ID: nht94-4.40

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: September 30, 1994

FROM: Arthur W. Perkins -- Perkins, Philips and Puckhaber

TO: John Womack -- Assistant Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: Re: Robert E. Dwyer, Administrator of the Estate of Sean P. Dwyer, Kelly Nedeau, Steven Nedeau and Diane E. Surran, Administratrix of the estate of Ronald G. Reed, Jr. v. Dobles Chevrolet, Inc., Van-Go, Inc., and Arthur "Lucky" Young, d/b/a Custom 's Unlimited

ATTACHMT: Attached to 2/3/95 letter from Philip R. Recht to Arthur W. Perkins (A43; Std. 207; Std. 208; Std. 301; Part 567.7); Also attached to 7/12/91 letter from Paul Jackson Rice to Samuel Albury

TEXT: Dear Assistant Chief Womack:

This office has had numerous conversations with Attorneys Marvin Shaw and Mary Versaille of your office relative to the applicability of various federal regulations to a motor vehicle that was converted from its original intended purpose as a cargo va n to a passenger vehicle. My office represents the interests of two estates and two injured parties in a products liability and negligence action which has been brought against a retail automobile dealership and the customizing company.

During our conversations with Mr. Shaw and Ms. Versaille, they informed me that by directing a letter to you outlining certain issues, we could obtain an opinion letter relative to the application of various sections of the Federal Motor Vehicle safet y Standards Act.

I expect this case will go to trial sometime in late 1994 or early 1995, and I would appreciate receiving a response from you at your earliest convenience.

Factual Summary

Defendant Dobles Chevrolet, Inc. of Manchester, New Hampshire ordered a 1985 cargo Astro Van from General Motors. (See Exhibit 1A and 1B General Motors invoice to Dobles Chevrolet, Inc.) Dobles Chevrolet, Inc., after having the cargo van in its inven tory for approximately three months, permitted Arthur "Lucky" Young, d/b/a Custom's Unlimited, to take the van for the purpose of converting it from a cargo to a passenger van. (See Exhibit 2, Dobles Chevrolet Purchase Order (#43031) to Customs Unlimite d). Mr. Young was a jobber and had an arrangement with Defendant Van-Go of New England, Inc. of Saugus, Massachusetts to customize cargo vans to passenger vans for a fixed price. (See Exhibit 3, Customs Unlimited sales order of 7/25/85).

1. Van-Go Accessories performed the following modifications:

The two Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) front driver and front passenger seats were removed and were replaced with "after market" captains style seats which were attached to rotating pedestals that were mounted on the original seat floor studs m anufactured by General Motors.

2. The van was further modified as follows:

A. The exterior of the van was cut to install three windows two 26" x 18" and one 30" x 18".

B. The ceiling and interior walls were covered with fabric.

C. The corrugated metal floor was covered with plywood (held in place with sheet rock screws) over which there was an application of foam pad and carpeting.

D. Two "after market" bench seats, middle and rear, (which folded to a platform bedding) were installed by using four mounting clips per seat frame. The mounting clips were held in place by one non-graded bolt, which passed through the elongated slot in the clip, through the carpet, the pad, the wood floor and the corrugated floor of the van and was bolted underneath using a washer and nut. (See Exhibit 4A, B & C, photos of bench seats and clips.)

E. Type 2 seatbelts for each seating position, two in the middle and three in the back, were attached to the frames of these seats. (See Exhibit 5A & B, photos of bench seats with attached seatbelts.)

The van was returned to Arthur Young, d/b/a Custom's Unlimited, absent any certification or any disclosure indicating that any work had been performed by Van-Go. Arthur Young performed some exterior painting, striping, put on new wheels, and affixed a 1 1/2" x 6" placard advertising that his firm had worked on the vehicle. Mr. Young then delivered the van to Dobles Chevrolet who prominently placed it in the showroom area and offered it for sale as a new vehicle.

Mr. Paul Nadeau went to Dobles Chevrolet for the purpose of acquiring a family vehicle, and purchased the van on August 31, 1985 (see Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 7.)

The placard affixed by Mr. Young was removed from the vehicle prior to Mr. Nadeau purchasing the vehicle.

The motor vehicle was being used by Paul Nadeau's son, Scott Nadeau, on September 20, 1987 when he was driving the vehicle together with four passengers, one of whom was buckled in the front passenger seat. The other three passengers, two in the midd le seat and one in the rear seat, were not wearing seatbelts. Scott Nadeau lost control of the vehicle at approximately 45 miles per hour, and the vehicle struck a tree in a rearward rotating fashion at approximately 28 miles per hour, whereupon the sea ts rotated from underneath the clip and came loose from the floor, allowing the two bench seats and their three occupants to load against the rear cargo doors. The front passenger was ejected rearward from underneath her belt, when her seat back collaps ed and was catapulted to the rear of the van. As the vehicle rotated from the point of impact with the tree, an accelerated force was exerted by the four bodies and the two bench seats on the rear door, and the welds holding the latching mechanism yield ed, allowing the four occupants to be ejected out the rear cargo doors.

Two of the passengers were killed and the other two sustained serious personal injuries. The back of the front passenger seat collapsed, in part because of the negligent manner in which the seat was affixed to the pedestal (only three nuts were insta lled although it was designed to be held by four), allowing the front passenger to slide under of the searbelt and be ejected out the rear door. The two occupants of the middle seats were ejected and killed, and the rear passenger, lying down on the ben ch seat, was ejected and sustained a head injury.

The Plaintiffs have brought an action against the dealer (Dobles), the converter (Van-Go), and the broker (Arthur Young, d/b/a Custom's Unlimited) in strict liability in tort because the seats and the seat anchoring mechanism were inherently dangerous .

The Plaintiffs claim 1) that the seats lacked sufficient strength, and 2) the anchoring system used for the seats in the vehicle did not comply with the minimum federal safety standards.

The Defendants are using the following as defenses:

1. The seats met Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 207 because they withstood the force of 20 g's times the weight of the seat. The seat weighed 50 pounds, therefore, if the seats and seat backs could withstand 1000 pounds of force, they com plied with the FMVSS. (The manufacturer tested the seats when they were attached to a metal surface with a clamp arrangement using two bolts and the seas withstood 20 times their weight. The manufacturer assumed that seatbelts would be attached to the floor and not to the frame of the seats. The seats were never tested as attached using a clamp with a single bolt to the plywood and carpeted surface of the customized van. Nor were the seats tested after the seatbelts were attached to them.

2. The components installed by Van-Go are "readily attachable" components and they are accordingly exempt by @ 567.7 from certifying the vehicle.

3. Since the Plaintiffs on the bench seats were not wearing seatbelts, the FMVSS relative to the strength of the frames of the seat, seat backs and anchoring system are not applicable, as they apply to forward forces only.

The Plaintiffs request your opinion on the following with respect to Defendant Van-Go Accessories of New England, Inc.:

1. Are the items installed by Van-Go on the cargo van (e.g. windows, sub-flooring, padding, carpeting, seats, changing the seating arrangements, and attaching the seatbelts to the frames of the bench seats not designed to accommodate seatbelts) class ified as "readily attachable" and therefore exempt under @ 567.7?

2. If the items installed on the cargo van by Van-Go are not classified as "readily attachable", is Van-Go required under @ 567.7 to certify that they altered the vehicle? If so, what is the procedure for such certification?

3. Is it required that the vehicle as altered, including the seats and seat anchoring systems, be subjected to and be able to withstand the forces which would be applied to them under the fuel integrity test as set forth in Regulation 308?

4. Pursuant to the seat anchoring system requirements as set forth in Section 210, although they are applied in a forward direction, is it a reasonable assumption that the seat anchoring system should likewise resist the same forces in a rearward dir ection?

5. Do the requirements of Regulation 308 mean that the seats and seat backs must be able to withstand the forces which would be applied to them under fuel integrity testing in Regulation 308?

The Plaintiffs request your opinion on the following with respect to Defendant Arthur "Lucky" Young, d/b/a Custom's Unlimited:

1. Are the items installed on the cargo van (e.g. exterior painting, striping and new wheels) by Arthur Young classified as "readily attachable" and therefore exempt under @ 567.7?

2. If the items installed on the cargo van by Arthur Young are not classified as "readily attachable", is Arthur Young required under@ 567.7 to certify that he altered the vehicle?

3. If the van has been altered by Van-Go, is Arthur Young as the broker between Dobles and Van-Go required to certify the van prior to returning it to Dobles?

The Plaintiffs request your opinion on the following with respect to Defendant Dobles Chevrolet:

1. Is Dobles Chevrolet, as a dealer and first time seller of new motor vehicles, required to make certain that before it sells a new motor vehicle which has been altered, that the vehicle complies with the FMVSS as of the date of the alteration?

2. Who is ultimately responsible for making certain that a new vehicle, once certified by the manufacturer (General Motors) but subsequently altered, meets the FMVSS requirements prior to sale - the converter or the seller of the new vehicle?

If you need any additional information please contact us and we will be pleased to immediately answer your requests. If the questions we have posed are too burdensome and you would like us to narrow our focus, please let us know right away and we wou ld be happy to modify our questions posed. It is my understanding that your department can normally respond to inquiries such as this within a sixty day time period. If that is not possible would you please contact us and let us know the expected date of your reply.

Very truly yours,

ID: nht94-6.15

DATE: April 25, 1994

FROM: Gerald Plante -- Manager, Product Compliance, Saab Cars USA, Inc.

TO: Barbara Gray -- Office of Market Incentives, NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 8/9/94 from Barry Felrice to Gerald Plante

TEXT: Dear Ms. Gray:

Saab has made some updates to our anti-theft alarm systems in our 1995 model year Saab 900 models. I am sorry I missed your return call. I was hoping we could have had some discussion about NHTSA's current evaluation guidelines on the telephone before submitting written materials. As a way of introduction, I have taken David Raney's place as Saab's Manager of Product Compliance.

Saab views the changes in 1995 components and designs with our anti-theft systems as de minimis ones that would enhance the anti-theft effectiveness of the 1994 alarm. To the extent permitted in 49 CFR Part 543.9, Saab is requesting permission to modify our existing exemption on the Saab 900.

The enclosed material is primarily updates of the material provided to NHTSA on March 25, 1993. Briefly, the changes involve the following:

1. Remote control added. 2. Arming/disarming of alarm/immobilizer functions from remote control only. 3. Remote control operation of the central locking system added. 4. Immobilizer function expanded by adding fuel pump and ignition disengagement to the existing starter motor disengagement.

We would very much appreciate your review of this material to confirm that NHTSA agrees with Saab on the above points. Please feel free to contact me at (404) 279-6377.

Given the definition of "carline" in Part 541.4(b), all 1995 Saab cars labelled as 900 models belong to one carline: Saab 900.

The basis of our petition for exemption is the specification of an effective anti-theft system on all Saab 900 models as standard equipment. In addition, this carline will be specified with an anti-theft radio system, which will further reduce the incidence of auto theft involving Saab cars.

Carline Description

1995 Saab 900 Carline: Body Style Model Designation Engine Variant 2-door hatchback 900 Turbo 4 cyl., 16-valve 4-door hatchback 900 6 cyl., 24-valve 2-door hatchback 900 6 cyl., 24-valve 4-door hatchback 900 4 cyl., 16-valve 2-door hatchback 900 4 cyl., 16-valve 2-door convertible 900 Turbo 4 cyl., 16-valve 2-door convertible 900 Turbo 6 cyl., 24-valve 2-door convertible 900 4 cyl., 16-valve

Anti-Theft System Description-MY 1995 Saab 900

The system consists primarily of the following components and functions:

Components

Audible signal device Electronic control module Remote control (2) Lock assembly protective covers Door-mounted switches (4) Hood-mounted switch Hatch/trunk lid-mounted switch Light-emitting diode (LED-system status indicator light) Glass breakage sensor Anti-Theft system window warning label (2) Three circuit disengagement relay (starter motor, fuel pump, and ignition)

Functions

Central door/lock/unlock from driver and front passenger door locks Dead-bolt locking of all doors and hatch/trunk lid from driver's door lock Starter motor, fuel pump, and ignition disengagement with alarm activation Horn sounding with alarm activation. Turn signal indicator flashing with alarm activation Arm/disarm from remote control Hatch/trunk lid lock/unlock and temporary disarming of the alarm from the remote control

Attachment I contains a wiring diagram depicting the Saab 900 anti-theft system circuitry and electric/electronic components. Attachment II depicts the location of the above-listed components. The vehicle depicted is the Saab 900 four-door hatchback. The two-door hatchback and convertible is identical to the four-door version, with the exception of the added rear passenger doors. Locking features for the rear passenger doors are identical to the front passenger locking features. The two-door convertible differs from the two-door hatchback only in that it has a conventional trunk, which is isolated from the passenger compartment by the rear seatbacks.

