ID: nht94-2.75

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: May 9, 1994

FROM: Womack, John -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Bloomfield, John -- Manager, Engine Management, Legislation and Certification, Lotus Cars, Ltd. (ENGLAND)

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached To a Letter Dated 10/28/93 From Rachel Jelly To John Womack

TEXT: This responds to the letter from Ms. Rachel Jelly, formerly of your company, concerning low volume CAFE exemptions. I apologize for the delay in our response. Ms. Jelly asked whether Bugatti Automobili S.p.A. (Bugatti) and Lotus Cars, Ltd. (Lotus), bot h of which are controlled by the same holding company, may submit separate low volume CAFE exemption petitions requesting two alternative standards. The answer to this question is no. Since any alternative CAFE standard would apply to Bugatti and Lotus together, a single combined petition must be submitted for a single alternative standard.

The reasons for the above response are discussed in the attached letter from NHTSA to Mr. Lance Tunick, of Bugatti. Mr. Tunick's letter to NHTSA raised issues that are of concern to both Bugatti and Lotus. Thus, NHTSA's response to Mr. Tunick should ad dress Lotus' concerns about filing for alternative CAFE standards.

I hope this information is helpful. If there are any questions, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht94-2.76

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: May 09, 1994

FROM: Womack, John -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Tunick, Lance -- Bugatti

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached To A Letter Dated 11/8/93 From Federico Trombi To John Womack (OCC 9318)

TEXT: This responds to your letter n1 concerning low volume CAFE exemptions. I apologize for the delay in our response. You asked whether Bugatti Automobili S.p.A. (Bugatti) and Lotus Cars, Ltd. (Lotus), both of which are controlled by the same holding compa ny, may submit separate low volume CAFE exemption petitions requesting two separate alternative standards. As discussed below, the answer to this question is no. Since any alternative CAFE standard would apply to Bugatti and Lotus together, a single co mbined petition must be submitted for a single alternative standard.

n1 The letter was signed by Federico Trombi of Bugatti Automobili S.p.A. but requested that the response be directed to you.

According to your letter and a separate one received from Lotus, General Motors sold Lotus to Bugatti International Holding, SA, in August 1993. That holding company also controls Bugatti, which is planning to enter the U.S. market in the near future. Lotus and Bugatti intend to submit petitions for low volume CAFE exemptions. Moreover, the joint annual production of Bugatti and Lotus is far below the 10,000 vehicles per year eligibility threshold for low volume CAFE exemptions.

In a telephone conversation with Edward Glancy of my staff, you indicated that Lotus cars are imported by Lotus USA. You also indicated that Bugatti cars could be imported by Lotus USA, or could be imported by a new company that would be established by Bugatti, e.g., "Bugatti USA." Finally, you indicated that Lotus USA is not in a control relationship with any other auto manufacturers.

In addressing whether Bugatti and Lotus would be eligible for two separate standards, I will begin by identifying the statutory provisions which are relevant to determining who manufactures the vehicles at issue. Under section 501(8) of the Motor Vehicl e Information and Cost Savings Act, "(t)he term 'manufacturer' means any person engaged in the business of manufacturing automobiles." Under section 501(9), "(t)he term 'manufacture' (except for purposes of section 502(c)) means to produce in the customs territory of the United States, or to import." Under section 501(10), "(t)he term 'import' means to import into the customs territory of the United States."

Under these sections, the company which imports foreign-built cars into the United States is the manufacturer of those automobiles. Thus, if Lotus USA imported Lotus cars and Bugatti cars, Lotus USA, rather than Bugatti Automobili S.p.A. and Lotus Cars, Ltd., would be considered the manufacturer of those vehicles for CAFE purposes.

Since Lotus USA would be the manufacturer of all the vehicles under this scenario, and CAFE standards apply to all passenger automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer, there would be no basis for Bugatti and Lotus to request two separate standards. Ins tead, a single alternative standard would need to be requested for Lotus USA, which would cover all automobiles imported by that company.

This result would not change if Bugatti established a new company, Bugatti USA, for importing cars into the U.S. This is because of the operation of the operation of section 503(c), which provides that any reference to "automobiles manufactured by a man ufacturer" is deemed to include all automobiles manufactured by persons who control, are controlled by, or are under common control with, such manufacturer. Since Lotus USA and Bugatti USA would presumably be under common control (traced back to Bugatti International Holding, SA), their fleets would be combined for CAFE purposes. Since many of the arguments you raise in your letter are relevant to this type of scenario, i.e., one in which Lotus and Bugatti cars would be considered to be manufactured b y manufacturers within a control relationship, I will assume it for the rest of this letter.

As you noted in your letter, NHTSA addressed the issue of how alternative CAFE standards apply to manufacturers within a control relationship in a July 1991 decision concerning low volume exemption petitions submitted by Ferrari. Ferrari and Alfa Romeo w ere under the common control of Fiat. We stated the following:

Because of the operation of section 503(c), Ferrari and Alfa Romeo are in essence the same manufacturer for purposes of CAFE standards. As discussed below, under section 502, the same CAFE standard should apply to both manufacturers together. This i s true for both generally applicable standards and alternative standards.

Section 502(a), in setting forth the generally applicable standard, specifies a standard for "passenger automobiles manufactured by any manufacturer." Section 502(c)(1), in setting forth requirements relating to low volume exemptions, specifies that s uch exemptions may not be granted unless the Secretary establishes, by rule, alternative average fuel economy standards for "passenger automobiles manufactured by manufacturers" which receive exemptions under this subsection. Under 503(c)(1), any refere nce to "automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer" is deemed to include all automobiles manufactured by persons who control, are controlled by, or are under common control with, such manufacturer. Thus, any CAFE standard which applies to Ferrari should apply to Ferrari and Alfa Romeo together. Therefore, granting Ferrari a low volume exemption in MY 1988 would create a paradox, since Alfa Romeo is indisputably not eligible (given its own worldwide production) for an exemption.

