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NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

Search Tool

NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 1551 - 1560 of 2067
Interpretations Date

ID: nht93-7.40

Open

DATE: October 25, 1993

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Greg Biba

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 9/21/93 Est. from Greg Biba to Office of Chief Council, NHTSA (OCC-9137)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter asking about safety regulations for a device you would like to sell. The device is an "infant observation mirror" that would allow parents to see their baby's face when the infant restraint is installed in the rear seat of a vehicle. The mirror is on a stand that sits under the infant restraint.

By way of background information, S103 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("Safety Act," 15 U.S.C. 1392) authorizes the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to issue safety standards for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA does not, however, approve or certify any vehicles or items of equipment. Instead, the Safety Act establishes a "self-certification" process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet all applicable safety standards. The agency periodically tests vehicles and items of equipment for compliance with the standards.

In response to your question, there is currently no Federal motor vehicle safety standard (FMVSS) that directly applies to the product you wish to manufacture. Under the authority of the Safety Act, NHTSA has issued Standard No. 213, Child Restraint Systems, which specifies requirements for child restraint systems used in motor vehicles and aircraft. However, Standard No. 213 applies only to new child restraint systems and not to aftermarket components of a child restraint system, such as an observation mirror.

I note, however, that there are other Federal laws that indirectly affect your manufacture and sale of the device. Under the Safety Act, your product is considered to be an item of motor vehicle equipment. As a manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment, you are subject to the requirements in S151-159 of the Safety Act concerning the recall and remedy of products with safety related defects. I have enclosed an information sheet that briefly describes those responsibilities. In the event that you or NHTSA determines that your mirror contains a safety-related defect, you would be responsible for notifying purchasers of the defective equipment and remedying the problem free of charge.

In addition, manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and motor vehicle repair businesses are subject to S108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act, which states: "No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative ... any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard ...." It appears unlikely from the nature of your product that it would be placed in vehicles by

commercial businesses instead of child restraint owners. However, if your product were to be installed by persons in those categories, they should ensure that its installation does not compromise the safety protection provided by a child restraint system. The prohibition of S108(a)(2)(A) does not apply to the actions of vehicle owners in adding to or otherwise modifying their vehicles or items of motor vehicle equipment.

The "render inoperative" prohibition of S108(a)(2)(A) does not apply to the actions of vehicle owners in adding to or otherwise modifying their vehicles or items of motor vehicle equipment. However, NHTSA urges owners not to undertake modifications that would reduce the efficacy of any safety device or element of design. We note that an observation mirror could be struck by an infant in a crash, such as during the "rebound" phase of a frontal impact. In the interest of safety, we suggest you manufacture your mirror so that the risk of head injuries in a crash is minimized.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have further questions, please contact Deirdre Fujita of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht73-2.2

Open

DATE: 08/30/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Electrical Testing Laboratories, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of June 18, 1973, concerning the conformity of certain designs of type III seat belt assemblies with Standard No. 209.

The first feature which you describe is a restraint consisting of a waist band with a single shoulder strap. The shoulder strap is attached to the buckle in front and is looped around the waist band in back. Unless this restraint has more elements then you describe, we haver serious questions about its conformity with the requirements for type III seat belts under Standard 209. Section S4.1(c) provides that the assembly must restrain the upper torso without shifting the pelvic restraint into the abdominal region and that the upper torso restraint shall be designed to minimize its vertical forces on the shoulders and spine. It appears doubtful that the described assembly meets either of these requirements.

The second feature you described is a strap through the harness assembly that passes around the seat back and is anchored to the floor by means of the vehicle's seat belt assembly anchorage. Your question appears to be whether such a restraint is a seat back retainer as required by Section S4.1(h). The attachment you describe would not be a seat back retainer under Section S4.1(h).

The third feature described, a closed loop strap without floor attachment would also violate the requirements of S4.1(h), unless it is designed and labelled for use only in specific models having adequate seat back restraints, as specified in that paragraph.