Functional Description

From the driver's, or front passenger's door lock, using the ignitiiion key or the remote control, the operator may activate or deactivate the central locking system by turning the key 45 degrees clockwise or counter-clockwise, respectively. In the locked position, all doors, including the hatch/trunk lid, are electro-mechanically locked. It is not possible to lock the doors while they are open (The lock plunger will not depress while the door is open); doors can only be locked from outside when the door is closed by using the ignition key in the door lock or the remote control.

From the dirver's door lock only, if the key is turned an additional 45 degrees in the same direction and withdrawn from this position, the dead-bolt is activated. This means that the door handles and lock devices are disengaged in the locked position, forcing an intruder to crawl through a broken window in order to enter the vehicle. The operator can not activate or deactivate the dead-bolt feature from the remote control.

From the left button on the remote control only, the alarm and immobilization features are armed. In armed condition, the vehicle doors, hatch/trunk, hood and windows are protected by the alarm system. If an attempt is made to enter the vehicle, an audible signal device (105-118 decibels) will sound for 30 seconds and the turn signals will flash for 300 seconds. If the alarm is disarmed within 30 to 300 second period, the horn is interrupted and the turn signal indicators cease flashing. If another trigger signal occurs (e.g., trunk) during this 30 or 300 second period, each function resets for another 30 or 300 second period, from the moment of retriggering.

At the same time, the starter motor, the fuel-pump and the ignition systems are automatically disabled for 30 minutes. If a renewed attempt is made to enter the vehicle, all systems will again react as described above. The anti-theft alarm can be disarmed idefinitely from the left button on the remote control, or temporarily from the hatch/trunk lid, using the right button on the remote control. In the latter case, the alarm rearms automatically ten seconds after the hatch/trunk lid is again closed.

In addition to the active systems described above, several passive anti-theft features further deter vehicle entry and theft. All door lock mechanisms are covered, and recessed inside the door, making it extremely difficult to unlock a door using an instrument slid down between the window and outer door skin. Furthermore, because the latch mechanism is located in the door, rather than in the B-pillar, it is much more difficult to unlatch the door using an instrument slid in between the door and B-or C-pillar. Also, the interior door lock plungers are of a design that is impossible to snag with a wire inserted between the weatherstip and window glass.

Functional Description continued

The Saab 900 ignition key and keylock, which is used to activate and deactivate the anti-theft system, are of a design unique to Saab, and are virtually impossible to "pick". The ignition key is also difficult to duplicate on the open market as a special blank, special key outlining equipment, and access to Saab key codes are required. Key blanks and codes are protected within the Saab corporate and dealer network.

The radio is designed to be extremely difficult to remove without the use of a special extraction tool. Once disconnected from a power-source, the radio will not function again unless a unit-specific, four-digit access code is keyed in. The radio facia is also an uncommon size, making it impractical to install in a different model vehicle.

A dash-mounted LED is used to indicate the various states of the alarm as follows:

1. Arming: The LED is lit for ten seconds.

2. Disarming: The LED is lit for one second.

System triggered during arming procedure: The LED Blinks at half-second intervals for 10 secons.

4. System triggering input cancelled during arming procedure: The LED stops blinking, and remains lit for 10 seconds.

5. Disarming from hatch/trunk lid: The LED is lit for 10 seconds after unlocking the hatch/trunk lid, and again for 10 seconds after closing it.

6. Glass breakage sensor override switch (M95) activated (ignition on): Teh LED is off.

7. Glass breakage sensor override switch (M95) pressed continuously (ignition off): The LED blinks at half-second intervals for 10 seconds.

8. Glass breakage sensor, override switch (M95) activated (ignition off): The LED blinks at half-second intervals for 10 seconds.

9. Disarmed system: The LED is off.

10. Armed system: The LED blinks at 2 second intervals until the system is disarmed.

11. Activated system: The LED blinks at 2 second intervals until the system is disarmed.

12. Self-armed three circuit disengagement: The LED blinks at 2 second intervals until the system is disarmed.

The system is protected against false activation from such common occurrences a shaiking or knockng, sound wave vibration, air turbulence, and temperature or light changes. In addition, the anti-theft system is equipped with a self-diagnostic system, which initiates a 10 second self-check function each time the system is armed. If a failure is detected, a fault code is stored, and the LED will blink for 10 seconds after arming the alarm (rather than remaining steadily lit for 10 seconds) as long as the code is left in the memory. Other system functions remain undisturbed. Diagnostic communication with the electronic control moduel can be initiated through the use of a special Saab Electronic diagnostic scanning tool when the alarm is unarmed.

Saab Automobile 900 MY95 Alarm Immobilizer Parts list:

900

INDEX PART NAME SAAB PART NUMBER: %Q1. Horn assembly 44 93 443 2. El. unit anti-theft system 45 88 182 3. Window warning label 95 68 049 4. Theft security lock/unlock switch 43 27 292 5. C-lock/security lock motor driver side 43 26 773 6. C-lock/security lock motor passenger 43 26 781 side 7. C-lock/security lock motors right read 43 26 799 doors 8. Door switch driver and passenger door 44 08 423 9. Door switch rear doors 44 08 423 10. Hatch/trunk lid switch 44 08 423 11. Hood switch 43 23 259 12. Glass breakage sensor/lamp 45 50 869 Convertible (black) 45 50 851 13. Central lock unit 40 90 991 14. L.E.D. 40 90 991 15 Remote control 45 50 075

GP/abh Enclosures

ID: nht94-2.100

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: April 25, 1994

FROM: Gerald Plante -- Manager, Product Compliance, Saab Cars USA, Inc.

TO: Barbara Gray -- Office of Market Incentives, NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 8/9/94 from Barry Felrice to Gerald Plante

TEXT: Dear Ms. Gray:

Saab has made some updates to our anti-theft alarm systems in our 1995 model year Saab 900 models. I am sorry I missed your return call. I was hoping we could have had some discussion about NHTSA's current evaluation guidelines on the telephone before submitting written materials. As a way of introduction, I have taken David Raney's place as Saab's Manager of Product Compliance.

Saab views the changes in 1995 components and designs with our anti-theft systems as de minimis ones that would enhance the anti-theft effectiveness of the 1994 alarm. To the extent permitted in 49 CFR Part 543.9, Saab is requesting permission to modify our existing exemption on the Saab 900.

The enclosed material is primarily updates of the material provided to NHTSA on March 25, 1993. Briefly, the changes involve the following:

1. Remote control added. 2. Arming/disarming of alarm/immobilizer functions from remote control only. 3. Remote control operation of the central locking system added. 4. Immobilizer function expanded by adding fuel pump and ignition disengagement to the existing starter motor disengagement.

We would very much appreciate your review of this material to confirm that NHTSA agrees with Saab on the above points. Please feel free to contact me at (404) 279-6377.

Given the definition of "carline" in Part 541.4(b), all 1995 Saab cars labelled as 900 models belong to one carline: Saab 900.

The basis of our petition for exemption is the specification of an effective anti-theft system on all Saab 900 models as standard equipment. In addition, this carline will be specified with an anti-theft radio system, which will further reduce the incidence of auto theft involving Saab cars.

Carline Description

1995 Saab 900 Carline: Body Style Model Designation Engine Variant 2-door hatchback 900 Turbo 4 cyl., 16-valve 4-door hatchback 900 6 cyl., 24-valve 2-door hatchback 900 6 cyl., 24-valve 4-door hatchback 900 4 cyl., 16-valve 2-door hatchback 900 4 cyl., 16-valve 2-door convertible 900 Turbo 4 cyl., 16-valve 2-door convertible 900 Turbo 6 cyl., 24-valve 2-door convertible 900 4 cyl., 16-valve

Anti-Theft System Description-MY 1995 Saab 900

The system consists primarily of the following components and functions:

Components

Audible signal device Electronic control module Remote control (2) Lock assembly protective covers Door-mounted switches (4) Hood-mounted switch Hatch/trunk lid-mounted switch Light-emitting diode (LED-system status indicator light) Glass breakage sensor Anti-Theft system window warning label (2) Three circuit disengagement relay (starter motor, fuel pump, and ignition)

Functions

Central door/lock/unlock from driver and front passenger door locks Dead-bolt locking of all doors and hatch/trunk lid from driver's door lock Starter motor, fuel pump, and ignition disengagement with alarm activation Horn sounding with alarm activation. Turn signal indicator flashing with alarm activation Arm/disarm from remote control Hatch/trunk lid lock/unlock and temporary disarming of the alarm from the remote control

Attachment I contains a wiring diagram depicting the Saab 900 anti-theft system circuitry and electric/electronic components. Attachment II depicts the location of the above-listed components. The vehicle depicted is the Saab 900 four-door hatchback. The two-door hatchback and convertible is identical to the four-door version, with the exception of the added rear passenger doors. Locking features for the rear passenger doors are identical to the front passenger locking features. The two-door convertible differs from the two-door hatchback only in that it has a conventional trunk, which is isolated from the passenger compartment by the rear seatbacks.

Functional Description

From the driver's, or front passenger's door lock, using the ignitiiion key or the remote control, the operator may activate or deactivate the central locking system by turning the key 45 degrees clockwise or counter-clockwise, respectively. In the locked position, all doors, including the hatch/trunk lid, are electro-mechanically locked. It is not possible to lock the doors while they are open (The lock plunger will not depress while the door is open); doors can only be locked from outside when the door is closed by using the ignition key in the door lock or the remote control.

From the dirver's door lock only, if the key is turned an additional 45 degrees in the same direction and withdrawn from this position, the dead-bolt is activated. This means that the door handles and lock devices are disengaged in the locked position, forcing an intruder to crawl through a broken window in order to enter the vehicle. The operator can not activate or deactivate the dead-bolt feature from the remote control.

From the left button on the remote control only, the alarm and immobilization features are armed. In armed condition, the vehicle doors, hatch/trunk, hood and windows are protected by the alarm system. If an attempt is made to enter the vehicle, an audible signal device (105-118 decibels) will sound for 30 seconds and the turn signals will flash for 300 seconds. If the alarm is disarmed within 30 to 300 second period, the horn is interrupted and the turn signal indicators cease flashing. If another trigger signal occurs (e.g., trunk) during this 30 or 300 second period, each function resets for another 30 or 300 second period, from the moment of retriggering.

At the same time, the starter motor, the fuel-pump and the ignition systems are automatically disabled for 30 minutes. If a renewed attempt is made to enter the vehicle, all systems will again react as described above. The anti-theft alarm can be disarmed idefinitely from the left button on the remote control, or temporarily from the hatch/trunk lid, using the right button on the remote control. In the latter case, the alarm rearms automatically ten seconds after the hatch/trunk lid is again closed.

In addition to the active systems described above, several passive anti-theft features further deter vehicle entry and theft. All door lock mechanisms are covered, and recessed inside the door, making it extremely difficult to unlock a door using an instrument slid down between the window and outer door skin. Furthermore, because the latch mechanism is located in the door, rather than in the B-pillar, it is much more difficult to unlatch the door using an instrument slid in between the door and B-or C-pillar. Also, the interior door lock plungers are of a design that is impossible to snag with a wire inserted between the weatherstip and window glass.

Functional Description continued

The Saab 900 ignition key and keylock, which is used to activate and deactivate the anti-theft system, are of a design unique to Saab, and are virtually impossible to "pick". The ignition key is also difficult to duplicate on the open market as a special blank, special key outlining equipment, and access to Saab key codes are required. Key blanks and codes are protected within the Saab corporate and dealer network.

The radio is designed to be extremely difficult to remove without the use of a special extraction tool. Once disconnected from a power-source, the radio will not function again unless a unit-specific, four-digit access code is keyed in. The radio facia is also an uncommon size, making it impractical to install in a different model vehicle.

A dash-mounted LED is used to indicate the various states of the alarm as follows:

1. Arming: The LED is lit for ten seconds.

2. Disarming: The LED is lit for one second.

System triggered during arming procedure: The LED Blinks at half-second intervals for 10 secons.

4. System triggering input cancelled during arming procedure: The LED stops blinking, and remains lit for 10 seconds.

5. Disarming from hatch/trunk lid: The LED is lit for 10 seconds after unlocking the hatch/trunk lid, and again for 10 seconds after closing it.

6. Glass breakage sensor override switch (M95) activated (ignition on): Teh LED is off.

7. Glass breakage sensor override switch (M95) pressed continuously (ignition off): The LED blinks at half-second intervals for 10 seconds.

8. Glass breakage sensor, override switch (M95) activated (ignition off): The LED blinks at half-second intervals for 10 seconds.

9. Disarmed system: The LED is off.

10. Armed system: The LED blinks at 2 second intervals until the system is disarmed.

11. Activated system: The LED blinks at 2 second intervals until the system is disarmed.

12. Self-armed three circuit disengagement: The LED blinks at 2 second intervals until the system is disarmed.

The system is protected against false activation from such common occurrences a shaiking or knockng, sound wave vibration, air turbulence, and temperature or light changes. In addition, the anti-theft system is equipped with a self-diagnostic system, which initiates a 10 second self-check function each time the system is armed. If a failure is detected, a fault code is stored, and the LED will blink for 10 seconds after arming the alarm (rather than remaining steadily lit for 10 seconds) as long as the code is left in the memory. Other system functions remain undisturbed. Diagnostic communication with the electronic control moduel can be initiated through the use of a special Saab Electronic diagnostic scanning tool when the alarm is unarmed.

