out and buy one of these things and use it for business purposes, they're still limited to line of sight. So this aspect of autonomy is still being kept out of drone use for the time being.

You've got -- within the rail industry
you've got positive train control which offers a lot
of things. For example, you know, right now actually
this is true with pilots and with engineers that you

need two people in the cockpit after a certain number of hours of use. And positive train control may help the single operator to be able to deal with some emergencies that he or she may not have been able to deal with before.

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But, you know, with the rail industry they've been trying to implement positive train control for a number of years. And I think recently, you know, they kicked it out to 2021 at this point moving it another three years before it can actually be implemented due to some of the issues that they're dealing with between industry and the regulatory environment.

And then, again, we have with computer assisted surgery in the medical domain. You've had the so-call robotic surgery devices which have been around for 17 years at this point, but none of these have any kind of automation behind them.

And I've talked to a bunch of surgeons who are very interested in what's going on in autonomous vehicles saying we have cars now that can park themselves. You know, why can't I have robotic

surgery device that can tie off a surgery -- tie off a suture or close a wound?

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And so I think all of these agencies need to talk to each other to find out what is everyone doing to be able to, you know, find out what the best -- what the best course of action is.

MS. HINES: Just one quick comment. So in regards to, say, FAA and the CPSC, the policy has, you know, refers to, you know, new regulatory tools and refers to certification.

And both the FAA and the CPSC have third party or not self-certification. And that could be something or that's something we recommend that the agency think about in this case, again, for the post regulatory tools, for the software updates.

If there are -- if there is a third-party standard for complying with -- for compliance to get software updates out, that might be, again, something that would protect consumers.

MR. THIERER: Again, just make a brief comment on this because I think NHTSA alluded to this question of like is there another model that we can

1 think about.

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And when talking about the FAA model, NHTSA says, and I quote, "The duration of the FAA certification process varies. Typically, however, they last three to five years. And that the most recent one for the Boeing Dreamliner lasted considerably longer, an estimated 200,000 hours of FAA staff time, and lasted eight years."

I would hope if nothing else today we can agree that's not a particularly good model for driverless car technology. We need things to move a little bit faster than even the average three to five years.

And I think NHTSA identifies that problem nicely and says we need to be aware of these tradeoffs. So, yes, we should make safety the paramount value, but we're also not having this debate happen in a vacuum. As the Administrator started off by talking about this morning, we live in an era when 35,000 people are losing their lives every year on the road.

And, you know, we're not starting this

debate about driverless cars from the fresh point. We have a starting point of a lot of deaths already due to human error.

I have to believe the baseline could be improved by embracing this technology.

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MR. CLAMANN: I'm just going to make comment related to the FAA again is that there was also, you know, the issue with the FAA as they kind of switched their -- some of their focus in the early 90s they were referred to as a tombstone agency because a lot of the policies that they enforced at that point had to do with recovering from fatalities.

So, for example, you know, when we have a flight that crashed in the Everglades due to a fire that happened in the cargo hold it took awhile before they were able to install smoke detectors and fire alarms within the cargo holds.

So it also does help to look at some of these issues in advance. Look at some of the guidelines that are already in place in some of the other agencies to do the hazard, do the risk analysis in advance to see -- try to predict what problems may

come up so we're not having to chase afterward with other -- other methods to be able to stop fatalities after they've already occurred.

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MS. WILLIAMS: Okay. We have a couple questions.

MR. FIKENTSCHER: So the first question:

Some of this panel's discussion has operated under the assumption that the status quo is reckless -- is riskless. Sorry. Riskless. That makes more sense.

Which we know it's not, i.e., rising fatalities.

How risky would a post market software update have to be to justify delay?

MR. THIERER: Well, I just alluded to this and, you know, this is what economists call the opportunity costs of regulation. That we live in a world of tradeoffs.

So perfect safety, if that's our goal, and we try to institute it by policy is actually going to lead to less safety. Because if you spend all your time obsessing about hypothetical worst-case scenarios and base a public policy upon it, then ultimately many best-case scenarios will never come about.

That it's only through ongoing trial and error experimentation that we get greater prosperity and wisdom and learning. And we learn from our failures and we also get innovation through that trial and error iterative process.

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So a lot of the great success stories of not just automotive engineering, but all forms of engineering have come about through trial and error experimentation. A lot of it being done in the real world.

