ID: nht92-6.37

DATE: May 26, 1992

FROM: Steven Henderson -- Department of Psychology, McGill University

TO: Howard Smolkin -- Acting Administrator, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 6-28-93 from John Womack to Steven Henderson (A41; Std. 108).

TEXT: My name Steven Henderson. I am PhD student in the Department of Psychology a McGill University, where I am studying visual perception. My coinventor David Kernaghan and I have designed, built and filed a patent application for a horn-activated headlight/signallight flasher system that enables motorcyclists to temporarily make themselves more conspicuous to other drivers. I have enclosed the patent application for your information. The U.S. Patent Office has granted claims 1-3 and 7-9 in their first response. Claims 4-6 were contained in a more recently submitted continuation in part (CIP).

The horn flasher is used in the following manner. When a motorcyclist becomes aware that another vehicle is about to encroach on his or her path of travel, a push of the motorcycle's horn button causes the headlight and signal lights to flash 10 times per second. (Ten hz is the frequency to which the human eye is most sensitive.) The flickering light in the car driver's visual periphery will immediately cause him or her to flexively fixate the motorcycle's location. By being made aware of the motorcycle's presence, the car driver is prevented from causing an accident. Our hope is that this invention will help to avert some of the approximately three thousand fatalities suffered annually by motorcyclists in North America.

I have exchanged correspondence with Mr. Paul Jackson Rice, Chief Council, NHTSA, concerning the application of DOT Standard No. 108 to our device. I have found his recommendations to be invaluable to our efforts to modify the device to more closely comply with the standard. However, as the invention was not envisioned when the standard was initially written, our device appears not to be in compliance with S5.5.10(c) and (d), and S5.6 of the standard. In his letter of August 28, 1992, Mr. Rice recommends the following:

The agency shares your concern with improving the detectability of motorcycles and their riders ... You may petition the agency for rulemaking to amend Standard No. 108 in a manner that would allow your device. A petition must set forth facts which it is claimed establish that a change in the standard is necessary, and a brief description of the changes which should be made. This means that you should show how your device is expected to improve safety, or, at a minimum, not decrease the existing level of safety.

Accordingly, I am acting on Mr. Rice's suggestion, and have enclosed a petition requesting that the agency for rulemaking amend Sections S5.5.10 and S5.6 of Standard No. 108 in order to permit the use of our device. I have also enclosed the U.S patent application submitted for the device. (On the advice of Mr. Rice, the circuit has been modified so that if the horn button is pressed while signalling for a turn, the appropriate signal light flickers at 2 hz, as required by SAE J590, rather than emitting 2 hz bursts of 10 hz flicker,

as does the unmodified circuit. Please also note that the tail light is always steady-burning, as required by Section S5.5.10(d).

As I state in the enclosed petition, I feel very strongly that our device furthers the purpose of Standard No. 108 as stated in Section S2, as it will:

reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries resulting from traffic accidents ... by enhancing the conspicuity of motor vehicles on the public roads so that their presence is perceived and their signals understood.

Furthermore, Section S5.5.10(b) illustrates an intent to allow a device similar to ours, by stating:

(b) Headlamps and side marker lamps may be wired to flash for signalling purposes.

I therefore request that you grant careful consideration to our petition to amend DOT Standard No. 108 so as to allow the use of our device.

Thank You.

ID: nht92-6.5

DATE: June 17, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Thomas Turner -- Manager, Engineering Services, Blue Bird Body Company

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 4/21/92 from Thomas D. Turner to Paul J. Rice (OCC 7241)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter asking about Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 131, School Bus Pedestrian Safety Devices, with respect to the automatic extension of a stop signal arm. You were especially concerned with the interaction between a provision in Wisconsin's Administrative code requiring activation of the stop signal arm under specified conditions and the stop signal arm activation requirements set forth in Standard No. 131. I have responded in detail to your questions below.

Before I answer your question about your company's design for complying with both the Wisconsin Code and Standard No. 131, I would like to note that it does not appear that the Wisconsin regulation is inconsistent with Standard No. 131 with respect to the stop signal arm activation requirements. The Wisconsin Administrative Code states that:

"Any bus manufactured after January 1, 1978, shall have the stop signal arm controlled by the service door. The stop signal arm shall not become operational until the service door opens. The stop signal arm shall be installed in such a manner that it cannot be activated unless the alternating red lamps are in operation."

S5.5 of Standard No. 131 states that "The stop signal arm shall be AUTOMATICALLY EXTENDED in such a manner that it complies with S5.4.1, at a minimum whenever the red signal lamps required by S5.1.4 of Standard No. 108 are activated..." (emphasis added) Both the Wisconsin requirement and the requirement in Standard No. 131 tie the activation of the stop signal arm to the operation of the red signal lamps. In addition, the Wisconsin regulation also ties the activation of the stop signal arm to the opening of the service door. Based on this information, it appears that a manufacturer could comply with both Standard No. 131 and the Wisconsin regulation by designing its school buses so that opening the service door automatically activates both the stop signal arm and the red flashing lamps. If the Wisconsin regulation were interpreted in a way that does not tie the automatic extension of the stop signal arm to opening the service door, then there could be an inconsistency with Standard No. 131.

You asked whether Blue Bird's system for activating the stop signal arm in accordance with Wisconsin's requirement complies with the requirements of Standard No. 131. You explained that, on its school buses sold in Wisconsin, Blue Bird provides a system by which the alternating red flashing lamps are activated by a driver controlled manual switch and the stop signal arm is activated by opening the service door. Under this system, the red flashing lamps are activated before the service door has been opened and before the stop

signal arm has been extended. Based on the information provided in your letter, we conclude that Blue Bird's system would not comply with the requirements of Standard No. 131.

Standard No. 131 explicitly requires the stop signal arm to be automatically deployed whenever the red signal lamps required by Standard No. 108 are activated. As explained in the final rule adopting Standard No. 131, "any system of activation is permissible provided the stop signal arm is extended during, at least, the entire time that the red warning lamps are activated." (56 FR 20363, 20368, May 3, 1991). As described in your letter, the system your company has developed for its Wisconsin school buses has the red warning lamps activated by a manual switch and the activation of those lamps does not activate the stop signal arm. Hence, that system does not comply with the explicit requirement of Standard No. 131 that the stop signal arm be automatically extended whenever the red warning lamps are activated.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: ToyotaLSA_cmcv2

Chris Tinto, Director, Technical & Regulatory Affairs
Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
1850 M Street, NW Suite 600
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Tinto:

This responds to your request for an interpretation regarding the proper positioning of a leg support system during a crash test specified in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 208, Occupant crash protection. As explained below, Toyota is correct in its understanding that the leg support system described in your letter is to be adjusted as an "other seat adjustment" under FMVSS No. 208.

On May 12, 2000, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) published a final rule in the Federal Register requiring advanced air bags in all passenger cars, multi-purpose vehicles, light trucks and buses with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 8,500 lb or less (65 FR 30680; Advanced air bag rule). That final rule established new, advanced air bag performance requirements to minimize the risk of injury to children, as well as new requirements to enhance the protection of small and mid-size adults. The advanced air bag rule established a rigid barrier dynamic crash test using a 5^th percentile adult female test dummy. Since the advanced air bag rule was established, the agency has amended FMVSS No. 208 on several occasions, in part to provide clearer and more objective test procedures for use of the 5^th percentile adult female in testing.

In your letter, you explained that the Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota) has developed a "leg support adjustment system (LSA)," which extends the forward edge of a seat cushion to provide additional support to the thighs of taller occupants. As further described in a conversation between Mr. Chris Calamita of my staff and Ms. Christina Mullen of Toyota, the system extends the front trim of the seat by mechanical means. As additionally explained in your letter, the LSA is engaged by an occupant through an adjustment switch on the side of a seat. Your letter then asked if the LSA would be adjusted according to S16.2.10.2, Other seat adjustments, under the FMVSS No. 208 test procedure for the rigid barrier 5^th percentile female crash test.