Saab Automobile 900 MY95 Alarm Immobilizer Parts list:

900

INDEX PART NAME SAAB PART NUMBER:

%Q1. Horn assembly 44 93 443 2. El. unit anti-theft system 45 88 182 3. Window warning label 95 68 049 4. Theft security lock/unlock switch 43 27 292 5. C-lock/security lock motor driver side 43 26 773 6. C-lock/security lock motor passenger 43 26 781 side 7. C-lock/security lock motors right read 43 26 799 doors 8. Door switch driver and passenger door 44 08 423 9. Door switch rear doors 44 08 423 10. Hatch/trunk lid switch 44 08 423 11. Hood switch 43 23 259 12. Glass breakage sensor/lamp 45 50 869 Convertible (black) 45 50 851 13. Central lock unit 40 90 991 14. L.E.D. 40 90 991 15 Remote control 45 50 075

GP/abh Enclosures

ID: nht92-6.39

DATE: May 25, 1992

FROM: C.N. Littler -- Coordinator, Regulatory Affairs for Motor Coach Industries, Inc., and Transportation Manufacturing Corporation

TO: Mary Versailles -- Office of Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: Subject: NHTSA Pre-emptive Authority With Respect to New York Program Bill No. 253

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 8/19/92 from Paul J. Rice to C.N. Littler (A39; Std. 208; VSA 103)

TEXT:

I have attached, pursuant to our telecon of May 14th, a copy of New York Governor Cuomo's Program Bill No. 253 for a departmental review. We believe that a legitimate argument of interference with Federal pre-emptive authority exists with respect to this proposed State legislation.

The Governor's Bill will require all buses, certified or licensed within New York, or entering New York and performing substantial revenue service; to be equipped with seat belts at all passenger seating positions. The Motor Vehicles Safety Act (1966) Sec 103(d) appears to prohibit the State from mandating vehicle safety standards to a higher level than the Federal standards on all but State owned vehicles.

Therefore, following your review of the attached bill, I would greatly appreciate a legal opinion regarding this issue and/or any other points of note.

Thank you for your time and consideration regarding this matter, with kindest regards, I remain, respectfully yours.

Attachment GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM BILL 1992 Memorandum

RE: AN ACT to amend the vehicle and traffic law, in relation to the requirement for seat belts on buses, the reexamination and disqualification of certain bus drivers, and the obligations of bus drivers and motor carriers

PURPOSE:

To increase bus driver qualification standards, to improve the system for providing information regarding the driving recOrd of bus drivers, and to require that certain buses be equipped with seat belts.

SUMMARY OR PROVISIONS:

Section 1 of the bill adds a new subdivision 6 to section 383 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law to provide that buses manufactured after July 1, 1993 shall be equipped with seat safety belts, except for buses operated by motor carriers which do not operate more than 100 days or more than ten thousand vehicle miles in the State.

Section 2 of the bill adds a new section 509-bb to the Vehicle and Traffic Law to require the reexamination of bus drivers who have a total of three driving convictions and/or accidents within a three-year period. One of the driver's convictions or accidents will not be counted in that total if the driver successfully completes a motor vehicle accident prevention course approved by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. The type of accidents which will be counted, as well as the type of reexamination to be administered, will be determined by regulation. If the driver fails the reexamination, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles may suspend, revoke or impose restrictions on the driver's license, and the driver must pass the examination before being authorized to operate a bus.

Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 of the bill amend sections 509-c(1)(d), 509-c(2)(d), 509-cc(1)(d) and 509-cc(2)(e) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, respectively, to require one-year disqualifications of bus drivers and school bus drivers upon the conviction of three or more serious driving violations, as defined by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, or upon the conviction of five or more driving violations of any kind, within a three-year period. One conviction of such drivers will not be counted in that total if the driver successfully completes a motor vehicle accident prevention course approved by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.

Sections 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the bill add two new paragraphs to sections 509-c (1), 509-c(2), 509-cc(1) and 509-cc(2) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, respectively: 1) to require a one-year disqualification of a bus driver or school bus driver who has failed a reexamination under new section 509-bb of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which is added by section 2 of this bill; and 2) to require a one-year disqualification of a bus driver or school bus driver who has been the subject of such a reexamination, if the driver is convicted of a serious driving violation, is convicted of three or more driving violations of any kind, or is involved in two or more vehicle accidents within an eighteen month period following such reexamination. The type of accidents which will be counted will be determined by regulations of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.

Section 11 of the bill amends section 509-d(1) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law to provide that, prior to hiring a new bus driver, a motor carrier must obtain the driving record of the applicant and investigate the applicant's employment record.

Section 12 of the bill amends section 509-f of the Vehicle and Traffic Law to provide that motor carriers annually shall require each bus driver to provide the carrier with a list of all traffic violations and all accidents in which the driver was involved during the prior twelve months.

Section 13 of the bill amends section 509-i of the Vehicle and Traffic Law to require the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to notify a motor carrier of any convictions or accidents of a bus driver resulting from the operation of any motor vehicle. Motor carriers will be required to establish an escrow account with the Department of Motor Vehicles, which shall charge a fee to defray the costs of the notification.

Section 14 of the bill amends section 509-j of the Vehicle and Traffic Law to increase the minimum civil penalty for violations of the motor carrier laws and regulations from $250 to $500 per violation, and to increase the maximum penalty from $1000 to $2,500 per violation.

This bill takes affect on the first day of September next succeeding the date on which it shall have become a law, provided that no reexamination or disqualification shall be required by the changes made by sections two through ten of the bill solely as a result of convictions or accidents which occurred prior to such effective date.

EXISTING LAW:

Under Section 383 Of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, seat belts are required on passenger vehicles manufactured after 1965 and on school buses manufactured after July 1, 1987, but are not required on other buses.

Under section 506 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles can require the reexamination of any driver who has been involved in three accidents within an eighteen-month period. If the driver fails the examination, the Commissioner may revoke or suspend the driver's license, or may impose restrictions on the use of the license.

Article 19-A of the Vehicle and Traffic Law currently provides for a one-year disqualification of bus drivers who accumulate nine or more points within an eighteen-month period. There is no current requirement for disqualification based upon a driver's involvement in multiple accidents.

Section 509-d of the Vehicle and Traffic Law requires that, prior to hiring a new bus driver, a motor carrier must "make an inquiry" for the driving record of the applicant, but does not require that the record actually be obtained. Section 509-i of the Vehicle and Traffic Law requires the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to provide notification of new driving convictions of bus drivers to those motor carriers which request such information and pay the necessary fee. Section 509-f of the Vehicle and Traffic Law requires bus drivers to inform motor carriers of driving convictions, but not accidents.

Under section 509-j of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles can require that a motor carrier pay a civil penalty between $250 and $1000 for violations of the motor carrier laws and regulations.

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT:

The tragic bus accident which occurred in Warren County on April 11, 1992 and resulted in the death of two young students from Long Island highlighted three deficiencies in our current law. First, present law does not permit the disqualification of bus drivers based upon prior accidents. Second, the current system of employer review of employees' prior accidents and driving convictions is insufficient. Finally, although seat belts are currently required on cars and school buses, they are not required on charter buses, even if those buses are carrying school children. This bill seeks to cure those deficiencies in the law, in order to reduce the chances of a similar accident in the future.

First, this bill provides that a bus driver who has a total of three serious driving convictions or accidents within a three-year period must undergo a new examination, including a road test. Driving convictions and accidents which occur while the driver is operating a personal vehicle are included in this total. If the driver fails to pass the road test, the driver will be disqualified from operating a bus for one year. If the driver passes the road test, no penalty is imposed, but a subsequent serious conviction or two subsequent accidents within an eighteen-month period will result in a one-year disqualification. In addition, any driver having three convictions within a three-year period will be disqualified for one year.

Second, this bill will reform the present conviction and accident information system. Under current law, a motor carrier is not permitted to hire a new driver unless they "make an inquiry" for the driving record of the applicant from every state in which the applicant worked or held a license during the preceding three years. Simply making the inquiry is all that is necessary, however, and there is no requirement that the record actually be obtained. In addition, every year drivers must inform their employers of motor vehicle violations which have occurred during the prior twelve months, but they are not required to report accidents. Moreover, although DMV operates a system for informing motor carriers of new convictions of their drivers, the program is optional. This bill will correct these inadequacies by requiring that motor carriers actually obtain the driving records of applicants, by requiring that drivers inform their employers of accidents as well convictions each year, and by requiring that all motor carriers take part in DMV's driving conviction notification system.

Finally, State law presently requires that all school buses manufactured after July 1, 1987 and operated in this State be equipped with seat belts, but does not require seat belts on other buses. This bill requires that all buses manufactured after July 1, 1993 and operated in this State be equipped with seat belts, except for buses of motor carriers which do not conduct substantial business within this State.

BUDGET IMPLICATIONS:

Any increased costs incurred by the Department of Motor Vehicles as a result of this bill will be accommodated within their present budget.

ID: toyo.ajd

Mr. Harold van der Meijden
Toyo Tire (USA) Corporation
6261 Katella Avenue
Suite 2B
Cypress, CA 90630

Dear Mr. van der Meijden:

This is in reply to your telefaxed note of August 29, 2003, to Taylor Vinson of the Office of Chief Counsel and your e-mail of September 2, 2003, to Jonathan White of the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) asking for a clarification of certain provisions of the early warning reporting (EWR) regulation, 49 CFR Part 579 Subpart C, and certain provisions of ODIs EWR Compendium that track the EWR regulation.

In your fax to Mr. Vinson, you advised that Toyo Tire Corporation (Toyo), in its warranty provisions, handles claims for "early ride" complaints and warrants projected mileages on certain tire lines. You assert that tires subject to such claims do not have a failure condition other than they did not meet the subjective expectancy for comfort or warranted mileage projections. You would like to know whether these types of claims have to be reported under component code 98 (other) for ride disturbances or 71 (tread) for mileage, respectively?

Also in your fax, you cited the preamble to the final rule, 67 FR 45822 at 45853 (July 10, 2000), where we stated that we did not think warranty claims that merely concern "cosmetic, ride or wear concerns or did not concern a failure would be useful to early detection of safety-related tire defects." You stated that it was your understanding that "claims with no failure condition fall into the category of tires that would not be useful in the early detection of safety-related tire defects."

We concur with your understanding that you do not have to report warranty adjustments that do not involve the component categories specified in 49 CFR 579.26(c). As we explained in our response to the Rubber Manufacturers Associations (RMA) August 26, 2002 Petition for Reconsideration, "we adhere to our view that we do not want to receive data on warranty adjustments that do not relate to one or more of the four identified component categories." 68 FR 35132 at 35137 (June 11, 2003).

I now address your questions raised in your e-mail to Mr. White regarding the EWR Compendium. At the outset, we note that the EWR Compendium is not an interpretation of Part 579 or the terms used therein, but merely is intended to assist manufacturers in submitting information to NHTSA pursuant to the requirements of the EWR regulation. In addition, the Compendium was updated on September 18, 2003, after your e-mail to Mr. White. In the future, any interpretive questions that you may have concerning substantive reporting regulations should be sent to the Office of Chief Counsel.

Your first question concerns Section IV A of the Compendium. You stated that:

Section IV A. Note reads: &"For tires that are produced or imported in quantities less than 15,000 annually..., the manufacturer need only report information on incidents involving deaths." Toyo interprets the term &"tires&" to mean all those products within a complete tire line with various SKU's whose production or importation is less that 15,000 units annually.

Your understanding is incorrect. We refer you to the introductory paragraph of Section 579.26 for clarification. See 49 CFR 579.26, as amended at 68 FR 35132. That section states:

For each group of tires with the same SKU, plant where manufactured, and year for which the volume produced or imported is less than 15,000, or are deep tread, winter-type snow tires, space saver or temporary use spare tires, tires with nominal rim diameters of 12 inches or less, or are not passenger car tires, light truck tires, or motorcycle tires, the manufacturer need only report information on incidents involving a death or injury, as specified in paragraph (b) of this section.

We note that the regulation refers in part to groups of tires with the same SKU. Therefore, if a tire line has SKUs, if fewer than 15,000 tires with a given SKU are produced (or expected to be produced) in a given year, only incidents involving a death or injury have to be reported.

Second, in connection with Compendium Section IV B.1 Reporting Production Data, you state:

"g.) Manufacturing Plant - code as appearing within the TIN per 574.5 and 574.6, and&" Referencing the Federal Register/ Vol. 68, No. 112 / Wednesday, June 11, 2003 / Rules and Regulations - page 35144/Section 579.26 Reporting requirements for manufacturers of tires states: &"For purposes of this section, the two-character DOT alphanumeric code for production plants located in the United States assigned by NHTSA in accordance with 574.5(a) and 574.6(b) of this chapter may be used to identify plant where manufactured. If the plant is located outside the United States, the full plant name must be provided&". Toyo's interpretation is since many of our tires are produced in foreign plants for distribution and sale in the United States, we must report the full plant name in our data. What is the requirement criteria for the &"plant name&" that will be noted in the Plant Code field of the template?

