ID: nht88-1.94

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/13/88

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Robert A. Rogers -- Director, Automotive Safety Engineering, General Motors Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Robert A. Rogers Director, Automotive Safety Engineering General Motors Corporation General Motors Technical Center 30400 Mound Road Warren, MI 18090-9015

This responds to your request for an interpretation of Standard No. 101, Controls and Displays, in connection with a design for head up displays (HUD's) that you are planning to introduce in certain future vehicles. The HUD's would protect readings from selected displays so that they appear as if they were located above the front bumper. The displays would initially include the following: speedometer, turn signal, highbeam, hazard, and low fuel warning. You stated that the HUD's would supplement corresp onding instrument panel displays, and would this be 'redundant displays.' You plan to provide the same light intensity for all of the HUD's, which would be variable and could be turned off by the driver.

You noted that section @5.3.4(b) of Standard No. 101 states in part that the telltales and identification for brakes, highbeams, turn signals, and safety belts may not be adjustable under any driving condition to a level that is invisible, and requested the agency's concurrence that variable illumination intensity, including levels at which the displays would not be visible, is permissible for the redundant (but not the other) turn signal and highbeam telltales. This letter provides our concurrence.

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration does not provide approvals of motor vehicles. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to ensure that its mo tor vehicles meet applicable requirements. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter.

Standard No. 101 specifies requirements for the location, identification, and illumination of motor vehicle controls and displays. The purpose of the standard is to ensure the accessibility and visibility of motor Vehicle controls and displays and to fac ilitate their selection under daytime and nighttime conditions, in order to reduce the safety hazards caused by the diversion of the driver's attention from the driving task, and by mistakes in selecting controls.

Standard No. 101 does not itself require that any particular controls or displays be furnished, although several of the controls and displays regulated by the standard are required by other safety standards. The standard instead provides that if certain controls and displays are furnished, they must meet the requirements of the standard. Controls and displays not listed in the standard are not subject to its requirements, except that section 55.3.5 specifies anti-glare requirements for certain sources o f illumination used for the controls and displays not otherwise regulated by Standard No. 101.

No. 101 apply to redundant displays. It is our opinion that where a manufactures provides more than one of a particular display listed in Standard No. 101, e.g., two speedometers, the requirements of the standard for that listed display are met of one of the displays complies with the standard's requirements. The standard's purposes of ensuring the accessibility and visibility of a particular display are fully satisfied by the complying display. Thus, the requirements need not be met again for a redunda nt display. However, redundant gauges, like other gauges not otherwise regulated by Standard No. 101, are subject to the requirements of section @5.3.5. (Telltales are excluded from the requirements of that section.) This interpretation is limited to where a manufacturer provides more than one of a particular telltale or gauge listed in Standard No. 101. We note, for example, that if a manufacturer provides a single fuel level gauge and a single fuel level telltale, neither display would be considered redundant, since gauges and telltales provide different types of information.

With respect to your planned design, it is our opinion that if the turn signal and high beam telltales located on the instrument panel comply with Standard No. 101, the turn signal and high beam telltales provided as HUD's need not meet the standard's re quirements. The light intensities of the turn signal and highbeam telltales provided as HUD's would thus be at the discretion of the manufacturer. Therefore, we concur that variable illumination intensity, including levels at which the displays would not be visible, is permissible for these displays.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

March 17, 1988

Ms. Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Nassif Building Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Ms. Jones:

This letter is a request for an interpretation from the NHTSA concerning head up displays (HUDs) and the illumination requirements of FMVSS 101 with respect to certain telltales.

General Motors is planning to introduce head up displays in certain future vehicles. The HUD provides redundant selected vehicle information which appears visible through the windshield. The driver can see through the HUD image which is projected to appe ar as if it is located above the front bumper at a height that is adjustable to accommodate varying driver seated heights. Displays which are now being considered for inclusion in the initial HUD are speedometer, turn signal, highbeam, hazard and low fue l warning. The HUD is capable of operation while the ignition is in the ON position, and is not operational when the ignition is in the ACCESSORY, LOCK, OFF or START positions. The illumination of the present design of this display can be varied over dif ferent ranges of light intensity depending upon whether the parking lights are on or off. When the parking lights are on, the greatest light intensity is substantially less than with the parking lights off. A thumb wheel control for HUD illumination is l ocated on the left side of the instrument panel. It is identified by "HUD Dimmer" above the control, with "LO" (Left) and "HI" (Right) indicating the direction that the wheel must be turned to control illumination. This design permits the driver to adjus t the illumination intensity to a comfortable level of visibility for any ancient lighting condition. The HUD can also be turned off at the option of the driver by moving the thumb wheel illumination control to the extreme low end. Our intent is to provi de the same variable intensity for all head up displays, including the turn signal and highbeam telltales. We seek the agency's concurrence that variable illumination intensity, including levels at which the displays would not be visible, is permissible for the redundant turn signal and highbeam telltales. @5.3.4(b) of FMVSS 101 states in part that: " ... the telltales and identification for brakes, highbeams, turn signals, and safety belts may not be adjustable under any driving condition to a level th at is invisible."

As mentioned above, the turn signal and highbeam displays to be included in the HUD are supplemental to primary instrument panel telltales. The primary telltales would comply with the FMVSS 101 illumination requirement cited above. The question, then, is whether the supplemental head up displays are also subject to this FMVSS 101 requirement. Our reasons for believing that the head up displays are not subject to this requirement are as follows:

They are redundant displays. FMVSS 101 does not specifically indicate whether redundant displays are subject to the illumination requirements. In the absence of clear direction from the wording of the standard, we believe a reasonable interpretation of t he standard would allow a HUD design that can be dimmed to an invisible level since no confusion or driver distraction can arise from the absence of a HUD inasmuch as the vehicle still offers the normal telltales. We believe another reason for permitting dimmable head up displays, including those for turn signal and highbeam, relates to the wide variation of lighting conditions in which it must operate. Because the subject displays appear to be outside the vehicle in the driver's forward view, it is imp ortant that the driver be able to control the brightness of the display. Accordingly, we believe that dimmability of the head up displays is more in line with the intent of FMVSS 101 than would be the alternative of maintaining the turn signal and highbe am head up displays at full illumination intensity at all times.

Some drivers may, for whatever reason, prefer conventional instrument panel displays to head up displays. A provision enabling drivers to turn the HUD off will accommodate this important customer satisfaction concern.

- Invisibility of redundant turn signal and highbeam telltales is not inconsistent with rulemaking history. We have reviewed the rulemaking history of FMVSS 100 and 101 and have located nothing which specifically addresses redundant displays of telltales . We have researched previous interpretation letters issued by the NHTSA for guidance in this matter. We have located several letters which the agency has written concerning the applicability of FMVSS 101 requirements to redundant controls; however, we hav e located no interpretation which addresses the applicability of FMVSS 101 to redundant displays. In the interpretations we have reviewed, the NHTSA has generally maintained that redundant controls are subject to FMVSS 101 requirements. An exception was a letter from the agency to Mazda in July of 1984, which distinguished rear seat controls from the visibility requirement of FMVSS 101. In distinguishing secondary rear seat controls, NHTSA explained that a stated purpose of FMVSS 101 (reducing the safet y hazard caused by the diversion of the driver's attention from the road) would not be compromised by the fact that the driver could not see the identification of rear seat controls. In other instances, where NHTSA has indicated that redundant controls a re subject to FMVSS 101 requirements, it has again based these determinations on the purpose of the standard. While there is some potential for misuse of redundant controls, there is no corresponding potential for "misuse" of redundant displays. That is, the subject head up displays will either be visible or invisible to the driver. If they are visible, there is no issue. If the driver chooses to make them invisible, and therefore not use the HUD, it cannot be relied upon or misused. Further, absence of the head up displays will not result in the driver being deprived of turn signal or highbeam information, sin ce this information would continue to be available from the primary instrument panel telltales.

We have located a single interpretation letter from NHTSA with respect to a HUD. It was dated June 19, 1987, and responded to a manufacturer's request for an interpretation of the requirements of FMVSS 205 related to a membrane in the lower left corner o f the windshield that reduced light transmissibility below 708. With regard to the issues discussed in this June 19, 1987 NHTSA interpretation, we would point out that GM vehicles equipped with HUDs will comply with all of the requirements of FMVSS 103, 104 and 205.

In summary, we believe that it is not only permissible, but also preferable, to provide variable illumination intensity for head up displays. Variable illumination for HUDs best satisfies the intent of FMVSS 101 and the interests of customer satisfaction . Furthermore, FMVSS 101, and previous NHTSA interpretations of which we are aware, do not expressly prohibit dimmability of redundant displays.