The fourth feature is the ability of a harness to move freely up and down on the restraint strap. This feature is the ability of harness to move freely up and down on the restraint strap. This feature is allowable under Standard 209.

Yours truly,

ELECTRICAL TESTING LABORATORISE, INC.

June 18, 1973

Richard Dyson -- Office of the Chief Counsel, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Subject: Type 3 Seat Belt Assemblies.

Dear Mr. Dyson:

We have recently been asked to perform tests on type III seat belt assemblies, the design of which has caused us some doubt as to their meeting some of the requirements of FMVSS 209. What we would like to know is whether or not the following design features are acceptable under the requirements for type III seat belt assemblies as outlined in FMVSS 209.

1. Upper torso restraint: Restraint consists of single strap starting at the midpoint of the pelvic band (strap around the waist). The anchor point is the buckle tongue hardware. The strap then passes over on shoulder of the child and is terminated in a loop through which the pelvic belt passes freely.

2. Seat Back Retainer: Strap passes through harness assembly around seat in a closed loop and is anchored to the vehicle by a narrow anchor plate using the same bolt as used to secure the seat belt assembly. This installation is performed by the purchaser.

3. Strap: The harness assembly is secured to the seat back by a closed loop strap. No seat back restraint provided.

4. Harness assembly: The harness assembly is secured by either the seat back retainer or strap and is free to move up or down on this section of webbing.

The specimens we have in for test are combinations of the above features and as such we would appreciate knowing what features are acceptable and which are not.

Should you require any additional information on this subject, in relation to the descriptions, please contact either Mr. H. D. Pomponio or myself.

Very truly yours,

C. F. Robb -- Manager, Automotive/Mechanical Division

ID: maxzonenew

Open

    Mr. Galen Chen
    Marketing Department
    Maxzone Vehicle Lighting Corp.
    5100 Walnut Grove Avenue
    San Gabriel, CA 91776

    Dear Mr. Chen:

    This is in reply to your email (copy enclosed) concerning replacement lighting equipment. We apologize for the delay in our response.

    You reported that your company is developing "a new headlamp" for 1998-2001 model Honda Accord passenger cars (we shall refer to this as the "Maxzone headlamp"). You informed us that the original equipment (OE) headlamp for these vehicles consists of "High Beam (9005 bulb), Low Beam (9006 bulb), Park Signal and reflector. No fog lamp function." (We would also note that the OE headlamp on this model Honda Accord appears to incorporate the required front turn signal and side marker lamp as well.) The Maxzone headlamp consists of "High Beam (H1 bulb), Low Beam (H3 bulb), Park Signal and weve added Fog Lamp (H3 bulb) to this headlamp assembly. It also comes with reflector." You informed us "the numbers of different functions after tests all pass SAE/DOT requirements." You asked whether the Maxzone headlamp could be certified and sold as legal replacements for the 1998-2001 Honda Accord models. As discussed below, the answer to this question is no.

    Under S5.8, Replacement equipment, of Standard No. 108, "Each lamp . . . manufactured to replace any lamp . . . on any vehicle to which this standard applies, shall be designed to conform to this standard." (S5.8.1)

    S7.1 of Standard No. 108 requires a motor vehicle, other than a motorcycle, to "be equipped with a headlighting system designed to conform to the requirements of S7.3, S7.4, S7.5, or S7.6." Maxzone stated that the OE headlighting system on the 1998-2001

    Honda Accord consists of headlamps with HB3 (9005) and HB4 (9006) replaceable light sources. Thus, a replacement headlamp for this vehicle must be evaluated according to the requirements of S7.5, Replaceable bulb headlamp systems.

