ID: nht93-7.46

DATE: November 1, 1993

FROM: Dan Neaga -- Project Engineer, Advanced Engineering Business Unit, Johnson Controls, Inc.; Dianna Sabo -- Engineering Manager, Advanced Engineering Business Unit, Johnson Controls Inc.

TO: DOCKET SECTION, NHTSA

COPYEE: S. Furr; B. Batzer

TITLE: Re: Request For Clarification On FMVSS 213 S5.2.2.1 (b)

ATTACHMT: Attached To Letter Dated 6/9/94 From John Womack To Dan Neaga And Dianna Sabo (A42; Std. 213)

TEXT: Dear Sir/Madam:

This letter is in regard to FMVSS 213 S5.2.2.1 (b). Johnson Controls, Inc. designs child seats for children that weigh from 20 to 60 pounds. We have developed a new design for an Integrated Child Restraint System (ICRS) that uses the same seat back surface as the adult occupant. Therefore, no lateral support other than the one offered to the adult occupant is provided.

We have enclosed a set of three illustrations that show a generic adult seat (a) with the child seat in fully stored position; (b) with the child seat deploying; (c) with the child seat fully deployed.

The wording in FMVSS 213 S5.2.2.1 (b) is "Each system surface provided for support of the side of the child's torso shall be flat or concave and have a continuous surface of not less than 24 square inches for systems recommended for children weighing 20 pounds or more . . . ", and we have interpreted it to mean that lateral support is not necessarily required. Please confirm that surface provided for support of the side of the child's torso is not required by FMVSS 213 under these circumstances.

The information and design concepts that we have provided you with are confidential. If you need additional information regarding this matter, please contact me at the above address, or you may reach me at [Illegible Word]. My fax number, should you require it, is (313) 454-7874.

2

We thank you very much for your cooperation and look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC.

Enclosures

ID: nht93-7.47

DATE: November 3, 1993

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: The Honorable Phil Gramm -- United States Senate

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to Privacy Form dated 9/19/93 from Thomas J. Devon to Senator Phil Gram (OCC number illegible)

TEXT:

Thank you for your inquiry on behalf of your constituent, Mr. Thomas J. Devon of Longview, Texas. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) referred your inquiry to this office, since the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) administers Federal safety standards for tires.

In his communication with you, Mr. Devon expressed concern about separated treads from retreaded large truck tires. He "referred to the deaths of two young women reportedly caused when they lost control of their vehicle after striking a separated tread in the road. Mr. Devon is concerned that retreaded tires do not meet the same standards as new tires and requested data on accidents caused by separated tire tread sections on the roadway.

By way of background information, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. S1381, et seq. (Safety Act) authorizes NHTSA to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. Pursuant to that authority, NHTSA has issued various Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) applicable to tires: FMVSS Nos. 109 and 110 for new pneumatic passenger car tires; FMVSS Nos. 119 and 120 for new pneumatic tires for other than passenger cars; and FMVSS No. 117 for retreaded passenger car tires. There is currently no standard applicable to retreaded tires for vehicles other than passenger cars. This is because the agency is not aware of any data suggesting a safety need for such a standard.

With respect to tire tread separation, examination of actual tire scraps from the nation's highways have indicated that about 60 percent came from retreaded tires and 40 percent from original tires. Because of the many complaints about heavy truck tire tread scraps on and around the highways, the University of Michigan conducted a study in the mid-1980s' entitled "Large Truck Accidents Involving Tire Failure." That study concluded that most large truck tire failures are caused by vehicle overload and/or tire underinflation. Underinflation causes excessive flexing of the tire. The friction resulting from that flexing causes excessive heat buildup which can, in turn, result in tread separation or other tire failure. Indeed, the heat buildup has been known to be so extreme as to cause the tire to burst into flame.

The findings from the Michigan study led the FHWA to prohibit the operation of commercial motor vehicles with overloaded and underinflated tires, unless the vehicle is operated pursuant to a special permit issued by a state. That permit, however, requires a reduced speed to compensate for the increased tire loading. In addition, the vehicle and the tires must be maintained in a safe operating condition at all times. FHWA conducts

roadside inspection programs to ensure that such requirements are being met.

While scraps of tires on the roadway could pose a safety hazard to motorists, this agency has no real world crash data to indicate what percentage of motor vehicle crashes could be attributed to separated tire treads. Our crash data are limited to the general category of tire failure.

Please be assured that NHTSA and FHWA, as well as the tire industry itself, are engaged in ongoing efforts to alleviate this problem by appropriate publicity to large truck owners and operators regarding proper tire care and maintenance and by vigorous vehicle inspection programs.