Pursuant to 49 CFR 571.109 and 571.119, every tire manufactured for use on the roads and offered for sale in the United States must have a Tire Information Number (TIN) in accordance with 49 CFR Part 574. However, if the tire is manufactured outside of the United States, the TIN need not include the plant name. If a tire that is the subject of an EWR report has a TIN that does not include the plant name of a foreign plant, the manufacturer is required to type in the name of the plant where it is manufactured, up to 25 characters. In typing the name of the plant, the manufacturer may either abbreviate or truncate the name of the plant to fit within the 25 character limitation so long as it uses the same abbreviation or truncation in all EWR reports, including future ones. This approach will satisfy 49 CFR 579.26. When a manufacturer provides the plant name in this manner, it indicates to NHTSA that the tire is manufactured in a foreign plant. We also note that manufacturers are allowed to provide the country of origin (and date of importation), rather than plant and date of manufacture, when the TIN is unknown. See Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Ann Wilson, Senior Vice President, RMA, of October 10, 2003, at 3.

Third, in connection with Compendium Section IV B. 3, you stated:

Reporting Numbers of Warranty Adjustments (including Extended Warranty and Good Will) reads: &"A warranty adjustment need not be reported when: c.) The claim/adjustment is denied&". Toyo's interpretation is that any claim that fails to meet the adjustabilility requirements that are explicitly stated in the applicable warranty, and is therefore denied to the dealer or consumer, need not be reported.

We concur in your understanding that you would not have to report a warranty claim/adjustment that is denied in its entirety. In applying the EWR definition of warranty adjustment, a tire manufacturer would only report warranty adjustments when it paid or provided other reimbursement to a consumer pursuant to a warranty program offered by a manufacturer or goodwill. See 49 CFR 579.4, as amended at 68 FR 35132 at 35142. Therefore, under the circumstances suggested in your e-mail, Toyo would not have to report any claim that was denied because it failed to meet the "adjustability" requirements that are explicitly stated in the applicable warranty.

Fourth, in connection with Compendium Section IV B. 4, you stated:

Reporting Claims and Notices of Death and Injury reads: &"A manufacturer need not file a report for a claim or notice of death and injury when: b.) The claim alleges one or more deaths in a foreign country involving a tire that is identical or substantially similar to one offered for sale in the United States&". This seems to contradict the statement on page 16 (paragraph 2): &"Similar reporting is also required when a claim alleging or proving that one or more deaths in a foreign country was caused by a defect in a tire that was identical or substantially similar to one offered for sale in the United States&". Toyo's interpretation is that we will need to report on any identical or substantially similar tire involved with a foreign death if it meets minimal specificity requirements.

In connection with the Section IV B. 4, the Compendium (Version 1.0) inadvertently left out the word "not" in the sentence you reference. The Compendium should have read:

A manufacturer need not file a report for a claim or notice of death and injury when:

b.) The claim alleges one or more deaths in a foreign country involving a tire that is not identical or substantially similar to one offered for sale in the United States.

This omission has been corrected in "Version 2.0" of the Compendium.

Lastly, in connection with one-time historical reporting section in the Compendium you wrote:

Section V One-Time Historical Reporting Requirements B. What To Report: reads: &"Historical data concerning production totals, number of warranty adjustments for the preceding 12 quarters (July 1, 2000 through June 30, 2003) covering production year 1998 and later tires (see 579.28(c))&". Referencing the Federal Register/ Vol. 68, No. 112 / Wednesday, June 11, 2003 / Rules and Regulations - page 35148/Section 579.28 Due date of reports and other miscellaneous provisions. (c) (iii) reads: &"Each manufacturer of tires covered by 579.26 of this part shall file separate reports covering the number of warranty adjustments recorded in the manufacturer's warranty adjustment system for tires that it received in each calendar quarter from July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2003, for tires manufactured from July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2003&". Toyo interprets this to mean that the production data for the one-time historical report should only include production numbers for the 3rd and 4th quarters of 1998 to June 30, 2003 and not the entire calendar production for 1998.

We do not agree with your understanding.The historical reports are expected to provide a baseline so that we will be able to compare current rates to historical rates. In order for NHTSA to evaluate the EWR information, we need annual production for the five previous years. Our intent is for tire manufacturers to provide annual production for all of 1998 until 2003 is complete and we have first quarter 2004 production. See 49 CFR 579.28, as amended at 68 FR 35132 at 35148. Therefore, when reporting for each quarter from July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2003, for tires manufactured from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2003, a manufacturer should include the total annual production of tires produced from the beginning of each calendar year included in the report until the close of the quarter that is the subject of the report.

If you have any questions, you may phone Andrew DiMarsico of my staff at (202) 366-5263.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:579
d.11/19/03

ID: 86-5.28

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 10/01/86

TITLE: TEXT OF THE RULING BY THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT UPHOLDING THE STATE'S LAW REQUIRING SEAT BELT USE BY DRIVERS AND FRONT SEAT PASSENGERS IN AUTOMOBILES

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 07/32/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS; REDBOOK A31; STANDARD 208 LETTER DATED 07/11/89 FROM BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS TO STEVE WOOD -- NHTSA

TEXT: Docket Nos. 62719, 62799, 63705, 63224 cons -- Agenda 40 -- May 1986.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS et al., Appellants, v. ELIZABETH J. KOHRIG et al., Appellees.

PER CURIAM: The defendants in these four consolidated cases were issued traffic citations for failure to wear seat safety belts while operating their motor vehicles on a street or highway in violation of section 12-603.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1 (hereinafter the section).) In each case, the trial court concluded that the section was unconstitutional and dismissed the charge. The State appealed each case directly to this court pursuant to our Rule 302(a) (94 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)), and the cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal. Only two of the four defendants -- Elizabeth J. Kohrig and Regina L. Greene -- have filed briefs in this court; however, various parties have been permitted to file briefs as amicus curiae.

At issue is whether the section, which requires drivers of motor vehicles and their front-seat passengers to wear safety belts when driving on a public highway or street, violates the due process guarantees of the State and Federal constitutions. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 2; U.S. Const., amend. XIV, sec. 1.

The section, which became effective on July 1, 1985, provides in part:

"(a) Each driver and front seat passenger of a motor vehicle operated on a street or highway in this State shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt; except that, a child less than 6 years of age shall be protected as required pursuant to the Child Passenger Protection Act. Each driver of a motor vehicle transporting a child 6 years of age or more, but less than 16 years of age, in the front seat of a motor vehicle shall secure the child in a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(a).)

The statute also provides that certain persons are exempt from complying with the seat-belt-use requirement, including persons with a written medical waiver from a physician or government agency; those persons frequently stopping and leaving the vehicle or delivering property from the vehicle if its speed between stops does not exceed 15 miles per hour; and drivers operating a vehicle in reverse. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(b)(1),

(b)(4).) Certain vehicles also are exempt from the statute's requirements, including motorcycles, motorized pedalcycles, and vehicles manufactured prior to 1965. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(b)(5), (b)(9).) Violators of the section are guilty of a "petty offense and subject to a fine not to exceed $ 25." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.I(d).

At the outset we note that, in reviewing the constitutionality of Illinois' mandatory-seat-belt law, this court does not join in the debate over whether the law is desirable or necessary. Our nation was founded in large part on the democratic principle that the powers of government are to be exercised by the people through their elected representatives in the legislature, subject only to certain constitutional limitations. Although this court has never hesitated to invalidate laws that it believes to be unconstitutional, we emphasize that our role is a limited one. The issue here in "not what the legislature should do but what the legislature can do." City of Wichita v. While (1970), 205 Kan. 408, 409, 469 P.2d 287, 288.

Defendant Greene contends that the section violates her fundamental right to privacy protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. (U.S. Const., amend XIV, sec. 2.) Additionally, both defendants argue that the section is beyond the police powers of the legislature and thus violates the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. We first turn to the issue of whether the section violates defendants' fundamental right to privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment.

Regulations that limit a person's constitutional right to privacy may be justified only by a "'compelling state interest,'" and the legislation "must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." (Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 155, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 178, 93 S. Ct. 705, 728. See also Carey v. Population Services International (1977), 431 U.S. 678, 686, 52 L.Ed. 2d 675, 685, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016.) However, "'only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" [citation]'" (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 65, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 462, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2639, quoting Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 152, 35 L. Ed.2d 147, 176, 93 S. Ct. 705, 726), or those liberties "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'" (Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L.Ed. 2d 140, 146, 106 S.

Ct. 2841, 2844; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 52 L. Ed.2d 531, 540, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938) are included in the right of privacy guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has selected only a few rights for such an esteemed status: the "privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 65, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 462, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2639. See Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 148, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2346; Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 712-13, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 420-21, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1166.

Moreover, recognizing that a court is "most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution," the Supreme Court has emphasized that there should be "great resistance" to further expanding the substantive due process right of privacy. (Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L. Ed.2d 140, 148, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846.) Thus, attempts by litigants to expand the privacy right beyond matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relations, abortion, child rearing and education have largely been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (right to privacy does not encompass right to engage in homosexual sodomy); Kelley v. Johnson (1977), 425 U.S. 231, 244, 47 L. Ed. 2d 708, 714, 96 S. Ct. 1440, 1444 (police officer does not have privacy right to choose hairstyle); Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (no privacy protection of reputation); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (privacy right does not encompass right of adults to watch obscene movies in places of public accommodation).

In the present case it cannot be said that defendant Greene's claimed right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt on a public highway resembles those liberties identified by the Supreme Court as being included in the right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. Although the section in question implicates a person's interest in "liberty" in the sense that it restricts his freedom of choice, the law here does not regulate those intimate

decisions relating to marriage, procreation, child rearing, education or family that have heretofore been recognized as deserving of heightened constitutional protection. (See Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d , 495 N.Y.S. 2d 591 (mandatory-seat-belt-use law does not violate right of privacy). Cf. People v. Thomas (1984), 159 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 18, 206 Cal. Rptr. 84 (statute requiring the securing of a child passenger in a seat-restraint system does not infringe on defendant's fundamental right of privacy); State v. Fetterly (1969), 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996 (motorcycle helmet law does not violate defendant's right of privacy).) Nor do we think that the right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed" (Palko v. Connecticut (1937), 302 U.S. 319, 325-26, 82 L. Ed. 288, 292, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152), or a liberty "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" (Moore v. East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 540, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938). The States historically have been given a wide latitude to regulate the use of motor vehicles (Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. (1959), 359 U.S. 520, 530, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1003, 1010, 79 S. Ct. 962, 968), and the individual driver's autonomy on the road has, out of necessity for the public safety and welfare, been significantly curtailed by State regulation. Like the court in Bisenius v. Karns (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed (1969), 395 U.S. 709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 655, 89 S. Ct. 2033, we reject any notion that the right of privacy includes the right to "do one's thing" on an expressway:

"There is no place where any such right to be let alone would be less assertable than on a modern highway with cars, trucks, busses and cycles whizzing by at sixty or seventy miles an hour. When one ventures onto such a highway, he must be expected and required to conform to public safety regulations and controls, including some that would neither have been necessary nor reasonable in the era of horse-drawn vehicles." (42 Wis. 2d 42, 55, 165 N.W.2d 377, 384.)

We are unwilling to graft onto the Constitution a right of privacy to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt where there is no textual basis or a clear historical precedent for such a right in the language of the Constitution or the opinions of the Supreme Court. To do so woul be to place the court in a position of acting as a super legislature,

nullifying laws it does not like. That is not our proper role in a democratic society. Therefore, we hold that the section does not infringe upon defendant's fundamental right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. Neither does it infringe upon any right to privacy arising under the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 6).

Defendants also argue that the section does not further the health, safety or welfare of the general public, asserting that the statute only protects the safety of the individual driver and passenger. They contend that since the section interferes with their right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt, and has no corresponding public benefit, the statute exceeds the State's police power and violates the due process guarantees of the State and Federal constitutions.

It is well established that the legislatures, not the courts, have the primary role in our democratic society in deciding what the interests of the public require and in selecting the measures necessary to secure those interests. (City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 111, 115; Memorial Gardens Association, Inc. v. Smith (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 116, 127.) Recognizing the legislature's broad power to provide for the public health, welfare and safety, the courts are hesitant to second-guess a legislative determination that a law is desirable or necessary. Only when the statute in question affects a fundamental constitutional right will the courts subject the legislation to strict or exacting scrutiny. In such cases, the State must have a "compelling" purpose for the law and show that it's goals cannot be accomplished by less restrictive means. (Carey v. Population Services International (1977), 431 U.S. 678, 686, 52 L. Ed. 2d 675, 685, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016.) Few rights, however, have been identified as "fundamental," since only those rights "that lie at the heart of the relationship between the individual and a republican form of nationally integrated government" are deemed deserving of heightened judicial scrutiny. (People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 88, 97.) Thus, in most cases involving substantive due process challenges to statutes, the courts give substantial deference to the legislative enactments.

