ID: nht90-3.34

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: July 30, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Betsy Dittemore -- Legislative Liaison, Iowa Department of Public Safety, Office of the Commissioner

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 6-14-89 to NHTSA from B. Dittemore; (OCC 3633); and NHTSA bulletin dated 8-85 re Federal Auto Safety Laws and Motor Vehicle Window Tinting

TEXT:

Thank you for your letter regarding a bill introduced in the Iowa Senate that, among other features, would establish light transmittance limits for "sunscreening devices" that may be applied to the windows of motor vehicles operated in Iowa. I apologize for the delay in this response. You requested our office's interpretation about whether provisions of this bill would violate or be preempted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials (49 CFR S571.205).

As you are aware, this agency is authorized by section 103 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1392) to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and certain items of motor vehicle equipment. One of the standard s that we have issued under this authority is standard No. 205, which applies to all new vehicles and all new glazing materials for use in motor vehicles. Among the requirements set forth in Standard No. 205 are specifications for minimum levels of ligh t transmittance (70 percent light transmittance in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars).

Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) specifies that no person may manufacture, import, or sell any vehicle in the United States unless it is in conformity with all applicable safety standards. Pursuant to section 108(b)(1) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(b)(1)), this prohibition no longer applies after the vehicle is sold to a consumer. However, both before and after the first sale, section 108(a)(2) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)) provides that "No manufacturer, d istributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal moto r vehicle safety standard . . . ."

In the case of windows on a passenger car, this provision of Federal law means that no manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business could install window tinting film that would result in a light transmittance of less than 70 percent for any wind ow of the car, because such action would "render inoperative" the vehicle's compliance with Standard No. 205. This same provision of Federal law prohibits a service station from permanently removing safety belts or permanently disconnecting brake lines on motor vehicles.

Please note that the Safety Act does not apply to the actions of vehicle

owners. Vehicle owners may alter their own vehicles and operate them on the highways as they please, even if the vehicle's windows no longer comply with the requirements of Standard No. 205. Hence, no provision of a Federal statute or this agency's reg ulations prevents individual vehicle owners themselves from tinting the windows on their vehicles.

The individual States, however, have the authority to regulate the modifications that vehicle owners may make to their own vehicles and to establish requirements for vehicles operated or registered in that State. The Iowa Senate bill enclosed with your l etter appears to be an attempted exercise of this inherent authority.

You asked for comments on whether this bill, if adopted as law in Iowa, would be preempted by Standard No. 205. I assume you were referring to the provision in this Iowa bill that would prohibit the operation of motor vehicles required to be registered in the State of Iowa if the vehicle has a "sunscreening device" on the front side windows with light transmittance of less than 35 percent or on the rear window and side windows behind the driver with light transmittance of less than 20 percent. Since t he original glazing on the vehicle could have had light transmittance of as little as 70 percent, this provision would permit overall light transmittance levels of as low as 25 percent for the front side windows and 14 percent for the rear windows.

This provision in the Iowa bill, and similar provisions in statutes adopted by other States, does not purport to legitimize conduct -- the rendering inoperative of glazing by firms installing window tinting -- that is illegal under Federal law. In other words, firms installing window tinting that results in light transmittance of less than 70 percent on any window of a passenger car would have violated the "render inoperative" provision in Federal law, even if Iowa had in place a statute that would per mit persons to operate and register vehicles whose windows had light transmittance that was far lower. Conversely, the Federal law setting requirements for the manufacture and sale of new vehicles and limiting the modifications commercial enterprises ca n make to those vehicles does not prohibit the State of Iowa from establishing lesser limits on owner modifications to their own vehicles and as the minimum requirements for vehicles to be operated and registered in the State of Iowa.

Thus, there does not appear to be any legal conflict between Federal law and this Iowa bill, and Iowa would be free to enforce the provisions of this bill if it is enacted into law. We would, however, urge the State of Iowa to carefully consider the adv erse safety consequences that would result from enacting this bill into law. NHTSA has determined that a 70 percent light transmittance minimum for new vehicles is the appropriate level to assure motor vehicle safety. Your letter indicated that Iowa ha d also adopted this 70 percent light transmittance minimum as a State requirement for new vehicles. It is not clear why the State of Iowa would conclude that the safety need that justifies requiring not less than 70 percent light transmittance in new ve hicles is satisfied by allowing light transmittance levels as low as 25 and 14 percent in vehicles to be operated in the State.

I hope that this information is helpful. If you have any further

questions or need additional information about this topic, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht90-3.36

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: July 31, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Jack E. Eanes -- Chief, Vehicle services, State of Delaware, Department of Public Safety, Division of motor Vehicles

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Letter dated 10-20-89 to T. Vinson from J. E. Eanes (OCC 3822)

TEXT:

This is in response to your letter asking whether very darkly tinted rear windows that obscure the center high mounted stop lamp (CHMSL) required in passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1985 would violate any Federal laws or regulations. Let me begin by apologizing for the delay in this response. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our laws and regulations for you.

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act) authorizes this agency to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. We have exercised this authority to issue two safety standards that are relevant to your question. The first of these is standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment (49 CFR S571.108), which applies to all new vehicles and new replacement equipment for motor vehicles. Among the requirement s set forth in this Standard is a requirement for all passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1985 to be equipped with a CHMSL of specified minimum size, brightness, and visibility from the range of locations set forth in the standard. The second relevant standard is Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials (49 CFR S571.205). This standard applies to all new vehicles and all new glazing for use in motor vehicles, and includes specifications for minimum levels of light transmittance of the glaz ing (70 percent light transmittance in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars).

Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) provides that no person may manufacture or sell any vehicle unless it is in conformity with all applicable safety standards. A new passenger car with a rear window tinted so darkly that th e CHMSL was not easily visible would probably not be in conformity with Standards No. 108 and 205, and so could not legally be manufactured or sold in the United States. However, this prohibition on the manufacture or sale of a nonconforming vehicle doe s not apply after a vehicle is first sold to a consumer.

Both before and after the first sale of a vehicle, section 108(a)(2) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)) provides that: "No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . ." If any of the listed commercial entities were to install tint film or otherwise darken the rear windows on passenger cars so that the light transmittance of that window plus the darkening material was below 70 percent, those entities would be "rendering inoperative" the light transmittance of the rear window of the car, in violation of Federal law.

This same prohibition in Federal law makes it unlawful for a service station to permanently remove the safety belts or permanently disconnect the brake lines on a car.

Please note that the Safety Act does not apply to the actions of individual vehicle owners. Vehicle owners may alter their own vehicles and operate them on the highways as they please, even if the vehicle no longer complies with the safety standards aft er such alterations. Hence, no provision of the Safety Act or our safety standards makes it unlawful for vehicle owners themselves to tint or otherwise darken the rear window of their car so that its light transmittance is below 70 percent and/or its CH MSL is obscured.

The individual States, however, do have authority to regulate the modifications that vehicle owners may make to their own vehicles. The States also have the authority to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered or operated in that Stake.