    S7.5(b) requires that each headlamp in the system be designed to conform to the photometrics as specified in S7.5(c) through (e) using any light source of the type intended for use in such system.Considering that this particular vehicle incorporates HB3 and HB4 replaceable light sources in its OE headlighting system, we view S5.8.1 and S7.5(b) as requiring each replacement headlamp for this vehicle to be designed to conform to the specified photometry when using HB3 and HB4 replaceable light sources. Because replaceable light sources are, by regulation, designed to be non-interchangeable, it would not be possible for the Maxzone replacement headlamp to comply with the applicable photometry using HB3 and HB4 replaceable light sources when the Maxzone headlamp is designed to use replaceable light sources other than HB3 and HB4. Therefore, the Maxzone headlamp could not be certified and sold as a replacement for a 1998-2001 Honda Accord headlamp. This also means that a headlamp dealer or motor vehicle repair business could not remove the original headlamp and install the Maxzone headlamp as a replacement without violating 49 U.S.C. 30122. This section prohibits manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and motor vehicle repair businesses from making inoperative equipment installed in accordance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard.

    You also informed us that the Maxzone headlamp "comes with reflector." We are unsure of your meaning. We interpret S5.8.1 as requiring replacement lighting equipment designed for specific motor vehicles to incorporate, at a minimum, the same required functionality as included on the original equipment lamp it is intended to replace. If the original Accord headlamp incorporated an amber side reflex reflector in compliance with Standard No. 108, each replacement headlamp for that Accord must also incorporate an amber side reflex reflector if we are to regard it being "designed to conform to this standard" within the meaning of S5.8.1.

    I hope that this information is useful to you. If you have any questions, you may call Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

    Sincerely,

    Jacqueline Glassman
    Chief Counsel

    Enclosure
    ref:108
    d.3/13/03

2003

ID: nht67-1.28

Open

DATE: 10/04/67

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; William Haddon, Jr., M.D.; NHTSA

TO: House of Representatives

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of August 16 in which you attached a letter from your constituent, Mrs. Beverly Hoffman of San Diego. Mrs. Hoffman asked if there is any Federal or state regulation, or city ordinance, which forbids the removal or concealment of passenger seat belts in taxicabs. Mrs. Hoffman has raised an important question and one which is of vital concern to the objectives of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966: the retention of a safety equipment in a vehicle after its original purchase.

Since I expect that California law is of most interest to both Mrs. Hoffman and you, I will answer her question on the basis of the California Vehicle Code. Since January 1, 1964, Section 27309 has made it an offense to sell in California any new passenger vehicle which does not have at least two state approved restraint belts or harnesses in its front seat. Retention of the front seat belts by the vehicle owner is indirectly required by Section 40001(b) (2) which makes it unlawful for "an owner to request, cause, or permit the operation of any vehicle which is not equipped as required in this Code." (emphasis supplied) Since California has no annual motor vehicle inspection, enforcement of this law has presumably been by spot inspection. Members of the California Highway Patrol (Section 2804) and city traffic officers (Section 2806) have the authority to inspect a vehicle to determine whether its equipment is in compliance with the code.

With respect to rear seat-belts which most directly concern Mrs. Hoffman as a passenger, their installation has not been required by the Code. Such belts as she may have seen in the rear of California taxis have been provided as a courtesy of the owner rather than as a requirement of the law. But, as she directly notes, all passenger cars including taxicabs manufactured on or after January 1, 1968, must comply with Federal motor vehicle safety standards. One of these, Standard No. 208, will require taxis to be manufactured with lap restraint belts installed in each rear seating position. But if the California legislature has not amended the Vehicle Code itself to require their installation it would appear that there is no legal reason why a cab owner may not remove rear seat belts should he wish to go to the trouble.

Under the Act, the Secretary of Transportation does not have the authority to directly regulate motor vehicles "after the first purchase of it in good faith for purposes other than resale." Instead, Congress intended that used vehicles be regulated by periodic state inspection. To implement this intent the Secretary has been directed to study state inspection systems and, in due course, to establish uniform standards applicable to all used motor vehicles. A hypothetical standard and one which we shall consider -- requiring the presence of original equipment safety items at time of each inspection would be sufficient to cover retention of rear seat safety belts. But the Act establishes no requirement that the states or any individual follow any used vehicle standard. For the probable enforcement mechanism of used car standards it is necessary to turn to the companion Highway Safety Act of 1966. Under this Act each state is required to have a highway safety program in accordance with standards promulgated by the Secretary. One such standard, already issued, establishes minimum requirements for periodic motor vehicle inspection. Eventually it is possible that used car standards will be suggested to the states through this motor vehicle inspection standard, but enforcement of the used car standards will be left to the states.