In the present case we already have determined that the section here involved does not infringe upon the defendants' right of privacy protected by the fourteenth

amendment, and defendants do not argue that the statute implicates any other fundamental constitutional right or liberty. As such, the State need not show a "compelling interest" for the law. It is sufficient that there is a rational basis for the statute. That is, the law will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464; Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368; Hayen v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 419; Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 443, 453.) Under the rational-basis test, a statute is presumed to be valid, and the party challenging the statute has the burden of proving that the statute is irrational. (Hayen v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 419; Pozner v. Mauck (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 250, 255.) As long as there is a conceivable basis for finding a rational relationship, the law will be upheld. McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420, 426, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 399, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1105; Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368.

In challenging the section as exceeding the scope of the State's police power, the defendants principally rely on the case of People v. Fries (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 446. In Fries the court held that a statute requiring the operator or passenger of a motorcycle to wear protective headgear was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the purpose of the headgear requirement was to "safeguard the person wearing it" and was unrelated to the safety of the public at large. (42 Ill. 2d 446, 450.) It concluded that the statute constituted a "regulation of what is essentially a matter of personal safety" and exceeded the scope of the State's police power. (42 Ill. 2d 446, 450.) Here, too, defendants argue that the decision of whether or not to wear a safety belt is "essentially a matter of personal safety" and that any regulation restricting the individual's right to make such a decision exceeds the State's police power.

The State, on the other hand, maintains that Fries was wrongly decided, and it urges us to overrule that decision. It correctly notes that at present Fries stands alone in holding that a motorcycle helmet law is unconstitutional. The overwhelming weight of authority is that motorcycle-helmet laws are a valid exercise of the State's police

power. (See Kingery v. Chapple (Alaska 1972), 504 P.2d 831; State v. Beeman (1975), 25 Ariz. App. 83, 541 P.2d 409; Penney v. City of North Little Rock (1970), 248 Ark. 1158, 455 S.W.2d 132; Love v. Bell (1970), 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118;State v. Brady (Del. Super. 1972), 290 A.2d 322; Hamm v. State (Fla. 1980), 387 So. 2d 946; State v. Cotton (1973), 55 Hawaii 138, 516 P.2d 709; State v. Albertson (1970), 93 Idaho 640, 470 P.2d 300; City of Wichita v. White (1970), 205 Kan. 408, 469 P.2d 287; Everhardt v. City of New Orleans (1968) 253 La. 285, 217 So. 2d 400, appeal dismissed and cert. denied (1969), 395 U.S. 212, 23 L. Ed. 2d 214, 89 S. Ct. 1775; State v. Quinnam (Me. 1977), 367 A.2d 1032; Simon v. Sargent (D. Mass. 1972), 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463; Commonwealth v. Howie (1968), 354 Mass. 769, 238 N.E.2d 373, cert. denied (1968), 393 U.S. 999, 21 L. Ed. 2d 464, 89 S. Ct. 485; City of Adrian v. Poucher (1976) 398 Mich. 316, 247 N.W.2d 798; State v. Edwards (1970), 287 Minn. 83, 177 N.W.2d 40; State v. Cushman (Mo. 1970), 451 S.W.2d 17; State v. Eight Judicial District Court (1985), 101 Nev. 658, 708 P.2d 1022; State v. Merski (1973), 113 N.H. 323, 307 A.2d 825; State v. Krammes (1969), 105 N.J. Super. 345, 252 A.2d 223; City of Albuquerque v.Jones (1975), 87 N.M. 486, 535 P.2d 1337; People v. Bennett (1977), 89 Misc. 2d 382, 391 N.Y.S.2d 506; State v. Anderson (1969), 275 N.C. 168, 166 S.E.2d 49; State v. Odegaard (N.D. 1969), 165 N.W.2d 677; State v. Stouffer (1971), 28 Ohio App. 2d 229, 276 N.E.2d 651; Elliott v. City of Oklahoma City (Okla. Crim. App. 1970), 471 P.2d 944; State v. Fetterly (1969), 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996; Commonwealth v. Kautz (1985), 341 Pa. Super. 374, 491 A.2d 864; State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi (1968), 104 R.I. 28, 241 A.2d 625; Arutanoff v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County (1969), 223 Tenn. 535, 448 S.W.2d 408; Ex Parte Smith (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), 441 S.W.2d 544; State v. Acker (1971), 26 Utah 2d 104, 485 P.2d 1038; State v. Solomon (1969), 128 Vt. 197, 260 A.2d 377; State v. Laitinen (1969), 77 Wash. 2d 130, 459 P.2d 789; State v. Zektzer (1975), 13 Wash. App. 24, 533 P.2d 399, cert. denied (1975), 423 U.S. 1020, 46 L. Ed. 2d 392, 96 S. Ct. 457; Bisenius v. Karns (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed (1969), 395 U.S. 709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 655, 89 S. Ct. 2033.) Alternatively, the State contends that the statute being challenged here promotes valid public

interests and thus is distinguishable from the motorcycle helmet law found to be unconstitutional in Fries.

Defendants are correct in asserting that the primary goal of the section is to protect the individual driver and front-seat passenger from death or serious injury. As such, the statute interfers with the individuals' choice concerning his or her personal safety. However, arriving at those conclusions does not ipso facto mean that the law is devoid of any public benefit and is unconstitutional. Regardless of a law's primary objective, it will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose. (Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368-69; Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 I11. 2d 443, 453.) In that regard, the defendants have not persuaded us that the legislature could not have found that the law bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. The legislative debates clearly indicate that the legislators believed that safety-belt use would protect persons other than the belt wearers by helping drivers to maintain control of their vehicles, and that the law would promote that economic welfare of the State by reducing the public and private costs associated with serious injuries and deaths caused by automobile accidents.

During debates in the House of Representatives, a principal sponsor of the safety-belt legislation remarked:

"The Bill would not only protect drivers and passengers in the front seat, the Bill would also protect other people. It would protect other drivers. It would protect pedestrains on our highways and on our sidewalks. The reason for that, of course, is that even a minor * * * accident, can if * * * a car is driven by a person who doesn't have a seat belt, * * * result in that person losing control of the car and injuring other people on or about the car." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 212 (statement of Representative John Cullerton).)

Another legislator argues that if she were to drive an automobile without her safety belt fastened "and I lose control of my car, I am endangering others." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 223 (statement of Representative Josephine Oblinger).) The Governor, in signing the seat-belt law, also agreed that the law would help drivers to maintain control of their vehicles and avoid accidents with other motorists and pedestrians:

"Unbelted passengers in a motor vehicle literally become human projectiles in the event of a crash. Unbelted passengers

can interfere with the ability of an operator to respond to the collision, and unbelted drivers may lose control of a vehicle and thus cause death and injury to others." Letter of Governor James R. Thompson to the General Assembly indicating his intent to sign House Bill 2800 (Jan. 8, 1985).

The State can enact laws aimed at reducting traffic accidents, since such laws are clearly related to the health, welfare and safety of the public. We also believe that the legislature could rationally conclude that unbelted drivers and passengers endanger the safety of others. In upholding a law similar to the one here under review, the court in People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, stated:

"A driver who is injured or who is jolted away from his vehicle's controls during a skid or by an initial impact, may well be less able to prevent or minimize injuries caused by an accident. Also, an unrestrained occupant of a vehicle may injure others inside or out of the vehicle during an accident. The preventing or reduction of such an injury seems to the Court to be a valid State interest." (129 Misc. 2d 993, , 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963.)

It also is conceivable that drivers who wear safety belts are less likely to fall asleep at the wheel, or to lose control of their vehicles in situations where the driver must apply the brakes suddenly, or in cases where a vehicle begins to skid or swerve. Safety belts can also prevent passengers from being thrown against the driver. And, as the State observes, children and other occupants who are wearing safety belts are less likely to distract the driver. See People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, , 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963; Druhot, The Constitutionality of the Illinois Mandatory Seat Belt Use Legislation, 74 Ill. B.J. 290, 296 (1986); Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach To Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 217, 244 (1980).

Defendants argue that there is no statistical evidence showing that seat-belt use helps the driver to maintain control of his vehicle and avoid accidents with other motorists or pedestrains. Even assuming this argument is correct, it is without merit. "The fact that a congressional directive reflects unprovable assumptions about what is good for the people * * * is not a sufficient reason to find that statute unconstitutional" (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 62, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 460, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2638), and a court "will not disturb a police regulation merely where there is room for a difference of

opinion as to its wisdom, necessity and expendiency." (City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 I11. 2d 111, 115. See also Schuringa v. City of Chicago (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 504, 515.) Moreover, "the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464.) Here, we think that the legislature could rationally determine that the seat-belt-use law would serve the public safety and welfare by reducing the likelihood that a driver would lose control of his vehicle and jeopardize other motorists or pedestrians.

Another reason advanced by the State for the section is that the law promotes the economic welfare of the State by reducing the public costs associated with serious injuries and deaths caused by automobile accidents. The legislative history of the section indicates that legislators were concerned about the financial costs associated with highway accidents. Representative Cullerton remarked that, the safety-belt legislation "would clearly save money," asserting that "it cost the State over 800,000 dollars for a 26 year old person who is made a paraplegic as a result of a car crash." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 212 (statement of Representative John Cullerton).) Another Representative stated: "The lives we were save and the injuries that we avoid are the injuries and lives that we, the taxpayers, are very likely to be responsible for in the long run. We're not talking about somebody's own individual decision to end up in a car crash and find him or herself in a hospital for 20 years with that individual paying the bill. It's the taxpayers that are going to be paying those bills." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 220 (statement of Barbara Currie).) Senator James Philip, in urging passage of the seat-belt law, observed that " in 1982 in Illinois some seventy-five people were killed in automobiles [while] performing their job * * *. This costs Illinois employers some twelve million dollars." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Debates, June 21, 1984, at 159 (statement of Senator James Philip).) Senator Dawn Netsch remarked: "We intrude because the consequences of the thousands of people * * * who are injured and whose affictions then are passed on

to their families, to all of us in society * * *." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Debates, June 21, 1984, at 162 (statement of Senator Dawn Netsch).) Governor Thompson, in explaining his reasons for signing the legislation, estimated that the seat belt law would "save more than 300 lives in Illinois in the first year, will avoid nearly 43,000 injuries and save more than $ 400 million in costs." Letter of Governor James R. Thompson to the General Assembly indicating his intent to sign House Bill 2800 (Jan. 8, 1985).

It cannot be seriously questioned that the police power may be used to promote the economic welfare of the State, its communities and its citizens. "[I]n the interest of general welfare, the police power may be exercised to protect citizens and their businesses in financial and economic matters, [and] it may be exercised to protect the governments itself against potential financial loss." (Sherman-Reynolds, Inc. v. Mahin (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 323, 326.) A law whose aim is to reduce the private and public costs resulting from injuries and deaths caused by motor vehicle accidents is therefore within the police power of the State. In finding that a motorcycle helmet law was rationally related to the public welfare, the court in Simon v. Sargent (D. Mass. 1972), 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463, stated:

"From the moment of the injury, society picks the person up off the highway; delivers him to a municipal hospital and municipal doctors; provides him with unemployment compensation if, after recovery, he cannot replace his lost job, and, if the injury causes permanent disability, may assume the responsibility for his and his family's continued subsistence. We do not understand a state of mind that permits plaintiff to think that only he himself is concerned." (346 F. Supp. 277, 279, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463.)

Because of the drain on private and public financial resources caused by highway accidents, society has a legitimate interest in minimizing injuries which result from such accidents. See Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d 495 N.Y.S.2d 591; People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960; State v. Eighth Judicial District Court (1985), 101 Nev. 658, 708 P.2d 1022; State v. Beeman (1975), 25 Ariz. App. 83, 541 P.2d 409; Love v. Bell (1970), 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118; See also Druhot, The Constitutionality of the Illinois Mandatory Seat belt Use Legislation, 74 Ill. B.J. 290 (1986); Note, The Illinois Seat Belt Law: Should those Who Ride Decide?, 19 John

Marshall L. Rev. 193 (1985); Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve, St. L. Rev. 217, 222 (1980).

Defendants make several arguments concerning the effectiveness of safety belts in reducing injuries and arguments regarding the merits of alternative safety devices such as air bags. Defendants also contend that in some instances safety belts may cause injuries instead of preventing them. We need not consider these arguments, however, since they are proper subjects of discussion for the legislature, not the courts. (Hayden v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 421; City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 111, 115; Pozner v. Mauck (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 250, 255.) We believe that the General Assembly could reasonably assume that a law requiring drivers and front-seat passengers to wear safety belts will reduce traffic-related injuries and fatalities. (Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d , 495 N.Y.S.2d 591; People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960.) Therefore, we hold that section 12.603.1 does not violate the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. To the extent that People v. Fries (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 446, is inconsistent with our opinion, it is overruled.