In my filing to NHTSA we actually took an effort to try to put some math to this and quantify this and talked about that using the baseline that others have come up with in terms of the potential delay. We could be talking about just a 10 percent slowdown you're looking at somewhere in the order of over 10,000 -- or, I'm sorry, over 30,000 lives potentially over a 30-year year period being foregone we could have saved assuming that driverless car technology could save a certain percentage of lives. And we used industry standards that were used in other reports.

I know these things are debatable in terms of exact numbers. We went through the exercise to exemplify these tradeoffs. And as the questions are asked, you know, we don't live in a riskless world right now. We live in a world where human error leads to around 94, 95 people losing their lives every single day and 6,500 people being injured because of that human error.

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MR. CLAMANN: There's a precedent within safety engineering for compar- -- for looking at risk and determining if there needs to be an intervention. Essentially it's a formula that looks at the probability of a risk occurring and the severity of the risk occurring.

So when we look at the types of updates that are going to come through, if it's something that, you know, isn't going to come up very often and has to do with a simple cosmetic change, it's probably not something that you need to intervene with. It's probably something we go through.

But if you look at the opposite extreme -- something that is extremely likely to happen or

something that happens frequently and something that's going to lead to some kind of a catastrophic multi-car accident, then, yes, you probably do want to step in and intervene in advance of this being released over the air.

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But then it depends on where across that continuum do you -- do you want to stop. And so it would be up to, you know, someone with a different pay grade than me try to look across that continuum in figuring out what is the point where we have to stop. But that point would exist, it just has to be decided on within that continuum.

MS. HINES: Okay. So just really quickly.

I mean, I don't have a number for you, but, I mean, I could say that, you know, just looking at, you know -- just looking at the news and the air bags and the -- all the various safety issues that have killed hundreds or thousands of consumers not because of their human error, but because of manufacturer -- manufacturer error and which have -- which could have been prevented.

And even where there have been recalls and

they identified the wrong fix for it and still had to make additional recalls because the -- because they didn't identify what the real problem was.

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So we've -- so we've seen this. And so I think, you know, there is -- that's out there and that could have been prevented. And that, you know, let's not make human lives part of your beta testing trial and error situation. These are people.

There are people who are going to be on the road who are driving cars on their own and then you have automated vehicles also on the road. So you're risking their lives, as well, then -- you know, then you're going to have vehicles that are kind of automated, but not really. And so you're going to have all of these three things on the road at the same time.

And so what we're saying here is, you know, we don't -- you know, we don't have a number for you, but a lot more could be done. We see what's happening now with people's lives being risked because of, you know, defects in cars which could have been prevented.

So, you know, there is a lot of work to be

done. And what we're saying is if there are, you know, proper standards, proper standards, you know, it is complicated and I understand that. But there can be proper standards with testing, proper standards for post-sale, proper standards, you know, throughout the process and we need those to be enforceable.

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MR. WOOD: Let me just add something there.

There's another aspect of what Christine's raising and that is -- and it's a source of a different kind of delay.

In addition to the human carnage, the agency, over its history, has experienced problems with different types of performance. Air bags in the mid/late 90s in low-speed crashes there were some drivers and young children being killed by air bags.

And I think one of the -- I think both the manufacturer as well as the regulators recognize that a concern is trying to maintain consumer confidence.

And so trying to strike the right balance between preintroduction or premaking of the software updates as well as the post-market surveillance.

That you need to try to maintain -- manage

risk in a way in which keeps that flow of technology moving forward and having the permission within society and within government for that process to continue to occur.

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MS. WILLLIAMS: Okay. With that we're going to conclude that panel since we have one last panel to get through this afternoon. So can you thank our panelists?

So and our sixth and final panel is on other potential tools. This will, again, be moderated by Mr. Paul Hemmersbaugh, chief counsel for NHTSA. He started us out this morning -- or this afternoon and he's going to finish us out, as well.

And I do just want to make one point. We did reach out to FDA and also CPSC. They unfortunately couldn't be with us today. They had other commitments. But these are dialogs that we definitely will be having with them since they are very relevant to this discussion.

(Sic) own advice. For the panelists when you want to turn on your microphone, again, if you look down it's

1 the button with the face, okay.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: So I noticed that our MC said we had one more panel to get through. I wish you all --

MS. WILIAMS: I apologize.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: -- courage and

perseverance --

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MS. WILLIAMS: I did not mean it that way.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: -- in that task. I got through all the panels today and I had a couple observations that I thought would be useful or at least of some value in summing up.