Concerning concealment of the belts, I am aware of no legislation, Federal, state, or municipal, which requires that a safety item not only be retained but also available for use. But I believe that sufficient authority may exist in the Highway Safety Act's mandate to the Bureau to include "vehicle operation" in the highway safety program standards to warrant our serious consideration of it.

I hope that this has answered Mrs. Hoffman's questions and I appreciate her interest in traffic safety.

ID: nht70-2.40

Open

DATE: 12/08/70

FROM: D.W. TOMS -- DIR., NHTSA; SIGNATURE BY CHARLES H. HARTMAN

TO: Physicians for Automotive Safety

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Thank you for your letters of November 6, 1970, to Secretary Volpe and me, concerning child restraint systems. I have taken the liberty of replying to both of your letter, as they seem to raise identical issues.

The points you raise are summarized at the conclusion of your letters. Your first is based upon your belief that no attempt has been made to require labeling on child harnesses that would enable the public "to distinguish between harnesses that provide collision protection, and those that merely serve to secure the child in one place and, at best, prevent him from being thrown forward in a sudden (but controlled) stop." You further state of the latter type of harness.

The Bureau's position in this matter is that harnesses marketed to provide restraint in panic or sudden stop situations must meet the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 209. In addition, enforcement proceedings in this area are presently underway to climinate harnesses that do not comply with the standard. The Bureau does not consider that these inexpensive harnesses provide a satisfactory minimum level of protection when used in motor vehicles. Furthermore, consumers desirable of obtaining crash protection for their children may be induced to compromise on safety by the availability of the cheaper systems, without realizing how limited is the effectiveness of these systems. Any benefits obtained from the cheaper harnesses are more than outweighed by these deficiences.

Your second recommendation concerns child seating systems, and consists of two parts. First, you suggest banning the manufacture of child seating systems that do not comply with Standard No. 213. Second, you recommed that warning notices be required on seating systems remaining on the market after April 1, 1971, that do not comply with the standard because they were manufactured before its effective date.

With reference to your first recommendation, the Buresu has proposed to take the action you recommend. In the notice of proposed rulemaking concerning Standard No. 213, published September 23, 1970 (35 F.R. 14786), the Bureau has proposed to extend the Scope of the standard to include all devices for seating children in motor vehicles. This requirement would become effective January 1, 1972, and a copy of the notice is enclosed for your information. Your letters will be placed in the rulemaking docket. With reference to your second recommendation, the Bureau is not authorized under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act to require much a warning. The Act, pursuant to which Standard No. 213 and all other motor vehicle safety standards are issued, provides that only motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment manufactured after the effective date of a standard must comply with it. We could not, therefore, impose a requirement, including a warning requirement, on those seating systems manufactured before April 1, 1971.

The Bureau agrees, however, that consumers should be aware that child seating systems that do not comply with Standard No. 213 will still be available after April 1, 1971. The Bureau is planning, therefore, to issue an advisory at or about the time the standard becomes effective that will indicate how consumers may distinguish between those child seats that comply with the standard and those that do not.

Your third recommendation is that child harnesses not meeting Standard No. 209 be required to contain warnings as to their deficiencies, and that harnessen that do meet the standard be required to carry detailed information about their value in a crash. As stated above, harnesses that do not comply with the standard may not be manufactured. As to requiring harnesses that do comply to carry detailed information concerning their value, the benefits that these devices can provide will differ according to the dynamics of all individual crash, and are not, therefore, capable of precise statement. The Bureau will, however, consider other methods of informing the public as to the broad safety benefits obtainable from the use of child restraint devices.

Your continued interest in motor vehicle safety is very much appreciated.