You indicated in your letter that the State of Delaware "allows vehicle rear windows to be tinted as dark as the owner desires." While I am not familiar with Delaware law, I assume that this statute, and similar statutes adopted by other States, does no t purport to legitimize conduct -- the rendering inoperative of glazing and CHMSLs by firms installing window tinting -- that is illegal under Federal law. In other words, any commercial firms installing window tinting that results in light transmittanc e of less than 70 percent and/or reduces the required brightness of the CHMSL would have violated the "render inoperative" provision in Federal law, even if Delaware permits individual owners to make such modifications themselves and to register and oper ate vehicles with rear windows and CHMSLs that would not comply with the requirements of the Federal safety standards for new vehicles. Conversely, the Federal law setting requirements for the manufacture and sale of new vehicles and limiting the modifi cations commercial enterprises can make to those vehicles does not prohibit the State of Delaware from establishing lesser limits on owner modifications to their own vehicles and as the minimum requirements for vehicles to be operated and registered in t he State of Delaware.

Thus, there does not appear to be any legal conflict between Federal law and Delaware law, and Delaware would be free to enforce the provisions of its law. We would, however, urge the State of Delaware to carefully consider the adverse safety consequenc es that will result from the provision of its law. NHTSA has determined that a 70 percent light transmittance minimum for new vehicles is the appropriate level to assure motor vehicle safety, and that the CHMSL on passenger cars enhances motor vehicle s afety. It is not clear why the State of Delaware would conclude that the safety need that justifies requiring not less than 70 percent light transmittance and CHMSLs in new passenger cars is satisfied by allowing far lower light transmittance levels and lower-brightness CHMSLs in passenger cars to be operated in the State.

I hope that this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need additional information about this topic, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202)

366-2992.

ID: nht92-4.18

DATE: September 4, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Kevin B. Brown -- EG&G Idaho, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 5/6/92 from Kevin B. Brown to NHTSA (OCC-7323)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter concerning 49 CFR 567 requirements for intermediate or final stage manufacture vehicle labeling. I apologize for the delay in responding. You stated in your letter that EG&G Idaho, as prime contractor for the Department of Energy, Idaho Field Office, procures and maintains all government-owned vehicles, and occasionally procures truck chassis purchased through the General Services Administration for subsequent mounting of service bodies.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our regulations to you. Before addressing the specific issues raised in the letter, some background information may be helpful. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended, 15 U.S.C., S1381-1431 (hereinafter "Safety Act") authorizes this agency to establish Federal motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA, however, does not approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Rather, the Safety Act establishes a self-certification process which requires each manufacturer, in the exercise of due care, to ensure and certify that its products meet all applicable Federal safety standards. Thereafter, NHTSA periodically tests vehicles and equipment for compliance with the standards and investigates allegations of safety-related defects.

In addition, the Safety Act only requires new vehicles to comply with applicable safety standards. The only provision of the Safety Act that would apply after the first purchase of a vehicle is 15 U.S.C. S1397(a)(2)(A), which states in relevant part that:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle ... in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard.

The first question to be answered is whether EG&G Idaho is a manufacturer. Under 49 CFR 568.3, a final-stage manufacturer is "a person who performs such manufacturing operations on an incomplete vehicle that it becomes a completed vehicle." An incomplete vehicle is "an assemblage consisting, as a minimum, of frame and chassis structure..." that requires "further manufacturing operations, other than the addition of readily attachable components... ." Readily attachable components include items such as mirrors or tire and rim assemblies. Service bodies are not "readily attachable components." Therefore, in installing service bodies on new chassis, EG&G is acting as a final-stage manufacturer under federal regulations.

49 CFR 586.6 establishes certain requirements for final-stage manufacturers,

including:

(a) Each final-stage manufacturer shall complete the vehicle in such a manner that it conforms to the standards in effect on the date of the manufacture of the incomplete vehicle, the date of final completion, or a date between those two dates. ... (b) Each final-stage manufacturer shall affix a label to the completed vehicle in accordance with S567.5 of this chapter.

EG&G must attach the proper label to the completed vehicle as set out in 49 CFR 567.5(c), a copy of which is enclosed for your convenience. According to your letter, EG&G mounts bodies in accordance with the original (i.e., incomplete) manufacturer's instructions or recommendations. In that case, EG&G's certification that the completed vehicle conforms to all applicable safety standards can state simply that the vehicle has been completed in accordance with the prior manufacturer's instructions, per S567.5(c)(7).

When EG&G mounts a new body on a new chassis, the resulting vehicle is subject to the Safety Act and the certification requirements of 49 CFR 567 and 568. However, according to your letter, you also mount bodies on "existing used" chassis. 49 CFR 571.7(e) deals with combining new and used components:

When a new cab is used in the assembly of a truck, the truck will be considered newly manufactured for purposes of paragraph (a) of this section (stating that safety standards apply to all relevant motor vehicles), the application of the requirements of this chapter, and the (Safety) Act, unless the engine, transmission, and drive axle(s) (as a minimum) of the assembled vehicle are not new, and at least two of these components were taken from the same vehicle.

This means that the vehicle resulting from placing a new body upon a used chassis is a used vehicle. If, in addition to adding a new body, the operation also modifies the chassis by adding new components, such as new engine, transmission, suspension, etc., it is more likely that the resulting vehicle would be considered a new vehicle. If your vehicles produced with "existing used chassis" will incorporate the engine, transmission, and drive axle from the existing used chassis, the completed vehicles would be "used" and would not require vehicle certification. Some of our standards, however, apply to individual items of motor vehicle equipment (e.g., brake hoses and fluids, lighting equipment, tires, seatbelt assemblies, glazing). If your converted vehicles incorporate new items of these types of equipment, the items must comply with the applicable Federal safety standards. For example, lights are subject to requirements specified in Standard No. 108, and glazing is subject to requirements specified in Standard No. 205.

Finally, you ask whether "EG&G Idaho need(s) to be certificated... ." There is no procedure to certify any manufacturer. It is the manufacturer that must certify that its vehicles meet the applicable federal safety standards. However, you should submit the manufacturer's information required by 49 CFR 566 to NHTSA. This information includes the name and address of the manufacturer (in this case, EG&G), a description of the type of vehicle manufactured, the use for which it is intended, and the fact that EG&G is a final stage manufacturer. I have enclosed a copy of Part 566 for your

information.

For your information, I have also enclosed a general information sheet for new manufacturers that gives a succinct outline of the relevant NHTSA regulations and explains how to get copies of those regulations.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need some additional information on this subject, feel free to contact David Elias of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: ntea.ztv

Mr. Michael E. Kastner
Director of Government Relations
National Truck Equipment Association
1300 19^th Street, NW, Fifth Floor
Washington, D.C. 20036-1609

Dear Mr. Kastner:

This is in reply to your letter of October 2, 2002, requesting an interpretation of several provisions of the "early warning reporting" final rule (49 CFR Part 579, Subpart C).

You asked three sets of questions. The first of these was:

All reports . . . require the vehicle make, model, and model year. As many of the bodies and equipment manufactured by NTEA members are installed on a variety of different makes and models of trucks most body and equipment manufacturers have never needed this information nor required it to be provided in normal processing of warranties or consumer complaints. Also, the vehicle make and model year are seldom recorded in field reports because the primary focus is on the truck body or equipment. Give the "Minimal Specificity" provision outlined in 579.28(d), if the historical records do not include the vehicle make, model and model year, it is our interpretation that they are not reportable by the body or equipment manufacturer since there is no way to identify the vehicle make or model. Is this interpretation correct and would it also apply to the one-time three year historical report and the nine years of historical data to be included in the quarterly reports?