I think one of the things is that these are some hard problems. And, you know, as Casey Stengel was reputed to have said, you know, "it's really hard to forecast especially about the future."

And the things that it seems like a lot of the panelists have said are that it's really important to get this regulatory approach right so you done stymie innovation and you don't short change safety and so forth. So it's really important to get it right, but how to get it right people don't seem to

have a lot of ideas.

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And similarly, I think, although we're talking about tools -- regulatory tools, it seemed also that people were saying, you know, the substance of how you do this -- what is the content of these tools and against what standards do you apply these tools and so forth. That the substance of that is really important and it's really important to get that right.

And then something that seems to me a little bit intentional with that people say but you need to do it really quickly. And you need to keep pace with this technology that is difficult to understand and difficult to predict, but let's do it quickly.

And so I'm sort of adding all those things up. I guess my thought was that the agency needs to be more perfect about these things. And so we'll try.

But I think it's really, you know, joking aside, it has illustrated that these are some tough problems and that they're not necessarily susceptible of easy solutions or perhaps of solutions that we've used well in other context.

And one of the things I'd like to encourage the three panelists here to talk about is if they have ideas about tools -- so this is kind of a cleanup obviously. And we're talking about -- here about other regulatory tools that the agency might use.

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And if you folks have ideas about things that were not included in the policy, I'd be very interested in hearing about them, we all would. But I think that this illustrates to me more than anything that the importance of this kind of dialog, but also that it's ongoing.

And it's one of the reasons we made this policy -- we're having these fora and hearings and also that we made this policy to be renewed and refreshed with some frequency is a little bit of a degree of humility about what we know about all this and what we can know and how the process needs to be the product of our learning as we go forward.

Before I go any further, let me introduce the panel members. We have directly on my immediate right Ryan Hagemann, Hagemann. Ryan is the techno- -- technology and civil liberties policy analyst at the

Niskanen Center. His research specialties include 1 2 privacy and surveillance, robotics and automation, 3 decentralized networks, Internet policy, and issues at 4 the intersection of sociology, economics, and 5 technology. So he's the one who's going to give us the solutions. 6 7 His previously authored works on the Economic and Social Ramifications of Autonomous 8 9 Vehicles with the Mercatus Center. 10 To his right and in the middle is Ian Adams. He's a senior fellow with the R Street Institute and R 11 12 Street's former western region director. He is also 13 an insurance and public policy associate with the firm Orrick, Herrington, and Sutcliffe in Sacramento, 14 15 California, where he advises clients on matters at the intersection of law, business, and public policy. 16 17 His research and writing has focused on 18 state-based property and casualty insurance 19 regulation. And finally we have with us on the far right 20 -- well, I guess we'll find that out, but to my right, 2.1 22 Cary Coglianese, the Edward Shils Professor of Law and

Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania where he currently serves as the director of the Penn program on regulation and has served as the law school's deputy dean for academic affairs.

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He specializes in the study of regulation and regulatory process with an emphasis on the puracol evaluation of alternative regulatory strategies and the role of public participation, negotiation, and business government relations in policymaking.

Thanks to the panel for coming today and thanks for persevering through the rest of the panels.

The first tool that we -- that I'd like to discuss and have each of you sort of give your take on is the notion of having a variable testing procedure for testing automated vehicles and their competence and their -- or their behavioral competence.

And the notion here I think is that in a very complex environment -- in fact, I think Mr.

Shladover mentioned this -- that in such a complex environment it's tough to have a single objective test that can take into account all the variability that especially higher level automated vehicles will

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And at the same time if you had such a test that had all these things sort of preprogrammed or preset in advance, it might be susceptible to the gaming of the test.

And so our Vehicle Safety Act, our authority, has been interpreted to require us to have a -- essentially a static test. So there might be some need for either new legislation or potentially a different interpretation of our testing authority.

But, first, does it make sense for us to have a variable test that is not applied in precisely the same way to each and every vehicle?

Ryan?

MR. HAGEMANN: Right. There we go. Well, first off, thank you, Paul. Thank you to NHTSA for having me here.

So I'll answer that question very briefly, but then I'm going to blow it up and broaden my response a little bit to discuss the toolkit, in general, that we're talking about here.

So, in short, attempting to impose some sort

of whether it's static or variable testing scheme here dynamic or otherwise to these types of vehicles and this type of underlying technology I think runs the risk of running into a lot of problems. And a lot of problems that aren't going to be easily communicated to the regulators.

