ID: 1984-3.30

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/27/84

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: H. Moriyoshi, Executive Vice President and General Manager, Mazda (North America), Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. H. Moriyoshi Executive Vice President and General Manager Mazda (North America), Inc. 24402 Sinacola Court Farmington Hills, Michigan 48018

This responds to your letter of August 3, 1984, seeking an interpretation of the requirements of Standard No. 201, Occupant Protection in Interior Impact. You specifically inquired about the application of the requirements of section S3.5 of the standard to four possible inner door panel designs Mazda is considering.

You explained that manufacturer-installed armrests originally were simple in design and only extended a short distance sufficient to provide actual support for the arm or elbow of an occupant, but that currently manufacturers "employ inner door panel designs that embody a continous and, in some cases, quite elaborate protrusion that extend the entire length of the door and serve many additional functions, often aimed at occupant convenience." You are concerned about whether the entire inner panel design would be considered an armrest.

You enclosed a drawing of four potential designs for an "inner door panel projection...that incorporate, in addition to a specific location that would be literally considered an armrest, ...other convenience functions. These additional functions, placed in remote locations from an occupant's trajectory during an impact, might include the door handle, power window switches, ashtrays, map pockets and remote side door mirror controls." You asked whether the entire designs would have to comply with section S3.5.1(b), which you understand applies to the whole armrest. You also asked how the designs could be changed to comply with section S3.5.1(a) or (c) and whether the agency's interpretation would differ if the designs were changed so that certain portions of the design were separate components.

First, I want to confirm that the requirements of S3.5.1(b), as with the requirements of S3.5.1(a), of the standard apply to the entire armrest, while S3.5.1(c) is limited to a portion of the armrest within the pelvic impact area. Based on a review of the four designs, we have concluded that the shaded and unshaded portions of each design would be considered an armrest since each design is an integral unit which provides an area for an occupant to rest his or her arm. We cannot comment on how these designs could be changed to comply with sections S3.5.1(a) or (c) since your letter does not explain why you consider it impracticable to meet the requirements of those sections of the standard.

The agency's answer would differ if the designs shown in Figures 1, 2 and 4 were changed so that the shaded areas of those designs were a separate component located away from what you have labeled the literal armrest and had features, such as power window switches, installed in them which would preclude their use as a conventional armrest. As to Figure 3, if the shaded portion of the design which does not have a portion of the "literal armrest" on top of it were likewise moved and included functions to preclude its use to rest the arm, the agency would not consider it an armrest. It would appear that, because of the large size of the entire shaded area shown in Figure 3, you might not be able to separate it and include sufficient design features to preclude its use as an armrest. If that could be done, the agency, again, would not consider it an armrest.

As shown by your careful discussion of the purpose of the armrest requirements of the standard, you are aware that the agency is concerned about reducing injuries caused by any protrusion in the vehicle. If you decide to modify your designs so that certain portions would not be considered armrests covered by the standard, I urge you to utilize a design which will minimize occupant injuries.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel 3 August 1984

Mr. Frank Berndt Office of Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Re: Interpretation of FMVSS 201, Occupant Protection in Interior Impact

Dear Mr. Berndt,

Mazda respectfully requests consideration of this letter seeking the interpretation of terminology used in S3.5, Armrests, of FMVSS 201, Occupant Protection in Interior Impact.

Mazda understands that the requirements of S3.5.1(b) apply to the entire "armrest". This term has been generically used to define a protrusion mounted on the inner door panel and situated in such a manner as to allow an occupant to comfortably and conveniently rest their arm or elbow. The goal was to relieve the occupant of the fatigue that often accompanies automobile trips of extended length and provide a stable platform for the driver that decreases uneven and unnecessary movement. Originally, manufacturers installed "armrests" that were quite simple in design and extended along the length of the door only a significant distance to actually provide support to the occupant. Currently, however, many manufacturers employ inner door panel designs that embody a continuous and, in some cases, quite elaborate protrusion that extend the entire length of the door and serve many additional functions, often aimed at occupant convenience.

It is in this context that some confusion arises. The obvious intent of S3.5.1 was and is to protect the occupant from potentially injurious collisions with the inner door panel. Indeed, S3.5.1(c) refers specifically to the "pelvic impact area", presumably as the location of greatest possible risk. However, S3.5.1(a) and S3.5.1(b) apply to the entire "armrest" and, in the case of designs mentioned previously, could thereby be applicable to the entire length of the inner door panel, including those locations of the inner door panel that the lower body of an occupant would not contact under an impact situation. Therefore, a possible design that could assist in the overall goal of providing occupant convenience may be prohibited by strict implementation of the term "armrest".

Mazda has conceived four possible design configurations for an inner door panel projection (see Figures 1-4) that incorporate, in addition to a specific location that would be literally considered an armrest and therefore in compliance with S3.5.1 (b) (Mazda currently considers it impractical to utilize the requirements of S3.5.1 (a) or S3.5.1 (c) relative to the depicted configurations), other convenience functions. These additional functions, placed in remote locations from an occupant's trajectory during an impact, might include the door handle, power window switches, ashtrays, map pockets and remote side door mirror controls.

Therefore, upon consideration of the preceding remarks, please examine the inner door panel configurations depicted and discuss them individually. Also, please offer any comments, suggestions or recommendations that might serve to insure adequate occupant protection, compliance with FMVSS 201, S3.5.1 (b) and maximum design flexibility. Further, please comment on the efficacy of modifying the configurations depicted so that compliance with S3.5.1 (a) or S3.5.1 (c) might be possible. Finally, please discuss any relevance that the continuity of the projection might impart on your interpretation; for example, the shaded area shown in Figures 1-4 being a separate component or piece.

Your consideration is most appreciated.

Thank you.

H. Moriyoshi Executive Vice President and General Manager HM/mls

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 10/03/84

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Rodger I. Bloch, Sales & Marketing Director, Scott Air, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Rodger I. Bloch Sales & Marketing Director Lavelle Road, P.O. Box 1745 Alamogordo, NM 88310

Dear Mr. Block:

This responds to your letter of August 15, 1984, concerning the application of Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, to an air conditioning system you supply to school bus manufacturers. You explained that your system taps into the fuel system of the school bus. If your system is installed by a manufacturer as an item of original equipment on a school bus, the manufacturer of the bus, is required by Part 567, Certification, to certify that the vehicle with the auxiliary air conditioner complies with all applicable standards, including Standard No. 301.

If you are installing the air conditioners on the vehicle before its sale to its first purchaser for purposes other than resale, then you would be considered a vehicle alterer and under Part 567.7 be required to certify that the vehicle as altered complies with all applicable standards.

In addition, you, in effect, asked about how a manufacturer or alterer demonstrates that it has exercised due care in making its certification of compliance. The agency has recently written Blue Bird Body Co. concerning this issue and I am enclosing a copy of that letter.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

Enclosure

August 15, 1984

Dear Mr. Burndt:

Scott Air is a manufacturer of bus air comfort systems (air conditioning). It has been called to our attention by a manufacturer of school buses, that FMVSS 301-75 relating to fuel integrity was a concern to them. They have taken all steps to certify compliance to this standard. We are now supplying a self contained air conditioning system that is skirt mounted on the drivers side.

Our system is mounted to the chasis of the vehicle and incased in a steel housing, it is protected also by the steel brackets, by which it is mounted, as well as, the vehicle itself. Please see the enclosed photo's. We are tapping into the original certified fuel system of the vehicle and our system holds only about 6.5 ounces of fuel.

I have been talking to Mr. Taylor Vincent of your staff and also Mr. Tom Grubbs with the engineering department. They have both indicated we should be able to secure a DO CARE certification. Would you or your staff be so kind as to issue instructions to me, so I can proceed in this matter.

Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely, Rodger I. Bloch Sales & Marketing Director ds Enclosure: omitted.

ID: 1985-04.32

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 11/19/85

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: The Honorable Tony P. Hall

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Thank you for your letter to Administrator Steed on behalf of your constituent, Mr. C. Daniel Raisch, Superintendent of the Oakwood City School District, regarding the school bus regulations issued by this agency. Your letter has been referred to my office for reply.

Superintendent Raisch is concerned with the manner in which our regulations are applied to school vans that carry 10 or more passengers. He believes that only 10 persons are allowed to be transported in a van, and requests that this number be increased to 12. You inquired into a waiver from this agency that would permit the Oakwood City School District to transport more than 10 school children in a school van.

I appreciate this opportunity to clarify our regulations for school buses. To begin, I would like to emphasize that Federal law does not prohibit schools from carrying more than 10 passengers in a school van. Federal law does, however, affect the sale of buses to schools. Our regulations would permit the sale of new 12-passenger vans to the Oakwood City School District if the seller can ensure that the van meets all applicable motor vehicle safety standards, including the safety standards we issued in 1977 for school buses.

Some background information on this subject may be helpful. Our agency has the authority, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, to issue motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles, including school buses. In 1974, Congress expressly amended the Vehicle Safety Act to direct this agency to issue motor vehicle safety standards on various aspects of school bus performance, such as seating systems, fuel systems, windows and windshields, and emergency exits. The standards we issued became effective April 1, 1977, and apply to each school bus manufactured after that date.

The Vehicle Safety Act requires any person selling a new "school bus" to ensure that the vehicle complies with our school bus safety standards. Under our regulations, a new vehicle designed for carrying 11 or more persons (including the driver) is considered to be a "bus," and is considered to be a "school bus" if sold for school-related purposes. 49 C.F.R. 571.3(b). Thus, new 12-passenger vans sold to the Oakwood City School District are included in our definition of a "school bus," and may be sold to the school district if they meet our school bus safety standards. If any new vehicle does not meet those standards, the seller may be required to recall the vehicle and to pay civil penalties.

Superintendent Raisch suggested that NHTSA grant a waiver permitting manufacturers to sell 12-passenger vans as school buses when those vans do not comply with the school bus safety standards. While section 123 of the Vehicle Safety Act authorizes NHTSA to issue temporary exemptions of motor vehicles from our motor vehicle safety standards, our agency has no general waiver authority. Under @ 123, our authority to grant exemption is limited to certain very specific conditions involving a limited number of vehicles. Therefore, NHTSA has no authority to provide the type of relief your constituent requests.

Mr. Raisch may also be suggesting that we change our definition of a "school bus" to permit the sale of new 12-passenger vans as school buses when those vans do not meet our school bus safety standards. At this time, we have no reason to believe that such a change would be in the interest of school bus safety. Our safety standards for school buses were developed to specify comprehensive requirements for school buses that would reduce the number of school bus fatalities and the severity of injuries. Amending our definition of a "school bus" along the lines suggested by Mr. Raisch would restrict the applicability of our school bus safety standards to a smaller group of vehicles than buses presently subject to those standards. The safety record of school buses since the issuance of our school bus safety standards in April 1977 has been remarkable, and we believe that school vans carrying 10 or more passengers should continue to afford the high levels of passenger protection currently required for school buses.

I hope this information is helpful. Please feel free to contact this agency if you have any further questions.

