NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
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ID: aiam3453OpenMr. Mick W. Blakely, C. F. Liebert, Inc., P. O. Box Drawer L, Blaine, WA 98230; Mr. Mick W. Blakely C. F. Liebert Inc. P. O. Box Drawer L Blaine WA 98230; Dear Mr. Blakely: This responds to your letter of April 7, 1981, concerning 'Oil Wel Service Rigs.' Please accept our apologies for the lateness of our reply. You ask whether NHTSA considers oil well service rigs to be off-road vehicles.; The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration issues safet standards for 'motor vehicles'. Therefore, our regulations apply to a vehicle and its manufacturer only if the vehicle qualifies as a motor vehicle under the provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (the Act). Section 102(3) of the Act defines motor vehicle as:; >>>Any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufacture primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.<<<<; Thus, a motor vehicle is a vehicle which the manufacturer expects wil use public highways as part of its intended function; Tracked and other vehicles incapable of highway travel are not moto vehicles. In addition, vehicles intended and sold solely for off-road use (e.g. aircraft runway vehicles and underground mining vehicles are not considered to be motor vehicles even if operationally capable of highway travel. They would, however, be considered motor vehicles if the manufacturer knew that a substantial proportion of his customers actually would use them on the highway.; Just as clearly, vehicles which use the highway on a necessary an recurring basis to move between work sites are motor vehicles. The primary function of some vehicles is of a mobile, work- performing nature and as such their manufacturer contemplate a primary use of the highway. Rigs and towed equipment such as chippers and pull-type street sweepers are examples in this area. Even if the equipment uses highways infrequently, it is considered a motor vehicle on the same basis as is a 'mobile structure trailer' which is often towed only once from the factory to the home site. All these motor vehicles qualify as trucks or trailers. As such, they are subject to several of the motor vehicle safety standards, and the manufacturer must comply with other regulations in Chapter V of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. (However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has affirmed the District Court's decision that mobile construction equipment does not fall within the definition of 'motor vehicles' found in section 102(3) of the Act. *Koehring Co. v. Adams*, 452 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Wis. 1978), *aff'd*., 605 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1979). The agency construes the opinion to apply only to the specific equipment at issue in *Koehring Co*., i.e. mobile excavators, and mobile well drills.); There are some vehicles which are excepted from the motor vehicl classification despite their use of the highway. Highway maintenance and construction equipment lane stripers, self-propelled asphalt pavers, and other vehicles whose maximum speed does not exceed 20 miles per hour and whose abnormal configuration distinguishes them from the traffic flow are not considered motor vehicle.; In your letter you state that oil well service rigs were designed fo off road use and use the highways infrequently. You also state that oil well service rigs can travel on the highways only when a special permit has been obtained because the vehicles are oversize. We assume that since a special permit is required for the use of such vehicles on the highway, oil well service rigs cannot travel unescorted on public roads. On the basis of the representations contained in your letter, and the assumptions we have made, we have determined that the oil well service rigs manufactured by Mainland Manufacturing are not 'motor vehicles' for purposes of the Act and Form HS-7. This is because an oil well service rig uses the highways infrequently and is distinguished by its escorts from the normal flow of traffic.; We hope you find this information helpful. Please contact this offic if you have further questions.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam2566OpenWilliam R. Scott, Esq., Messrs. Allen & Korkowski & Associates, P. O. Box 337, Rantoul, IL 61866; William R. Scott Esq. Messrs. Allen & Korkowski & Associates P. O. Box 337 Rantoul IL 61866; Dear Mr. Scott: This is in reply to your letter of March 3, 1977, to Mr. Oates of thi office asking whether your client, a manufacturer of motorcycle accessories, is subject to requirements imposed by 49 CFR Parts 573, 576, and 577 and 15 U.S.C. 1402.; For your reference I am enclosing a copy of a new Part 577 whic becomes effective June 28, 1977, that implements Part B of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1411 *et seq*.) effective December 27, 1974. These new sections have superseded Section 1402, to which you referred. Since you apparently are unaware of these changes I am also enclosing a copy of the amended Act.; Because your client manufactures motor vehicle equipment other tha original equipment (*i.e*. accessories) its products appear to be 'replacement equipment' as defined by 15 U.S.C. 1419(2)(B). Since Parts 573 and 576 apply only to motor vehicle manufacturers and not to equipment manufacturers you are correct in your conclusion that these regulations are inapplicable to your client. We have proposed, however, that Part 573 be amended to apply to manufacturers of replacement equipment although no