I hope this information is helpful. If your constituent has any further questions, he may contact Walter Myers of this office at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht93-7.48

DATE: November 3, 1993

FROM: Ronald L. Signorino -- Director, Health, Safety & Regulatory Affairs, Universal Maritime Service Corp.

TO: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, Federal Highway Administration

TITLE: VIA FAX: 202 366 3820

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 11/19/93 from John Womack to Ronald L. Signorino (A41; Std. 108)

TEXT:

I write representing Maersk Line, Inc., a shipping corporation having considerable interests in intermodal transportation issues worldwide.

Maersk Line is poised to have production begun on a very large number of intermodal container chassis. They will be fabricated by manufacturers in the United States. Indeed, Maersk Line's purchasing representatives are due to view prototype chassis next week; authorization to begin actual production is expected at that time.

Desiring to remain consistent with the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) Conspicuity Rule, Maersk Line sought the assistance of Selecto- Flash, Inc., of Orange, New Jersey. Selecto-Flash has for some time serviced the marking, stenciling, and decaling needs of intermodal interests, and was thought to be well-positioned in determining proper routes of compliance with the conspicuity requirements.

To that end, they had been in contact with FHWA and had been given advice relative to the conspicuity marking of intermodal container chassis. Once in receipt of that advice Selecto-Flash shared it with Maersk Line, hoping to provide them with the benefit of FHWA's considered interpretation. Subsequently, Selecto-Flash received a letter from you dated October 20, 1993, in which you reversed that FHWA interpretation. That reversal gives rise to this communication in which I, as the individual responsible for regulatory issues to this firm's parent, Maersk Line, Inc., am compelled to gain a clearer understanding of FHWA's conspicuity position. This is necessary so that Maersk Line may effectively act next week in approving prototype versions of U.S. manufactured intermodal container chassis.

My understanding can be gained by providing you with a set of given facts and posing one question.

Fact: With particular reference to Maersk Line's prospective order for forty-foot gooseneck chassis (drawing accompanies this fax), your October 20 letter makes clear that calculable conspicuity treatments must not be obscured by trailer cargo;

Fact: In calculating the area of conspicuity treatment for such chassis, the gooseneck section, as it is often hidden from view by mounted intermodal containers (trailer cargo), cannot properly be considered as an appropriate site; and

Fact: In determining the fifty percent of side surface area to receive conspicuity treatment on such chassis, the length of the chassis, from its rear bolster to its point immediately behind the gooseneck's terminus, is

solely relevant.

Question: Are the foregoing facts right, or wrong?

Please appreciate, Mr. Womack, that the timeliness of your response is important to all parties concerned in this matter. Given the contrasting nature of positions on this matter emanating from FHWA, I know you will make every effort to be sympathetic to Maersk Line's production schedule. With kindest regards.

ID: nht93-7.49

DATE: November 3, 1993

FROM: Leo Chung -- Operational Services, Genstar Container Corporation

TO: Taylor Vinson -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: Re: Trailer Conspicuity Requirement of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard no. 108: Lamps, Reflective Devices and Associated Equipment

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 11/29/93 from John Womack to Leo Chung (A41; Std. 108)

TEXT:

We are one of the worldwide container leasing companies and I am writing to request any further interpretations of the captioned requirement which concerns our U.S. container chassis equipment operation due to the information we received from various sources giving different interpretations on the application of the side horizontal strip of conspicuity marking over 50% of the trailer length.

In order to comply with the law, please kindly clarify the actual definition of the trailer length and how the 50% computation applies to our container chassis because there are chances that this equipment will be running around with NO container being carried on top. Therefore, shall the gooseneck be included in the 50% computation and the length be the OVERALL length? (ie. measure from the very end point of one end to another)

Look forward to hearing from you soonest.

ID: nht93-7.5

DATE: October 1, 1993 Est.

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Tom DeLapp -- Executive Coach Builders, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 8/18/93 from Tom DeLapp to Chief Council, NHTSA (OCC-9085)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter of August 18, 1993, concerning a modification you wish to make on limousines manufactured by your company. You wish to modify the hinge assembly controlling forward and reclining movement of the front seat to provide access to the area between the front of the privacy panel and the back of the front seat. (The area contains auxiliary fuse panels and relays.) The modification would involve removal of a metal pin in the hinge assembly, allowing the seat to articulate forward to a greater degree. You asked whether Standard No. 207, Seating Systems, prohibits the removal of a limiting pin or limits forward movement of a seat back.

