ID: nht90-2.60

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: May 30, 1990

FROM: G. Nick Routh -- President, American Energetics

TO: Connie Mack -- United States Senator

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 8-1-90 from J.M. Fish to C. Mack (A35; Std. 205); Also attached to letter dated 5-29-90 from G.N. Routh to NHTSA c/o J. Medlin

TEXT:

I have a small business that is engaged in the selling and distribution of solar control films throughout the United States. These films are designed to reduce radiant heat gain through windows thereby lowering the energy costs. Over the past ten years or so, the market for auto window film has grown significantly. The demand for these films has increased year after year due to the features they provide for automobiles. As you are aware, the design of cars has changed dramatically due to fuel use co nsiderations and other factors. Cars have become smaller with smaller engines and more glass has been added to give a more spacious feeling. The additional glass and smaller engines have placed a greater load on the air conditioners in automobiles. Th e use of film on auto windows helps reduce the heat gain through the glass area and allows the cars to be more efficient and more comfortable for the occupants. It also reduces the effects of ultra-violet rays on the interior, reduces glare, and makes t he glass more shatter-resistant.

The purpose of this letter is enlist your assistance in a very serious matter that could gravely affect our industry. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), through the U.S. Justice Department, has filed suits against six companies involved in the installation of film on autos in the state of Florida. The six companies named in the suits are all in the Tampa/St. Petersburg area. The basis for the suits is that these companies have violated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Statute # 2 05 (FMVSS #205). This statute states that there must be a minimum of 70% visible light transmission through driver and passenger windows of new automobiles and cannot be tampered with even after first sale of the automobile since these windows are consi dered a safety aspect of the vehicle. The problem is that the State of Florida has a law on the books which allows companies to install film on automobiles as long as the film has a visible light transmission of 35% on the driver and passenger windows. Various other Sunbelt states have adopted laws similar to Florida's with no increase in accidents or additional problems with law enforcement officers. Our problem appears to be one of a "jurisdictional" nature in that NHTSA allowed the states to write laws that allowed these six companies and some 5,000 other businesses throughout the United States to be engaged in the business of applying films to automobiles and they are now saying that their statute preempts the state laws that are different from t he statute. I have enclosed a copy of a letter that I have sent to the people at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration which will hopefully shed more light on the situation.

Basically, the suits that NHTSA have filed endanger the livelihoods of some 5,000 installers across the country along with some 30 distributors

and 7 manufacturers. We feel that this is an issue that is best left to the discretion of the individual states with regard to the use of film in the automotive aftermarket. In the states that allow darker film than FMVSS #205 would allow, there is no evidence that traffic safety has suffered or law enforcement personnel have been placed in any greater danger than they normally face in the pursuit of their duties. What has happened is that some half-million consumers per year are enjoying the benefit s of a product that is sorely needed in the automotive aftermarket.

Our industry has petitioned NHTSA to change their standard to more correctly reflect what is going on in many states which is the allowance of 35% visible light transmission film on the driver/passenger windows. While this may be one way to address the p roblem we currently face, it would seem to me that the simplest way to address this problem would be for NHTSA to address itself to the standards necessary for the manufacture of new automobiles and let the individual states legislate the requirements of items that are going to be added to automobiles after the car has been purchased and registered in a state.

I would humbly request that you look into this matter at your earliest convenience to see if you can determine what would be the best solution to this problem that is fair to all concerned.

ID: nht88-4.54

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 12/30/88

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA

TO: FRANK J. TRECY -- GENERAL MANAGER - MANUFACTURING MILLER STRUCTURES, INC.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 11/14/88 FROM F. J. TRECY TO ERIKA Z. JONES, OCC 2811; LETTER DATED 10/04/88 FROM FRANK J. TRECY TO ERIKA Z. JONES

TEXT: Dear Mr. Trecy:

I am writing in response to your request for an interpretation of whether Standard No. 115; Vehicle Identification Number - Basic Requirements (49 CFR @ 571.115) would apply to your company's portable commercial use structures. In your letter to me, you stated that Miller Structures, Inc. manufactures offices, storage buildings, classrooms, laboratories, branch banks, medical clinics, and other related commercial buildings on axles. This allows the structures to be transported to the desired location by attaching them to a truck tractor and moving them over the roads. You state that a "considerable" amount of your units go to a location and are placed there permanently. You inform us that other buildings are placed on a location "for varying length s of time" and are then relocated.