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There is this notion in artificial intelligence research called algorithmic pareidolia. Pareidolia is a psychological condition where one looks at a pattern or an object and sees something that is not actually there. So they interpret, for example, a -- if any of you have ever seen the movie Mallrats, the fellow who's looking at the magic eye and he's trying to see the boat, the schooner as the child tells him, that's sort of what we deal with in AI research when we're talking about algorithmic pareidolia.

The difficulty is if you get the algorithm coming back to telling you, you know, you feed it the image of a cat but it comes back and it feeds you, you know, an answer that says, well, it's a jumble of nothing or alternatively you get a jumble of nothing

that's fed to it and it comes back and it says, well, it's a cat. There's no real way for the algorithm to actually explain to you why it is it made that decision.

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So I think a lot of the trouble you're going to run to -- into with that first tool is at this point there's no real objective measurement tool we can use to assess why it is an autonomous vehicle maybe made a particular decision that it made.

But to broaden this a little bit more, my comments don't actually focus on the tools here at the end of the Federal Automated Vehicles Policy Guidelines at all because I saw the tools as a means to support a number of the newly proposed authorities in the guidance document almost some of which I objected to on a number of different grounds. And we've already covered those in all of the other panels.

But just to put that into perspective for you, the reason I didn't focus so much on these tools in particular was because of -- because the way I saw them was a means to support those ends.

Something that I think we need to think about moving forward here when we start to discuss not just these tools, but what our next steps are is something that my friends over at the Mercatus Center I thought did a fabulously excellent job on with these comments which is cost benefit analysis.

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We aren't -- we just don't have enough cost benefit analysis that have been done or that maybe are on the horizon to be done to assess what kind of an impact some of the proposed new authorities are going to have and there's a lot still to be done there.

So I think next steps for us is not only embarking on that path, but also addressing what I look at as the underlying question with all of this which is what exactly is it we're trying to regulate here?

We're not actually talking about -- and I've heard the phrases functional safety processes, system safety processes. I mean, are these checklists for software engineers? Is this what we're talking about?

I mean, what we're actually talking about I see maybe this as the subtext throughout some of the

automated vehicle guidelines policies. But what I'm worried about and why I objected to some of these newly proposed authorities is I see this as perhaps -- I don't want to call it a stalking horse -- but a situation which we start regulating the underlying algorithms at play here. The underlying artificial intelligence and we essentially turn NHTSA into the Federal Code Commission as some have proposed.

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That worries me partly because, as I've already explained, part of the reason tool number one maybe isn't that valuable for us right now in terms of assessing appropriate objective standards of regulations for these vehicles is we don't actually know how AI works in all situations.

So to give you just a very broad understanding of AI, here's basically how AI works. This is basically underpants gnomes logic for you. Step one, inputs; step two; step three, outputs. And then there's an infructuous feedback loop where the outputs are fed back into the -- it's complicated, but basically algorithms -- artificial intelligence in general is still kind of sort of a black box for all

1 of us.

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And so when we're actually talking about autonomous vehicles I think we need to start separating the actual physical car from what we're actually talking about with automated vehicles which is the artificial intelligence that feeds into the software algorithms that actually make the automation possible.

How you regulate -- how you regulate that I don't have a good answer to that. And anyone who says they do is probably fibbing a little bit.

So I just wanted to sort of attack this from a high level starting point to begin with because, you know, I think the toolkit is, you know, if we can make this work, great. But I don't think it is a workable solution to what right now seems like a problem that ultimately needs to be solved by industry-like consensus based standards and best practices in partnership with NHTSA and other federal regulators.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Ian?

MR. ADAMS: Yes. And I also am pleased to be here, Paul. Thank you.

So I suppose I'll jump right in. I don't know that deviating from objective testing procedures is the way to move because simply if I'm going to take a test and I am in an industry with other folks, I'd very much like the other participants in the industry to be taking the same test.

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At least with my clients in the insurance industry if we were held to different regulatory standards, that would be -- that would be a real problem for me.

And then the second element of that is that I don't know how profound the problem with gaming is going to be in the event that during these tests, right, manufacturers play to the test and then in the real world these vehicles are unable to function as we'd hope, right.

So you've got real world constraints in the terms of recall, lawsuits, and as we've talked about at great length today, customer trust which is going to be a large component of this new technology's adoption moving forward.

So and finally I think that this is

something where in -- once these vehicles are deployed if there is some sort of a failing that was not detected in an objective test, it's going to become apparent rather quickly in the way that these vehicles operate.