Standard No. 207 specifies strength and other performance requirements for seats in passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses. Section S4.3 of Standard No. 207 contains requirements for hinged or folding seat backs, except for passenger seats in buses or a seat adjustable only for its occupants. Section S4.3(a) requires a self-locking device for restraining the hinged or folding seat back. Section S4.3.2 contains performance requirements for this restraining device.

Section S4.3 does not limit the degree of movement of a hinged or folding seat back. Thus, you may remove the limiting pin if removing it only increases the degree of movement of the seat. However, the seat must still meet the requirements of S4.3 with the pin removed. Accordingly, the seat must have a self-locking device that can withstand the force applications specified in S4.3.2.1 and acceleration specified in S4.3.2.2.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht93-7.50

DATE: November 3, 1993

FROM: Thomas D. Price -- President, Strait-Stop Manufacturing Co., Inc.

TO: Senator David Boren

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 12/23/93 from Howard M. Smolkin to David L. Boren (A41; Std. 121); Also attached to letter dated 4/13/93 from Howard M. Smolkin to David Boren

TEXT:

In August, 1992, I wrote to inform you of our noncomputerized antilock brake system and to enlist your aid in monitoring the activities of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration during the amendment process for FMVSS 105, and FMVSS 121. Since then, and on several occasions, we have communicated our views and our concerns to the Agency as to the possible discrimination which might be employed by NHTSA regarding a definition of ABS. Our requests that the Agency become familiar with the Strait-Stop system before they reach final decisions have regularly ignored or rejected.

Meanwhile, our system has continued to prove itself as an effective antilock device that also significantly reduces maintenance expense for the vehicle operator. Whereas, the computerized systems only activate when lockup is imminent, the Strait-Stop ABS actuates almost every time the driver applies the brakes. In NHTSA's own final report on a two year test of computerized ABS on trucks, they concluded the systems activated 1.4 times per 10,000 brake applications or 1.1 times per 10,000 miles traveled. Our system activates 7.000 times more often than theirs. It is an aid with which the drivers can become familiar. It is a constant approach to maintaining enhanced stability and controlled braking, not a dire emergency, last minute device.

This brings me to the extreme concern of the moment and my purpose in approaching you. On September 28, 1993, NHTSA published in the Federal Register two NPRMs relating to FMVSS 105, and FMVSS 121. Included therein is the following proposed definition of ABS to be included both at S571.105, S4 and at S571.121, S4:

Braking System means a portion of a service brake system that automatically controls the degree of rotational wheel slip during braking by:

1. Sensing the rate of angular rotation of the wheels; 2. Transmitting signals regarding the rate of wheel angular rotation to one or more devices which interpret those signals and generate responsible controlling out put signals; and 3. Transmitting those controlling signals to one or more devices which adjust brake actuating forces in response to those signals.

This definition is absolutely restrictive and discriminatory to the benefit of only one technology. It not only excludes the Strait-Stop ABS, but also precludes the development of any future technology which might be even more effective in achieving brake safety. Although NHTSA persists in the position that they never approve nor disapprove equipment, they are, very effectively, attempting to prescribe one specific technology. The defense for such a biased

opinion is the three year testing of only one technology, which DID NOT demonstrate an irreproachable, overwhelming body of evidence that the computerized ABS is the only solution to vehicle stability and control problems. Since they have not completed nor even entertained a comparison of the computerized versus the noncomputerized technologies, one can only conclude NHTSA is proposing an arbitrary restraint favoring one vested interest.

The antilock brake industry will be a multibillion dollar business and we resent what we believe to be an overt attempt to exclude our opportunity to compete. In addition, there are several segments of the transportation market which can only use the Strait-Stop technology to their benefit. One of those segments is transit buses. The computerized systems can never be anything but an unmitigated cost, whereas, the noncomputerized system has proven it can substantially reduce operating and maintenance expense.

We will continue in our response to NHTSA's NPRMs and in our attempts to rally other transportation industry participants to our views. We desperately need immediate political intervention to avoid an economic catastrophe for our company and a deprivation of the transportation industry of a viable aid to safety and the right of self-determination as to how to best meet their needs. We are the smallest of a minority now, but we can grow to be a significant contributor to the economic welfare of Oklahoma in general and Cleveland County in particular.

Please lend us your immediate knowledgeable support in this very critical battle.