In a subsequent television conversation with Dorothy Nakama of my office, you stated that the structures are not self-propelling but must be towed by a semi-trailer or truck. Some of these structures have removable running gears. You also stated that th e structures are constructed very much like mobile homes, and that the structures are intended to go on the public roads at least once, in order to get to their designated sites. You also stated that your structures are not regulated by the U.S. Departm ent of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) because they are not homes.

Standard No. 115, and all of our safety standards, apply only to vehicles that are "motor vehicles," within the meaning of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.). The term "motor vehicle" is defined at section 102(3) of the Safety Act as follows:

"Motor Vehicle" means any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.

We have interpreted this language as follows. Vehicles that are equipped with tracks or are otherwise incapable of highway travel are plainly not motor vehicles. Agricultural equipment, such as tractors, are not motor vehicles. Further, vehicles design ed and sold solely for off-road use (e.g., airport runway vehicles and underground mining vehicles) are not considered motor vehicles, even though they may be operationally capable of highway travel. Vehicles, such as mobile construction equipment, that use the public roads only to travel between job sites and which typically spend extended periods of time at a single job site are not considered motor vehicles. In such cases, the use on the public roads is merely incidental, not the primary purpose for which the vehicle was manufactured.

On the other hand, vehicles that use the public highways on a necessary and recurring basis are motor vehicles. For instance, utility vehicles like the Jeep are plainly motor vehicles, even though they are equipped with special features to permit off-ro ad operation. If a vehicle's greatest use will be off-road, but it will spend a substantial amount of time on-road, NHTSA has interpreted the vehicle to be a "motor vehicle." Further, if a vehicle is readily usable on the public roads and is in fact use d on the public roads by a substantial number of owners, NHTSA has found the vehicle to be a motor vehicle. This finding was made with respect to dune buggies and regardless of the manufacturer's stated intent regarding the terrain on which the vehicles were to be operated.

Based on the information you have provided, it appears that your mobile structures are not "motor vehicles" within the meaning of the Safety Act and, therefore, are not subject to the requirements of Standard No. 115 or any other of our safety standards. This conclusion is based on our judgment that the vehicles seem analogous to mobile construction equipment -- i.e., the on-road use of the vehicles appears to be incidental and not the primary purpose for which the vehicles are manufactured. Please no te that this conclusion is based solely on the facts presented in your letter. We may reexamine this conclusion if additional information becomes available that would warrant a reexamination.

Additionally, you should note that this interpretation applies only to Federal requirements. The individual States may establish their own identification requirements for vehicles that are not subject to the Federal identification requirements, such as your mobile structures. Thus, the State of South Dakota could establish identification requirements applicable to your mobile structures sold in that State.

I hope the information provided is useful. If you need further information on this subject, please contact Dorothy Nakama at (202) 366-2992 or write to me again.

Sincerely,

ID: nht88-2.64

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/08/88

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: NORMAN D. SHUMWAY -- CONGRESS

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 11/29/89 ESTIMATED, FROM JEFFREY R. MILLER -- NHTSA TO JOHN D. DINGELL -- HOUSE; REDBOOK A34; STANDARD 205; LETTER DATED 09/22/89 FROM JOHN D. DINGELL -- HOUSE TO JEFFREY R. MILLER; LETTER DATED 08/25/89 FROM CONSTANCE A. MORELLA -- HOUSE TO NORMAN Y. MINETA -- HOUSE; LETTER DATED 07/31/89 FROM W. MARSHALL RICKERT -- MVA TO CONSTANCE A. MORELLA; LETTER DATED 11/01/88 FROM ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA TO BEVERLY B. BYRON -- HOUSE; INTERPRETATION STANDARD 205

TEXT: Dear Mr. Shumway:

Thank you for your recent letter on behalf of your constituent, Mr. Ernest P. Crockett, who received a State of California citation for having tinted film on his car windows for medical reasons. You asked me to review Mr. Crockett's letter and provide a ny comments or assitance that I could. I am pleased to have this opportunity to do so.