Under the Vehicle Safety Act, a manufacturer of "bodies and equipment" is a manufacturer of "motor vehicle equipment." The bodies and equipment manufactured by NTEA members are "original equipment" because they are equipment installed on a motor vehicle at the time it is delivered to its first purchaser. (This answer assumes that the "bodies and equipment" are installed on a chassis by a third person.) The only early warning reporting requirements of Part 579 that apply to manufacturers of original equipment (other than tires) are the limited reporting requirements of 49 CFR 579.27.The one-time historical report established by Section 579.28(c) is required only of manufacturers "covered by Sections 579.21 through 579.26 of this part."This does not include manufacturers covered by Section 579.27, such as manufacturers of original equipment.

If an NTEA member that is a manufacturer of original equipment receives a claim or notice of an incident involving death, the claim or notice need not be reported if it does not identify the equipment with "minimal specificity" (Section 579.28(d)). For bodies and other equipment, "minimal specificity" (as defined in Section 579.4(c)) amounts to the name of the manufacturer (and if there is a model or family of models identified on the item of equipment, the model name or model number). Even if the equipment is identified with minimal specificity, the claim or notice need not be reported if the identified equipment was manufactured prior to four calendar years before the reporting period (Section 579.27(b)).

In sum, it appears to us that NTEA members who are solely manufacturers of original equipment will have very limited reporting responsibilities under the early warning reporting rule.

NTEAs second question was as follows:

In the truck body and equipment industry, typically, a body manufacturer supplies the body to a distributor who installs it on the truck chassis. In this case, the body manufacturer would be a manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment and the distributor would be the final stage manufacturer. Distributors (the final stage manufacturer) typically complete warranty work, as it applies to the body, on a customers vehicle and subsequently submit a warranty claim to the body manufacturer for coverage under its warranty plan. If the distributor is the final stage manufacturer of more than 500 vehicles per year, then presumably the distributor must report warranty information to NHTSA. There is the potential that both the distributor and the body manufacturer will submit warranty information to NHTSA on the same warranty claim. How is this situation to be handled?

In the example you give, the body manufacturer is subject to the reporting provisions of Section 579.27. This section requires reporting only of information regarding claims and notices of incidents involving deaths. There is no requirement that the body manufacturer report warranty claims to NHTSA, even if it receives them. However, the entity that you have characterized as the "distributor" would be a vehicle manufacturer under our statute and thus would have to submit warranty data if it produced 500 or more vehicles of a given category per year. It is possible that such claims may also be reported by the chassis manufacturer (although it probably would not have to do so), but our screeners will be able to adjust to avoid double counting.

NTEAs third question was as follows:

Some body manufacturers install the bodies on truck chassis themselves (thus becoming the final stage manufacturer) while also selling some bodies through distributors, who become the final stage manufacturers of those vehicles. Does this body manufacturer need to submit reports as both an equipment manufacturer and a motor vehicle manufacturer? Do they need to submit one form for the bodies sold as equipment and one for the bodies they installed as the final-stage motor vehicle manufacturer? If so, should the equipment manufacturer form cover both those bodies sold via distributors and those bodies installed directly? Does the body manufacturer need to report on behalf of its independent distributors?

The body manufacturer must submit reports as both an equipment manufacturer and a motor vehicle manufacturer when circumstances dictate. However, as discussed above, only the limited reporting requirements of Section 579.27 apply to manufacturers of bodies furnished to persons who become the final stage manufacturer. If the body manufacturer becomes a final stage manufacturer of less than 500 vehicles annually, the limited reporting requirements of Section 579.27 will also apply. Each claim or notice of a death it receives as a body manufacturer and as a vehicle manufacturer must be reported separately. If the body manufacturer is the final stage manufacturer of 500 or more of any category of vehicles annually (e.g., medium heavy vehicle), it must furnish full reports as specified in the sections that apply to the type of vehicle completed.

If you have further questions, you may call Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:579
d.4/11/03

ID: aiam4461

"Dear Mr. Rossow: This responds to your letter requesting a interpretation of Standard No. l2l, Air Brake Systems. You asked whether a proposed design would meet the requirements of S5.l.2. Your question is responded to below. By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to ensure that its motor vehicles or equipment comply with applicable requirements. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter. Under section S5.l.2, trucks and buses are required to have the following equipment: 'Reservoirs. One or more service reservoir systems, from which air is delivered to the brake chambers, and either an automatic condensate drain valve for each service reservoir or a supply reservoir between the service reservoir system and the source of air pressure. You stated that some of your existing air braked trucks utilize a supply reservoir or wet tank between the service reservoir system and the air compressor without using automatic condensate drain valves on the service reservoirs. You noted that the supply reservoir functions as a means of removing excess water vapor from the air supply to avoid water contamination of the braking system and works on thermodynamic principles whereby water condenses to a liquid as the hot compressed air cools. Your proposed design would utilize an air dryer between the service reservoir system and the air compressor. According to your letter, the air dryer serves the same function as the supply reservoir in your existing system but works on a different principle. You stated that the moist, compressed air passes through a filter media contained in a small canister sized reservoir. The material, a desiccant, has a high chemical affinity for water. The water absorbs on the desiccant and is later purged by stored dry air. The air dryer would have an integral automatic condensate drain valve. Since your proposed design would not include an automatic condensate drain valve for each service reservoir, the issue raised by your letter is whether it complies with S5.l.2's option for 'a supply reservoir between the service reservoir system and the source of air pressure.' You stated that you believe the air dryer with automatic condensate drain is the functional equivalent of the more generally accepted embodiment of a supply reservoir in the context of S5.l.2. You also noted that Standard No. l2l does not specify a separate volume for the supply reservoir, although it does require in S5.l.2.l that the combined volume of all service reservoirs and supply reservoirs be at least l2 times the total service brake chamber volume. You suggested that if the volume of the service reservoirs is l2 times the volume of the service brake chambers, it would appear that there is no requirement for a specific volume in the supply reservoir. While Standard No. l2l does not include a definition for 'supply reservoir,' the term is one that is commonly understood. For example, you indicated in your letter that some of your current brake system designs utilize the 'more generally accepted embodiment of a supply reservoir.' In considering whether a particular item of equipment can be considered a 'supply reservoir,' we believe that effect must be given to both 'supply' and 'reservoir.' The dictionary defines 'reservoir' as 'a receptacle or chamber for holding a liquid or fluid, as oil or gas.' The word 'supply' is defined as 'to furnish or provide.' Random House Dictionary of the English Language (unabridged edition). The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) defines 'air reservoir' as '(a) storage container for compressed air.' SAE Recommended Practice J656g, 'Automotive Brake Definitions and Nomenclature.' Thus, in order to qualify as a 'supply reservoir,' an item of equipment must hold or store air in order to furnish or provide the air to the rest of the brake system. The information provided with your letter does not provide sufficient information to determine whether your air dryer qualifies as a 'supply reservoir.' In particular, the information does not indicate whether the air dryer holds other than a de minimis amount of air. While your letter is correct that there is no requirement for a specific volume in the supply reservoir if the volume of the service reservoirs is l2 times the volume of the service brake chambers, an air dryer with a de minimis volume could not be considered to hold or store air in order to furnish or provide the air to the rest of the brake system. On the other hand, if a supply reservoir provides an air cleaning function as well as holding or storing air in order to furnish or provide the air to the rest of the brake system, it would still be a supply reservoir. Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel";