ID: 7241

Open

Mr. Thomas Turner
Manager, Engineering Services
Blue Bird Body Company
P.O. Box 937
Fort Valley, GA 31030

Dear Mr. Turner:

This responds to your letter asking about Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 131, School Bus Pedestrian Safety Devices, with respect to the automatic extension of a stop signal arm. You were especially concerned with the interaction between a provision in Wisconsin's Administrative Code requiring activation of the stop signal arm under specified conditions and the stop signal arm activation requirements set forth in Standard No. 131. I have responded in detail to your questions below.

Before I answer your question about your company's design for complying with both the Wisconsin Code and Standard No. 131, I would like to note that it does not appear that the Wisconsin regulation is inconsistent with Standard No. 131 with respect to the stop signal arm activation requirements. The Wisconsin Administrative Code states that:

"Any bus manufactured after January 1, 1978, shall have the stop signal arm controlled by the service door. The stop signal arm shall not become operational until the service door opens. The stop signal arm shall be installed in such a manner that it cannot be activated unless the alternating red lamps are in operation."

S5.5 of Standard No. 131 states that "The stop signal arm shall be automatically extended in such a manner that it complies with S5.4.1, at a minimum whenever the red signal lamps required by S5.1.4 of Standard No. 108 are activated..." (emphasis added) Both the Wisconsin requirement and the requirement in Standard No. 131 tie the activation of the stop signal arm to the operation of the red signal lamps. In addition, the Wisconsin regulation also ties the activation of the stop signal arm to the opening of the service door. Based on this information, it appears that a manufacturer could comply with both Standard No. 131 and the Wisconsin regulation by designing its school buses so that opening the service door automatically activates both the stop signal arm and the red flashing lamps. If the Wisconsin regulation were interpreted in a way that does not tie the automatic extension of the stop signal arm to opening the service door, then there could be an inconsistency with Standard No. 131.

You asked whether Blue Bird's system for activating the stop signal arm in accordance with Wisconsin's requirement complies with the requirements of Standard No. 131. You explained that, on its school buses sold in Wisconsin, Blue Bird provides a system by which the alternating red flashing lamps are activated by a driver controlled manual switch and the stop signal arm is activated by opening the service door. Under this system, the red flashing lamps are activated before the service door has been opened and before the stop signal arm has been extended. Based on the information provided in your letter, we conclude that Blue Bird's system would not comply with the requirements of Standard No. 131.

Standard No. 131 explicitly requires the stop signal arm to be automatically deployed whenever the red signal lamps required by Standard No. 108 are activated. As explained in the final rule adopting Standard No. 131, "any system of activation is permissible provided the stop signal arm is extended during, at least, the entire time that the red warning lamps are activated." (56 FR 20363, 20368, May 3, 1991). As described in your letter, the system your company has developed for its Wisconsin school buses has the red warning lamps activated by a manual switch and the activation of those lamps does not activate the stop signal arm. Hence, that system does not comply with the explicit requirement of Standard No. 131 that the stop signal arm be automatically extended whenever the red warning lamps are activated.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel Ref:131 d:6/17/92

1992

ID: nht90-4.98

Open

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: December 26, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Arthur H. Bryant, Esq. -- Executive Director, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice

TITLE: Neilson v. Porsche, et al., D. Idaho, Civ. No. 87-1121

TEXT:

This is in response to your letter to Kenneth Weinstein, the Assistant Chief Counsel for Litigation of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), regarding the above-referenced case, in which the District Court ruled that the plaintiff 's claims are preempted by Federal law. You have requested that the United States file an amicus curiae brief with the Ninth Circuit in support of the plaintiff.

Although this agency strongly disagrees with both the result and the rationale adopted by the District Court, we have decided not to request the Department of Justice to file an amicus brief in this appeal. A discussion of our views on this legal issue and the basis for our decision not to participate is set forth below.

