ID: nht94-1.2

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: 01/01/94 EST

FROM: Rowe Manufacturing

TO: NHTSA

TITLE: GLAD-GRIP

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 5/18/94 from John Womack to Neil Rowe (A42; Std. 106)

TEXT:

The Glad-Grip started as a useful device to help connect and disconnect the hydraulic hoses on farm implements. This device is called the Hydra-Grip. As time passed and the Hydra-Grip became better known, several truckers saw the Hydra-Grip and thought they would be an asset on the air hoses of semi truck tractors. There is nothing on the air hoses to get a grip on except the hose itself or the spring below the glad hand. Especially during cold weather when drivers twist the glad hand loose from its mating coupler half, the hose would be bent at a severe angle causing the hose to either break or develop a leak. This problem is greatly reduced by installing the Glad-Grip, a very durable and simple handle. Safety is also a factor as the operator's hand is not in contact with the air hose itself.

The Glad-Grip has a machined steel core designed and tested to withstand a minimum of 3000 psi of hydraulic pressure, far in excess of the pressure on the air line system. The center bore of the core exceeds DOT requirements of at least 66% of the air l ine inside diameter. The threads, both male and female, are cut to American National Standard Institute one half inch NPTF threads.

It is the desire of Rowe Manufacturing to provide a safe and economical device for the trucking industry. To help minimize down time and costly repairs associated with broken hoses. At the same time we want to abide by all DOT standards and regulations .

Thank you for your consideration of our product. If you have any questions regarding our product feel free to call.

ID: nht69-2.22

DATE: 10/03/69

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; C. A. Baker; NHTSA

TO: Donald J. Norris

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This reply is in reference to your letter to Mrs. Knauer concerning Federal tire codes and tire tests, and a minimum service guarantee on tires.

The list of tire manufacturer's approved code marks is periodically updated wherever new number are requereted or other chop as are necessary. The latest revision, a copy of which is enclosed, was printed on July 2, 1969. in the Federal Register. The tire code mumber, you realise, is placed on the tire to enable the consumer to identify the actual manufacturer of a tire. With respect to the minimum performance standards for passenger care times it is our intent to revise there standard and up-grade as necessary to protect the motoring public.

It has been the policy of the National Highway Safety Bureau to retest tires when individual failures are found and to request the manufacturer of these tires to provide information concerning their basis of certifying compliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109. When upon retesting a significant number of tires of a certain brand and line of tires are found to be defective, indicating that failures are not of the "isolated-instance type", this information has been released to the public and recall campains have been initiated. The Bureau has taken the position that an isolated instance of failure is not necessarily representative of the tires being manufactured and further verification is needed by retesting. We feel that the release of information on isolated failures would be confusing and serve no useful purpose to the consumer.

The National Highway Safety Bureau has the responsibility of establishing safety standards for motor vehicles to reduce accidents.(Illegible Words) injuries in(Illegible Word) accidents.(Illegible Words) into relationships between the consumer and the caller of tires in cases involving(Illegible Word) service(Illegible Word).

ID: aiam1783

Dear Mr. Chancey: This responds to Trail-O-Matic's January 21, 1975, question whether trailer manufactured from the running gear and suspension of an existing trailer and a newly- fabricated frame and upper structure would qualify as a rebuilt vehicle that would not have to be certified as conforming to the requirements of Standard No. 121, *Air brake systems*.; The answer to your question is no. In determining that a buildin operation constitutes the repair of an existing vehicle, and not the manufacture of a new vehicle, the NHTSA requires that, as a minimum, the running gear and frame of the existing vehicle be used in the building operation. For your information, I have enclosed a letter which discusses a similar operation in the trailer industry.; Standard No. 121, therefore, applies to the manufacture of trailer described in your letter.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel

ID: aiam1453

Dear Mr. Sundelin: This responds to your February 20, 1974 request for a determination o whether two of your motorcycle treadwear indicator designs conform to the S6.4 requirements of Standard 119 *New pneumatic tires for vehicles other than passenger cars.*; The treadwear indicator requirements have been amended by deleting al of the portio of S6.4 that begins 'The indicators shall, as a minimum'. this means that the manufacturer determines for himself the location and design of the six treadwear indicators requires (three in the case of motorcycle tires). He must assure himself that when the indicator is reached, the tread at that point o the tire is worn to a depth of on-sixteenth of an inch (or one-thirty-second of an inch in the case of motorcycle tires).; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel

ID: aiam0510

Dear Mr. Teich: This is in reply to your letter of November 9, 1971, inquiring o behalf of the Ford Motor Company to whom you supply synthetic sewing threads, whether there is a specification for the flammability of sewing thread.; Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 302, 'Flammability of Interio Materials' (49 CFR 571.302) (copy enclosed), which becomes effective September 1, 1972, establishes minimum requirements for the flammability of certain motor vehicle components which are listed in S4.1 of the standard. Any synthetic or other thread that is used in the manufacture of any of these components must meet the standards requirements when tested as part of the component.; If you have additional questions, please let us know. Sincerely, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel

ID: aiam0045

Dear Mr. Diehl: #In our telephone conversation of January 8, 1968, an your letter of January 9, 1968, your requested: #>>>'...an early reply whether labels are required, when the information already appears on *one sidewall*, except the basic label. (Basic Label Information - DOT-153) It is also our feeling that the labeling is not a serious requirement to meet minimum safety standards.'<<< #This letter confirms my statement in our telephone conversation that Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 109 may be met if the information required in S4.3 of this standard is molded on one or both sidewalls of the tire in lieu of a label until August 1, 1968, after which this information is required on each sidewall. #Sincerely, Roger H. Compton, Director, Office of Standards on Accident Avoidance, Motor Vehicle Safety Performance Service;

ID: aiam5243

Dear Ms. Jones: This responds to your request for an interpretation o Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, Child restraint systems. S5.2.3.2(b) of Standard No. 213 specifies a minimum thickness for materials of a certain compression- deflection resistance. You ask whether more than one piece of material may be used to meet the thickness requirement. The answer is yes. S5.2.3.2(b) does not require the material to be of a single piece, and the final rule that incorporated the requirement into Standard No. 213 did not address the issue. 44 FR 72131, December 13, 1979. Accordingly, more than one piece of material may be used. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact us. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel;

ID: aiam3021

Dear Mr. Kurre: This responds to your May 18, 1979, letter asking to what extent th parallelepiped device required by Standard No. 217, *Bus Window Retention and Release*, must fit inside a school bus in order to provide the mandated 'unobstructed passage.'; The agency responded to a request similar to yours in 1976. A copy o that interpretation is included for your information. The essence of that interpretation is that while conducting the test in accordance with S5.4.2.1(a) of the standard, the parallelepiped device must, at a minimum, fit inside a bus so that the device's outside edge is flush with the lower outside edge of the bus body. If your bus complies with this interpretation of the standard, it would be in compliance.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel

ID: nht89-1.70

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/13/89

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA

TO: MABEL Y. BULLOCK -- ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER FROM MABEL Y. BULLOCK AND LACY H. THORNBURG TO SUSAN SCHRUTH -- NHTSA RE WINDOW TINTING, FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION OF STATE REGULATIONS, OCC 2142; NORTH CAROLINA STATUTE REGULATING WINDOW TINTING; LETTER DATED 12/18/87 FROM LACY H. THORNBURG A ND MABEL Y. BULLOCK, SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLES REGULATIONS OF DARK SHADED WINDOWS; PREEMPTION; LETTER DATED 05/06/88 FROM DAIRL BRAGG TO WILLIAM S. HIATT; LETTER DATED 10/28/82 FROM FRANK BERNDT -- NHTSA TO LAWRENCE T. HIROHATA, NOA-30; LETTER DATED 04/04/8 5 FROM JEFFREY R. MILLER TO ARMOND CARDARELLI; REGULATIONS DATED 07/01/85 EST, FEDERAL AUTO SAFETY LAWS AND MOTOR VEHICLE WINDOW TINTING.

TEXT: Dear Ms. Bullock:

Thank you for your letter to Ms. Susan Schruth of my staff, regarding North Carolina General Statute 20-127, Windshields must be unobstructed. I regret the delay in responding. You enclosed a copy of the statute, the regulations implementing it, a copy of a December 18, 1987 legal memorandum prepared by your department concluding that a State statute or regulation allowing 35% light transmittance through windows in motor vehicles would be preempted by current Federal safety laws and standards regulati ng this same subject matter, and a copy of a May 6, 1988 letter from the Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA) to Mr. William S. Hiatt, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for North Carolina, asserting that the North Carolina statute was no t preempted by Federal laws and regulations. You asked for my opinion as to whether the North Carolina statute conflicts with any provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1381 et seq.) or with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (49 CFR 571.1 et seq.).