S16.2.10 of FMVSS No. 208 provides the specifications for the driver and passenger seat set-up conditions for the rigid barrier 5^th percentile female crash test. S16.2.10.1, Lumbar support adjustment, specifies the proper position for lumbar support adjustments. S16.2.10.2 specifies the proper positioning of seat adjustments that provide additional support, other than a lumbar support adjustment. As originally adopted in the advanced air bag rule, this provision specifically referred to seat cushion and seat back side bolster adjustments.

In response to the advanced air bag rule, a manufacturer asked what would be required for vehicles with seat cushions that could be lengthened or shortened. In response, the agency amended the seat positioning procedure to specify the position for adjustable seat parts that provide the occupant additional support (66 FR 65376; December 18, 2001). The December 2001 final rule amended S16.2.10.2 to read:

Other seat adjustments. Position any adjustable parts of the seat that provide additional support so that they are in the lowest or most open adjustment position.

The LSA, as described in your letter, performs the same type of function as the seat cushion which gave rise to the amended S16.2.10.2. Therefore, that section specifies the position of the LSA.

Based on the diagrams you provided, it appears that the forwardmost edge of the seat cushion is higher in relation to the floor pan when the LSA is extended as opposed to when the LSA is fully retracted. S16.2.10.2 specifies that a vehicle equipped with an LSA would be tested with the LSA in the lowest position. Therefore, if we were to test a vehicle equipped with a LSA, we would place the LSA in its shortest and lowest position.

I hope you find this helpful. If you have any additional questions please contact Mr. Calamita at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:208
d.8/27/04

ID: Copy of 05-009466drn

ID: 1210corrforweb

VIA FACSIMILE






Air Brake Systems, Inc.
c/o David M. Lick, Esq.
Loomis, Ewert, Parsley, Davis and Gotting
232 South Capitol Avenue
Suite 1000
Lansing, MI 48933





Dear Mr. Lick:

This letter provides an interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 121, Air Brake Systems (49 CFR 571.121) with regard to a device sold by Air Brake Systems, Inc. (ABS, Inc.) known as the MSQR-5000. It is issued pursuant to orders in Air Brake Systems, Inc. v. Mineta (E.D. Mich. No. 01-10038).

Background

On June 4, 2001, we sent to Mr. James Arnold of MAC Trailer Manufacturing Inc. an interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS or Standard) No. 121, Air Brake Systems (49 CFR 571.121). MAC Trailer, a small business manufacturing semi-trailers, asked if the MSQR-5000, manufactured by ABS, Inc., could be used to satisfy the antilock brake system (ABS) requirements of FMVSS No. 121 for trailers.

Our letter to MAC trailer explained that MAC Trailer, if it manufactured a vehicle equipped with the MSQR-5000, would be responsible for ensuring that the vehicle met all applicable standards, including Standard 121. We further stated that installation of the MSQR-5000 as an ABS would not allow a vehicle to meet the requirements of Standard 121.

ABS, Inc. challenged the conclusions of our June 4, 2001 interpretation, and requested further consideration. ABS, Inc. has submitted additional materials to the agency for its consideration. NHTSA has considered these materials and additional information it has obtained. This letter supercedes our June 4, 2001 interpretation.

ABS systems and the requirements of Standard 121.

Standard 121 establishes requirements for braking systems on vehicles equipped with air brake systems. The ABS requirements of FMVSS No. 121 were incorporated into the standard by a final rule published in the Federal Register on March 10, 1995 (60 Fed. Reg. 13216). In the preamble to the final rule, the agency noted that 10 to 15 percent of heavy combination vehicle crashes involve braking-induced instability or loss of control. These crashes result in significant property damage, injury and loss of life. In order to address the safety consequences of braking related instability, NHTSA amended FMVSS No. 121 to require antilock braking systems.

One of the primary considerations in developing the new requirements was what, at a minimum, an antilock braking system must do in order to prevent or reduce crashes. The agency determined that due to the wide range of surfaces a vehicle may encounter in normal use, an ABS system must have the ability to determine if and when a braked wheel is momentarily locked as it passes from high to low traction conditions. Because of such varying conditions, the agency determined that any ABS must be a "closed loop" system - i.e., a system that continuously monitors the rate of wheel rotation, adjusts wheel rotation when needed and reacts to ongoing changes in rotation caused by the operation of the system, by changed road surfaces, or both (60 Fed. Reg. 13217). NHTSA also determined that warning light requirements that establish a minimum level of safety are also important for reducing crashes, deaths and injuries. The warning light requirements would inform operators of an ABS malfunction and both facilitate and encourage repairs of faulty ABS systems (60 FR 13244).

We now turn to the terms of Standard 121.

Warning light.

An ABS malfunction warning light is required by Sections 5.1.6.2 and 5.1.6.3 of Standard 121. As noted in the preamble to the final rule, for an ABS that does not require electrical power for operation, the only mandatory electrical requirement is for malfunction indicator lamps used to signal a problem in the ABS (60 FR 13227).

Definition

An antilock brake system is defined in S4 of Standard 121 as follows:

Antilock brake system or ABS means a portion of a service brake system that automatically controls the degree of rotational wheel slip during braking by:

(1) Sensing the rate of angular rotation of the wheels;

(2) Transmitting signals regarding the rate of wheel angular rotation to one or more controlling devices which interpret those signals and generate responsive controlling output signals; and

(3) Transmitting those controlling signals to one or more modulators which adjust brake actuating forces in response to those signals.

The opening clause of the definition states: "Antilock brake system or ABS means a portion of a service brake system that automatically controls the degree of rotational wheel slip during braking [by]:" As noted in the preamble to the final rule adopting the definition of an ABS, the agency's definition of ABS incorporated the terms set forth in Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) publications and European regulations to reflect the attributes of antilock systems as commonly understood by the automotive industry. (60 FR 13224).

As background, a document that addresses the topic of antilock braking systems from the standpoint of the industry as a whole is "Antilock Brake System Review" SAE J2246 (June 1992). As explained therein, "ABS is a feedback control system that attempts to maintain controlled braking under all operating conditions. This is accomplished by controlling the slip at each wheel so as to obtain optimum forces within the limits of the tire-road combination." (emphasis added). Ibid Sec 5.3 (now renumbered as 7.3). The SAE document reiterated that ABS attempts to regulate the tire-road forces during braking to follow the driver's steering and braking commands within the constraints of the tire-road traction capability. This is accomplished by controlling the wheel slip. Ibid Sec. 5.4.4 (now renumbered as 7.4.4). "If the braking capability of the tire and road is exceeded, the wheels tend to lock. It is at this time that the antilock brake system's control logic takes over the pressure regulation at the wheel in order to obtain optimum braking." (emphasis added) Ibid Sec. 5.4.5 (now renumbered as 7.4.5).

We first address the terms in the introductory clause of the definition of ABS. "Automatically controls" means that the ABS, rather than the driver, must regulate the degree of rotational wheel slip. This is based on the meaning of the words "automatic" and "control", and is consistent with the discussion in the preamble to the rule (60 FR 13225). As the agency noted, automatic control is necessary since the driver cannot control lockup in an emergency situation. (Id.)

Next, the "degree of rotational wheel slip" includes several terms. To begin, the term "wheel slip" is both fundamental and well established. In the context of antilock braking systems, wheel slip refers to the proportional amount of wheel/tire skidding relative to the forward motion (velocity) of the vehicle (60 FR 13225 at n. 27); for a mathematical definition see 60 FR 13261. Zero wheel slip occurs when a wheel is unbraked and free rolling. As defined in S4 of FMVSS 121, wheel lockup means 100 percent wheel slip.

As explained in the preamble to the rule, a rolling tire generates braking and stabilizing forces. As the brakes are applied with increasing amounts of force, braking generally improves. However, at some point, the forces in the brakes exceed the grip of the tire on the road. The tire then begins to slide and the wheel rapidly goes into full lockup. The braking force at which this occurs is not fixed; it is dependent, among other things, on the characteristics of both the tire and the road. A sliding tire loses its grip in all directions. Thus, locked wheels make a vehicle unstable and lead to loss of control (See 60 FR 13261; 13278).