As you are aware, it is the position of the United States, as expressed in amicus briefs filed in Ritt v. General Motors, No. 88-1822 (7th Cir.), and Wood v. General Motors, No. 89-46 (U.S. S.Ct.), that under certain circumstances, claims seeking to hold a motor vehicle liable in tort for its failure to install airbags in a vehicle are preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 ("Act"), 15 U.S.C. S 1381 et seq., and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard ("FMVSS") No. 208, 49 CFR S 571.208, issued at 49 Fed. Reg. 28962 (July 17, 1984). However, in both of those briefs, the United States emphasized that, as a general matter, the fact that a motor vehicle complies with applicable federal safety standards neither preempts state law tort actions nor provides a complete defense to such claims.

Those briefs noted that NHTSA had, for many years, interpreted the Act to allow such claims to proceed, and referred to a January 5, 1981 letter from Frank Berndt, NHTSA's Chief Counsel, to Daniel L. Thistle. As that letter noted:

Section 108(c) (15 U.S.C. 1397(c)) of the Act provides that compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard "does not exempt any person from liability under common law." The House Report (H.R. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess (1966)) on se ction 108(c) states that, "It is intended, and this subsection specifically establishes, that compliance with safety standards is not to be a defense or otherwise to affect the rights of parties under common law, particularly those relating to warranty, contract, and tort liability."

This principle has been upheld consistently by the courts, as reflected in the cases cited in the plaintiff's brief in opposition to Porsche's motion for summary judgment in this case. (Of course, NHTSA takes no position on the merits of this case; i.e. , whether Porsche should be held liable for not making the seat backs in the vehicle in question stronger.)

Thus, as noted above, in our view the District Court's opinion misstates the law on this issue. In relying upon cases in which courts have found claims involving airbags to be preempted, the court ignored the vital distiction between claims challenging a manufacturer's failure to install airbags rather than other forms of occupant protection that were specifically authorized by FMVSS No. 208, and claims such as the one at issue here, in which it is alleged that the manufacturer should have provided a h igher level of protection than that required under a NHTSA safety standard. However, to our knowledge, this is the first case in which a court has misapplied the airbag precedents to reverse a consistent body of law that permits claims such as this to p roceed. In keeping with NHTSA's long-standing policy of minimizing its involvement in private tort litigation, we believe that it would not be appropriate to participate formally in this case, particularly since the plaintiff will be able to provide the Ninth Circuit with our views on the issue. In the unlikely event that this erroneous view of the extent of Federal preemption proliferates in the future, the agency may decide to participate in a subsequent case.

ID: nht88-2.100

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 08/11/88

FROM: PAUL ULTANS -- VICE PRESIDENT GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS SUBARU OF AMERICA

TO: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 10/13/88 TO PAUL UTANS FROM ERIKA Z JONES, REDBOOK A32 STANDARD 208, STANDARD 210; LETTER DATED 08/18/78 TO D. BLACK FROM JOSEPH J LEVIN, STANDARD 210, RE NOA - 30

TEXT: Dear Ms. Jones:

Subaru of America, requests your interpretation of how the requirements of various Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) apply to a belt system Subaru would like to offer as standard equipment on its U.S. station wagon models, beginning in m id-model year 1989. This system is a manual, single-loop, 3-point (combination lap-shoulder) belt for use at the rear outboard seating positions.

Subaru currently offers a manual lap belt at the rear outboard positions of our station wagons. The belt system that we would like to offer is now used in European versions of these autos. It has a single-point buckle mechanism and is automatically adjustable. The upper anchorage for this European belt is located outside the FMVSS 210 "approved range", but within the ECE Regulation No. 14 "permitted area". (See enclosed Figures 1 and 2.) n1

n1 The vehicles in question have an additional upper anchorage located in the U.S. approved range, as required by FMVSS 210. However, the European belt system cannot directly be used with the U.S. anchorage, due to the need for additional bolt holes to accommodate the European belt and its retractor.

It is our view that the installation of the European-type belt in the ECE anchorage is permitted under the various FMVSSs. The European system qualifies as a "Type 2 belt assembly", as required in FMVSS 208. The European belt assembly is certified t o meet the requirements of FMVSS 209 by the belt manufacturer. The anchorages required under FMVSS 210 (including the current upper anchorage in the U.S. approved range) would continue to be provided. Therefore, we believe all the explicit requirements of these standards would continue to be met.