Defendant Greene also filed a motion to strike certain portions of the briefs and appendices filed by the State and certain parties amicus curiae. This motion was taken with the case. Our review of the record shows that certain safety statistics relied on by the State and the amicus were not presented in the trial courts. Accordingly, defendant Greene's motion to strike this information is allowed.

For the reasons stated the judgments of the circuit courts of Marion, Effingham, Fayette and Champaign counties in cause Nos. 62719, 62799, 63705 and 63224 are reversed, and said causes are remanded to those respective courts for further proceedings.

Motion allowed;

judgments reversed;

causes remanded.

CLARK, C.J., and SIMON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

ID: 1983-2.20

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 06/23/83

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Middletown Van Pool Association

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your note of May 27, 1983, attaching correspondence between yourself and a District Manager for Ford Motor Company. You requested that we investigate the Ford E-150 van (which you state is a 15-passenger van) to determine if the stated Gross Vehicle Weight Rating of that vehicle is accurate.

Each manufacturer of a motor vehicle is required by the agency's regulations to place a certification label on the vehicle specifying that the vehicle is in compliance with all Federal motor vehicle safety standards and regulations (issued pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966). This certification label must include information regarding the vehicle's Gross Vehicle Weight Rating, as specified in 49 CFR 567.4(g)(3):

"(3) "Gross Vehicle Weight Rating" or "GVWR", followed by the appropriate value in pounds, which shall not be less than the sum of the unloaded vehicle weight, rated cargo load, and 150 pounds times the vehicle's designated seating capacity. However, for school buses the minimum occupant weight allowance shall be 120 pounds."

Thus, you are correct in your assumption that the GVWR for a 15-passenger vehicle would have to include 2,250 pounds for occupant weight. Further, if a 15-passenger vehicle has a stated GVWR of 6,200 pounds, its unloaded vehicle weight could not exceed 3,950 pounds. I cannot state whether the Ford E-150 van has an unloaded vehicle weight in excess of this figure. However, I am sending a copy of your correspondence to our Office of Enforcement so that they may review this matter.

SINCERELY,

Marriott Hotels

5/27/83

MR. FRANK (Illegible Word) CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA

THE ATTACHED FILE I BELIEVE POINTS TO A PROBLEM FORD MOTOR CO. HAS AND THEY NEED TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION ON.

THANKS FOR LOOKING INTO THIS PROBLEM.

(Illegible Words) May 21, 1983

Mr. J. R. Rose - District Manager Ford Motor Company

Dear Mr. Rose

Just a note to let you know that I received your May 17 letter which contains various specific accuations that "you (refering to the writer) apparently intensified the problem of load by actually carrying an overload". Sorry to inform you Mr. Rose, but you are totally misinformed and there is some question on the facts you put forth. Consider:

1. A Ford representative, Mr. Frank Palbo, speced out the Van in question. . . .as per the attached specification sheet. He had very simple guidelines.

(a) Want a 15 passenger Ford Van

(b) Want to carry 10 passenger in Captains Chairs

(c) Want individual reading lights for each Captains Chair.

2. Frank's note of August 17, 1981 and vehicle layout (copy attached) indicate,

(a) Seats will fit

(b) Van converter will do the job

(c) Finance Company approved the lease.

3. Consider Mr. Rose, I specified a 15 Passanger Ford Van. . . .which normally contains:

(a) Two front seats . . . . equals 2

b) Three bench seats holding three persons each . . . equals 9

(c) One rear bench seat holding four people . . . equals 4

(d) If my math holds up . . . that is 2 + 9 + 4 = 15 people

(e) If your letter is correct, I quote "10 passengers possibly totally 1500 lbs" is correct . . . then your Ford 15 passenger van carries a payload of 15 times 150lbs = 2250 pounds of payload.

(f) Since we are saving 5 passengers we should be saving . . . . 5 times 150lbs = 750 pounds.

(g) Now, we added 8 captains chairs on bases verses your 4 bench seats . . . and since our seats our top quality, we'll agree they probably weigh on a two for one bases, 50 pounds each more than seats . . . so eights seats times 50lbs. = 400 pounds.

(h) O.K. - I saved 750lbs. by carrying 5 less passengers - I added 400lbs by using Captains Chairs . . . so basic subtraction says 750 minus 400 equals 350 pounds.

(i) Now the Van converter recommended we beef-up your flooring along with insulating the floor so we added 3/4" plywood to the floor in under your luxurious carpeting. Say that added 100lbs. to the Van. Let's see, I still have 350lbs. I saved and I take away 100lbs. from that and I have 250lbs. . net savings.

(j) We also added reading lights, electrical wire, front wood console, rear tire carrier . . . must all total out to at least 50lbs . . . . so I reduce my 250pounds savings by 50 and my new net savings is 200 pounds.

(k) Now our regular riders are of hearty stock and probably average 20lbs. overweight to your 150lbs. standard . . . so 10 passengers being 201lbs. each overweight equals 200lbs . . . can you believe it . . . 200 plus and 200 minus and I come out to . . . ZERO.

Now that we've finished our basic math quiz we can get down to the heart of the problem. Ford is selling a Cargo/Passenger vehicle that can't possibly meet their stated weights . . . . once again simple math says: GVW is 6200 pounds 15 Passengers -2250 pounds NVW is 3950 pounds

There is no way that vehicle or any Ford Vehicle setting on your showroom floor, equipped with bench seats and ready accept 15 passengers can weigh less than 400 pounds.

So, by your own figures, you show that you are falsely representing your product, that you are endangering peoples lives and worst of all you don't give a damn. And to prove that statement, I'll take a Saturday and in your facility, take out the eight captains chairs and bases and let you weigh the Van. And so that everyone knows things are on the up and up, let's invite the President of Ford to be the official weighing judge. He certainly has a vested interest. And just in case you don't want to accept the challenge, rest assured I'll do it on my own, having everything (Illegible Word) so that TV Stations, Consumer Organizations, FTC, and NHTSA can all benefit from this information.

So, back to you Mr. Rose and this time please do your homework and get the facts straight before you respond. I want to know why a Ford Motor Company representative speced and sold our group a Van that could not possibly conform to what we requested.

A VERY UNHAPPY FORD VAN LEASEE:

WILLIAM E. MEITER Middletown Van Pool Association

Ford Motor Company

May 17, 1983

William E. Meiter Middletown Van Pool Association

Dear Mr. Meiter:

This is in response to your recent letter to Mr. Peck in which you relate the problems experienced with replacement of brake linings and pads on your 1982 Ford E-150 Van.

While the warranty which you received with the Ford E-150 Van covers defects in material and workmanship within the first 12 months or 12,000 miles, it does not cover replacement of normal maintenance items such as brake linings (friction material). There are several factors that may effect brake life; for example: individual driving habits, road conditions, stop and go traffic into and within Manhattan and optional equipment such as 10 captian chairs causing extra load. You apparently intensified the problem of load by actually carrying an overload which is indicated in the following: Your vehicle's GVW is - 6,200 lbs. After alterations, your vehicle's net weight registered as - 5,720 ibs. Allowing you - 480 lbs. to use as load; i.e.: passengers.

By transporting 10 passengers possibly totalling 1,500 lbs., you are overloading your vehicle by approximately 1,000 lbs.

We regret that our response could not be more favorable, but appreciate having had the opportunity to review this matter for you.

J. R. Rose District Manager New York District

MANHATTAN FORD, LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC. (Illegible Words) 555 WEST 57th STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10019 (201)581-7860

PRICE BOOK DATE PAGE DATE SALESMAN: SALBO

CUSTOMER: J.C. PENNY

ADDRESS

ATTENTION: W.E. MEITER 60 WALLACE ROAD, MIDDLETOWN, N.J. 07748 PHONE: 212-957-0092. MODEL: EIEO WINDOW VAN SUPER (Illeg.) 6941.- PAYLOAD PACKAGE: #2 GVM: 6200 N/C ENGINE: 302-V8 101.- TRANSMISSION: AUTOMATIC 352.- AXLES FRONT: (TRACTION LOK) REAR RATIO: 4.75 170.- TIRES: P235 75R 15XL STD.- SPARE TIRE: P235 75R 15XL 111.- AIR CONDITION DASH [] HI CAPACITY [] 1020.- ALTERNATOR: 60 AMP INCL W/AIR. - BATTERY: HD 36.- BRAKES: POWER STD BUMPER: REAR STEP. 84.- OUT CONVENIENCE GROUP: INTER WIPERS-12" O/N MIRROR-RHVANITY MIRROR 50.- COOLING SYS EXTRA [] SUPER [] 55.- DOOR SIDE: SLIDING OR HINGED N/C FUEL TANK: AUX. TOTAL CAP. 40 GALS 112.- (Illeg.) SPEED CONTROL 135.- GLASS (Illeg.): SWING OUT REAR. 40.- GLASS TINTED [] PRIVACY [] 264.- (Illeg.): COMFORT RIDE 15.- HEATER AUX [] HI OUTPUT [] 25.- INSULATION: DELUX 362.- LIGHT (Illeg.): COURTESY SWITCHES 24- LOCK GROUP: SECURITY 51.- MIRRORS: WESTERN LOW MTG. 69.- PAINT: ONE COLOR N/C PROTECTION GROUP RADIO: AM. FM. CASSETTE (4 SPEAKERS.) 224.- SEATING: QUAD CAPTS. CHAIRS. (2 ONLY) 1100.- 550 SHOCKS: HD FRONT & REAR (Illeg.) SPRING FRONT: HD REAR: HD 62.- STABILIZER BAR: FRONT 25.- STEERING: POWER 197.- (Illeg.): OUTSIDE SWING AWAY TIRE CARRIER. 117.- (Illeg.): CIGAR LIGHTER. 17.- FREIGHT 509.- DELIVERY & PREPARATION CHARGE 75.- 1981 PRICE (Illeg.) 82 ESTIMATED INCREASE 4% 500.- 12926- BILL, THE VAN PEOPLE ON LONG ISLAND WANT X 355.00- EACH INSTALLED FOR CAPTAINS CHAIRS FIGURING ANOTHER SEVEN TX 368.00-297.50 25.00- 2.972 I STILL WANT TO SHOP THIS ITEM LIGHTS 34.35 15 TOTAL 212.45 504.00 15.286

(Illegible Words)

P.S. ALL ACCESSORIES ARE FIGURED AT COST SO ANYTHING YOU THINK YOU DON'T WANT JUST DELETE.

LENNIE (Illegible Words) - 914-638-2972 3 YR. #562 MO PLUS INSURANCE. DOWN #600 + ONE MOS. PAYMENT $ 8,500 BUY BACK

MANHATTAN FORD, LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC

8-17-81

BILL,

JUST A QUICK NOTE TO TELL YOU THE FINANCE CO. APPROVED THE LEASE.

ALSO ATTACHED IS A LAY OUT. I GOT THE SEAT PEOPLE TO DROP THEIR PRICE TO $ 297.50 AND THE READING LIGHTS INSTALLED EACH SEAT $ 34.95 EACH.

I THINK WE HAVE EVERYTHING, GIVE ME A CALL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

Frank

THIS IS THE SEAT MOVES BACK & FORWARD & SWIVELS DOES NOT RECLINE.

MAIN CUT OFF SWITCH FOR LIGHTS INSTLD. IN DASH

8 (Illegible Word) SEATS INSTLD ON SWIVEL BASES W/SLIDE TRACKS AS SHOWN

SEAT INSTALLATION NOTE:

POSITION ALL SEATS APPROXIMATELY 4 (Illegible Word) FROM SIDE TO ALLOW FOR:

- SWIVEL OF SEATS

- STOREAGE OF BLUE CASES ON FLOOR BETWEEN SEAT AND SIDE WALL

WE WILL USE 8 OF THESE DRIVE & PASSENGER WILL BE FORD.

SPECIAL NOTE:

CENTER THIS SEAT (MOVE INTO AISLE) SO PASSENGERS CAN ENTER BEHIND SEAT AND (Illegible Words) AISLE TO THEIR SEATS

9 SINGLE AIRCRAFT LIGHT W/SEPARATE SWITCHES INSTLD OVER EACH SEAT AS SHOWN.

(Graphics omitted)

ID: nht87-2.41

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/09/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Mr. Alberto Negro

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Alberto Negro Fiat Research & Development - USA Branch Parklane Towers West Suite 1210 Dearborn, MI 48216

Dear Mr. Negro:

This is a response to Mr. Rossi's request for an interpretation of the Federal motor vehicle theft prevention standard (49 CFR Part 541), which he asked that I direct to you. That standard requires that certain parts of high-theft carlines, including the engine and transmission, be marked with the vehicle identification number, if the part is an original equipment part, or with the letter "R" and the manufacturer's trademark, if the part is a replacement part. Mr. Rossi stated that it is occasionally ne cessary to remove the original equipment engine or transmission from one of these cars and install a replacement engine or transmission in the car. The original equipment engine and/or transmission is then sent to the factory to be repaired and reconditi oned. Following such repair, the engine and/or transmission is then put into the replacement parts network.