To continue, in order to minimize lockup and maximize braking, an ABS must control the degree of rotational wheel slip. To control wheel slip, an ABS system automatically reduces the amount of brake application pressure (in air braked vehicles, conventionally this is done by venting air in the brake chambers to the atmosphere) to prevent or abate excessive wheel slip - including prolonged lockup. When there is wheel slip, the level of which is assessed by the ABS from the actual and recent rates of rotation of the vehicle's wheels, the brake pressure is adjusted if the amount of wheel slip is not within an acceptable range (See 60 FR 13262). An antilock system reduces, holds and reapplies, i.e. modulates, brake pressure to each controlled wheel. As a wheel approaches lockup, the control unit sends signals to the modulator device to hold or reduce the build-up of wheel brake pressure. The brake pressure must then be increased again to ensure that the wheel is not underbraked for the road surface conditions. Through these cycles, which may require reducing or applying air pressure by as much as 60 pounds per square inch or more, the degree of wheel slip is controlled. ⁽¹⁾

Finally, "during braking" means during all phases of braking when antilock braking would be called upon, including incipient wheel lock and wheel lock up. In order to meet this portion of the definition, an ABS must therefore act when wheels are about to lock, when they have locked and after they have locked.

Therefore, the introductory clause of the definition of ABS contained in Standard 121 requires that an ABS system act automatically - without any action on the part of the driver. When functioning on its own, the system must exercise control over the degree of rotational wheel slip, including 100 percent wheel slip or full lockup. Finally, a qualifying system must act during braking, including those periods where lock up is about to occur, and where full lockup has occurred.

The definition also sets forth the means by which these requirements are to be met. I now turn to the numbered elements of the regulatory definition quoted above.

The first numbered element of the definition is "sensing the rate of angular rotation of the wheels." This requires sensing the rate of angular wheel rotation (emphasis added). The ability to sense the rate of angular wheel rotation, not simply whether the wheel is rotating or not, is critical to meeting the requirements of the overarching introductory clause of the definition. Information about the rate of wheel rotation, relative to the forward motion of the vehicle, enables an ABS to determine if a wheel is about to lockup or has locked up. It also enables the ABS to then control (release/hold) brake pressure to enable the wheel to begin rotating again, at an appropriate level of rotational wheel slip.

Second, with regard to the next portion of the definition, "transmitting signals regarding the rate of wheel angular rotation to one or more controlling devices which interpret those signals and generate responsive controlling output signals," we note that the preamble stated that this is necessary to ensure that lockup will be prevented or controlled for all road surfaces and under all load conditions, and also to ensure that stability is not provided at the expense of stopping distance (60 FR 13225). The amount of braking air pressure that causes lockup varies dramatically depending on road surface, vehicle loading and other factors (60 FR 13261-62). At a given time, the rate of wheel rotation is the product of all these factors; also, wheel slip can be determined from it (60 FR 13225). The remainder of the second element - that rate information be transmitted for interpretation by a control unit - is necessary to ensure that an ABS uses the rate of wheel rotation to control wheel slip and prevent lockup. Ibid.

The third numbered element in the definition, "transmitting those controlling signals to one or more modulators which adjust brake actuating forces in response to those signals," completes the definition of a qualifying system. In order to prevent/control lockup and ensure good stopping distances under all road surface and load conditions, such a system must modulate brake pressure in response to the rate of angular rotation of the wheels relative to the vehicle's forward motion. During automatic brake control, wheel speed is constantly monitored so that the maximum braking force for the conditions can be achieved by a succession of pressure reduction, pressure-holding and pressure-reapplication phases (60 FR 13226-28).

All of the elements of this definition are necessary to ensure that an ABS system provides the minimum level of performance required by Standard 121 for safe braking. As discussed in the preamble and appendix to the rule, an antilock system must be capable of reducing, holding and reapplying brake pressure to each controlled wheel. The wheel speed sensor monitors the rotational speed of the wheel. When a monitored wheel approaches a lockup condition, there is a sharp deceleration of the wheel and rise in wheel slip. If this exceeds threshold levels, the control unit sends signals to the modulator device to hold or reduce the build-up of wheel brake pressure until the danger of wheel lockup has passed. The brake pressure must then be increased again to ensure that the wheel is not underbraked for the road surface conditions. During automatic brake control, wheel speed is constantly monitored so that the maximum braking force is achieved (60 FR 13226). The preamble noted that all ABSs currently marketed in the United States are electronic in nature, but other systems are not precluded.

Following issuance of the rule on March 10, 1995, William Washington, now president of ABS, Inc., challenged the rule on the grounds that the rule reflected a deliberate attempt to exclude all but electronic ABS designs, impermissibly conflicted with operational standards for commercial motor carriers, and improperly imposed design specifications rather than performance criteria. The petitioner also claimed that NHTSA failed to evaluate and disclose information regarding petitioner's mechanical alternative to electronic ABS and published false data. The petition was denied. Washington v. Department of Transportation, 84 F.3d 1222 (10^th Cir. 1996).

The MSQR-5000 and why we initially concluded that it appeared to lack one or more features that an ABS must have to meet FMVSS No. 121's definition of ABS

The MSQR-5000, is patented as a Differential Pressure Regulator Quick Release Valve, but not as an antilock brake system or portion thereof. ⁽²⁾ The device is essentially a diaphragm, backed by a piston and dampened by a rubber spring, which is acted on by the air pressure in the brake lines to the brake cylinders. As promoted, the MSQR-5000 operates on the theory that wheel lockup and other unwanted conditions occurring during braking are the result of pressure spikes and pressure differentials inside the braking system caused by out-of-round brake drums and warped rotors. It does not have a warning light. A decade ago, NHTSA tested similar devices for hydraulic brake systems on passenger cars and light trucks; NHTSA observed, and the Federal Trade Commission ruled, that they did not function as an ABS. ⁽³⁾

On January 8, 1992, William Washington, president of the corporation then manufacturing the MSQR-5000, petitioned NHTSA to amend Standard 121 to require "differential pressure regulating systems." In its review of the petition, the agency reviewed a variety of materials including test reports of vehicle testing performed at the Aberdeen Proving Ground and Southwest Research Institute (SWRI). The Aberdeen Proving Ground tests, in which a variation on the MSQR-5000 (the BX-100) was tested in comparison to other devices claimed to improve brake performance, did not verify that the device produced the claimed safety benefits. ⁽⁴⁾ Similarly, tests performed at SWRI of the MSQR-5000 indicated that the phenomenon of differential pressure between brake chambers on the same axle did not exist. Based on its finding that the requested rulemaking would not produce any safety benefits and would entail significant cost, NHTSA denied the petition on July 2, 1992 (57 FR 29459).

The agency's recent experience with the MSQR-5000 arose shortly after particular types of vehicles were required to have ABS under Standard 121. ABS, Inc., the current manufacturer of the MSQR-5000, was marketing the device as an antilock brake system that purportedly complied with the requirements of Standard 121, according to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). Review of ABS, Inc.'s website revealed that the device was being marketed as an ABS complying with Standard 121 and as being "excluded" from meeting the warning light requirements due to the decision rendered in Washington v. DOT - Mr. Washington's prior challenge to Standard 121.

In January 2001, as NHTSA began to receive inquiries from vehicle manufacturers about the MSQR-5000, a consultant retained by ABS, Inc. requested a meeting that was held on February 13, 2001. At this meeting, William Washington, President of ABS, Inc., explained the operational theory of the MSQR-5000 and presented some test data. NHTSA personnel present asked for evidence of the existence of pressure pulses caused by brake drums as previous NHTSA testing on air brake systems did not reveal the existence of such pressure pulses, questioned the ability of a device that had no means to vent air pressure from the brake lines in response to a lockup situation, and indicated to Mr. Washington that ABS, Inc. should conduct proper tests on the device using qualified test facilities.

