ID: nht73-2.17

DATE: 11/08/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; James B. Gregory; NHTSA

TO: Department of California Highway Patrol

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of October 1, 1973, in which you asked that we review an enclosed opinion by the California Attorney General on the question of preemption of California motor vehicle regulations by Federal standards. The opinion concluded that the California requirement that motorcycles be wired so that their headlamps are lit whenever their engines are running was not preempted. This conclusion was contrary to the position taken in an NHTSA letter of November 14, 1972, to Mr. Edward Kearney.

We adhere to the position stated in the November 14, 1972, letter that the California requirement is preempted, and consider the legal opinion by the California Attorney General to be an erroneous view of the Federal law.

The opinion properly viewed the question as turning on the application of the phrase in @ 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1392(d), "applicable to the same aspect of performance." If the Federal standard (Standard No. 108, 49 CFR 571.108) covers a given aspect of performance, any State requirement must be identical to it. The California opinion relied on the language in the main opinion of one of the Super Lite cases, Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (1969), that preemption should be "narrowly construed", and went on to find that since Standard 108 does not specifically address the matter of wiring the headlamps when the engine is running, that aspect of performance is not covered by the standard and the California law is valid.

More important, however, than the nebulous concept of whether preemption is "narrowly" construed (a concept with which Judge Friendly, concurring in Chrysler, did not agree) is the point made at the end of the main opinion, that the administering Federal agency was supporting the State's position regarding the scope of the Federal regulation. The Court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court in Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969):

[W]hen construing an administrative regulation,'a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt. . . .[T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'

In this case the situation is the opposite of that in the Super Lite cases. The NHTSA's position is that the standard does cover the aspect of performance in question. As stated in the NHTSA letter of November 14, 1972, the standard "establishes requirements for motorcycle headlighting, along with special wiring requirements for motorcycles and other vehicles." It is the intent of the NHTSA that its requirements for headlamp performance, configuration, and wiring cover all aspects of performance directly involving headlamps, and thus preempt any non-identical State Standards relating to headlamps.

The implication of the California opinion is that any mode of design or performance that is not expressly dealt with in the Federal standard is open to regulation by the States. Such a position is impractical, where the agency's intent is to have a comprehensive, uniform regulation in a given area. In order to preempt the field it would be necessary for a Federal agency to anticipate the imaginative regulatory impulses of future State agencies or legislatures and include in a standard such provisions as, "It is not required that motorcycle headlamps be wired to operate when the engine is running." Congress clearly intended the NHTSA to establish a single set of uniform standards to which manufacturers must comply, and that intent would tend to be defeated by the position taken in the California opinion. Federal regulation has a negative as well as a positive aspect: in determining that there should be certain requirements in an area, we also are deciding against imposing others. The only way to effectuate such a decision is to declare, as we have done here, that our regulation is intended to be exclusive, and to describe as necessary its outer limits.

The California opinion's factual comparison with the Super Lite cases is also inapt. The Super Lite itself was a new type of lighting equipment, a supplementary lamp, for which Standard 108 contained no requirements. Headlamps, by contrast, are comprehensively regulated by the standard.

For these reasons, we conclude that the California requirement that motorcycle headlamps be wired to operate when the engine is running is preempted by Standard 108, and void.

While we feel constrained by law to so conclude, I want you to know that I have instructed my staff to consider the merit of amending the Federal lighting standard to include the California requirement in 108.

Sincerely,

October 1, 1973

James B. Gregory -- Administrator, U. S. Dept. of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Dr. Gregory:

A copy of Mr. Douglas Toms' letter of November 14, 1972, to Mr. Edward Kearney expressing his opinion that a recently passed California law relative to motorcycle headlamps was preempted by Federal Standard 108, was received by this Department on November 20, 1972.

The opinion expressed by Mr. Toms prompted a request by this Department to the Office of the Attorney General of the State of California for an opinion on the question of federal preemption as related to this recently enacted statute. A copy of the Attorney General's Opinion on this matter is enclosed for your review.

You will notice that the Attorney General's Opinion is not in accord with that expressed by Mr. Toms; therefore, we are proceeding on the premise that all motorcycles first manufactured and registered in California after January 1, 1975, will be required to meet these headlamp requirements.

