NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
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ID: aiam1841OpenHonorable Lawton Chiles, United States Senator, Federal Building, Lakeland, FL 33801; Honorable Lawton Chiles United States Senator Federal Building Lakeland FL 33801; Dear Senator Chiles: This is in response to your letter of March 5, 1975, forwarding a inquiry from one of your constituents, Mr. Vincent Tetuan, concerning a proposed amendment to the Federal bumper standard.; On January 2, 1975, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administratio (NHTSA) issued a Federal Register notice (copy enclosed) proposing to reduce the current 5 mph bumper impact requirements to 2.5 mph until the 1979 model year. The impact requirements would then have been increased to 4 mph for 1979 and later model year cars.; The proposal was based primarily on the results of two agency-sponsore studies which indicated that the cost and weight of many current production bumpers, in light of inflation and fuel shortages, made the bumpers no longer cost beneficial. Information presented at public hearings on the bumper notice and comments submitted to the docket in response to the proposal have brought to light additional data. The NHTSA has carefully examined all of this evidence and reviewed its studies in light of the new information. As a result, the agency has concluded that the 5 mph protection level should not be reduced. This decision is contained in a Federal Register notice that was published March 12, 1975 which is enclosed (Docket No. 74-11, Notice 7, Docket No. 73-19, Notice 6).; Mr. Tetuan appears to be directing his comments to what he believes t be a proposed requirement that vehicles manufactured in the future be equipped with plastic bumper systems. Such an understanding of the proposal is incorrect. The January 2, 1975 proposal was aimed at enabling a reduction in vehicle weight. In the preamble to that notice, the NHTSA cited soft face bumpers as one type of system that could produce a significant weight reduction. However, no proposal was made to require the use of soft face systems. The March 12, 1975 notice reiterates the agency's position that bumpers which are lighter in weight than those currently in mass production could and probably would be developed. The requirements proposed in the March notice, however, ensure that a wide variety of materials could continue to be used in bumper systems.; Sincerely, James C. Schultz, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4710OpenLewis H. Goldfarb, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Chrysler Motors Corporation l2000 Chrysler Drive Highland Park, MI 48288-l9l9; Lewis H. Goldfarb Esq. Assistant General Counsel Chrysler Motors Corporation l2000 Chrysler Drive Highland Park MI 48288-l9l9; "Dear Mr. Goldfarb: This responds to your letter concerning the fue economy implications of Chrysler's acquisition of American Motors Corporation (AMC). You stated that you were writing to obtain confirmation of Chrysler's 'understanding' that fuel economy credits earned by AMC, for exceeding light truck standards in model years l984-86, are now available to Chrysler. You enclosed a memorandum of law explaining your position. As discussed below, it is our opinion that even if Chrysler is considered the 'successor' to AMC under the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, that fact would not result in the conclusion that credits earned, prior to the acquisition, by AMC for exceeding a fuel economy standard could be applied to shortfalls incurred by Chrysler's pre-acquisition fleet, under the three-year carryforward and carryback provisions of the Act and regulations. However, credits earned by AMC could be applied to the pre-acquisition AMC fleet and to the post-acquisition Chrysler/AMC fleet. Also, credits earned by post-acquisition Chrysler/AMC could be applied to the pre-acquisition Chrysler fleet and/or AMC fleet, provided that double counting does not take place. Other issues raised by your letter and legal memorandum are also addressed below. Section 50l(8) of the Cost Savings Act defines 'manufacturer' as follows: The term 'manufacturer' means any person engaged in the business of manufacturing automobiles. The Secretary shall prescribe rules for determining, in cases where more than one person is the manufacturer of an automobile, which person is to be treated as the manufacturer of such automobile for purposes of this part. Such term also includes any predecessor or successor of such a manufacturer to the extent provided under rules which the Secretary shall prescribe. One issue raised by Chrysler's memorandum is whether Chrysler is the successor of AMC. The term 'successor,' as used in the definition of 'manufacturer' quoted above, is not defined in the statute or in agency regulations. Under general principles of corporate law, the term 'successor' ordinarily refers to a corporation which, through amalgamation, consolidation, or other legal succession, becomes invested