Mr. Crockett suffers from systemic lupus erythematosus and as a result needs protection from ultra-violet rays. He consulted with the California Highway Patrol and was told that the law allowed him to use tinting film on his car windows, if he had a med ical letter stating that this was necessary. Not known at this time to Mr. Crockett was a provision in the California law prohibiting the use of noncomplying medically-necessary devices during darkness. Mr. Crockett had Security Glass System's "Almost Clear" tinting permanently installed on his windshield and front windows and was subsequently given a citation by the California Patrol for not being in compliance with @ 26708(a)(2) of the California Vehicle Code. Upon further inquiry, Mr. Crockett lea rned that his film was unacceptable because it had been permanently affixed, and that a much darker tint (blocking 70 percent of light) film was allowable, if it was removable at darkness.

Some background information on the Federal requirements in this area may be helpful. Our agency is authorized, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and certain items of motor vehicle equipment. The safety standard that specifies performance and location requirements for glazing used in vehicles is Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials. These requirements include specifications for minimum levels of light transmittance (70 pe rcent in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars). Under Standard 205 no manufacturer or dealer is permitted to install solar films and other sun screen devices in a new vehicle, without certifying that the v ehicle continues to be in compliance with the light transmittance and other requirements of the standard.

After a vehicle is first sold to a consumer, modifications to the vehicle's glazing are affected by section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act. That section prohibits any manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business from "rendering inoperative" any device or element of design installed in a vehicle in compliance with any safety standard. In the case of glazing, this means that no manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business could install a sun screen device that would result in a light t ransmittance of less than 70 percent for any window of a passenger car, or result in the window no longer complying with any other requirements of Standard No. 205. Violations of this "render inoperative" provision can result in Federal civil penalties to the manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business of up to $ 1000 for each noncomplying installation. The materials enclosed with Mr. Crockett's letter appear to show that the business that installed the film on his car windows did not render inoperative compliance with the light transmittance requirements of Standard No. 205, since the film installed on Mr. Crockett's car windows is said to have 70 percent light transmittance.

However, Federal law does not affect vehicle owners. Vehicle owners may alter their own vehicles and operate them on the highways as they please, even if the vehicle's glazing no longer complies with the requirements of Standard No. 205. We do, however, urge vehicle owners not to take actions that degrade the performance of required safety features.

The individual States have the authority to govern the operational use of vehicles by their owners. In this case, the State of Californai has exercised its authority to establish requirements in this area. The wisdom and fairness of applying those requ irements to individuals in Mr. Crockett's situation is something to be decided by the State of California, not the Federal government.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need some more information on this subject, please do not hesitate to contact Ms. Susan Schruth of my staff at this address, or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

ID: 003917rbm

[ ]

Dear [ ]:

This responds to your letter requesting an interpretation of the advanced air bag requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208, Occupant crash protection (FMVSS No. 208). You specifically ask whether the telltale requirements of S19.2.2 would prohibit a design that would cause the telltale to flash for five seconds to inform vehicle occupants that the status of the air bag has changed. You have also requested that the name of your company be kept confidential due to the confidential business nature of the contemplated design. That request is granted. I am pleased to provide a response to your request for interpretation. The design discussed in your letter would not be prohibited by S19.2.2.

On May 12, 2000, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) published a final rule in the Federal Register (65 FR 30680) requiring advanced air bags in all passenger cars, multi-purpose vehicles, light trucks and buses with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 8,500 lb or less. The phase-in for these new requirements begins September 1, 2003. That final rule established new, advanced air bag performance requirements to minimize the risk of injury to children, as well as new requirements to enhance protection of small and mid-size adults.

Under S19.2.2, any air bag system that uses automatic suppression technology to satisfy the requirements of the standard must have a telltale that illuminates whenever the air bag is suppressed and that does not illuminate whenever the air bag is active, except that the telltale need not illuminate when the passenger seat is unoccupied. S19.2.2 is silent as to how the telltale must operate while the status of the air bag is in transition. Nor does the provision address flashing, as opposed to continuous, illumination. S20.2 tests the air bag suppression system by placing a child restraint, test dummy, or human in the passenger seat, starting the engine and then waiting 10 seconds before determining the status of the air bag.