Enclosure:

ABS DEFINITION

The NHTSA is doing precisely what it has said all along it would not do. Instead of limiting itself to requiring performance standards for stopping distance, steering control and maintaining vehicle lateral stability, it is proposing a definition for ABS that adopts ONLY ONE antilock braking system technology currently available and may very well preclude the utilization of existing and future alternative, more effective systems.

ABS is an acronym for antilock braking system, which is a compound term of four words having the following meanings:

anti - opposing in effect or activity (as by inhibiting, curing, neutralizing or combating)

lock - to hold fast or inactive; to make fast by the interlacing or interlocking of parts

braking - arresting the motion of a mechanism, usually employing friction; slowing down or stopping movement or activity

system - a group of interacting bodies under the influence of related forces

Therefore, generically, ABS is defined as, "a group of interacting bodies (components) opposing (inhibiting) loss of activity capability necessary to arrest the motion of vehicle by employment of friction".

More specifically, ABS could be defined as, "a group of mechanical and/or electronic components, which inhibits the nullification of frictional forces employed in arresting the longitudinal and lateral motion of a motor vehicle".

Any ABS, so defined would be required to meet or exceed the performance standards for stopping, control and stability. The only elements lost by the above definition are (1) the propensity of the Agency staff to consider computerized technology as the only viable approach to ABS and (2) the economic compulsion of Rockwell/WABCO, Midland/Grau, Bendix/Knorr and Robert Bosch to limit the scope of competition, via Federal mandate, in the United States.

- - - -

The following letter transmits Mr. Price's letter to the NHTSA:

November 15, 1993

Howard Smolkin, Acting Administrator NHTSA 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Mr. Smolkin:

I have again been contacted by my constituent, Mr. Thomas Price, of ABAS Marketing concerning his anti-locking braking system. Mr. Price is concerned that the proposed rule-making by the NHTSA is discriminatory and by definition would exclude his braking system from being considered for future use.

Enclosed is his most recent letter to me raising these issues and his concerns about them. In an effort to be helpful to Mr. Price, I would appreciate your review of his letter and a response that I can share with him.

Thank you for your thoughtful consideration. I will look forward to hearing from you. Please send your response to my Oklahoma City office, to the attention of Jim Hopper.

Sincerely,

David L. Boren United States Senator

ID: nht93-7.51

DATE: November 3, 1993

FROM: William J. MacAdam -- President and CEO, trans2 Corporation

TO: John G. Womack, Esq. -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 4/1/94 from John Womack to William J. MacAdam (A42; VSA 102(3))

TEXT:

Enclosed is a letter written on behalf of trans2 Corporation (trans2) requesting that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issue a letter confirming that the electric vehicle that trans2 plans to manufacture is not a "motor vehicle" as that term is defined in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. A list of vehicle specifications and two photographs of the vehicle are also enclosed.

Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. Part 512, I hereby request that NHTSA treat the list of vehicle specifications and the photographs as confidential business information and withhold them from public disclosure.

trans2 hasn't yet begun full scale manufacture of their low speed electric vehicle. Public disclosure of the vehicle's specifications and the photographic detail of the vehicle's appearance would cause the company substantial competitive harm. Such disclosure would provide trans2's competitors with an opportunity to develop competing products faster. As such, the information constitutes a trade secret and is confidential commercial information.

trans2 has made efforts to prevent the information contained in the vehicle specifications and the photographs from becoming publicly available. The photographs have only been seen by employees of trans2, the company's attorneys and investment bankers, a few key suppliers and limited number of potential investors. All of the above disclosures were on a confidential basis. The list of vehicle specifications has only been disclosed to the company's attorneys.

We are aware of no occasions on which this information has appeared publicly, or any other circumstances that would compromise the confidential nature of the information. We are aware of no prior determinations by NHTSA or any other federal agency or federal courts relating to the confidentiality of the submitted information or similar information. Moreover, disclosure of this type of information would impair NHTSA's ability to obtain similar information from small manufacturers in the future.

We request NHTSA to keep the materials confidential until January 1, 1995.

Thank you for you consideration of this request.

ENCLOSURE

11/3/93

Mr. John G. Womack, Esq. Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

Dear Mr. Womack:

On behalf of trans2 Corporation (trans2), I am writing to request the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issue a letter confirming that the electric vehicle which trans2 plans to manufacture is not a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the "Safety Act").

trans2 intends to manufacture a low speed electric vehicle for use in residential communities, university campuses, industrial complexes and on short commuter trips. As you can see from the attached photographs and technical description, the trans2 vehicle has a body configuration that readily distinguishes it from other highway vehicles. In addition, the trans2 vehicle has a top speed of 20 miles per hour.

