ID: nht92-4.18

DATE: September 4, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Kevin B. Brown -- EG&G Idaho, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 5/6/92 from Kevin B. Brown to NHTSA (OCC-7323)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter concerning 49 CFR 567 requirements for intermediate or final stage manufacture vehicle labeling. I apologize for the delay in responding. You stated in your letter that EG&G Idaho, as prime contractor for the Department of Energy, Idaho Field Office, procures and maintains all government-owned vehicles, and occasionally procures truck chassis purchased through the General Services Administration for subsequent mounting of service bodies.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our regulations to you. Before addressing the specific issues raised in the letter, some background information may be helpful. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended, 15 U.S.C., S1381-1431 (hereinafter "Safety Act") authorizes this agency to establish Federal motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA, however, does not approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Rather, the Safety Act establishes a self-certification process which requires each manufacturer, in the exercise of due care, to ensure and certify that its products meet all applicable Federal safety standards. Thereafter, NHTSA periodically tests vehicles and equipment for compliance with the standards and investigates allegations of safety-related defects.

In addition, the Safety Act only requires new vehicles to comply with applicable safety standards. The only provision of the Safety Act that would apply after the first purchase of a vehicle is 15 U.S.C. S1397(a)(2)(A), which states in relevant part that:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle ... in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard.

The first question to be answered is whether EG&G Idaho is a manufacturer. Under 49 CFR 568.3, a final-stage manufacturer is "a person who performs such manufacturing operations on an incomplete vehicle that it becomes a completed vehicle." An incomplete vehicle is "an assemblage consisting, as a minimum, of frame and chassis structure..." that requires "further manufacturing operations, other than the addition of readily attachable components... ." Readily attachable components include items such as mirrors or tire and rim assemblies. Service bodies are not "readily attachable components." Therefore, in installing service bodies on new chassis, EG&G is acting as a final-stage manufacturer under federal regulations.

49 CFR 586.6 establishes certain requirements for final-stage manufacturers,

including:

(a) Each final-stage manufacturer shall complete the vehicle in such a manner that it conforms to the standards in effect on the date of the manufacture of the incomplete vehicle, the date of final completion, or a date between those two dates. ... (b) Each final-stage manufacturer shall affix a label to the completed vehicle in accordance with S567.5 of this chapter.

EG&G must attach the proper label to the completed vehicle as set out in 49 CFR 567.5(c), a copy of which is enclosed for your convenience. According to your letter, EG&G mounts bodies in accordance with the original (i.e., incomplete) manufacturer's instructions or recommendations. In that case, EG&G's certification that the completed vehicle conforms to all applicable safety standards can state simply that the vehicle has been completed in accordance with the prior manufacturer's instructions, per S567.5(c)(7).

When EG&G mounts a new body on a new chassis, the resulting vehicle is subject to the Safety Act and the certification requirements of 49 CFR 567 and 568. However, according to your letter, you also mount bodies on "existing used" chassis. 49 CFR 571.7(e) deals with combining new and used components:

When a new cab is used in the assembly of a truck, the truck will be considered newly manufactured for purposes of paragraph (a) of this section (stating that safety standards apply to all relevant motor vehicles), the application of the requirements of this chapter, and the (Safety) Act, unless the engine, transmission, and drive axle(s) (as a minimum) of the assembled vehicle are not new, and at least two of these components were taken from the same vehicle.

This means that the vehicle resulting from placing a new body upon a used chassis is a used vehicle. If, in addition to adding a new body, the operation also modifies the chassis by adding new components, such as new engine, transmission, suspension, etc., it is more likely that the resulting vehicle would be considered a new vehicle. If your vehicles produced with "existing used chassis" will incorporate the engine, transmission, and drive axle from the existing used chassis, the completed vehicles would be "used" and would not require vehicle certification. Some of our standards, however, apply to individual items of motor vehicle equipment (e.g., brake hoses and fluids, lighting equipment, tires, seatbelt assemblies, glazing). If your converted vehicles incorporate new items of these types of equipment, the items must comply with the applicable Federal safety standards. For example, lights are subject to requirements specified in Standard No. 108, and glazing is subject to requirements specified in Standard No. 205.

Finally, you ask whether "EG&G Idaho need(s) to be certificated... ." There is no procedure to certify any manufacturer. It is the manufacturer that must certify that its vehicles meet the applicable federal safety standards. However, you should submit the manufacturer's information required by 49 CFR 566 to NHTSA. This information includes the name and address of the manufacturer (in this case, EG&G), a description of the type of vehicle manufactured, the use for which it is intended, and the fact that EG&G is a final stage manufacturer. I have enclosed a copy of Part 566 for your

information.