On February 1, 2001, MAC Trailer, a small entity within the meaning of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, in the business of manufacturing semi-trailers, requested that NHTSA provide it with an opinion of whether the MSQR-5000 met the requirements of Standard 121 as represented by ABS, Inc. MAC trailer forwarded information provided to it by ABS, Inc. about the device, including a "certification" of compliance and a decal to be applied to new vehicles documenting the warning light "exclusion." The agency responded to MAC Trailer on June 4, 2001 (at which time we had not received information from ABS, Inc.). NHTSA stated that it is NHTSA's view that the installation of an MSQR-500 alone would not allow a vehicle to meet FMVSS 121's ABS requirements. NHTSA observed that the MSQR-5000 did not have the required ABS malfunction warning light and was not, as represented by ABS, Inc. "excluded" from the warning light requirement by the decision in Washington v. DOT. The agency further indicated that it did not appear that the device had one or more features required by the definition of ABS. NHTSA based its decision on promotional literature by ABS, Inc., statements by ABS, Inc. at the meeting in February 2001, NHTSA's experiences with the MSQR-5000 and similar products, its knowledge of ABS systems and the requirements of the definition in Standard No. 121.

NHTSA's Position on Reconsideration

NHTSA has reconsidered its interpretation in light of materials received or obtained since June 4, as well as those that we had previously obtained. We reiterate that, as Standard 121 is a vehicle standard, the vehicle manufacturer is responsible for ensuring that the ABS requirements are met. Overall, our interpretation remains that the installation of the MSQR-5000 alone would not allow a vehicle to meet FMVSS 121's ABS requirements.

Warning Light Requirements

Since the issuance of the MAC trailer letter, ABS, Inc. has apparently conceded the correctness of the agency's position regarding the warning light requirement. There is no dispute that the MSQR-5000 lacks a warning light. Rather than maintaining that it is "excluded" from the warning light requirement, ABS Inc. has alternatively argued that it should not be subjected to the warning light requirement and requested that NHTSA grant it an exemption. As we explained in our June 4, 2001 letter, Standard 121 applies to vehicles and not items of equipment. Therefore, NHTSA could only grant such an exemption to the manufacturer of a complete vehicle employing the MSQR-5000.

ABS, Inc. now claims that applying FMVSS No. 121's ABS malfunction signal/indicator requirements to the MSQR-5000 is an attempt to "place a round peg in a square hole." It is ABS, Inc.'s position that these requirements are unnecessary for the MSQR-5000, since it operates solely on air pressure and does not have any electrical or electronic components. ABS argues that if the MSQR-5000 were to fail, this failure would be evidenced by the existing gauge and low pressure warning required by S5.14 and S5.15 of FMVSS No. 121.

This is not an argument that can be entertained in an interpretation letter such as this. An interpretation applies our laws or regulations in the context of the facts in the interpretation. It is not a vehicle for granting exceptions to our rules.

If we were to entertain ABS, Inc.'s argument, we would not adopt it. ABS, Inc. claims that "it is clear that the warning signal requirements of FMVSS 121 were drafted with electronic ABS in mind" and that "(i)n the final rule, it is clear that NHTSA contemplated use of such warning signals for electronic ABS systems." The statement that the warning signal requirements of FMVSS No. 121 were drafted with electronic ABS in mind is simply incorrect. During the rulemaking establishing the ABS requirements, the agency expressly considered whether the malfunction signal/indicator requirements should apply to vehicles equipped with non-electrical ABS. In the preamble to the final rule, NHTSA explained that a mechanical ABS would have to comply with the malfunction indicator requirements (60 FR 13246).

ABS, Inc. also suggests that the language of S5.2.3.3(d) indicates that NHTSA contemplated that ABS systems must be electronic. The language in question specifies that a trailer's external antilock malfunction indicator lamp illuminate whenever power is supplied to the antilock brake system and there is a malfunction in the trailer's antilock system. Your understanding is incorrect. Trailers receive power from the towing vehicle, and the antilock malfunction indicator lamp is part of the trailer's antilock brake system. The requirement that a light illuminate when the trailer receives power is not a requirement that an ABS be electronic.

ABS, Inc. also contends that an air-operated device like the MSQR-5000 does not need any malfunction warning device other than the existing low air pressure warnings. This argument assumes that the MSQR-5000, by itself, cannot fail or be incapacitated by damage. We will not assume that a mechanical device cannot fail. Indeed, as the affidavit of William Washington attests, the MSQR-5000 may be damaged in use. (Washington para. 6(g)). Moreover, failures, or malfunction caused by damage to the unit would not necessarily result in loss of vehicle brake system pressure to the point where the vehicle's low pressure warning system would activate.

Nonetheless, as we have explained to you before, if ABS, Inc., wishes the agency to modify the ABS malfunction signal/indicator requirements of FMVSS No. 121, it may submit a petition for rulemaking under 49 CFR Part 552 seeking modification of the standard.

Definition of ABS

Several arguments are offered by ABS, Inc., in support of its contention that the MSQR-5000 is an ABS system for the purposes of Standard No. 121. First, ABS, Inc., contends that the affidavits it has submitted have established that the MSQR-5000 meets the definition of an ABS contained in Standard 121. Second, ABS, Inc. contends that through testing, it has established that the MSQR-5000 meets the performance requirements of Standard 121.

In considering the contention that the MSQR-5000 meets the requirements of Standard No. 121, we note, as we have before, that Standard 121 applies to vehicles and not to equipment. Therefore, any claim made by ABS, Inc. (or any other manufacturer of equipment as opposed to vehicles) that the device meets Standard 121 is improper.

Definitional issues

Through affidavits, ABS, Inc. seeks to establish that the MSQR-5000 meets the definition of ABS contained in Standard 121. We note at the outset that these affidavits, as well as the arguments contained in correspondence with NHTSA, do not address the entire definition as set forth in the Standard. As observed above, the introductory clause of the definition establishes overarching characteristics of an ABS - the automatic control of the degree of rotational wheel slip during braking. The materials submitted by ABS, Inc. do not address, much less establish that the device automatically controls rotational wheel slip during braking.

For example, Standard 121 applies to braking, including periods of incipient lockup and full lock up (100% wheel slip). ABS, Inc. has submitted materials advancing a theory that the device would satisfy parts of the definition, based on pressure pulses produced when a braked wheel is rotating. ⁽⁵⁾ ABS, Inc.'s affidavits do not address the performance of the MSQR-5000 once full wheel lockup -- 100% wheel slip -- has occurred. At lock up, the wheel, which is attached to the brake drum, does not rotate. Since the generation of the claimed pressure pulses is dependent on a rotating wheel and drum, if the wheels stop rotating due to lockup, no more "pressure pulse" signals would be produced. As a result, the device would not function. An alternative mode of operation once the "pressure pulses" have stopped is not presented or explained. ⁽⁶⁾

In regard to the first numbered element of the definition - sensing the rate of angular rotation of the wheels - ABS, Inc.'s affidavits indicate that the MSQR-5000 senses the rate of angular rotation of the wheels through the pressure pulses described above. The generation of these pulses depends on irregularities in brake drums, such as occur with wear. Assuming that there are such pulses, there are still questions that must be answered before this portion of the definition would be satisfied. One is whether the device would function as an ABS on a vehicle with new brake drums. New brake drums are essentially round ("out of round" by less than five-thousandths of an inch). The test data and affidavits do not address the performance of the MSQR-5000 on a vehicle with new brake drums. An ABS, Inc. consultant, Mr. Perazzola, noted that in one test of the MSQR-5000, elimination of lockup was not demonstrated due to the use of new brake shoes and drums (Perazzola II, para. 25). No further data or explanation is given. It is not shown, therefore, that new drums would provide the signal needed by the MSQR-5000.