After your review of the enclosed material, I would appreciate your comments on this very important issue.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

W. PUDINSKI Commissioner--Dept. of California Highway Patrol

Enclosure

cc: Senator Donald L. Grunsky; Edward Kearney

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

SAN FRANCISCO

September 13, 1973

W. Pudinski, Commissioner-- Department of California Highway Patrol

Dear Commissioner Pudinski:

You have requested the opinion of this office on the question of whether California Vehicle Code sections 25650.5 and 24253 are pre-empted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.

We conclude that these Vehicle Code provisions are not pre-empted by that Federal Act.

Our conclusion is based upon the following analysis:

In 1966 the Federal Government assumed a paramount role in the field of motor vehicle safety with the passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 15 U.S.C. @ 1381 et seq. (hereafter Federal Act). Basically this Act establishes a comprehensive system for the formulation and implementation of safety standards for the performance and equipment of new motor vehicles.

The enactment of such an extensive federal law naturally gave rise to the question of whether State legislation in the same field was pre-empted. n1E. g., see Chrysler Corporation v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (1969); Chrysler Corporation v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (1969).

n1 See U.S. Const. art. VI, @ 2, the so-called Supremacy Clause.

Congress anticipated the question in their enactment of a provision in the Federal Act expressly dealing with issue of pre-emption, 15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d). It provides: "(d) Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the Federal Government or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof from establishing a safety requirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment procured for its own use if such requirement imposes a higher standard of performance than that required to comply with the otherwise applicable Federal standard."

This pre-emption provision (15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d)) was succinctly summarized by the United States Court of Appeals in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofany, supra, 419 F.2d 499 (1969). In that case the Court declared:

"This provision indicates that state regulation of an item of motor vehicle equipment will be preempted only if the following factors appear in combination: (1) a federal standard in effect which covers that item of equipment; (2) a state safety standard . . . for the item which is not identical to the federal standard; and (3) application of the state and federal regulations to 'the same aspect of performance' of the item of equipment." 419 F.2d at 506.

In connection with the present inquiry, the question of federal pre-emption has arisen with respect to two provisions in the State Vehicle Code: Vehicle Code section 25650.5 (relating to the activation of motorcycle headlights) and Vehicle Code section 24253 (relating to the duration of tail lamp illumination). It is noted that there are federal standards issued pursuant to the Federal Act which are (1) applicable to the same "items of equipment" (viz., motor cycle headlights and tail lamps); and (2) which are "not identical" to the State regulations. Hence in determining whether or not the State regulations are preempted, the specific question here is whether the State and federal regulations apply to "the same aspect of performance" of these specified items of equipment. In making this determination, it would be appropriate to first ascertain whether the phrase "same aspect of performance" is to be given a narrow or broad construction; i.e., whether the pre-emptive effect of the Federal Act is to be narrowly or broadly applied.

This specific point was considered by the United States Court of Appeals in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, 419 F.2d 499. In evaluating Congressional intent with respect to the Federal Act's pre-emptive effect, the Court noted that "uniformity through national standards" was merely "a secondary objective." 419 F.2d at 511. On the other hand, the Court declared that "the clear expression of purpose in section 1381 and other evidence of legislative intent indicate that the reduction of traffic accidents was the overriding concern of Congress. We think that these expressions of legislative purpose should govern our assessment of the preemptive effect of the Act and the standards issued under it." 419 F.2d at 508. (See also Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lowery, 452 F.2d 431, 438 (1971), where the Court reiterates this conclusion.) Accordingly, the Court determined that "the 'aspect of performance' language in the preemption section of the Act must be construed narrowly." 419 F.2d at 510. The Court further stated: "If traffic safety is furthered by a traditional type of state regulation under the police power, . . . a narrow construction of the preemptive effect of the federal Act and [the standards issued pursuant thereto] is required." 419 F.2d at 511. n2.

n2 See Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, 340 F.Supp. 1120, 1124 (1972), which cites Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, for the proposition that "[w]here exercise of the local police power serves the purpose of a federal Act, the preemptive effect of that Act should be narrowly construed." See also Chrysler Corporation v. Rhodes, supra, 416 F.2d 319, 324, n. 8 (1969).