action has yet been taken on the proposal. I include a copy of that proposal.; You also asked about the applicability of Section 577.4 which you foun to be 'silent about the duty of manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment'. The Part 577 that you referenced reflects the statutory scheme that was in effect until December 27, 1974, under which a manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment (as contrasted with a vehicle manufacturer who also produced equipment) was not required to notify purchasers of safety-related defects or noncompliances which it, the manufacturer, had discovered. The equipment manufacturer's obligation to notify arose only upon determination of the existence of a safety-related defect or noncompliance by the NHTSA Administrator and in that event Section 577.5 requires the equipment manufacturer to follow the provisions of Section 577.4. The new statutory scheme of 15 U.S.C. 1411 *et seq*., as reflected in revised Section 577.5, now extends the notification and remedy obligation to safety-related defects and noncompliances discovered by manufacturers of replacement equipment.; Finally, you have asked if there is no duty to retain records how ca an equipment manufacturer 'observe the requirements of Part 577.4.' I assume what you mean is how can it notify 'the first purchaser (where known). . .and any subsequent purchaser to whom a warranty on such. . . item of equipment has been transferred'. The actual obligation of a manufacturer of replacement equipment today, however, is that established by 15 U.S.C. 1413(c)(3)(A), in effect since December 27, 1974, and it is to notify 'the most recent purchaser known to the manufacturer' (See also new Section 577.7(a)(2)(ii)(A). Congress appears to have recognized that manufacturers of small and less expensive items of motor vehicle equipment generally may not keep records of ultimate purchasers when it authorized our agency to issue a public notice when the public interest requires it (15 U.S.C. 1413(c)(3)(B)). Since there is no obligation for a manufacturer to know the names of its purchasers, NHTSA will accept in good faith an equipment manufacturer's statement as to the extent of its knowledge of its most recent purchasers. Under proposed Section 573.7(c) your client, as a manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment, would be required to maintain certain records including a list of the names and addresses of the 'most recent purchasers known to the manufacturer'. Such a list would probably at a minimum comprise distributors of the product, might also include the dealers of the distributors, and possibly in some instances the ultimate purchaser. But it is not a requirement that steps be taken to know and list the names and addresses of all ultimate purchasers.; If you have further questions after reviewing this letter and it enclosures I will be happy to answer them for you.; Yours truly, Frank Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4191OpenMr. J. Leon Conner, Manager, Long & Associates, Inc., P.O. Box 691, San Angelo, TX 76902; Mr. J. Leon Conner Manager Long & Associates Inc. P.O. Box 691 San Angelo TX 76902; Dear Mr. Conner: This responds to your letter seeking an interpretation of th requirements of 49 CFR S575.104, *Uniform Tire Quality Grading Standards* (UTQGS). Specifically, you asked whether this regulation requires the treadwear testing for a tire size to be conducted only with vehicles that specify the subject tire size either as the original equipment size or as one of the recommended optional tire sizes. The UTQGS does not contain any such provision.; The conditions and procedures to be followed in grading tires fo treadwear under the UTQGS are set forth in S575.104(e). That section specifies tire loading conditions and rim dimensional requirements for the vehicles used in the treadwear testing. However, it does *not* specify that the vehicles used in the treadwear testing can only be used to test tire sizes recommended as either original equipment or optional tires on the vehicle when new. Accordingly, persons testing tires to determine the treadwear grade may mount the tires on any vehicle, provided that the tire and vehicle satisfy all the requirements of S575.104(e), relating to tire construction, inflation pressure, size designation, vehicle loading, and wheel alignment.; You stated in your letter that the UTQGS compliance test procedures used by this agency for conducting its enforcement testing for treadwear grades, currently specify that tire sizes must be tested on vehicles that specify that size as either original equipment or recommended optional size. This specification may have been adopted after the following language appeared in a 1975 preamble to a final rule establishing the UTQGS:; >>>Several commenters suggested that the rule specify all vehicles in given convoy be identical, to reduce variations in projected treadlife. ... Variations in vehicle type, however, do not appear to produce significant variations in treadwear projections. Nevertheless, to minimize such variations, tires will be tested for compliance only on vehicles for which they are available as original equipment or recommended replacement options. 40 FR 23073, at 23076, May 28, 1975.