Under the design contemplated by your company, the required telltale would flash for five seconds to notify the vehicle occupants that the status of the air bag has changed. You state that you believe this feature will better alert both drivers and front seat passengers when the status of the air bag has changed than simply turning the telltale on or off. Under your design, the five seconds of flashing would be triggered by a change in status from "active" to "inactive" and vice versa. After the five-second flashing period has ended, the telltale would either illuminate steadily or go out, depending on the activation status of the air bag.

Nothing in S19.2.2 prohibits a telltale that flashes to inform vehicle occupants that the air bag has transitioned from an active to inactive status. While S19.2.2(h) prohibits telltale illumination other than when the air bag has been turned off (except during a bulb check), the intention behind S19.2.2(h) is to let vehicle occupants know whether or not their air bag is suppressed without requiring them to discern varying light intensities or other potentially confusing designs. Accordingly, we interpret the standard to permit a system that transitions from continually burning to flashing for a brief period of time, no more than 10 seconds, after the air bag has been reactivated.

Thus, your contemplated design would be permissible under S19.2.2 as long as the telltale only flashes when the air bag is actually suppressed or for a brief period of time after the air bag has been reactivated. Please note that while nothing in the standard would prohibit the telltale from continuously flashing whenever the air bag is suppressed, such designs could be unduly annoying and could lead a vehicle owner to disconnect the telltale. Likewise, an occupant detection system that regularly turned the air bag on and off because the status of the air bag was constantly in transition would be problematic.

Finally, we note that while a flashing design is not prohibited, any vehicle manufacturer choosing to incorporate such a design in its telltale would need to either provide an alternative means of determining whether the air bag is active or suppressed consistent with S19.2.3 or limit the flash to less than 10 seconds. This is because the test procedure set forth in S20.2, and its corollaries in S22.2 and S26.2, require the manufacturer to provide a mechanism that NHTSA can use to determine whether the automatic suppression system is, in fact, able to reliably classify the front passenger seat occupant. For a continually flashing system, the alternative means is necessary to differentiate between a properly functioning system and a problematic system that is continually transitioning between suppression and activation.

I hope this letter addresses your concerns. Please feel free to contact Rebecca MacPherson of my staff at (202) 366-2992 should you have any additional questions.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:208
d.7/16/03

ID: 08-002439as

ID: 09-003169 nissan.draft.dj.aug20

ID: 10407

Mr. Larry W. Overbay
Director, Automotive and Support
Equipment Directorate
U.S. Department of the Army
U.S. Army Combat Systems Test Activity
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-5059

Dear Mr. Overbay:

This responds to your letter requesting information about Federal motor vehicle safety standard (FMVSS) No. 121, Air brake systems, and NHTSA Test Procedure TP 121-02. You stated that your organization recently tested a vehicle's compliance to the emergency stopping distance requirements in FMVSS No. 121 by disconnecting the service air signal line at the rear service air relay. You further stated that this action "essentially eliminated rear braking during all stops" making the vehicle totally reliant on the front brakes for stopping. According to your letter, the vehicle manufacturer contends that the manner in which you conducted the test is invalid since it was not done in accordance with NHTSA Test Procedure TP 121-02, which specifies rapid bleeding of the vehicle's air reservoirs.

In addition to general questions about FMVSS No. 121 and the NHTSA Test Procedure, you asked whether the removal of the service air signal line (a non-manifold line which is designed to carry compressed air) from the rear air brake relay valve is considered by NHTSA to be a valid test of the emergency system requirements under the provisions in FMVSS No. 121. After providing background information that responds to your general questions about testing of motor vehicles, I will respond to your specific question about test conditions applicable to the emergency stopping requirements.

Congress has authorized NHTSA to issue FMVSSs applicable to new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. (Formerly, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which has been codified at 49 U.S.C. 30303) NHTSA, however, does not approve or endorse motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Instead, the statute establishes a "self-certification" process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet all applicable safety standards.

Each of NHTSA's safety standards specifies performance requirements for the vehicle or equipment being tested for compliance with the particular safety standard.

In addition to the test conditions and procedures set forth in the FMVSSs themselves, NHTSA has provided instructions, known as "compliance test procedures," to the test facilities with which the agency enters into contracts to conduct compliance tests for the agency. The compliance test procedures are intended to provide a standardized testing and data recording format among the various contractors that perform testing on behalf of the agency, so that the test results will reflect the performance characteristics of the product being tested, not differences between various testing facilities.