Second, to satisfy the definition, the rate of angular rotation must be sensed. The materials submitted by ABS, Inc. do not establish a standard number of irregularities per wheel. Thus, the input in terms of pressure pulses would not be meaningful. For the sake of discussion, consider a wheel with four irregularities per rotation and one with one irregularity per rotation. The MSQR-5000 would not sense a difference between a wheel with four pressure pulses per rotation at a given speed and another wheel with one irregularity turning at four times the given speed. Because the number of events is not known and is not the same from wheel to wheel, the device is incapable of quantifying the rate of angular wheel rotation or wheel slip. Other than Mr. Foss' analysis - which assumes without support 10 irregularities per revolution (Foss para. 20), ABS, Inc. has not provided any information on how many pulses will be available for the device to sense changes in the rate of angular wheel rotation. Without these data, it has not been shown that the device can actually sense the rate of angular rotation of the wheels.

The second and third numbered elements of Standard 121's definition of ABS require that an ABS automatically control the degree of rotational wheel slip by:

(2) Transmitting signals regarding the rate of wheel angular rotation to one or more controlling devices which interpret those signals and generate responsive controlling output signals; and

(3) Transmitting those controlling signals to one or more modulators which adjust brake actuating forces in response to those signals.

ABS, Inc submitted materials asserting that the MSQR-5000 "interprets" the "pressure pulses" it receives through the deformation of the rubber diaphragm incorporated in the device, and the subsequent movement of the piston and rubber shock absorber behind the diaphragm. This deformation is described in the affidavits and other documents as "interpretation" of the "pressure pulses." The required responsive controlling output signals are explained as being found in the waves that are produced when the piston and rubber shock absorber diaphragm rebound and create a "compensating" pressure wave. This "compensating" pressure wave purportedly travels back to the brake cylinder, which modulates brake application.

We need not address this in detail. We observe that ABS, Inc.'s pressure wave analysis is disputed on the ground that it does not account for the physical realities of the fluid mechanics in an actual air brake system. Furthermore, it is uncorroborated by data showing the existence of the pressure wave posited. However, even under ABS, Inc.'s theory, the MSQR-5000 would not produce controlling output signals during lockup, as required. This is so because operation of the device is dependent on pulses traveling to it in order for it to create reflected pressure wave output signals. As described above, there are no such inputs and therefore no output at lock up. Second, modulators would have to adjust brake forces to control lockup. Assume that a vehicle travels from a dry concrete surface that momentarily becomes an icy surface; assume that the brake application on the concrete involves significant amounts of brake pressure. Without ABS, the wheels would lock (due to excess brake pressure on an icy surface) and stay locked until the driver reacted. The task of the ABS system is to relieve the excess brake pressure conditions and modulate the pressure application whenever the actuation level is too high, whether the excess is 1 psi or 100 psi. As a matter of standard practice, ABS in air-braked vehicles releases the excess pressure by venting air into the atmosphere. If the MSQR-5000 reacts to incipient lockup as described in the affidavit of Mr. Foss, the offsetting pressure wave would be on the order of magnitude of 2 psi. Nothing that ABS, Inc., has submitted indicates that a 2 psi pressure differential would prevent or relieve lockup in a conventionally air braked vehicle. ABS, Inc., has not provided data showing that the MSQR-5000 device would relieve significant over-pressure conditions that occur during braking data. The materials also do not provide any information indicating if outgoing "control" pulses are affected by incoming "data" pulses, when both travel in the same brake lines.

Vehicle Testing

Our analysis must proceed on the assumption that the vehicle tests submitted by ABS, Inc. are intended to be the equivalent of tests performed by vehicle manufacturers to establish ABS functioning and compliance . In so doing, we note that the information on January 9 and February 13, 2001 tests provided by ABS, Inc. represents only segments of the performance tests required to establish compliance with Standard 121 and would not, by themselves, constitute sufficient documentation of compliance. Moreover, the test reports that have been provided are inadequate and incomplete.

Three test reports have been provided to NHTSA. Even though they were submitted to show the effectiveness of the MSQR-5000, none of them compares the performance of the test vehicle with the MSQR-5000 device disabled to performance of a vehicle with the device enabled. Each reveals that they were performed without any observance of Standard 121's test procedures or accepted industry protocols in the case of the split coefficient test. ⁽⁷⁾ We have prepared charts, placed in the record, outlining the requirements of Standard 121, the Standard 121 test procedure, and SAE J46, an industry standard for split coefficient tests, with the three tests submitted by ABS, Inc. In addition, the attached Affidavits of Alfred Beier, Duane Perrin, Robert Ervin and Jeffrey Woods address the performance and value of these tests.

The first of the tests is a stopping distance test. This January 9, 2001 test contains a number of omissions. We note first that the unbraked control trailer required by S6.1.10 of Standard 121 was not used. Instead, a standard highway van trailer was used. The report is not complete. It is not known if the trailer brakes were employed. The brakes themselves were old, unburnished, and their temperature unknown. No information on vehicle loads is given although vehicle loading is critical to evaluating brake and ABS performance. Speed data were collected through the use of an observer in the cab monitoring the speedometer - an unreliable method of measuring speed.

The February 13, 2001 braking in a curve test contains similar omissions. In braking in curve tests, which are designed to evaluate ABS performance on low friction surfaces, establishing the characteristics of the test surface is critical. Standard 121 S5.3.6.1 specifies that the test must be performed on a curved wet roadway with a peak coefficient of friction of 0.5 as determined by use of an ASTM E1136 standard reference tire in accordance with ASTM measurement method E1337-90 at a speed of 40 mph. The test report states that the approximate coefficient of friction used was 0.5, apparently derived through use of E1337-90 tires. No record of the speed during these measurements is recorded. To simulate a panic stop, Standard 121 requires that this test be run with a full treadle brake application - an application in which, according to the definition in Standard 121, within 0.2 seconds after brake application is initiated, at least 85 psi is reached in the treadle valve's output circuits or maximum pedal travel is reached. ⁽⁸⁾ The test report indicates simply that "maximum peddle effort" was used without providing any data on the rate of application or the pressure of the application. The Standard 121 test procedure requires that this full treadle brake application be initiated 60 feet after the test vehicle enters the curved test lane. Braking was initiated in the February 13 test when approximately 28 feet into the test lane. The test report is silent in regards to the loading of the vehicle, while Standard 121 requires that the test be performed in a loaded and unloaded condition. Finally, the condition of the test vehicle's brakes and braking system are not noted. If the brakes were impaired to the point where braking force was reduced, non-compliant vehicle could successfully complete the test.

Although the Standard 121 test procedures do not specify a split coefficient test, an examination of an industry standard test protocol, SAE J46, provides guidance on testing to produce the requisite data. SAE J46 requires split coefficient tests to be performed on a test surface where the "high" coefficient surface has twice the friction of the low surface, requires that test runs be made with the ABS activated and deactivated, requires the test course to be run in two directions, and sets minimum requirements for brake condition to ensure that braking effort is sufficient to adequately test the ABS. The SAE protocol also requires that all brake applications in all test runs be made as rapidly as possible.

The July 9, 2001 split coefficient tests provide very little information. No data are presented on the condition of the vehicle's brakes. No measurements were made of the coefficient of friction of the high or low coefficient portions of the test surface. No data are presented comparing vehicle test runs with the MSQR-5000 enabled and disabled to show disparities in performance. It is not shown if the vehicle was run through the course in different directions. No record is presented regarding the rate of brake applications for the test stops other than a notation that in one stop, the driver "slammed" on the brakes in a simulated panic stop where the brake pressure was 40 psi. As most air braked vehicles are capable of producing brake pressures of 80 to 120 psi in a simulated panic stop, data on the particular configuration of the test vehicle is needed.

The test data and information provided by ABS, Inc. do not establish that the MSQR-5000 device, if installed in a new vehicle, would allow that vehicle to meet the requirements of Standard 121. The device does not have, or accommodate, an ABS warning light when it is required to do so. Data presented to NHTSA to date, do not establish that a new vehicle with the MSQR-5000 would be in compliance with Standard 121, including the definition of ABS contained in the Standard. This letter does not address use of the MSQR-5000 for purposes other than as an ABS.

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

cc:
James Arnold

ref:121
d.12/10/01





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¹For example, a braking vehicle may move from a high friction surface, like dry pavement, to a very low friction surface such as an icy road or a wet steel plate. In such an instance, an ABS would sense the different surfaces through changes in the rate of wheel rotation, reduce brake air line pressure by significant amounts on the low friction surface and restore it when a high friction surface is reached.