<<<; As explained above, the UTQGS regulation does not specify that th vehicles used in treadwear testing can only be used to test tire sizes recommended as either original equipment or optional tires on the vehicle. The agency's compliance test procedures are only the methods the agency itself uses to determine the appropriate treadwear grade for a tire. Persons outside the agency are not bound by any testing conditions and methods not set forth in the UTQGS itself. Such persons may, therefore, conduct their own testing in a manner different from that specified in NHTSA's compliance test procedures, provided that their testing satisfies all requirements of S575.104(e).; You also stated that the use of different vehicles for treadwea testing of tires will produce measurably different treadwear grades for the tire, even when all the vehicle factors are closely and properly controlled. As quoted above, NHTSA concluded that vehicle-to-vehicle variations 'do not appear to produce significant variations in treadwear projections', when it examined this issue in 1975. However, the agency is currently re-examining the effects of vehicle-to- vehicle variations on treadwear projections, particularly with respect to front-wheel vs. rear-wheel drive vehicles and passenger cars vs. light trucks and vans. If you wish to provide some additional data on this subject, please forward the data to Mr. Barry Felrice, Associate Administrator for Rulemaking, at this address. We would be interested in analyzing whatever data form the basis for your belief that our 1975 conclusion was incorrect.; Please feel free to contact Steve Kratzke of my staff, at this addres or by telephone at (202) 366-2992, if you have any further questions about our UTQGS.; Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam5407OpenMr. Walter Lavis 2467 Rt. 10 Bldg. 3 Apt. 7B Morris Plains, NJ 07950; Mr. Walter Lavis 2467 Rt. 10 Bldg. 3 Apt. 7B Morris Plains NJ 07950; "Dear Mr. Lavis: We have received your letter of June 6, 1994, wit respect to your 'Saf-T-Flec' reflectors. You say that you have been informed by a NHTSA representative that 'using the standard DOT approved reflector tape would allow the use of my reflector for the trucking industry.' Judging from the red, white, and amber samples you have enclosed, your 'reflectors' appear to be retroreflective tape which adheres to a semicircular aluminum base and is intended for vertical mounting on the side and back of vehicles. Several potential customers have asked whether your concept was 'DOT approved', and you have asked for a reply. The Department of Transportation has no authority to 'approve' items of motor vehicle equipment. We advise inquirers whether manufacture or use of any particular item of equipment is prohibited or permitted under the Federal motor vehicle safety standards and associated regulations. However, if an item is deemed permissible, this must not be represented as 'approval' by DOT. Your letter is somewhat unclear as to the intended use and market for Saf-T- Flec. The fact that you have enclosed a highlighted copy of S5.1.1.4 leads us to believe that one application you envision for Saf-T-Flec is as a substitute for original equipment side reflex reflectors. This substitution is permitted if the reflective material conforms to Federal Specification L-S- 300 (September 7, 1965) and, as used on the vehicle, meets the performance standards of SAE Standard J594f Reflex Reflectors, January 1977. Accordingly, if your red and amber samples meet these two requirements, they may be used as the side front, intermediate, and rear reflex reflectors that Tables I and III require on trucks and trailers. However, Standard No. 108 does not allow sheeting material to be used on the rear of vehicles in lieu of reflex reflectors. What if your reflectors do not meet the two specifications listed above? In this instance, they may be used as supplementary side reflectors to the reflectors that are required by Standard No. 108, and you may employ amber devices for this use as well as red and white. As supplementary equipment, they are subject to the Federal restriction only that they not impair the effectiveness of the required reflex reflectors. We do not believe that additional reflectors would have this effect. Supplementary lighting equipment such as additional reflectors is subject to the laws of the individual states. We are not able to advise you as to their acceptability under state laws. The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) provides opinions on state law. AAMVA's address is 4600 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, Va. 22203. As you may know, S5.7 of Standard No. 108 requires red and white retroreflective material to be applied to the side and rear of large trailers that have been manufactured since November 30, 1993 (those whose overall width is 80 inches or more and whose GVWR is more than 10,000 pounds). This material may be retroreflective sheeting or reflectors. If sheeting is used, it must meet the photometric specifications of Figure 29. If reflectors are used, they must conform to SAE J594f, and provide specified minimum millicandela/lux at specified light entrance angles. Your initial question indicates that you may be interested in marketing Saf-T-Flec for use as a substitute for the conspicuity materials that conform to Standard No. 108. Manufacturers of conspicuity sheeting certify it with the material in a flat vertical plane (as evidenced by the DOT-C2 marking on your white sample). We have reservations whether the curved red and white Saf-T-Flec devices could meet the photometric specifications of Figure 29, for sheeting, or J594f and the millicandela/lux specifications of S5.7.2.1(b) or (c) for reflectors. Amber is not one of the specified colors for conspicuity treatment, and could not be used as a substitute. I hope that this answers your questions. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel"; |