If further information concerning our planned head up displays would expedite the agency's response to this request for interpretation, we would be pleased to provide such information.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Rogers, Director Automotive Safety Engineering

cc: Ms. Diane Steed, Administrator, NHTSA Mr. Barry Felrice, Associate Administrator for Rulemaking, NHTSA USG 2623

ID: Braun

The Braun Corporation
631 W. 11^th St.
PO Box 310
Winamac, IN 46996

Dear Braun Corporation:

This responds to your letter concerning the applicability of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 403, Platform lifts installed for motor vehicles, and No. 404, Platform lift installations in motor vehicles, to lifts manufactured before the effective date. I have addressed your concerns below.

In a December 27, 2002, final rule, the agency established FMVSS Nos. 403 and 404 in order to protect individuals that are aided by canes, walkers, wheelchairs, scooters, and other mobility devices and rely on platform lifts to enter/exit a motor vehicle (67 FR 79416; amended 69 FR 58843, October 1, 2004). FMVSS No. 403 is an equipment standard that specifies minimum performance requirements for platform lifts designed for installation on motor vehicles. FMVSS No. 404 requires that certain vehicles that are manufactured with platform lifts comply with a set of minimum requirements. The effective date of these standards has recently been delayed until April 1, 2005 for FMVSS No. 403 and July 1, 2005 for FMVSS No. 404 (69 FR 76865; December 23, 2004).

In your letter, you expressed concern that individuals would not be able to have a lift that was manufactured prior to the effective date installed on a vehicle that was manufactured on or after the effective date. You explained that it is a common practice for lift users to transfer a lift from one vehicle to another. You expressed concern that FMVSS Nos. 403 and 404 will prohibit a lift user from having a lift transferred to a vehicle that was manufactured after the effective date of FMVSS No. 404.

Generally, FMVSSs apply to motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment up to their first retail sale. See 49 U.S.C. 30112. Manufacturers are required to certify that their products conform to all applicable FMVSSs before the products can be offered for sale. After the first retail sale of a vehicle, manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and repair businesses are prohibited from "making inoperative" any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable standard. 49 U.S.C. 30122.

The "make inoperative" provision only applies to standards with which a vehicle is certified as complying. If a vehicle with a manufacture date of July 1, 2005, or later is manufactured with a lift, that vehicle must comply with FMVSS No. 404. However, if after first retail sale a platform lift is added to a vehicle manufactured either before or after July 1, 2005, that was not equipped with a lift at first retail sale, there is no duty for a modifier to bring that vehicle into compliance with FMVSS No. 404; i.e. , there is no requirement to equip the modified vehicle with a lift that complies with FMVSS No. 403. Therefore, in such instances, a lift user would be able to have a non-compliant lift taken from an older vehicle and installed on a vehicle that he or she had previously purchased.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any additional questions please contact Mr. Chris Calamita of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:403#404
d.1/3/04

ID: 24065.ztv

D.W. Robertson, Captain
Commonwealth of Virginia
Department of State Police
491 Southlake Boulevard
Richmond, VA 23236





Dear Captain Robertson:

This is in reply to your letter of January 28, 2002, to Taylor Vinson of this Office. You reported receiving inquiries regarding the legality of brush guards. You further reported that courts in Virginia differ on whether Section 46.2-1002 of the Code of Virginia applies to brush guards, and that "the question they have is, does the brush guards diminish the light output?"

In your view, the brush guard raises three questions. We shall answer each in turn.

"1. Are brush guards on motor vehicles, both front and rear, in compliance with FMVSS 108?"

We would rephrase the question as whether motor vehicles equipped with front and rear brush guards are in compliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 108. We addressed this issue in a letter of October 27, 1994, to Thomas L. Wright of the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles. I enclose a copy for your reference. In brief, paragraph S7.8.5 of FMVSS No. 108 prohibits new motor vehicles from being sold with "any styling ornament or other feature" in front of a headlamp lens; we regard a brush guard as an "other feature" of the type prohibited by S7.8.5. The letter notes that there is no similar direct prohibition in FMVSS No. 108 regarding other vehicle lamps, including front lamps, but that such other lamps must comply with the photometric requirements of FMVSS No. 108 with the brush guards in place. Thus, the installation of front brush guards in front of a lamp other than a headlamp, or rear brush guards, does not per se create a noncompliance with FMVSS No. 108.

"2. Do brush guards impair the effectiveness of lighting equipment required by FMVSS 108?"

Front brush guards in front of headlamp lenses are prohibited by S7.8.5. As the 1994 letter indicates, other front lamps and rear lamps must comply with photometric requirements with the brush guards in place, and compliance with FMVSS No. 108 would depend on the design and location of the specific brush guard. Compliance also requires that rear lamps meet visibility requirements at certain angles to the right and left of the vehicle.

"3. Are brush guards allowed to be installed on new vehicles by manufacturers?" If not, why?"

A manufacturer must certify that the vehicles it manufactures comply with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards. Thus, a manufacturer could not certify compliance with FMVSS No. 108 if a vehicle is equipped with brush guards in front of headlamp lenses as prohibited by S7.8.5. The manufacturer could certify compliance with FMVSS No. 108 if brush guards are in front of lamps other than headlamps and if it determines that those lamps meet all applicable photometric and visibility requirements with the brush guards installed.

FMVSS No. 108 is not the only Federal motor vehicle safety standard for which compliance may be affected by installation of front brush guards. I enclose a copy of our letter of July 3, 1997, to Steve Brookmire, discussing the relationship of brush guards to airbag deployment under FMVSS No. 208.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

Enclosures
ref:108
d.4/5/02

ID: nht88-1.28

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: FEBRUARY 8, 1988

FROM: ANDREW P. KALLMAN -- TU-GROOVES

TO: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL; NHTSA; SUSAN SCHRUTH

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 10-28-88, TO ANDREW P. KALLMAN -- TU-GROOVES, FROM ERIKA JONES -- NHTSA, REDBOOK A32, STANDARDS 205 AND 212; ALSO ATTACHED -- LETTER DATED 1-14-85, TO OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL -- NHTSA, FROM ANDREW P. KALLMAN -- DIRECTOR , KALLMAN MARKETING; ; PATZIG TESTING LABORATORIES CO. INC., REPORT ON 1/4 INCH CLEAR, LAMINATED, SAFETY GLASS, AS 1 WITH SAFETY GROOVES FOR USE ANYWHERE IN MOTOR VEHICLES, DATED 10-30-85, LAB. NO. 219766

TEXT: On January 14, 1985 a letter was sent to the Chief Counsel's office regarding our windshield safety groove process. Included with that letter were reports from the Technical Research Centre of Finland on the grooves.

On March 1, 1985 we received a reply from your office that stated in general that the Finnish results did not address FMVSS 205 and that your office felt that testing needed to be completed to demonstrate the grooves' compliance with FMVSS 205.

On October 30, 1985 the Patzig Testing Laboratories, 3922 Delaware Ave., Des Moines, Iowa, 50313 (Lab No. 219766), issued a report on our grooving process stating that the grooves fully comply with ANSI Z26.1-1977 (Supp. Z26.1a-1980) and FMVSS No. 205 an d Canadian MVSS 205.

Since November of 1985 we have been marketing the grooves under the trademark of Tu-Grooves and have grooved over 14,000 vehicles since that time.

Currently we are having problems with States which require inspections on motor vehicles. Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Virginia have all given written approval to use Tu-Grooves within their states. New York has given us a verbal o.k. and we are waiting for the letter confirming that. However, Maryland and New Jersey are bringing up issues for approval which have absolutely no bearing on whether or not the grooves comply with FMVSS 205.

The MVMA sent a response to N.J. which raised a question as to whether or not we might be in violation of FMVSS 212. N.J. has temporarily rejected our request for approval to cut grooves in N.J. based upon this question from the MVMA on FMVSS 212.

Our process is an aftermarket process only. The grooves can only be installed on an existing windshield. We do not remove or install a windshield at any time during our process. I am quite sure that if FMVSS 212 was applicable to our process that your office would have notified us of this in its letter of March 1, 1985 and also requested that we conduct "crash tests" to show compliance with FMVSS 212.

We recognize that the USDOT does not approve any process, however we have performed the necessary tests for FMVSS 205 as suggested in your letter to us of March 1, 1985. As a matter of fact, the samples that we submitted for testing exceeded the normal depth of the grooves and the grooves went right off the ends of the samples. Under normal conditions the grooves are only .3 mm (3/10ths) deep and are usually just an inch or two longer than the blades with the ends tapered to the surface of the windshi eld.

We would appreciate a response from you as to whether the steps we have taken are sufficient to show compliance with FMVSS 205. Also, we would appreciate a response regarding the MVMA's question as to FMVSS 212. It is our understanding that we do not n eed to show compliance with this section.

Would it be possible for us to indicate somehow on the windshields in which we place safety grooves that we have shown compliance with FMVSS 205 of the USDOT, (ie on a clear sticker)?