Thus in view of the judicial constraint upon the scope of the Federal Act's pre-emption provisions, it is apparent that the states are still afforded substantial leeway in the enactment of vehicle equipment safety regulations.

In this light we now compare the State statutes in question with the pertinent federal standards issued pursuant to the Federal Act to determine if they cover the "same aspect of performance."

With respect to motorcycle headlamps:

(1) State Law

Vehicle Code section 25650.5 provides that after January 1, 1975, all motorcycle headlamps shall "automatically turn on when the engine of the motorcycle is started and which remain lighted as long as the engine is running."

(2) Federal Standards

The standard pertinent to motorcycle headlamps is found in 49 CFR section 571.108, Standard 108, subsection S4.5.7(b). This standard provides: "When the headlamps are activated in a steady-burning state, the taillamps, parking lamps, license plate lamps and side marker lamps shall also be activated."

In comparing these two provisions, it can be seen that the State law relates to the mechanism or event of activation and duration of activation of the headlamps. The federal standard, on the other hand, is unconcerned with these factors. It merely constitutes a designation of other lamps whose activation is to accompany the activation of headlights. It would appear reasonable to conclude that these two provisions apply to different aspects of performance of motorcycle headlamps and that, accordingly, the State provision is not pre-empted. As will be seen, our conclusion is the same as to State law regulating taillamps.

With respect to taillamps:

(1) State Law

Vehicle Code section 24253 provides in essence that all motor vehicles and motorcycles shall be equipped with taillamps that will remain lighted at least one-quarter hour if the engine stops.

(2) Federal Standards

49 CFR section 571.108, Standard 108, subsections S4.5.3 and S4.5.7(b) provide that the taillamps shall be activated upon the activation of the headlamps. Subsection S4.5.7(a) provides that the taillamps shall be activated upon the activation of the parking lamps.

Thus the State law is solely concerned with the duration of illumination, while the federal standards are directed to the event of activation. Again, it would appear that, just as in the case of headlamps, these State and federal regulations are each addressed to separate and distinct aspects of taillamps performance. Accordingly then, the State provision is not pre-empted by the Federal Act.

Our conclusion that the State headlamp and taillamp regulations relate to aspects of performance different from those covered by federal standards, is fortified by the analysis engaged in by the Court in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, as it compared the state and federal standards at issue in that case. There state law prohibited a type of auxiliary headlight because of its unacceptable glare and dazzle effect (419 F.2d at 502, n. 5, 503) and because it emitted a blue light, a color of light which the states had reserved for emergency vehicles (419 F.2d at 503). The pertinent federal standards prohibited such auxiliary headlights only if they impaired the effectiveness of the required lights (419 F.2d at 506). The Court concluded that the federal standard applied to the impairment of light emission from the required headlights to the extent that such impairment affected the visibility of the driver of the car (419 F.2d at 511). On the other hand, the Court determined that the state provisions purported to regulate the effects of the light upon drivers of oncoming cars. The Court concluded that this was "a different aspect of performance" and thus the states' "attempts at regulation are not preempted." (Ibid.)

Thus we have a case where even though the state and federal regulations both related to the quality of the illumination itself which was emitted by the headlight, the Court nonetheless found that these regulations were directed to "different aspects of performance," because of the distinction between the effect of the illumination upon the driver of the car in question, and the effect upon drivers of oncoming cars.

If such closely related factors are deemed to constitute "different aspects of performance," a fortiori, such manifestly distinct elements of operation as the event or mechanism of light activation on the one hand, and the duration of illumination on the other hand, must be deemed to constitute "different aspects of performance."

In view of the explicit quality of this difference, our conclusion that it constitutes a different "aspect of performance" would appear to be warranted whether the phrase "aspect of performance," as used in the pre-emptive provisions of the Federal Act (viz., 15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d)), is given a narrow or broad construction. n3 It is thus our opinion that Vehicle Code sections 25650.5 and 24253 are not pre-empted.

n3 The concurring opinion in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, 419 F.2d at 512-515, argued that the pre-emptive provisions of the Federal Act should be broadly construed (419 F.2d at 512-513). Yet it concluded that the state regulations were not pre-empted because one of the basis for restricting the auxiliary headlight was the fact that it emitted light of a blue color (a color reserved for emergency vehicles), and that this was an aspect of performance different from that encompassed by the federal standard; viz., impairment of the effectiveness of the required lights (419 F.2d at 515). It would appear that the aspects of performance under consideration here are at least as distinct as those aspects of performance found to be different under the concurring opinion's broad construction of the Federal Act's pre-emption provisions.

Very truly yours,

EVELLE J. YOUNGER --

Attorney General,

VICTOR D. SONENBERG --

Deputy Attorney General

ID: nht73-2.18

DATE: 04/24/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R.B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Flex-N-Gate

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: In your letter of April 17, 1973 to Mr. Schneider you ask whether the Federal lighting standard, No. 108, applies to you as a manufacturer of rear step-hitch bumpers for pick-up trucks. Since the bumper installation interferes with the original vehicle license plate mounting bracket, provision is made for relocating the license plate mounting bracket, provision is made for relocating the license plate in the bumper. You apparently do not yourself mount the bumper to the vehicle, as your letter indicates that they are sold as after market items "to purchasers of new trucks" and to two truck manufacturers "who install these items before the trucks are released to the dealers".

Under the circumstances you describe, Standard No. 108 would not apply to you. Compliance and certification of new vehicles is the responsibility of the truck manufacturers who install the bumpers, although you may have a contractual obligation with them to provide license plate lighting meeting Federal requirements. In the aftermarket, if the bumper is installed prior to delivery of the truck to the purchaser, the dealer making the installation is legally responsible for compliance with Standard No. 108.

Yours truly,

April 17, 1973

Lawrence R. Schnieder Office of Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 7th Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Mr. Schnieder:

We manufacture rear step-hitch bumpers for pick-up trucks, and market them through dealers who sell them as add on accessories to purchasers of new trucks. We also are an O.E.M. supplier to Jeep Corporation and Toyota who install these items before the trucks are released to the dealers. As the bumper installation interferes with the original license light mounting bracket on the vehicle we make provisions for relocating the license plate onto the bumper (see attached brochure).

I would like to get your interpretation of Standard 108, i.e. whether it applies to us or not, if it does then the proper way of certifying that the license lights meet the federal requirements.

Sincerely,

SHAHID R. KHAN Engineer -- FLEX-N-GATE (Graphics omitted)

ID: nht73-2.19

DATE: 08/20/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Robert L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: American Safety Equipment Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: In reference to your August 3, 1973, petition for rule making pertaining to Standard No. 213, we require additional information on your harness release mechanism prior to reaching any decision on this matter.

Specifically, we require data on the amount of force required to open your release mechanism under the following conditions:

1. When the harness system is preloaded with the child body block to 45 pounds (according to the existing procedure in Standard No. 213);

2. When the harness system is preloaded to 45 pounds with a three-year-old Sierra child dummy (by pulling on the arms and legs of the dummy); and

3. When the child seating system with an actual child occupant is suspended upside down and when the harness system is not unloaded (pulling only on the latch mechanism without releasing the load on the harness).

Your cooperation in furnishing us this data will aid in resolving this matter.

ID: nht73-2.2

DATE: 08/30/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Electrical Testing Laboratories, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of June 18, 1973, concerning the conformity of certain designs of type III seat belt assemblies with Standard No. 209.

The first feature which you describe is a restraint consisting of a waist band with a single shoulder strap. The shoulder strap is attached to the buckle in front and is looped around the waist band in back. Unless this restraint has more elements then you describe, we haver serious questions about its conformity with the requirements for type III seat belts under Standard 209. Section S4.1(c) provides that the assembly must restrain the upper torso without shifting the pelvic restraint into the abdominal region and that the upper torso restraint shall be designed to minimize its vertical forces on the shoulders and spine. It appears doubtful that the described assembly meets either of these requirements.

The second feature you described is a strap through the harness assembly that passes around the seat back and is anchored to the floor by means of the vehicle's seat belt assembly anchorage. Your question appears to be whether such a restraint is a seat back retainer as required by Section S4.1(h). The attachment you describe would not be a seat back retainer under Section S4.1(h).

The third feature described, a closed loop strap without floor attachment would also violate the requirements of S4.1(h), unless it is designed and labelled for use only in specific models having adequate seat back restraints, as specified in that paragraph.

The fourth feature is the ability of a harness to move freely up and down on the restraint strap. This feature is the ability of harness to move freely up and down on the restraint strap. This feature is allowable under Standard 209.

Yours truly,

ELECTRICAL TESTING LABORATORISE, INC.

June 18, 1973

Richard Dyson -- Office of the Chief Counsel, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Subject: Type 3 Seat Belt Assemblies.

Dear Mr. Dyson:

We have recently been asked to perform tests on type III seat belt assemblies, the design of which has caused us some doubt as to their meeting some of the requirements of FMVSS 209. What we would like to know is whether or not the following design features are acceptable under the requirements for type III seat belt assemblies as outlined in FMVSS 209.

1. Upper torso restraint: Restraint consists of single strap starting at the midpoint of the pelvic band (strap around the waist). The anchor point is the buckle tongue hardware. The strap then passes over on shoulder of the child and is terminated in a loop through which the pelvic belt passes freely.

2. Seat Back Retainer: Strap passes through harness assembly around seat in a closed loop and is anchored to the vehicle by a narrow anchor plate using the same bolt as used to secure the seat belt assembly. This installation is performed by the purchaser.

3. Strap: The harness assembly is secured to the seat back by a closed loop strap. No seat back restraint provided.

4. Harness assembly: The harness assembly is secured by either the seat back retainer or strap and is free to move up or down on this section of webbing.

The specimens we have in for test are combinations of the above features and as such we would appreciate knowing what features are acceptable and which are not.

Should you require any additional information on this subject, in relation to the descriptions, please contact either Mr. H. D. Pomponio or myself.

Very truly yours,

C. F. Robb -- Manager, Automotive/Mechanical Division

ID: nht73-2.20

DATE: 12/22/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Robert L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: American Safety Equipment Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reference to our letter of August 20, 1973 (copy enclosed), requesting additional technical information on your harness release mechanism (the subject of your August 3, 1973, Petition for Rule Making).

Please inform us within ten days whether or not you intend to furnish us the information we requested in our letter, so that we may make a final decision on your Petition for Rule Making action.

ID: nht73-2.21

DATE: 04/07/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; David Schmeltzer; NHTSA

TO: Arthur H. Davis

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter which we received April 5, 1973, which asks if you, as a dealer of tires, may register all new and retreaded tires sold to first purchasers on a single form and send that form to a tire registry service.

Under the Tire Identification and Record Keeping regulation (49 CFR Part 574) dealers selling cars to first purchasers must record the sale and forward the required information to the manufacturer or his designee. Therefore, you can only record all the tire sales from various manufacturers and retreaders on a registry service form if that registry service is the designee of all of the manufacturers and retreaders whose tires you sell.

For your information we have enclosed a copy of the Tire Identification and Record Keeping regulation (Notice No. 5) and a copy of an interpretation of the regulation dealing with the question of manufacturers' designees (Notice No. 10).

Thank you for your interest in auto safety.

Sincerely,

Enclosures

Sir

RE: D.O.T Registration

I am in the wholesale tire business. It has come to my attention twice that a dealer may register all this not only mine but all this on one simple registration form. That being Axican Systems hire.

Can a dealers register all new turn' and all retracks on the form that Axican Systems he use, mail it to Axican and be legally within the bainclouir of the federally law.

Sincerely,

(Illegible Word) --

RFD 2 Box 174A.,(Illegible Word). Mc 04401

ID: nht73-2.22

DATE: 02/13/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Lawrence R. Schneider; NHTSA

TO: International Harvester Company

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: In your petition for reconsideration of 49 CFR 575.103 dated January 12, 1973, you enclosed a copy of "International Camper's Manual for Truck-Camper Leading(Illegible Word) and asked whether its data content and format complied with the requirements, and especially @ 575.6.

Section 576.6 allows a document provided with a vehicle to "contain more than one table", but it "must clearly and unconditionally indicate which of the tables applies to the vehicle with which it is provided". Although pages 8 and 9 of the Guide explain how to use the tables, and page 6 refers the owner to the "capacity plate" for the proper weight rating, there appears to be nothing within the booklet itself that indicates which of the 16 tables applies to "the vehicle with which it is provided".

Other issues raised in your petition will be considered in the agency's response which will be published shortly.

Sincerely,

INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY

MOTOR TRUCK DIVISION

January 12, 1973

Douglas W. Toms -- Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Subject: Petition for Reconsideration -- 49CFR 575.103, Truck Camper Loading, Docket No. 71-7; Notice 5

Dear Mr. Toms:

International Harvester Company (IH) respectfully files this petition requesting the Administrator to amend the new Consumer Information Regulation as published in the Federal Register p. 26607 on December 14, 1972.

On August 15, 1972 the NHTSA issued a new Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 126, Truck Camper Loading, with a mandatory effective date of January 1, 1973. On December 14, 1972 the NHTSA by issuance of 575.103 rescinded Standard No. 126 and enacted the new Consumer Information Requirements as a replacement for Standard No. 126.

IH is deeply concerned since it has put forth considerable time, effort and expense in developing and publishing information required to comply with the January 1, 1973 effective date of Standard No. 126. As a means of complying with Standard No. 126, production quantities of a 28-page IH Truck Camper Loading Guide (10 copies enclosed) were recently printed. We believe that this Camper Guide would be quite beneficial and effective in providing information to the consumer to assure proper selection of a compatible slide-in camper unit. In view of above, IH must support and favor the NHTSA's previous position of regulating requirements for truck camper loading information as a Motor Vehicle Safety Standard in preference to a Consumer Information Regulation.

It is apparent that revisions would have to be made to the above mentioned IH Camper Guide in order to comply with 575.103. We will not be able to implement these necessary revisions in time to meet the February 1, 1973 availability deadline as required by Docket No. 71-7, Notice 5. The amount of additional lead time needed by IH is, of course, dependent on the nature of the changes that would have to be made to the attached MVSS 126 Camper Guide to make it compliant with 575.103. Some of the obvious changes include certain references, definitions and effective dates that have been modified by NHTSA in the transition from MVSS 126 to 575.103.

There is one additional area in which some question exists. Heretofore IH has not been required to furnish consumer information under Part 575. We are therefore requesting an official interpretation from the NHTSA that the data content and format as presented in the attached IH Camper Guide - Part No. 1086777-R1 does in fact comply with 49 CFR Part 575. We are particularly concerned about Section 575.6.

As noted earlier IH will not be able to comply with the 3/1/73 effective date of 575.103 due to the time that would be required to revise and republish our Truck Camper Loading Guide. If the changes are of a minimal nature (i.e correction of references, definitions and dates) we will need approximately 60 days beyond the date that NHTSA responds to this Petition. If more extensive revisions are required, we anticipate that a minimum of six months lead time would be needed.

The following points will summarize the basic content of this Petition:

1. IH favors promulgation of subject requirements as Safety Standard No. 126 instead of a Consumer Information Regulation.

2. However, if NHTSA sees fit to implement as a Consumer Information Regulation IH is requesting a favorable interpretation that the basic content and format of the IH Camper Guide that has been developed to meet MVSS 126 would likewise satisfy the statutory requirements of 575.103. Consequently, if only minimal changes are required to the existing IH Camper Guide, the revised information can be made available within 60 days after the NHTSA response to this Petition is received by IH. If more substantive changes are required, it is estimated that approximately six months lead time will be required by IH.

IH would further point out that NHTSA's promulgation of 575.103 has, in fact, violated procedures outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act in that interested parties were not provided opportunity to comment upon providing the subject information under Part 575 Consumer Information prior to final enactment of 575.103. Therefore, should NHTSA decide not to grant any of the alternative modifications requested herein, we request that the subject regulation be reissued as a Notice of Proposed Rule Making as stipulated in the Administrative Procedure Act.

D. E. Schmidt -- Assistant Manager of Engineering

ID: nht73-2.23

DATE: 03/26/73

FROM: Francis Armstrong; Francis Armstrong; Office of Standards Enforcement

TO: File

TITLE: FMVSS Interpretation

TEXT:

March 26, 1973 Close-out of Investigatory File, CIR 584 N41-21RGa; CIR 584 Director, Office of Standards Enforcement File The Investigatory File, CIR 584, has been closed out inasmuch as the manufacturer utilitzed a driver test dummy during his certification tests. This alternate certification technique is permissible by FMVSS No. 204. A maximum rearward dynamic horizontal displacement of 5.1 inches was obtained on the standards enforcement Checker test vehicle, NHTSA No. 71518, during a 29.3 mph frontal barrier impact. This maximum displacement was only 0.1 inch greater than the maximum allowable and which occurred late (124 msec.) during the collision interval. The manufacturer's submitted data indicated that their test dummy impacted the steering control early (approximately 55 msec.) in the vehicle impact phase and thereby would restrict the steering control rearward displacement. It is therefore, concluded that the NHTSA vehicle would have met the performance requirements of FMVSS No. 204 if the alternate driver dummy technique had been utilized in the test. Francis Armstrong

ID: nht73-2.24

DATE: 05/02/73

FROM: JAMES E. WILSON -- NHTSA ACTING ADMINISTRATOR

TO: GALE S. MOLOVINSKY -- ATTORNEY, LEGAL DEPARTMENT NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE DEALERS ASSOCIATION

TITLE: NY0-30

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 03/30/73 FROM GALE S. MOLOVINSKY -- NADA TO LAUREN SNYDER -- NHTSA; OBTAINED OCTOBER 17, 1973

TEXT: Dear Mr. Molovinsky:

This is in response to your letter of March 30, 1973, in which you asked whether it would be permissible for automobile dealers to modify vehicles as necessary for handicapped persons in such a manner that they might not conform to all the applicable motor vehicle safety standards.

Section 108(b) (1) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1397 (b) (1), states that the prohibition against delivery of a nonconforming vehicle "shall not apply to the introduction or delivery for introduction in interstate commerce of any motor vehicle . . . after the first purchase of it in good faith for purposes other than resale." The question is when the "purchase" of a vehicle is completed so that a dealer or other person is free to modify it as he wishes. We have generally taken the position that the purchase is not completed until the vehicle is delivered to the purchaser. This of course raises the problem you have described in cases where the vehicle must be modified prior to delivery.

Our position, that the first purchase of a vehicle is not completed until the vehicle is actually delivered, is necessary, we believe, in the general situation to carry out the intent of Congress and maintain the effectiveness of the standards. The situation where a vehicle must be modified for the special needs of a handicapped person is distinguishable, however, from the general case in that the modification (1) is necessary for the buyer to use the vehicle, (2) takes the vehicle out of its

2 normal commercial configuration and thus identifies it to the particular buyer, and (3) is performed for purposes other than evasion of the requirements of the safety standards. In this limited case, therefore, we are willing to consider any violation a purely technical one that is justified by the public need, and will exercise our discretion not to take any enforcement action.

Sincerely,

ID: nht73-2.25

DATE: 03/15/73

FROM: B.T. DRIVER -- NHTSA MOTOR VEHICLE PROGRAMS

TO: WARREN M. HEATH -- DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL

TITLE: N41-34

TEXT: Dear Mr. Heath:

This is in reply to your letter of February 28th to Mr. Dougins W. Toms, Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, concerning the mounting of lamps and reflectors on mini-pickup trucks.

The December 8, 1972, letter from Commissioner M. Pudinski was placed in Docket 69-19; Motion No. 3. We inadvertently failed to knowledge this action to Mr. Pudinski.

The visibility requirements of lamps and reflectors in Standard No. 100 are predicated on the normal driving or closed tail gate position. Since the use of motor vehicles, including driving with tail gates down or[Illegible word] lids open or otherwise having the lights and reflectors obscurred by a particular load on the vehicle, is under the jurisdiction of the individual states, we do not anticipate rule making on this subject.

Sincerely,