² NHTSA has been given an affidavit by John Cepican, a patent attorney, stating that the MSQR-5000 is an ABS under Standard 121. In our view and as indicated by the letter from the U.S. Patent Office, which is in the record, the grant of a patent for the MSQR-5000 does not establish that a device complies with regulatory requirements for an ABS.

³The Brake-Guard, which responded to "fluctuations" caused by irregularities in drums and rotors, allegedly prevented premature wheel lock by "metering" surges and allowing brake shoes to move "reciprocally" as needed. It had been patented. Finding that the devices were not ABS systems, the FTC issued orders forbidding representations of ABS function against the manufacturers of the Brake-Guard device, In re Brake Guard Products, Inc., Docket No. 9277, 1998 FTC Lexis 184, January 23, 1998, and the manufacturers of the ABS-Traxx device, In re Automotive Breakthrough Sciences, Inc. Docket No. 9275, Federal Trade Commission, 1998 FTC Lexis 112, January 23, 1998.

⁴The Aberdeen tests included both wet and dry test stops in which vehicles with the BX-100, which is identical to the MSQR-5000 except the quick release valve is mounted externally, experienced lockup at brake application pressures within the range of pressures that would be experienced in highway use.

⁵As described by ABS, Inc. and its affiants, the device depends on air pressure pulses generated by irregularities in brake drums as a wheel turns for the production of signals about the rate of angular wheel rotation. Despite NHTSA requests for data documenting the existence of these pulses, they are simply said to exist or, in theory, are the inevitable product of the operation of fluid dynamics. As we have indicated before, NHTSA itself, despite extensive testing of vehicles and brakes, does not have any data indicating the pressure pulses exist. However, it is not the function of an interpretive letter to adjudicate factual issues such as this.

⁶ Also, we note that mathematically, wheel slip may be expressed as the ratio of the difference between the velocity of the wheel center and the velocity of a point on the tread of the tire that is not in contact with the road, to the velocity of the wheel center. 60 FR 13260. There is nothing in ABS, Inc.'s affidavits to show that the MSQR-5000 receives or generates information about the forward velocity of the vehicle wheel center. There is nothing to show that it controls the degree of rotational wheel slip during braking.

⁷ Split coefficient means that the roadway is "split" down the middle, longitudinally, and the coefficient of friction (roughly, a measure of friction or slipperiness) is different from side to side; the left-side and right-side wheels are on different surfaces. Wheels on different surfaces would reach lock up at different braking levels (see 60 FR 13278) unless controlled by an ABS.

⁸ The treadle valve is linked to the driver's brake pedal. The valve sends compressed air to the brakes in proportion to the driver's input.

ID: aiam4565

"Dear Mr. Ditlow: This responds to your most recent letter to m concerning retrofitting of cars originally equipped with rear seat lap belts with rear seat lap/shoulder belts. In my November 1, 1988 letter to you, I explained that we have sought the voluntary cooperation of manufacturers to make retrofit kits available for those customers who desire them and that the vehicle manufacturers have responded positively to our efforts. I also explained that the fact that retofit kits are not available for all model lines produced by each manufacturer does not suggest some failure on the part of the vehicle manufacturers or of our policy to encourage the manufacturers to make such retrofit kits available. In a November 7, 1988 letter, you asserted that my November 1 letter 'reflects such callous disregard and ignorance of the facts as to defy belief that you are doing little more than covering up for a GM policy that will kill rear seat passengers.' You stated that you would welcome a 'substantive response' to this letter. I am happy to be able to give you such a response. Let me begin by emphasizing that the lap belts in the rear seat of most vehicles on the road today are effective in reducing the risk of death and injury in a crash. Based on our analysis of a number of crash data files, we estimate that rear seat lap belts saved about 100 lives and prevented over 1500 serious injuries in 1987 alone. These figures would have been substantially higher if more rear seat occupants used their lap belts. In fact, if everyone had worn their rear seat lap belts each time they rode in a vehicle, those belts would have saved about 660 lives and prevented more than 10,000 serious injuries in 1987 alone. These facts illustrate that the fastest and most effective way to save the greatest number of lives and prevent the greatest number of injuries is to convince the public to use the safety belts, including the rear seat lap belts, that are in their vehicles every time they ride in those vehicles. Because of these facts, I do not accept your assertion that GM's policy of not providing rear seat lap/shoulder belt retrofit kits for a few of their past models will 'kill people.' To the extent that reckless assertions like this tell the public that they should not wear their rear seat lap belts, it is unfortunate that you have chosen to divert attention away from the overriding issue of convincing the public to use their safety belts, and instead chosen to mislead the public about the quality of their safety belts. Even though lap belts have been proven to be effective in reducing the risk of death and injury in a crash, we agree that properly designed lap and shoulder belts have the potential to offer even greater crash protection than lap belts alone. For this reason, we have proposed to require that all new passenger cars sold in the United States be equipped with rear seat lap and shoulder belts beginning in the 1990 model year. Additionally, we have actively sought the car manufacturers' cooperation in providing retrofit kits to interested consumers. As you may know, every domestic manufacturer and many foreign manufacturers now offer retrofit kits for many of their vehicle models. You objected to General Motors' (GM) statement in its Information Bulletin that retrofit kits are not offered for its 1978-88 Oldsmobile Cutlass, Buick Regal, Chevrolet Monte Carlo, or Pontiac Grand Prix, 'because GM safety engineers have concluded that in these cars, a rear seat lap/shoulder belt combination would not enhance the safety offered by the lap belt alone.' You asserted that since Leonard Evans, a GM employee, has concluded that lap/shoulder belts are significantly more effective than lap belts and since the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is proposing to require rear seat lap/shoulder belts, there is no 'possible scientific basis' for GM's conclusion. NHTSA's proposal reflects our tentative conclusion that rear seat lap/shoulder belts that are designed and installed at the factory have the potential to offer even greater crash protection than lap belts alone for vehicles in general. However, any particular vehicle model's floor pan design, seat stiffness, and seat design (as it relates to occupant posture) can affect the possibility of an occupant submarining under a lap/shoulder belt system in a crash. During the design and production of the vehicle, the vehicle manufacturer can take these factors into account to minimize the likelihood of such submarining and its associated consequences. However, this is emphatically not true for vehicles that were not originally engineered and designed to use rear seat lap/shoulder belts as original equipment. With respect to these vehicles, the effectiveness of a retrofitted rear seat lap and shoulder safety belt system may well depend on the belt system's compatability with the vehicle and the installation of the belt system. The suitability of a particular vehicle for retrofitting is therefore a complex question. It is our view that the judgment as to whether a retrofit lap/shoulder belt system should be installed in a particular vehicle is best made by a vehicle manufacturer, which is most familiar with the detailed seat and structural design and crash performance of the car. I hope this information is helpful. Please let me know if you have any further questions or would like some additional information on this subject. Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel";