Since we have a temporary rejection from the State of New Jersey which impedes our licensee's ability(s) to conduct business there, we would like to thank you in advance for your help and consideration in this matter.

ID: Google -- compiled response to 12 Nov 15 interp request -- 4 Feb 16 final

Chris Urmson

Director, Self-Driving Car Project

Google, Inc.

1600 Amphitheatre Parkway

Mountain View, CA 94043

Dear Dr. Urmson:

This responds to your November 12, 2015 letter[1] requesting that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) interpret a number of provisions in the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs) as they apply to Google’s described design for motor vehicles that it is in the process of developing and testing.  According to Google, those self-driving vehicles (SDVs) are “fully autonomous motor vehicles, i.e., vehicles whose operations are controlled exclusively by a Self-Driving System (SDS).”  The SDS is an artificial-intelligence (AI) “driver,” which is a computer designed into the motor vehicle itself that controls all aspects of driving by perceiving its environment and responding to it.[2]  Thus, Google believes that the vehicles “have no need for a human driver.” 

In this response, NHTSA addresses each of Google’s requests for interpretation, and grants several of them.   In some instances, the issues presented simply are not susceptible to interpretation and must be resolved through rulemaking or other regulatory means.  NHTSA believes that many of these issues may be resolved on an interim basis through well-supported exemption petition(s), and invites Google to file such petitions.  In other instances, if Google is able to provide sufficient additional information and evidence, it may be possible to resolve open issues through interpretations.

INTRODUCTION

Google describes its vehicles as having what NHTSA’s May 2013 Preliminary Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles calls Level 4 Full Self-Driving Automation.  According to that Statement, a Level 4 vehicle

is designed to perform all safety-critical driving functions and monitor roadway conditions for an entire trip. Such a design anticipates that the driver will provide destination or navigation input, but is not expected to be available for control at any time during the trip. This includes both occupied and unoccupied vehicles. By design, safe operation rests solely on the automated vehicle system.

Google is asking for interpretations to determine how it would certify its SDV to the FMVSS.  In essence, Google seeks to produce a vehicle that contains L4 automated driving capabilities, and removes conventional driver controls and interfaces (like a steering wheel, throttle pedal, and brake pedal, among many other things).  Given that the SDS controls all aspects of driving, and given Google’s belief that the SDS consistently will make the optimal decisions for the SDV occupants’ safety (as well as for pedestrians and other road users), the company expresses concern that providing human occupants of the vehicle with mechanisms to control things like steering, acceleration, braking, or turn signals, or providing human occupants with information about vehicle operation controlled entirely by the SDS, could be detrimental to safety because the human occupants could attempt to override the SDS’s decisions.  While the L4 automation is the impetus behind these design decisions, it is Google’s design decisions that create the uncertainty over how to apply the FMVSS to Google’s proposed vehicle. 

Google’s design choices in its proposed approach to the SDV raise a number of novel issues in applying the FMVSSs.  Those standards were drafted at a time when it was reasonable to assume that all motor vehicles would have a steering wheel, accelerator pedal, and brake pedal, almost always located at the front left seating position, and that all vehicles would be operated by a human driver.  Accordingly, many of the FMVSSs require that a vehicle device or basic feature be located at or near the driver or the driver’s seating position.  For vehicles with an AI driver that also preclude any occupant from assuming the driving task, these assumptions about a human driver and vehicle controls do not hold.  As self-driving technology moves beyond what was envisioned at the time when standards were issued, NHTSA may not be able to use the same kinds of test procedures for determining compliance.  And since the Safety Act creates a self-certification system for compliance, NHTSA’s verification of a manufacturer’s compliance (and thus, the agency’s ability to enforce against non-compliance) is based on our established test procedures.

In order to determine where to place vehicle devices and features, or whether to provide them at all, Google has asked who or what is to be considered the “driver” and which seating position is considered to be the “driver’s seating position” in its SDV.  49 CFR 571.3 defines “driver” as “the occupant of a motor vehicle seated immediately behind the steering control system.”  Because Google’s SDV design purposely does not have any mechanism by which human occupants could steer or otherwise “drive” the vehicle, it would be difficult in several instances to determine who the “driver” would be in its SDV, and thus to determine how to certify its motor vehicle design to certain FMVSS provisions that reference that “driver.”  To attempt to solve this challenge, Google has offered different interpretations of “driver” or “driver’s seating position” for NHTSA’s consideration, varying with the specific requirement or circumstances, and requests that we confirm its interpretations.

Specifically, Google suggests two potential interpretations of “driver” and one potential interpretation for “driver’s position” or “driver’s designated seating position” in the context of its described motor vehicle design:

• NHTSA could interpret the term “driver” as meaningless for purposes of Google’s SDV, since there is no human driver, and consider FMVSS provisions that refer to a driver as simply inapplicable to Google’s vehicle design;
• NHTSA could interpret “driver” and “operator” as referring to the SDS; or
• NHTSA could interpret “driver’s position” or “driver’s designated seating position” as referring to the left front outboard seating position, regardless of whether the occupant of that position is able to control the vehicle’s operation or movements.

Google then applies these suggested interpretive approaches to a number of FMVSS provisions in order to justify being able to certify its intended motor vehicle design as compliant with the FMVSSs, without having to change the design in ways that Google finds problematic. 

We will address each of Google’s suggested interpretations in turn.  The critical point of NHTSA’s responses for many of the requested interpretations is that defining the driver as the SDS (or the driver’s position as the left front position) does not end the inquiry or determine the result.  Once the SDS is deemed to be the driver for purposes of a particular standard or test, the next question is whether and how Google could certify that the SDS meets a standard developed and designed to apply to a vehicle with a human driver.  Related, in order for NHTSA to interpret a standard as allowing certification of compliance by a vehicle manufacturer, NHTSA must first have a test procedure or other means of verifying such compliance.

While some of Google’s requested interpretations may be permissible given the facts presented here, we wish to make clear that many of the other requests present policy issues beyond the scope and limitations of interpretations and thus will need to be addressed using other regulatory tools or approaches.  NHTSA further notes that in a number of instances (in particular, several included in Table B), it may be possible for Google to show that certain standards are unnecessary for a particular vehicle design.  To date, however, Google has not made such a showing.  We note that these interpretations are confined to the specific facts and circumstances set forth in Google’s letter, and that they do not apply to other facts and circumstances.  We also emphasize that the interpretations NHTSA is issuing are subject to change or revocation if new or different facts or information comes to light.

DISCUSSION

NHTSA is authorized by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (“Safety Act,” 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301) to issue FMVSSs that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment.  Under the Safety Act, NHTSA does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment and does not make determinations as to whether a product conforms to the FMVSSs outside of a NHTSA compliance test.  Instead, the Safety Act requires manufacturers to self-certify that their products conform to all applicable FMVSSs that are in effect on the date of manufacture.  Manufacturers are also responsible for ensuring that their products are free of safety-related defects.  NHTSA enforces compliance with the FMVSSs by testing vehicles and regulated equipment.  NHTSA also investigates safety-related defects and conducts related enforcement and recall actions. 

As a foundational starting point for the interpretations below, NHTSA will interpret “driver” in the context of Google’s described motor vehicle design as referring to the SDS, and not to any of the vehicle occupants.  We agree with Google its SDV will not have a “driver” in the traditional sense that vehicles have had drivers during the last more than one hundred years.  The trend toward computer-driven vehicles began with such features as antilock brakes, electronic stability control, and air bags, continuing today with automatic emergency braking, forward crash warning, and lane departure warnings, and continuing on toward vehicles with Google’s SDV and potentially beyond.  No human occupant of the SDV could meet the definition of “driver” in Section 571.3 given Google’s described motor vehicle design – even if it were possible for a human occupant to determine the location of Google’s steering control system, and sit “immediately behind” it, that human occupant would not be capable of actually driving the vehicle as described by Google.  If no human occupant of the vehicle can actually drive the vehicle, it is more reasonable to identify the “driver” as whatever (as opposed to whoever) is doing the driving.  In this instance, an item of motor vehicle equipment, the SDS, is actually driving the vehicle. 

NHTSA will consider initiating rulemaking to address whether the definition of “driver” in Section 571.3 should be updated in response to changing circumstances, as contemplated by Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review.  Section 5, Reducing Regulations, of that Order provides that each federal regulatory agency will

[i]n order … to determine whether regulations promulgated by the executive branch of the Federal Government have become unjustified or unnecessary as a result of changed circumstances …  periodically review its existing significant regulations to determine whether any such regulations should be modified or eliminated so as to make the agency’s regulatory program more effective in achieving the regulatory objectives …

NHTSA recognizes that it can take substantial periods of time to develop some rulemaking proposals and final rules, including time spent obtaining review of those proposals and seeking and analyzing public comments.  NHTSA further understands that the time it takes to conduct rulemakings may, in some instances, make such proceedings ill-suited as first-line regulatory mechanisms to address rapidly-evolving vehicle technologies.  That said, there are limits to the result the agency may reach in an interpretation, even if it believes that result might be sound policy.  An interpretation describes an agency’s view of the meaning of an existing statute or regulation.  It can make sense of the overall legal framework and provide clarity for regulated entities and the public.  For example, an interpretation may clarify a statutory or regulatory term or provide crisper and more detailed lines than the regulation or statute being interpreted.  An interpretation may not, however, make a substantive change to the statutory or regulatory regime or to the clear language of a provision.  In particular, an interpretation may not adopt a new position that is irreconcilable with or repudiates existing statutory or regulatory provisions.   