with the rights and assumes the burdens of another corporation. Based on our general understanding of Chrysler's acquisition of AMC, we have no reason to doubt your conclusion that Chrysler is the successor of AMC. However, your letter does not provide specific facts concerning the structure of Chrysler's acquisition of AMC or whether Chrysler is invested with the rights and has assumed the burdens of AMC. In the absence of such facts, we are unable to provide an opinion that Chrysler is the successor of AMC. However, for purposes of this letter, it will be assumed that a factual showing can be made that Chrysler is the successor to AMC. It should be noted that the mere fact that one corporation acquires another corporation does not necessarily mean that the acquiring corporation is a 'successor.' In the context of the Cost Savings Act, manufacturer A may be wholly owned by manufacturer B, yet still be a manufacturer itself. Under sections 503(a) and (c), however, the automobiles of such related manufacturers would be combined for purposes of calculating average fuel economy. Another issue raised by Chrysler's memorandum is whether Chrysler and AMC became the same manufacturer for fuel economy purposes for model year l987. According to the memorandum, Chrysler agreed to acquire AMC in the spring of l987, and the transaction closed on August 6, l987. The memorandum concludes that Chrysler and AMC became the same manufacturer for fuel economy purposes in model year l987. Based on the above facts, it is our opinion that all of Chrysler's and AMC's vehicles should be treated as manufactured by the same manufacturer for model year l987. Fuel economy standards apply to passenger automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer, for a particular model year. See section 502(a)(l). Moreover, average fuel economy is calculated based on the total number of passenger automobiles manufactured in a given model year by a manufacturer. See section 503(a)(l). Under section 503(c), the term 'passenger automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer' includes all automobiles manufactured by persons who control, are controlled by, or are under common control with, such manufacturer.' Since Chrysler controlled AMC prior to the end of the l987 model year, and since fuel economy standards apply to particular model years as a whole and not to separate parts of a model year, it is our opinion that all of the vehicles produced by both Chrysler and AMC for model year l987 shall be treated as if manufactured by the same manufacturer, i.e., placed into one fleet. Otherwise, one or both of the manufacturers would have two separate CAFE values, pre-acquisition (or pre-control) and post-acquisition (or post-control), for the same model year. We will now address generally the issue of how credits may be used where one manufacturer is the successor of another. In discussing the issue, we will refer to the following hypothetical example: A and B are both car manufacturers. After consolidation, A is the only surviving corporation and is invested with the rights and assumes the burdens of B. Thus, A is the 'successor' of B. While this example and subsequent discussion is for passenger automobiles, the relevant requirements concerning the earning and availability of credits are essentially identical for passenger automobile standards and light truck standards. Compare section 502(l)(1)(B) and 49 CFR Part 535, and see 45 FR 83233-36, December l8, l980. Thus, our analysis for passenger automobile standards is also relevant to light truck standards. Section 502(l)(1)(B) states: Whenever the average fuel economy of the passenger automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer in a particular model year exceeds an applicable average fuel economy standard . . ., such manufacturer shall be entitled to a credit calculated under subparagraph (C), which-- (i) shall be available to be taken into account with respect to the average fuel economy of that manufacturer for any of the three consecutive model years immediately prior to the model year in which such manufacturer exceeds such applicable average fuel economy standard, and (ii) to the extent that such credit is not so taken into account pursuant to clause (i), shall be available to be taken into account with respect to the average fuel economy of that manufacturer for any of the three consecutive model years immediately following the model year in which such manufacturer exceeds such applicable average fuel economy standard. We note first that credits earned by a particular manufacturer are only 'available to be taken into account with respect to the average fuel economy of that manufacturer,' for any of the three model years before, or after, the model year in which the credits are earned. (Emphasis added.) In the example set forth above, B is no longer a manufacturer under the Cost Savings Act. (Indeed, it is no longer a 'person' under section 50l(8).) Thus, in the absence of some provision concerning 'successors,' any unused credits