Mr. Rossi stated his belief that the original equipment part should have the original equipment identification removed and a replacement marking put onto the part. He then asked whether Ferrari was required to remove the footprint left by the original eq uipment identification marking or if that should be left on the part. The answer is that Ferrari and all other reconditioners are not permitted to remove from any reconditioned part the original equipment identification marking inscribed or affixed to th e part in compliance with Part 541. further, reconditioners are not required to inscribe or affix any additional markings to parts they have reconditioned.

Title II of the Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-547: the Theft Act) includes a provision that addresses this question. This section (18 U.S.C. 511) reads as follows:

S511. Altering or removing motor vehicle identification numbers

(a) Whoever knowingly removes, obliterates, tampers with, or alters an identification number for a motor vehicle, or motor vehicle part, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(b)(1) Subsection (a) of this section does not apply to a removal, obliteration, tampering, or alteration by a person specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection (unless such person knows that the vehicle or part involved is stolen).

(2) The persons referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection are

(A) a motor vehicle scrap processor or a motor vehicle demolisher who complies with applicable State law with respect to such vehicle or part;

(B) a person who repairs such vehicle or part, if the removal, obliteration, tampering, or alteration is reasonably necessary for the repair; and

(C) a person who restores or replaces an identification number for such vehicle or part in accordance with applicable State law.

None of the exceptions set forth in 18 U.S.C. 511(b)(2) would permit Ferrari to routinely remove original equipment markings from reconditioned engines and transmissions. The first exception is not applicable, since Ferrari is clearly not a motor vehicle scrap processor or demolisher. The second exception would be applicable only in rare instances, since it is not usually necessary to remove the original equipment identification marking in order to recondition engines or transmissions. The third excepti on was explained as follows in the House Report on the Theft Act (H.R. Rep. No. 1087, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 24 (1984)): "The exemption also applies to persons acting under the authority of the Secretary of Transportation or State law to restore or rep lace such markings." for the policy reasons discussed below, we will not give reconditioners authority to routinely remove original equipment identification markings from engines and transmissions. Assuming Ferrari does not have authority under applicabl e State law to remove such markings, the third exception does not apply to Ferrari when it is reconditioning engines and transmissions.

If reconditioners of engines and transmissions were allowed to routinely remove the original equipment identification markings, the law enforcement purposes of the Theft Act would be seriously undermined. In response to some comments received on the prop osed Part 541, a new S541.6(b) was added to the final rule. This section expressly prohibits covered major parts from being marked as both original equipment and replacement parts. The preamble to the final rule explained the reasons for prohibiting such "dual markings" as follows:

Dual markings would give thieves the opportunity to present stolen original equipment parts as properly marked replacement parts. Once the original equipment identification (the VIN) had been obliterated from those stolen parts, a legitimate replacement part marking would remain. Assuming that the obliteration of the VIN were performed reasonably proficiently, repair shops and investigators would have little reason to suspect chat this part was anything other than a properly identified replacement part. 50 FR 43178; October 24, 1985.

These same law enforcement concerns would arise if Ferrari were to remove the VIN markings from its reconditioned engines and transmissions. If those parts were marked as both original equipment and replacement parts, the problems associated with dual ma rkings would arise. If, on the other hand, Ferrari were to try to obliterate the footprint from the original equipment, law enforcement officials would have no means of distinguishing engines Ferrari had reconditioned from stolen engines on which thieves had obliterated the original equipment marking and added a counterfeit replacement marking. In either case, it would cause confusion and uncertainty for law enforcement officials if Ferrari and the large number of other reconditioners were legitimately and routinely to remove the original equipment identification from reconditioned parts and add a replacement part marking to those parts.

Indeed, such action by reconditioners would serve to defeat the purpose of the Theft Act, which was to "decrease the ease with which stolen vehicles and their major parts can be fenced." If reconditioners routinely removed the original equipment markings from the engines and transmissions they reconditioned, car thieves could also remove those original equipment markings with impunity. If the thieves were ever questioned by law enforcement officials about the obliterated original equipment marking, they could respond that the marking must have been obliterated during reconditioning. If obliterated original equipment markings on parts do not provide law enforcement officials with evidence of illegal activity, there would seem to be no reason to require the original equipment markings on the parts.

Further, a requirement that all persons reconditioning engines and transmissions obliterate the original equipment marking and add a replacement part marking would impose significant additional costs and burdens on those persons. This would be inconsiste nt with the Theft Act's stated purpose of minimizing regulation of the aftermarket motor vehicle industry.

All of these potential problems can be avoided if reconditioners simply leave the original equipment marking on the parts after reconditioning. When those markings are left in place by reconditioners, thieves cannot claim that an engine or transmission t hat has a "footprint" in the area where the original equipment identification is placed is just a reconditioned part. Instead, the "footprint" would alert law enforcement officials to the likelihood that the original equipment marking had been unlawfully removed from the part. Further, no burdens are imposed in reconditioners if they must leave the original equipment markings in place and are not required to add any markings of their own. Therefore, we conclude that the Theft Act and Part 541 require th at businesses that recondition any major parts required to be marked pursuant to Part 541 leave those markings in place on the reconditioned parts. Part 541 does not require reconditioners to add any further identification markings to these parts.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

Ms. Erika Jones Office of Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh St., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

SUBJECT: Theft Prevention Standard Request for Agency Interpretation

Dear Ms. Jones:

On October 24, 1985, the agency published in the Federal Register (50 FR 43166) the final rule for the Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard and Selection of Covered Major Parts as required by the Motor Vehicle Theft law Enforcement Act of 1984.

The Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard requires a manufacture whose car line(s) fall above the median theft rate to mark the fourteen (14) major parts with the vehicle identification number (VIN) and replacement parts for those high theft lines are to be marked with the manufacturers logo and the letter "R". The standard also requires that the "target area" for marking of the replacement parts be different from the marking of the original parts marking so that repair shops and investigators can identify an original part from a replacement part.

On occasions, it becomes necessary for Ferrari to replace the original engine and/or gearbox in a customers vehicle in order to prevent tying up a customer's vehicle for an extended period to correct a major problem in the engine and/or gearbox. This rep lacement engine and/or gearbox will contain the label with the Ferrari logo and the letter "R" beginning with 1987 models.

The original engine and/or gearbox is then sent to the factory to be repaired and re-conditioned and at that point is placed in the spare parts network. The re-conditioned part will have the label containing the VIN removed and a replacement label affixe d prior to going into the spare parts network. The removal of the original parts marking label and the affixing of the replacement label is causing Ferrari some concern and they have asked that we request an agency interpretation on how to best handle th is matter.

The regulations in paragraph 541.5(d)(v)(8) requires that the removal of the label must "discernibly alter the appearance of that area of the part where the label was affixed by leaving residual parts of the label or adhesive in that area, so that invest igators will have , evidence that a label was originally present". The label to be affixed to the original engine and gearbox will be riveted and glued to the part so that when it is removed a "footprint" will be left behind.

The concern that Ferrari has for which they are requesting an agency interpretation is what to do with the "footprint" left by the original label after it is removed once the engine and/or gearbox has been re-conditioned prior to going into the spare par ts network? Do they remove the footprint or do they leave it on the part? If they are to remove it, do they have to fill in the two holes which were drilled for the rivets?

Ferrari does not want to cause confusion with repair shops or investigators when the "re-conditioned" engine and/or gearbox is used at some later date to replace a customers engine and/or gearbox that is in need of some major repair.

The agency's response to this request of interpretation should be sent to the Fiat R & D office in Dearborn, Michigan to the attention of Mr. Alberto Negro. We are prepared to supply you with any further information you may need to respond to our request .

Sincerely yours,

Ing. M. Rossi FSM/ai

ID: nht80-2.47

DATE: 06/06/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Blue Bird Body Co.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Dear Mr. Milby: This responds to your letter of January 16, 1980, in which" you asked a number of questions pertaining to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 101-80, Controls and Displays. The answers to your questions are presented below and are numbered to correspond with the numbering of the questions in your letter.

1. Section 5.2.1 provides that where Table 1 of Standard 101-80 shows both a symbol and identifying words or abbreviations for a particular control, use of the symbol is mandatory and use of the words or abbreviations is optional.

2. When a manufacturer identifies a control with both the symbol shown in Table 1, Column 3, and the identifying words or abbreviations shown in Table 1, Column 2, only the symbol is subject to the illumination requirements of Section S5.3. That section states that with certain exceptions (i.e., foot operated controls or hand operated controls mounted upon the floor, floor console or steering column or in the windshield header area) "the identification required by S5.2.1 or S5.2.2 of any control listed in column 1 of Table 1 and accompanied by the word 'yes' in the corresponding space in column 4 shall be capable of being illuminated whenever the headlights are actuated." Since this section refers only to the identification required by Safety Standard 101-80, it does not apply to identification which is optional under the standard.

3., 4., 5., 6., 7., 8. In questions designated by these numbers, you asked whether the following controls are subject to the identification and illumination requirements of Standard 101-80:

(a) a driver comfort fan which is not a part of the windshield or rear window defrosting and defogging system or the heating and air conditioning system,

(b) hot water flow valves for heaters which are opened in winter and then closed again in summer,

(c) heater fresh air control valves used to control the ratio of fresh to recirculated air entering the heater,

(d) driver's side window defroster control,

(e) driver's fresh air vent control,

(f) fan control for an optional driver's heater which directs air at the driver's feet.

Section 5 of Standard 101-80 states that each vehicle that is subject to the standard and is manufactured with any control listed in Section 5.1 or in column 1 of Table 1 must comply with the requirements of Standand 101-80 regarding the location, identification and illumination of such control. Of the controls listed above, those lettered (a), (d) and (e) are not listed in either of these locations and thus are not subject to these requirements. Items (b), (c) and (f) are part of a heating or air conditioning system indicated in column 1 of Table 1 and is therefore subject to the location and identification requirements of Standard 101-80. However, the fan control, which directs air at the driver's feet, is not subject to the illumination requirements, since section 5.3.1 states, "control identification for a heating and air conditioning system need not be illuminated if the system does not direct air directly upon windshield." Likewise, if the hot water flow valves and fresh air control valves are mounted upon the floor, floor console or steering column, or in the windshield header area,' then section 5.3.1 does not require them to be illuminated.

9. In your question 9, you asked whether the penultimate line in Table 2 concerning malfunctions in antilocks applies only to vehicles equipped with air brakes and whether the last line concerning brake system malfunctions applies only to vehicles equipped with hydraulic brakes.

The penultimate line of Table 2 applies to all vehicles less than 10,000 pounds GVWR which are equipped with an antilock system, regardless of whether they are air or hydraulic brake equipped vehicles. The agency included the reference to Standard 105, Hydraulic Brake Systems, to indicate that section 5.3 of that standard permits a manufacturer to use either a yellow or red warning light depending on whether there is a separate indicator that only warns of antilock failure or there is an indicator which warns of antilock and other brake system failures.

The last line of Table 2 concerning the telltale for brake system malfunction applies to all vehicles equipped with this type of telltale regardless of the type of brake system. The agency included the reference to Standard 105 since section 5.3 of that standard specifies other requirements that brake system malfunction indicators used in hydraulic brake systems must meet.

10. This agency has never established specific size requirements for the identification symbols specified in Tables 1 and 2 of Standard 101-80. Sections 5.2.1 and 6 only require that such symbols be visible to a driver restrained by crash protection equipment. 11. None of the display requirements of Table II of Standard 101-80 apply to vehicles with a GVWR exceeding 10,000 pounds. Displays included in such vehicles in accordance with other standards are subject only to the provisions of those standards.

12. Section 5.3.1 provides that the illumination requirements of Standard 101-80 do not apply to hand operated controls mounted on the steering column. Accordingly, they are not applicable to a hazard control mounted on the steering column.

13. If the clearance lamps are controlled with the headlamp switch, Table 1, footnote 2, of the standard provides that the only identification required is the headlamp switch symbol.

14. Standard 101-80, section 5.2.1, states that controls must be identified with the symbol indicated in Table 1 and that such identification shall be placed on or adjacent to the control. The agency has previously indicated that manufacturers could use a symbol that is a minor deviation from the required symbol, as long as the symbol used substantially resembles that specified in the standard (43 FR 27541, June 26, 1978). Thus, if the wiper symbol you want to use is only a minor deviation and substantially resembles the required wiper symbol, you may use it.

15. You enclosed in your letter a blueprint showing a bank of switches which control multispeed fans and asked whether the identification shown in the print would comply with the requirements of Standard 101-80. Since the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1391) requires manufacturers to certify their compliance with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards, this agency does not approve products. However, from our understanding of the information you have provided, it appears that the identification you propose to use for fan controls would comply with Standard 101-80. This opinion is based on the fact that your blueprint shows use of the fan symbol in accord with section 5.2.1 and identification of each function of the fan switch in accord with section 5.2.2.

16. With respect to air conditioning systems:

(1) Section 5.3.1 does not require illumination of the control identification if the system does not direct air directly upon the windshield.

(2) Table 1 and section 5.2.1 require the fan symbol to be used to identify the fan for an air conditioning system;

(3) If the air conditioning system control regulates temperature over a quantitative range, the extreme positions must be identified in accord with 5.2.2.

17. With respect to vehicles over 10,000 pounds GVWR, the requirements of Standard 101-80 concerning telltales used to indicate high engine coolant temperature or low engine oil pressure are inapplicable. With respect to vehicles less than 10,000 pounds GVWR, these requirements are applicable. In a letter to Ford Motor Company (copy enclosed), this agency stated that use of the engine symbol which Ford proposed for identification of such telltales would comply with the requirements of Standard 101-80.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

January 16, 1980

Dear Mr. Berndt:

SUBJECT: FMVSS 101-80

The purpose of this letter is to seek confirmation of several issues related to FMVSS 101-80, discussed at a January 9, 1980 meeting of NHTSA. The issues are numbered below in the sequence discussed at the meeting:

1. In all cases where both symbols and wording are shown in Table I, the symbol is mandatory and the wording is optional.

2. In the case of optional wording accompanying mandatory symbols, which require illumination, only the symbol must be illuminated. It is mandatory for the optional wording to be illuminated.

3. There is no requirement relating to driver comfort fans. These fans are provided to direct air at the driver for his comfort as the name indicates. However, they can be adjusted to direct air on the windshield.

4. There is no requirement for hot water flow valves for heaters. Typically, these valves are opened in winter and left open; closed in summer and left closed. Heat in regulated be means of switch controls to operate air blowers.

5. There is " requirement for heater fresh air control valves. These valves are used to control the ratio of fresh/recirculated air entering the heater.

6. The fan control for an optional driver's heater must be identified but not illuminated.

7. There is no requirement for a driver's side window defroster control.

8. There is no requirement for a driver's fresh air vent control.

9. Confirmation is needed with respect to Table II that the next to last line is only applicable to vehicles with air brakes and the last line is only applicable to vehicles with hydraulic brakes.

10. The proportion of the symbols are those developed by the ISO, however, there is no requirement limiting the minimum or maximum sizes of the symbols.

11. None of the requirements of Table II apply to vehicles with a GVWR over 10,000 pounds. This is true even in the case where a display is required by another FMVSS; Example: the turn signal display required by FMVSS 108.

12. A hazard control mounted in the steering column does not require illumination.

13. Clearance lamps may be controlled by the headlamp switch. In this case, only the headlamp symbol should be used.

14. If necessary to accomodate a temporary inventory balance out, a slightly different wiper symbol may appear on the wiper knobs that is required by Table I, provided that the required symbol appears adjacent to the control and is properly illuminatted. It is also satisfactory to provide no symbol on the knob itself.

15. With respect to S5.2.2, a bank of switches which control multi-speed fans will comply if they are identified as shown in the enclosed print 0981233.

16. Air conditioning controls must be identified but not illuminated. The extreme positions of air conditioning controls must be identified. The fan symbol is required for air conditioning fan controls.

17. Any type tell tale may be used for a single display on vehicles over 10,000 pounds GVWR to indicate high engine coolant temperature and/or low engine oil pressure. We understand that Ford Motor Company has proposed an engine symbol for such a display. What is the status of this proposal?

We would like to go on record at this time to alert NHTSA that it may be necessary to revise the effective date of the subject standard as it applies to heavy duty vehicles to alleviate a temporary chassis shortage. This could be caused by a prolonged strike by a major chassis manufacturer which is still in effect. This may result in the mounting of bodies on chassis built after September 1, 1980, which were scheduled for chassis built prior to that date.

Your early response to these items will be appreciated.

Thank you.

Very truly yours, William G. Milby Manager Engineering Services Department

fvc

Enclosure

c: Wilbur Rumph Ben Newberry Jim Moorman Jim Swift Bob DuMond

ID: nht78-2.22

DATE: 04/06/78

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; J. J. Levin, Jr.; NHTSA

TO: Illinois Department of Transportation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of September 22, 1977, to the Administrator asking whether an Illinois standard applicable to school bus lighting is neither preempted by nor violates Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment.

Paragraph S4.1.4(b) (ii) of Standard No. 108 requires that:

"The [school bus signal lamp] system shall be wired so that the amber signal lamps are activated only by manual or foot operation and, if activated, are automatically deactivated and the red signal lamps automatically activated when the bus entrance door is opened."

Under the Illinois requirement (4.2.18.2) the amber signal lamps appear to be activated only by manual or foot control (4.2.18.2 (d)), and are automatically deactivated when the bus entrance door is opened (4.2.18.2 (e) and (f)). The red signal lamps are activated before the bus entrance door is opened (4.2.18.2 (e)) and remain activated when the door is opened (4.2.18.2 (f)). Thus, these portions of the Illinois requirement comply with Standard No. 108.

As for the remaining portions of 4.2.18.2, they dictate sequential operational requirements of the 8-lamp system and stop arm (an item of equipment not required by Standard No. 108). To accomplish this operation, 4.2.18.2 requires that "A separate circuit breaker and a master switch shall be provided for this signal system." You have asked whether this is preempted by Standard No. 108.

The aspect of performance involved here is that of wiring requirements for school bus warning lamps. Standard No. 108 specifies the manner in which these lamps shall operate but it is silent as to the ways this performance shall be achieved. Therefore Illinois is not preempted from requiring a separate circuit breaker and master cylinder in school bus lighting systems, a specification which is one of good engineering practice and probably used as a matter of course by most school bus manufacturers.

SINCERELY,

Illinois Department of Transportation

September 22, 1977

Joan Claybrook, Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Ms. Claybrook:

In this letter, I ask you to advise that the Illinois safety standard for school bus alternately flashing signal lamps does not violate Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 108. I also ask that you advise this Illinois standard is not preempted under provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (PL 89-563). We are asking for these statements because a representative of one school bus manufacturer has stated the Illinois standard violates a portion of FMVSS 108, as interpreted by his company.

Before going into details, I will present some background information.

School buses are defacto mobile traffic control devices. To lessen confusion and earn public respect and compliance, their signals must be displayed in a consistent and reasonable manner.

When a conventional traffic signal at an intersection changes to yellow (amber) some drivers will decelerate and stop; others will continue or will accelerate (if traffic permits), attempting to enter the intersection before the signal changes to red. Drivers usually react the same way to yellow alternately flashing school bus signal lamps -- some slow down; some continue or speed up. In addition, some drivers tend to disobey the red school bus signals even though they might tend to obey red traffic signals at intersections.

Exuberant and impulsive pupils rushing out of a school bus are likely to dash into a roadway -- without checking whether all vehicles have stopped.

Under very cold, inclement, or severe weather conditions, many pupils tend to remain in their homes or other shelter until the school bus arrives.

Police have reported that school bus drivers tend to keep the service door closed while waiting in cold, inclement, or severe weather, opening the door as each pupil arrives. This is done to prevent loss of heat and/or entrance of snow, sleet, or rain. (This tendency was mentioned in the 2nd paragraph on page 4 of "ILLINOIS COMMENT ON PROPOSED TRAFFIC SAFETY PROGRAM STANDARD 17, PUPIL AND YOUTH TRANSPORTATION SAFETY -- DRAFT OF JUNE 30, 1970, VERSION A" which was submitted 9-30-70 in response to Traffic Safety Program Letter 42-11, dated 6-30-70.)

Studies show a significant portion of school bus related pupil fatalities and injuries in Illinois occur while the pupil is a pedestrian.

A copy of "ILLINOIS MINIMUM SAFETY STANDARDS FOR TYPE 1 SCHOOL BUSES", effective July 1, 1977, a copy of Section 12-812 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (referred to therein), and a transmitting memorandum are enclosed. Please note that these Standards apply to every Type 1 school bus procured for use in Illinois. Also, the FMVSS applicable to buses are included by reference (1.2, 4.1, & 5.1). This inclusion eliminates doubts about state and local agencies with enforcement powers having authority to enforce those FMVSS.

The Illinois standard for school bus alternately flashing signal lamps is set forth at 4.2.18.2 on pages 15 and 16 of the enclosed Standards. The prescribed sequence of operations, (a) through (j), describes operations on a typical Type 1 school bus equipped with a manual service door operating mechanism, in which a signal control switch (or switches) is operated by movement of the door control handle. Of course, each of the described operations is not used deliberately by the school bus driver at every stop.

The "master switch" is moved to "off" only when complying with statutory and administrative requirements (upper portion of page 15).

After stopping on a clear roadway to load or unload pupils, the school bus driver might move the door control handle from its "secured" or "travel" position to its "door-fully-open" position in one rapid and continuous movement. In this case Operation (e) is of very short duration but, still, the signal switch(es) acts to deactivate and activate the yellow and red signals before the service door is opened.

After discharging or loading pupils, the driver might move the door control handle from its "door-fully-open" position to its "secured" or "travel" position in one rapid, continuous movement. In this case Operation (g) is of very short duration, Operation (i) is bypassed, and Operation (j) is completed. But, still, the door is closed before the signal switch(es) acts to extinguish the red signals.

There are many stops, however, where Operations (e) and (f) and/or Operations (g) and (h) are important to pupil safety, orderly traffic movement, and traffic safety.

When a school bus driver reaches a stop where other vehicles are moving on the roadway, Operation (e) allows him to hold exuberant and impulsive pupils in the bus by keeping the service door closed until all other vehicles have stopped in response to display of the red alternately flashing signal lamps. With the manual service door control, he does this by moving the door control handle, or lever, only a short distance from its "secured" or "travel" position, but not far enough to open the service door. After all other vehicles have stopped, the bus driver can use Operation (f) and allow pupils to leave the bus. Without either Operation (e) or its equivalent, which usually has not been provided with power operated doors, the school bus driver must open the service door to activate the red signals, and thereby, discharge exuberant and impulsive pupils onto the roadway before all drivers of moving vehicles react to the signal change from yellow to red.

Operation (e) also allows a school bus driver to prevent loss of heat and/or the entrance of snow, sleet, or rain during very cold or severe weather conditions by keeping the service door closed while pupils dash from their home or other shelter to the stopped, red-signalling bus.

When a school bus driver has stopped and admitted a pupil, Operation (g) allows him to maintain display of red signals without losing heat or allowing entrance of snow, sleet, or rain while waiting for the arrival of other pupil(s) during cold or severe weather. With a manual service door, he does this by moving the door control handle, or lever, far enough to close the door but not far enough to extinguish the red signals (which happens when the control is moved to its "secured" or "travel" position). With signal controls arranged as they often are on power operated service doors, closing of the door prevents display of the red signals and other vehicles move. This endangers pupils as they arrive at the school bus. When alternate opening and closing of such a door causes intermittent operation of the red signals, drivers of other vehicles become confused or frustrated and tend to lose respect for the special school bus signals.

The sequence of operations prescribed in 4.1.18.2(a) through-(j) (including ability to "skip through" Operations (e) and (g) and to "bypass" Operations (f) and (h), as desired) is either inherent in or easily provided with nearly every manually operated service door control device on Type 1 school buses. However, many power operated service door control devices in use and being manufactured do not provide for such a sequence of operations -- particularly Operations (e) and (f) and Operations (g) and (h). In the past, a typical power door has been either fully-closed-and-secured or fully-opened, with the signals controlled by those conditions and with no provision for intermediate conditions and/or Operations (e) and (g).

We have been requested to change the Illinois Standard (4.2.18.2) so as to accommodate typical power operated door mechanisms and controls as they have been designed and manufactured in the past. We have responded by stating the required sequence of signal operations must be provided whether the service door is manual or power operated and have interpreted the standard so as to ease certain apparent requirements in 4.2.18.2(e) and 4.2.18.2(g). The enclosed letter dated September 15, 1977, was sent to each school bus manufacturer.

Conditions causing traffic hazards or confusion should not be perpetuated merely to accommodate the traditional designs of a convenience such as a power operated service entrance door -- whether the bus is procured by the State, a local government, a public school district, or a religious or private organization or person. School buses that conform to the Illinois standard for alternately flashing school bus signal lamps (4.2.18.2) will provide for lessening or preventing dangers to pupils in roadways near stopped buses.

It seems clear that such buses conform to S4.1.4(b)(ii) in FMVSS 108. On such buses the yellow (amber) signals are activated only by manual or foot operation and, if activated, are automatically deactivated and the red signals automatically activated when the bus service entrance door is opened.

It seems clear that the Illinois Standard (4.2.18.2) is not preempted by FMVSS 108 under provisions of Section 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (PL 89-563). The Illinois requirements for a separate circuit breaker and a "master switch" and for controls that provide Operations (e) and (f) and Operations (g) and (h) apply to each Type 1 school bus procured by a person, organization, or government in Illinois. They are prescribed to govern aspects and provide safety not governed or provided by FMVSS 108.

Will you please affirm that:

The Illinois standard (4.2.18.2) for school bus alternately flashing signal lamps does not violate Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 108; and The Illinois standard (4.2.18.2) for school bus alternately flashing signal lamps is not preempted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 108.

Karsten J. Vieg Governor's Representative for Highway Safety