For your information, I have also enclosed a general information sheet for new manufacturers that gives a succinct outline of the relevant NHTSA regulations and explains how to get copies of those regulations.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need some additional information on this subject, feel free to contact David Elias of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht90-3.34

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: July 30, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Betsy Dittemore -- Legislative Liaison, Iowa Department of Public Safety, Office of the Commissioner

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 6-14-89 to NHTSA from B. Dittemore; (OCC 3633); and NHTSA bulletin dated 8-85 re Federal Auto Safety Laws and Motor Vehicle Window Tinting

TEXT:

Thank you for your letter regarding a bill introduced in the Iowa Senate that, among other features, would establish light transmittance limits for "sunscreening devices" that may be applied to the windows of motor vehicles operated in Iowa. I apologize for the delay in this response. You requested our office's interpretation about whether provisions of this bill would violate or be preempted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials (49 CFR S571.205).

As you are aware, this agency is authorized by section 103 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1392) to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and certain items of motor vehicle equipment. One of the standard s that we have issued under this authority is standard No. 205, which applies to all new vehicles and all new glazing materials for use in motor vehicles. Among the requirements set forth in Standard No. 205 are specifications for minimum levels of ligh t transmittance (70 percent light transmittance in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars).

Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) specifies that no person may manufacture, import, or sell any vehicle in the United States unless it is in conformity with all applicable safety standards. Pursuant to section 108(b)(1) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(b)(1)), this prohibition no longer applies after the vehicle is sold to a consumer. However, both before and after the first sale, section 108(a)(2) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)) provides that "No manufacturer, d istributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal moto r vehicle safety standard . . . ."

In the case of windows on a passenger car, this provision of Federal law means that no manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business could install window tinting film that would result in a light transmittance of less than 70 percent for any wind ow of the car, because such action would "render inoperative" the vehicle's compliance with Standard No. 205. This same provision of Federal law prohibits a service station from permanently removing safety belts or permanently disconnecting brake lines on motor vehicles.

Please note that the Safety Act does not apply to the actions of vehicle

owners. Vehicle owners may alter their own vehicles and operate them on the highways as they please, even if the vehicle's windows no longer comply with the requirements of Standard No. 205. Hence, no provision of a Federal statute or this agency's reg ulations prevents individual vehicle owners themselves from tinting the windows on their vehicles.

The individual States, however, have the authority to regulate the modifications that vehicle owners may make to their own vehicles and to establish requirements for vehicles operated or registered in that State. The Iowa Senate bill enclosed with your l etter appears to be an attempted exercise of this inherent authority.

You asked for comments on whether this bill, if adopted as law in Iowa, would be preempted by Standard No. 205. I assume you were referring to the provision in this Iowa bill that would prohibit the operation of motor vehicles required to be registered in the State of Iowa if the vehicle has a "sunscreening device" on the front side windows with light transmittance of less than 35 percent or on the rear window and side windows behind the driver with light transmittance of less than 20 percent. Since t he original glazing on the vehicle could have had light transmittance of as little as 70 percent, this provision would permit overall light transmittance levels of as low as 25 percent for the front side windows and 14 percent for the rear windows.

This provision in the Iowa bill, and similar provisions in statutes adopted by other States, does not purport to legitimize conduct -- the rendering inoperative of glazing by firms installing window tinting -- that is illegal under Federal law. In other words, firms installing window tinting that results in light transmittance of less than 70 percent on any window of a passenger car would have violated the "render inoperative" provision in Federal law, even if Iowa had in place a statute that would per mit persons to operate and register vehicles whose windows had light transmittance that was far lower. Conversely, the Federal law setting requirements for the manufacture and sale of new vehicles and limiting the modifications commercial enterprises ca n make to those vehicles does not prohibit the State of Iowa from establishing lesser limits on owner modifications to their own vehicles and as the minimum requirements for vehicles to be operated and registered in the State of Iowa.

Thus, there does not appear to be any legal conflict between Federal law and this Iowa bill, and Iowa would be free to enforce the provisions of this bill if it is enacted into law. We would, however, urge the State of Iowa to carefully consider the adv erse safety consequences that would result from enacting this bill into law. NHTSA has determined that a 70 percent light transmittance minimum for new vehicles is the appropriate level to assure motor vehicle safety. Your letter indicated that Iowa ha d also adopted this 70 percent light transmittance minimum as a State requirement for new vehicles. It is not clear why the State of Iowa would conclude that the safety need that justifies requiring not less than 70 percent light transmittance in new ve hicles is satisfied by allowing light transmittance levels as low as 25 and 14 percent in vehicles to be operated in the State.

I hope that this information is helpful. If you have any further

questions or need additional information about this topic, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht90-3.36

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: July 31, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Jack E. Eanes -- Chief, Vehicle services, State of Delaware, Department of Public Safety, Division of motor Vehicles

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Letter dated 10-20-89 to T. Vinson from J. E. Eanes (OCC 3822)

TEXT:

This is in response to your letter asking whether very darkly tinted rear windows that obscure the center high mounted stop lamp (CHMSL) required in passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1985 would violate any Federal laws or regulations. Let me begin by apologizing for the delay in this response. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our laws and regulations for you.