The compliance test procedures must, of course, not be inconsistent with the procedures and conditions that are set forth in the relevant safety standard. However, the compliance test procedures do, on occasion, provide additional detail beyond what is set forth in the relevant FMVSS. These more detailed test procedures and conditions are requirements only for the contractor test facility in conducting tests on behalf of the agency. The test procedures are subject to change and do not always directly reflect all of the requirements of the particular standard for which they are written. The agency has generally stated that the test procedures are not intended to limit the requirements of the applicable FMVSS(s) and that in some cases the test procedures do not include all of the various FMVSS minimum performance requirements.

With this background in mind, let me respond to your specific questions. As for your first question, the requirements in FMVSS No. 121 take precedence over the TP 121-02. As noted above, TP 121-02 contains instructions issued by NHTSA to provide information to agency contractors about how to conduct compliance tests. In contrast, the law requires manufacturers to certify their vehicles to Standard No. 121.

As for your question about FMVSS No. 121's emergency stopping test requirements, those requirements are set forth in section S5.7.1. However, those requirements are not currently applicable to trucks and trailers, as the result of the U.S. Court of Appeals decision in PACCAR v. DOT, 573 F.2d 632, (9th Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978). (see S3 of 49 CFR 571.121). The agency retained the language in S5.7.1 so that those manufacturers that wish to construct their vehicles in accordance with the non-mandatory sections of the standard will have the necessary information to do so.

I hope this information has been helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Philip R. Recht Chief Counsel

ref:121 d:2/17/95

ID: 11417LOR.D2

Mr. John Lord
The Booster Seat Company Ltd.
P.O. Box 15-573, New Lynn, Auckland
New Zealand

Dear Mr. Lord:

This responds to your letter asking about S5.5.1(a) in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, AChild Restraint Systems.@ I apologize for the delay in responding.

As discussed below, it is our opinion, based on the information in your letter, that your child restraint would not meet S5.1.1(a).

Background You state in your letter that your company has developed a child restraint system which conforms to an Australian child seat standard. A U.S. company wishes to manufacture and sell the child seat in the United States. You have had the child seat dynamically tested in the U.S., and believe that the seat achieved Avery favorable results@ with regard to the injury criteria of Standard 213. However, S5.5.1(a) of the standard was a problem.

Section S5.1.1 sets forth requirements for child restraint system integrity. Paragraph (a) of that section states that when dynamically tested, each child restraint shall:

Exhibit no complete separation of any load bearing structural element and no partial separation exposing either surfaces with a radius of less than 1/4 inch or surfaces with protrusions greater than 3/8 inch above the immediate adjacent surrounding contactable surface of any structural element of the system . . . .

Your child seat, a belt-positioning seat under S4 of Standard 213, consists of a high density polystyrene (commonly called

Astyrofoam@) platform, covered by a foam seat cover. The platform raises a child occupant approximately four to five inches to better fit a vehicle=s Type II belt system. The styrofoam platform also has arm rests formed into it.

The child seat cracked during the dynamic test of Standard 213. You sent us a child seat showing the cracks. However, you believe the cracking of the seat should not be considered to be a violation of S5.1.1(a) because, in your opinion, it does not pose a safety problem:

Clearly cracking/splitting on blow molded plastic possesses a serious safety issue with the possibility of pinching, cutting, or stabbing the child. We are confident that polystyrene possess [sic] no such problem. By nature, all cracked edges are soft. In addition, the product is sold with a 3/8" (10mm) foam seat cover.

Discussion

After reviewing your submissions and other information, our answer is that the child seat would not meet S5.1.1(a). Because the cracks occurred in a load bearing structural element of the child seat, S5.1.1(a) applies. Each crack is a Apartial separation exposing . . . surfaces with a radius of less than 1/4 inch . . . ,@ which is prohibited by S5.1.1(a).

