

# Achieving V2X Interoperability & Security

Results from USDOT's Security Credential Management System (SCMS)

Deployment Workshops

March 2019

### Why do we want V2X communications?




## Light Vehicle crash avoidance safety benefits are the tip of the iceberg for V2X!

- Vehicle to Pedestrian (V2P)
- Vehicle to Motorcycle (V2M)
- Commercial Vehicles
- Mobility Applications
  - Platooning
  - Coordinated movements at:
    - Intersections
    - entrance ramps and merging
- Automated Driving System Applications that will leverage sensor sharing and pathway communications to further advance safety and mobility of ADS equipped vehicles.

### But security and trust in messaging is key!

- Integrity the message was not modified between sender and receiver
- Authenticity the message originates from a trustworthy and legitimate device
- Privacy the message must appropriately protect the privacy of the sender






## Implementing V2X security requires some functions to be centralized

- Device Certification Eco-system
- Misbehavior Detection and Revocation
- Root certificate(s) management

.....and associated decision making and enforcement actions (if/when something goes wrong) must be implanted in a consensus fashion

## Authority needs to start somewhere...example, certification eco-system



If there is not a centralized authority and management entity ...what could happen?








Non-interoperable systems with differing policies and requirements

Lack of effective enforcement mechanisms, reducing security, trust and/or privacy Non-sustainable system with inconsistent funding streams

A Security Credential Management System (SCMS), and associated governing structure, is therefore vital to securing the V2X ecosystem

### USDOT SCMS Research and Development

- Conducted SCMS analysis and outreach efforts on how to deploy at scale
- Built and demonstrated the SCMS Proof-of-Concept (PoC)
- Conducted outreach activities and workshops with industry stakeholders to assess pathways (or models) for how a large-scale (National) SCMS eco-system could be established.



### Stakeholder Groupings

### SCMS IMPLEMENTERS INCLUDE:



PKI Security Services



**Certification Services** 



**OEMs** 



USDOT



Communications Service Providers

#### SCMS USERS INCLUDE:



Vehicle Owner/ Operators



Dealers and Installers



Service and Parts Facilities



CV Equipment and Application Suppliers



**OEMs** 



State and Local DOTs



Public Infrastructure System Integrators

### SCMS OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES INCLUDE:



**USDOT** 



Academia



Standards Organizations



**Advocacy Groups** 

### SCMS Model Ownership and Governance Attributes

#### **SCMS Structure Attributes**



**Initial Ownership** 



**Initial Funding** 



SCMS Manager Sustainment Funding



Technical Component Sustainment Funding



Competition



Legislation/Regulation

### **SCMS Manager Roles and Responsibilities Attributes**



**Initial Policy Development** 



Recurring Policy Development and Approval



Oversight and Auditing



Misbehavior Authority Management



**End Entity Certification** 



Trust Anchor Management

### Range of Ownership and Governance Models

### **Public Model**

Government controls by establishing new office to serve as SCMS Manager

## Government-led Public Private Partnership (P3)

Government office leads creation of public-private team

### **P3 Concession**

Government facilitates and governs. SCMS Manager is run as a concession.


### **Industry-led P3**

Government is on the board for facilitation and oversight, and financially assists only with initiation

### **Private Model**

Government is only a stakeholder. Industry forms a consortium and funds development.

### Day 2 Models: Both Workshops




**Industry Leadership** 


### Key Stakeholder Recommendations


- Stakeholders must continue to meet and drive the establishment of a largely self-regulated SCMS Governance entity—but Government has a facilitation role
  - Security and technical policies are needed to initiate PKI operations
  - b. High level business (funding) model must be establish
- 2. Agreements are needed to memorialize relationships among stakeholder groups
- 3. Additional research is needed around misbehavior detection and certificate revocation
- 4. Additional research is needed around device certification and initial enrollment and provisioning


### Public Reports from Project

- SCMS Baseline Summary Report: <a href="https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/36397">https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/36397</a>
- Literature Search Report: <a href="https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/36395">https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/36395</a>
- Potential SCMS Ownership and Governance Models: https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/36393
- Full-Scale Security Credential Management System (SCMS) Deployment Workshop Read Ahead: <a href="https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/36651">https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/36651</a>
- Workshop Findings: TBD









### Questions for U.S. DOT?

### **Points of Contact**



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