NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
|---|---|
ID: Lorenz2OpenMr. Steffen Lorenz Webasto AG Kraillinger Straβe 5 D-82131 Stockdorf Germany Dear Mr. Lorenz: This responds to your e-mail in which you requested confirmation as to the permissibility of your sunroof design under our regulations, specifically one incorporating a number of solar cells intended to power a ventilator to help cool the occupant compartment. As shown in the attachment to your e-mail, we understand that your company intends to produce a sunroof with Item 2 glazing, which is tempered by a glazing manufacturer according to the specifications of the American National Standard for Safety Glazing Materials for Glazing Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment Operating on Land Highways Safety Standard ANSI Z26.1 (ANSI Z26.1) and which exhibits light transmissibility of greater than 70 percent. You further stated that crystalline solar cells enveloped in a laminate film would then be attached to the inner side of the glass panel, which would effectively diminish the light transmissibility of the glazing to zero percent. In addition, you stated that the sunroof design is such that the sunshade is affixed to the glass panel, thereby preventing occupants from touching the glass/laminate portion of the sunroof from the inside of the vehicle. Although we have not had the opportunity to examine your product in operation, from the information provided in your letter, we are of the opinion that it would be permissible, so long as it meets the applicable requirements of our safety standard on glazing materials. As discussed below, placement of opaque solar cells on the sunroof would not be prohibited, because there are no light transmittance requirements for sunroofs, since roof glazing is not in an area requisite for driver visibility. By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. To clarify, NHTSA does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we issue permits. Instead, it is the responsibility of manufacturers to certify that their products conform to all applicable safety standards before they can be offered for sale. The requirements concerning vehicle certification may be found at 49 CFR Part 567, Certification, and for items of glazing themselves, a prime glazing manufacturer certifies its glazing by marking it with the symbol DOT and the manufacturers code mark assigned by NHTSA (see 49 CFR 571.205 S6). NHTSA enforces compliance with the standards by purchasing and testing vehicles and equipment, and we also investigate safety-related defects. Of particular relevance here, FMVSS No. 205, Glazing Materials, specifies, inter alia, strength and light transmittance performance requirements for various types of glazing used in motor vehicles, including sunroof applications. As you are aware, FMVSS No. 205 incorporates by reference ANSI Z26.1. Accordingly, prior to sale, a manufacturer must certify compliance of its product with the requirements of FMVSS No. 205, including those requirements incorporated from ANSI Z26.1. Turning to the specifics of your sunroof design, we would first note that under FMVSS No. 205, Item 2 glazing is permitted to be used anywhere in the vehicle except the windshield, provided that it meets the relevant requirements incorporated under ANSI Z26.1. In order to sell the glazing or incorporate it in a new vehicle offered for sale in the United States, the manufacturer must self-certify that the glazing complies with Standard No. 205. As to placement of solar panels on the sunroof glazing, the standard would not prohibit such an application. FMVSS No. 205 contains no light transmittance requirements applicable to your glass sunroof because roof glazing is not in an area requisite for driver visibility. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Eric Stas of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Anthony M. Cooke Chief Counsel ref:205 d.10/17/06 |
2006 |
ID: lotus.ztvOpenMr. Arnold Johnson Dear Mr. Johnson: We have received the "Petition of Lotus Cars" for a temporary exemption from Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 201, dated April 30, 1999, accompanied by a letter of the same date to Assistant Chief Counsel Coleman requesting confidential treatment of certain information in the petition. The manufacturer of the vehicle is Lotus Cars Ltd., a corporation organized under the laws of the United Kingdom. It has a wholly-owned subsidiary, Lotus Cars USA, Inc., which imports and distributes Lotus vehicles in the United States. The petition states that it is being submitted by both the British and the American corporations. You have signed the petition as CEO of Lotus Cars USA, Inc., and provided financial data relating to your company. Under 49 U.S.C. 30113(b)(3)(B)(i), we may grant a temporary exemption upon a finding that compliance with a standard "would cause substantial economic hardship to a manufacturer that has tried to comply with the standard in good faith." It seems clear that Congress intended that we grant temporary relief under this provision to the fabricating manufacturer. Accordingly, as a general rule, we accept hardship petitions only from the fabricating manufacturer of the vehicle and the person who certifies compliance of the vehicle pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30115. As