In many instances, interpreting the term “driver” in a manner that Google has requested does not necessarily change the requirements of the regulation or otherwise fully resolve the issue Google seeks to address. Because the interpretations provided by this letter do not fully resolve all of the issues Google has raised, Google may wish to explore the interim step of seeking exemptions.  Exemptions are available under 49 U.S.C. 30114 and 49 CFR Part 555 for manufacturers able to demonstrate that features of their products provide equivalent levels of safety to those required by the FMVSS.  

1. “Priority Interpretive Issues”

Google requested NHTSA’s interpretation of several “priority interpretive issues” related to the absence of a human driver.  Google also provided two tables, Attachments A and B, listing FMVSS provisions for which Google requested that NHTSA interpret the “driver” or “operator” to be the SDS (provisions in Attachment A) and other provisions for which Google requested that NHTSA interpret “driver” to be the human occupant seated in the left front designated seating position (primarily provisions in Attachment B).  We address these interpretation requests in the order presented by Google’s November 12 letter.

FMVSS No. 135, “Light Vehicle Brake Systems”

Deeming the SDS to be the “driver” of a motor vehicle does not excuse that vehicle from compliance with the brake requirements of applicable standards.  FMVSS No. 135 contains requirements for service brakes and associated parking brake systems.  Among these requirements is S5.3.1, which states that service brakes “shall be activated by means of a foot control,” and also that “control of the parking brake shall be independent of the service brake control, and may be either a hand or foot control.”  Google’s described motor vehicle design does not include hand or foot controls for either the service brakes or the parking brake.  Google argues that because the SDS will control all aspects of braking, it would not be necessary or beneficial for safety for a human occupant to be able to brake the vehicle.  Google therefore requests that NHTSA interpret these provisions regarding the activation or control of braking systems to be inapplicable to its described motor vehicle design.  Similarly, Google requests that NHTSA interpret S6.5.1 of FMVSS No. 135 to allow the service brake system performance requirements to be met if the SDS activates the service brakes, rather than “solely by use of the service brake control” as the provision directs. 

We agree that Google’s SDS may be deemed to be the driver for purposes of compliance with these provisions.  Given that there will be no foot (or even hand) control to be activated – indeed, given that the SDS will have neither feet nor hands to activate brakes – we understand that Google’s described vehicle design would not comply with S5.3.1 as written.  We also understand Google’s assertions that the SDS will be able to activate the brakes electronically such that its vehicle will “stop [] safely and in accordance with all performance requirements of FMVSS No. 135.”  The fact that the SDS may be programmed to perform the tests enumerated in FMVSS No. 135 does not, however, overcome the plain language of S5.3.1.  NHTSA would need to commence a rulemaking to consider how FMVSS No. 135 might be amended in response to “changed circumstances” in order to ensure that automated vehicle designs like Google’s, i.e., ones that control all braking through an AI driver and do not provide brake controls to vehicle occupants, have a way to comply with the standard.  Such a rulemaking would also consider S6.5.1 and any other provisions that implicate the potential use of a foot-actuated service brake control.  In the interim, Google may wish to consider petitioning the agency for an exemption from these provisions.[3]

FMVSS No. 101, “Controls and Displays”

FMVSS No. 101 contains requirements for location, identification, color, and illumination of motor vehicle controls, telltales, and indicators.  S5.1.1 requires the controls listed in Tables 1 and 2 of the standard to be “located so that they are operable by the [belted] driver.”  S5.1.2 requires the telltales and indicators in those Tables and their identification to be “located so that, when activated, they are visible to a [belted] driver.”  Google states that its motor vehicle will not have any of the controls listed in Tables 1 and 2 because there will not be a human driver in its vehicle.  Further, Google believes that allowing the human occupants to affect the operation of, for example, lamps or turn signals otherwise controlled by the SDS could be detrimental to safety.  Google therefore asks that NHTSA interpret S5.1.1 to be inapplicable to its motor vehicle design, or that NHTSA interpret Google’s SDS to be the “driver” for the purposes of S5.1.1.  For S5.1.2, Google says it will equip its vehicle’s occupant compartment with the telltales and indicators required by other FMVSSs (like the telltales/indicators for malfunctions of the brake system, electronic stability control system, or tire pressure monitoring system).  For purposes of placement of those telltales and indicators, Google requests that NHTSA interpret the “driver position” to be the left front seating position.

Because we interpret “driver” as referring to the SDS, we agree with Google that the controls listed in Tables 1 and 2 may simply be operable by the SDS and need not be located so that they are available to any of the human occupants of the motor vehicle.  Similarly, telltales and indicators must also be “visible” to the SDS.  For purposes of both S5.1.1 and S5.1.2, we interpret the SDS to be the “driver.”  However, we have no defined way at this time of verifying Google’s compliance with this interpretation of these requirements.  Thus, if Google certified its compliance with these provisions consistent with this interpretation, NHTSA would be unable to conduct confirmatory testing to satisfy ourselves that the Google vehicle is compliant.  Therefore, unless and until NHTSA has a standard and testing procedures to confirm compliance with S5.1.1 and S5.1.2, or a standard providing equal or greater safety, it cannot conclude that Google’s SDV is compliant with those requirements.  In order to determine what “operable by” and “visible to” the SDS mean, and to establish procedures for testing compliance with those requirements using its existing regulatory tools, NHTSA would be required to conduct a rulemaking.

In the interim, Google may wish to petition the agency for an exemption from these provisions.[4]  Additionally, we agree with Google that it could be beneficial to vehicle occupants to be aware of certain aspects of vehicle status through telltales and indicators while they are traveling in the vehicle.  Given the historical status of the left front seating position as the location of the human in charge of vehicle operation, we agree that Google may voluntarily locate telltales and indicators so that they are visible to that position.  However, if it is foreseeable that a different seating position is more likely to be occupied, it may make more sense for the telltales and indicators to be located so that they are visible in another position.

FMVSS No. 108, “Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment”

FMVSS No. 108 contains requirements for original and replacement lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment.  Google states that it “recognizes that all vehicles must comply with all of the performance requirements of FMVSS No. 108 with respect to external lamps and reflectors,” but asks that NHTSA interpret S6.6.1 of FMVSS No. 108 to allow certain internal controls “to be excluded from the occupant compartment, as long as their functions are performed by the vehicle autonomously.”  S6.6.1 requires all vehicles covered by FMVSS No. 108 to be “equipped with a turn signal operating unit, a turn signal flasher, a turn signal pilot indicator, a headlamp beam switching device, and an upper beam headlamp indicator meeting the requirements of S9.” 

With respect to turn signal operating units, Google requests that NHTSA interpret the term “operator” in the S4 definition of “turn signal operating unit” to mean the SDS.  That definition states that the unit is “an operating unit that is part of a turn signal system by which the operator of a vehicle causes the signal unit to function.”  Google notes that, in its vehicle, the turn signals will be operated and controlled by the SDS.  Google’s letter also addresses S9.1.1, which requires that the “turn signal operating unit…must be self-canceling by steering wheel rotation and capable of cancellation by a manually operated control.”  Google requests that NHTSA interpret this provision to be met by Google’s SDS since there would not be any steering wheel or conventional turn signal stalk.  Google also argues that providing either a steering wheel or the ability to control turn signal operation to the vehicle occupants could be detrimental to safety.  Google further asks that NHTSA “expressly acknowledg[e]” that a steering wheel is not required by the FMVSS.  The supplemental information Google provided on January 11, 2016 stated that the SDV’s turn signal operating unit self-cancels based on the position of the steering rack (which is controlled by the SDS), “which is what happens in a conventional vehicle by virtue of the link between the steering rack, steering column, and steering wheel,” and that Google therefore believes that the SDV complies with S9.1.1.

With respect to the S9.4 requirement for headlamp beam switching devices, which provides that “[e]ach vehicle must have a means of switching between lower and upper beams designed and located so that it may be operated conveniently by a simple movement of the driver’s hand or foot,” Google again states that the SDS will control headlamp beam switching “fully and appropriately” and that human occupant control over such functions could be detrimental to safety.