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So I do have some reservations about variable test procedures and I think I'd probably stick to a more objective approach.

MR. HAMMERSBAUGH: Cary, do you have thoughts?

MR. COGLIANESE: I think the concern about gaming is something that exists with any kind of test whether it's objective or variable I think really.

It's something that could always be there.

I guess the variable test would perhaps make it harder to gain and that's for sure. But I think there's actually two other reasons to think about variable testing here that's not stated in the guidelines, but I think probably are even more important than gaming.

One is just that the testing should relate to one's objective. And the objective here is that a

vehicle perform in a highly varied environment. And so if the test is going to meet the objective, it's got to be something that mirrors that varied environment. So that would seem to me to be the first and foremost reason to think about a varied test here and not gaming.

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But a second reason to think about this is that tests in the regulatory context have historically tended to have a narrow set of goals or even maybe just one goal in mind. And, yet, in practice we often demand of technologies and systems the meeting of more than one goal. And variable testing might actually help flush out how -- how vehicles will perform with respect to multiple goals.

What I mean by that let me just give you two examples. One was already mentioned before about that NHTSA has had experience with in the air bag context which the performance test initially was to, you know, meet a set of pressures and so forth on crash test dummies that were sized to the average adult male.

And obviously that -- those systems were built and performed to meet that test well, but didn't

perform as well for people who were smaller than the average adult male. And then with time we've developed more sophisticated tests and now have a range of things that we're looking for.

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But I think that was an example of where you can get with a single test -- a single objective test to sort of a set of blinders -- regulator can get a certain set of blinders. And I think that's important to try to avoid here.

Here's another example from outside of NHTSA's context and it has to do with something we're probably all very familiar with. The child resistant packaging on pharmaceutical products.

Lots of kids were dying because they were able to get access to medications and so forth so the federal government put in place standards that products containing medicines and other harmful substances had to have child-resistant packaging.

And what the standard called for was a test that said give this product -- this package to kids, show them how to open it, and then close it up and see how many of them can open it. And as long as no more

than 15 percent of the kids could open it, it met the test. It was great. And, again, products met that single-objective test.

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But it also turned out to be the case that those products that met that test were hard for adults to open. And so what ended up happening is that adults would open the packages and leave them open because it was so hard to open.

And we went from a situation where there actually were -- was an increase in certain kinds of childhood poisoning from products being left open. So what it -- it took about 15 years and the federal government then created a multi-factor test that said, oh, these product packages have to be hard for kids to open, but they also have to be easy for adults to open.

So I think those are the sorts of factors that I would be thinking about even more than gaming. I think gaming's always a worry one has to think about ways of monitoring, verifying. Not just trusting, but verifying in any kind of testing situation.

But you also need I think and particularly

in this context to pay attention to the highly variable conditions under which vehicles are being used in which in this context the autonomous systems are designed to perform and also to the fact that there's multiple objectives.

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And with that in mind, by the way, I would say that there are likely to be tradeoffs among the various goals and objectives that have been tossed about here today. You know, up until this point in time NHTSA's primary objective I think with respect to automobile design has been safety, but I'm hearing, and rightly so, concerns about things like privacy and cybersecurity which introduce completely new objectives and which may introduce tradeoffs in how these systems perform. And one needs to be mindful of the multiple objectives that in practice we're demanding of these new vehicles.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Thank you. I think that, again, this sort of illustrates, I mean, we've got responses ranging from testing is maybe futile to beware unintended consequences.

What perhaps both of those suggest is that

we're not likely to get it exactly right in the first try. And one response to that sort of uncertainty is to have sunsets in regulations.

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And so, you know, you issue a regulation and then you say in five years it shall cease to apply.

And I think the idea of that is to require agencies to go back and revisit what their regulatory analyses and conclusions were.

And in a lot of ways that seems to make sense to me and I'm going to ask you what you folks think about it. But the one thing I would also ask you to take into account is the length of time it takes to promulgate these regulations in the first place, including cost benefit analysis.

And the -- we can't assume unlimited agency resources. And, in fact, the agency resources are quite limited. And so in the context of limited agency resources, long lead times to promulgate regulations, but aware of the cautions that each of you has sounded, what do you think about sunset provisions in regulations and should it be almost a standard practice or used sparingly or used

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Ryan?