the wholly-owned subsidiary of Lotus Cars, Ltd., Lotus Cars USA Inc. may submit a petition on behalf of its parent. However, an exemption would only be granted to Lotus Cars, Ltd. as the actual manufacturer of the vehicle. This means that we must assess the hardship that compliance and denial would create for the parent, not just for its wholly-owned American subsidiary. Your petition is incomplete in this regard as it does not contain the required financial information for Lotus Cars Ltd. for its past three fiscal years. When we have this information we shall be pleased to give further consideration to the Lotus petition. With respect to confidentiality requests, please be advised that the public must have access to the same financial information that we use in determining the existence of hardship. In the usual hardship case, cumulative net loss figures are sufficient such as are shown by Lotus Cars USA Inc. in its profit and loss figures for 1993-1997 (i.e., we would have granted your confidentiality request for all financial information except for these bottom-line figures). If Lotus Cars, Ltd. has cumulative net profits, we may need to consider and make available additional financial information in order to assess its hardship arguments. Sincerely, |
1999 |
ID: ltrtoMyles2OpenRussell Myles, Esquire Dear Mr. Myles: This is in response to your letter of April 17, 2002, requesting clarification of certain requirements in our regulations in 49 CFR Part 592 that specify the duties of registered importers of motor vehicles that were not originally manufactured to comply with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards. You note that under section 592.5(a)(8) of those regulations, an applicant for registered importer (RI) status must supply a copy of a contract to acquire "a prepaid mandatory service insurance policy underwritten by an independent insurance company" to ensure that the applicant will be financially able to remedy any noncompliance or safety-related defect determined to exist in a vehicle that is covered by a certificate of conformity the applicant furnishes to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Section 592.6(i) specifies that one of the duties of an RI is to maintain such a policy in effect to guarantee its ability to carry out the defect and noncompliance notification and remedy responsibilities that are set forth in section 592.6(g). You note that under section 592.6(g)(2)(i), the requirement to provide a remedy without charge does not apply "if the noncompliance or safety-related defect exists in a motor vehicle whose first sale after importation occurred more than 10 calendar years before notification of the failure to comply is furnished" to the owner of the affected vehicle pursuant to 49 CFR Part 577. This has prompted you to ask how long prepaid mandatory service insurance would be required (1) for a vehicle that was first sold after importation 30 days before owner notification under Part 577 is provided and (2) for a vehicle that was first sold after importation nine years before such notification. You state that you are asking these questions so that you can better understand "when coverage for each imported vehicle must begin and when that obligation expires, and how that coverage commitment is affected by the language of 592.6(g)(2)(i)." Because the mandatory service insurance policies required under sections 592.5(a)(8) and 592.6(g) are for the purpose of guaranteeing the RI's ability to fulfill its responsibility to provide notification and remedy for defects and noncompliances under section 592.6(g), those policies must take effect no later than the date on which the vehicle is first purchased after importation, and must remain in effect until ten years have elapsed from that date. Therefore, a full ten-year policy would be required for the vehicle in each of the examples that you cite, effective upon the date of the vehicle's first sale after importation. In the case of the first vehicle, 9 years and 335 days of outstanding coverage would remain on the policy, and in the case of the second vehicle, one year of outstanding coverage would remain. You next request confirmation that if a prepaid mandatory service insurance policy becomes ineffective because the insurance underwriter has gone out of business, the RI would be required to secure a new policy that provides coverage for the periods that remain outstanding on all previously imported vehicles, as well as for the full ten-year term on all vehicles the RI may subsequently import. As far as we are aware, no company that underwrites mandatory service insurance policies has gone out of business to date. We therefore have never had the need to address this issue. An RI would have to obtain mandatory service insurance policies for its future imports from a new company in the event that the company that previously provided this coverage is no longer able to satisfy applicable requirements, including those of state regulatory authorities. The RI would not be required to obtain new mandatory service insurance coverage for periods that remain outstanding on vehicles that it has previously imported. We note that the owners of those vehicles would be protected to the extent that the company is required by state regulatory authorities to maintain sufficient reserves or take other measures