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act) authorizes this agency to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. We have exercised this authority to issue two safety standards that are relevant to your question. The first of these is standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment (49 CFR S571.108), which applies to all new vehicles and new replacement equipment for motor vehicles. Among the requirement s set forth in this Standard is a requirement for all passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1985 to be equipped with a CHMSL of specified minimum size, brightness, and visibility from the range of locations set forth in the standard. The second relevant standard is Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials (49 CFR S571.205). This standard applies to all new vehicles and all new glazing for use in motor vehicles, and includes specifications for minimum levels of light transmittance of the glaz ing (70 percent light transmittance in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars).

Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) provides that no person may manufacture or sell any vehicle unless it is in conformity with all applicable safety standards. A new passenger car with a rear window tinted so darkly that th e CHMSL was not easily visible would probably not be in conformity with Standards No. 108 and 205, and so could not legally be manufactured or sold in the United States. However, this prohibition on the manufacture or sale of a nonconforming vehicle doe s not apply after a vehicle is first sold to a consumer.

Both before and after the first sale of a vehicle, section 108(a)(2) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)) provides that: "No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . ." If any of the listed commercial entities were to install tint film or otherwise darken the rear windows on passenger cars so that the light transmittance of that window plus the darkening material was below 70 percent, those entities would be "rendering inoperative" the light transmittance of the rear window of the car, in violation of Federal law.

This same prohibition in Federal law makes it unlawful for a service station to permanently remove the safety belts or permanently disconnect the brake lines on a car.

Please note that the Safety Act does not apply to the actions of individual vehicle owners. Vehicle owners may alter their own vehicles and operate them on the highways as they please, even if the vehicle no longer complies with the safety standards aft er such alterations. Hence, no provision of the Safety Act or our safety standards makes it unlawful for vehicle owners themselves to tint or otherwise darken the rear window of their car so that its light transmittance is below 70 percent and/or its CH MSL is obscured.

The individual States, however, do have authority to regulate the modifications that vehicle owners may make to their own vehicles. The States also have the authority to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered or operated in that Stake.

You indicated in your letter that the State of Delaware "allows vehicle rear windows to be tinted as dark as the owner desires." While I am not familiar with Delaware law, I assume that this statute, and similar statutes adopted by other States, does no t purport to legitimize conduct -- the rendering inoperative of glazing and CHMSLs by firms installing window tinting -- that is illegal under Federal law. In other words, any commercial firms installing window tinting that results in light transmittanc e of less than 70 percent and/or reduces the required brightness of the CHMSL would have violated the "render inoperative" provision in Federal law, even if Delaware permits individual owners to make such modifications themselves and to register and oper ate vehicles with rear windows and CHMSLs that would not comply with the requirements of the Federal safety standards for new vehicles. Conversely, the Federal law setting requirements for the manufacture and sale of new vehicles and limiting the modifi cations commercial enterprises can make to those vehicles does not prohibit the State of Delaware from establishing lesser limits on owner modifications to their own vehicles and as the minimum requirements for vehicles to be operated and registered in t he State of Delaware.

Thus, there does not appear to be any legal conflict between Federal law and Delaware law, and Delaware would be free to enforce the provisions of its law. We would, however, urge the State of Delaware to carefully consider the adverse safety consequenc es that will result from the provision of its law. NHTSA has determined that a 70 percent light transmittance minimum for new vehicles is the appropriate level to assure motor vehicle safety, and that the CHMSL on passenger cars enhances motor vehicle s afety. It is not clear why the State of Delaware would conclude that the safety need that justifies requiring not less than 70 percent light transmittance and CHMSLs in new passenger cars is satisfied by allowing far lower light transmittance levels and lower-brightness CHMSLs in passenger cars to be operated in the State.

I hope that this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need additional information about this topic, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202)

366-2992.

ID: nht88-1.45

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/18/88

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: HOWARD SMOLKIN -- MANAGING DIRECTOR

TITLE: THE MEANING OF PRACTICABILITY AND THE VEHICLE SAFETY ACT

TEXT: Attached per your request is a discussion of the meaning of "practicable" under the Vehicle Safety Act, for use in connection with the next meeting of the Research Advisory Committee.

Attachment

PRACTICABILITY AND THE VEHICLE SAFETY ACT

This paper provides a general discussion of the meaning of "practicable" under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Vehicle Safety Act). The Vehicle Safety Act directs the Secretary of Transportation, or his or her delegate, to issue Feder al motor vehicle safety standards that "shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms." 15 U.S.C. @ 1392(a). (Emphasis added.) See also 15 U.S.C. @ 1391(2). In issuing these standards, the Se cretary is directed to consider "relevant available motor vehicle safety data," whether the proposed standard "is reasonable, practicable and appropriate" for the particular type of motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment for which it is prescri bed, and the "extent to which such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes of the Act." 15 U.S.C. 1392(f)(1), (3), (4). (Emphasis added.)