that B had earned prior to the consolidation would expire unused, since the only manufacturer to which they are available no longer exists. However, for some purposes B continues to exist as part of A, its 'successor.' Section 50l(8)'s definition of 'manufacturer' does not provide that the term 'manufacturer' necessarily includes any precedessor or successor but instead provides that the term does so 'to the extent provided under rules which the Secretary shall prescribe.' This provision was added by the Automobile Fuel Efficiency Act of l980 as a conforming amendment to the section concerning modification of local content requirements to encourage domestic production of fuel efficient automobiles and not to the section concerning credits. The legislative history does not provide any indication as to why the provision was added, and, to date, NHTSA's administration of the statutory provisions concerning modification of the local content requirements has not turned up a situation for which such rules would be relevant. Should rules be issued under section 50l(8), NHTSA would do so by notice-and-comment rulemaking, taking account of the purposes of that section and the statutory scheme as a whole. Notwithstanding the absence of rules, we do not believe that Congress intended to require the forfeit of a manufacturer's unused credits in a situation where that manufacturer's substance continues to exist as part of a 'successor.' Thus, taking account of section 50l(8) and the statutory scheme as a whole, we conclude that, in the example set forth above, B can be deemed as continuing to exist as part of A, from the time of succession. This conclusion does not, however, permit the general integration of A's and B's credits and shortfalls. Under section 502(l)(1)(B), credits earned by a particular manufacturer are only 'available to be taken into account with respect to the average fuel economy of that manufacturer.' Since B's existence as part of A only dates from the time of succession, B is not the same manufacturer as A prior to the time of succession. Thus, any credits earned by B would only be available to offset A's shortfalls for the model years during which B exists as part of A, since it is only at that time that the credits earned by B and applied to A can be considered to be taken into account with respect to the average fuel economy of 'that manufacturer.' Similarly, the only credits earned by A which would be available to B would be those credits earned during the time when B exists as part of A. The general integration of A's and B's credits would be inconsistent with the basic structure of section 502(l)(l). Assume, for example, that A and B are separate manufacturers for model years 1 through 6, and A is the successor of B for model year 7. If general integration of credits were permitted, credits earned by B in model year 4 could be applied to A's CAFE for model years l-6, as well as model year 7. However, the structure of section 502(l)(l) does not permit this result. Under paragraph (B)(i), any credits earned by B in model year 4 are available to be carried back with respect to B's CAFE for any of model years l, 2 and 3. To the extent that such credits are not so used, paragraph (B)(ii) makes those credits available to be carried forward with respect to B's CAFE for any of model years 5, 6 and 7. In order for credits earned by B in model year 4 to be applied to A's CAFE for model years l-6, B's credits would first have to be carried forward to model year 7 (the model year where A is B's successor) and then be carried back to model years l-6 (for application to A's CAFE), a process which has no statutory basis. We will now apply the general analysis discussed above to the particular facts cited in Chrysler's letter. Prior to MY l987, Chrysler and AMC were two separate manufacturers. Chrysler acquired AMC during MY l987, and became the 'successor' to AMC at that time. Under section 502(l)(1)(B), credits earned by a particular manufacturer are only 'available to be taken into account with respect to the average fuel economy of that manufacturer.' Since AMC's existence as part of Chrysler only dates from MY l987, AMC was not the same manufacturer as Chrysler prior to MY l987. Thus, any credits earned by AMC would only be available to Chrysler to offset CAFE shortfalls incurred in the model years during which AMC exists as part of Chrysler, i.e., MY l987 and thereafter, since it is only at that time that the credits earned by AMC and applied to Chrysler can be considered to be taken into account with respect to the average fuel economy of 'that manufacturer.' Similarly, the only credits earned by Chrysler which would be available to AMC would be those credits earned during the time when AMC exists as part of Chrysler, i.e., credits earned in MY l987 and thereafter. Chrysler's memorandum argues that section 502(l) must mean more than that the predecessor's credits can be carried forward and used for the successor firm for l987 and subsequent years. The memorandum states: 