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ID: aiam1447OpenMr. Gerhard P. Riechel, Volkswagen of America, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ 07632; Mr. Gerhard P. Riechel Volkswagen of America Inc. Englewood Cliffs NJ 07632; Dear Mr. Riechel: This responds to your March 8, 1974, letter reviewing our dispositio of Volkswagen's petition to add a new crash protection option to S4.1.2 of Standard 208 (49 CFR 571.208). You requested a determination of whether the seat belt assembly described in that petition constitutes a passive restraint system for purposes of Standard 208, that is, one that requires 'no action' by vehicle occupants.; The Volkswagen assembly consists of a single diagonal belt fo restraint of the upper torso and an energy-absorbing knee bolster. Mounting of the upper torso restraint to the door causes the belt to move forward during occupant entry and then fall back across the occupant's torso when he is seated and the door is closed.; The NHTSA issued an interpretation of what constitutes a 'passive restraint system on May 4, 1971 (36 FR 4600):; >>>The concept of an occupant protection system that requires 'n action by vehicle occupants' as used in Standard No. 208 is intended to designate a system that requires no action other than would be required if the protective system were not present in the vehicle.<<<; The question of what constitutes 'no action by vehicle occupants' in vehicle equipped with (presumptively) passive belts is best considered in two stages: (1) entry and exit from the vehicle, and (2) positioning of the belt for safety and comfort.; Entry and exit action 'that requires no action other than would b required if the protective system were not present in the vehicle' means that a person is not hampered in his normal movements by the presence of the belt system. A test of this is whether a human occupant of approximately the dimensions of the 50th percentile adult male finds it necessary to take additional actions to displace the belt or associated components in order to enter or leave the seating position in question. An example of impermissible action would be the necessity of manually pushing a belt out of the way to gain access to the seat. Displacement of the components incidental to normal entry and exit, or merely for the convenience of the occupant, would not be prohibited. Examples of permissible displacement would be brushing against the upper torso restraint during seating, or grasping the torso restraint to close the door.; The second question relates to the usefulness of the system once th occupant has been seated. The essence of a passive restraint is that it provides at least the minimum level of protection without relying on occupant action to deploy the restraint. At this stage, then, the question is whether an occupant who has seated himself without taking any 'additional action' is in fact protected in a 30 mi/h impact. This can be measured by conducting the impact tests with the belt positioned on the test dummy in the orientation that results when a human occupant enters the vehicle according to the first test described above. It would not be required that the belt position itself for maximum comfort of the human occupant, if it met the safety requirements. For example, if the belt were to fall across the upper arm instead of the clavicle, but still passed the test, the system would be considered conforming.; The procedure for conducting this evaluation would be to have a huma occupant enter the vehicle without taking any 'additional actions' to displace the belt, to note the location of the belt on him before he exits, to position the test dummy in accordance with S8.1 of Standard 208, to position the belt as it positioned itself on the sample occupant, and then to conduct the impact tests. The exit evaluation would require the human occupant to be seated with the restraint normally deployed and then exit the vehicle without needing to take any separate actions to displace the belt.; This discussion is intended to permit you to evaluate your passive bel system under the language of the May 4, 1971, interpretation.; Sincerely, Lawrence R. Schneider, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam3616OpenMr. J. L. Campbell, Jr., 12813 95th Avenue, N.E., Kirkland, WA 98033; Mr. J. L. Campbell Jr. 12813 95th Avenue N.E. Kirkland WA 98033; Dear Mr. Campbell: I have recently received a copy of your letter to Senator Gorto concerning the difficulties small manufacturers of motor vehicles have in complying with Federal standards. To alleviate these difficulties, you suggested that blanket exemptions from the bumper regulations and the Federal motor vehicle safety standard on side door strength be granted to all 4-wheel vehicles under 800 pounds dry weight.; As explained more fully below, this agency does not have authority fro Congress to grant an exemption from the bumper standard for the ultra-lightweight vehicles you describe. Such authority would require new legislation. However, we do have authority either to exclude all of those vehicles from the side door strength standard or to exempt particular manufacturers of those vehicles from that standard.; Congress set forth the guidelines under which this agency could issu exemptions from the bumper standards in section 102(c)(1) of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (15 U.S.C. 1912(c)(1). Exemptions may be granted only to passenger motor vehicles manufactured for a special use. While neither the Cost Savings Act nor this agency has defined 'special use', the Cost Savings Act is explicit that a vehicle can be exempted only if two conditions are met: (1) the vehicle is manufactured