to cover its outstanding liability on previously issued policies in the event that it should go out of business. Beyond that, our regulations do not obligate an RI to obtain new mandatory service insurance policies for previously imported vehicles if the original underwriter should go out of business. It naturally follows that there is no "information concerning the new policy" that the RI would be required to furnish to the owners of those vehicles. In asking us whether an RI would have such an obligation, your referred us to 49 CFR 592.5(f), which requires an RI to notify NHTSA of any changes in the information submitted with its application for RI status, which, as previously noted, includes a copy of a contract to acquire a prepaid mandatory service insurance policy, or a copy of the policy itself. We note that this section requires notification to NHTSA if there is a change in the mandatory service insurance policy furnished with the RI's application for RI status. There is no comparable requirement for the RI to furnish notification of such a change to the owners of the affected vehicles as well. Lastly, you have asked whether the actual insurer should be identified in the policy information that an RI places with a vehicle to be sold, and if so, you have asked how much information concerning the actual insurer should be provided to the vehicle owner. You have referenced, in this regard, Registered Importer Newsletter No. 16 dated May 2000, which states that the service insurance policy that an RI is required to obtain for each vehicle it imports or brings into conformity with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards should be placed in the glove box of the vehicle or given to the owner with other important vehicle documents if the vehicle does not have a glove box. The guidance further states that "[t]hese policies must be written by an insurance company or by a company that is backed by an insurance company," and that "[t]he insurance company must be registered with a state as authorized to issue insurance policies and be totally independent of any RI to which it is providing policies." Although there is no express requirement in either the Part 592 regulations or this guidance for the insurance company underwriting the policy to be identified on the face of the policy, NHTSA expects this information to be provided to the vehicle owner. Without that information, the owner would encounter practical difficulties in making a claim in the event that the RI defaults on its obligation to provide notification and remedy for safety-related defects and noncompliances. If you have any further questions regarding the mandatory service insurance requirements or other requirements that NHTSA has placed on RIs, please contact Coleman Sachs of this office at 202-366-5238. Sincerely, |
2002 |
ID: LW007646OpenMr. Robert Babcock Dear Mr. Babcock: This is in response to your letter of October 7, 2004, in which you requested "confirmation that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 110 presents no obstacle to the inclusion of a label identifier for the Tire and Loading Information label required in the standard. " Your letter appears to seek clarification of the June 3, 2004, final rule amending Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 110, Tire Selection and Rims for Motor Vehicles with a GVWR of 4,536 Kilograms (10,000 Pounds) or Less (69 FR 31306). Paragraph S4.3(h) of that standard allows a vehicle manufacturer to place an optional bar code or vehicle identification number (VIN) on the righthand edge of the vehicle placard and tire information label. Specifically, you asked whether it would be permissible under paragraph S4.3(h) to place an alphanumeric identifier other than the VIN "outside the box" of the label in order to ensure that the correct label is placed on a specific configuration during the assembly process. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is in the process of responding to petitions for reconsideration of the June 3, 2004, final rule, and we expect to issue our response shortly. We will address the issue raised in your letter in our response to the petitions for reconsideration. Should you have any remaining or additional questions once the response to the petitions for reconsideration is published, please feel free to submit them to the agency. If you have further questions in the interim, you may contact Mr. George Feygin of my staff at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman ref:110 |
2004 |
ID: LWP008657OpenMr.Robert Babcock Dear Mr.Babcock: This responds to your letter asking about Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No.201s requirements for instrument panels, set forth in S5.1.You ask whether an interior component contiguous to the instrument panel of a future model shown in a photograph and diagram you submitted would be excluded from meeting S5.1 under a provision of S5.1.1 of the standard.Our answer is yes.