'Manufacturer' is a defined term, and it must be read in light of its definition. The only satisfactory reading of this provision is that the reference to 'that manufacturer' includes its predecessors and successors--that is, the successor firm may use the credits available to it for calculating its own fuel economy for l987 and subsequent model years or that of its predecessors, including pre-acquisition Chrysler, for the years before l987. On any other reading, the definition of 'manufacturer' would be meaningless, and the term would mean different things in different places in the Act. Chrysler also asserts that its approach would represent a 'literal' reading of the Act, and that the agency should not seek to import into the carryover scheme a qualification on the use of credits that Congress did not impose. We believe that Chrysler's analysis is incorrect since it does not take into account fundamental differences in the timing of the earning of the credits and of Chrysler's becoming a successor. Chrysler was not the successor to AMC during the model years prior to Chrysler's acquisition of AMC in which AMC earned credits. In MY l984, for example, Chrysler and AMC were two separate manufacturers. In particular, Chrysler is incorrect in concluding that AMC's l984-l986 credits can be applied to Chrysler for model years before l987. Chrysler cannot succeed to rights greater than AMC possessed at the time of the acquisition. As of its acquisition in MY l987, AMC's 'rights' as to its MY 1984 credits were to apply them to its own fleet in MY l981-l983 and l985-l986 (since it had no successor in that time period) and to apply them to itself/successor in MY l987. In construing the Act, we believe that it is appropriate and necessary to read its provisions in the correct temporal context. Thus, we do not believe that the term 'manufacturer' means different things in different places in the Act, but instead recognize that corporate relationships, and thus manufacturer identities, may differ for different model years. Moreover, we believe that Chrysler's memorandum itself construes the term 'manufacturer' differently in different parts of the Act. As indicated above, section 502(l)(l)(B) states that 'whenever the average fuel economy of the passenger automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer in a particular model year exceeds an applicable average fuel economy standard . . ., such manufacturer shall be entitled to a credit . . . .' Emphasis added. In concluding that Chrysler is entitled to AMC's l984 credits, Chrysler's memorandum apparently reads 'manufacturer' to mean 'AMC only' the first time it is used in this section, and 'AMC and its future successors' the second time it is used. We also note that Chrysler's current position would lead to absurd results. For example, if the term 'manufacturer' were consistently read to include future successors, Chrysler's acquisition of AMC would presumably require calculation of new CAFE values, for the combined Chrysler/AMC fleet, for each model year all the way back to the beginning of the CAFE program. See section 503(a)(l). Moreover, if a company which paid penalties in a particular model year were later acquired by another company which had earned credits in that same model year, but never used the credits, under Chrysler's retroactive successorship interpretation NHTSA could be required to refund those penalties, even if the acquisition took place ten or twenty years later. The Cost Savings Act was designed to encourage manufacturers to improve their CAFE performance, not to allow them to avoid penalties for non-compliance by acquiring companies that had, independently, earned credits in prior years. Finally, we reject the argument that we are importing into the carryover scheme a qualification on the use of credits that Congress did not impose. Congress expressly chose to limit the ability to use credits to the manufacturer that exceeded an applicable average fuel economy standard and thereby earned the credits. Credits earned by AMC are only available to Chrysler for the model years during which AMC exists as part of Chrysler, since it is only at that time that the credits earned by AMC can be considered as being 'taken into account with respect to the average fuel economy' of the manufacturer that earned them. Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel"; |