For purposes of these provisions of FMVSS No. 108, we interpret the SDS to be the “driver.”  We also agree that the “operator” of a turn signal operating unit is the SDS, because NHTSA has typically used “driver” and “operator” interchangeably in its interpretations over time.  We further agree that a steering wheel is not expressly required by any FMVSS.  We agree with Google that, as described, the SDV appears to be designed to self-cancel the turn signal operating unit as NHTSA would have intended, had vehicles without steering wheels been available when FMVSS No. 108 was developed.  Similar to the provisions of FMVSS No. 135, however, the fact that the SDS may be programmed to cancel the turn signal and switch headlamp beams does not overcome the (other) plain language of S9.1.1 and S9.4.  Even if we agree that Google’s self-cancelation for the turn signal operating unit is consistent with our intent in S9.1.1., that provision further expressly requires that the turn signal be capable of cancellation by a “manually operated control.” We understand Google’s argument that in the case of the SDV, manual cancelation of the turn signal operating unit by a human occupant could interfere with decisions already made by the SDS in ways that could affect safety.  However, this is an issue that cannot be addressed through interpretation alone.  Similarly, S9.4 specifically requires operation of headlamp switches by movement of the “driver’s hand or foot”.[5]  Under existing test procedures, we cannot verify Google’s compliance with these express requirements. 

Unless and until NHTSA has a standard and testing procedures to confirm compliance with these provisions, it cannot interpret Google’s SDV as compliant with these standards and requirements.  In order to determine what requirements would be appropriate, and to establish procedures for testing compliance with those standards, using its existing regulatory tools, NHTSA would be required to conduct a rulemaking.  NHTSA would need to consider how it could propose to amend FMVSS No. 108 in order to ensure that automated vehicle designs like Google’s, i.e., those that control all lighting and signals through the AI driver and do not provide lighting or signal controls to vehicle occupants, have a way to comply with the standard.  Meanwhile, Google may wish to petition the agency for an exemption from these provisions.  An exemption petition could seek to demonstrate that Google’s SDV would provide an equivalent level of safety to that provided by compliance with the FMVSS.[6] 

1. Interpretive Issues regarding “Miscellaneous Provisions in Other FMVSS”

Google also requested interpretation of several other “miscellaneous provisions in other FMVSS” relating to the absence of a human driver.

FMVSS No. 111, “Rear Visibility”

FMVSS No. 111 contains requirements for rear visibility devices and systems, requiring that vehicles have external and internal rear view mirrors to provide the driver with certain fields of view around and behind the vehicle.  FMVSS No. 111 also requires that vehicles display a rearview image (of a specified area of certain dimensions behind the vehicle) to the vehicle operator.  Google asks that NHTSA interpret these provisions as requiring that the specified view be provided to the SDS, rather than to the human occupant.  Google further requests that “the vehicle would be deemed compliant if the SDS receives sensor input at least equivalent to the images a driver would be able to view through mirrors and a rear visibility system meeting the field of view and other performance requirements of the standard.”

As above, because we are interpreting “driver” and “operator” in this instance to refer to the SDS, we agree that the information required by the provisions of FMVSS No. 111 that must be provided to the “driver” or “operator” may be provided to the SDS.  Here again, we have no defined way at this time of verifying Google’s compliance with this interpretation of those requirements.  Thus, if Google certified its compliance with these provisions consistent with this interpretation, NHTSA would be unable to conduct confirmatory testing to satisfy ourselves that such certification was valid. 

Therefore, unless and until NHTSA develops and adopts appropriate performance criteria and test procedures for evaluating whether the sensor input received by the SDS provides enough information to ensure that the SDS is as well informed by its sensors of the conditions behind and around it as a human driver of a conventional vehicle that meets the existing requirements of FMVSS No. 111 (or a standard providing equal or greater safety), it cannot interpret Google’s SDV as compliant with these standards and requirements.  This would need to be undertaken through rulemaking.  NHTSA may also consider as part of such a rulemaking whether there is benefit to conveying this information to human occupants in the case of vehicle designs like the Google SDV.  Google may wish to petition the agency for an exemption from these provisions, in which it could seek to demonstrate that its SDV would provide an equivalent level of safety to that provided by compliance with the FMVSS.[7] 

FMVSS No. 114, “Theft Protection and Rollaway Prevention”

FMVSS No. 114 contains requirements intended to reduce the incidence of crashes resulting from theft and accidental rollaway of vehicles.  Among these requirements is S5.3, which requires vehicles with an automatic transmission that includes a “park” position to have a system that “requires the service brake to be depressed before the transmission can be shifted out of ‘park.’”  Google states that its vehicle will not have any brake pedal, and that its SDS “will determine the appropriate transmission position and will not select a position other than park unless the service brake is first applied by the SDS.”  Google therefore requests that NHTSA interpret S5.3 as met by this described approach.

We agree that the language of S5.3 requiring the service brake to be depressed does not necessarily require the service brake itself to be pressed or applied by any particular object or function, such as a human foot.  We also agree that if the SDS is controlling the service brake, in theory, it would be able to make the decisions that would accomplish the intent of this provision.  In order for NHTSA to assess compliance of Google’s vehicle with this standard, however, we would need more information regarding how the SDS applies the service brake.  We would also intend to develop and adopt through rulemaking performance standards and test procedures for evaluating how (for example) the SDS “determines the appropriate transmission position” and avoids “selecting a position other than park unless the service brake is first applied.”  NHTSA might also consider as part of such a rulemaking the safety intent of the standard, and how human occupants should be protected when the vehicle is making decisions about when to initiate movement.  Google may wish to petition the agency for an exemption from these provisions.[8] 

FMVSS No. 126, “Electronic Stability Control Systems”

FMVSS No. 126 contains performance and equipment requirements for electronic stability control (ESC) systems.  Google argues that because its vehicle will not have a steering wheel, and the SDS will control all aspects of steering, NHTSA should interpret the relevant provisions of FMVSS No. 126 “to allow compliance with the performance requirements of the standard to be tested on the basis of appropriate steering inputs provided by the SDS.”  Google cites in particular the definition of an ESC system in S4 as referring to “a means to monitor driver steering inputs” and the test conditions in S6 and test procedures in S7, which refer to steering wheel velocity and angle.

Test procedure provisions in S7 (such as S7.5.2, S7.5.3, S7.6, S7.6.1, S7.9.3, and others) refer specifically to measurement of “steering wheel angle,” which is, literally, a measurement of the angle of the steering wheel in degrees.  Without a steering wheel, we agree that Google cannot certify its vehicle design to such provisions.  As above, in order for NHTSA to assess compliance of Google’s vehicle with this standard, we would need to determine how to evaluate the SDS’ control of the steering inputs, and whether and how to modify test conditions and procedures to address more clearly the situation of a vehicle with steering controlled entirely by an AI driver, with no mechanism for the vehicle occupants to affect the steering.  Google could petition for exemption from the relevant provisions of FMVSS No. 126

and the agency could work to develop alternate test procedures.  Over the longer term, NHTSA would need to undertake rulemaking to incorporate test procedures into FMVSS No. 126 to provide a clearer path to compliance for similar future vehicle designs.

Google’s letter concludes with two attachments, summarily listing numerous additional provisions for which it seeks interpretation.  Attachment A lists “Requirements for which the ‘Driver’ or ‘Operator’ should be considered to be the Self-Driving System.”  The letter provides no further explanation or justification for those requested interpretations.  Attachment B provides a similar list of FMVSS “Requirements for which the ‘Driver’ should be considered to be a person seated in the left front designated seating position.”  We address these numerous items in Attachments A and B in Tables A and B, to this letter, respectively (attached).  The Tables in those attachments reproduce each of Google’s requests in the first three columns, and provide NHTSA’s response in the final column.

In closing, we note that, in some instances, it may be possible for Google to provide more information and explanations that would allow NHTSA to expand or otherwise revise interpretations set forth in this letter.  If Google believes it can address concerns and limitations expressed in this letter that prevent us from providing the full interpretation it seeks, we encourage the company to submit more information to do so. In addition, as discussed above, Google may wish to seek exemptions from standards and requirements addressed in this letter. I hope this information provided in this letter and its attachments is helpful.  If you have further questions, please feel free to contact me at (202) 366-2830, or Steve Wood, Assistant Chief Counsel for Vehicle Safety Standards and Harmonization, at (202) 366-2992.

                                                                        Sincerely yours,

                                                                        Paul A. Hemmersbaugh

                                                                        Chief Counsel

III.  Table A

NHTSA interprets the SDS to be the “driver” or “operator” for the following specific FMVSS provisions.  As discussed above, we have no defined way at this time of verifying Google’s compliance with this interpretation of these requirements.  Thus, if Google certified its compliance with these provisions consistent with this interpretation, NHTSA would be unable to conduct confirmatory testing to satisfy ourselves that such compliance was valid.  Therefore, unless and until NHTSA develops performance criteria and test procedures for evaluating whether the SDS satisfies the FMVSS provision in question to be met, or a standard providing equal or greater safety, it cannot interpret Google’s SDV as compliant with these standards and requirements.  Google may wish to petition the agency for exemption from these petitions in the interim.