Some background information on Federal motor vehicle safety laws and regulations may be helpful. As you are aware, our agency is authorized, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehic les and certain items of motor vehicle equipment. One of the standards that we have issued under this authority is Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials (49 CFR @ 571.205), which applies to all new vehicles and all new glazing materials for use in motor v ehicles. Among the requirements set forth in Standard No. 205 are specifications for minimum levels of light transmittance (70 percent light transmittance in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars).

Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) specifies that, "No person shall manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or

import into the United States, any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment manufactured on or after the date any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect under this title unless it is in conformity with such standard . . ." Because of this statutory requirement, any manufacturer, importer, or dealer that installs solar films or other sun screen devices on new glazing materials or the glazing installed in new vehicles must certify that the vehicle continues to comply with th e light transmittance and other requirements of Standard No. 205.

The requirement that a car comply with all applicable safety standards applies only until the car is first sold to a consumer. See section 108(b)(1) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(b)(1)). Both before and after a vehicle is first sold to a consumer, any modifications to the vehicle's windows, including tinting, are affected by section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)). That section prohibits any manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business from "rendering inoperative " any device or element of design installed in a vehicle in compliance with any safety standard. In the case of windows in a passenger car, this means that no manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business could install a sun screen device or win dow tinting that would result in a light transmittance of less than 70 percent for any window of the car, or otherwise cause the car to no longer comply with the other requirements of Standard No. 205. Violations of this "render inoperative" prohibition can result in Federal civil penalties to the manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business of up to $ 1000 for each noncomplying installation.

Please note that Federal law does not affect vehicle owners. Vehicle owners may alter their own vehicles and operate them on the highways as they please, even if the vehicle's windows no longer comply with the requirements of Standard No. 205. Hence, n o provision of a Federal statute or this agency's regulations prevents individual vehicle owners themselves from tinting the windows on their vehicles.

The authority of States to regulate glazing is affected by section 103(d) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d)). This section provides that:

[whenever] a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this title is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or ite m of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing any State from en forcing any safety standard which is identical to a Federal safety standard.

The effect of this provision of the Safety Act, with respect to the light transmittance requirements of Standard No. 205, is to expressly prohibit any State from specifying some level of light transmittance other than than 70 percent specified in Standar d No. 205 for new motor vehicles and

new glazing for the use in motor vehicles. Each of the individual States has authority to enforce identical standards (i.e., a minimum of 70 percent light transmittance) for new motor vehicles and new glazing for use in motor vehicles. Additionally, eac h of the individual States has the authority to regulate the modifications that may be made to vehicles by their owners and to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered in that State.

Having provided this background, we want to turn now to the results of our review of the North Carolina statute and regulations, along with your office's memorandum concluding that the statue is preempted by Federal law.

1. New vehicles and new glazing for use in vehicles. We concur with the conclusions in your memorandum that the North Carolina statute would be preempted if it specifies any requirements other than the requirements of Standard No. 205 (minimum of 70 per cent light transmittance) for new vehicles or few new glazing for use in motor vehicles. Section 108(a)(1) of the Safety Act and Standard No. 205 require all new vehicles and new glazing for use in motor vehicles to be delivered to the first purchaser w ith a light transmittance of at least 70 percent. Section 103(d) of the Safety Act expressly preempts any non-identical State standard on the subject of window tinting. Section 20-127(d) of the North Carolina statute appears to permit a single applicat ion of tinted film with a light transmittance of as little as 35 percent to be applied to vehicle glazing after factory delivery, but before sale to the public. This provision is preempted by Federal law, as is any other provision of North Carolina law which specifies that new glazing and glazing in new vehicles shall have some level of light transmittance other than the 70 percent minimum light transmittance requirement specified in Standard No. 205.

2. Modifications to vehicles and glazing by manufacturers, distributors, dealers and repair businesses after the first purchase of the vehicle or glazing in good faith for purposes other than resale. We concur with the conclusions in your memorandum tha t the North Carolina statute would be preempted by Federal law if it permits the commercial installation of sunscreen materials so that the combination of the sunscreen material and the existing glazing no longer meet the 70 percent light transmittance r equirement specified in Standard No. 205. This conclusion is based on the conflict between the North Carolina statute and the "render inoperative" provision of section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act. That provision prohibits any manufacturer, distributor , dealer, or repair business from rendering inoperative the compliance of a vehicle or an item of glazing with any of the requirements of Standard No. 205, including the minimum 70 percent light transmittance requirement.