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ID: aiam1512OpenMr. William P. Stallsmith, Jr., Senior General Attorney, Southern Railway System, Law Department, P.O. Box 1808, Washington, DC 20013; Mr. William P. Stallsmith Jr. Senior General Attorney Southern Railway System Law Department P.O. Box 1808 Washington DC 20013; Dear Mr. Stallsmith: In your letters of January 10, 1974, and May 17, 1974, you have aske if a trailer would comply with S5.8 of Standard No. 121, *Air brake systems*, ('have a parking brake system. . . when the air pressure in the supply line is at atmospheric pressure') if its parking brake system contained a valve that allows manual release of the parking brake with the supply line at atmospheric pressure but automatically resets itself when the supply line is pressurized, so that the parking brake system operates as specified by S5.8. Such a valve would permit limited motion of trailers on flat cars to cushion shock experienced during transit.; Such a valve does not appear to conflict with the intent of S5.8 tha the parking brake system apply when the supply line is at atmospheric pressure. The requirement is not intended to interfere with intentional manual release of the parking brakes after automatic application has occurred. The danger of inadvertent disablement of the parking brake system during subsequent highway travel is avoided by the automatic features which would return the system to normal operation as soon as the trailer is connected to a source of air pressure, i.e., a tractor.; Sincerely, Richard B. Dyson, Acting Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam3485OpenMr. Richard F. Gordon, President, IPD Co. Inc., 2762 N.E. Broadway, Portland, OR 97232; Mr. Richard F. Gordon President IPD Co. Inc. 2762 N.E. Broadway Portland OR 97232; Dear Mr. Gordon: Secretary Lewis has referred your letter of October 6, 1981, to thi office for reply. You have requested, in essence, a 'waiver' pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act of the requirements of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 that vehicle headlamps be of sealed beam construction.; There is no legal way such a request could be implemented through th Regulatory Flexibility Act itself. That Act urges regulatory agencies to use their existing statutory authority to accommodate small businesses where appropriate to do so. Modifications of regulations issued pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act occur through normal rulemaking procedures conducted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. This agency has no current plan to engage in rulemaking allowing importation and sale in the aftermarket of European-type unsealed headlamps, and has consistently denied petitions for such rulemaking over the last few years. Further, we have no authority to grant exemptions or other waivers to manufacturers or importers of motor vehicle equipment.; However, the agency is always interested in new headlighting ideas, an I enclose a copy of a Notice of Request for Comments which we recently issued, that I think you will find of interest.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4340OpenMr. Hisashi Tsujishita, Chief Co-ordinator, Technical Administration Department, Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd., 1. Daihatsu- cho, Ikeda City, Osaka Prefecture, JAPAN; Mr. Hisashi Tsujishita Chief Co-ordinator Technical Administration Department Daihatsu Motor Co. Ltd. 1. Daihatsu- cho Ikeda City Osaka Prefecture JAPAN; Dear Mr. Tsujishita: Thank you for your letter requesting an interpretation of th requirements of three of our safety standards. This letter responds to your question concerning Standard No. 101, *Controls and Displays.* A response to your question concerning Standard 219 was sent to you earlier, and we expect to respond to your question concerning Standard No. 201 shortly.; By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safet Administration (NHTSA) does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to ensure that its vehicles or equipment comply with applicable safety standards. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter.; You asked whether Standard No. 101's illumination requirements apply t controls and displays not otherwise regulated by the standard. You quoted section S5.3.3's requirements for the light intensities of informational readout systems and asked whether those requirements apply to the following such items: digital clock using liquid crystals, radio employed digital frequency indicator using liquid crystals, and miscellaneous illuminations for conventional analog clock, cigar lighter, ashtray, and radio control switches, etc., which are lighted only when the headlights or parking light are activated.; I would like to note that Standard No. 101's requirements for ligh intensities were amended in a final rule published in the Federal Register (52 FR 3244) on February 3, 1987. An effective date of March 5, 1987, was adopted for most of the amendments. Subsequently, in response to petitions for reconsideration, NHTSA amended 49 CFR Part 571 to permit compliance with either the earlier version of the standard, reissued as Standard No. 100, or the amended standard until September 1, 1989. 