ID: aiam4094

Dear Mr. Martin: Thank you for your letter of July 30, 1985, to Administrator Stee concerning the requirements of Standard No. 210, *Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages*. Your letter was referred to my office for reply. I regret the delay in our response.; You asked the agency to reconsider its interpretation of th requirements of S4.1.1 of the standard which requires the installation of '(s)eat belt anchorages for a Type 2 seat belt assembly' at certain positions in motor vehicles. You specifically asked that we issue a new interpretation that S4.1.1 is satisfied by installation of safety belt anchorages utilized by a safety belt meeting the occupant protection requirements of Standard No. 208, *Occupant Crash Protection*. You also asked that if a new interpretation could not be issued, then the agency should treat your letter as a petition for rulemaking. As discussed below, the agency believes that the change you seek can only be made by a rulemaking proceeding. Therefore, as you requested, we will treat your letter as a petition for rulemaking, which is granted.; You offered several arguments in support of your view that the existin language of S4.1.1 is satisfied if a passenger car is equipped with anchorages for safety belts meeting the occupant protection requirements of Standard No. 208. You noted that the definition of a Type 2 safety belt assembly set forth in S3 of Standard No. 209, *Seat Belt Assemblies*, is based solely on the existence of pelvic and upper torso restraints and does not differentiate between manual and automatic belts. You also noted that S4.3(j) of Standard No. 209 applies to Type 1 and Type 2 belts and that the agency has interpreted section S4.3(j) to apply to both automatic and manual safety belts.; You also argued that redundant anchorages would not be used since a owner would not purchase an aftermarket manual belt intended to be anchored in the vehicle 'B' pillar, if a door-anchored safety belt were available from the manufacturer. You said this would be particularly true of the door-mounted detachable automatic safety belts General Motors intends to use. In addition, you pointed out that the agency's April 1985 proposal to require dynamic testing of manual belts also supports the elimination of the requirement for additional anchorages. You noted that the agency proposed that dynamically-tested manual belts would be exempt from the anchorage location requirements of Standard No. 210. Thus, a manufacturer may have anchorages outside of Standard No. 210 location zones, but the automatic belts attached to the anchorages would meet the occupant protection requirements of Standard No. 208. You said that a manual belt attached to anchorages within Standard No. 210's zone might not meet Standard No. 208's occupant protection requirements.; Finally, you said that the cost impact of providing the additiona anchorages is not minimal. You said that 'the cost penalty to General Motors customers would be approximately $6,000,000 annually when all vehicles were redesigned assuming that the vehicles were required to incorporate automatic restraints.'; While we believe that you have raised a number of important issue concerning the current requirements of Standard No. 210, we believe that given the specific language of S4.1.1, any change to those requirements can only be made through a rulemaking proceeding. Standard No. 210, as currently written, specifically refers to providing anchorages for a Type 2 safety belt. The agency has consistently recognized a distinction between Type 2 belts and automatic belts. That distinction is based on a comparison of the design features of a two point automatic belt with those of a Type 2 lap/shoulder safety belt. Standard No. 209 defines a seat belt assembly as 'a strap, webbing, or similar device' used to secure a person in a crash. Under Standard No. 209, a Type 2 seat belt assembly is defined as a strap, webbing or similar device which provides 'pelvic and upper torso restraint.' Thus, a Type 2 safety belt provides webbing to restrain both the pelvis and upper torso and requires three anchorages to be installed. In contrast, an automatic belt can use webbing to provide upper torso restraint, which would require two anchorages to install, and not have webbing to restrain the pelvis. Instead, a two point automatic belt relies on non-belt technology, such as a knee bolster, to restrain movement of the pelvis.; The agency recognized the design distinctions between Type 2 belts an automatic belts by specifically providing a separate definition of automatic belt in S4.5.3 of Standard No. 208. In addition, the agency recognized a distinction between automatic and Type 2 belts by specifying in Standard No. 208 that an automatic belt may be used 'in place of any seat belt assembly otherwise required by' S4 of the standard. The other seat belt assemblies required by S4 are Type 1 and Type 2 systems. To further contrast the distinction between automatic belts and Type 2 belts, S4.5.3.1 of Standard No. 208 specifically provides that 'an automatic belt that provides only pelvic restraint may not be used...to meet the requirements of any option under S4 and in place of any seat belt assembly otherwise required by that option.'; Given these distinctions between a Type 2 and an automatic belt, w believe that the reference to a Type 2 belt in S4.1.1 of Standard No. 210 requires us to retain our current interpretation of that provision. However, we do believe you have raised important questions about whether that provision should be changed. We expect to begin rulemaking shortly on this issue.; Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel

ID: aiam4240

Dear Senator Stevens: Thank you for your letter on behalf of your constituent, Ms. Bridge Ernst, regarding our regulations for safety belts on school buses. Your letter has been referred to my office for reply, since the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is responsible for administering Federal programs relating to school bus safety.; In her letter to you, Ms. Ernst enclosed materials issued by th National Coalition for Seat Belts on School Buses which explained why the Coalition believes safety belts should be required by Federal law on all school buses. You asked us to discuss the main counter-arguments against such a requirement, and asked also whether any Federal legislation has been introduced recently to increase the safety requirement on school buses. I am pleased to respond.; I would like to begin with some background information on our schoo bus regulations. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 authorizes NHTSA to issue motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles, including school buses. Pursuant to that authority, NHTSA issued a comprehensive set of motor vehicle safety standards to improve school bus safety. Our school bus safety standards apply to various aspects of vehicle performance, including school bus windows and windshields, emergency exits, fuel systems and passenger seating and crash protection.; The safety belt issue your constituent raises involves the safet standard we issued for school bus passenger crash protection, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 222. Standard No. 222 requires that large school buses provide passenger crash protection through a concept called 'compartmentalization.' Compartmentalization requires that the interior of the school bus be improved with protective seat backs, additional seat padding, and better seat spacing and performance. These interior features are intended to keep occupants in their seating area during an accident. They ensure that a system of crash protection is provided to passengers independent of their actions to use safety belts. Standard No. 222 requires safety belts for passengers in smaller school buses since belts are needed on those vehicles to provide adequate crash protection.; The information from the Coalition that Ms. Ernst enclosed in he letter to you states that safety belts are needed on all school buses to protect children and keep them within their seating compartment in the event of a collision or rollover. We believe that effective passenger crash protection and containment is already provided by compartmentalization and that it would be inappropriate to issue a Federal mandate for safety belts on all school buses. While the effects of compartmentalization are expected to be greater in crashes involving front or rear impacts, the standard also has potential in side impacts and rollovers by minimizing the 'hostility' of the crash environment and by limiting the range of movement of an occupant in those two types of crashes.; For your information, I have enclosed a DOT report, 'Seat Belts i School Buses' (June 1985), which provides a thorough discussion of the safety belt issues raised by your constituent. As explained in the report, school buses in this country have compiled an excellent safety record. In addition to meeting compartmentalization requirements, large school buses incorporate more safety by virtue of their greater mass, higher seating height and high visibility to other motorists. Thus, the need for safety belts to mitigate against injuries and fatalities is not the same as that for other vehicles, such as passenger cars. Because the safety record of large school buses is very good, we must conclude that a Federal requirement for the installation of safety belts is not justified at this time.; The Coalition's material enclosed by Ms. Ernst included a statemen indicating that NHTSA 'supports local district seat belt programs.' NHTSA permits the voluntary installation of safety belts for passengers on large school buses if the purchaser wishes to have belts installed. We believe that such a decision should be made by individual schools and school districts that have made a reasoned assessment of their particular pupil transportation needs. However, because there are many effective ways to improve pupil transportation safety, such as improving driver training and school bus maintenance programs, it would be inappropriate for us to endorse local district programs for safety belts on school buses. Therefore, for purposes of clarification, we neither support nor discourage school districts' decisions to install safety belts on their large school buses.; You asked about any Federal legislation that had been recentl introduced to increase the safety of school buses. The Administration has not proposed any legislation affecting school buses. However, two bills were introduced in the 99th Congress concerning school buses. H.R. 3129 contained a provision calling for a school bus safety study to determine the measures most effective in protecting the safety of school children. H.R. 749 proposed incentive grants to the States encouraging the adoption and enforcement of laws requiring the use of safety belts in school buses. Neither H.R. 3129 nor H.R. 749 was enacted.; In addition, NHTSA has issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to amen Standard No. 222 by setting performance requirements for safety belts voluntarily installed in large school buses. If adopted, this rule would require safety belts voluntarily installed on new large school buses to meet Federal safety belt standards for strength and proper installation.; We are evaluating the comments submitted on our proposal and a fina decision on the rulemaking action is expected in the near future.; I hope this information is helpful. Please contact my office if we ca be of further assistance.; Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel

ID: aiam5650

"Dear Mr. Cuvala: This responds to your letter of September 10, 1995 concerning 'conference and display vehicles' you have been asked to manufacture for a client. The vehicles used are cargo vans with a gross vehicle weight rating of 9200 pounds. You convert the cargo area of the van to a product display and conference area. Your letter contained an illustration of the vehicle, indicating an L-shaped seating area behind the driver and front passenger seats. Your letter states that this area is not intended for transport of people. You asked whether such a vehicle must comply with 'seating and occupant orientation and restraint directives.' As explained below, the seats in such a vehicle would have to comply with federal standards on seats and seat belts if the modification is done prior to the first retail sale of the vehicle. By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards that apply to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA does not approve or certify any vehicles or items of equipment. Instead, each manufacturer is required to certify that its motor vehicles comply with all applicable Federal safety standards prior to their sale or import. NHTSA's certification regulations are set forth in 49 CFR Part 567. Conversion Prior to Sale Your letter does not state whether the conversion of the cargo area of these vehicles is done before or after the first retail sale of the vehicles. Prior to the first retail sale of a vehicle, the vehicle is considered to be 'new.' If the conversion is done prior to the first retail sale, your company would be considered an 'alterer' under our regulations. A person who alters a previously certified new vehicle also must certify that the altered vehicle complies with all applicable standards (49 CFR 567.7). The seats in a new vehicle must comply with federal regulations if they are 'designated seating positions.' A 'designated seating position' is defined in 49 CFR 571.3 as: any plan view location capable of accommodating a person at least as large as a 5th percentile adult female, if the overall seat configuration and design is such that the position is likely to be used as a seating position while the vehicle is in motion. While you indicate that the vehicles are not intended to transport people except in the front seats, the design of the seating area is similar to other vehicle seats. Therefore, it appears from their design that these seats are likely to be used and are therefore designated seating positions. NHTSA has exercised its authority to establish five safety standards which could be relevant to seats in these vehicles: Standard No. 207, Seating Systems (49 CFR 571.207), Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208), Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies (49 CFR 571.209), Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages (49 CFR 571.210), and Standard No. 302, Flammability of Interior Materials (49 CFR 571.302). Standards Nos. 207, 208, 210, and 302 apply, with certain limited exceptions not relevant to your conversion, to vehicles and not directly to items of equipment. Standard No. 207 establishes requirements for seats, their attachment assemblies, and their installation to minimize the possibility of their failure in a crash. Standard No. 207 does not require a specific orientation for seats. However, some of the requirements are different for side- and rear-facing seats like those illustrated in your attachment. Standard No. 208 specifies seat belt requirements for seating positions in vehicles. For the seats in the rear of your vehicles, Standard No. 208 would require lap belts at each designated seating position. Standard No. 210 specifies performance requirements for seat belt anchorages. Standard No. 302 specifies burn resistance requirements for materials used in the interior of motor vehicles. Standard No. 302 would affect not only the seats, but also installation of other materials in these vehicles. Standard No. 209 applies to seat belt assemblies as separate items of motor vehicle equipment, regardless of whether the belts are installed as original equipment in a motor vehicle or sold as replacements. Thus, the manufacturer is required to certify that the seat belts comply with Standard No. 209. If you do not manufacture the seat belts yourself, you should install only belts certified by their manufacturer. This is true regardless of whether the conversion occurs before or after the first sale of the vehicle. Conversion After Sale If the conversion is done on a used motor vehicle, you do not have to certify that the vehicle complies with Standards Nos. 207, 208, 210, and 302. However, 49 USC 30122 provides, in pertinent part: A manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business may not knowingly make inoperative, any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard. . . . Thus, you could not convert these vehicles if the conversion affected a device or element of design, installed prior to sale, so as to cause the vehicles to no longer comply with any of the safety standards. I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Samuel J. Dubbin Chief Counsel";

ID: aiam1943

Dear Commander Heath: This is a further reply to your letter dated January 21, 1975, askin several questions regarding Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials.' We have attempted to incorporate the substance of your questions in our various answers.; 1. *Prime Glazing Material Manufacturer.* A company that buys and the bends or otherwise forms flat plastic glazing material into a motorcycle windshield is *not* a prime glazing material manufacturer, nor is a company which blows or stretches flat plastic glazing material that is purchased from another company. Prime glazing material manufacturers are only those who fabricate, laminate, or temper the glazing material. In neither of the examples you pose is the material fabricated, laminated, or tempered by the company in question.; 2. *Marking Requirements.* In the amendment to Standard No. 20 published November 11, 1972, (37 FR 24035), it was our intention to limit the use of the DOT symbol and manufacturer's code number to the prime glazing material manufacturer. Persons who cut glazing fabricated by others should not under Standard No. 205 utilize the prime manufacturer's code number or the DOT symbol. Our purpose in structuring the marking requirements this way was to enable us to determine, for purposes of attributing responsibility for conformity, which glazing in a motor vehicle had been manufactured by the prime manufacturer specifically for use in that vehicle, and which glazing had been cut, shaped, or otherwise altered before installation.; >>>(a) You are correct in your interpretation that the DOT symbol an the code number are applied by a prime glazing material manufacturer in addition to the manufacturer's trademark. It was our expectation that the prime manufacturer would furnish his customers with a heat stamp of the markings required by Section 6 of ANS Z26, without the DOT symbol and code number, by which the manufacturer cutting or otherwise shaping the material would mark those pieces he cut or shaped.; (b) Glazing produced by a prime glazing material manufacturer that i not designed for use in a specific vehicle should not contain the DOT symbol or the manufacturer's code number.; (c) The NHTSA has assigned numbers only to prime glazing materia manufacturers. We have not inquired, however, whether the company is in fact producing glazing materials for use in specific vehicle applications.; (d) As stated previously, a company which does not manufacture it glazing but which cuts glazing from larger pieces purchased from the producer of the material should not be using the prime manufacturer's code number or the DOT symbol.; (e) You are correct in your conclusion that the marking requirements o the standard do not apply to dealers. However any person (including a dealer) who sells glazing (separately or in a new vehicle) which is improperly marked may be violating Section 108 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.<<<; 3. *General Requirements.* >>>(a) Standard No. 205 does presently prohibit dealers from using th prime glazing material manufacturer's code number. If you are aware of instances where this requirement is not being followed, please forward to us the particulars of the cases in question and we will take appropriate action.; (b) Manufacturers who purchase glazing in large sheets and then cut i to fit window frames are not prime manufacturers and may not use the DOT symbol or manufacturer's code number. You are therefore not correct in your statement that a manufacturer of a window assembly may use the prime manufacturer's number even when the window manufactured is for a special application.; (c) The model number of glazing used in motorcycle windshields shoul be that which is assigned to it by the prime glazing material manufacturer in the glazing's original thickness. ANS Z26 calls for testing plastic glazing materials in substantially flat specimens, and not in molded specimens. However, the Federal standard does not require testing. Manufacturers are required only to use due care in the manufacture of their products. A person reforming' the plastic does not thereby become a prime glazing material manufacturer.; (d) The markings which should appear on plastic bubbles on minivan should be those of the prime manufacturer (not the DOT symbol or code number) of the glazing material and not those of the person who reshapes the glazing.; (e) A material marked AS4 that was used as a motorcycle windshiel would technically fail to conform to the standard as the standard does not provide for the use of AS4 materials in motorcycle windshields. However, if the material also conformed to the requirements of AS6 (which is permitted to be used in motorcycle windshields), the nonconformity would not be considered significant.; (f) Our basic approach has been that the standard applies to th vehicle locations specified in ANS Z26, and to any glazing (glass or plastics) used in those locations. However, opaque plastic materials which are clearly structural materials do not fall within the ambit of Standard No. 205.; (g) Standard No. 205 presently limits the use of plastic glazin materials in buses to readily removable windows, which include push-out windows. Plastic materials may not be used in buses in fixed quarter panels or sliding windows that are not readily removable.; We believe our reasons to be valid for limiting the use of the DO symbol and manufacturer's code number to glazing manufactured by prime manufacturers for use in a specific vehicle location. However, we would certainly be willing to consider steps you might suggest to facilitate State inspections that are consistent with the purposes of the labeling requirements presently in effect. Such a suggestion should be in the form of a petition to amend Standard No. 205 and should be specific.; Sincerely, James C. Schultz, Chief Counsel