MR. HAGEMANN: I'm a huge fan of sunset provisions. I say include the sunsets all over the place. Especially, though, with emerging technologies because this is an area where, you know, as Adam already pointed out, the technology is just developing, the innovation is occurring at such a fast pace that organizations like NHTSA, the FDA, FAA, all of these federal bureaucracies that were constructed during a time when we didn't experience the type of rapid progress that we've been experiencing now simply can't keep pace.

And that -- this is sort of a broader issue with -- you know, it's not just NHTSA. It's everyone in the federal government, you know. The real question right now of our time I think as it relates to emerging technology regulations is how can regulatory agencies more appropriately tailor their rules to address this current policy dilemma?

And, you know, part of that answer is, well, there's not really a good answer. But maybe the best

answer we have available to us is to simply, you know, promulgate those rules we think will do the most good in a very narrow sense, you know. I mean, pick -- pick your primary goal, as Cary was pointing out, you know, and let's just install a, you know, one to two-year sunset. I'm in favor.

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MR. ADAMS: So, Paul, I'm also comfortable with regulatory sunsets. That's just because I primarily do most of my work in an industry that is really very old when it comes to -- when it comes to the regulatory environment and the insurance industry and we're consistently running into regulations that are different across the states because insurance is regulated at the state level and have been on the books in some cases for decades and decades and no longer bear any resemblance to the sort of ongoing business that is -- that is going on within the industry.

And that's a real problem when it comes to the new and exciting products that we'd like to see developed and that we'd like to see consumers get their hands on and it's also leading to -- I know

you've heard this recently -- a patchwork -- a patchwork across the states of products available to people which has turned into a real loss for consumers.

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But at the same time I'm mindful of the fact that it's very expenses and very time consuming to go back and to reassess these things particularly in the event that the sunset applies to a provision that ultimately will not be changed in a meaningful way.

And so we don't want to be wasting resources either.

So while drop dead sunsets do certainly have, you know, an appeal to them, I think that ongoing dialog, that an iterative approach as NHTSA calls it, an informal approach that has constant contact between the industry and the regulator is likely the best way to inform when the implementation of a sunset may be necessary.

So maybe not right out of the gate, but as you begin to see issues on the horizon potentially introduce one.

MR. COGLIANESE: I think the question is how do we create an optimally flexible or an optimally

rigid regulatory system in the face of innovation. 1 2 And when one looks at it in terms of the optimality 3 and the degree of -- and rigidity is sort of a 4 negative term, but it has a negative connotation to 5 it, but I think there's actually positive connotations, as well. Predictability comes with that 6 7 rigidity. I think a system -- an economy doesn't thrive if we have too much unpredictability in our legal system. 9 10 But when one looks at it, then, and from the 11 standpoint of optimality I think sunset provisions, 12 which may have their place in certain context, are in 13 many contexts a really blunt instrument. 14 There are other ways of creating the 15 smoothing and adaptability to a regulatory system without creating hard sunsets. I mean, one thing, 16 17 Paul, you noted that the -- I think these were you 18 words -- wanted to require agencies to go back and

Well, you can do that without a sunset.

Just require agencies every X period of time go back and review and make a finding about whether it needs

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revisit.

to be changed. This is how the EPA is told under the Clean Air Act to go back and revisit air quality standards, for example. So it can be done even without a sunset.

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But there's also other vehicles. We had a session here on exemptions. So to the extent that there needs to be some flexibility adaptation the use of exemptions maybe not under the current limitations of a small number of vehicles, but there could be -- that could be a way.

Petitions, as well, are -- you know, if there's something that's so outmoded like we're all here today discussing whether the current regime is outmoded, there will be avenues for people to petition and try to seek to convince the agency to change. So I think that there are those other avenues.

The real question in my mind is whether at the end of the day thinking about the automation of driving is -- and that's it's really the automation of driving much more than the automation of vehicles that we're here talking about.

Whether the automation of driving is

conducive to traditional regulation in the sense that we have conceived of it over the years. We started historically in this country with a legal system that was based upon a common law method which was built upon case after case after case and maybe principles emerged from the accretion of individual contextual decisions.

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And then we moved into a world of regulation which is sort of top down a set of general rules that then apply to individual circumstances. And I think what's really interesting and challenging about artificial intelligence machine learning technologies is that, first of all, those technologies, themselves, are really, really, really good at contextualizing, at making individualized forecasts.

This is -- and this is the beauty of it and why it holds the promise of automating driving. And the question is whether a legal system that is highly general is capable of actually adequately addressing the very real risks associated with the implementation of a contextualizing technology.