SINCERELY,

Congress of the United States house of Representatives

September 30, 1985

Honorable Diane Steed Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Ms. Steed:

I am enclosing copies of correspondence I received from C. Daniel Raisch, Superintendent of School for Oakwood, Ohio. You will note that Mr. Raisch is seeking a waiver of the number of students which can be transported in school vans. He makes the point that today's vans are built to accommodate twelve individuals.

I would appreciate your review of this suggestion and your comments with respect to the possibility of waivers being permitted.

Tony P. Hall Member of Congress

ENCLS.

September 18, 1985

Rick Carne

Dear Mr. Rick Carne: Earlier this month I discussed with one of the representatives from your Dayton office the issue concerning the minimum number of student passengers permitted transportation in a van before the van must be equipped as a bus.

Currently, the number is ten persons allowed transportation in a van. I am requesting the number be elevated to twelve. This request is based primarily upon the fact that most vans built today are designed to accomodate twelve passengers.

Attached is a document which should aid in your review of the request.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this request.

C. Daniel Raisch Superintendent

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

Notice Expires September 1, 1977

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Implementing Highway Safety Program Standard 17, Pupil Transportation Safety

PURPOSE:

To provide new NHTSA information regarding:

a) definition of "school bus;"

b) interpretation of "to and from school;" and,

c) implementation/affect for NHTSA and the various State and local jurisdictions.

BACKGROUND:

1-Definition of "School Bus":

NHTSA regulates the manufacture of school buses under the National Traffic and Motor Vehilce Safety Act of 1966 and the operation of school buses under the Highway Safety Act of 1966. Regulations under these Acts have provided somewhat differing, although not conflicting, definitions of school bus.

Congress, in passing the Motor Vehicle and School Bus Safety Almendments of 1974, defined "school bus" in terms of function rather than design. In line with this undate, all vehicles manufactured on or after April 1, 1977, which are designed for carrying more than 10 persons and which are sold or introduced in (Illegible Word) (Illegible Word) for purposes that include carrying students to and from school or related events, shall be considered school buses. In keeping with the (Illegible Word) of Congress as reflected in the legislative history of the 1974 amendments, these vehicles will be required to be equipped with a system of signal lamps conforming to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108.

Discussion related to the change may be found in the Federal Register for December 31, 1973, 40 FR 60033 (See Attachment "A") and August 26, 1976, 41 FR 36026 (See Attachment "B").

2 - Interpretation of "to and from school":

In an opinion dated May 5, 1977, the NHTSA's Chief Counsel has ruled that the phrase," to and from school in paragraph III of Highway Safety Program Standard 17, as interpreted in Notice 900, (dated April 11, 1974) is excessively narrow, and that the phrase should include any trip for a school-related event. However, buses in operation prior to April 1, 1977, for use soley in the transportation of students to and from school related events will not be required to meet the requirements of Standard 17. For ease of reference, see:

Attachment "C" Notice 900, Q and A #5, dated April 11, 1974 Attachment "D" Counsel Memo, May 5, 1977.

IMPLEMENTATION/EFFECT:

1 - Definition of "school bus" and identification and marking requirements:

Effective April 1, 1977, the definition of "school bus" in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR @ 571.3) reads as follows:

"School bus" means a bus that is sold or introduced in interstate (Illegible Word), for purposes that include carrying students to and from school or related events, but does not include a bus designed and sold for operation as a common carrier in urban transportation.

The definition for "bus" (49 CFR @ 571.3) will continue to read as follows:

"Bus" means a motor vehicle with motive power, except a trailer, designed for carrying more than 10 persons.

Therefore, the impact on ESPS #17 is as follows:

In addition to all Type I vehicles, this new definition of "school bus" will include many of the van-type vehicles that are classified as Type II school vehicles under ESPS #17. If a Type II van is designed to carry more than 10 persons, and if it is sold for purposes that include "carrying students to and from school or related events," it will have to be sold with all the equipment specified for school buses by the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. It will, therefore, have to have school bus lights as specified by the Standard on lighting (49 CFR @ 371.108).

Since these vehicles will be equipped with the school bus lighting system, ESPS #17, Section IV.3.5, requires that they comply with two other requirements for identifying school buses; i.e., they must be painted, "National School Bus Glossy Fellow," and be identified format and rear with the words SCHOOL BUS. Of course, vehicles manufactured before April 1, 1977, will not be subject to this new requirement.

2 - Interpretation of "to and from school" Effective May 5, 1977, NHTSA's position is that "to and from school" includes any trip to and from school or school related events.

Previous interpretation/definitions in NHTSA Notices, correspondence, or program manuals/materials are hereby superseded.

Fred W. Vetter

ATTACHMENTS

ID: 571.108--NCC-230201-001 LED Headlights_ M. Baker

February 13, 2024

Mr. Mark Baker, B.S.E.E. Soft Lights

9450 SW Gemini Drive PMB 44671

Beaverton, OR 97008

mbaker@softlights.org

Dear Mr. Baker:

This responds to your letter and email dated June 27, 2021 and October 31, 2021, respectively, regarding the legal status and safety of motor vehicle headlamps that use light-emitting diode (LED) technology as the light source. Please note that our answer below is based on our understanding of the specific information provided in your letter and email.

You ask about the “legality of LED headlights.” You state your belief that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 108 does not regulate “peak luminance, absolute spectral power distribution or flicker” and that the standard “only applies to spherical emitters such as tungsten- filament and gas-discharge and is not applicable to non-uniform luminance flat-source emitters such as LED chips.” You ask whether it is “NHTSA’s position that FMVSS No. 108 is only applicable to uniform luminance emitters which can be regulated by setting maximums for luminous intensity without the need of setting peak luminance maximums” and whether “NHTSA [has] approved the use of spatially heterogeneous visible radiation for use as the light source used in vehicle headlights.” You state your concerns about adverse health impacts due to the performance characteristics of LEDs, such as high peak luminance, high-color temperature, high-energy blue wavelength light, and flicker. You request NHTSA’s opinion about the “sufficiency” of FMVSS No. 108 regarding these health concerns.

We understand you to use “uniform luminance emitters” to refer to filament (halogen/tungsten) and high-intensity discharge (HID) light sources, and “non-uniform” or “heterogenous emitter” to refer to LED light sources. We therefore understand you to be asking whether LEDs are legal as a light source in motor vehicle headlamps under FMVSS No. 108, and, if they are legal, what is NHTSA’s position on the safety of LED light sources in headlamps with respect to “eye safety, mental safety, and visual performance.”

Background

NHTSA is authorized by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301) to issue FMVSS that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. The Safety Act requires manufacturers to self-certify that their vehicles and equipment conform to all applicable FMVSS in effect on the date of manufacture. NHTSA also investigates safety-related defects.

FMVSS No. 108, “Lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment,” applies to “[p]assenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, trailers (except pole trailers and trailer converter dollies), and motorcycles” and covers, among other things, “original and replacement lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment” for motor vehicles. The standard specifies performance requirements for headlamps. The most common types of headlamps are integral beam (S10.14) and replaceable bulb (S10.15, S11) headlamps.

NHTSA has stated that LED light sources are permitted as part of an integral beam headlamp if they are wired in series such that a failure of one LED would cause all the LEDs to cease functioning, and they otherwise comply with all relevant FMVSS.1 Paragraph S4 of FMVSS

No. 108 defines an integral beam headlamp as “a headlamp … comprising an integral and indivisible optical assembly including lens, reflector, and light source, except that a headlamp conforming to paragraph S10.18.8 or paragraph S10.18.9 may have a lens designed to be replaceable.” The standard does not contain performance requirements for a light source that is part of an integral beam headlamp, but instead specifies performance requirements for the complete headlamp. These include (among other things) photometry, through minimum and maximum candela at specified test points,2 color, which must remain within specified boundaries,3 and that the headlamp be steady burning.4

While LED light sources that are part of an integral beam headlamp are permitted as noted above, no LED light source is currently permitted to be used in a replaceable bulb headlamp. FMVSS No. 108 contains specific requirements for the replaceable light sources (i.e., bulbs) used in replaceable bulb headlamps. These requirements are intended to support light source interchangeability. Paragraph S11 of the standard requires that “[e]ach replaceable light source must be designed to conform to the dimensions and electrical specifications furnished with respect to it pursuant to part 564 of this chapter[.]”5 Part 564 requires that replaceable bulb manufacturers submit to NHTSA for review and acceptance various design specifications for the bulb. If accepted, this design information is then placed in a publicly available docket to facilitate the manufacture and use of those light sources. As of the date of this letter, no submission that includes LEDs as the light source for a replaceable bulb headlamp has been listed in the docket. Therefore, no LED replaceable light source may be used in a replaceable bulb headlamp.

Discussion

Pursuant to FMVSS No. 108, paragraphs S4 and S10.14, LEDs are allowed to be used as a light source in integral beam headlamps as long as the headlamp conforms to all applicable headlamp requirements in FMVSS No. 108. However, LEDs are not currently permitted in a replaceable bulb headlamp. Nevertheless, illegal LED headlamp replaceable light sources may be available for purchase on the internet, and although these lights do not conform to the requirements of FMVSS No. 108, some consumers purchase and install these LED light sources in their replaceable bulb headlamps. While NHTSA regulates the manufacture and sale of light sources, it generally does not regulate the modifications individuals make to their own vehicles. It is therefore left to State law to address installation of an LED replaceable light source in a headlamp.

FMVSS No. 108 does not directly regulate what you describe as peak luminance as measured in nits or the spectral power distribution of the headlamp light source. However, this is indirectly regulated through the headlamp performance requirements, such as the photometry and chromaticity requirements. Additionally, flicker is regulated through the requirement that lower beam headlamps be steady burning. We also note that, although FMVSS No. 108 requires that the light emitted by headlamps be white, the permissible boundary of white includes colors that may be perceived by the human eye as white with a yellow tint and white with a blue tint.6

In your communications, you raise concerns about the health impacts of LED headlamps. We are aware of concerns raised about possible adverse effects of certain LED devices, particularly as used in street lighting that emits excess blue light.7 NHTSA’s focus is on automotive safety, but the agency recognizes that separate expertise resides in sister agencies that are health-focused, such as the Food and Drug Administration.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Eli Wachtel of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,
 

John Donaldson
Acting Chief Counsel

1 Letter from Stephen Wood, Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Takayuki Amma, Manager, Koito Manufacturing Co. (Dec. 21, 2005). Letter from O. Kevin Vincent, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Junichi Hasegawa, Stanley Electric Co. (Apr. 8, 2013). Interpretation letters are available on NHTSA’s online interpretations database at https://www.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa-interpretation-file-search.

2 Photometry requirements for headlamp systems can be found in FMVSS No. 108, Tables XVIII and XIX.

3 See FMVSS No. 108, Table I-a (headlamp color). Chromaticity requirements are pursuant to FMVSS No. 108 S14.4.

4See FMVSS No. 108 Tables I-(a and c). NHTSA has stated that “steady burning” means “light that is essentially unvarying in intensity.” See Letter from Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to United Sidecar Association, Inc. (Feb. 9, 1982). A device may fail to meet this requirement where the driver “would not see a signal that was consistent or reliable in its meaning.” See Letter from Paul Jackson Rice, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Bob Abernathy, Idea’s Inc. (Sept. 7, 1990) (applying steady burning in a taillamps context). In the context of a modulating motorcycle headlamp, we have stated that “there is no failure to conform if the modulating light from the lamp is perceived to be a steady beam.” Letter from John Womack, Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Joe De Sousa (March 10, 1994).