The dictionary defines "practicable" as "capable of being done, effected, or put into practice, with the available means; feasible: a practicable solution." Random House Dictionary of the English Language (unabridged edition). Courts construing the term under the Vehicle Safety Act have generally relied on the following statements in the legislative history:

House Report: "In establishing standards the Secretary must conform to the requirement that the standard be practicable. This would require consideration of all relevant factors, including technological ability to achieve the goal of a particular sta ndard as well as consideration of economic factors." H. R. Rep. 1776 at 16.

Senate Report: "The committee intends that safety shall be the overriding consideration in the issuance of standards under this bill. The committee recognizes . . . that the Secretary will necessarily consider reasonableness of cost, feasibility and adequate leadtime." S. Rep. 1301, p.6.

The court decisions construing the term "practicable" have established several general principles about its meaning. First, while NHTSA must bear in mind that Congress intended safety to be the preeminent factor under the Vehicle Safety Act, the agency is to look at costs as well as benefits. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 54-55 (1983), a case reviewing a recission by the agency of the automatic restraint requirements, the Supreme Court concluded that the agency had been correct to look at the costs as well as the benefits of the requirements. NHTSA had determined that the incremental costs of the requirements were no longer reasonable based on its prediction that the safety benefits of the regulation might be minimal. In this instance, the court required a reexamination of the agency's conclusion that the safety benefits might be minimal. The court stated that when the agency examined its findings as to the likely safety benefits, it must also reconsider i ts judgment of the reasonableness of the monetary and other costs associated with the standard, bearing in mind that Congress intended safety to be the preeminent factor under the Act.

A second principle is that NHTSA must conduct careful analysis of the economic impacts of safety standards. In H & H Tire Co. v. DOT, 471 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1972), a case reviewing a safety standard requiring retreaded tires to meet many of the same per formance requirements as new tires, the court concluded that NHTSA had not adequately investigated the practicability of the standard. The court found that current retread tires could not comply with the requirements and that there was a possibility tha t the industry's best efforts might be insufficient to insure prompt compliance. The court concluded that NHTSA had acted precipitately, adopting a rule which might possibly destroy a well-established industry, without adequate study. The court also in dicated that NHTSA must consider possible economic hardships of both manufacturers and customers. Note: The court agreed with the government that "the fact that a government regulation may cause economic hardship to a party does not make such regulation unreasonable" and stated that the deleterious economic effect on the industry of compliance with the standard at issue might be permissible if retreads unquestionably were major safety hazards and if compliance with the standard clearly enhanced retread s' safety under on-the-road conditions. 471 F.2d at 354.

A third principle is that NHTSA may issue safety standards that are technology-forcing. In Chrysler v. DOT, 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972), a case reviewing a safety standard requiring vehicles to be equipped with automatic restraints, the court held that NHTSA has authority to issue safety standards which require improvements in existing technology or which require the development of new technology, and is not limited to issuing standards based solely on devices already developed.

A fourth principle is that NHTSA must consider the public acceptability of safety standards. In Pacific Legal Foundation v. DOT, 593 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1979), a case reviewing a safety standard requiring vehicles to be equipped with automatic restrain ts, the court held that consideration of public reaction is part of the requirement that standards be practicable. The court stated that "(m)uch as economic analysis must evaluate both supply and demand conditions, motor vehicle safety standards cannot be considered practicable unless we know both that the needed production capability is within reach and that motorists will avail themselves of the safety system." 593 F.2d at 1345.

Finally, the meaning of the term "practicable" appears to differ depending upon whether it is applied to a mandatory or optional provision in a safety standard. In Chrysler v. DOT, 515 F.2d 1053, 1060 (6th Cir. 1975), Chrysler argued that a standard perm itting use of rectangular headlamps, as an alternative to round headlamps, for a specified time period was impracticable because that company could not complete the necessary engineering and retooling in time to produce automobiles equipped with the new headlamps before the option expired. In dicta, the court stated that it had "some doubt that practicability is a significant principle in the context of an optional provision in a safety standard." The court stated that a review of the cases in this are a suggests the practicability requirement was designed primarily to prevent NHTSA from establishing mandatory safety requirements that are economically or technologically infeasible. The court contrasted that situation with the one at bar, in which the use of rectangular headlamps was not required, and Chrysler was not subject to any statutory penalties for failing to comply with this aspect of the standard. The court also stated that even assuming that an optional requirement were required to be prac ticable, it would be difficult to conclude that the rectangular headlamp option was impracticable in any absolute sense, since at least two manufacturers were capable of producing rectangular headlamps.