Apart from the issue of preemption, I want to note that the provisions of State law cannot alter the effect of the "render inoperative" prohibition in Federal law. Regardless of how North Carolina law treats the combination of the glazing and the tintin g, if it results in less than 70

percent light transmittance, a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business that installed such tinting on a vehicle would be liable for the Federal civil penalty discussed above.

3. Modifications to vehicles and glazing by individual owners themselves after the first purchase of the vehicle or glazing in good faith for purposes other than resale. As noted above, Federal law does not regulate modifications that individual owners themselves make to their vehicles or glazing after the first purchase in good faith for purposes other than resale, even if those modifications result in the vehicles or glazing on longer complying with the requirements of Standard No. 205, including the requirement for at least 70 percent light transmittance. The State of North Carolina is free to establish whatever restrictions, if any, it deems appropriate on individual owner modifications, without regard to the requirements of Standard No. 205. To the extent that the North Carolina statute seeks to address these individual owner modifications, it would not be preempted by Federal law.

$4. Requirements for vehicles to be registered in the State of North Carolina. An individual State is free to establish whatever requirements it deems appropriate for vehicles to be registered in the State, provided that those State requirements would n ot prohibit the registration of vehicles that complied with the requirements of the Federal safety standards. Thus, the State of North Carolina is free to permit vehicles that do not comply with the requirements of Standard No. 205 to be registered in N orth Carolina. To the extent that the North Carolina window tinting statute seeks to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered in the State, it would not be preempted by Federal law.

We have also reviewed the May 6, 1988 letter from MEMA to Mr. Hiatt, in which MEMA discusses why it believes North Carolina's statute would not be preempted by Federal law. The MEMA discussion does not address the "render inoperative" provision in secti on 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act, which prohibits commercial businesses from adversely affecting the compliance of elements of design installed in a vehicle or item of equipment in compliance with a safety standards, regardless of whether the vehicle is new or used. As was previously stated, Federal law prohibits any manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business from ever installing window tinting material for the owner of a car if the combination of the original glazing and the tinting materi al results in less than 70 percent light transmittance through any window of the car.

To summarize, the North Carolina statute would be preempted to the extent that it seeks to permit some level of light transmittance other than that specified in Standard No. 205 for glazing in vehicles prior to the first purchase of the vehicles in good faith for purposes other than resale. Similarly, the statute would be preempted to the extent it seeks to permit the commercial installation of sunscreen materials with the result that the combination of the sunscreen material and the existing glazing n o longer complies with the requirements of Standard No. 205. However, the North Carolina statute would not be preempted to the extent that it seeks to regulate the modifications that owners themselves can make to

their vehicles or to the extent that it seeks to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered in the State, even if those requirements differ from those specified in Standard No. 205.

Sincerely,

ID: nht87-1.16

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 01/12/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Donald P. Weiher -- Dirctor, Product Assurance, LTV Aerospace and Defense Company, AM General Division

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Donald P. Weiher Director-Product Assurance LTV Aerospace and Defense Company AM General Division P.O. Box 3330 Livonia, MI 48151-3330

This is in reply to your letter of September B, 1986, to Mr. Oesch of this Office asking whether certain military vehicles are "motor vehicles" for purposes of notification and remedy in the event they are discovered to have safety related defects.

Based on the information your letter provides, we must conclude that the tactical military vehicles in question are motor vehicles within the meaning of section 102 (3) of the Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1391 (3), and that they are subject to the defect notifi cation and remedy provisions of the Act, although, as military vehicles they are exempt from compliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.

You have described the vehicles in question as "all tactical vehicles designed for cross-country (40%), secondary (30%) and primary (30%) roads." Such vehicles include the M998 Series 1 1/4 ton truck, and other tactical military trucks such as the 2 1/2 ton M44 Series and the 5-ton M809 and M939 Series. You have noted that the Office of Defects Investigation has previously assigned campaign numbers for safety related defects on similar tactical military vehicles. You have also noted the agency's 1969 in terpretation on mini-bikes states, as you have quoted it, that "in the absence of clear evidence that, as a practical matter a vehicle is not being, or will not be, used on the public streets, roads, and highways the operating capability of a vehicle is the most relevant fact in determining whether that vehicle is a motor vehicle."