ID: aiam5312

"Dear Mr. Carver: This responds to your letter of January 8, 1994 asking two questions concerning a recent amendment to Standard No. 217, Bus Emergency Exits and Window Retention and Release (57 FR 49413, November 2, 1992). Your questions and the response to each follow. 1. There's some confusion here in our engineering department regarding the interpretation of the 'Daylight Opening' and 'Unobstructed Opening' as it applies to the new side emergency door specification in FMVSS 217. Page 2 shows the allowable obstruction and the context in which 'Daylight Opening' and 'Unobstructed Opening' are used. Page 3 shows some measurements of our seats placed according to the '30 cm minimum' shown on page 2. Page 4 shows four different interpretations of the 'Unobstructed Opening' area. Depending on the interpretation, between 9 and 15 people may be accommodated by a side emergency door. My question is this: of the four possibilities shown, which definition of the 'Unobstructed Opening' area is correct? Mr. Hott indicated definition 4. The term 'daylight opening' is defined in the Final Rule as 'the maximum unobstructed opening of an emergency exit when viewed from a direction perpendicular to the plane of the opening.' An obstruction in this context would include any obstacle or object that would block, obscure, or interfere with, in any way, access to that exit when opened. In determining the 'maximum unobstructed opening of an emergency exit,' we would subtract, from the total area of the opening, the area of any portions of the opening that cannot be used for exit purposes as a result of the obstruction. The area measurements would be taken when viewed from a direction perpendicular to the plane of the opening. Your question specifically concerns how the 'maximum unobstructed opening' of a side door is measured when the opening is partially obstructed by a seat. In the case of the illustrated door exit, occupants would use the exit by movement along the floor. This would be considered in determining the extent of an obstruction. None of the four examples you enclosed with your letter correctly illustrates the area that would be credited for the illustrated exit. The following regions would not be credited for this exit: (1) the area visually obstructed by the seat, (2) your region A2, an area bounded by a horizontal line tangent to the top of the seat back, a vertical line tangent to the rearmost portion of the top of the seat, the upper edge of the door opening, and the edge of the door forward of the seat, (3) your region A5, an area bounded by the seat back, a horizontal line tangent to the top of the seat back, and the edge of the door forward of the seat, and (4) your region A8, an area bounded by the seat leg, the floor, the lower edge of the seat bottom, and the edge of the door forward of the seat. Because the seat would make the last three regions unusable as exit space for a person traveling along the floor of the bus towards the exit, they would not be credited for that exit. You should be aware that the agency published a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend Standard No. 217 on December 1, 1993 (58 FR 63321). The notice proposed two alternate means for determining the maximum amount of area that will be credited for all types of emergency exits on school buses. The agency is currently reviewing the comments received in response to this notice. I am enclosing a copy of this notice. 2. Here is an excerpt from FMVSS 217 S5.5.3(a): 'Each school bus ....shall have the designation 'Emergency Door' or 'Emergency Exit' as appropriate, .... For emergency exit doors, the designation shall be located at the top of, or directly above, the emergency exit door on both the inside and outside surfaces of the bus..... For emergency window exits, the designation shall be located at the top of, or directly above, or at the bottom of the emergency window exit on both the inside and outside surfaces of the bus.' I've seen a two-sided sticker used by other bus manufacturers. It is applied on the inside surface of a window and the same image 'Emergency Door' or 'Emergency Exit' can be read from both inside and outside the bus. Is it permissible for us to use this sort of decal, assuming it meets all other (i.e., FMVSS 302)? The answer to your question is yes. The agency addressed this issue in an October 2, 1978, letter to Mr. E.M. Ryan of Ward Industries, Inc. I am enclosing a copy of this letter. I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Walter Myers of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel Enclosures";

ID: nht90-4.30

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: October 2, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: S. Kadoya -- Manager, Safety and Technology, Mazda Research and Development of North America, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 11-7-89 from S. Kadoya to S.P. Wood

TEXT:

This responds to your request for interpretations of several safety standards and the Bumper Standard, in connection with a planned "active" suspension system. I regret the delay in responding to your letter. Your questions are responded to below.

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Under the statutes administered by this agency, it is the responsibility of the manufac turer to ensure that its vehicles and equipment comply with applicable standards. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter.

According to your letter, Mazda is concerned about the protocol of compliance testing of vehicles equipped with an active suspension system. This concern arises because many standards do not specify a suspension height that is to be used during complianc e testing. As you noted, this has not been a concern for conventional suspension systems, since they do not provide for variable height.

Mazda's planned active suspension system would be actuated by hydraulic fluid or compressed air, with control pressure being developed by a hydraulic pump or air compressor driven off the engine. Consequently, the active suspension system would be opera tional only when the vehicle's engine is operating. At vehicle speeds in excess of "z" mph, where z is greater than 35 mph, the suspension height would be lowered by "x" mm from the nominal or design position for vehicle operation. If the engine/vehicl e were not used for several consecutive days, pressure in the control system would fall such that the supension height may be lowered from the nominal or design position for vehicle operation by "y" mm, where y is greater than x. The suspension height w ould return to the nominal or design position for vehicle operation after such an extended period of inoperation almost immediately after starting the vehicle's engine.

Before discussing your specific questions, I would like to discuss more generally the issue of how compliance is determined in situations where a standard does not specify a particular test condition. In issuing Federal motor vehicle safety standards, N HTSA attempts to specify all relevant test conditions. The agency does this as part of ensuring that its standards are objective and practicable. As a practical matter, however, it is not possible to specify every conceivable test condition. This is p articularly true for ones which may only be relevant to

as-yet-undeveloped technologies.

In cases where a standard does not specify a particular test condition, we believe there are several relevant factors to consider in interpreting the standard. First, in the absence of specification of a particular test condition, we believe there is a presumption that the requirements need to be met regardless of such test condition, since the standard does not include any language which specifically limits applicability of its requirements to such test condition. For example, where a standard does n ot specify suspension height, its requirements may need to be met at all heights to which the suspension can be adjusted. Before reaching such a conclusion, however, we also consider the language of the standard as a whole and its purposes. Even if a s tandard is silent as to a particular test condition, the language of the standard or its purposes may indicate limitations on such test condition. Finally, in situations where a limitation on a particular test condition may appear to be appropriate, we also must consider whether the limitation is sufficiently clear, both with respect to justification and specificity, to be appropriate for interpretation. For example, in a situation where it may appear to be reasonable to limit a particular test condit ion but it is not obvious what particular limitation should be adopted, it would be inappropriate to select a particular limitation by interpretation. Instead, such a decision should be reached in rulemaking.

I will now address the specific questions asked in your letter.

Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment

In asking about Standard No. 108, you stated the following:

NHTSA has previously issued an interpretation of the requirements of FMVSS No. 108; at the request of a confidential applicant and dated February 12, 1985, with respect to active suspension equipped vehicles. This interpretation stated that the requirem ents of FMVSS 108 must be meet (sic),"...at any time in which..." lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment are to be,"...operated for its intended purpose." Consequently, headlamps, tailamps, stoplamps, the license plate lamp, and side marker lamps, must comply with the location requirements of FMVSS No. 108 whenever the vehicle's ignition is in the "on" postiion. Conversely, reflex reflectors, and turn signal lamps that also function as hazard warning signal flashers must comply with the lo cation requirements when the vehicle's ignition is in either the "on" or "off" position. However, it is Mazda's interpretation that hazard warning flashers are not intended to be operational for a period of days, but rather for a period of hours, at max imum, only.

You then asked two questions, (1) whether Mazda's understanding of the subject NHTSA interpretation is accurate, and (2) whether Mazda's interpretation of the maximum intended operating duration of hazard warning signal flashers is correct.

I note that the February 1985 interpretation was written in the context of a vehicle with a variable height system actuated by hydraulic fluid. In that particular system, the hydraulic pressure relaxed over a period of

about three hours after the ignition was turned off, with the result that the vehicle assumed a lower height than it would have during driving. NHTSA stated the following:

We believe that the minimum height requirement should be met for any lamp at any time in which it is operated for its intended purpose. Since vehicles at rest do not require use of headlamps, the minimum height requirement would be measured at the point after the ignition is on and when the car begins to travel (your letter implies that the time lag between turning on the ignition and restoration of a complying mounting height is a matter of seconds). On the other hand, the hazard warning signal lamps are frequently operated when the vehicle is stopped, and therefore the minimum mounting height of turn signal lamps, through which they operate, must be met with the ignition off, even if the system requires three hours to deplete itself and lower the v ehicle to its minimum height.

With respect to your question of whether Mazda's understanding of the interpretation is correct, I would like to note two points. First, while you state that "the requirements of FMVSS 108" must be met at any time in which lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment are to be operated for their intended purpose, our interpretation was limited to standard's minimum height requirement. While we are prepared, if asked, to address other requirements, our interpretations should be understood to be limited to their specific facts and conclusions. Second, while our interpretation only addressed headlamps and hazard warning signal lamps, you applied the interpretation for headlamps to taillamps, stoplamps, the license plate lamp, and side marker lam ps, and the interpretation for hazard warning signal lamps to reflex reflectors. We concur with this application, with respect to Standard No. 108's minimum height requirement.

We do not agree with Mazda's suggested interpretation of the maximum intended operating duration of hazard warning signal flashers. You would apparently like us to conclude that Standard No. 108's minimum height requirement for hazard warning signal fla shers does not apply after a vehicle's ignition has been turned off for a matter of days.

In addressing how Standard No. 108 applies in the absence of a specification for vehicle height, our February 1985 interpretation differentiates between situations where the vehicle is operating and where it is not. Looking at the purpose of the require ments in question, we believe it is obvious that the minimum height requirement for headlamps is only relevant in situations where the vehicle is operating, while the minimum height for hazard warning signal lamps is also relevant to situations where the vehicle is stopped and the ignition turned off. However, we believe that any determination that Standard No. 108's minimum height requirement for hazard warning signal flashers should not apply after a specified number of hours after the ignition has be en turned off is one that would need to be addressed in rulemaking.

It is therefore my opinion that the minimum mounting height of hazard warning signal lamps must be met at all heights with the ignition off, even if the system requires days to deplete itself and lower the vehicle

to its minimum height. If you believe that a time limitation should be placed on this requirement, I note that you can submit a petition for rulemaking requesting such a change.

Standard No. 111, Rearview Mirrors

You requested an interpretation of section S5.1.1 of Standard No. 111, which generally requires a passenger car's rearview mirror to "provide a field of view with an included horizontal angle measured from the projected eye point of at least 20 degrees, and sufficient angle to provide a view of level road surface extending to the horizon beginning at a point not greater than 200 feet to the rear of the vehicle...." You noted that since the specified procedures for determining the location of the driver 's eye reference points are made referenced to points with the vehicle's cabin, your active suspension system would not affect these measurements. However, different vehicle heights would be relevant to whether there is a view of level road surface exte nding to the horizon beginning at a point not greater than 200 feet to the rear of the vehicle. You stated that, based on "intended purpose," Mazda's interpretation of Standard No. 111 is that the requirements of this standard are to be met when the vehi cle's ignition is in the "on" position as rearview mirrors are not intended to be used when the vehicle's engine is not operating.

You then asked two questions, (1) whether Mazda's interpretation of the requirements of FMVSS No. 111 with respect to the state of the vehicle's ignition switch is correct, and (2) for the purposes of compliance testing to the requirements of FMVSS No. 1 11, what means of maintaining the intended suspension height for a given speed and operating condition would be satisfactory to NHTSA.

We agree that the field of view requirement specified in S5.1.1 for rearview mirrors need not be met for vehicle heights that only occur when the engine is not on, since the requirement is only relevant in situations where the vehicle is operating. Howe ver, the requirement would need to be at all vehicle heights that occur during vehicle operation, under the loading conditions specified in S5.1.1.

With respect to the issue of how suspension height should be maintained for purposes of compliance testing, you note early in your letter that, for reasons of practicality and safety, a vehicle's engine is not actually operational during compliance testi ng. However, since the active suspension system derives its power from the vehicle's engine, the system's ability to maintain and regulate suspension height is only possible during engine operation. You therefore indicated that Mazda is seeking guideli nes (for several standards) by which Mazda may be able to establish a means to maintain the intended suspension height for compliance testing purposes in the absence of engine operation.

We are not able, in an interpretation, to specify a particular means for maintaining suspension height for compliance testing in the absence of engine operation. However, the basic principle that should be followed in selecting a means for maintaining s uspension height is that it should not result in different test results than would occur if testing could be conducted with suspension height being maintained by engine operation,

i.e., what would happen in the real world. This should be relatively straightforward for section S5.1.1 of Standard No. 111, since the test is static. For a crash test, it is important that a vehicle not be altered in any way that would change the vehi cle's crash performance relevant to the aspect of performance being tested.

Standard No. 204, Steering Control Rearward Displacement

In asking about Standard No. 204, you stated the following:

Section S4 of this standard specifies the compliance parameter for this standard. Section S5 specifies the testing conditions to determine compliance with this standard. Section S5.1 specifies that the vehicle be loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight. Section S5.5 specifies that the vehicles fuel tank be filled with Stoddard solvent to any capacity between 90 and 95 percent of the total capacity of the tank. Mazda's interpretation of the requirements of this standard is that they are to be met when the vehicle's ignition switch is in the "on" position only. Furthermore, Mazda interprets the vehicles suspension height pursuant to S5.1 and S5.5 to be the intended suspension height for the vehicle given the conditions of S4, i.e., 30 mph vehicle speed and steered wheels are positioned straight ahead.

You then asked whether Mazda's interpretation of the requirements of FMVSS No. 204 are correct. As discussed below, we agree that Standard No. 204's requirements need to be met only at the suspension height that occurs at a 30 mph vehicle speed and with steered wheels positioned straight ahead.