ID: ntea.ztv

Mr. Michael E. Kastner
Director of Government Relations
National Truck Equipment Association
1300 19^th Street, NW, Fifth Floor
Washington, D.C. 20036-1609

Dear Mr. Kastner:

This is in reply to your letter of October 2, 2002, requesting an interpretation of several provisions of the "early warning reporting" final rule (49 CFR Part 579, Subpart C).

You asked three sets of questions. The first of these was:

All reports . . . require the vehicle make, model, and model year. As many of the bodies and equipment manufactured by NTEA members are installed on a variety of different makes and models of trucks most body and equipment manufacturers have never needed this information nor required it to be provided in normal processing of warranties or consumer complaints. Also, the vehicle make and model year are seldom recorded in field reports because the primary focus is on the truck body or equipment. Give the "Minimal Specificity" provision outlined in 579.28(d), if the historical records do not include the vehicle make, model and model year, it is our interpretation that they are not reportable by the body or equipment manufacturer since there is no way to identify the vehicle make or model. Is this interpretation correct and would it also apply to the one-time three year historical report and the nine years of historical data to be included in the quarterly reports?

Under the Vehicle Safety Act, a manufacturer of "bodies and equipment" is a manufacturer of "motor vehicle equipment." The bodies and equipment manufactured by NTEA members are "original equipment" because they are equipment installed on a motor vehicle at the time it is delivered to its first purchaser. (This answer assumes that the "bodies and equipment" are installed on a chassis by a third person.) The only early warning reporting requirements of Part 579 that apply to manufacturers of original equipment (other than tires) are the limited reporting requirements of 49 CFR 579.27.The one-time historical report established by Section 579.28(c) is required only of manufacturers "covered by Sections 579.21 through 579.26 of this part."This does not include manufacturers covered by Section 579.27, such as manufacturers of original equipment.

If an NTEA member that is a manufacturer of original equipment receives a claim or notice of an incident involving death, the claim or notice need not be reported if it does not identify the equipment with "minimal specificity" (Section 579.28(d)). For bodies and other equipment, "minimal specificity" (as defined in Section 579.4(c)) amounts to the name of the manufacturer (and if there is a model or family of models identified on the item of equipment, the model name or model number). Even if the equipment is identified with minimal specificity, the claim or notice need not be reported if the identified equipment was manufactured prior to four calendar years before the reporting period (Section 579.27(b)).

In sum, it appears to us that NTEA members who are solely manufacturers of original equipment will have very limited reporting responsibilities under the early warning reporting rule.

NTEAs second question was as follows:

In the truck body and equipment industry, typically, a body manufacturer supplies the body to a distributor who installs it on the truck chassis. In this case, the body manufacturer would be a manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment and the distributor would be the final stage manufacturer. Distributors (the final stage manufacturer) typically complete warranty work, as it applies to the body, on a customers vehicle and subsequently submit a warranty claim to the body manufacturer for coverage under its warranty plan. If the distributor is the final stage manufacturer of more than 500 vehicles per year, then presumably the distributor must report warranty information to NHTSA. There is the potential that both the distributor and the body manufacturer will submit warranty information to NHTSA on the same warranty claim. How is this situation to be handled?

In the example you give, the body manufacturer is subject to the reporting provisions of Section 579.27. This section requires reporting only of information regarding claims and notices of incidents involving deaths. There is no requirement that the body manufacturer report warranty claims to NHTSA, even if it receives them. However, the entity that you have characterized as the "distributor" would be a vehicle manufacturer under our statute and thus would have to submit warranty data if it produced 500 or more vehicles of a given category per year. It is possible that such claims may also be reported by the chassis manufacturer (although it probably would not have to do so), but our screeners will be able to adjust to avoid double counting.

NTEAs third question was as follows:

Some body manufacturers install the bodies on truck chassis themselves (thus becoming the final stage manufacturer) while also selling some bodies through distributors, who become the final stage manufacturers of those vehicles. Does this body manufacturer need to submit reports as both an equipment manufacturer and a motor vehicle manufacturer? Do they need to submit one form for the bodies sold as equipment and one for the bodies they installed as the final-stage motor vehicle manufacturer? If so, should the equipment manufacturer form cover both those bodies sold via distributors and those bodies installed directly? Does the body manufacturer need to report on behalf of its independent distributors?

The body manufacturer must submit reports as both an equipment manufacturer and a motor vehicle manufacturer when circumstances dictate. However, as discussed above, only the limited reporting requirements of Section 579.27 apply to manufacturers of bodies furnished to persons who become the final stage manufacturer. If the body manufacturer becomes a final stage manufacturer of less than 500 vehicles annually, the limited reporting requirements of Section 579.27 will also apply. Each claim or notice of a death it receives as a body manufacturer and as a vehicle manufacturer must be reported separately. If the body manufacturer is the final stage manufacturer of 500 or more of any category of vehicles annually (e.g., medium heavy vehicle), it must furnish full reports as specified in the sections that apply to the type of vehicle completed.

