Interpretation ID: nht91-5.43

DATE: September 10, 1991

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Rosemary Dunlap -- President, Motor Voters

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 6-19-91 from Rosemary Dunlap to Paul Jackson Rice (OCC 6150)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter seeking clarification of statements made by NHTSA's Associate Administrator for Rulemaking, Barry Felrice, at the July 1990 Public/Industry Meeting regarding possible federal preemption of proposed state disclosure legislation. Specifically, you requested us to provide legal support for Mr. Felrice's general statement that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act) may preempt state laws requiring safety information disclosures to be affixed to vehicles. During a telephone conversation on July 1, 1991, Elizabeth Barbour of my staff informed you that in order to provide an opinion as to whether the Safety Act would preempt a specific state bill, we would need to review the provisions of that bill as a whole. Accordingly, you forwarded a copy of California Assembly Bill No. 71 to this office and asked whether the bill, if enacted into law, would be federally preempted.

We have reviewed the California bill. Because the question of preemption could turn on how the State of California would interpret the language in the bill and how it would be enforced if adopted, we are declining to provide a specific opinion as to whether or not the bill would be preempted. However, our discussion identifies the principles under which the validity of such legislation can be determined.

The bill would add a new section 24011.5 to the California Vehicle Code to read as follows:

24011.5 (a) Every dealer or lessor shall affix to the dashboard or a window of every new multipurpose passenger vehicle sold or leased, or offered for sale or lease, a notice which specifies whether or not the vehicle meets the following federal safety standards applicable to passenger cars:

(1) Side door strength; (2) Roof crush resistance; (3) Passive restraint devices; (4) Raised brake light.

(b) The notice required by subdivision (a) shall not be smaller than 8 inches by 10 inches, and shall be printed in at least 20-point type and shall be affixed in such a manner as to be readily removable by the purchaser or lessee.

(c) As used in this section, "passenger car" and "multipurpose passenger vehicle" have the same meaning as defined in regulations adopted pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act . . . .

According to the California Legislative Counsel's Digest, other provisions of existing California law would make violation of this requirement a crime.

At the outset, I would like to note that NHTSA has recently extended its standards/requirements on side door strength (FMVSS 214, quasi-static requirements only), roof crush resistance (FMVSS 216), passive restraint devices (FMVSS 208), and raised brake light (FMVSS 108) to cover most multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPV's). The amendments will become effective over the next several years. Therefore, we believe that this bill will become largely superfluous during that timeframe, since most MPV's will be required to be certified as complying with the enumerated requirements. We note, however, that there may be some slight differences in the way these requirements are applied to MPV's and the way they currently apply to passenger cars.

By way of background information, Federal law, including agency regulations, can expressly or impliedly preempt state law. Under section 103(d) of the Safety Act, whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard is in effect, a state may not adopt or maintain a safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance which is not identical to the Federal standard. A non-identical state standard preempted under section 103(d) would be an example of express preemption.

A requirement for a label related to safety could in some cases constitute a safety standard. For example, several Federal motor vehicle safety standards include requirements for permanent labels.

We do not, however, believe that the California bill would constitute a safety standard. Therefore, it would not be expressly preempted under section 103(d). While the bill would require an information sheet to be affixed to the vehicle, the information sheet would be readily removable by the purchaser or lessee. Thus, the information sheet is not intended to remain affixed to the vehicle after sale. The requirement that the information sheet be affixed to the vehicle appears to be solely for the purpose of ensuring that a prospective purchaser will see it, and is thus akin to a requirement that the information be prominently displayed in the dealer showroom.

Federal law impliedly preempts state law when (1) it is impossible to comply with both; (2) the federal interest in the field is so dominant that federalism principles prevent enforcement of complementary or auxiliary state laws; (3) the federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive as to be exclusive; or (4) state law hinders the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of federal law. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 108 S. Ct. 1145, 1150-51 (1988).

We do not believe that the California bill would be preempted under any of the first three factors cited above for implied preemption. The California bill would not make it impossible to comply with federal law. Further, the federal interest in this area is not so dominant that complementary state laws may not be enforced, and the federal regulatory scheme is not so pervasive as to be exclusive.

There remains the issue of whether the California bill would be preempted as a state law which hinders the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of federal law. One problem in analyzing this question relates to the fact that we have difficulty understanding how the drafters of the California bill contemplate that the dealers/lessors subject to the requirements would be capable of complying with them.

Dealers/lessors would have no way of knowing whether an MPV met particular passenger car requirements unless the manufacturer advised them. For example, while dealers/lessors could visually determine whether an MPV had a passive restraint or raised brake light, they would not know whether those devices met Federal standards for passenger cars. Dealers/lessors obviously could not determine from inspection whether an MPV met the side door strength or roof crush resistance requirements applicable to passenger cars.

The drafters of the California bill may have assumed that dealers/lessors could obtain information from manufacturers concerning whether MPV's met particular requirements. However, even if manufacturers wanted to help their dealers comply with this requirement by providing such information, the manufacturers might not be able to do so. A manufacturer would not know whether its MPV's met certain passenger car standards unless it had conducted substantial testing. And it may not be possible to test some MPV's to passenger car standards, because of different vehicle configurations or other factors. If this were the case, it is unclear how anyone, including a manufacturer, would be able to determine whether an MPV met such a standard.

One of the purposes of the Safety Act that is emphasized in the legislative history is the need for uniform standards. If the bill were interpreted as going beyond requiring dealers/lessors to disclose what they or manufacturers know and instead to require manufacturers or others to undertake significant testing, it would impose burdens similar to the certification burdens of a safety standard. For some standards, such as those involving crash tests, these burdens are quite large. We believe that a state disclosure law that imposed significant testing burdens, in connection with an aspect of performance for which NHTSA has issued a safety standard or decided not to issue such standard, would hinder the objective of uniform standards and be preempted under federal law.

I hope this information is helpful to you.