5 See Letter from John Womack, Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Nancy Tavarez, Beitrix Industries (Aug. 30, 1995) (clarifying application of Part 564 to replaceable headlamp bulbs).

6 Letter from Frank Seales, Jr., Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Richard Hodson, (July 4, 2000) (stating that “SAE J578c defines white by blue, yellow, green, red, and purple boundaries within a chromaticity diagram. Thus, it is possible to design a headlamp that emits a light that approaches the blue boundary and is perceived as having a blue tint but which nevertheless remains within the boundaries that define "white." These headlamps would comply with the color requirements of Standard No. 108.”).

7 See “AMA adopts guidance to reduce harm from high intensity street lights,” American Medical Association, June 14, 2016, available at https://www.ama-assn.org/press-center/press-releases/ama-adopts-guidance-reduce-harm-high- intensity-street-lights.

ID: 86-5.28

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 10/01/86

TITLE: TEXT OF THE RULING BY THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT UPHOLDING THE STATE'S LAW REQUIRING SEAT BELT USE BY DRIVERS AND FRONT SEAT PASSENGERS IN AUTOMOBILES

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 07/32/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS; REDBOOK A31; STANDARD 208 LETTER DATED 07/11/89 FROM BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS TO STEVE WOOD -- NHTSA

TEXT: Docket Nos. 62719, 62799, 63705, 63224 cons -- Agenda 40 -- May 1986.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS et al., Appellants, v. ELIZABETH J. KOHRIG et al., Appellees.

PER CURIAM: The defendants in these four consolidated cases were issued traffic citations for failure to wear seat safety belts while operating their motor vehicles on a street or highway in violation of section 12-603.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1 (hereinafter the section).) In each case, the trial court concluded that the section was unconstitutional and dismissed the charge. The State appealed each case directly to this court pursuant to our Rule 302(a) (94 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)), and the cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal. Only two of the four defendants -- Elizabeth J. Kohrig and Regina L. Greene -- have filed briefs in this court; however, various parties have been permitted to file briefs as amicus curiae.

At issue is whether the section, which requires drivers of motor vehicles and their front-seat passengers to wear safety belts when driving on a public highway or street, violates the due process guarantees of the State and Federal constitutions. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 2; U.S. Const., amend. XIV, sec. 1.

The section, which became effective on July 1, 1985, provides in part:

"(a) Each driver and front seat passenger of a motor vehicle operated on a street or highway in this State shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt; except that, a child less than 6 years of age shall be protected as required pursuant to the Child Passenger Protection Act. Each driver of a motor vehicle transporting a child 6 years of age or more, but less than 16 years of age, in the front seat of a motor vehicle shall secure the child in a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(a).)

The statute also provides that certain persons are exempt from complying with the seat-belt-use requirement, including persons with a written medical waiver from a physician or government agency; those persons frequently stopping and leaving the vehicle or delivering property from the vehicle if its speed between stops does not exceed 15 miles per hour; and drivers operating a vehicle in reverse. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(b)(1),

(b)(4).) Certain vehicles also are exempt from the statute's requirements, including motorcycles, motorized pedalcycles, and vehicles manufactured prior to 1965. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(b)(5), (b)(9).) Violators of the section are guilty of a "petty offense and subject to a fine not to exceed $ 25." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.I(d).

At the outset we note that, in reviewing the constitutionality of Illinois' mandatory-seat-belt law, this court does not join in the debate over whether the law is desirable or necessary. Our nation was founded in large part on the democratic principle that the powers of government are to be exercised by the people through their elected representatives in the legislature, subject only to certain constitutional limitations. Although this court has never hesitated to invalidate laws that it believes to be unconstitutional, we emphasize that our role is a limited one. The issue here in "not what the legislature should do but what the legislature can do." City of Wichita v. While (1970), 205 Kan. 408, 409, 469 P.2d 287, 288.

Defendant Greene contends that the section violates her fundamental right to privacy protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. (U.S. Const., amend XIV, sec. 2.) Additionally, both defendants argue that the section is beyond the police powers of the legislature and thus violates the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. We first turn to the issue of whether the section violates defendants' fundamental right to privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment.

Regulations that limit a person's constitutional right to privacy may be justified only by a "'compelling state interest,'" and the legislation "must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." (Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 155, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 178, 93 S. Ct. 705, 728. See also Carey v. Population Services International (1977), 431 U.S. 678, 686, 52 L.Ed. 2d 675, 685, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016.) However, "'only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" [citation]'" (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 65, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 462, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2639, quoting Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 152, 35 L. Ed.2d 147, 176, 93 S. Ct. 705, 726), or those liberties "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'" (Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L.Ed. 2d 140, 146, 106 S.

Ct. 2841, 2844; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 52 L. Ed.2d 531, 540, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938) are included in the right of privacy guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has selected only a few rights for such an esteemed status: the "privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 65, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 462, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2639. See Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 148, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2346; Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 712-13, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 420-21, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1166.

Moreover, recognizing that a court is "most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution," the Supreme Court has emphasized that there should be "great resistance" to further expanding the substantive due process right of privacy. (Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L. Ed.2d 140, 148, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846.) Thus, attempts by litigants to expand the privacy right beyond matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relations, abortion, child rearing and education have largely been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (right to privacy does not encompass right to engage in homosexual sodomy); Kelley v. Johnson (1977), 425 U.S. 231, 244, 47 L. Ed. 2d 708, 714, 96 S. Ct. 1440, 1444 (police officer does not have privacy right to choose hairstyle); Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (no privacy protection of reputation); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (privacy right does not encompass right of adults to watch obscene movies in places of public accommodation).

In the present case it cannot be said that defendant Greene's claimed right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt on a public highway resembles those liberties identified by the Supreme Court as being included in the right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. Although the section in question implicates a person's interest in "liberty" in the sense that it restricts his freedom of choice, the law here does not regulate those intimate

decisions relating to marriage, procreation, child rearing, education or family that have heretofore been recognized as deserving of heightened constitutional protection. (See Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d , 495 N.Y.S. 2d 591 (mandatory-seat-belt-use law does not violate right of privacy). Cf. People v. Thomas (1984), 159 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 18, 206 Cal. Rptr. 84 (statute requiring the securing of a child passenger in a seat-restraint system does not infringe on defendant's fundamental right of privacy); State v. Fetterly (1969), 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996 (motorcycle helmet law does not violate defendant's right of privacy).) Nor do we think that the right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed" (Palko v. Connecticut (1937), 302 U.S. 319, 325-26, 82 L. Ed. 288, 292, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152), or a liberty "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" (Moore v. East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 540, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938). The States historically have been given a wide latitude to regulate the use of motor vehicles (Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. (1959), 359 U.S. 520, 530, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1003, 1010, 79 S. Ct. 962, 968), and the individual driver's autonomy on the road has, out of necessity for the public safety and welfare, been significantly curtailed by State regulation. Like the court in Bisenius v. Karns (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed (1969), 395 U.S. 709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 655, 89 S. Ct. 2033, we reject any notion that the right of privacy includes the right to "do one's thing" on an expressway:

"There is no place where any such right to be let alone would be less assertable than on a modern highway with cars, trucks, busses and cycles whizzing by at sixty or seventy miles an hour. When one ventures onto such a highway, he must be expected and required to conform to public safety regulations and controls, including some that would neither have been necessary nor reasonable in the era of horse-drawn vehicles." (42 Wis. 2d 42, 55, 165 N.W.2d 377, 384.)

We are unwilling to graft onto the Constitution a right of privacy to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt where there is no textual basis or a clear historical precedent for such a right in the language of the Constitution or the opinions of the Supreme Court. To do so woul be to place the court in a position of acting as a super legislature,

nullifying laws it does not like. That is not our proper role in a democratic society. Therefore, we hold that the section does not infringe upon defendant's fundamental right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. Neither does it infringe upon any right to privacy arising under the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 6).

Defendants also argue that the section does not further the health, safety or welfare of the general public, asserting that the statute only protects the safety of the individual driver and passenger. They contend that since the section interferes with their right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt, and has no corresponding public benefit, the statute exceeds the State's police power and violates the due process guarantees of the State and Federal constitutions.

It is well established that the legislatures, not the courts, have the primary role in our democratic society in deciding what the interests of the public require and in selecting the measures necessary to secure those interests. (City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 111, 115; Memorial Gardens Association, Inc. v. Smith (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 116, 127.) Recognizing the legislature's broad power to provide for the public health, welfare and safety, the courts are hesitant to second-guess a legislative determination that a law is desirable or necessary. Only when the statute in question affects a fundamental constitutional right will the courts subject the legislation to strict or exacting scrutiny. In such cases, the State must have a "compelling" purpose for the law and show that it's goals cannot be accomplished by less restrictive means. (Carey v. Population Services International (1977), 431 U.S. 678, 686, 52 L. Ed. 2d 675, 685, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016.) Few rights, however, have been identified as "fundamental," since only those rights "that lie at the heart of the relationship between the individual and a republican form of nationally integrated government" are deemed deserving of heightened judicial scrutiny. (People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 88, 97.) Thus, in most cases involving substantive due process challenges to statutes, the courts give substantial deference to the legislative enactments.

In the present case we already have determined that the section here involved does not infringe upon the defendants' right of privacy protected by the fourteenth

amendment, and defendants do not argue that the statute implicates any other fundamental constitutional right or liberty. As such, the State need not show a "compelling interest" for the law. It is sufficient that there is a rational basis for the statute. That is, the law will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464; Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368; Hayen v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 419; Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 443, 453.) Under the rational-basis test, a statute is presumed to be valid, and the party challenging the statute has the burden of proving that the statute is irrational. (Hayen v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 419; Pozner v. Mauck (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 250, 255.) As long as there is a conceivable basis for finding a rational relationship, the law will be upheld. McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420, 426, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 399, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1105; Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368.

In challenging the section as exceeding the scope of the State's police power, the defendants principally rely on the case of People v. Fries (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 446. In Fries the court held that a statute requiring the operator or passenger of a motorcycle to wear protective headgear was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the purpose of the headgear requirement was to "safeguard the person wearing it" and was unrelated to the safety of the public at large. (42 Ill. 2d 446, 450.) It concluded that the statute constituted a "regulation of what is essentially a matter of personal safety" and exceeded the scope of the State's police power. (42 Ill. 2d 446, 450.) Here, too, defendants argue that the decision of whether or not to wear a safety belt is "essentially a matter of personal safety" and that any regulation restricting the individual's right to make such a decision exceeds the State's police power.