And I know in one of the earlier panels the

question of ex-post liability came up. And I think
that's something that's really critical and to be
thinking about what's the interface between what the
federal government does and what liability which
exists at the state level principally will also -- how
all that will play out.

But I do think -- I do think the sunset provisions are solutions that are put forth to a real problem, but probably too blunt of a solution.

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MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: So I'll toss it back to you, Cary. If automated driving or automated motoring is not conducive to traditional regulation, what's the answer?

How do we ensure safety, ensure motor vehicle safety of American consumers?

MR. COGLIANESE: Well, one thing that is in the section right after ours about resources, networks of experts, special hiring. I will say that this is -- this is absolutely fundamentally crucial if we're going to set sensible policy with respect to highly complex technologies.

And there's no question that, I mean,

automobiles even with human drivers in them are very complex systems. But to do this well we need to make sure that we have government officials who have the capacity to analyze the data.

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So all the tools -- the subsequent tools that maybe you still want to get to about data collection and recordkeeping and reporting, all of those I think are important.

The general strategy here is I think to think about this as a strategy of regulating by learning. And that -- that's why, you know, certainly, as I say, the sunset provision is trying to get at the right kind of problem of forcing an agency to periodically learn and assess. That's important.

I'm just not sure that, quite frankly, that there's a given time period. We could say let's all agree on this panel here that sunset provisions every five years are the right amount, but I don't know if five. Maybe five months we'll get there.

But we -- you know, I think we need a system that's learning and adaptable. So putting something out like NHTSA has done as a guidance gives you that

flexibility, it puts it out there. And a lot of things in this guidance are calling for additional data and analysis and processing.

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And we just need to make sure, to come back to my first point here, was that, you know, the government continues to have the human resources and capacity to solve this. These are not going to be just technical problems, but ones that require good experts within government.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Thanks. We're getting toward the end here. Ian, I wanted to give you a chance to in the last -- both of you a chance to mention if you -- if you're interested any of the tools that we may have listed in the policy, the other tools, or other ideas you may have as to good -- good safety facilitating devices that the agency might consider.

MR. ADAMS: So I'm always confronted with the issue of when something has presented a risk or something has gone wrong what is the appropriate point at which to report that to the regulator.

And so a regulator that is willing to build

a relationship with me and exercise a fair amount of discretion in understanding the nature of the issue that I have been confronted with that regulator is going to be more likely to have me report the issue earlier on.

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And ultimately I think that's what's better for consumers the earlier we can get this in the process. And so if there were to be a tool that I would point out, I would say, the FAA gentleman mentioned it a little earlier, that when it is a mistake and it is not intentional and there is a meaningful remediation measure that is underway to have the flexibility to not move forward to fine or in some way publicly -- because that can be just as big of a problem, publicly shame the group involved.

I would encourage NHTSA to if it doesn't have that authority already to certainly make great use of it because, as I think we've heard in the other panels, given just how difficult the testing will be it's going to be very important that we analyze what happens once these vehicles are deployed.

And so we're going to see some of these

Page 252 mistakes made out on the road in the environment with 1 2 the public and that's going to be the context in which 3 knowing when to forgive and build together the 4 knowledge associated with that process when it's going 5 to be even more important. MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: So prudent to exercise 6 7 jud- -- or judicial -- prosecutorial discretion? 8 MR. ADAMS: Oh, geez. Oh, geez. 9 Enforcement discretion? MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: 10 MR. ADAMS: Yes. Yes. I feel like I just 11 failed the professor's test. 12 MR. COGLIANCESE: I'm all in favor of 13 prudence. 14 MR. ADAMS: Okay. 15 MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Ryan? 16 MR. HAGEMANN: Yeah. No. Plus one to 17 everything that Ian and Cary just said honestly. think you kind of hit the head of the -- you hit the 18 19 head of the nail with your policy toolkit hammer at the beginning, Paul, when you talked about this need 20 2.1 for humility. 2.2 You know, regulatory forbearance can

sometimes be a very powerful signaling mechanism I think. Adam talked previously about, you know, the use of soft law to start regulating a lot of these emerging technologies.

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The multi-stakeholder process, ongoing dialogs between industry regulators and other stakeholders in the community. I think having those dialogs and keeping them going is important as a means of signaling to the American people that these vehicles aren't just being shoved out there, but we are thinking about it.