52 FR 7150, March 9, 1987. I have enclosed copies of those notices for your convenience.; In answering your question, I will separately discuss the requirement for vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1989, and vehicles manufactured before that date.; *Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1989* Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1989, must meet th requirements of the current version of Standard No. 101. Secton S5.3.5 provides:; >>>S5.3.5 Any source of illuminating within the driver's forward fiel of view which is not used for the controls and displays regulated by this standard, and which is capable of being illuminated while the vehicle is in motion, must have either a variable intensity, a single intensity that is barely discernible to a driver who has adapted to dark ambient roadway conditions, or a means of being turned off. This requirements shall not apply to buses that are normally operated with the passenger compartment illuminated.<<<; As noted in your letter, the items you listed are not among th controls and displays generally regulated by Standard No. 101. However, if sources of illumination for those items are within the driver's forward field of view and are capable of being illuminated while the vehicle is in motion, they must meet the requirements of section S5.3.5.; *Vehicles manufactured before September 1, 1989* Standard No. 100, i.e. the earlier version of Standard No. 101, applie only to vehicles manufactured before September 1, 1989. The application section of Standard Nos. 100 and 101 make it clear that manufacturers have the option of meeting the requirements of either standard for any control, display or illumination until September 1, 1989. Also, the application section of Standard No. 101 provides that if no requirements are specified in Standard No. 100 for a control, display, or illumination, none need be met as a result of Standard No. 101 for motor vehicles manufactured before September 1, 1989.; Section S5.3.3 of Standard No. 100 provides: >>>Light intensities for controls, gauges, and their identificatio shall be continuously variable from: (a) A position at which either there is no light emitted or the light is barely discernible to a drive who has adapter to dark ambient roadway conditions to (b) a position provided illumination sufficient for the driver to identify the control or display readily under conditions of reduced visibility. Light intensities for informational readout systems shall have at least two values, a higher one for day, and a lower one for nighttime conditions. *The intensity of any illumination that is provided in the passenger compartment when and only when the headlights are activated shall also be variable in a manner that complies with this paragraph.* (Emphasis added.)<<<; In considering manufacturer options under Standards No. 100 and 101 for vehicles manufactured before September 1, 1989, the following points should be noted:; >>>(1) Some illumination covered by the highlighted language o Standard No. 100 are not covered by section S5.3.5 of Standard No. 101. An example is a control located in the rear seating area that is illuminated only when the headlights are activated. Since a manufacturer may meet the requirements of either Standard No. 100 or Standard 101 for any illumination and no requirement need be met for such illuminations.; (2) Some illuminations not covered by the highlighted language o Standard No. 100 are covered by section S5.3.5 of Standard No. 101. An example is a clock, located in the driver's forward field of view, which is always illuminated as a result of utilizing light emitting diodes. No requirement need be met for such illuminations (for vehicles manufactured before September 1, 1989).; (3) Some illuminations covered by the highlighted language of Standar No. 100 are also covered by section S5.3.5 of Standard No. 101. For these illuminations, the requirements of section S5.3.5 of Standard No. 101 are more flexible. While the highlighted language of Standard No. 100 provides that such illuminations must, depending on the illumination, be either continuously variable or have at lest two values, one for day and one for night, section S5.3.5 of Standard No. 101 provides three options for all such illuminations. Such illuminations must have either a variable intensity, i.e., at least two levels of intensity, as single intensity that is barely discernible to a driver who has adapted to dark ambient roadway conditions, or a means of being turned off.<<<; Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam1142OpenMr. David J. Humphreys, RVI Washington Counsel, Recreational Vehicle Institute, Inc., Suite 406, 1140 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, DC, 20006; Mr. David J. Humphreys RVI Washington Counsel Recreational Vehicle Institute Inc. Suite 406 1140 Connecticut Avenue Washington DC 20006; Dear Mr. Humphreys: This is in reply to your letter of April 27, 1973, regarding th application of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 302, 'Flammability of Interior Materials', to mattress covers. You ask whether 'mattress covers', listed under Paragraph S4.1 of the standard, includes a cover 'that is used generally to enclose a mattress for cleanliness or sanitary purposes *or* only the ticking which encloses the mattress filling or core *or* both items . . .'; We consider that mattress ticking and a cover enclosing a mattress fo sanitary