(We note that by letter dated November 3, 2005, you removed the request for confidentiality related to your interpretation request.) The photograph shows an instrument panel (dashboard) of a vehicle.The instrument panel forms a T-shape design with a contiguous structure that contains the gear shift lever and some dials and compartments.The design is visually similar to "one-piece" dashboard and console assemblies that do not have a space separating the dashboard from the console assembly.However, in your design, the contiguous structure containing the gear shift lever does not extend all the way rearward between the driver and passenger seats.It extends less than a foot below the instrument panel. FMVSS No.201 establishes performance requirements designed to reduce the risk of injury in the event an occupant strikes the interior of a vehicle during a crash.Certain areas within the vehicle must be properly padded or otherwise have energy absorbing properties to provide head protection in the event of an impact.The requirements for instrument panels are set forth in S5.1.S5.1 states, "Except as provided in S5.1.1, when that area of the instrument panel that is within the head impact area is impacted" by a head form, the deceleration of the head form shall be within specified limits.The exceptions relevant to your letter are S5.1.1(a) and (e). S5.1.1(a) of FMVSS No.201 excludes console assemblies from the head impact protection requirements of the standard.Although console assemblies are not defined in FMVSS No.201, we have noted in previous interpretations that we regarded a "low-lying structure mounted on the floor and [lying] primarily between the vehicle seats" to be a console assembly. (September 21, 1988 letter to Mr.Hiroshi Kato; October 27, 1986 letter to Mr.Shimizu.)The structure you ask about in your design does not extend between the seats and is not "mounted to the floor". It is thus different from structures we called console assemblies in the past. However, S5.1.1(e) of FMVSS No.201 excludes from the head impact protection requirements "[a]reas below any point at which a vertical line is tangent to the rearmost surface of the panel". You suggest that the rearmost surface of the instrument panel in this vehicle is the rearmost surface of the dashboard at the right front passenger seating position.Based on your letter, we agree with you that the line you have drawn on your photograph shows the rearmost surface of the instrument panel.Areas below any point at which a vertical line is tangent to that rearmost surface are excluded from S5.1. If you have further questions, please contact us at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Stephen P.Wood ref:201 |
2006 |
ID: lynch.dfOpenB. Daniel Lynch, Esq. Dear Mr. Lynch: This responds to your letter and telephone calls asking whether 49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq. would preempt legislation that you would like to have introduced in the California Assembly. I apologize for the delay in responding. Based on our understanding of your letter, we believe that the answer is a qualified no. You explain that the California law you wish to see introduced would require a mirror on the passenger side of the hood of conventional "big rig" trucks (i.e., trucks with hoods that extend forward from the driver, as opposed to flat-faced "cab-over" trucks"). The law would be to correct a "blind spot" on the passenger side of the hood. Your inquiry arose out of a desire to prevent the kind of crash that a former client of yours had experienced. That person's car was in the right lane of a highway and was struck when a big rig truck moved into that lane without seeing the car. The truck was equipped with side-mounted rearview mirrors, but the passenger side mirror did not provide a view of the area to the right side of the hood, forward of the mirror. You would like California to enact a law to require big rig trucks to have a passenger-side mirror that would enable the driver to see small cars and other vehicles that could be obscured by the truck's large hood. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 111, Rearview mirrors (49 CFR 571.111), requires side rear view mirrors on trucks with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 4,563 kilograms (kg) or more. The standard at S7.1 (for trucks with GVWRs of between 4,536 kg and 11,340 kg) and at S8.1 (for trucks with GVWRs of 11,340 kg or more) requires mirrors on both sides of the vehicle. The mirrors must be "located so as to provide the driver a view to the rear along both sides of the vehicle and shall be adjustable both in the horizontal and vertical directions to view the rearward scene." The use of the words "a view to the rear" and "rearward scene" indicates that the specified field of view does not extend forward of some point. That point, logically, is the driver. Our review of the rulemaking history of the standard indicates that there is no Federal intent to regulate the view of the driver and passenger side of a truck forward of the driver. California would thus be regulating a different aspect of performance (i.e., a different field of view) than that regulated by Standard No. 111. Section 30103(b) of our statute, 49 U.S.C. 30103(b) (formerly 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act), states in part:
If the State regulation would address only the area forward of the driver, it would not be preempted by 30103(b). (1) However, it is difficult to respond categorically that the State regulation would not be preempted because you have provided little information on what the State would require. The State regulation could still be preempted if it conflicts with Federal law, either by creating a situation in which manufacturers cannot comply with both the State and Federal laws, or by interfering in some way with another Federal motor vehicle safety standard (such as the field-of-view requirements for the lighting standard, 49 CFR 571.108). The Department's Office of Motor Carrier Safety has jurisdiction over interstate motor carriers operating in the U.S. You should contact that office at (202) 366-4012, for information about that agency's requirements. In closing, we want to make clear that we are not providing any views with respect to the merits of the State mirror requirement which you briefly described and which you would like to see enacted in California. This letter only addresses the preemption issue you raised. If you have any further questions, please contact us. Sincerely, 1. If NHTSA were to issue a standard in this area, inconsistent State laws of general applicability would be preempted to the extent that they are not identical with the Federal standard. Of course, we would consider any relevant State laws when adopting a Federal standard. |
1999 |
ID: Magrin.jegOpen Mr. Bob Magrin Dear Mr. Magrin: This responds to your request by telephone to have the passenger air bag of your car deactivated. You explained that you have a baby who was born very premature and who just came home from the hospital. The baby is on a respirator and heart monitor and requires special monitoring. As discussed below, we would consider the special needs of your child as sufficient justification for not taking enforcement action against a dealer that either temporarily deactivates the passenger-side air bag to accommodate your child, or places a cutoff switch in the vehicle for the same purpose. Federal law now requires that new cars be equipped with automatic crash protection at the front outboard seating positions. The air bags in your car were installed as a means of complying with that requirement. The law also prohibits dealers and repair businesses from knowingly making inoperative devices, such as air bags, installed to comply with a safety standard. However, in very limited situations in which a vehicle must be modified to accommodate a person's special physical needs, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has in the past stated that we would consider violations of the "make inoperative" provision as technical, justified by public need, and that we would not institute enforcement proceedings. We would regard a temporary deactivation of the passenger-side air bag in your car, or the addition of a cutoff switch, in the same way. Infants riding in rear-facing child safety seats should never be placed in the front seat of a vehicle with a passenger-side air bag. Since your baby is on a respirator and heart monitor and requires special monitoring, we would consider your situation as sufficient justification for not taking enforcement action against a dealer that temporarily deactivates the passenger-side air bag, or installs a cutoff switch, to accommodate your child. I want to add a caution. The purpose of the "make inoperative" provision is to ensure, to the degree possible, that current and subsequent owners of a vehicle are not deprived of the maximum protection afforded by the vehicle as newly manufactured. Accordingly, if you have the air bag deactivated, we strongly encourage you to have the air bag reactivated by the dealer when your child can ride in the rear seat. In addition, I strongly encourage you to ensure that passengers in your vehicle use their safety belts. I hope that this letter resolves your problem. If you have any other questions, please contact Edward Glancy of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack |
1996 |
ID: malone.ztvOpenDaniel P. Malone Dear Mr. Malone: This is in reply to your e-mail of June 20, 2003, to Taylor Vinson of this Office, asking about the early warning reporting (EWR) responsibilities of seat manufacturers that supply integrated child seat systems. Your question arises from a statement in the preamble to the EWR final rule, which remarked:
You have asked whether "this comment regarding integrated child seat systems eliminates any responsibility of seat manufacturers [under] EWR as a child restraint system manufacturer for those products." The answer is no. This comment relates to the reporting responsibilities of manufacturers of light vehicles. The proposed rule would have had these manufacturers reporting separately for integrated child restraint systems (Code 08) and for seats (Code 17) (see 66 FR at 66222). In the final rule, as the preamble indicated, reports of light vehicle manufacturers involving integrated child seat systems are to be included as a report for seats (Code 22). As a manufacturer of original equipment, a manufacturer of seats with integrated child seat systems remains subject to the reporting requirements of 49 CFR 579.27, which oblige it to report to NHTSA any claims or notices involving death that relate to its product. Your second question was "for purposes of EWR, does that comment clarify that integrated child seat systems are to be considered as 'seats' and not child restraint systems."The answer is yes. If you have further questions, you may phone Taylor Vinson at 202-366-5263. Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman ref:579 |