If you have further questions, you may call Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:579
d.4/11/03

ID: nht93-3.47

DATE: May 17, 1993

FROM: Thomas D. Turner -- Manager, Engineering Services, Blue Bird Body Company

TO: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: REFERENCE: 49 CFR Part 571.217; Docket No. 88-21; Notice No. 3; Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 217; Bus Emergency Exits and Window Retention and Release; Federal Register Vol. 57, No. 212, Monday, November 2,1992

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 7/7/93 from John Womack to Thomas D. Turner (A41; Std. 217)

TEXT:

Section S5.5.3(c) of the referenced final rule requires that:

"Each opening for a required emergency exit shall be outlined around its outside perimeter with a minimum 3 centimeters wide retro-reflective tape, either red, white or yellow in color that when tested under the conditions specified in S6.1 of 571.131, meets the criteria specified in Table 1."

1. The March 15, 1991 NPRM of Docket No. 88-21; Notice No.2 proposed the of "one inch wide" retro-reflective tape and item 10 of the Supplementary Information section of the final rule discussed the final rule requirement of a "minimum 1 inch wide strip of retro-reflective tape." The conversion to metric units in the final wording resulted in requirement for a "minimum 3 centimeters wide retro-reflective tape." Since the logic and rationale for the requirement is based on the use of one inch wide tape and because retro-reflective tape is currently not commercially available in metric widths, Blue Bird requests an interpretation or a change in the rule to require the tape be 1 inch or 2.5 centimeters wide rather than 3 centimeters wide. Blue Bird is in the process of developing exit marking designs to conform to the requirement that "each opening for a required emergency exit shall be outlined around its outside perimeter...." The retro-reflective tape commercially available for this application is stiff and will not conform to rivet heads, curved surfaces, and other discontinuities. It must be located to avoid rivets, rubrails, hinges or curved surfaces and/or must have relief holes punched in it to allow installation over rivet heads. Attached are photographs of various emergency exits with tape installed around their perimeters. The photographs are labeled to illustrate the problem areas encountered and the discontinuities required to install the tape. Blue Bird requests interpretations that the tape outlining the perimeter of the exit shall be installed such that the edge of the tape closest to the emergency exit opening is not greater than 6 inches from the edge of the opening and that splits, interruptions, discontinuities and holes in the tape are allowed to avoid and/or accommodate rivets, rubrails, hinges, handle, curved surfaces, and other function components located around the exit opening.

In addition, Blue Bird requests that appropriate NHTSA officials and staff review the enclosed photographs and advise if the retro-reflective tape installations shown would be in compliance with the subject requirement of Section S5.5.3(c).

Although the final rule does not become effective until May 2, 1994, several states have mandated conformance to the new standard in advance of the FMVSS effective date. Blue Bird must therefore complete the Engineering work and release final designs to Production in the very near future. We, therefore, request that prompt and favorable responses to our requests for interpretations be provided.

(Graphics omitted)

ID: nht79-2.28

DATE: 09/11/79

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Dixson, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

NOA-30

Mr. Clay Lansdown Chief Engineer H. D. Instrument Division Dixson, Inc. P. O. Box 1949 Grand Junction, Colorado 81501

Dear Mr. Lansdown:

This is in response to your letter of August 8, 1979, asking whether construction, mining and agricultural machinery must comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 127. In order for a vehicle to fall within the ambit of Standard 127 or any other safety standard it must be a motor vehicle. Section 103(3) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.) defines a motor vehicle as

any vehicle drawn or driven by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.

Thus, a motor vehicle is a vehicle which the manufacturer expects will use the public highways as part of its intended function.

There are two exceptions to the above rule that permit certain vehicles to use the highways without being considered motor vehicles. Agricultural equipment that is strictly used in farm fields and only incidentally uses the roads adjacent to those fields has been excepted from the definition of motor vehicle. However, not all agricultural equipment is excepted from the definition of motor vehicle. A piece of agricultural equipment, like any other vehicle, that uses the public streets and roads not adjacent to the fields on a necessary and recurring basis would be considered to be a motor vehicle and must meet the requirements of Standard 127 and the other safety standards.

The agency has further excepted certain vehicles from the definition of motor vehicle despite frequent highway use. Some maintenance and construction equipment whose maximum speed does not exceed 20 miles per hour and whose abnormal configuration distinquishes them from the traffic flow are not considered motor vehicles.

I suggest that you contact the manufacturers to whom you are selling your equipment. It is their responsibility initially for determining whether use on the public highways is part of the vehicles' intended function. The enclosed information sheet should be helpful in making that determination.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

Enclosure

August 7, 1979

National Highway Traffic Administration United States Department of Transportation Docket No. 76-06 Speedometer-Odometers 400 Seventh Street S. W. Washington, D. C. 20590

Dear Sir,

Our product line includes electronic speedometer-odometers. A significant portion of the units we manufacture are sold to manufacturers of construction, mining, and agricultural machinery. I am not sure if S3 of Standard 127 defines vehicles of the type listed above. These vehicles do on occasion, travel on highways, and in some cases are used to repair and build highways. The speedometers in these vehicles rarely, if ever, have markings above 40 MPH I wish to know if these vehicles are defined by S3 of Standard 127 in order to determine if the speedometers are required to meet S4.1.1 and S4.1.3 of Standard 127.