1. Table B

For specific FMVSS provisions set forth on Google’s Attachment B, Google requested that NHTSA interpret the human occupant seated in the left front designated seating position (‘DSP’) as the “driver.”  As discussed above, NHTSA defines “driver” for purposes of the FMVSS at 49 CFR 571.3.  We also discuss above the need to amend that definition in light of the possibility that Google raises, that an AI driver could be the sole means of driving a vehicle.  Given the focus of the definition of “driver” as, essentially, the entity that controls steering, and given that Google’s proposed vehicle design gives the human occupant no means to steer the vehicle, the human occupant of the left front DSP could not be the driver.  Moreover, interpreting “driver” as the human occupant of the left front DSP in the instances below that Google cites would not, in most cases, provide Google with a means of certifying that its proposed vehicle design complies with the applicable standard, because the agency would need to establish standards and tests to verify that the design complies. 

It may be that for some of these provisions, the elimination of a human driver makes the provision unnecessary, as Google implies in its letter.  NHTSA will consider these issues further and looks forward to receiving additional information from Google to assist us in this consideration.  For the following provisions, we are therefore continuing to interpret “driver” as referring to the SDS, and discuss what steps would need to be taken next in order to provide a path forward:

[1] Google also submitted a supplemental letter date January 11, 2016, providing more detailed information on its approach to canceling the turn signal, which is discussed below.

[2] NHTSA considers this AI driver to be an item of motor vehicle equipment within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 30102 and other applicable law and regulations.

[3] Google may also wish to reconsider its view that a pedal may never be needed in any circumstance, and that there is not a risk of harm associated with a pedal’s absence.

[4] Google may also wish to reconsider its view that the controls listed in Tables 1 and 2 of S5.1.1 may never be needed in any circumstance, and that there is not a risk of harm associated with their absence.

[5] We note that S9.4.1 of FMVSS No. 108 provides a mechanism by which a manufacturer can certify a “semi-automatic headlamp beam switching device,” but Google did not ask for interpretation of this provision, nor do we have enough information to assess whether Google’s proposed design would comply with this provision.

[6] Google may also wish to reconsider its view that a steering wheel and the vehicle occupants’ ability to control any lighting and signals may never be needed in any circumstance, and that there is not a risk of harm associated with their absence.

[7] Google may also wish to reconsider its view that rear visibility devices and systems may never be needed in any circumstance, and that there is not a risk of harm associated with their absence.

[8] Google may also wish to reconsider its view that a pedal may never be needed in any circumstance, and that there is not a risk of harm associated with a pedal’s absence.

[9] We note that NHTSA has previously interpreted this provision as prohibiting automatic (i.e., non-driver initiated) control of turn signal lamp flashing, but we do not consider this interpretation as inconsistent with those, because in this instance we are interpreting the “driver” (the SDS, given that the human occupants have no mechanism by which they can drive the vehicle) as being the entity controlling the vehicular hazard warning signal operating unit.  NHTSA would like to explore further with Google the instances in which Google would intend for the SDS to flash the hazard warning signals.

ID: nht92-9.4

DATE: February 17, 1992

FROM: Stephen E. Selander -- Attorney, GM Legal Staff

TO: Paul Jackson Rice -- Office of the Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: Re: General Motors Corporation; FMVSS 101, 105; Request for Interpretations

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 4/29/92 from Paul J. Rice to Stephen E. Selander (A39; Std. 101; Std. 105)

TEXT:

General Motors Corporation (GM) is currently preparing an electric vehicle (GMEV) which will be offered for sale in the near future. The GMEV contains basic design strategies that differ from traditional Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicles. While these strategies are intended to comply with all Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS), questions have arisen about how to correctly apply the requirements of FMVSS 101 - Controls and Displays and 105 Hydraulic Brake Systems. The purpose of this letter is to seek the agency's concurrence with, or guidance regarding the proposed interpretations of these requirements.

FMVSS 101 PROPOSED INTERPRETATIONS

FUEL GAUGE REQUIREMENTS Proposed Interpretation: Permit electrically powered vehicles to use symbols that are appropriate for indicating electric power reserve.

FMVSS 101 S5.2.3 requires that information pertaining to fuel level be identified by the fuel level symbol found in Table 2 of FMVSS 101 or by the corresponding word: FUEL. This identification appears quite appropriate for traditional ICE vehicles that consume combustible fuels. However, the GMEV will not use combustible fuel; rather, it will rely on electrical energy stored in its battery packs. In this context the fuel symbol is inappropriate and potentially misleading.

As currently planned, the GMEV will be equipped with a gauge that will monitor battery charge as a percent of full charge. This gauge is to be identified by a symbol substantially similar to that found in FMVSS 101 Table 2 for Electrical Charge. We believe that this type of gauge is more appropriate for Electric Vehicles (EVs). It will allow the operator to readily monitor electric power remaining in the batteries and will serve as the functional equivalent of a fuel gauge found in traditional ICE vehicles.

It should be noted that the GMEV is being designed for domestic and international sale. In order to optimize cost effectiveness, it is imperative that we harmonize requirements whenever possible. To that end, we have reviewed our current design strategy for the "electric fuel" gauge with the appropriate European agencies. They have agreed that the ISO fuel symbol is inappropriate to indicate "electric fuel" and that a more appropriate symbol is the ISO battery symbol.

Therefore, we request the agency's concurrence that EVs are permitted to utilize symbols that are appropriate for identifying electric power reserve and not the FMVSS 101 fuel level symbol.

OIL PRESSURE REQUIREMENTS Proposed Interpretation: Allow the "Service Soon" telltale to indicate loss of powertrain oil pressure for the GMEV.

FMVSS 101 S5.2.3 requires information pertaining to oil pressure be indicated by the oil pressure symbol found in Table 2 of FMVSS 101 or by the corresponding word: OIL.

As currently planned, the GMEV will be equipped with a "Service Soon" telltale which will light in the event of a malfunction that could eventually cause damage to the vehicle powertrain, but does not require immediate attention. GM proposes to light this telltale in the event of a loss of oil pressure to the powertrain. We believe this to be a more appropriate telltale because the GMEV can continue to be driven without oil pressure.

The GMEV powertrain consists of an electric motor which drives a single speed transmission. Lubricating oil, contained in a reservoir below the powertrain, is splashed onto the gears and bearings of the powertrain by the motion of the vehicle and the turning of the transmission gears. Under normal conditions, the splashing oil sufficiently lubricates most of the powertrain pans except for the rear motor bearing. Oil is supplied to the rear bearing by an oil pump.

While a loss of oil pressure in traditional ICE vehicles causes significant damage in a very short period of time, a loss of oil pressure in the GMEV is not a catastrophic event. The normal motion of the GMEV supplies sufficient oil for it to continue to operate for some time. We estimate the GMEV would be able to operate approximately 500 miles without sustaining serious damage to the powertrain. This is a significant distance, especially for this commuter vehicle which has a maximum range between recharging of far less than 500 miles.

In the event of a loss of oil pressure, activating a traditional oil pressure telltale could send the wrong message to the operator of a GMEV. In its traditional context, an active oil pressure telltale means that severe engine damage is imminent. An explanation of low oil pressure found in a typical GM owner's manual of an ICE vehicle reads as follows:

CAUTION: An engine low on oil can catch fire. You could be seriously burned. If your oil warning light stays on, don't keep driving. Check your oil immediately and have the problem corrected.

The appropriate action by the operator is to stop the vehicle immediately, turn the engine off and correct the underlying condition.

In the event of a loss of oil pressure in the GMEV, the preceding action is not appropriate. It is not necessary for the driver to pull over immediately to prevent damage to the powertrain. Even if the operator did pull over, the oil could not be checked because the GMEV does not require traditional routine oil maintenance and therefore, is not equipped with an oil dip stick.

Therefore, in the event of a loss of oil pressure, we believe it is appropriate to light the "Service Soon" telltale which indicates that service is needed, but immediate action by the driver is not required.

FMVSS 105 PROPOSED INTERPRETATIONS

GM has previously submitted a letter from Mr. R. A. Rogers to the agency (USG 2886, dated July 2, 1991) which describes the brake system planned for the GMEV. This brake system consists of front hydraulic disc service brakes, rear electric drum service and parking brakes, four wheel ABS, and regenerative braking. USG 2886 also describes the regulatory requirements within FMVSS 105 which must be addressed, either through interpretation or rulemaking, to facilitate introduction of the GMEV brake system. A copy of USG 2886, Part III with the cover letter and the information for which confidential treatment is requested removed, is attached to this document. (Note: The content of USG 2886 Part III is identical to that which was originally submitted as USG 2886, July 1991; however, the document has been revised to reduce the portions for which GM continues to request confidential treatment. There are a few very minor inaccuracies in this document with respect to current design intent for the GMEV brake system. These slight differences in the brake system do not affect the FMVSS 105 interpretations being requested. It is likely that additional minor changes in the brake system will occur as it is refined. GM will keep the agency advised of any changes which have new FMVSS implications.)

GM's request for interpretations, as described in USG 2886, Part III, have not changed, so we respectfully request that the agency refer to the attachment for a detailed discussion of the issues which we propose be addressed by interpretation. A summary follows:

PROPOSED INTERPRETATIONS:

1. The GMEV parking brake is mechanically retained in accordance with the requirements of S5.2

2. The GMEV brake system is a "split service brake system" consisting of four subsystems, one at each wheel.

3. The four service brake subsystems may be certified to the requirements of S5.1.2 in accordance with the test procedure of S7.9.1 through S7.9.3 by disabling each subsystem in a way that does not affect the other three subsystems.

4. The GMEV brake system may be certified to the requirements of S5.1.3 in accordance with the test procedure of S7.10 by functionally disabling the Brake Control Unit (BCU). Such a procedure will completely disable the brake power assist, and since the electric motors within the hydraulic unit and the rear brake drums are separately disabled during S5.1.2 testing, there is no need to separately consider these electric motors when certifying to the requirements of S5.1.3.

5. The GMEV brake system may be certified to the requirements of S5.5 in accordance with the test procedure of S7.9.4 by functionally disabling the BCU. Since such a procedure will completely disable ABS and the variable proportioning function, no other testing is required in connection with S5.5.

6. Assuming the conditions established in proposed S6.2, regenerative braking is permitted to function normally when conducting the test procedures of S7. In particular, the phrase "service brakes shall be capable of stopping" (found in S5.1.4 and S5.1.5, for example) is not to be construed as prohibiting the normal operation for regenerative braking.

There is one additional FMVSS 105 interpretation that we would now request which was not discussed in USG 2886:

BRAKE TELLTALE ILLUMINATION

Proposed Interpretation: In addition to the explicit conditions for activation of the brake telltale set forth in S5.3 of the standard, permit illumination of the service brake telltale when an impending or latent brake system malfunction is detected during electrical diagnosis.

S5.3.1 of FMVSS 105 prescribes the conditions during which the brake telltale shall be illuminated. This section requires that the telltale illuminate when there is a gross loss of hydraulic pressure (or, alternatively, a drop in fluid level), a total functional electrical failure in the ABS or variable proportioning brake system, or when the parking brake is applied. On the GMEV, the brake telltale will illuminate whenever these prescribed conditions exist. However, a diagnostic capability will also exist to detect faults in the brake system which do not cause any of the conditions explicitly listed in S5.3.1. That is, a fault may be detected in a redundant component that does not affect brake system performance. However, such a fault would leave the brake system vulnerable to a single additional failure that could substantially diminish braking capability.

A specific example of this with respect to the GMEV's brake system could be a stuck solenoid within the hydraulic unit. Such a failure would not necessarily have an effect on brake system performance, nor would any of the explicit conditions listed in S5.3.1 be exhibited. Yet such a fault would decrease the overall reliability of the brake system and make the system more vulnerable to a significant degradation in performance should a second failure occur.

We believe that the opportunity should be afforded to alert the driver to brake system faults of the nature described above. Accordingly, we request the agency's concurrence that the language of S5.3.1 allows for illumination of the brake telltale when a fault is detected which INCREASES THE LIKELIHOOD of a substantial degradation in brake system performance, even if the fault in question does not strictly fall into any of the categories listed in that section of FMVSS 105.

SUMMARY

GM would be pleased to discuss with the agency any of the issues that we propose be handled through interpretation. Our overriding interest is to provide the agency with the information it needs to quickly resolve any and all compliance questions involving the applicability of FMVSS 101 and 105 to the GMEV so that design work can continue and plans to offer the GMEV to the public can be carried out promptly.

We appreciate the NHTSA's consideration of these proposed interpretations. If the agency has any questions or requires additional information please contact me at (313) 974-1704.

Attachment

USG 2938 - Attachment 1 -- USG 2886 Part III. (Text omitted here.)

ID: 09-007987 bolduc feb25 11

ID: 11155b

Hugh J. Bode, Esq.
Reminger & Reminger
The 113 St. Clair Building
Cleveland, OH 44114

Dear Mr. Bode:

This responds to your letter concerning whether 49 U.S.C. ''30101 et seq. (formerly the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act) requires a motor vehicle manufacturer to ensure that its vehicle continues to comply with applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) after the first retail purchase of the vehicle.

You specifically ask about FMVSS No. 124, "Accelerator Control Systems," and its application to a 1988 Dodge Ram 50 pickup truck. It appears from the questions you ask that corrosion developed inside the carburetor of the pickup truck at some point during the life of the vehicle, such that the carburetor would not return to idle in accordance with the requirements of Standard No. 124.

You asked us to "confirm the accuracy" of a number of statements. Your first statement, concerning the application of the FMVSSs generally, is as follows:

As we understand it, former '108(a)(1)(A) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. '30112(a), prohibits any person from manufacturing, selling or introducing into commerce any new motor vehicle unless the vehicle is in conformity with all applicable FMVSS. However, the Safety Act further provides that the requirement that a vehicle comply with all applicable FMVSS does not apply after the first purchase for purposes other than resale, i.e., the first retail sale of the vehicle. Safety Act former '108(b)(1), 49 U.S.C. '30112(b)(1). After the first retail sale, the only provision in the Safety Act that affects a vehicle's continuing compliance with an applicable FMVSS is set forth in former '108(a)(2)(A), 49 U.S.C. '30122(b), which prohibits certain persons from knowingly rendering inoperative a device installed in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable FMVSS.

Your general understanding is correct. However, a manufacturer has responsibilities in addition to those in '30112, that may bear upon on "continuing compliance" of its vehicle. Under ''30118-30122 of our statute, each motor vehicle manufacturer must ensure that its vehicles are free of safety-related defects. If NHTSA or the manufacturer of a vehicle determines that the vehicle contains a safety-related defect, the manufacturer must notify purchasers of the defective vehicle and remedy the problem free of charge.

This is not to say that the development of the corrosion in the carburetor necessarily constitutes a safety-related defect. Rather, we acknowledge the possibility of such a finding in certain circumstances, such as where the corrosion developed unreasonably quickly in the vehicle and the problem was such that it could lead to crashes involving injuries or fatalities.

State law could also be relevant to this issue. For example, as part of its vehicle inspection requirements, a State could require that the accelerator control systems on vehicles "continue to comply" with the requirements of Standard No. 124.

With the above discussion in mind, I will now address your other four questions on Standard No. 124.

Question 1. We ask that NHTSA confirm that FMVSS 124 is a standard that a given vehicle must comply with only at the time of the first retail sale of the vehicle.

As explained in our answer above, your understanding is correct with regard to our requirements (49 U.S.C. '30112). There may be State requirements that apply.

Question 2. We ask NHTSA to confirm that if a carburetor installed in a 1988 Dodge Ram 50 pickup truck met all the requirements of FMVSS 124 at the time of the truck's first retail sale, but, after the sale, due to in- service conditions, corrosion developed inside the carburetor so the carburetor would not return to idle in accordance with the requirements of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3 of FMVSS 124, that circumstance would not render the vehicle in violation of FMVSS 124.

Your understanding is essentially correct. As permitted by Federal law, Chrysler sold the truck based upon its own certification of compliance with FMVSS No. 124. That corrosion developed in the system may or may not be relevant with respect to the existence of a safety-related defect.

Question 3. We ask NHTSA to confirm that all of the performance standards imposed by FMVSS 124 are contained in S5.1, S5.2 and S5.3 of FMVSS 124 and that S2 headed PURPOSE does not impose any separate regulatory obligation beyond those contained in S5.

While your understanding is essentially correct, note that Standard No. 124 and other motor vehicle safety standards are minimum performance standards.

Question 4. We ask you to confirm that the performance standard set forth in FMVSS 124 does not contain any requirement relating to durability or corrosion resistance.

Standard No. 124 does not specify a test for corrosion resistance. It is unclear what you mean by "durability." The requirements of the standard must be met when the engine "is running under any load condition, and at any ambient temperature between -40N F. and +125N F. ...." (S5) In addition to the performance regulated by Standard No. 124, each manufacturer must ensure that its motor vehicle does not have a safety-related defect.