for a special use, (2) compliance with the bumper standard would unreasonably interfere with that use. The example Congress cited for such a vehicle was a Jeep with snow removal equipment on the front. The agency believes that the purpose of an ultra-lightweight passenger vehicle is essentially the same as that of a lightweight vwehicle such as the Toyota Starlet, Honda Civic or Ford Escort, i.e., to carry passengers. The agency does not view that purpose to be a special use within the meaning of section 102. Further, even if the first condition could be met, it is not clear that the second one could be. Hence, an amendment to the Cost Savings Act would have to be made by the Congress before we could grant an exemption from the bumper standard to your ultra-lightweight passenger motor vehicles.; Concerning your request regarding Standard No. 214, side door strength NHTSA formerly excepted motor vehicles (other than trailers and motorcycles) of 1,000 pounds or less curb weight from all safety standards. However, that exception was eliminated in 1973 (38 F.R. 12808, May 16, 1973). At that time, the agency stated that manufacturers seeking relief from compliance problems peculiar to these vehicles could either petition for amendments to individual standards or petition for an exemption under section 123 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1410).; These options remain the ones available to manufacturers o ultra-lightweight vehicles. Thus, one option is to submit a petition for rulemaking under 49 CFR Part 552 requesting the agency to amend Standard No. 214 to exclude those vehicles from that standard's applicability provision. I should point out that few, if any, petitions of this type have been submitted since the agency's May 1973 notice and none have been granted. Also, you should be aware that the rulemaking process is often a lengthy one.; The other option is for a manufacturer to submit a petition for th exemption of his vehicles from a particular standard. I have enclosed a copy of 49 CFR Part 555 which sets forth the information that a manufacturer must include in its petition. Exemption petitions are not uncommon and are often granted at least in part. Also, because fewer procedural steps are necessary, the exemption process is typically much faster than the amendment process. Should you wish to submit an exemption petition, you may find useful the enclosed copies of section 123 of the Safety Act and Standard No. 214, *Side Door Strength* (49 CFR S 571.214).; If you need any further assistance or information on either of thes subjects, please do not hesitate to contact me. We try to minimize the regulatory difficulties experienced by small manufacturers to the extent we can do so consistent with our legislative authority.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel |
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ID: 09-001535 206Open
Ms. Valrie Fortin Regulations and Standards Technician Girardin Minibus Inc. 3000 rue Girardin Drummondville, Qubec J2E 0A1 Dear Ms. Fortin: This responds to your letter concerning a February 6, 2007 final rule amending Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 206, Door Locks and Door Retention Components. Among other matters, that rule removed an exclusion of vehicle doors equipped with wheelchair platform lift systems from FMVSS No. 206 requirements. As explained in the enclosed agency response to petitions for reconsideration of the final rule, Thomas Built Buses petitioned the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to reinstate the exclusion, and we have done so. See the enclosed Federal Register document (75 FR 7370, February 19, 2010) for a detailed explanation as to the agencys rationale. Please note, however, that NHTSA determined that the former exclusion of all doors equipped with a wheelchair lift was too broad, given that some lifts made today do not completely block the doorway. Therefore, in the enclosed document, the agency has amended the February 2007 final rule (the requirements at S4 of FMVSS No. 206) to exclude doors equipped with a permanently attached wheelchair lift system meeting the following criteria: (a) When the lift is in the retracted position, the lift platform retracts to a vertical orientation parallel to and in close proximity with the interior surface of the lift door; (b) in that position, the platform completely covers the doorway opening, has fixed attachments to the vehicle and provides a barricade to the doorway; and (c) the wheelchair lift door is linked to an alarm system consisting of either a flashing visible signal located in the drivers compartment or an alarm audible to the driver that is activated when the door is not fully closed and the vehicle ignition is activated. These requirements appear to not exclude the wheelchair lift system in one of the pictures you enclosed because that platform only halfway covers the door opening. As to the second picture you enclosed with your letter, we cannot determine from that picture whether that door meets all the requirements for the exclusion set forth above. If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact Sarah Alves of my staff at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely yours, O. Kevin Vincent Chief Counsel Enclosure Dated: 3/18/2010 |
2010 |