Sincerely,

DIXSON, INC.

Clay Lansdown Chief Engineer aH. D. Instrument Division

CL/ms

ID: VINs

Mr. Dale Kardos
Dale Kardos & Associates
1150 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Suite 715
Washington, DC 20036-4104





Dear Mr. Kardos:

This responds to your letter requesting information on Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) requirements as they pertain to a forthcoming Porsche sport utility vehicle (SUV). You state that the Porsche SUV will be produced in two stages and in two different Porsche plants. The first stage will occur at the Porsche plant in Bratislava, Slovakia, where the body structure will be produced, and the front windshield and VIN will be installed. This basic structure then will be transported to the Porsche plant in Leipzig, Germany, where it will be combined with the rest of the vehicle (i.e., engine, transmission, wheels, tires, brakes, etc.).

You ask whether it is acceptable to use the letter "L" as the eleventh character of the VIN, which would indicate the plant of manufacture as the Leipzig plant rather than the Bratislava plant. Under the circumstances described above, this is acceptable.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA's) VIN requirements are contained in 49 CFR Part 565. Each VIN must be made up of seventeen characters consisting of Arabic numbers and Roman letters. Under 565.6(d)(2), the eleventh character must represent the "plant of manufacture," which is defined as the plant where the manufacturer affixes the VIN. Since the VINs of the Porsche SUVs will be affixed at the Bratislava plant, it would appear that the eleventh character in the Porsche SUV VINs should indicate the Bratislava plant, not the Leipzig plant.

However, the requirements of Part 565 do not apply until the structure at a minimum meets the definition of an "incomplete vehicle." Section 565.4(a) requires a vehicle manufactured in more than one stage to have a VIN assigned by the incomplete vehicle manufacturer. An "incomplete vehicle" is defined as:

an assemblage consisting, at a minimum, of frame and chassis structure, power train, steering system, suspension system and braking system, to the extent that those systems are to be part of the completed vehicle, that requires further manufacturing operations, other than the addition of readily attachable components, such as mirrors or tire and rim assemblies, or minor finishing operations such as painting, to become a completed vehicle.

Since the Porsche SUV unit which will be produced at the plant in Bratislava will consist only of the body structure, front windshield, and VIN, it does not meet the definition of an "incomplete vehicle." Thus, the requirements of Part 565 do not apply to the Porsche SUV until the unit produced at the Bratislava plant is married with the power train, steering system, suspension system, and braking system. Since this will take place at the Leipzig plant, NHTSA considers the Leipzig plant to be the plant of manufacture for purposes of 49 CFR Part 565. Consequently, Porsche should use the letter "L" as the eleventh character in Porsche SUV VINs to indicate the Leipzig plant as the plant of manufacture.

I hope this answers your question. If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact Mr. Dion Casey in my office at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel
ref:565
d.2/20/01

ID: 1982-2.40

DATE: 08/16/82

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; C. M. Price; NHTSA

TO: Ichikoh Industries, Ltd.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

AUG 16 1982

AIR MAIL

Mr. Fukuo Takata, Manager Certifications Regulations Section Ichikon Industries, Ltd. 80 Itado, Isehara City Kanagawa 259-11 JAPAN

Dear Mr. Takata:

This is in reference to your letter of June 30, 1982, to Mr. Elliott of this agency concerning the effective luminous lens area of a front turn signal lamp under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 108 with respect to three proposed designs.

We assume that you wish to know what is the effective projected luminous lens area for a front turn signal on vehicles less than 80 inches in overall width. The SAE Standard No. J588e, "Turn Signal Lamps," which you quote, imposes no additional requirements for a two compartment front turn signal lamp. Thus, it appears that so long as you meet the minimum of 3.5 square inches for a single compartment lamp, your proposed designs (Case 1 and 2) meet the necessary requirements of FMVSS No. 108. Case 3 would not conform as neither of the two section compartments meets the 3.5 square inch minimum.

Sincerely,

Courtney M. Price Associate Administrator for Rulemaking

L57/30 June 30, 1982

Mr. Marx Elliott Program Manager Rulemaking National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590 U.S.A.

Subject: Effective projected luminous area of Front Turn Signal Lamp

Dear Mr. Elliott,

We would like to inquire as follows. FMVSS 108 references SAE J588e for turn signal lamps, and SAE J588e prescribe Effective Projected Luminous Area as follows.