Under the information you have presented, the tactical military trucks are designed to be used 60% of the time on primary and secondary public roads. In our view, they must then be considered as having been designed primarily for use on the public roads, and hence, "motor vehicles" under the Act.

We have conferred with our Office of Defects Investigation, and it appears to us that when that office responded to your inquiries on February 19 and March 5, 1986, it acted in the belief that the vehicles in question are intended primarily for off road use and that they lack an operating capability for substantial on road use. The fact that the vehicles are intended for use on roads 60 percent of the time indicates operating capability for such use.

We hope that this clarifies the status of these vehicles with respect to the definition of "motor vehicle" contained in the Act. We appreciate your having requested this further consideration of this question. If you have further questions concerning thi s matter, please contact Mr. Taylor Vinson, an attorney in this office who can be reached by telephone at (202) 366 5263.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

September 8, 1986

Mr. Steven Oesch Office of the Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

- PETITION -

Dear Mr. Oesch:

Please provide concurrence with the attached interpretations from Mr. Philip W. Davis, Director, Office of Defects Investigation/Enforcement regarding military vehicles "not manufactured primarily for highway use."

A generalization would be that all tactical vehicles designed for cross-country (40%), secondary (30%) and primary (30%) roads such as the subject M998 Series 1 1/4 Ton Trucks (a.k.a. HUMM-V) would all be exempt by virtue of not being "manufactured prima rily for highway use" and therefore not considered to be a "MOTOR VEHICLE under the provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. (Title I, Part A, Sec. 102(3) Interpretation).

Our previous verbal direction from your office had been that although these vehicles may be exempt from compliance with the safety standards (Ref. 571.7(c) enclosed), they are not exempt from the Safety Act or the Regulations, further the enclosed interp retations dated October 3, 1969, 34 F.R. 15416 and published under Part 571.3 "Definitions" state "that in the absence of clear evidence that as a practical matter a vehicle is not being, or will not be, used on the public streets, roads or highways the operating capability of a vehicle is the most relevant fact in determining whether or not that vehicle is a motor vehicle under the act", leaves us confused. Since the Office of Defects Investigation has previously assigned campaign numbers for safety re lated defects on similar tactical military vehicles, we solicit your official interpretation and guidance regarding safety related defects on tactical military trucks, such as the noted 1 1/4 Ton M998 Series, the 2 1/2 Ton M44 Series and the 5-Ton M809 a nd M939 Series.

Sincerely,

Donald P. Weiher Director-Product Assurance

DPW/tlb

Mr. Fred I. Masten Supervisor - Warranty/Safety LTV Aerospace and Defense Company AM General Division 701 W. Chippewa Avenue South Bend, IN 46680-2841

Dear Mr. Masten:

Thank you for your letter of February 19, 1986, concerning the recall of 1984-1986 AM General M998 Series trucks.

As the vehicles involved in this campaign are specifically designed to meet military specifications and are not manufactured primarily for highway use, we do not consider this to be a motor vehicle safety defect recall under the provisions of the Nationa l Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

Therefore, no further reports on this matter are necessary.

Sincerely,

Philip W. Davis Director Office of Defects Investigation Enforcement

Mr. Fred I. Masten Supervisor - Warranty/Safety LTV Aerospace and Defense Company AM General Division 701 W. Chippewa Avenue South Bend, IN 46680-2841

Dear Mr. Masten:

Thank you for your letter of January 27, 1986, concerning the recall of 1984-1986 AM General M998 Series trucks.

As the vehicles involved in this campaign are specifically designed to meet military specifications and are not manufactured primarily for highway use, we do not consider this to be a motor vehicle safety defect recall under the provisions of the Nationa l Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

Therefore, no further reports on this matter are necessary.

Sincerely,

Philip W. Davis Director Office of Defects Investigation Enforcement

Sec. 102 (cont.) (3) "Motor vehicle" means any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.

(4) "Motor vehicle equipment" means any system, part, or component of a motor vehicle as originally manufactured or any similar part or component manufactured or sold for replacement or improvement of such system, part, or component or as any accessory, or addition to the motor vehicle, and any device, article, or apparel not a system, part, or component of a motor vehicle (other than medicines, or eyeglasses prescribed by a physician or other duly licensed practitioner), which is manufactured, sold, de livered, offered, or intended for use exclusively to safeguard motor vehicles, drivers, passengers, and other highway users from risk of accident, injury or death.

s571.7 (cont.) (c) Military vehicles. No standards applies to a vehicle or item of equipment manufactured for, and sold directly to the Armed Forces of the United States in conformity with contractual specifications.