This interpretation limits a previous agency interpretation of S5.1.1(a). In NHTSA=s July 8, 1988 letter to Mr. Donald Friedman of Liability Research, Inc. (copy enclosed), the agency addressed whether edges exposed by the tearing of a restraint that was made of woodfiber violated S5.1.1(a), when the edges exposed by the tearing were not lacerating (due to the composition of the material) and not likely to come into contact with the infant. NHTSA said that S5.1.1(a) did not prohibit the tearing because:

. . . In the preamble of [the rulemaking document proposing the requirement], we stated that our objectives in promulgating the system integrity requirements were to prevent a child=s excessive excursion or ejection from the system, and to ensure that the system does not fracture or separate in such a way as to harm the child. (43 FR 21470, 21473.) (Emphasis in text.)

In the Friedman letter, NHTSA focused on the highlighted text, stating that any partial separation resulting from the dynamic test Amust not expose surfaces with sharp edges that may contact the child.@ The agency did not examine the effect of partial separations on the structural integrity of the system. Nevertheless, the agency acknowledged that, @In promulgating S5.1.1(a), the agency intended to minimize dangers resulting from failures in the structural integrity of the system, rather than failures in the materials.@

Your child restraint is formed from a single piece of styrofoam; there is no reinforcement of any kind. As you note, due to the material comprising the restraint, the child restraint Ais inclined to crack.@ With your child restraint, a failure in the material results in a failure in the structural integrity of the system. While the edges formed by the partial separations you identified might not form Asharp@ edges, the partial separations are an indication that the structural integrity of the restraint has not been maintained. Thus, we conclude that the restraint would not meet the requirements of S5.1.1(a).

I hope this answers your inquiry. If you have further questions, please do not hesitate to contact Deirdre Fujita of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Samuel J. Dubbin Chief Counsel

Enclosure

ref:213 d:5/3/96

ID: nht94-1.88

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: March 21, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Lawrence P. White -- Acting Director, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Dept. of Transportation, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 12/13/93 from Lawrence P. White to Mary Versie (OCC-9479)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter of December 13, 1993, asking several questions concerning a recent amendment to Standard No. 217, Bus Emergency Exits and Window Retention and Release (57 FR 49413; November 2, 1992). Your questions and the response to each follows.

1. The effective date - is it the chassis manufacturer's date of completion, the final stage manufacturer's date of completion, or somewhere in between?

The effective date for the November 2 final rule is May 2, 1994. Only vehicles manufactured on or after the effective date of an applicable requirement in a Federal motor vehicle safety standard must comply with that requirement. If a vehicle is manufa ctured in two or more stages, the final stage manufacturer is required to certify that the vehicle complies with "the standards in effect on the date of manufacture of the incomplete vehicle, the date of final completion, or a date between those two date s." (49 CFR Part S568.6).

2. Based on the formula for emergency exit space, is the area of the front service door to be included? Does this mean on a vehicle of 60 to 77 passengers, the only additional requirements beyond the front and rear doors is a left side exit door?

The November 2 final rule requires additional emergency exit area (AEEA) for some buses. The amount, if any, of AEEA which must be provided is determined by subtracting the area of the front service door and either the area of the rear emergency door or the area of the side emergency door and the rear push-out window, depending on the configuration of the bus (S5.2.3.1). These are the minimum exits required on all buses. If AEEA is required, the first additional exit which must be installed is a left side emergency door (for a bus with a rear emergency door) or a right side emergency door (for a bus with a left side emergency door and a rear push- out window). The number of exits may vary for buses which carry the same number of passengers, because the amount of area credited for each exit is the area of daylight opening, and because different variations of types of exits are possible. However, in the regulatory evaluation for the final rule, the agency estimated that a bus would not be required to have a roof exit (the second type of additional exit required) unless the capacity was greater than 62 (for a bus with a rear emergency door) or 77 (for a bus with a left side emergency door and a rear push-out window).

3. The "clear aisle space" required for exit to the proposed side

emergency door, according to federal specifications, can be met with a flip-up type seat or a clear opening of 12", as measured from the back of the door forward. Are there any specifications, definitions, or descriptions provided as to what would be co nsidered a "flip seat"?

The November 2 final rule allowed a flip-up seat to be adjacent to a side emergency exit door "if the seat bottom pivots and automatically assumes and retains a vertical position when not in use, so that no portion of the seat bottom is within" the requi red 12 inch aisle to the exit (S5.4.2.1(a)(2)(ii)). The agency did not otherwise define a flip-up seat, nor did it include any performance requirements for these seats.