Standard No. 204 specifies requirements limiting the rearward displacement of the steering control into the passenger compartment to reduce the likelihood of chest, neck, or head injury. These requirements must be met in a 30 mile per hour perpendicular impact into a fixed collision barrier. While the standard specifies a number of test conditions, it does not specify suspension height.

Looking at the Standard No. 204 as a whole, we believe it is clear that NHTSA explicitly decided to limit the standard's evaluation of steering control rearward displacement to how vehicles perform in 30 mph perpendicular impacts, even though the require ments have relevance at lower and higher speeds. Therefore, we agree that the standard's requirements need to be met only at suspension heights that occur at a 30 mph vehicle speed and with steered wheels positioned straight ahead.

With respect to Mazda's question concerning means of maintaining intended suspension height for compliance testing, please see our discussion provided with respect to Standard No. 111.

Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection

In asking about Standard No. 208, you stated the following:

Section S8.1.1(d), "Vehicle test attitude," specifies the procedure for determining the vehicle test attitude that is to be used for testing. Specifically, this section requires that the vehicle's pretest attitude,

"...shall be equal to either the as delivered or fully loaded attitude or between the as delivered and fully loaded attitude." The as delivered attitude is defined by S8.1.1(d) as being, "...the distance between a level surface and a standard reference point on the test vehicle's body, directly above each wheel opening, when the vehicle is in its "as delivered" condition. The "as delivered" condition is the vehicle as received at the test site..." Because it is highly likely that the test vehicle wil l not have been operated for a period of days prior to arriving at the test site, the suspension height may have fallen by "y" mm. The fully loaded attitude is defined as the attitude of the vehicle when loaded in accordance with S8.1.1(a) or (b) and a determination of the height of the suspension at the fully loaded condition is made from the same level surface, using the same standard reference points, as were used to determine the "as delivered" condition. The definition of the "as delivered" condi tion is quite clear. However, Mazda interprets the "fully loaded condition" of the vehicle to be the condition when the vehicle's ignition is "on." In this instance it is likely that the height of the standard reference points on the vehicles body when in the "fully loaded condition" relative to the level surface will be greater than for the "as delivered" condition. Conversely, conventional vehicle suspension systems will likely have an "as delivered" height greater than the "full loaded" height. H owever, this fact is of no importance as S8.1.1(d) states that the pretest vehicle attitude may be, "...between the as delivered and the fully loaded attitude." With respect to the injury criteria specified by section S6 of this standard, Mazda's interp retation is that these criteria must be met with the vehicle's ignition in the "on" position only.

You then asked three questions, (1) whether Mazda's interpretation of the definition of the "fully loaded condition" is correct with respect to the condition of the ignition switch, (2) whether Mazda's interpretation of the irrelevance of the relative re lationship between the "as delivered" and "fully loaded" conditions is correct, and (3) whether Mazda's interpretation of the meaning of "between the as delivered and the fully loaded attitude" is correct.

In addressing your questions, I will begin by noting that Standard No. 208 specifies occupant protection requirements which must be met in specified crash tests at any impact speed up to and including 30 mph. While the standard specifies a number of tes t conditions, it does not specify suspension height. However, the standard does specify vehicle attitude, which is closely related to suspension height. In addressing how Standard No. 208 applies in the absence of a specification for vehicle height, th e relationship between the standard's attitude specification and vehicle height must be considered.

Section S8.1.1(d) specifies the attitude of the vehicle during testing, i.e., the angle of the vehicle relative to the ground. This test condition ensures that the vehicle is not overly tilted toward the front or back, or to one side. The section accom plishes this purpose by specifying that, during a compliance test, the height of the vehicle at each wheel is within a specified range. This range, which may be somewhat different for each wheel, is determined by looking at the vehicle in the "as delive red" condition and the "fully loaded" condition. A vehicle must meet the requirements of Standard No. 208 when its height at each wheel is

anywhere within the specified ranges.

On first glance, one might read section S8.1.1(d) to create a height requirement, since ranges of height are determined under that section (at each wheel). This would be incorrect, except in a very narrow sense, since Standard No. 208 does not specify, for vehicles with variable height suspension systems, what suspension height should be used in the two conditions ("as delivered" and "fully loaded") where the specified ranges of height are determined under section S8.1.1(d).

Looking at the Standard No. 208 as a whole, we believe it is clear that NHTSA explicitly decided to limit the standard's evaluation of occupant crash protection in frontal impacts to how vehicles perform in impacts of 30 mph or less, even though the requ irements also have relevance at higher speeds. It is our interpretation that the frontal crash test requirements need to be met at all suspension heights that can occur at speeds of 30 mph or less, with the vehicle operational. It is also our interpret ation that the crash test requirements need to be met only at suspension heights that can occur at the speed used in the crash test.

A remaining issue is how section S8.1.1(d) applies for vehicles with variable height suspension systems. As discussed below, vehicle attitude should be determined under this section using the actual suspension setting (or equivalent, if the setting is a utomatic) to be used in a crash test.

For purposes of illustration, I will assume a vehicle with two very different suspension height settings. It would not be appropriate to conclude that the ranges of height determined under section S8.1.1(d) should simultaneously cover both suspension he ights. Such ranges would be very large, and would not ensure that the vehicle is not overly tilted toward the front or back, or to one side. Moreover, such ranges would not be relevant to the real world, with respect to vehicle attitude.

Traditional vehicles can be viewed as having a single suspension "setting." This single suspension condition is used in determining vehicle attitude under section S5.8.8.1. The ranges of height result from the differences in loading under the "as deliv ered" and "fully loaded" conditions.

A single suspension "setting" (or equivalent, if the setting is automatic) should similarly be used in determining vehicle attitude for vehicles with variable height suspension systems. The "setting" should be the one to be used in a crash test.

With respect to Mazda's question concerning means of maintaining intended suspension height for compliance testing, please see our discussion provided with respect to Standard No. 111.

You also asked for an interpretation of section S8.2.7 of Standard No. 208. That section specifies additional conditions to be used for lateral moving barrier crash testing. Section S8.2.7(a) states that the vehicle is at rest in its "normal attitude." You stated that Mazda interprets the meaning of "normal attitude" to be that vehicle attitude which is intended

when the vehicle's ignition is in the "on" condition, with the vehicle loaded pursuant to S8.1.1(a) or (b), and while the vehicle is at rest. Standard No. 208 provides manufacturers the option of either equipping their vehicles with safety belts or meeti ng certain alternative requirements, including lateral moving barrier crash test requirements. These requirements are relevant at all vehicle heights that can occur during vehicle operation, regardless of speed. Moreover, NHTSA has not decided to limit the standard's evaluation of this aspect of safety performance to how vehicles perform at certain limited speeds. It is our interpretation that the lateral moving barrier crash test requirements, if applicable, must be met at all suspension heights that can occur with the vehicle operational. "Normal attitude" is the attitude determined under section S8.1.1(d). As discussed above, attitude for vehicles equipped with variable height suspension systems is determined under section S8.1.1(d) using the ac tual suspension setting (or equivalent, if the setting is automatic) to be used in a crash test.