purposes are both 'mattress covers' within the meaning of the standard, and both items must meet the requirements of the standard.; Thank you for sending us the copy of your memorandum, 'Department o Commerce Standards Issued Under the Flammable Fabrics Act.'; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam1457OpenMr. Tatsuo Kato, Nissan Motor Company, Ltd., 560 Sylvan Avenue, Englewood, NJ 07632; Mr. Tatsuo Kato Nissan Motor Company Ltd. 560 Sylvan Avenue Englewood NJ 07632; Dear Mr. Kato: This is in response to your letter of April 5, 1974, requestin interpretations of two sections of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301 (39 FR 10588).; Your first question was whether dummies are required to be positione at each front outboard seating position even if such dummies are not specified for testing under Standard No. 208. The answer to your question is yes. Standard No. 301 provides for testing with dummies at each front outboard seating position regardless of the Standard No. 208 testing provisions. Where, however, Standard No. 208 specifies additional tests for dummies, such dummies are to be included in the vehicle for Standard No. 301 testing.; Your second question was whether the dummies are to be restrained b belt systems until passive restraint systems become mandatory under Standard No. 208. The answer to this question is no. The dummies are to be restrained for testing under Standard No. 301 only by systems that require no action by the vehicle occupant. Therefore, dummies are not to be restrained during testing by belt systems, but only by the passive means, if any, that are employed in the vehicle.; Thank you for your inquiry. Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4655OpenMr. John K. Moody Moody & Moody Enterprises 1027 Lochmont Drive Brandon, FL 33511; Mr. John K. Moody Moody & Moody Enterprises 1027 Lochmont Drive Brandon FL 33511; Dear Mr. Moody: This is in reply to your letter of August 30, l989, t Taylor Vinson of this Office with respect to your forward direction brake application indicator. The device will be available as an aftermarket kit. The two front turn signal lamps are wired to be activated in a steady-burning mode when the brake pedal is depressed. If the turn signals are activated when the brake pedal is depressed, the lamp indicating the direction of the turn will switch from the steady-burning mode to the turn signal mode, while the other turn signal lamp remains steady-burning. This will provide an indication at the front of a motor vehicle as to whether or not the driver is attempting to apply the brakes. You have asked whether vehicles equipped with the device would be in conflict with the existing vehicle lighting standards of this agency. There is no Federal motor vehicle safety standard that applies to aftermarket lighting equipment of the nature that you describe. However, installation of the device would involve modifications to a vehicle certified as meeting the Federal standards, most particularly Standard No. 108, the vehicle lighting standard. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, a vehicle owner may alter his vehicle with impunity, however, modifications to certified vehicles by manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and motor vehicle repair businesses are subject to the restriction that they not render inoperative, in whole or in part, equipment installed pursuant to a Federal motor vehicle safety standard. We have two comments on your device. The first is that you have not described its effect, if any, on the hazard warning system. This system operates through the turn signal lamps, and is activated by a switch that is separate from the turn signal switch. When activated, the hazard warning switch causes the front and rear turn signal lamps to flash. The front turn signal lamps in the hazard warning system, when activated, must flash, even when the brake pedal is applied. If they do not do so when your device is installed, they would be 'inoperative' within the meaning of the prohibition. Our second comment concerns the fact that in the turn signal mode the unused turn signal lamp would continue to be illuminated when the brake pedal is applied. Thus, an observer would see a flashing turn signal and a steady burning one, whereas with an ordinary vehicle, the observer would see only the flashing turn signal. Whether the presence of the steady burning turn signal on the side of the vehicle opposite the flashing turn signal would detract from the effectiveness of the flashing turn signal, and by obscuring its message make it 'partially inoperative', is difficult to judge. Certainly, when a vehicle is signaling a turn, it does not appear necessary to also indicate, to the front, that it is stopping. These remarks also serve as some comments of this Office as to 'safety benefits' that might result from vehicles equipped with your device. Certainly, no standard lighting equipment on vehicles today indicate from the front that the brake pedal is being applied. This is an interesting concept, and we appreciate your interest in enhancing motor vehicle safety. Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel; |