But there's a lot of, as we've learned through the last five panels this afternoon, there's a lot of issues at play here. So I think continuing to exercise regulatory humility is an important -- is an important quality that folks over at NHTSA are exercising very well and should keep doing.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Thank you. I don't know if we have questions or ...?

MS. WILLIAMS: I will leave that to your discretion. We do have one question, but we are also at time.

Page 254 MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: I will -- we'll take the 1 2 question --MS. WILLIAMS: You'll take the question. 3 4 MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: -- so nobody can say that we didn't entertain all questions. 5 6 MS. WILLIAMS: Okay. 7 MR. FIKENTSCHER: Okay. Here we go. In the 8 absence of a reliable objective test, would an 9 alternative strategy be to treat AVs less like an 10 inanimate object and more like a new human driver? 11 You might measure safety via a lifecycle 12 error rate, an enforced performance via relatively 13 strict liability for AV developers for safety critical failures. 14 15 The idea is to create a string of incentives to arrive at a high level behavioral pattern rather 16 17 than regulate the minutia of software. 18 MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Who would like to start? 19 MR. COGLIANESE: I was going to say, yeah. Rather than regulate the minutia of software I think 20 2.1 that makes sense. I don't -- I think the performances 22 of the software and the systems is what really

1 | matters.

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And taking that -- the kind of approach thinking about this as automated driving calls to mind how do we regulate driving. We have people who just go down and they take a test and actually sometimes they can take one test for the rest of their life. That's the only time they're ever tested.

And those tests, by the way, to go back to the variable they are highly varied, right. It depends on what truck is coming down the street at any given moment.

So I think thinking about this as how can we have a testing or regulatory regime that gets us closer to what we have right now which is -- seems, you know, I guess less than fully rigorous in many states would definitely be an advance.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Ian, do you have thoughts?

MR. ADAMS: Well, I forget the exact language of the question, but it sounded -- I don't know why we would need to make the liability system any more stringent than it is. And that would be a

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So I would be reluctant to move that direction, but certainly sounds like an interesting way of doing it given that it assumes that an objective test is unable to accomplish the goals that we would like to see accomplished.

MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Thanks. Ryan?

MR. HAGEMANN: Yeah, briefly. I mean, it sounds like an interesting idea. As with anything, the devil is in the detail. So when we are talking about putting this artificial intelligence, this automated machine through this test what does that actually mean?

Does it mean downloading the code onto a central server at, you know, DMV and then they, you know, run it in an AI-like simulation?

I mean, what does it actually look like?

Are we just running the code, are we installing it into a particular vehicle? Many vehicles are different. So, you know, there's a lot of questions with something like that.

I generally am in favor of any sort of

1	approach that takes us away from any, you know,
2	stalking horse potential for regulating the underlying
3	code of, you know, the automaton or the artificial
4	intelligence unit, if you will.
5	So it's an interesting idea. I'd be
6	interesting in exploring it more, but I'm not going to
7	say definitely yes or definitely no right off the bat.
8	MR. HEMMERSBAUGH: Thanks very much to the
9	panel and thanks to all of you for persevering. And a
10	little bit more seriously, we really had some good and
11	thoughtful input I think today and given everybody
12	some things to think about and certainly the agency.
13	And on behalf of the agency, thanks to
14	everybody for participating and coming and listening
15	to this important topic. Thanks to the panel.
16	MS. WILLIAMS: So I'll just close us out.
17	Of course, as Paul just said, that concludes our
18	meeting for today.
19	However, if you do have any further feedback
20	that you would like to provide us either on the
21	morning session which was on the Model State Policy,
22	this afternoon's session, modern regulatory tools or

1	otherwise, you can still do so at the official docket.
2	So it's NHTSA-2016-0090. We'll still
3	consider that since, you know, as we committed as an
4	agency we'll be updating that document. So that
5	docket will be reviewed on a constant basis.
6	On behalf of Administrator Rosekind, I just
7	want to, again, say thank you. And we really did
8	enjoy the enriched conversation. And I meant that
9	very much so with our last panel. I know we stayed a
10	little longer today than we normally do for these
11	public sessions so I appreciate it.
12	You can also reach out to any member of the
13	team. Again, Dee Williams, I serve as the team leader
14	for the FAV policy, Josh Fikentscher, Debbie Sweet had
15	to leave us this afternoon but she was sitting in this
16	seat earlier, and, of course, Michelle Atwell.
17	So thank you and please look for
18	opportunities after the New Year.
19	(Whereupon, at 4:54 p.m., the meeting
20	concluded.)
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