The minimum FMVSS seat belt requirements for rear outboard seating positions provide for lap belts and an additional upper anchorage (in a specified location). The upper anchorage is included to permit owner retrofit of a 3-point belt system, if desi red. Under our proposal, we would continue to provide these items. In addition, Subaru would voluntarily provide the shoulder portion of the belt and an additional anchorage. We believe the additional, voluntarily provided, items should not be subject to regulation, so long as they do not impair the functioning of any required safety equipment. We do not believe that the additional upper anchorage and shoulder belt section will in any way impair the operation of the lap belt section. To the contrar y, we believe that the additional items will provide further safety benefits. Permitting use of the European-type belt and anchorage would enable Subaru to provide U.S. vehicle purchasers with the benefits of three point restraint in an automatically adj ustable system at the earliest possible date. Requiring the use of an upper anchorage within the U.S. acceptable range would result in delay while anchorage and/or belt modifications are engineered and implemented.

In order for Subaru to begin offering the proposed belt system by mid-model year 1989 (e.g., to arrange for the necessary supplies of belt systems), we would need to receive your response to this letter no later than November 1, 1988. Therefore, we r equest your expeditious consideration of this proposal. If you have any questions on this matter, please contact me.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

FIGURE 1

1989 SUBARU STATION WAGON PROPOSED REAR SEAT THREE-POINT SEAT BELT INSTALLATION

(DIAGRAM OMITTED)

FIGURE 2

(DIAGRAM OMITTED)

1989 SUBARU STATION WAGON PROPOSED REAR SEAT THREE-POINT SEAT BELT INSTALLATION

ID: nht88-2.6

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/22/88

FROM: PAUL SCULLY -- VICE PRESIDENT, PETERSON MANUFACTURING COMPANY

TO: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

TITLE: INTERPRETATION OF "EFFECTIVE PROJECTED LUMINOUS AREA"

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 08/19/88 TO PAUL SCULLY FROM ERIKA Z. JONES, REDBOOK A32 (2) STANDARD 108

TEXT: Dear Ms. Jones:

The members and counsel of the Transportation Safety Equipment Institute, who met with you on April 14, 1988, requested that I send you a summary of the interpretations which industry has been using regarding the term, "effective projected luminous area" . This relates to an inquiry from Wesbar and the agency's response on the meaning of this term.

On October 28, 1970, the National Highway Safety Bureau issued the following interpretation:

"The effective projected luminous area is that area of the lens measured on a plane at right angles to the axis of the lamp, excluding reflex reflectors, which is not obstructed by an opaque object, such as a mounting screw, mounting ring, or an ornam ental bezel or trim. This allows the area of rings or other configurations (raised portions) molded in the lens to be considered part of the total effective area, even if this area does not contribute significantly to the total light output."

On October 28, 1979, an interpretation was issued by Roger Compton, Director, Office of Operating Systems, Motor Vehicle Programs, to American Motors Corporation which read as follows:

"The effective projected luminous area is that area of the lens measured on a plane at right angles to the axis of the lamp, excluding reflex reflectors, which is not obstructed by an opaque object. This interpretation allows the area of rings, or ot her configurations molded to the lamp to be considered part of the total effective area, even if this area does not contribute significantly to the total light output."

The above interpretations are basically the same. The vehicle lighting industry has been using these definitions, based on opinions from your agency, for about 18 years. Prior to that time, this same basic definition was even used by a number of indivi dual states. Also, the independent testing laboratories throughout the nation, as well as all manufacturers, have been excluding reflex areas in calculating "effective projected luminous area" for well over 40 years.

In 1987, the Society of Automotive Engineers through the SAE Lighting Committee adopted the following language which is now a part of SAE J387-Terminology:

"Effective projected luminous area" is the part of the light emitting surface measured on a plane at right angles to the axis of a lamp, excluding reflex reflectors, (but including congruent reflexes), which is not obstructed by opaque objects such as mounting screws, mounting rings, bezels or trim or similar ornamented feature areas. Areas of optical or other configurations, for example, molded optical rings or markings, shall be considered part of the total "effective projected luminous area" even if they do not contribute significantly to the total light output. The axis of the lamp corresponds to the H-V axis used for photometric requirements."