ID: 09-002561drn June 10OpenMr. Jeffrey S. Conway Vice President of Operations Atlantic Design Inc., P.O. Box 938 Abington, MD 21009 Dear Mr. Conway: This responds to your letter asking us to confirm the continued validity of the interpretation this office provided to Mr. Russell Roden of your company by letter dated October 26, 1999. Assuming the facts presented in the previous letter regarding the Atlantic Design Inc., (ADIs) products still apply today, we confirm our interpretation that ADIs products are not motor vehicles. According to information submitted by you and by your predecessor at ADI, ADI designs and manufactures modular process systems for the construction, industrial maintenance, and the quarry and mining industry. The products include grit recycling and dust collection systems, and sand dedusting units. The equipment may stay at a job site (a maintenance or construction site or at a quarry) for years at a time. The equipment rarely stays at a job site for less than six to eight weeks. A review of the products represented on your website: www.calladi.com shows large industrial machinery, some of which are mounted on trailers. Many of the equipment items depicted on the web site are not even mounted on wheels; they look as if they must be loaded on trailers or other motor vehicles to be transported. In your recent letter to us, you state that ADI is essentially building the same type of equipment as we were ten years ago. Based on the 1999 description of ADIs products, your recent letter, and the information at www.calladi.com, we confirm our belief that ADIs equipment are not motor vehicles within the meaning of our statute. ADIs modular process systems stay on job sites for extended periods of time (which could be years) and only use the highway to move from site to site. Since 1999, we have received no additional information indicating that ADIs equipment use the roads more than on an incidental basis. We appreciate your contacting us to confirm the previous interpretation. If you have any further questions, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely yours, Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel ref:VSA d.7/24/09 |
2009 |
ID: 007901.jegOpenChris Tinto, Director Dear Mr. Tinto: This responds to your request for an interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, with regards to adjusting the seat back angle for the low risk deployment tests for the driver. You asked about the order of the seat adjustments for the chin on module test (S26.2) and the chin on rim test (S26.3). As you noted in your letter, the same seat adjustment procedure is specified for both tests. S26.2.3 and S26.3.1 read as follows:
In your letter, you indicated that the seat back angle may vary depending on when it is adjusted during this procedure.You stated your belief that the adjustment of the seat back angle specified in the fourth (underlined) sentence of this paragraph is conducted after the adjustments specified in the previous sentences, and asked us to confirm that view. It is our opinion that the various seat adjustments specified in S26.2.3 and S26.3.1 are to be made in the order specified in those paragraphs.Accordingly, we agree that the adjustment of the seat back angle specified in the fourth (underlined) sentence of this paragraph is conducted after the adjustments specified in the previous sentences. I hope this information is helpful.If you have any further questions, please call Edward Glancy of my staff at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman ref:208 |
2005 |
ID: 10628Open Mr. Richard Kreutziger Dear Mr. Kreutziger: This responds to your letter of January 3, 1995, telefaxed to Walter Myers of my staff in which you asked whether the bottom edge of a flip-up school bus seat, when in the vertical position, could extend past the rearward edge of a side emergency exit door a maximum of 3/4 inch. The short answer to your question is no. You enclosed with your letter a copy of Figure 5B of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 217, Bus emergency exits and window retention and release, which shows the permitted positions of the seats forward and rearward of a school bus side emergency exit door. You drew in a depiction of the flip-up seat bottom showing the seat bottom extending into the access aisle a maximum of 3/4 inch. You stated that even with such intrusion, 11.75 inches of clear aisle space remains without obstruction of the door release mechanism. Paragraph S5.4.2.1(a)(2)(i) of FMVSS No. 217 provides that no seat or restraining barrier shall be installed within the area bounded by a vertical transverse plane tangent to the rearward edge of the door opening frame and a vertical transverse plane parallel to that plane at a distance of 30 centimeters forward of that plane. Paragraph S5.4.2.1(a)(2)(ii) then provides: A seat bottom may be located within the area described in paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section if the seat bottom pivots and automatically assumes and retains a vertical position when not in use, so that no portion of the seat bottom is within the area described in paragraph (i) when the seat bottom is vertical. (See Figure 5B). (Emphasis added). This requirement for a specific minimum aisle space leading to side emergency exit doors on school buses was contained in the final rule issued by this agency on November 2, 1992 (57 FR 49413) to permit bus occupants unobstructed access to the emergency exit door. The language is very clear. No variation from that requirement is permitted. I hope this information is helpful to you. Should you have any further questions or need additional information, please feel free to contact Mr. Myers at this address or at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely,
Philip R. Recht Chief Counsel ref:217 d:2/13/95
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1995 |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.