4. Also, there is concern regarding school buses that are equipped with the "flip seat" by the emergency door opening and the possibility of school children, either intentionally or accidently, unlatching the door latch mechanism. Are the door latch me chanisms to be equipped to help prevent this from occurring?

Standard No. 217 includes requirements for the type of motion and force required to release an emergency exit (S5.3.3). One of these requirements is that the notion to release a door must be upward from inside the bus (upward or pull-type for school bus es with a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 kilograms or less). This is intended to lessen the chance of a door accidently being opened, without unnecessarily making the exit more complicated to open in an emergency. In addition, warning alarms are required for door and window exits to notify the driver that the exit has been opened.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Walter Myers of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht94-2.34

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: April 12, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Ted H. Richardson -- Fleet Coordinator, Priefert Manufacturing Company, Inc. (Mt. Pleasant, Texas)

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 12/15/93 from Ted H. Richardson to Office of Chief Counsel, NHTSA (OCC 9478)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter and telephone call to this office asking our opinion regarding Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 120, Tire selection and rims for motor vehicles other than passenger cars. Your letter referenced a telephone c onversation with Walter Myers of my staff about the applicability of FMVSS 120 to your product. As Mr. Myers informed you, the answer to your question depends on whether your product, the "Wishbone Carriage" used to position and carry the "Priefert live stock chute" is a "motor vehicle" (i.e., trailer) under our Safety Act and regulations. Based on the information we have, we believe the answer is no.

By way of background information, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. S1381, et seq. (Safety Act), authorizes this agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), to issue safety standards applicable t o motor vehicles. Section 102(3) (15 U.S.C. S1391(3)) of the Safety Act defines motor vehicle as:

(A)ny vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.

NHTSA further defines "trailer" in 49 CFR 571.3 as:

(A) motor vehicle with or without motive power, designed for carrying persons or property and for being drawn by another motor vehicle.

Your letter enclosed a brochure containing pictures and other information relating to the livestock chute (Priefert Squeeze Chute, Model 91). The chute is farm equipment. The upper 2/3 of the chute is constructed of steel bars, while the lower 1/3 is c omposed of steel panels on both sides that can be lowered or removed. The chute comes with such accessories as head gate, tail gate, and calf table. The chute is positioned on the ground in a barnyard, feed lot, pasture, or field. It is used to channe l livestock or, with the head and/or tail gate in place, to immobilize an animal for medicating, branding, tagging, and the like. Your information also describes the carriage that transports the chute. The Wishbone Carriage is a 2-wheeled U-shaped doll y which is designed to be manually attached to special fittings on the chute.

With the carriage thus attached, the chute can be towed by vehicle to the next job site. Once at the next job site, the wheeled carriage is detached and the chute is once again placed on the ground for use.

Whether the Wishbone Carriage is a motor vehicle (trailer) depends on its on-road use. This agency has consistently held that vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use, such as airport runway vehicles and underground mining equipment, are not c onsidered motor vehicles even though they may be operationally capable of highway travel. Vehicles that have an abnormal body configuration that readily distinguishes them from other highway vehicles and that have a maximum speed of 20 miles per hour ar e not considered motor vehicles. Agricultural equipment, such as tractors, as well as equipment that uses the highways solely to move between job sites and which typically spend extended periods of time at a single job site, are not considered motor veh icles. That is because the use of these vehicles on the public roadways is intermittent and merely incidental to their primary off-road use.

We have determined that the Wishbone Carriage is not a motor vehicle, because it appears it will be primarily used to transport the chute from job site to job site on the farm. Not being a motor vehicle, the Federal motor vehicle safety standards, inclu ding FMVSS No. 120, would not apply to your product.

Please note, however, that if the Carriage is regularly used to carry the chute from farm to farm on public roads, or is used more frequently on the public roads than the use we anticipate, the agency may reexamine the determination that the carriage is not a motor vehicle. Also, you may wish to consult your attorney for information on possible operational restrictions on your product, such as State licensing and use laws and product liability.

I hope this information is helpful to you. We have enclosed a copy of FMVSS 120 and provided you our definition of a trailer, as you requested. Should you have any further questions or need additional information, please feel free to contact Mr. Myers at this address or at (202) 366-2992.