SAE J588e

3.2 The effective projected luminous area of a single compartment lamp measured on a plane at right angles to the axis of a lamp must be at least 8.0 sq in. for a rear lamp and at least 3.5 sq in. for a front lamp.

3.3 If a multiple compartment lamp or multiple lamps are used to meet the photometric requirements of a rear turn signal lamp, the effective projected luminous lens area of each compartment or lamp shall be at least 3 1/2 sq. in. provided the combined area is at least 8 sq in.

That is, in the case of front turn signal lamp, section 3.2 provide that Effective Projected Luminous Area should be more than 3.5 sq in.

But when we want to take into account of two compartments of front turn signal lamp, may we understand that the following cases are acceptable for FMVSS 108.

*Insert artwork

Condition of Effective Projected Luminous Area

Area A Area B A + B

Case 1 >/3.5 in.2 >/3.5 in.2 >/3.5 in.2

Case 2

/3.5 in.2

Case 3 < 3.5 in.2 <>/3.5 in.2

We await your early reply.

Very truly yours, ICHIKOH INDUSTRIES, LTD.

Fukuo Takata, Manager Certifications Regulations Section

ID: aiam4434

"Dear Mr. Momboisse: Your letter of May 19, 1988, to the Genera Counsel of the Department of Transportation has been forwarded to this Office for reply. You request a waiver 'exempting the Hummer vehicle from the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) when purchased directly from the manufacturer, AM General Corporation.' This response is based upon the information contained in your letter, and upon information my staff has obtained in telephone conversations with Ed Butkera of AM General Corporation, manufacturer of the Hummer, relating to its compliance with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards, and Gary Runyon of the Border Patrol, relating to the mission of that agency and the role the Hummer plays in it. According to our information, the Hummer is a vehicle which was developed specifically for, manufactured for, and sold exclusively to, the U.S. Army. The Border Patrol has bought Hummers from the Army because of certain features it finds advantageous in its operations, and its expanded missions involving interdiction of drugs. The principal reasons for your request are (1) that the Border Patrol desires to buy Hummers equipped with an assembly line addition (a central tire inflation system) is not incorporated on the Hummers sold to the Army, and (2) that, by buying directly from AM General Corporation, the Border Patrol will save $5,000 per vehicle, as the price of Army Hummers reflects the added expense of amortized development costs. This agency has jurisdiction over 'motor vehicles' as that term is defined by l5 U.S.C. 139l(3). If a vehicle is not a 'motor vehicle,' then the Federal motor vehicle safety standards do not apply to it. The exclusion of military vehicles from applicability of the safety standards in 49 C.F.R. 57l.7(a), which you quoted, is operative only if those vehicles would otherwise be 'motor vehicles' required to comply with the standards. Under l5 U.S.C. 1391(3), a 'motor vehicle' is 'any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways....' The agency has interpreted this definition to exclude such vehicles as minibikes, golf carts, all-terrain vehicles, single seat racing cars used on closed courses, airport crash and rescue vehicles, and farm tractors. On the other hand, the agency has included in the definition farm trailers which haul produce over the public roads to processing centers, stock cars modified for racing unless such modifications are so extensive that the vehicle can no longer be licensed for use on the public roads, and vehicles capable of use both on rails and the public roads. You have informed us that the Hummer will 'generally only be used on public highways to travel between stations and assigned duty areas.' However, you have also informed us that this will constitute approximately 30% of its operational time. Were we to consider this factor alone, we could not conclude that the Hummer was not a 'motor vehicle.' However, there are further factors that make the proper classification of the Hummer a close question. The Hummer was developed as a vehicle for military operations and not for civilian applications, its manufacturer does not advertise or sell it for civilian purposes, and its configuration is such that it probably could not be licensed for use on the public roads without modification of some of its original military specifications. Resolution of this question is not necessary since the mission and method of operation of the Border Patrol provide a separate basis for concluding that the Hummers to be purchased by the Border Patrol are not subject to the FMVSS. We understand that one of the missions of the Border Patrol is to act as an agency of national security in protection of the country's borders to ensure that persons and goods enter and exit only through official Customs and Immigration stations, and that this role has become of paramount importance in the 'war against drugs.' In this enforcement effort, the Hummers of necessity carry firearms such as the M-l4 and M-16 rifles which the Army Hummer carries, can be equipped with military communications equipment enabling them to serve as command posts, and carry certain military equipment used for electronic interception and sensing movement. It further appears that in this mission the Border Patrol is not only equipped like a component of the Armed Forces of the United States, but also is trained and functions in many respects that are similar to such a component. Accordingly, for the purposes of applying the exclusionary phrase of 49 CFR 571.7(a), it is appropriate to regard the Border Patrol as being akin to a component of the Armed Forces of the United States. In consideration of the foregoing, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has concluded that AM General Corporation will not be in violation of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act if it manufactures and sells Hummers to the Border Patrol for its use as described in your letter. Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel";