ID: 9017

Erika Z. Jones, Esq.
Mayer, Brown & Platt
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006-1882

Dear Ms. Jones:

This responds to your request for an interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, Child restraint systems. S5.2.3.2(b) of Standard No. 213 specifies a minimum thickness for materials of a certain compression-deflection resistance. You ask whether more than one piece of material may be used to meet the thickness requirement.

The answer is yes. S5.2.3.2(b) does not require the material to be of a single piece, and the final rule that incorporated the requirement into Standard No. 213 did not address the issue. 44 FR 72131, December 13, 1979. Accordingly, more than one piece of material may be used.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact us.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:213 d:10/7/93

ID: nht71-1.15

DATE: 12/30/71

FROM: Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Gurley Refining Company

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: We have examined the proposed label for "GRC" brake fluid you have submitted to us for comment.

Generally, the label appears to meet the requirements of paragraph S5.2.2 of [Illegible Word] Vehicle Safety Standard No. 116 (36 f.r. 11987, June 24, 1971, as amended, 36 F.R. 21594, November 11, [Illegible Date]. The words "or [Illegible Word]" in your conformity statement are redundant; since the standard is a minimum requirement, "conforming to" and "exceeding" it mean exactly the same thing. If the fluid packager is an entity other than Curley, the packager's name or code identification must appear either below Gurley's name or on the bottom of the can. We assume that the required serial number identifying the packaged lot and date of packaging will be stamped either below Curley's name or on the bottom of the can.

ID: nht71-2.6

DATE: 02/12/71

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R. H. Compton; NHTSA

TO: Koito Manufacturing Co., Ltd.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of January 22, 1971, to Mr. Charles A. Baker of this Office concerning questions on paragraph S4.1.1.7 of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108.

"Red" was inadvertently included in paragraph S4.1.1.7 of the amendment to Standard No. 108 published on October 31, 1970. It is anticipated that this paragraph will be further amended in the near future by changing" . . . requirements for Class A red turn signal lamps . . ." to ". . . requirements for Class A turn signal lamps. . ."

The answers to your questions are therefore as follows:

1. Amber turn signal lamps shall conform to the minimum candlepower requirements for Class A amber as specified in Table 2 of SAE J575d.

2. There is no maximum candlepower requirement for amber front turn signal lamps.

ID: nht72-3.46

DATE: 03/17/72

FROM: J.E. LEYSATH FOR E.T. DRIVER -- NHTSA

TO: U.M. Electrical Distributers Ltd.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of March 6, 1972, concerning warning buzzers for the automobile industry.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has issued two safety standards which specify warning requirments. These requirements are given in Paragraph S4.4 of Standard 114 and Paragraph S7.3.1 of Standard 208. A copy of these two standards are enclosed for your review and further information.

You will note that these standards do not stipulate minimum requirements for the warning devices, and, at the present time, we have no plans to specify such requirements. The data sheet, however, which you enclosed will be useful to us should we specify such requirements in future amendments to these standards.

We appreciate your writing to us, and if we can be of any further service, please let us know.

ID: nht92-6.26

DATE: May 29, 1992

FROM: Berkley C. Sweet -- Vice-President, School Bus Manufacturers Institute

TO: Barry Felrice -- Associate Administrator for Rulemaking, NHTSA

TITLE: Subject: Standard No. 222, School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 7/28/92 from Paul J. Rice to Berkley C. Sweet (A39; Part 571.3)

TEXT:

Based on the requirements specified in the Standard No. 222 for Seat Performance Forward, Seat Performance Rearward and the Head Protection Zone, what was the minimum size of the passenger (eight and height) used to establish the design criteria of this standard?

Several school districts are now transporting new born and under school-age children with their parents to a school that provides a day-care service, while the parent attends classes.

The School Bus Manufacturers Institute has received inquiries as to limits, if any, on passenger size and age that can be safely transported on school bus seats.

ID: nht87-2.47

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/13/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; SIGNATURE UNAVAILABLE; NHTSA

TO: Mr. Yueh-An Chen

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Yueh-An Chen Division Head Planning Division Yue Loong Motor Engineering Center P.O. Box 510 Taoyuan, Taiwan Republic of China

Dear Mr. Chen:

This is in reply to your letter of June 5, 1987, asking whether certain rear lighting arrangements are acceptable under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108.

You have submitted a diagram showing four lamps on either side of the vertical centerline of the rear of the car. The most inboard lamps, denoted "R", are the backup lamp system. Yue Loong contemplates four different functions for the remaining three sys tems of lamps, "A", "B", "C", and "D", "E", "F" (inboard to outboard) and asks about acceptability.

1. In the first system, ABC or DEF will serve the respective turn signal functions. All lamps would serve as hazard warning signal lamps and stop lamps. Standard No. 108 generally does not prohibit lamp clusters from performing multiple functions. This s ystem is permissible as long as ABC and DEF meet all Standard No. 108's requirements for turn, hazard warning, and stop signals when tested in those modes. Your diagram, however, does not indicate which, if any, of these lamps provide the taillamp functi on that Standard No. 108 also requires for the rear of motor vehicles. Therefore, lamps ABC and DEF would have to meet the taillamp requirements as well.

2. The second system differs from the first in that the hazard warning system would not operate through all six lamps of the turn signal system, but only through the two most outboard lamps. This system is permissible, as Standard No. 108 does nor mandat e use of all turn signal lamps for the hazard warning signal mode, requiring only "at least one" on each side of the vehicle, front and rear.

3. The third system differs from the second in that the two most outboard lamps would no longer be part of the stop lamp system. We view this arrangement as permissible. Standard No. 108 requires that stop lamps, turn signal lamps, and taillamps be locat ed "as far apart as practicable". In a literal sense this would appear to require stacking the lamps vertically at the outboard edges of the vehicle, but NHTSA has not adopted a design-restrictive interpretation of this requirement. The determination of practicability is initially that of the manufacturer, but it is subject to review and comment by this agency in instances where such a determination appears clearly erroneous. Where the turn signal system (or part of it) is located at the outboard edges of the vehicle, and the stop lamps and taillamps are adjacent to it, or to each other, we view the "practicability" requirement as met.

4. The fourth system differs from the third in that the stop lamp system would be either that of the systems discussed in items 2 and 3 above, and operating according to Section 3 of your letter. Either system would be acceptable, subject to the operatio nal restriction with turn signal lamps that I shall discuss in my response to Section 3.

Next, you have presented four kinds of flashing arrangements for the turn signal lamps. You ask (a) which could meet Standard No. 108, and (b) which could meet Standard No. 108 assuming a flash cycle of 1-4 seconds. With respect to (a), all four would ap pear to be acceptable. The standard allows multiple turn signal lamps either to flash simultaneously, or sequentially in the direction of the turn. With respect to (b), Standard No. 108 specifies that a turn signal flasher provide not less than 60 and no t more than 120 cycles per minute. This translates to not less than 1 and not more than 2 cycles per second. This requirement would have to be met by all lamps in arrangement i.e. where all lamps operate simultaneously. When operating sequentially, each lamp individually would be subject to the restrictions with the result that the inclusive cycle for a three lamp system would be not less than 3 seconds and not more than 6 seconds. Therefore, arrangements (a), (b), and (c) would meet this requirement as suming a flash cycle of 4 seconds, but arrangement (d) would not, being restricted to a cycle of 2 seconds maximum.

In your third question, or Section 3 as you term it, you have combined the conditions of your first two questions and attached a table of "detailed operating states" of the rear lamps, which incorporates three attached figures, with the question whether it would comply with Standard No. 108. Two of the Operating States illustrated denote the stop lamp "on" and, individually, the right or left turn signal as "on". Standard No. 108 does not allow simultaneous activation of the stop lamp and turn signal la mp when the stop signal is optically combined with the turn signal, In that event, the circuit must be such that the stop signal cannot be turned on in the turn signal which is flashing (paragraph 4.2, SAE Standard J586c Stop Lamps, August 1970, incorpor ated by reference in Standard No. 108). Our other comment concerns "Fig. a", "Fig. b", and "Fig. c" depicting flash cycles of the turn signal lamp;. As we noted earlier, the individual lamps are subject to the cycle minima and maxima of 1 to 2 cycles per second, and none of the rates depicted in the three Figures appears to meet the minimum requirement of 1 second. Otherwise, the "Operating State" table appears acceptable.

I hope that this answers your questions.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

June 5, 1987

Ms. Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel U.S. Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh St., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Mr. Jones,

On Jan. 23, 1986 we consulted NHTSA about the problems of headlamps systems, and received your reply letter of May. 8, 1986. The information was very useful to us, thank you again for your kind assistance.

Now, we still have some questions about the turn signal lamps and other rear lamps, will you please kindly give us your suggestions as soon as possible?

The feature of rear lamps of the vehicle is shown as fig. 1. In the following conditions, which could meet the requirements of the FMVSS No. 108 and other related U.S.A. regulations?

1. As shown in Fig. 1, "R", is the backup lamp, and the lighting function of the other lamps "A", "B", "C", "D", "E", "F" are shown as Table 1. In the four cases, which could meet the requirements of U.S.A. regulations?

2. As shown in Fig. 2, there are four kinds of flashing arrangements for the turn signal lamps "ABC" (LH) & "DEF" (RH). a. Which could meet the requirements of U.S.A. regulations? b. If the period of flashing (t) 1 cycle = 1 - 4 sec. which could meet the requirements of U.S.A. regulations?

3. Combining the conditions of section 1, 2, we set a detailed operating state of the rear lamps as shown in Table 2. Could it meet the requirements of U.S.A. regulations?

Your kind assistance and earlier reply will be highly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Yueh-An Chen Division Head Planning Division SEE HARD COPY FOR GRAPHIC INFORMATION

ID: 24023

Dick Keller, Product Development Manager
Bruno Independent Living Aids
1780 Executive Drive
PO Box 84
Oconomowoc, WI 53066





Dear Mr. Keller:

This responds to your recent correspondence where you ask whether defeating a seat cushion occupant classification system on a vehicle manufactured before September 1, 2006, would constitute making the system inoperative when the vehicle modification is performed to accommodate the needs of a person with a disability. I am pleased to be able to provide a response.

By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) administers a statute requiring that motor vehicles manufactured for sale in the United States or imported into the United States be manufactured so as to reduce the likelihood of motor vehicle crashes and of deaths and injuries when crashes do occur. That statute is the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 ("Vehicle Safety Act") (recodified at 49 U.S.C. 30101, et seq.).

One of the agency's functions under that Act is to issue and enforce the Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs). These standards specify safety performance requirements for motor vehicles and/or items of motor vehicle equipment. Manufacturers of motor vehicles must certify compliance with all applicable safety standards and permanently apply a label to each vehicle stating that the vehicle complies with all applicable FMVSSs and providing the vehicle gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR). Alterers of motor vehicles are companies that modify a completed vehicle prior to first retail sale. Alterers must determine whether those modifications could affect the vehicle manufacturer's certification of compliance and, if so, must certify that the vehicle continues to comply with those safety standards that were affected by the modification.

The Vehicle Safety Act also prohibits manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or motor vehicle repair businesses from knowingly making inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment that is in compliance with any applicable FMVSS (49 U.S.C. 30122). If NHTSA determines that a business has violated the make inoperative provision, it may assess a civil penalty in the amount of $5,000 per violation (not to exceed $15,000,000 in the aggregate). NHTSA may, through regulation, exempt a person or business from the prohibition if it decides that an exemption is consistent with motor vehicle safety and the Vehicle Safety Act.

On February 27, 2001, NHTSA published a final rule setting forth a limited exemption from the make inoperative prohibition for businesses or individuals who modify vehicles for persons with disabilities (66 Federal Register 12638; Docket No. NHTSA-01-8667). This exemption is codified in 49 CFR Part 595. Only portions of some FMVSSs are covered by the exemption. Additionally, the exemption only applies to modifications made after the first retail sale of the vehicle.

On May 8, 2000, NHTSA published a final rule amending FMVSS No. 208, Occupant crash protection, to add several new requirements to minimize the risk of air bags to children and small adults, while maintaining the benefits of the air bags for all other front seat occupants. These requirements are collectively referred to as the "advanced air bag" requirements of FMVSS No. 208. They apply to all vehicles manufactured for sale or use in the United States with a GVWR of 8,500 pounds or less and an unloaded vehicle weight of 5,500 pounds or less (other than walk-in van-type trucks or vehicles manufactured exclusively for the U.S. Postal service).

The advanced air bag requirements are subject to a phase-in, whereby, generally speaking, ⁽¹⁾ at least 35% of a given vehicle manufacturer's fleet must comply with the requirements between September 1, 2003, and August 31, 2004, 65% of its fleet must comply between September 1, 2004, and August 31, 2005, and 100% of its fleet must comply between September 1, 2005, and August 31, 2006. Vehicles manufactured in two or more stages or by companies manufacturing less than 5,000 vehicles for the U.S. market per year must meet the advanced air bag requirements in all vehicles produced on or after September 1, 2006.

In amending FMVSS No. 208, NHTSA contemplated three different types of technologies that could be used, individually or in combination, to minimize air bag risks to children seated in the front seat of a vehicle. First, the rule allows vehicle manufacturers to certify compliance with the new requirements by using a system that suppresses the air bag when a small child is sitting in the front seat (automatic suppression system requirements). Second, manufacturers may deploy the air bag for a small child using a system that is unlikely to injure the child when the air bag deploys (low-risk deployment system requirements). Finally, manufacturers may use a system that suppresses the air bag whenever any occupant moves far enough into the air bag's deployment zone that an air bag related injury could result (dynamic automatic suppression system requirements).

Some of the technologies contemplated by manufacturers to meet these requirements are located in the passenger seat. When such systems are used, removal of the seat would make the suppression system inoperative.

Subpart C of Part 595 does not include the advanced air bag requirements of FMVSS No. 208 among the provisions for which an exemption may be granted. We are reviewing a petition for rulemaking that requests us to amend Part 595 to allow modifiers to make these systems inoperative. We anticipate that if we decide to so amend Part 595, the amendment will become effective before September 1, 2003, the beginning of the phase-in.

Until we amend Part 595 to include the advanced air bag requirements, a vehicle modifier must retain the vehicle features relied upon by the manufacturer for compliance with those requirements. A vehicle manufacturer is permitted to certify compliance with the advanced air bag requirements of FMVSS No. 208 before the beginning of the phase-in. If a vehicle manufacturer relies on a seat-based occupant detection system to certify a vehicle's compliance, regardless of whether it manufactures the vehicle before the beginning of the phase-in, removing a seat containing the system would make the vehicle's compliance "inoperative" within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 30122.

In such a case, a modifier may not remove the system unless NHTSA has issued a letter stating that it will not enforce the make inoperative prohibition for the work performed on the vehicle. Accordingly, a vehicle modifier should assure itself that the vehicle manufacturer is not relying on a seat-based occupant detection system to comply with the advanced air bag requirements before removing the passenger seat. If the seat-based system is relied upon for compliance, the modifier may request written agency approval of to the required modification. Any requests for such a letter should be submitted to this office.

I hope this addresses your concerns on this issue. Should you require any additional information or assistance, please contact Rebecca MacPherson, of my staff, at (202) 366-2992 or at the address given above.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:595
d.5/2/02

---

¹ Manufacturers who produce two or fewer car lines for the U.S. market may opt out of the phase-in schedule if 100% of their vehicles meet the advanced air bag requirements beginning September 1, 2004. Final-stage manufacturers and very small vehicle manufacturers (no more than 5,000 vehicles per year) are not required to comply with these new requirements during the phase-in period.

ID: nht88-1.45

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/18/88

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: HOWARD SMOLKIN -- MANAGING DIRECTOR

TITLE: THE MEANING OF PRACTICABILITY AND THE VEHICLE SAFETY ACT

TEXT: Attached per your request is a discussion of the meaning of "practicable" under the Vehicle Safety Act, for use in connection with the next meeting of the Research Advisory Committee.

Attachment

PRACTICABILITY AND THE VEHICLE SAFETY ACT

This paper provides a general discussion of the meaning of "practicable" under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Vehicle Safety Act). The Vehicle Safety Act directs the Secretary of Transportation, or his or her delegate, to issue Feder al motor vehicle safety standards that "shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms." 15 U.S.C. @ 1392(a). (Emphasis added.) See also 15 U.S.C. @ 1391(2). In issuing these standards, the Se cretary is directed to consider "relevant available motor vehicle safety data," whether the proposed standard "is reasonable, practicable and appropriate" for the particular type of motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment for which it is prescri bed, and the "extent to which such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes of the Act." 15 U.S.C. 1392(f)(1), (3), (4). (Emphasis added.)

The dictionary defines "practicable" as "capable of being done, effected, or put into practice, with the available means; feasible: a practicable solution." Random House Dictionary of the English Language (unabridged edition). Courts construing the term under the Vehicle Safety Act have generally relied on the following statements in the legislative history:

House Report: "In establishing standards the Secretary must conform to the requirement that the standard be practicable. This would require consideration of all relevant factors, including technological ability to achieve the goal of a particular sta ndard as well as consideration of economic factors." H. R. Rep. 1776 at 16.

Senate Report: "The committee intends that safety shall be the overriding consideration in the issuance of standards under this bill. The committee recognizes . . . that the Secretary will necessarily consider reasonableness of cost, feasibility and adequate leadtime." S. Rep. 1301, p.6.

The court decisions construing the term "practicable" have established several general principles about its meaning. First, while NHTSA must bear in mind that Congress intended safety to be the preeminent factor under the Vehicle Safety Act, the agency is to look at costs as well as benefits. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 54-55 (1983), a case reviewing a recission by the agency of the automatic restraint requirements, the Supreme Court concluded that the agency had been correct to look at the costs as well as the benefits of the requirements. NHTSA had determined that the incremental costs of the requirements were no longer reasonable based on its prediction that the safety benefits of the regulation might be minimal. In this instance, the court required a reexamination of the agency's conclusion that the safety benefits might be minimal. The court stated that when the agency examined its findings as to the likely safety benefits, it must also reconsider i ts judgment of the reasonableness of the monetary and other costs associated with the standard, bearing in mind that Congress intended safety to be the preeminent factor under the Act.

A second principle is that NHTSA must conduct careful analysis of the economic impacts of safety standards. In H & H Tire Co. v. DOT, 471 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1972), a case reviewing a safety standard requiring retreaded tires to meet many of the same per formance requirements as new tires, the court concluded that NHTSA had not adequately investigated the practicability of the standard. The court found that current retread tires could not comply with the requirements and that there was a possibility tha t the industry's best efforts might be insufficient to insure prompt compliance. The court concluded that NHTSA had acted precipitately, adopting a rule which might possibly destroy a well-established industry, without adequate study. The court also in dicated that NHTSA must consider possible economic hardships of both manufacturers and customers. Note: The court agreed with the government that "the fact that a government regulation may cause economic hardship to a party does not make such regulation unreasonable" and stated that the deleterious economic effect on the industry of compliance with the standard at issue might be permissible if retreads unquestionably were major safety hazards and if compliance with the standard clearly enhanced retread s' safety under on-the-road conditions. 471 F.2d at 354.

A third principle is that NHTSA may issue safety standards that are technology-forcing. In Chrysler v. DOT, 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972), a case reviewing a safety standard requiring vehicles to be equipped with automatic restraints, the court held that NHTSA has authority to issue safety standards which require improvements in existing technology or which require the development of new technology, and is not limited to issuing standards based solely on devices already developed.

A fourth principle is that NHTSA must consider the public acceptability of safety standards. In Pacific Legal Foundation v. DOT, 593 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1979), a case reviewing a safety standard requiring vehicles to be equipped with automatic restrain ts, the court held that consideration of public reaction is part of the requirement that standards be practicable. The court stated that "(m)uch as economic analysis must evaluate both supply and demand conditions, motor vehicle safety standards cannot be considered practicable unless we know both that the needed production capability is within reach and that motorists will avail themselves of the safety system." 593 F.2d at 1345.

Finally, the meaning of the term "practicable" appears to differ depending upon whether it is applied to a mandatory or optional provision in a safety standard. In Chrysler v. DOT, 515 F.2d 1053, 1060 (6th Cir. 1975), Chrysler argued that a standard perm itting use of rectangular headlamps, as an alternative to round headlamps, for a specified time period was impracticable because that company could not complete the necessary engineering and retooling in time to produce automobiles equipped with the new headlamps before the option expired. In dicta, the court stated that it had "some doubt that practicability is a significant principle in the context of an optional provision in a safety standard." The court stated that a review of the cases in this are a suggests the practicability requirement was designed primarily to prevent NHTSA from establishing mandatory safety requirements that are economically or technologically infeasible. The court contrasted that situation with the one at bar, in which the use of rectangular headlamps was not required, and Chrysler was not subject to any statutory penalties for failing to comply with this aspect of the standard. The court also stated that even assuming that an optional requirement were required to be prac ticable, it would be difficult to conclude that the rectangular headlamp option was impracticable in any absolute sense, since at least two manufacturers were capable of producing rectangular headlamps.

ID: 11373JEG

B. Michael Korte, Esq.
Law Firm of John Schwabe II
St. Louis Office
The Locust Building--Suite 900
1015 Locust Street
St. Louis, MO 63101

Dear Mr. Korte:

This responds to your letter asking about Federal standards concerning the deployment of air bags. You asked whether AFederal regulations establish a minimum speed that vehicles must be traveling, below which an air bag will not deploy.@

The answer to your question is no. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, establishes a number of performance requirements for air bags and air-bag-equipped vehicles. However, neither that standard nor any other Federal motor vehicle safety standard specifies that air bags must not deploy in crashes below a specified vehicle speed.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Edward Glancy of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Samuel J. Dubbin Chief Counsel

Ref:208 d:1/29/96 NCC-20 Eglancy:mar:1/3/96:OCC 11373

ID: nht72-5.48

DATE: 11/08/72

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Francis Armstrong; NHTSA

TO: Dalmon Enterprises Ltd.

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of September 20, 1972, in which you enclose a brochure describing your feed mover as requested by Mr. (Illegible Words), of my staff.

In (Illegible Word) of the material submitted would seem to indicate that your classification of the land owner as farm machinery is valid. We would not, therefore, consider it to be a "motor vehicle" within the (Illegible Word) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Act) based on the information furnished.

In addition to the Act (FL 87-563) and 49 C.F.R. 12.50, that you have requested, we are also enclosing Part 571 (formerly Part 371) of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Of particular interest to you would be the interpretation on mini-bikes that set forth criteria to assist manufacturers in classifying their products insofar as off-road use is concerned.

If you have further questions, we will be pleased to answer them.