If you have any questions about the information provided above, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:VSA#124 d:10/26/95

ID: nht95-4.67

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: October 26, 1995

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Hugh J. Bode, Esq. -- Reminger & Reminger

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 8/21/95 LETTER FROM HUGH J. BODE TO JOHN WOMACK

TEXT: Dear Mr. Bode:

This responds to your letter concerning whether 49 U.S.C. @@ 30101 et seq. (formerly the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act) requires a motor vehicle manufacturer to ensure that its vehicle continues to comply with applicable Federal motor veh icle safety standards (FMVSSs) after the first retail purchase of the vehicle.

You specifically ask about FMVSS No. 124, "Accelerator Control Systems," and its application to a 1988 Dodge Ram 50 pickup truck. It appears from the questions you ask that corrosion developed inside the carburetor of the pickup truck at some point duri ng the life of the vehicle, such that the carburetor would not return to idle in accordance with the requirements of Standard No. 124.

You asked us to "confirm the accuracy" of a number of statements. Your first statement, concerning the application of the FMVSSs generally, is as follows:

As we understand it, former @ 108(a) (1) (A) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. @ 30112(a), prohibits any person from manufacturing, selling or introducing into commerce any new motor vehicle unless the vehicle is in conformi ty with all applicable FMVSS. However, the Safety Act further provides that the requirement that a vehicle comply with all applicable FMVSS does not apply after the first purchase for purposes other than resale, i.e., the first retail sale of the vehicl e. Safety Act former @ 108 (b) (1), 49 U.S.C. @ 30112 (b) (1). After the first retail sale, the only provision in the Safety Act that affects a vehicle's continuing compliance with an applicable FMVSS is set forth in former @ 108(a) (2) (A), 49 U.S.C. @ 30122(b), which prohibits certain persons from knowingly rendering inoperative a device installed in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable FMVSS.

Your general understanding is correct. However, a manufacturer has responsibilities in addition to those in @ 30112, that may bear upon on "continuing compliance" of its vehicle. Under @@ 30118-30122 of our statute, each motor vehicle manufacturer must ensure that its vehicles are free of safety-related defects. If NHTSA or the manufacturer of a vehicle determines that the vehicle contains a safety-related defect, the manufacturer must notify purchasers of the defective vehicle and remedy the problem free of charge.

This is not to say that the development of the corrosion in the carburetor necessarily constitutes a safety-related defect. Rather, we acknowledge the possibility of such a finding in certain circumstances, such as where the corrosion developed unreason ably quickly in the vehicle and the problem was such that it could lead to crashes involving injuries or fatalities.

State law could also be relevant to this issue. For example, as part of its vehicle inspection requirements, a State could require that the accelerator control systems on vehicles "continue to comply" with the requirements of Standard No. 124.

With the above discussion in mind, I will now address your other four questions on Standard No. 124.

Question 1. We ask that NHTSA confirm that FMVSS 124 is a standard that a given vehicle must comply with only at the time of the first retail sale of the vehicle.

As explained in our answer above, your understanding is correct with regard to our requirements (49 U.S.C. @ 30112). There may be State requirements that apply.

Question 2. We ask NHTSA to confirm that if a carburetor installed in a 1988 Dodge Ram 50 pickup truck met all the requirements of FMVSS 124 at the time of the truck's first retail sale, but, after the sale, due to in-service conditions, corrosion develo ped inside the carburetor so the carburetor would not return to idle in accordance with the requirements of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3 of FMVSS 124, that circumstance would not render the vehicle in violation of FMVSS 124.

Your understanding is essentially correct. As permitted by Federal law, Chrysler sold the truck based upon its own certification of compliance with FMVSS No. 124. That corrosion developed in the system may or may not be relevant with respect to the exi stence of a safety-related defect.

Question 3. We ask NHTSA to confirm that all of the performance standards imposed by FMVSS 124 are contained in S5.1, S5.2 and S5.3 of FMVSS 124 and that S2 headed PURPOSE does not impose any separate regulatory obligation beyond those contained in S5.

While your understanding is essentially correct, note that Standard No. 124 and other motor vehicle safety standards are minimum performance standards.

Question 4. We ask you to confirm that the performance standard set forth in FMVSS 124 does not contain any requirement relating to durability or corrosion resistance.

Standard No. 124 does not specify a test for corrosion resistance. It is unclear what you mean by "durability." The requirements of the standard must be met when the engine "is running under any load condition, and at any ambient temperature between - 4 0 degrees F. and + 125 degrees F. . ." (S5) In addition to the performance regulated by Standard No. 124, each manufacturer must ensure that its motor vehicle does not have a safety-related defect.

If you have any questions about the information provided above, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht95-6.56

DATE: October 26, 1995

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Hugh J. Bode, Esq. -- Reminger & Reminger

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 8/21/95 LETTER FROM HUGH J. BODE TO JOHN WOMACK

TEXT: Dear Mr. Bode:

This responds to your letter concerning whether 49 U.S.C. @@ 30101 et seq. (formerly the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act) requires a motor vehicle manufacturer to ensure that its vehicle continues to comply with applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) after the first retail purchase of the vehicle.

You specifically ask about FMVSS No. 124, "Accelerator Control Systems," and its application to a 1988 Dodge Ram 50 pickup truck. It appears from the questions you ask that corrosion developed inside the carburetor of the pickup truck at some point during the life of the vehicle, such that the carburetor would not return to idle in accordance with the requirements of Standard No. 124.

You asked us to "confirm the accuracy" of a number of statements. Your first statement, concerning the application of the FMVSSs generally, is as follows:

As we understand it, former @ 108(a) (1) (A) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. @ 30112(a), prohibits any person from manufacturing, selling or introducing into commerce any new motor vehicle unless the vehicle is in conformity with all applicable FMVSS. However, the Safety Act further provides that the requirement that a vehicle comply with all applicable FMVSS does not apply after the first purchase for purposes other than resale, i.e., the first retail sale of the vehicle. Safety Act former @ 108 (b) (1), 49 U.S.C. @ 30112 (b) (1). After the first retail sale, the only provision in the Safety Act that affects a vehicle's continuing compliance with an applicable FMVSS is set forth in former @ 108(a) (2) (A), 49 U.S.C. @ 30122(b), which prohibits certain persons from knowingly rendering inoperative a device installed in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable FMVSS.

Your general understanding is correct. However, a manufacturer has responsibilities in addition to those in @ 30112, that may bear upon on "continuing compliance" of its vehicle. Under @@ 30118-30122 of our statute, each motor vehicle manufacturer must ensure that its vehicles are free of safety-related defects. If NHTSA or the manufacturer of a vehicle determines that the vehicle contains a safety-related defect, the manufacturer must notify purchasers of the defective vehicle and remedy the problem free of charge.

This is not to say that the development of the corrosion in the carburetor necessarily constitutes a safety-related defect. Rather, we acknowledge the possibility of such a finding in certain circumstances, such as where the corrosion developed unreasonably quickly in the vehicle and the problem was such that it could lead to crashes involving injuries or fatalities.

State law could also be relevant to this issue. For example, as part of its vehicle inspection requirements, a State could require that the accelerator control systems on vehicles "continue to comply" with the requirements of Standard No. 124.

With the above discussion in mind, I will now address your other four questions on Standard No. 124.

Question 1. We ask that NHTSA confirm that FMVSS 124 is a standard that a given vehicle must comply with only at the time of the first retail sale of the vehicle.

As explained in our answer above, your understanding is correct with regard to our requirements (49 U.S.C. @ 30112). There may be State requirements that apply.

Question 2. We ask NHTSA to confirm that if a carburetor installed in a 1988 Dodge Ram 50 pickup truck met all the requirements of FMVSS 124 at the time of the truck's first retail sale, but, after the sale, due to in-service conditions, corrosion developed inside the carburetor so the carburetor would not return to idle in accordance with the requirements of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3 of FMVSS 124, that circumstance would not render the vehicle in violation of FMVSS 124.

Your understanding is essentially correct. As permitted by Federal law, Chrysler sold the truck based upon its own certification of compliance with FMVSS No. 124. That corrosion developed in the system may or may not be relevant with respect to the existence of a safety-related defect.

Question 3. We ask NHTSA to confirm that all of the performance standards imposed by FMVSS 124 are contained in S5.1, S5.2 and S5.3 of FMVSS 124 and that S2 headed PURPOSE does not impose any separate regulatory obligation beyond those contained in S5.

While your understanding is essentially correct, note that Standard No. 124 and other motor vehicle safety standards are minimum performance standards.

Question 4. We ask you to confirm that the performance standard set forth in FMVSS 124 does not contain any requirement relating to durability or corrosion resistance.

Standard No. 124 does not specify a test for corrosion resistance. It is unclear what you mean by "durability." The requirements of the standard must be met when the engine "is running under any load condition, and at any ambient temperature between - 40 degrees F. and + 125 degrees F. . ." (S5) In addition to the performance regulated by Standard No. 124, each manufacturer must ensure that its motor vehicle does not have a safety-related defect.

If you have any questions about the information provided above, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.