(d) Export. No standard applies to a vehicle or item of equipment in the circumstances provided in Section 108(b) (5) of the Act 15 U.S.C. 1397(b) (5)).

(e) Combining new and used components. When a new cab is used in the assembly of a truck, the truck will be considered newly manufactured for purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, the application of the requirements of this chapter, and the Act, unless the engine, transmission, and drive axle(s) (as a minimum) of the assembled vehicle are not new, and at least two of these components were taken from the same vehicle.

Interpretations

General. Compliance with Initial Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards is determined by actual date of manufacture, rather than model year designation.

Mini-bikes. A number of persons have asked the Federal Highway Administrator to reconsider his February 4, 1969, interpretation of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 concerning mini-bikes (34 F.R. 1909). In that interpretation, the Administrator concluded that mini-bikes are "motor vehicles" within the meaning of section 102(3) of the Act, and are regarded as "motorcycles" or "motor-driven cycles" under the Federal Highway Administration regulations (34 F.R. 1909). Under those re gulations, motorcycles and motor-driven cycles must conform to Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, which imposes performance requirements relating to lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment.

The primary basis for the conclusion of the February 4 interpretation, as stated therein, was that "in the absence of clear evidence that as a practical matter a vehicle is not being, or will not be, used on the public streets, roads, or highways the ope rating capability of a vehicle is the most relevant fact in determining whether or not that vehicle is a motor vehicle under the ACT * * *" It was stated that if examination of a vehicle's operating capability revealed that the vehicle is "physically capable (either as offered for sale or without major additions or modifications) of being operated on the public streets, roads, or highways, the vehicle will be considered as having been manu factured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways'." It was also stated that a manufacturer would need to show substantially more than that it has advertised a vehicle as a recreational or private property vehicle or that use of the vehicle on a public roadway, as manufactured and sold, would be illegal in order to overcome a conclusion based on examination of the vehicle's operating capability.

Petitioners have urged the Administrator to abandon the operating capability test. They have argued that many vehicular types, such as self-propelled riding mowers, have an "operating capability" for use on the public roads and yet are obviously outside the class of vehicles which Congress subjected to safety regulations. True as that may be, the Administrator has decided to adhere to the view that the operating capability of a vehicle is an important criterion in determining whether it is a "motor vehi cle" within the meaning of the statute. As the above-quoted portion of the February 4, 1969, interpretation states, however, the operating capability test is not reached if there is "clear evidence that as a practical matter the vehicle is not being used on the public streets, roads, or highways." In the case of self-propelled riding mowers, golf carts, and many other similar self-propelled vehicles, such clear evidence exists.

It is clear from the definition of "motor vehicle" in section 102(3) of the Act* that the purpose for which a vehicle is manufactured is a basic factor in determining whether it was "manufactured primarily or use on the public streets, roads, and highway s." However, this does n ot mean that the proper classification of a particular vehicle is wholly dependent on the manufacturer's subjective state of mind. Instead, the Administrator intends to invoke the familiar principle that the purpose for which an act, such as the p roduction of a vehicle, is undertaken may be discerned from the actor's conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances. Thus, if a vehicle is operationally capable of being used on public thoroughfares, and if in fact, a substantial proportion of the consuming public actually uses in that way, it is a "motor vehicle" without regard to the manufacturer's intent, however manifested. In such a case, it would be incumbent upon a manufacturer of such a vehicle either to alter the vehicle's design, con figuration, and equipment to render it unsuitable for on-road user or, by compliance with applicable motor vehicle safety standards, to render the vehicle safe for use on public streets, roads, and highways.

In borderline cases, other factors must also be considered. Perhaps the most important of these is whether state and local laws permit the vehicle in question to be used and registered for use on public highways. The nature of the manufacturer's promotio nal and marketing activities is also evidence of the use for which the vehicle is manufactured. Some relevant aspects of those activities are: (1) Whether the vehicle is advertised for on-road use or whether the manufacturer represents to the public that the vehicle is not for use on public roads; (2) whether the vehicle is sold through retail outlets that also deal in conventional motor vehicles; and (3) whether the manufacturer affixes a label warning owners of the vehicle not to use it for travel ove r public roads.