The State, on the other hand, maintains that Fries was wrongly decided, and it urges us to overrule that decision. It correctly notes that at present Fries stands alone in holding that a motorcycle helmet law is unconstitutional. The overwhelming weight of authority is that motorcycle-helmet laws are a valid exercise of the State's police

power. (See Kingery v. Chapple (Alaska 1972), 504 P.2d 831; State v. Beeman (1975), 25 Ariz. App. 83, 541 P.2d 409; Penney v. City of North Little Rock (1970), 248 Ark. 1158, 455 S.W.2d 132; Love v. Bell (1970), 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118;State v. Brady (Del. Super. 1972), 290 A.2d 322; Hamm v. State (Fla. 1980), 387 So. 2d 946; State v. Cotton (1973), 55 Hawaii 138, 516 P.2d 709; State v. Albertson (1970), 93 Idaho 640, 470 P.2d 300; City of Wichita v. White (1970), 205 Kan. 408, 469 P.2d 287; Everhardt v. City of New Orleans (1968) 253 La. 285, 217 So. 2d 400, appeal dismissed and cert. denied (1969), 395 U.S. 212, 23 L. Ed. 2d 214, 89 S. Ct. 1775; State v. Quinnam (Me. 1977), 367 A.2d 1032; Simon v. Sargent (D. Mass. 1972), 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463; Commonwealth v. Howie (1968), 354 Mass. 769, 238 N.E.2d 373, cert. denied (1968), 393 U.S. 999, 21 L. Ed. 2d 464, 89 S. Ct. 485; City of Adrian v. Poucher (1976) 398 Mich. 316, 247 N.W.2d 798; State v. Edwards (1970), 287 Minn. 83, 177 N.W.2d 40; State v. Cushman (Mo. 1970), 451 S.W.2d 17; State v. Eight Judicial District Court (1985), 101 Nev. 658, 708 P.2d 1022; State v. Merski (1973), 113 N.H. 323, 307 A.2d 825; State v. Krammes (1969), 105 N.J. Super. 345, 252 A.2d 223; City of Albuquerque v.Jones (1975), 87 N.M. 486, 535 P.2d 1337; People v. Bennett (1977), 89 Misc. 2d 382, 391 N.Y.S.2d 506; State v. Anderson (1969), 275 N.C. 168, 166 S.E.2d 49; State v. Odegaard (N.D. 1969), 165 N.W.2d 677; State v. Stouffer (1971), 28 Ohio App. 2d 229, 276 N.E.2d 651; Elliott v. City of Oklahoma City (Okla. Crim. App. 1970), 471 P.2d 944; State v. Fetterly (1969), 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996; Commonwealth v. Kautz (1985), 341 Pa. Super. 374, 491 A.2d 864; State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi (1968), 104 R.I. 28, 241 A.2d 625; Arutanoff v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County (1969), 223 Tenn. 535, 448 S.W.2d 408; Ex Parte Smith (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), 441 S.W.2d 544; State v. Acker (1971), 26 Utah 2d 104, 485 P.2d 1038; State v. Solomon (1969), 128 Vt. 197, 260 A.2d 377; State v. Laitinen (1969), 77 Wash. 2d 130, 459 P.2d 789; State v. Zektzer (1975), 13 Wash. App. 24, 533 P.2d 399, cert. denied (1975), 423 U.S. 1020, 46 L. Ed. 2d 392, 96 S. Ct. 457; Bisenius v. Karns (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed (1969), 395 U.S. 709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 655, 89 S. Ct. 2033.) Alternatively, the State contends that the statute being challenged here promotes valid public

interests and thus is distinguishable from the motorcycle helmet law found to be unconstitutional in Fries.

Defendants are correct in asserting that the primary goal of the section is to protect the individual driver and front-seat passenger from death or serious injury. As such, the statute interfers with the individuals' choice concerning his or her personal safety. However, arriving at those conclusions does not ipso facto mean that the law is devoid of any public benefit and is unconstitutional. Regardless of a law's primary objective, it will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose. (Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368-69; Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 I11. 2d 443, 453.) In that regard, the defendants have not persuaded us that the legislature could not have found that the law bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. The legislative debates clearly indicate that the legislators believed that safety-belt use would protect persons other than the belt wearers by helping drivers to maintain control of their vehicles, and that the law would promote that economic welfare of the State by reducing the public and private costs associated with serious injuries and deaths caused by automobile accidents.

During debates in the House of Representatives, a principal sponsor of the safety-belt legislation remarked:

"The Bill would not only protect drivers and passengers in the front seat, the Bill would also protect other people. It would protect other drivers. It would protect pedestrains on our highways and on our sidewalks. The reason for that, of course, is that even a minor * * * accident, can if * * * a car is driven by a person who doesn't have a seat belt, * * * result in that person losing control of the car and injuring other people on or about the car." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 212 (statement of Representative John Cullerton).)

Another legislator argues that if she were to drive an automobile without her safety belt fastened "and I lose control of my car, I am endangering others." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 223 (statement of Representative Josephine Oblinger).) The Governor, in signing the seat-belt law, also agreed that the law would help drivers to maintain control of their vehicles and avoid accidents with other motorists and pedestrians:

"Unbelted passengers in a motor vehicle literally become human projectiles in the event of a crash. Unbelted passengers

can interfere with the ability of an operator to respond to the collision, and unbelted drivers may lose control of a vehicle and thus cause death and injury to others." Letter of Governor James R. Thompson to the General Assembly indicating his intent to sign House Bill 2800 (Jan. 8, 1985).

The State can enact laws aimed at reducting traffic accidents, since such laws are clearly related to the health, welfare and safety of the public. We also believe that the legislature could rationally conclude that unbelted drivers and passengers endanger the safety of others. In upholding a law similar to the one here under review, the court in People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, stated:

"A driver who is injured or who is jolted away from his vehicle's controls during a skid or by an initial impact, may well be less able to prevent or minimize injuries caused by an accident. Also, an unrestrained occupant of a vehicle may injure others inside or out of the vehicle during an accident. The preventing or reduction of such an injury seems to the Court to be a valid State interest." (129 Misc. 2d 993, , 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963.)

It also is conceivable that drivers who wear safety belts are less likely to fall asleep at the wheel, or to lose control of their vehicles in situations where the driver must apply the brakes suddenly, or in cases where a vehicle begins to skid or swerve. Safety belts can also prevent passengers from being thrown against the driver. And, as the State observes, children and other occupants who are wearing safety belts are less likely to distract the driver. See People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, , 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963; Druhot, The Constitutionality of the Illinois Mandatory Seat Belt Use Legislation, 74 Ill. B.J. 290, 296 (1986); Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach To Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 217, 244 (1980).

Defendants argue that there is no statistical evidence showing that seat-belt use helps the driver to maintain control of his vehicle and avoid accidents with other motorists or pedestrains. Even assuming this argument is correct, it is without merit. "The fact that a congressional directive reflects unprovable assumptions about what is good for the people * * * is not a sufficient reason to find that statute unconstitutional" (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 62, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 460, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2638), and a court "will not disturb a police regulation merely where there is room for a difference of

opinion as to its wisdom, necessity and expendiency." (City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 I11. 2d 111, 115. See also Schuringa v. City of Chicago (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 504, 515.) Moreover, "the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464.) Here, we think that the legislature could rationally determine that the seat-belt-use law would serve the public safety and welfare by reducing the likelihood that a driver would lose control of his vehicle and jeopardize other motorists or pedestrians.

Another reason advanced by the State for the section is that the law promotes the economic welfare of the State by reducing the public costs associated with serious injuries and deaths caused by automobile accidents. The legislative history of the section indicates that legislators were concerned about the financial costs associated with highway accidents. Representative Cullerton remarked that, the safety-belt legislation "would clearly save money," asserting that "it cost the State over 800,000 dollars for a 26 year old person who is made a paraplegic as a result of a car crash." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 212 (statement of Representative John Cullerton).) Another Representative stated: "The lives we were save and the injuries that we avoid are the injuries and lives that we, the taxpayers, are very likely to be responsible for in the long run. We're not talking about somebody's own individual decision to end up in a car crash and find him or herself in a hospital for 20 years with that individual paying the bill. It's the taxpayers that are going to be paying those bills." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 220 (statement of Barbara Currie).) Senator James Philip, in urging passage of the seat-belt law, observed that " in 1982 in Illinois some seventy-five people were killed in automobiles [while] performing their job * * *. This costs Illinois employers some twelve million dollars." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Debates, June 21, 1984, at 159 (statement of Senator James Philip).) Senator Dawn Netsch remarked: "We intrude because the consequences of the thousands of people * * * who are injured and whose affictions then are passed on

to their families, to all of us in society * * *." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Debates, June 21, 1984, at 162 (statement of Senator Dawn Netsch).) Governor Thompson, in explaining his reasons for signing the legislation, estimated that the seat belt law would "save more than 300 lives in Illinois in the first year, will avoid nearly 43,000 injuries and save more than $ 400 million in costs." Letter of Governor James R. Thompson to the General Assembly indicating his intent to sign House Bill 2800 (Jan. 8, 1985).

It cannot be seriously questioned that the police power may be used to promote the economic welfare of the State, its communities and its citizens. "[I]n the interest of general welfare, the police power may be exercised to protect citizens and their businesses in financial and economic matters, [and] it may be exercised to protect the governments itself against potential financial loss." (Sherman-Reynolds, Inc. v. Mahin (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 323, 326.) A law whose aim is to reduce the private and public costs resulting from injuries and deaths caused by motor vehicle accidents is therefore within the police power of the State. In finding that a motorcycle helmet law was rationally related to the public welfare, the court in Simon v. Sargent (D. Mass. 1972), 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463, stated:

"From the moment of the injury, society picks the person up off the highway; delivers him to a municipal hospital and municipal doctors; provides him with unemployment compensation if, after recovery, he cannot replace his lost job, and, if the injury causes permanent disability, may assume the responsibility for his and his family's continued subsistence. We do not understand a state of mind that permits plaintiff to think that only he himself is concerned." (346 F. Supp. 277, 279, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463.)

Because of the drain on private and public financial resources caused by highway accidents, society has a legitimate interest in minimizing injuries which result from such accidents. See Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d 495 N.Y.S.2d 591; People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960; State v. Eighth Judicial District Court (1985), 101 Nev. 658, 708 P.2d 1022; State v. Beeman (1975), 25 Ariz. App. 83, 541 P.2d 409; Love v. Bell (1970), 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118; See also Druhot, The Constitutionality of the Illinois Mandatory Seat belt Use Legislation, 74 Ill. B.J. 290 (1986); Note, The Illinois Seat Belt Law: Should those Who Ride Decide?, 19 John

Marshall L. Rev. 193 (1985); Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve, St. L. Rev. 217, 222 (1980).

Defendants make several arguments concerning the effectiveness of safety belts in reducing injuries and arguments regarding the merits of alternative safety devices such as air bags. Defendants also contend that in some instances safety belts may cause injuries instead of preventing them. We need not consider these arguments, however, since they are proper subjects of discussion for the legislature, not the courts. (Hayden v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 421; City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 111, 115; Pozner v. Mauck (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 250, 255.) We believe that the General Assembly could reasonably assume that a law requiring drivers and front-seat passengers to wear safety belts will reduce traffic-related injuries and fatalities. (Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d , 495 N.Y.S.2d 591; People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960.) Therefore, we hold that section 12.603.1 does not violate the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. To the extent that People v. Fries (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 446, is inconsistent with our opinion, it is overruled.

Defendant Greene also filed a motion to strike certain portions of the briefs and appendices filed by the State and certain parties amicus curiae. This motion was taken with the case. Our review of the record shows that certain safety statistics relied on by the State and the amicus were not presented in the trial courts. Accordingly, defendant Greene's motion to strike this information is allowed.

For the reasons stated the judgments of the circuit courts of Marion, Effingham, Fayette and Champaign counties in cause Nos. 62719, 62799, 63705 and 63224 are reversed, and said causes are remanded to those respective courts for further proceedings.

Motion allowed;

judgments reversed;

causes remanded.

CLARK, C.J., and SIMON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

ID: nht76-1.40

DATE: 02/18/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R. B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Miller Spreader Company

COPYEE: MR. WELTZER -- REGION OFC. V

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of January 1, 1976, to Regional Office V of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), concerning whether your company's spreader product must comply with the requirements of Federal motor vehicle safety standards and regulations, paricularly Standard No. 119, New Pneumatic Tires.

The NHTSA issues safety standards and regulations for "motor vehicles." Section 102(3) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act defines a motor vehicle as a vehicle "manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways." Thus, a motor vehicle is a vehicle which the manufacturer expects will use public highways as part of its intended function. The primary function of some vehicles is of a mobile, workperforming nature, and, as such, their manufacturer contemplates a primary use of the highway. Mobile cranes, rigs, and towed equipment such as chippers and pull-type street sweepers that travel at a normal highway speed are examples in this area. These motor vehicles qualify as trucks or trailers. As such they are subject to the Federal motor vehicle safety standards and regulations. On the basis of the information you have sent us your company's towed paver appears to be in this category of vehicles, and would therefore be considered a "motor vehicle."

There are some vehicles which are excepted from the motor vehicle classification despite their use on the highway. Highway maintenance and contruction equipment, lane stripers, self-propelled asphalt pavers, and other vehicles whose maximum speed does not exceed 20 mph and whose abnormal configuration distinguishes them from the traffic flow are not considered motor vehicles. Your company's paver would not appear to qualify in this category of vehicles since, as a towed paver, it would travel at a speed greater than 20 mph, at least when moving between job sites.

Consequently, your product must comply with the requirements of the Federal standards and regulations. Standard No. 119 does not directly impose any duty on you, because it applies to tires rather than vehicles. However, the NHTSA has recently issued Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 120, Tire Selection and Rims for Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars (copy enclosed). This standard does require, effective September 1, 1976, that your vehicles be equipped with tires that conform to Standard No. 119 and are of sufficient load rating.

Please contact us if we can be of any further assistance.

YOURS TRULY,

Miller Spreader Company

December 30, 1975

Bob Webtzer U. S. Department of Transportation

Enclosed please find the following items:

A. Literature describing two (2) models of Towed Pavers manufactured by the Miller Spreader Company:

1) Dial-A-Mat Paver

2) MS-708A Paver

B. Drawing 41001 showing the general arrangement of the rubber tired undercarriage used on both paver models above.

C. One photograph showing rubber tired undercarriage mounted under a Paver (See photograph marked "C")

D. One photograph showing towed paver carried on the rear of the dump body of a drump truck (see photograph marked "d").

E. One photograph showing paver elevated off the ground and being pulled by a tow bar assembly (see photograph marked "E")

F. Copy of Internal Revenue Service ruling exempting the Miller Paver when used in conjunction with a Miller Tow Bar from Excise Tax Regulations.

The Miller Towed Paver is a piece of construction machinery used specifically to spread asphalt or base materials on a prepared surface. This machine is used by both governmental bodies and commercial contractors to build and maintain driveways, parking areas, roads, etc.

A rubber tired undercarriage provides running gear for this paver. We have used a 530/450 6" wheel and pneumatic tire assembly in either 4 or 6 ply design. Our present models of this towed paver use eight (8) of these tire assemblies per paver (See drawing 41001).

To date we have no recorded incidents of wheel or tire failure other than an occassional flat, on these towed pavers.

We are interested in how the use of our present wheel and tire assembly on our Towed Paver meet current Department of Transportation specifications for this type of construction machinery. Specifically, we are interested in information pertaining to the particular application of our Towed Paver with a tow bar for highway use.

For purposes of our discussions we can treat both the Miller Dial-A-Mat Towed Paver and the Miller MS-708A Towed Paver as similar units in that changes in accessory components change the model designation and not the basic function of the machine. Hereafter we will refer to either machine as "Towed Paver".

The operation of the Towed Paver involves attaching the paver to the dump truck rear wheel assembly by means of an in-a-wheel hitch (see cover of Miller Dial-A-Mat literature). The dump body of the truck is then elevated, dumping asphalt materials into the hopper of the paver. The dump truck then moves forward pulling the paver which deposits a thickness of asphalt.

Transportation of the Towed Paver to and from the jobsite is done in either of two (2) ways. The most common method of transportation is to suspend the paver on the rear of a dump body (see photograph marked "d").

The second method of transportation of the paver to and from the jobsite is to use a tow bar (see photograph marked "e"). The towed paver is lifted off the ground by use of two (2) hydraulic cylinders and locked into the elevated position. The tow bar is attached to the rear of the paver. The tow bar is then attached to rear of the towing vehicle. Safety chains, lights, etc. are provided. The Paver is pulled from jobsite to jobsite much in the same manner as portable concrete pumps, concrete mixers, etc.

The distance the paver would be towed would not normally exceed 10-15 miles. I don't know whether the enclosed information for a excise tax exemption will be of any help but I have enclosed it for any useful purpose it might serve. I trust the enclosed information is complete. Please let me know if you need further information. Thank you for your assistance.

W. Thomas James, III

Internal Revenue Service

May 13 1974

Miller Spreader Company

Attn: Mr. W. Thomas James, II Vice President

This is in reply to your letter of April 3, 1974, requesting a ruling whether the proposed manufacture and sale of a towing device described below will be subject to the manufacturer's excise tax imposed by section 4061(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

The towing device (Tow Bar) is specially designed to be attached directly to an asphault spreader (Miller Paver) and will be used to connect the Miller Paver to a towing vehicle (truck) for the purposes of job to job moves. The Tow Bar will be limited to use only with a Miller Paver and will not be adaptable for use with other machinery.

Section 4061(b)(1) of the Code imposes a tax on parts or accessories (other than tires and inner tubes) for any of the articles enumerated in subsection (a)(1) sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer.

Section 48.4061(b)(2) of the Excise Tax Regulations defines the term "parts or accessories" as including (1) any article the primary use of which is to improve, repair, replace, or serve as a component part of an automobile truck or bus chassis or body, or other automobile chassis or body or taxable tractor, (2) any article designed to be attached to or used in connection with such chassis, body or tractor to add to its utility or ornamentation, and (3) any article the primary use of which is in connection with such chassis, body, or tractor, whether or not essential to its operation or use.

We have previously ruled in Revenue Ruling 72-479, published in the Internal Revenue Cumulative Bulletin 1972-2 at page 544, that a self-feeding spreading device designed to be attached to a standard dump truck body is not a "part or accessory" subject to excise tax. The Miller Paver is a self-feeding spreading device as described in Revenue Ruling 72-479 and is therefore not a "part or accessory" subject to excise tax.

The Tow Bar described is designed to be used primarily as a component part of, to add to the utility of, and in connection with the non-taxable Miller Paver rather than primarily with a taxable towing vehicle. Therefore the proposed manufacture and sale of the Tow Bar would not be subject to the tax imposed by section 4061(b)(1) of the Code.

We are enclosing a copy of Revenue Ruling 72-479 for your information.

Richard L. Crain Acting Chief, Excise Tax Branch

For the best paving job, greater profits . . . chec miller MS - 708A with Hydraulic Beam Electric/Hydraulic Controls Rubber Tires Heat

FOR MATERIAL SAVINGS

You'll need Miller's exclusive Hydraulic Beam. This feature alone will save time and material as well as reduce operator fatigue. Two levers on the operator's console let him make thickness corrections on either or both sides of the paver.

Corrections are made quickly and accurately . . . WITH HYDRAULIC BEAM a correction can be made in less than 4 feet of paver travel . . . with other pavers the same correction takes from 12 to 15 feet of travel.

FOR A SMOOTHER MAT

Check Miller's wide stance rubber tire undercarriage. The tires are staggered so they won't follow truck ruts and will provide a smoother ride over rough base.

(Graphics omitted)

(Graphics omitted)

FOR QUALITY MAT FINISH

Miller's heavy duty screed wear plate features rolled edges to assure a better mat seal on both straight pulls and on a radius. Both edges are rolled making the wear plate reversible.

A 31 jet in line screed heater provides even heat along the entire screed to assure a uniform mat finish. The even heat also eliminates plate warpage.

An insulated cover running the entire width of the paver shields the operator from the heat and minimizes fuel consumption.

FOR BETTER MATERIAL FLOW Miller's clean, unobstructed hopper design provides excellent material flow. Enlarged gate and bleed out openings increase the flow of material to the screed and extensions.

FOR MOBILITY

Only Miller utilizes a 4-point chain hook up for transporting the paver from job to job. This system assures safe, even support along the entire width of the truck body and prevents damage to the body or tailgate.

FOR GREATER RETURN ON INVESTMENT

In addition to all these outstanding performance features, Miller pavers are built to hold up under high tonnage and extreme paving conditions. All stress points (*) are engineered to provide maximum strength, thus assuring extended paver life.

MAKE US PROVE MILLER IS BEST . . . ASK US TO DEMONSTRATE.

(Graphics omitted)

ID: nht76-3.2

DATE: 07/16/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Robert L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: Jeep Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to Jeep Corporation's March 9, 1976, petition for rulemaking as supplemented by its letter of April 1, 1976. The petition requested an amendment of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301-75, Fuel System Integrity, that would add the following sentence at the end of S7.1.6(b):

For the purposes of this section, unloaded vehicle weight does not include the weight of work-performing accessories.

The supplement to the petition included a list of 15 examples of such work-performing accessories. The amendment would require the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to remove these accessories before performing compliance testing pursuant to the standard.

In Section 108 of the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, (15 U.S.C. 1392 note), Congress directed that the fuel system integrity standard take effect in the form in which it had been most recently published. Conditions for amending the standard were specified in Section 108(b) as follows:

Amendment or Repeal of Standard. -- The Secretary may amend the standard described in subsection (a) in order to correct technical errors in the standard, and may amend or repeal such standard if he determines such amendment or repeal will not diminish the level of motor vehicle safety.

The practical result of the amendment requested by Jeep would be that certain vehicles would not, as is presently specified, be required to conform to the standard in the form in which they are actually delivered to purchasers and used on the highways. In fact, the presence of work-performing accessories could seriously degrade a vehicle's performance in the standard's barrier crash tests. We therefore cannot conclude that the requested amendment "will not diminish the level of motor vehicle safety." Furthermore, the amendment goes beyond the mere correction of technical errors in the standard. Consequently, Jeep's petition must be and is hereby denied.

Despite this denial, however, the NHTSA interprets the term "unloaded vehicle weight" in a manner that provides some of the relief that Jeep has requested. The term is defined in 49 CFR Part 571.3 as follows:

'Unloaded vehicle weight' means the weight of a vehicle with maximum capacity of all fluids necessary for operation of the vehicle, but without cargo or occupants.

The "weight of a vehicle" includes the weight of those accessories that are installed on a vehicle before delivery and are not ordinarily removed. Among such accessories are the following: air bag suspension systems

draw bars

headlamp and radiator protectors

helper-springs

hitches

pintle hooks

power take-offs

push bumpers

step bumpers and side steps

tire carriers

wreckers

The weight of those accessories that are ordinarily removed from a vehicle when they are not in use, however, is not included in the "weight of a vehicle". Consequently, accessories in this latter group would be removed by the NHTSA prior to testing for conformity to Standard No. 301-75. Among these are the following:

snow plows

spreaders

tow bars

Categorization of winches, the remaining accessory that you have listed, depends on the nature of the particular winch. One that is generally removed only when its presence interferes with other vehicle functions would be included in the evaluation of "unloaded vehicle weight". A portable winch that is ordinarily removed after use, however, would not be included in that evaluation.

SINCERELY,

Jeep Corporation

April 1, 1976

James B. Gregory Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Administration U.S. Department of Transportation

On March 9, 1976 the Jeep Corporation petitioned the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration for rulemaking to exempt work-performing accessories from the test requirements of FMVSS No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, as the standard applies to multi-purpose vehicles and light trucks. This letter transmits additional information to supplement our March 9 petition.

It has occurred to us that a summary of the types of available work-performing accessories referenced in our petition might be of benefit to you in your efforts to evaluate the merits of the Jeep petition. We, therefore, submit the following list of work-performing accessories, or work-related accessories, for your information and review:

Air bag suspension systems

Draw bars

Headlamp and radiator protectors

Helper springs

Hitches

Pintle hooks

Power take-offs

Push bumpers

Snow plows

Spreaders

Step bumpers and side steps

Tire carriers

Tow bars

Winches

Wreckers

In addition, we have attached copies of the booklet "Jeep Vehicle Special Equipment and Jeep Vehicle Accessories Catalog" which includes illustrations of the type of accessories and devices discussed above as well as descriptions of other factory-approved equipment and accessories that are available on these unique vehicles.

We request your prompt and favorable acceptance of this petition since less than five months remain before FMVSS No. 301 becomes effective as applied to MPV's and light trucks.

George E. Brown Executive Director - Vehicle Emissions & Safety

ATTACHMENTS Jeep Corporation

March 9, 1976

James B. Gregory Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Administration U.S. Department of Transportation

RE: Petition For Rulemaking Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity

On October 16, 1975, Jeep Corporation submitted a petition to amend the definition of "unloaded vehicle weight" so that work-performing accessories would not be included. That petition was subsequently denied (your letter N40-30) on the grounds that the NHTSA has adopted a policy of evaluating potential dynamic testing problems with heavy or protruding accessories on a "standard-by-standard" basis.

In accord with that stated NHTSA policy, Jeep Corporation, herewith, submits the attached petition to amend Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, so that the test conditions specified by the standard do not include the work-performing accessories used on trucks and multi-purpose vehicles.

George E. Brown Executive Director Vehicle Emissions and Safety

March 9, 1976

PETITION TO AMEND FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD (49 CFR PART 301) FUEL SYSTEM INTEGRITY

Pursuant to Section 124 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, Jeep Corporation petitions the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to undertake rulemaking to amend Motor Vehicle Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, so that the test conditions specified by the standard do not include work-performing accessories for trucks and multipurpose vehicles. Thus, the test conditions for Standard No. 301 would then be consistent in this respect with those for Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion.

The Jeep Corporation requests the Administrator's consideration of this petition for the amendment to Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, for the following reasons:

Currently, the Test Conditions of Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, Are Not Consistent with Those of Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion

In the preamble to the proposal for Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion, Docket No. 74-21; Notice 2, the Administrator stated:

"Finally, the NHTSA is continuing to promote compatibility and economy in barrier crash testing by adopting vehicle loading and dummy restraint requirements in Standard No. 219 identical to those set out in proposed amendments to Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, 49 CFR 571.301 (40 FR 17036, April 16, 1975)."

Jeep Corporation fully supports the Administrator's efforts to promote compatibility and economy in barrier testing; however, the requirements for Standard No. 219 and 301 do not provide the desired compatibility or economy.

Section 7.7b of Standard No. 219 referring to the test loading and dummy requirements for multi-purpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses states:

"For the purposes of this section, unloaded vehicle weight does not include the weight of work performing accessories."

Standard No. 301 does not provide for the exemption of work-performing accessories and, therefore, is not compatible with Standard No. 219 and thus requires clarification regarding the loading conditions for barrier testing.

Barrier Tests Including Work-Performing Accessories Would Not Be Representative of Normal Production Vehicles

Multi-purpose vehicles, because of their nature, are used in many ways with equipment not typical of normal passenger car usage. Barrier tests involving work-performing accessories would not be representative of most production vehicles. For example, the barrier test results of a truck with a snow plow on its front and carrying a salt spreader on its rear should not be used to depict base vehicles because of the possible protection offered to the base vehicle by its work-performing devices.

Excessive Barrier Test Requirements May Cause Some Accessories Specifically Engineered for Jeep Vehicles to be Removed From the Marketplace

Jeep Corporation offers a full range of work-performing accessories ranging from snow plows and push plates to power winches and wrecker assemblies. Such accessories are highly desirable to customers who want to more fully utilize the multi-purpose features of their Jeep vehicles or who want to utilize the capabilities of any class of vehicle for recreational or work purposes.

These accessories, which are marketed as Jeep Special Equipment, are specifically designed to be compatible with Jeep vehicles, thereby requiring a minimum of vehicle modification, and are offered either as factory-installed or dealer add-on equipment. Aftermarket universal-type accessories may not be so readily adaptable to Jeep vehicles resulting in major vehicle modifications which may compromise the safety performance of the original vehicle.

Marketing of these engineered accessories may not be possible, however, if the dynamic testing procedures of Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, differ from the test procedures specified for other standard such as Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion, and require multi-purpose vehicles to be tested with a myriad of special equipment accessories. Programs to assure compliance to any Federal Safety Standard specifying barrier testing with all possible equipment combinations would create a testing and financial burden which Jeep Corporation could not bear. The end result would be the withdrawal from the marketplace of certain original equipment, manufacturer-installed accessories or dealer-installed, manufacturer-approved accessories which may not be in the best interest of public safety.

Summary

In recognition of the above arguments, Jeep Corporation petitions the Administrator to amend Section 7.1.6(b) of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, by adding the sentence underlined here:

". . . same. Each dummy shall be restrained only by means that are installed in the vehicle for protection at its seating position. For the purposes of this section, unloaded vehicle weight does not include the weight of work-performing accessories."

Jeep Corporation submits that such rulemaking is both in the public interest and in the best interest of vehicle safety.

ID: nht87-2.41

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/09/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Mr. Alberto Negro

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Alberto Negro Fiat Research & Development - USA Branch Parklane Towers West Suite 1210 Dearborn, MI 48216

Dear Mr. Negro:

This is a response to Mr. Rossi's request for an interpretation of the Federal motor vehicle theft prevention standard (49 CFR Part 541), which he asked that I direct to you. That standard requires that certain parts of high-theft carlines, including the engine and transmission, be marked with the vehicle identification number, if the part is an original equipment part, or with the letter "R" and the manufacturer's trademark, if the part is a replacement part. Mr. Rossi stated that it is occasionally ne cessary to remove the original equipment engine or transmission from one of these cars and install a replacement engine or transmission in the car. The original equipment engine and/or transmission is then sent to the factory to be repaired and reconditi oned. Following such repair, the engine and/or transmission is then put into the replacement parts network.

Mr. Rossi stated his belief that the original equipment part should have the original equipment identification removed and a replacement marking put onto the part. He then asked whether Ferrari was required to remove the footprint left by the original eq uipment identification marking or if that should be left on the part. The answer is that Ferrari and all other reconditioners are not permitted to remove from any reconditioned part the original equipment identification marking inscribed or affixed to th e part in compliance with Part 541. further, reconditioners are not required to inscribe or affix any additional markings to parts they have reconditioned.

Title II of the Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-547: the Theft Act) includes a provision that addresses this question. This section (18 U.S.C. 511) reads as follows:

S511. Altering or removing motor vehicle identification numbers

(a) Whoever knowingly removes, obliterates, tampers with, or alters an identification number for a motor vehicle, or motor vehicle part, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(b)(1) Subsection (a) of this section does not apply to a removal, obliteration, tampering, or alteration by a person specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection (unless such person knows that the vehicle or part involved is stolen).

(2) The persons referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection are

(A) a motor vehicle scrap processor or a motor vehicle demolisher who complies with applicable State law with respect to such vehicle or part;

(B) a person who repairs such vehicle or part, if the removal, obliteration, tampering, or alteration is reasonably necessary for the repair; and

(C) a person who restores or replaces an identification number for such vehicle or part in accordance with applicable State law.

None of the exceptions set forth in 18 U.S.C. 511(b)(2) would permit Ferrari to routinely remove original equipment markings from reconditioned engines and transmissions. The first exception is not applicable, since Ferrari is clearly not a motor vehicle scrap processor or demolisher. The second exception would be applicable only in rare instances, since it is not usually necessary to remove the original equipment identification marking in order to recondition engines or transmissions. The third excepti on was explained as follows in the House Report on the Theft Act (H.R. Rep. No. 1087, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 24 (1984)): "The exemption also applies to persons acting under the authority of the Secretary of Transportation or State law to restore or rep lace such markings." for the policy reasons discussed below, we will not give reconditioners authority to routinely remove original equipment identification markings from engines and transmissions. Assuming Ferrari does not have authority under applicabl e State law to remove such markings, the third exception does not apply to Ferrari when it is reconditioning engines and transmissions.

If reconditioners of engines and transmissions were allowed to routinely remove the original equipment identification markings, the law enforcement purposes of the Theft Act would be seriously undermined. In response to some comments received on the prop osed Part 541, a new S541.6(b) was added to the final rule. This section expressly prohibits covered major parts from being marked as both original equipment and replacement parts. The preamble to the final rule explained the reasons for prohibiting such "dual markings" as follows:

Dual markings would give thieves the opportunity to present stolen original equipment parts as properly marked replacement parts. Once the original equipment identification (the VIN) had been obliterated from those stolen parts, a legitimate replacement part marking would remain. Assuming that the obliteration of the VIN were performed reasonably proficiently, repair shops and investigators would have little reason to suspect chat this part was anything other than a properly identified replacement part. 50 FR 43178; October 24, 1985.

These same law enforcement concerns would arise if Ferrari were to remove the VIN markings from its reconditioned engines and transmissions. If those parts were marked as both original equipment and replacement parts, the problems associated with dual ma rkings would arise. If, on the other hand, Ferrari were to try to obliterate the footprint from the original equipment, law enforcement officials would have no means of distinguishing engines Ferrari had reconditioned from stolen engines on which thieves had obliterated the original equipment marking and added a counterfeit replacement marking. In either case, it would cause confusion and uncertainty for law enforcement officials if Ferrari and the large number of other reconditioners were legitimately and routinely to remove the original equipment identification from reconditioned parts and add a replacement part marking to those parts.

Indeed, such action by reconditioners would serve to defeat the purpose of the Theft Act, which was to "decrease the ease with which stolen vehicles and their major parts can be fenced." If reconditioners routinely removed the original equipment markings from the engines and transmissions they reconditioned, car thieves could also remove those original equipment markings with impunity. If the thieves were ever questioned by law enforcement officials about the obliterated original equipment marking, they could respond that the marking must have been obliterated during reconditioning. If obliterated original equipment markings on parts do not provide law enforcement officials with evidence of illegal activity, there would seem to be no reason to require the original equipment markings on the parts.

Further, a requirement that all persons reconditioning engines and transmissions obliterate the original equipment marking and add a replacement part marking would impose significant additional costs and burdens on those persons. This would be inconsiste nt with the Theft Act's stated purpose of minimizing regulation of the aftermarket motor vehicle industry.

All of these potential problems can be avoided if reconditioners simply leave the original equipment marking on the parts after reconditioning. When those markings are left in place by reconditioners, thieves cannot claim that an engine or transmission t hat has a "footprint" in the area where the original equipment identification is placed is just a reconditioned part. Instead, the "footprint" would alert law enforcement officials to the likelihood that the original equipment marking had been unlawfully removed from the part. Further, no burdens are imposed in reconditioners if they must leave the original equipment markings in place and are not required to add any markings of their own. Therefore, we conclude that the Theft Act and Part 541 require th at businesses that recondition any major parts required to be marked pursuant to Part 541 leave those markings in place on the reconditioned parts. Part 541 does not require reconditioners to add any further identification markings to these parts.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

Ms. Erika Jones Office of Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh St., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

SUBJECT: Theft Prevention Standard Request for Agency Interpretation

Dear Ms. Jones:

On October 24, 1985, the agency published in the Federal Register (50 FR 43166) the final rule for the Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard and Selection of Covered Major Parts as required by the Motor Vehicle Theft law Enforcement Act of 1984.

The Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard requires a manufacture whose car line(s) fall above the median theft rate to mark the fourteen (14) major parts with the vehicle identification number (VIN) and replacement parts for those high theft lines are to be marked with the manufacturers logo and the letter "R". The standard also requires that the "target area" for marking of the replacement parts be different from the marking of the original parts marking so that repair shops and investigators can identify an original part from a replacement part.

On occasions, it becomes necessary for Ferrari to replace the original engine and/or gearbox in a customers vehicle in order to prevent tying up a customer's vehicle for an extended period to correct a major problem in the engine and/or gearbox. This rep lacement engine and/or gearbox will contain the label with the Ferrari logo and the letter "R" beginning with 1987 models.

The original engine and/or gearbox is then sent to the factory to be repaired and re-conditioned and at that point is placed in the spare parts network. The re-conditioned part will have the label containing the VIN removed and a replacement label affixe d prior to going into the spare parts network. The removal of the original parts marking label and the affixing of the replacement label is causing Ferrari some concern and they have asked that we request an agency interpretation on how to best handle th is matter.

The regulations in paragraph 541.5(d)(v)(8) requires that the removal of the label must "discernibly alter the appearance of that area of the part where the label was affixed by leaving residual parts of the label or adhesive in that area, so that invest igators will have , evidence that a label was originally present". The label to be affixed to the original engine and gearbox will be riveted and glued to the part so that when it is removed a "footprint" will be left behind.

The concern that Ferrari has for which they are requesting an agency interpretation is what to do with the "footprint" left by the original label after it is removed once the engine and/or gearbox has been re-conditioned prior to going into the spare par ts network? Do they remove the footprint or do they leave it on the part? If they are to remove it, do they have to fill in the two holes which were drilled for the rivets?

Ferrari does not want to cause confusion with repair shops or investigators when the "re-conditioned" engine and/or gearbox is used at some later date to replace a customers engine and/or gearbox that is in need of some major repair.

The agency's response to this request of interpretation should be sent to the Fiat R & D office in Dearborn, Michigan to the attention of Mr. Alberto Negro. We are prepared to supply you with any further information you may need to respond to our request .

Sincerely yours,

Ing. M. Rossi FSM/ai

ID: 09-002613 BMW positioning the seat

ID: nht94-4.40

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: September 30, 1994

FROM: Arthur W. Perkins -- Perkins, Philips and Puckhaber

TO: John Womack -- Assistant Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: Re: Robert E. Dwyer, Administrator of the Estate of Sean P. Dwyer, Kelly Nedeau, Steven Nedeau and Diane E. Surran, Administratrix of the estate of Ronald G. Reed, Jr. v. Dobles Chevrolet, Inc., Van-Go, Inc., and Arthur "Lucky" Young, d/b/a Custom 's Unlimited

ATTACHMT: Attached to 2/3/95 letter from Philip R. Recht to Arthur W. Perkins (A43; Std. 207; Std. 208; Std. 301; Part 567.7); Also attached to 7/12/91 letter from Paul Jackson Rice to Samuel Albury

TEXT: Dear Assistant Chief Womack:

This office has had numerous conversations with Attorneys Marvin Shaw and Mary Versaille of your office relative to the applicability of various federal regulations to a motor vehicle that was converted from its original intended purpose as a cargo va n to a passenger vehicle. My office represents the interests of two estates and two injured parties in a products liability and negligence action which has been brought against a retail automobile dealership and the customizing company.

During our conversations with Mr. Shaw and Ms. Versaille, they informed me that by directing a letter to you outlining certain issues, we could obtain an opinion letter relative to the application of various sections of the Federal Motor Vehicle safet y Standards Act.

I expect this case will go to trial sometime in late 1994 or early 1995, and I would appreciate receiving a response from you at your earliest convenience.

Factual Summary

Defendant Dobles Chevrolet, Inc. of Manchester, New Hampshire ordered a 1985 cargo Astro Van from General Motors. (See Exhibit 1A and 1B General Motors invoice to Dobles Chevrolet, Inc.) Dobles Chevrolet, Inc., after having the cargo van in its inven tory for approximately three months, permitted Arthur "Lucky" Young, d/b/a Custom's Unlimited, to take the van for the purpose of converting it from a cargo to a passenger van. (See Exhibit 2, Dobles Chevrolet Purchase Order (#43031) to Customs Unlimite d). Mr. Young was a jobber and had an arrangement with Defendant Van-Go of New England, Inc. of Saugus, Massachusetts to customize cargo vans to passenger vans for a fixed price. (See Exhibit 3, Customs Unlimited sales order of 7/25/85).

1. Van-Go Accessories performed the following modifications:

The two Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) front driver and front passenger seats were removed and were replaced with "after market" captains style seats which were attached to rotating pedestals that were mounted on the original seat floor studs m anufactured by General Motors.

2. The van was further modified as follows:

A. The exterior of the van was cut to install three windows two 26" x 18" and one 30" x 18".

B. The ceiling and interior walls were covered with fabric.

C. The corrugated metal floor was covered with plywood (held in place with sheet rock screws) over which there was an application of foam pad and carpeting.

D. Two "after market" bench seats, middle and rear, (which folded to a platform bedding) were installed by using four mounting clips per seat frame. The mounting clips were held in place by one non-graded bolt, which passed through the elongated slot in the clip, through the carpet, the pad, the wood floor and the corrugated floor of the van and was bolted underneath using a washer and nut. (See Exhibit 4A, B & C, photos of bench seats and clips.)

E. Type 2 seatbelts for each seating position, two in the middle and three in the back, were attached to the frames of these seats. (See Exhibit 5A & B, photos of bench seats with attached seatbelts.)

The van was returned to Arthur Young, d/b/a Custom's Unlimited, absent any certification or any disclosure indicating that any work had been performed by Van-Go. Arthur Young performed some exterior painting, striping, put on new wheels, and affixed a 1 1/2" x 6" placard advertising that his firm had worked on the vehicle. Mr. Young then delivered the van to Dobles Chevrolet who prominently placed it in the showroom area and offered it for sale as a new vehicle.

Mr. Paul Nadeau went to Dobles Chevrolet for the purpose of acquiring a family vehicle, and purchased the van on August 31, 1985 (see Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 7.)

The placard affixed by Mr. Young was removed from the vehicle prior to Mr. Nadeau purchasing the vehicle.

The motor vehicle was being used by Paul Nadeau's son, Scott Nadeau, on September 20, 1987 when he was driving the vehicle together with four passengers, one of whom was buckled in the front passenger seat. The other three passengers, two in the midd le seat and one in the rear seat, were not wearing seatbelts. Scott Nadeau lost control of the vehicle at approximately 45 miles per hour, and the vehicle struck a tree in a rearward rotating fashion at approximately 28 miles per hour, whereupon the sea ts rotated from underneath the clip and came loose from the floor, allowing the two bench seats and their three occupants to load against the rear cargo doors. The front passenger was ejected rearward from underneath her belt, when her seat back collaps ed and was catapulted to the rear of the van. As the vehicle rotated from the point of impact with the tree, an accelerated force was exerted by the four bodies and the two bench seats on the rear door, and the welds holding the latching mechanism yield ed, allowing the four occupants to be ejected out the rear cargo doors.

Two of the passengers were killed and the other two sustained serious personal injuries. The back of the front passenger seat collapsed, in part because of the negligent manner in which the seat was affixed to the pedestal (only three nuts were insta lled although it was designed to be held by four), allowing the front passenger to slide under of the searbelt and be ejected out the rear door. The two occupants of the middle seats were ejected and killed, and the rear passenger, lying down on the ben ch seat, was ejected and sustained a head injury.

The Plaintiffs have brought an action against the dealer (Dobles), the converter (Van-Go), and the broker (Arthur Young, d/b/a Custom's Unlimited) in strict liability in tort because the seats and the seat anchoring mechanism were inherently dangerous .

The Plaintiffs claim 1) that the seats lacked sufficient strength, and 2) the anchoring system used for the seats in the vehicle did not comply with the minimum federal safety standards.

The Defendants are using the following as defenses:

1. The seats met Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 207 because they withstood the force of 20 g's times the weight of the seat. The seat weighed 50 pounds, therefore, if the seats and seat backs could withstand 1000 pounds of force, they com plied with the FMVSS. (The manufacturer tested the seats when they were attached to a metal surface with a clamp arrangement using two bolts and the seas withstood 20 times their weight. The manufacturer assumed that seatbelts would be attached to the floor and not to the frame of the seats. The seats were never tested as attached using a clamp with a single bolt to the plywood and carpeted surface of the customized van. Nor were the seats tested after the seatbelts were attached to them.

2. The components installed by Van-Go are "readily attachable" components and they are accordingly exempt by @ 567.7 from certifying the vehicle.

3. Since the Plaintiffs on the bench seats were not wearing seatbelts, the FMVSS relative to the strength of the frames of the seat, seat backs and anchoring system are not applicable, as they apply to forward forces only.

The Plaintiffs request your opinion on the following with respect to Defendant Van-Go Accessories of New England, Inc.:

1. Are the items installed by Van-Go on the cargo van (e.g. windows, sub-flooring, padding, carpeting, seats, changing the seating arrangements, and attaching the seatbelts to the frames of the bench seats not designed to accommodate seatbelts) class ified as "readily attachable" and therefore exempt under @ 567.7?

2. If the items installed on the cargo van by Van-Go are not classified as "readily attachable", is Van-Go required under @ 567.7 to certify that they altered the vehicle? If so, what is the procedure for such certification?

3. Is it required that the vehicle as altered, including the seats and seat anchoring systems, be subjected to and be able to withstand the forces which would be applied to them under the fuel integrity test as set forth in Regulation 308?

4. Pursuant to the seat anchoring system requirements as set forth in Section 210, although they are applied in a forward direction, is it a reasonable assumption that the seat anchoring system should likewise resist the same forces in a rearward dir ection?

5. Do the requirements of Regulation 308 mean that the seats and seat backs must be able to withstand the forces which would be applied to them under fuel integrity testing in Regulation 308?

The Plaintiffs request your opinion on the following with respect to Defendant Arthur "Lucky" Young, d/b/a Custom's Unlimited:

1. Are the items installed on the cargo van (e.g. exterior painting, striping and new wheels) by Arthur Young classified as "readily attachable" and therefore exempt under @ 567.7?

2. If the items installed on the cargo van by Arthur Young are not classified as "readily attachable", is Arthur Young required under@ 567.7 to certify that he altered the vehicle?

3. If the van has been altered by Van-Go, is Arthur Young as the broker between Dobles and Van-Go required to certify the van prior to returning it to Dobles?

The Plaintiffs request your opinion on the following with respect to Defendant Dobles Chevrolet:

1. Is Dobles Chevrolet, as a dealer and first time seller of new motor vehicles, required to make certain that before it sells a new motor vehicle which has been altered, that the vehicle complies with the FMVSS as of the date of the alteration?

2. Who is ultimately responsible for making certain that a new vehicle, once certified by the manufacturer (General Motors) but subsequently altered, meets the FMVSS requirements prior to sale - the converter or the seller of the new vehicle?

If you need any additional information please contact us and we will be pleased to immediately answer your requests. If the questions we have posed are too burdensome and you would like us to narrow our focus, please let us know right away and we wou ld be happy to modify our questions posed. It is my understanding that your department can normally respond to inquiries such as this within a sixty day time period. If that is not possible would you please contact us and let us know the expected date of your reply.

Very truly yours,

ID: toyo.ajd

Mr. Harold van der Meijden
Toyo Tire (USA) Corporation
6261 Katella Avenue
Suite 2B
Cypress, CA 90630

Dear Mr. van der Meijden:

This is in reply to your telefaxed note of August 29, 2003, to Taylor Vinson of the Office of Chief Counsel and your e-mail of September 2, 2003, to Jonathan White of the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) asking for a clarification of certain provisions of the early warning reporting (EWR) regulation, 49 CFR Part 579 Subpart C, and certain provisions of ODIs EWR Compendium that track the EWR regulation.

In your fax to Mr. Vinson, you advised that Toyo Tire Corporation (Toyo), in its warranty provisions, handles claims for "early ride" complaints and warrants projected mileages on certain tire lines. You assert that tires subject to such claims do not have a failure condition other than they did not meet the subjective expectancy for comfort or warranted mileage projections. You would like to know whether these types of claims have to be reported under component code 98 (other) for ride disturbances or 71 (tread) for mileage, respectively?

Also in your fax, you cited the preamble to the final rule, 67 FR 45822 at 45853 (July 10, 2000), where we stated that we did not think warranty claims that merely concern "cosmetic, ride or wear concerns or did not concern a failure would be useful to early detection of safety-related tire defects." You stated that it was your understanding that "claims with no failure condition fall into the category of tires that would not be useful in the early detection of safety-related tire defects."

We concur with your understanding that you do not have to report warranty adjustments that do not involve the component categories specified in 49 CFR 579.26(c). As we explained in our response to the Rubber Manufacturers Associations (RMA) August 26, 2002 Petition for Reconsideration, "we adhere to our view that we do not want to receive data on warranty adjustments that do not relate to one or more of the four identified component categories." 68 FR 35132 at 35137 (June 11, 2003).

I now address your questions raised in your e-mail to Mr. White regarding the EWR Compendium. At the outset, we note that the EWR Compendium is not an interpretation of Part 579 or the terms used therein, but merely is intended to assist manufacturers in submitting information to NHTSA pursuant to the requirements of the EWR regulation. In addition, the Compendium was updated on September 18, 2003, after your e-mail to Mr. White. In the future, any interpretive questions that you may have concerning substantive reporting regulations should be sent to the Office of Chief Counsel.

Your first question concerns Section IV A of the Compendium. You stated that:

Section IV A. Note reads: &"For tires that are produced or imported in quantities less than 15,000 annually..., the manufacturer need only report information on incidents involving deaths." Toyo interprets the term &"tires&" to mean all those products within a complete tire line with various SKU's whose production or importation is less that 15,000 units annually.

Your understanding is incorrect. We refer you to the introductory paragraph of Section 579.26 for clarification. See 49 CFR 579.26, as amended at 68 FR 35132. That section states:

For each group of tires with the same SKU, plant where manufactured, and year for which the volume produced or imported is less than 15,000, or are deep tread, winter-type snow tires, space saver or temporary use spare tires, tires with nominal rim diameters of 12 inches or less, or are not passenger car tires, light truck tires, or motorcycle tires, the manufacturer need only report information on incidents involving a death or injury, as specified in paragraph (b) of this section.

We note that the regulation refers in part to groups of tires with the same SKU. Therefore, if a tire line has SKUs, if fewer than 15,000 tires with a given SKU are produced (or expected to be produced) in a given year, only incidents involving a death or injury have to be reported.

Second, in connection with Compendium Section IV B.1 Reporting Production Data, you state:

"g.) Manufacturing Plant - code as appearing within the TIN per 574.5 and 574.6, and&" Referencing the Federal Register/ Vol. 68, No. 112 / Wednesday, June 11, 2003 / Rules and Regulations - page 35144/Section 579.26 Reporting requirements for manufacturers of tires states: &"For purposes of this section, the two-character DOT alphanumeric code for production plants located in the United States assigned by NHTSA in accordance with 574.5(a) and 574.6(b) of this chapter may be used to identify plant where manufactured. If the plant is located outside the United States, the full plant name must be provided&". Toyo's interpretation is since many of our tires are produced in foreign plants for distribution and sale in the United States, we must report the full plant name in our data. What is the requirement criteria for the &"plant name&" that will be noted in the Plant Code field of the template?

Pursuant to 49 CFR 571.109 and 571.119, every tire manufactured for use on the roads and offered for sale in the United States must have a Tire Information Number (TIN) in accordance with 49 CFR Part 574. However, if the tire is manufactured outside of the United States, the TIN need not include the plant name. If a tire that is the subject of an EWR report has a TIN that does not include the plant name of a foreign plant, the manufacturer is required to type in the name of the plant where it is manufactured, up to 25 characters. In typing the name of the plant, the manufacturer may either abbreviate or truncate the name of the plant to fit within the 25 character limitation so long as it uses the same abbreviation or truncation in all EWR reports, including future ones. This approach will satisfy 49 CFR 579.26. When a manufacturer provides the plant name in this manner, it indicates to NHTSA that the tire is manufactured in a foreign plant. We also note that manufacturers are allowed to provide the country of origin (and date of importation), rather than plant and date of manufacture, when the TIN is unknown. See Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Ann Wilson, Senior Vice President, RMA, of October 10, 2003, at 3.

Third, in connection with Compendium Section IV B. 3, you stated:

Reporting Numbers of Warranty Adjustments (including Extended Warranty and Good Will) reads: &"A warranty adjustment need not be reported when: c.) The claim/adjustment is denied&". Toyo's interpretation is that any claim that fails to meet the adjustabilility requirements that are explicitly stated in the applicable warranty, and is therefore denied to the dealer or consumer, need not be reported.

We concur in your understanding that you would not have to report a warranty claim/adjustment that is denied in its entirety. In applying the EWR definition of warranty adjustment, a tire manufacturer would only report warranty adjustments when it paid or provided other reimbursement to a consumer pursuant to a warranty program offered by a manufacturer or goodwill. See 49 CFR 579.4, as amended at 68 FR 35132 at 35142. Therefore, under the circumstances suggested in your e-mail, Toyo would not have to report any claim that was denied because it failed to meet the "adjustability" requirements that are explicitly stated in the applicable warranty.

Fourth, in connection with Compendium Section IV B. 4, you stated:

Reporting Claims and Notices of Death and Injury reads: &"A manufacturer need not file a report for a claim or notice of death and injury when: b.) The claim alleges one or more deaths in a foreign country involving a tire that is identical or substantially similar to one offered for sale in the United States&". This seems to contradict the statement on page 16 (paragraph 2): &"Similar reporting is also required when a claim alleging or proving that one or more deaths in a foreign country was caused by a defect in a tire that was identical or substantially similar to one offered for sale in the United States&". Toyo's interpretation is that we will need to report on any identical or substantially similar tire involved with a foreign death if it meets minimal specificity requirements.

In connection with the Section IV B. 4, the Compendium (Version 1.0) inadvertently left out the word "not" in the sentence you reference. The Compendium should have read:

A manufacturer need not file a report for a claim or notice of death and injury when:

b.) The claim alleges one or more deaths in a foreign country involving a tire that is not identical or substantially similar to one offered for sale in the United States.

This omission has been corrected in "Version 2.0" of the Compendium.

Lastly, in connection with one-time historical reporting section in the Compendium you wrote:

Section V One-Time Historical Reporting Requirements B. What To Report: reads: &"Historical data concerning production totals, number of warranty adjustments for the preceding 12 quarters (July 1, 2000 through June 30, 2003) covering production year 1998 and later tires (see 579.28(c))&". Referencing the Federal Register/ Vol. 68, No. 112 / Wednesday, June 11, 2003 / Rules and Regulations - page 35148/Section 579.28 Due date of reports and other miscellaneous provisions. (c) (iii) reads: &"Each manufacturer of tires covered by 579.26 of this part shall file separate reports covering the number of warranty adjustments recorded in the manufacturer's warranty adjustment system for tires that it received in each calendar quarter from July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2003, for tires manufactured from July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2003&". Toyo interprets this to mean that the production data for the one-time historical report should only include production numbers for the 3rd and 4th quarters of 1998 to June 30, 2003 and not the entire calendar production for 1998.

We do not agree with your understanding.The historical reports are expected to provide a baseline so that we will be able to compare current rates to historical rates. In order for NHTSA to evaluate the EWR information, we need annual production for the five previous years. Our intent is for tire manufacturers to provide annual production for all of 1998 until 2003 is complete and we have first quarter 2004 production. See 49 CFR 579.28, as amended at 68 FR 35132 at 35148. Therefore, when reporting for each quarter from July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2003, for tires manufactured from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2003, a manufacturer should include the total annual production of tires produced from the beginning of each calendar year included in the report until the close of the quarter that is the subject of the report.

If you have any questions, you may phone Andrew DiMarsico of my staff at (202) 366-5263.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

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