Standards No. 212, Windshield Mounting; No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion; No. 301, Fuel System Integrity

In asking about Standards No. 212, No. 219, and No. 301, you noted that NHTSA has previously issued an interpretation to Mazda about how these standards apply to adjustable height suspension systems. In a letter dated August 10, 1982, the agency address ed a vehicle equipped with a suspension system having two height positions, one for normal highway driving and another for off-road driving, which could be selected by the driver. NHTSA stated the following:

(Safety Standards No. 212, No. 219, and No. 301) do not specify a height adjustment because almost all vehicles have a single, set adjustment. . . After careful consideration, it is the agency's position that such a vehicle capable of variable height adj ustment would have to comply with the vehicle adjusted to any position that is possible. This is true because the vehicle could be driven on the highway, for example, even if it were adjusted to the off-road position. Consequently, it is important that the vehicle comply with the standards in all positions.

You noted that while suspension height could be adjusted by the driver for the system discussed in the agency's previous interpretation, the active suspension system you are currently considering would use an on-board electronic controller to select susp ension height, and suspension height would not be adjustable by the driver. Consequently, according to your letter, only one unique set of suspension height parameters is possible for a given vehicle speed and loading condition as is the case with conve ntional suspension systems. You stated that because it is possible to determine exactly what the intended suspension height should be for a given situation, it is Mazda's opinion that the test vehicle should be tested at the intended suspension height g iven the specified speed and loading conditions. You also stated that, using an "intended purpose" argument, Mazda concludes that the requirements of the three standards are to be met only when the vehicle's ignition is "on." You then asked whether thes e suggested interpretations are correct.

Standard No. 212 specifies windshield retention requirements that must be

met in a specified frontal crash test at any impact speed up to and including 30 mph. Similarly, Standard No. 219 specifies windshield zone intrusion requirements that must be met in a specified frontal crash test at any impact speed up to and including 30 mph. Standard No. 301 specifies fuel system integrity requirements for several specified crash tests. These include a frontal crash test similar to those in Standards No. 212 and No. 219. Requirements for this test must be met at any impact speed up to and including 30 mph. Other tests include a rear moving barrier crash test, a lateral moving barrier crash test, and a static rollover test.

We agree that the requirements of Standards No. 212, No. 219, and No. 301 need not be met for vehicle heights that only occur when the engine is not on, since the requirements are only relevant in situations where the vehicle is operating. Looking at th e three standards as a whole, we believe it is clear that, for the frontal tests specified by the three standards, NHTSA decided to limit the standards' evaluation of safety performance to how vehicles perform in impacts of 30 mph or less, even though th e requirements have relevance at higher speeds. It is our interpretation that the frontal crash test requirements specified by these standards need to be met at all suspension heights that can occur at speeds of 30 mph or less, with the vehicle operatio nal. It is also our interpretation that the crash test requirements need to be met only at suspension heights that can occur at the speed used in the crash test.

We reach a different conclusion for Standard No. 301's other crash test requirements. These requirements are relevant at all vehicle speeds and suspension heights. Moreover, NHTSA has not decided to limit the standard's evaluation of these aspects of s afety performance to how vehicles perform at certain limited speeds. It is our interpretation that these crash test requirements must be met at all suspension heights that can occur with the vehicle operational.

Part 581 Bumper Standard

In asking about the Part 581 Bumper Standard, you noted that NHTSA has previously issued several interpretations of how the standard applies to vehicles with adjustable height suspension systems. In a letter to Subaru dated May 6, 1986, NHTSA stated the following:

Given the absence of a specific test condition concerning suspension height, it is our interpretation that a vehicle must be capable of meeting the standard's damage criteria at any height position to which the suspension can be adjusted. There is no la nguage in the test requirements of the standard limiting their applicability to "the manufacturer's nominal design highway adjusted height position."

This interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the Bumper Standard, set forth in section 581.2, to reduce physical damage to the front and rear ends of a passenger motor vehicle from low speed collisions. If a vehicle's suspension could be adjust ed so that its bumper height resulted in bumper mismatch with other vehicles in the event of low speed collisions, the reduction in physical damage attributable to the Bumper Standard would be defeated in whole or part.

In another letter, dated February 12, 1985, NHTSA stated that a vehicle is "required to meet the pendulum test of Part 581 in any vehicle use scenario in which the vehicle operates, and the barrier test of Part 581 when the engine is idling."

You suggested, for the barrier test, that the agency's May 1986 interpretation may be inappropriate for your active suspension system, since your system provides for only one suspension height when the engine is idling. You also suggested, for the pendu lum test, that these interpretations seem to be in conflict with the Bumper Standard's stated purpose to reduce physical damage to motor vehicles in low speed collisions. We assume that you are referring to the fact that your suspension system has heigh ts that occur only at speeds greater than 35 mph. You then requested that NHTSA provide an interpretation of Part 581 with respect to your system.

In addressing how Part 581 applies to vehicles equipped with an active suspension system, I will address separately the standard's barrier and pendulum tests. For the barrier test, a vehicle must meet specified damage criteria after an impact into a fix ed barrier that is perpendicular to the line of travel of the vehicle, at 2.5 mph. Section 581.6 sets forth conditions applicable to bumper testing. Under section 581.6(c), at the onset of a barrier impact, the vehicle's engine is operating at idling s peed.

Looking at the Bumper Standard as a whole, we believe it is clear that NHTSA decided to limit the barrier test's evaluation of bumper performance to how vehicles perform in 2.5 mph frontal impacts, even though the requirements have relevance at lower and higher speeds and when the vehicle is nonoperational. It is our interpretation that the barrier test requirements specified by this standard need to be met at all suspension heights that can occur at 2.5 mph.

We reach a different conclusion for the pendulum test, which serves the purpose of creating a bumper height requirement. This requirement is relevant at all vehicle speeds and suspension heights, and when the vehicle is nonoperational. I note that whil e Mazda is correct that the Bumper Standard's stated purpose is to reduce physical damage to motor vehicles in low speed collisions, NHTSA has justified the bumper height requirement on safety concerns related to "higher speed collisions." In proposing Standard No. 215, the predecessor of Part 581, the agency stated:

. . . in higher speed collisions the tendency of a bumper to override another or to ride under or over a guardrail creates hazards for vehicle occupants. Vehicles with interlocking bumpers block traffic and expose their occupants to considerable danger, particularly if they attempt to get out to unlock bumpers. By overriding or underriding a guardrail, a bumper may strike a supporting post, or similar fixed object, with serious consequences for the vehicle and its occupants. 35 FR 17999, November 24, 1970.

The relevance of the bumper height requirement to nonoperational

situations is also clear, e.g., to help protect parked cars.

Moreover, NHTSA has not decided to limit the bumper height requirement to how vehicles perform at certain limited speeds. It is our interpretation that the pendulum test requirements must be met at all suspension heights that can occur, regardless of ve hicle speed or whether the ignition is turned on.

This interpretation is consistent with an October 18, 1978 letter to Nissan, in which NHTSA addressed how the pendulum test applies to vehicles equipped with height control systems, including automatic height control systems. Among other things, the age ncy stated the following:

. . . There is no language in the pendulum test requirements of the standard which would limit their applicability to only the ignition-on or ignition-off situation or to the recommended driving position for normal roadways. The vehicle must be capable of meeting the pendulum test requirements at all stable bumper heights possible at unloaded vehicle weight.