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ID: aiam3190OpenThe Yokohama Rubber Co., Ltd., Hiratsuka Plant, P. O. box 20, Hiratsuka-shi, Kanagawa-ken 254, Japan; The Yokohama Rubber Co. Ltd. Hiratsuka Plant P. O. box 20 Hiratsuka-shi Kanagawa-ken 254 Japan; Dear Sirs: Your September 10, 1979, letter to our Tire Division has been referre to me for reply, since you are requesting an interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 119 (49 CFR S 571.119)/ You asked two questions in your letter. First, you asked whether the definition you offered for 'maximum speed' was correct. If it was correct, you stated that the tire could exceed the speed restriction shown o the tire at a lighter load, ad showed how the information could be set forth on the tire. The listing of varying maximum loads at different maximum speeds is not permitted to appear on the tire. Second, you asked if speed restricted tires could specify a speed restriction other than the 35, 50, and 55 mile per hour (mph) restrictions shown in the endurance test schedule of Standard No. 119. The answer to this question is no.; Regarding you first question, you defined a tire's maximum speed as the highest speed at which a tire can carry the maximum single load that is molded on the tire sidewall.' This definition is an acceptable one for tires with a speed restriction listed for them. However, you went on to note that if this definition was acceptable, the a tire could list varying maximum loads at varying maximum speeds. Such a listing is expressly prohibited by the language of Standard No. 119.; S6.5 of Standard No. 119 specifies that each tire subject to th Standard shall be marked with the information that is set forth in the (sic) following paragraphs. Paragraph (d) of S6.5 requires the maximum load rating and corresponding inflation pressures for single load tires, the type of tire about which you are inquiring, to appear as: Max load * * lbs. at * *psi cold. Paragraph (e) of S6.5 requires that a speed restriction on the tire appear only as: max speed * *mph. Hence, a single load tire can be labeled with only one maximum load and only one maximum speed.; Your second question was whether a manufacturer could restrict th speed of a tire subject to Standard No. 119 to a speed other than the three speed restrictions shown in Table III of the Standard. Paragraph S6.1 requires all ties to pass the endurance test requirements of the Standard, and Table II shows the load and speeds to which the tires will be subjected during the endurance test. If the tire being subjected to the endurance test does not qualify for the special speeds and load as one of the three speed restricted tires shown in the table or as a motorcycle tire, the tire would be tested at the speed and load shown under the heading 'All other'. This would mean that the tire's speed restriction would be ignored for purposes of the endurance test, and it would be tested as if it were a non-sped restricted tire. Such conditions, and no tire which fails to pass the endurance test can be sold in the United States. As a practical matter, therefore, speed restrictions other than the three shown in Table III of the Standard are not recognized by this agency.; The three speed restrictions shown in Table III of the Standard wer adopted from descriptions of three types of speed restricted tires sued by the United States tire industry in 1972, when the agency was initially promulgating Standard No. 119. If your company would like to add another speed restriction to those shown in Table III, you should file a petition for rulemaking with this agency requesting an amendment to Standard No. 119.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam1007OpenMr. Louis C. Lundstrom,Director, Automotive Safety Engineeri- ng,Environmental Activities Staff,General Motors Corporation,Warren, Michigan 48090; Mr. Louis C. Lundstrom Director Automotive Safety Engineeri- ng Environmental Activities Staff General Motors Corporation Warren Michigan 48090; Dear Mr. Lundstrom:#This is in reply to your request of February 1 1973, for an interpretation of paragraph S5.4.1 of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 105a. You have asked if 'a master cylinder with a dam at the 25 percent capacity level' would meet the requirements of the standard.#The paragraph in question requires a 'reservoir compartment for each service brake subsystem serviced by the master cylinder' with the further requirement that 'loss of fluid from one compartment shall not result in a complete loss if brake fluid from another compartment'. in our view, a master cylinder with a dam at the 25 percent level would be compartmentalized within the meaning of S5.4.1.#Sincerely,Robert L. Carter,Associate Administrator for Motor Vehicle Programs; |
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Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.