Section 108(a)(1) of the Safety Act prohibits the manufacture for sale of motor vehicles that do not conform to applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards. 15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1). Section 102(3) defines a "motor vehicle" as "any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on rail or rails." 15 U.S.C. 1391(3) We understand that prior NHTSA interpretations of the Safety Act have excluded certain limited use vehicles from the definition of "motor vehicles." For example, NHTSA has determined that vehicles with "an abnormal body configuration that readily distinguishes them from other highway vehicles and maximum speed of 20 miles per hour (mph) are not considered motor vehicles." Letter from Paul Jackson, NHTSA Chief Counsel, to Matthew J. Plache, Esq., at 2 (Dec. 3, 1991); see also Letter from Jeffrey R. Miller, NHTSA Chief Counsel to Alexander E. Nagy, at 2 (April 16, 1985). The trans2 vehicle satisfies these two criteria.

Accordingly, based on NHTSA's prior interpretations of the Safety Act, we request a NHTSA letter confirming that the foregoing interpretation remain applicable and that when applied to the trans2 vehicle result in the conclusion that our vehicle is not "motor vehicle" under the Safety Act.

Thank you for your consideration of this request. Please contact me if you need further information about the trans2 vehicle.

ATTACHMENTS

(Specifications and photo omitted.)

ID: nht93-7.52

DATE: November 4, 1993

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: John B. Walsh -- Legal Affairs Manager, American Suzuki Motor Corporation

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 10/29/93 from John B. Walsh to John Womack (OCC-9263)

TEXT:

This acknowledges receipt of your letter dated October 29, 1993, requesting an interpretation of the labeling requirements of the recent final rule mandating the installation of air bags in passenger cars and light trucks (58 FR 46551, September 2, 1993). As you suggested in your letter, we believe it would be appropriate to respond to your request in the notice responding to the petitions for reconsideration of the September 2 final rule.

If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht93-7.53

DATE: November 5, 1993

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Toshi Tanaka -- General Manager, Sales & Marketing Dept., Sensor Technology Co., Ltd.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 8/4/93 from Toshi Tanaka to Delmas Johnson

TEXT:

This responds to your FAX of August 4, 1991, to Ms. Delmas Johnson of this agency concerning Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection. Your questions and the answers to each follows.

Is it true that the belt fastening law now goes into a part of the federal law?

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act authorizes NHTSA to issue motor vehicle safety standards that apply to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. The Federal requirements do not, however, regulate the use of vehicles. While there is no Federal requirement mandating safety belt use, a recent final rule will impose penalties on states which do not have both a safety belt and a motorcycle helmet use law by 1994. Currently, all the states and territories have some type of mandatory belt use law except Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and South Dakota.

Is it true that the cars with airbag do not need to perform "Roll Over Test"?

Passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1989, are required to be equipped with automatic crash protection at the front outboard seating positions. "Automatic crash protection" means that a vehicle is equipped with occupant restraints that require no action by vehicle occupants. The two types of automatic crash protection currently offered on new passenger cars are automatic safety belts (which help to assure belt use) and air bags (which supplement safety belts and offer some protection even when safety belts are not used). The performance of automatic crash protection is dynamically tested, that is, vehicles equipped with automatic crash protection systems are required to comply with certain injury criteria as measured by test dummies in a barrier crash test at speeds up to 30 mph. In addition, the automatic crash protection must either meet the lateral and rollover crash protection requirements or have a Type I (lap) or Type 2 (lap/shoulder) seat belt assembly. A passenger car equipped with an air bag does not have to comply with the rollover test if it has a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt at that position. To our knowledge, all vehicles currently being manufactured are certified to the automatic crash protection requirement by installing Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assemblies.

A new Federal statutory requirement will make air bags and Type 2 seat belts mandatory in all cars and light trucks by the late 1990's. I am enclosing a copy of the recently published final rule implementing these requirements. These requirements will make the option of complying with

the lateral and rollover crash protection requirements moot.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht93-7.54

DATE: November 5, 1993

FROM: Terry Karas -- T.K. Auto Inc.

TO: John Womack -- Acting Chief Council, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 1/21/94 from John Womack to Terry Karas (A42; Part 591)

TEXT:

I would like to know can a Canadian car that was accommodated by a Canadian manufacturing letter stating that the vehicle complies with U.S. safety standards, can be imported as a conforming vehicle under Box 2?

If so, does it make a difference if it is being imported for commercial or private purposes.

Your prompt response would be greatly appreciated.