Thus, in the situations described in Question 1 and 2 of your letter, in which an automatic height control system is employed, the vehicle must comply with the pendulum test requirements in both the ignition-on and ignition-off positions . . . .

I note that one of our past letters, a December 24, 1984 letter addressed to Porsche, appears to suggest that the pendulum test must be met in any setting in which the system operates "when the engine is idling." This might be read to suggest that the p endulum test need not be met when the vehicle is nonoperational. However, this interpretation cited section 581.6(c) in concluding that the engine is idling during Part 581 testing. Section 581.6(c) applies only to the barrier test and not the pendulum test. We therefore consider this interpretation to be incorrect to the extent that it is inconsistent with the analysis presented above.

ID: 2706y

Mr. Dennis T. Johnston
Senior Executive Engineer
Product Engineering and
Regulatory Affairs
Sterling Motor Cars
8953 N.W. 23rd Street
Miami, Florida 33172

Dear Mr. Johnston:

This responds to your letter reporting a change in the locking system to be installed on the MY 1991 British Sterling car line. Although your letter does not explicitly request the agency determine that the change is of a de minimis nature and that therefore the Sterling vehicles containing the change would be fully covered by the previously granted exemption for Sterling vehicles, we are treating the letter as making such a request. The alternative to making such a request is to submit a modification petition under 49 CFR 543.9(b) and (c)(2).

As you are aware, the Sterling car line was granted an exemption, pursuant to 49 CFR Part 543, from antitheft marking because Austin Rover showed that the antitheft device to be used in lieu of marking on the car line was likely to be as effective as parts marking. This exemption was issued on July 16, 1986, and appeared in the Federal Register on July 22, 1986 (51 FR 26332).

In your letter, you stated that beginning with the start of MY 1991, Sterling Motor Cars (Sterling) plans an improvement in the antitheft device that is standard equipment on the Sterling vehicle. The change involves the consequence of opening of the trunk when the system is armed. Currently, the system, once armed, activates when the trunk is opened, even if it is opened with the key. In order to avoid this, the antitheft device must first be disarmed before the trunk is opened. It is our understanding that Sterling plans to change the system by allowing the system to be disarmed by opening the trunk with a key and rearmed by closing the trunk lid. However, if the trunk were to be forced open without a key, the alarm would still be activated.

After reviewing the planned change to the antitheft device on which the exemption was based, the agency concludes that the change is de minimis. While the change means that opening the trunk with a key will no longer activate the alarm, the agency does not believe that activating the alarm under those circumstances contributes to theft prevention. The agency concludes that the antitheft device, as modified, will continue to provide the same aspects of performance provided by the original device and relies on essentially the same componentry to provide that performance. Therefore, it is not necessary for Sterling to submit a petition to modify the exemption pursuant to 543.9(b) and (c)(2).

If Sterling does not implement the new antitheft device as described in your letter, or delays implementation until after MY 1991, we request that Sterling notify the agency of such decisions.

Sincerely,

Barry Felrice Associate Administrator for Rulemaking

ref:543 d:l0/5/90

ID: 77-3.29

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/15/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R. L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: Patton, Boggs & Blow

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your April 20, 1977, petition to amend Standard No. 120, Tire Selection and Rims for Motor Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars. In your petition, you request that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) permit the use of tires that have a maximum load rating of not less than 95% of the gross axle weight rating (GAWR) and not less than 95% of the gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR). Your petition is denied.

The problem addressed by your petition concerns a revision in the 1977 Tire and Rim Manual that alters the load rating of tires. In effect, this revision will result in lower load ratings for certain tires. According to the facts you submit, the change in tire load rating will be implemented by tire manufacturers throughout the next few months which may not provide vehicle manufacturers sufficient time to correspondingly alter the GAWRs of their vehicles in accordance with the new tire load ratings. Therefore, for a short period of time, you allege that it will be impossible to obtain tires that correspond to the GAWR indicated on the vehicle.

To alleviate the above problem, you recommend rulemaking that would permit vehicle manufacturers to install on their vehicles tires with load ratings slightly less than the GAWR of each axle. The NHTSA cannot permit the relief you request even for the limited time you propose. The intent of our tire standards is to provide minimum requirements for tires to ensure adequate safety. One of these minimum requirements mandates that the tire load rating be at least equal to the GAWR. Your request would have us reduce this minimum requirement. Since the matching of tires on a vehicle with the GAWR of each axle is such a basic principle of safety, the agency concludes that it would not be in the interest of safety to grant your request. Further, such an amendment might violate Section 202 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1381 et seq.), which requires that motor vehicles be equipped "with tires which meet the maximum permissible-load standards when such vehicle is fully loaded. . . ."

As you may know, the label requirements of Standard No. 120 which become effective in September permit you to list suitable tire and rim combinations on the vehicle. You need not equip a vehicle, however, with the tires indicated on the label. In this case, you may equip a trailer with any trailer tire that has a load rating equal to or greater than the GAWR of its associated axle. This may help resolve part of your problem with respect to a short term problem with matching tires on the vehicle with those indicated on the vehicle label.

ID: nht76-3.32

DATE: 04/02/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank A. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Hackney & Sons Inc.

COPYEE: BUREAU OF MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of December 2, 1975, concerning the duties of a manufacturer of a beverage trailer that, when fully loaded, would overload a light-duty truck by which it might be towed.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not directly regulate the use of motor vehicles. Instead, it regulates their manufacture, with a view towards their expected and intended uses. If a trailer manufacturer knows that his product is likely to be towed by a vehicle of insufficient load-carrying capacity, the NHTSA expects him to take reasonalbe steps, short of refraining from production, to minimize the likelihood of such misuse. Otherwise, the trailer would be considered to contain a defect relating to motor vehicle safety.

In the first hypothetical situation presented in your letter, there would be no violation of the Federal motor vehicle safety standards or regulations. In Situation 2, we are not prepared to state categorically whether or not the trailer manufacturer could be obliged to assume defect responsibility. Such responsibility might be minimized assuming that the written warning to which you refer clearly indicates (i) what load ratings are necessary as a minimum for the towing vehicle and (ii) that the trailer must not be towed by a vehicle without such load ratings. Nevertheless, the lines of responsibility between two such parties are not that clear-cut, especially where the trailer manufacturer knowingly delivers for introduction into interstate commerce a vehicle which immediately results in a serious overload situation.

In Situation 3, the trailer would probably contain a safety-related defect, because its advertising would promote its misuse in a way that would create a safety hazard. In Situation 4, the trailer would probably also be considered to contain a safety-related defect, because the total payload capacity could be calculated, and the warnings to limit the actual load to the limits of the towing vehicle could not reasonably be expected to be observed.

You have also asked more generally for a description of the circumstances under which trailers of this type might be considered to contain safety-related defects. The NHTSA cannot define in advance all such possible circumstances. Among them, however, would be those in which the owner's manual lacked the warning described above for Situation 2 and those in which the trailer's advertising promoted its misuse.

I have forwarded a copy of your letter to the Federal Highway Administration's Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety for examination of the possibility that the user of a mismatched combination of vehicles, if he is an interstate carrier, would be in violation of their regulations. There may also be State laws prohibiting local carriers from making such combinations.

Thank you for your concern for safety on the highways. We especially appreciate your realization that a manufacturer can have ethical duties that go beyond his legal duties.