Again, you will note that the SAE term clearly excludes the reflex reflector areas. A prismatic reflex reflector is constructed to return light from an outside source. In contrast, a lens optic is designed to direct light which originates inside the le ns area. While it is true that a small amount of light escapes through the prismatic reflector area, this light cannot be controlled or directed and provides nothing more than a minimal glow of light.

I confirmed that the vehicle manufacturers in Detroit have also relied on the interpretations issued by your agency and its predecessor as described above.

The letter to Wesbar Corporation, dated March 16, 1988, appears to have been caused by a misunderstanding involving some engineering terms. We respectfully suggest a prompt clarification should satisfy everyone.

Very truly yours,

ID: nht92-4.7

Open

DATE: September 14, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Lyle Walheim -- Lieutenant, Motor Carrier and Inspection Services, Wisconsin Department of Transportation

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 6/30/92 from Lyle Walheim to Paul Jackson Rice (OCC-7495)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter seeking a clarification of whether Wisconsin's current requirements for the activation of stop signal arms on school buses would comply with the stop signal arm requirements set forth in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 131, School Bus Pedestrian Safety Devices. Your letter was prompted by my June 17, 1992 interpretation to Blue Bird Body Company. After evaluating the information provided in your letter, together with the information previously supplied by Blue Bird, we have reconsidered our assessment of the Wisconsin requirements. Subject to the qualifications discussed below, it is our reconsidered view that the Wisconsin requirements are not preempted by Standard No. 131 and that Blue Bird can continue to supply buses meeting Wisconsin's specifications, with the addition of the audible warning device described in Blue Bird's letter.

The distinguishing feature of Wisconsin's requirement is that it ties the operation of the stop arm to the opening of the service door, not to the operation of the red flashing lamps. In practice, the lamps on a Wisconsin bus equipped with a four-lamp system would operate like those on a bus equipped with an eight-lamp system, with the red lamps (instead of yellow lamps) flashing while the bus is coming to a stop. Since S5.1.4(b)(ii) of Standard No. 108 requires the yellow lamps on an eight-lamp system to turn off automatically and the red lamps to turn on automatically whenever the entrance door opens, and since the red lamps on the Wisconsin buses would operate whenever the entrance door is open, the Wisconsin buses would conform to the requirements of Standard No. 108. That standard does not prohibit the flashing of red lamps on a four-lamp system while the service door is closed.

For purposes of Standard No. 131, the question is whether there is any circumstance in which the stop arm may be deactivated while the red lamps are flashing. From the standpoint of practicality, we agree with you that the stop arm should not function before the bus has stopped and the driver has opened the service door. We further believe it is consistent with the purpose of the standard for the stop arm to be deactivated on a Wisconsin bus before the bus stops, even though the bus's red lamps may be flashing. To reconcile this view with the language of the standard, however, requires us to address the requirement of the standard that the arm must extend "at a minimum whenever the red signal lamps required by S5.1.4 of Standard No. 108 are activated...."

Standard No. 131 expressly contemplates a situation in which the stop arm would not automatically extend despite the operation of the red lamps. The final clause of S5.5 provides that "a device may be installed that prevents

the automatic extension of a stop signal arm." The question in Wisconsin's situation is whether the manual switch that activates the red signal lamps but not the stop arm would qualify as such a device. In our view, it does. Since the only time the red lamps are required by Standard No. 108 to operate is when the entrance door is open, and since the Wisconsin system would automatically extend the stop arm when the entrance door opens, we believe that the manual switch in the Wisconsin system can be fairly characterized as an override device that prevents the automatic extension of the stop signal arm until the red lamps are required to operate. For an override to be permitted, the device must comply with the other provisions set forth in S5.5, including the presence of a continuous or intermittent signal.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Request an Interpretation

You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:

The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.

Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.

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