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ID: malone_new.ztvOpenDaniel P. Malone Dear Mr. Malone: This is in reply to your e-mail of June 20, 2003, to Taylor Vinson of this Office, asking about the early warning reporting (EWR) responsibilities of seat manufacturers that supply integrated child seat systems. Your question arises from a statement in the preamble to the EWR final rule, which remarked:
You have asked whether "this comment regarding integrated child seat systems eliminates any responsibility of seat manufacturers [under] EWR as a child restraint system manufacturer for those products." The answer is no. This comment relates to the reporting responsibilities of manufacturers of light vehicles. The proposed rule would have had these manufacturers reporting separately for integrated child restraint systems (Code 08) and for seats (Code 17) (see 66 FR at 66222). In the final rule, as the preamble indicated, reports of light vehicle manufacturers involving integrated child seat systems are to be included as a report for seats (Code 22). As a manufacturer of original equipment, a manufacturer of seats with integrated child seat systems remains subject to the reporting requirements of 49 CFR 579.27, which oblige it to report to NHTSA any claims or notices involving death that relate to its product. Your second question was "for purposes of EWR, does that comment clarify that integrated child seat systems are to be considered as 'seats' and not child restraint systems."The answer is yes. If you have further questions, you may phone Taylor Vinson at 202-366-5263. Sincerely, Chief Counsel |
2003 |
ID: mansfieldOpen
Via Federal Express
Mr. Christopher C. Mansfield General Counsel Liberty Mutual Group 175 Berkeley Street Boston, MA 02117
Dear Mr. Mansfield:
We have received reports that certain insurance companies may be engaging in transactions that violate Federal odometer disclosure law with respect to vehicles damaged in Hurricane Sandy. Although we are not asserting that your company is engaging in such practices, we are writing to a number of auto insurance companies to remind them of the Federal odometer disclosure law requirements and ask them to review their practices regarding odometer disclosures. These letters do not accuse your company, or any other company, of violating the law.
We understand that when a flood-damaged vehicle is declared a total loss, the insurance company pays the insured the value of the vehicle, becomes the owner, and acquires control over the vehicle from the insured. However the reports we have received indicate that instead of completing the required odometer disclosure, some companies ask the insured to complete the odometer disclosure statement without listing the insurance company as the transferee. According to these reports, the insurance company will not sign the title, make an odometer disclosure, or transfer title. The insurance company then sells the vehicle at auction, keeps the proceeds from the auction, and provides the title with the odometer disclosure statement as signed by the insured to the auction buyer. The next person in the chain of title of the vehicle will be the buyer at auction. The insurance company will essentially be omitted from the chain of title.
In the circumstance described above, an insurance company is considered a transferee when it pays the insureds claim (in return it obtains ownership of the vehicle), and a transferor when it sells the vehicle at auction. See 49 C.F.R. 580.3. As a transferor, the insurance company is required to make certain disclosures.
Under federal odometer disclosure law, 49 U.S.C. 32705, a person transferring ownership of a motor vehicle shall give the transferee written disclosure of the cumulative mileage registered on the odometer. More specifically, under 49 C.F.R. 580.5, each transferor shall disclose the mileage to the transferee in writing on the title or on the document being used to reassign the title [t]his written disclosure must be signed by the transferor, including the printed name. The transferee must sign the disclosure statement, print his name, and return a copy to his transferor.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Marie Choi of my staff at (202) 366-1738 or via email at marie.choi@dot.gov.
Sincerely,
O. Kevin Vincent Chief Counsel
d: 12/20/12
Identical letters sent to:
Mr. Dana Proulx General Counsel GEICO Corporation One Geico Plaza Washington, DC 20076
Mr. Charles E. Jarrett Chief Legal Officer The Progressive Corporation 300 North Commons Blvd., OHF 11 Mayfield Village, OH 44143
Mr. Christopher C. Mansfield General Counsel Liberty Mutual Group 175 Berkeley Street Boston, MA 02117
Ms. Patricia R. Hatler Chief Legal and Governance Officer Nationwide One Nationwide Plaza Columbus, OH 43215
Ms. Susan L. Lees General Counsel Allstate Insurance Company 3075 Sanders Road Northbrook, IL 60062
Mr. Garrett Paddor General Counsel Farmers New World Life Insurance Company 4680 Wilshire Blvd, 2nd Fl. Los Angeles, CA 90010 Mr. Steven A. Bennett General Counsel United Services Automobile Association (USAA) 9800 Fredericksburg Road San Antonio, TX 78288
Mr. Jeffrey W. Jackson General Counsel State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company One State Farm Plaza Bloomington, IL 61710
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Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.