A similar paradox would arise in the context of determining compliance with the statute. Under section 503(a), neither manufacturer may have an independent CAFE value. Instead, by operation of section 503(c), they share a CAFE value that is based on the total volume of cars imported by both companies.

Thus, a decision to grant an exemption to Ferrari while applying the generally applicable standard to Alfa Romeo would cause compliance enforcement difficulties by compelling the agency to try to compare a combined CAFE value to separate CAFE standard s. 56 FR 31461, July 10, 1991.

You argued in your letter that, because of factual differences, the Ferrari/Alfa analysis should not be applied to the Bugatti/Lotus situation, and Bugatti and Lotus should be permitted to submit separate low volume CAFE exemption petitions requesting tw o separate alternative standards.

While we agree that there are factual differences, e.g., Ferrari and Alfa Romeo together produced too many vehicles to meet the eligibility threshold while Bugatti and Lotus do not, the situations are identical with respect to the issue of how CAFE stand ards apply to manufacturers within a control relationship. In particular, since Lotus USA and Bugatti USA would be under common control and because of the operation of section 503(c), the two companies would in essence be the same manufacturer for purpo ses of CAFE standards. Any alternative standard issued under section 502 would apply to the two companies together. Moreover, neither manufacturer would have an independent CAFE value under section 503(a). Instead, by operation of section 503(c), they would share a CAFE value that is based on the total volume of cars imported by both companies. Therefore, the same CAFE standard would necessarily apply to the two companies together.

You raised several other objections in your letter. First, you stated that the CAFE statute provides that "a manufacturer" may submit a petition for a CAFE exemption, and a joint petition would not fall within this provision. In fact, any one of the re lated companies (Lotus, Lotus USA, Bugatti, the Bugatti U.S. subsidiary, or the holding company) could submit a petition on behalf of the combined companies. However, any such petition would apply to the combined fleet of both Bugatti USA and Lotus USA.

You also stated that combining two small companies together would muddy the question of the best fuel economy that each company is capable of achieving. However, NHTSA would simply assess the "maximum feasible average fuel economy level" that could be ac hieved by the combined Bugatti/Lotus fleet. We recognize that this level would be dependent on assumptions about the relative volumes of Bugatti USA and Lotus USA. However, the agency needs to take this factor into account in assessing the capability o f any manufacturer which produces vehicles with varying fuel economy values.

Finally, you stated that if a joint alternative standard was established, NHTSA would face a difficult enforcement situation in the event of a failure to comply with the standard. You asked how the agency would divide the civil penalties. It is our opin ion that Lotus USA and Bugatti USA would be jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the civil penalty, although we would permit the two companies to divide the penalty between themselves.

I would like to address two other issues that are raised by the factual situation described in your letter: (1) the immediate eligibility of Bugatti/Lotus given that Lotus was owned by General Motors until August 1993, and (2) the timing of petitions for low volume exemptions.

As you know, section 502(c)(1) specifies that low volume exemptions are only available for manufacturers "who manufactured . . . fewer than 10,000 passenger automobiles in the second model year preceding the model year for which the application is made. . . ." (Emphasis added.) During the time that Lotus was owned by General Motors, the combined companies manufactured far more than 10,000 vehicles. It is our opinion that Lotus does not have to wait two years from the date it ceased being in a control r elationship with General Motors to be eligible, given the circumstances described above. In particular, we believe that the requirement that a manufacturer have manufactured fewer than 10,000 passenger automobiles in the second model year preceding the model year for which the application is made was intended to address varying production levels (above and below 10,000) and not a situation where a small manufacturer such as Lotus is sold by a large manufacturer.

With respect to the timing of petitions, NHTSA's regulations at 49 CFR @ 525.6, Requirements for petition, state that petitions from low volume manufacturers for alternative fuel economy standards must be "submitted not later than 24 months before the be ginning of the affected model year, unless good cause for later submission is shown." Clearly, the deadline for a timely submission for model years 1994-96 has passed. On the issue of "good cause" for a later submission, we note that Lotus was not sold by General Motors until August 1993, and both Lotus and Bugatti requested our opinion concerning submitting a petition within three months of that sale.

Under the circumstances, we conclude that, Lotus/Bugatti have, to date, taken reasonable measures to submit a petition in as timely a manner as possible. Therefore, if a petition that meets the requirements of 49 CFR Part 525 is submitted promptly after receipt of this letter, we will consider there to be good cause shown for submitting a late petition for model years 1994-96. I also note that a petition for model year 1997 would be due later this year.

I hope this information is helpful. If there are any questions, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht94-2.77

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: May 10, 1994

FROM: Christopher A. Hart -- Acting Administrator, NHTSA; Signature by Stephen P. Wood

TO: The Honorable Doug Bereuter -- U.S. House of Representatives

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached To Letter Dated 4/20/94 From Doug Bereuter To Christopher Hart (OCC-9916) And 1/1/94 (EST) Letter From Christopher A. Hart To Doug Bereuter

TEXT: Dear Mr. Bereuter:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning our rulemaking on compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicle fuel systems and fuel containers. Please be assured that I will keep you fully apprised of the rulemaking's status. I share your concern that the rulemak ing be completed expeditiously as possible and appreciate your interest in this matter.

Thank you for your patience.

Sincerely,

ID: nht94-2.78

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: May 11, 1994

FROM: William L. Blake

TO: United States Department of Transportation

TITLE: Re: 1985 Mercedes Benz, Model 280SL, A "Gray Model" Car

ATTACHMT: Attached to Letter Dated 6/9/94 From John Womack to William L. Blake (A42; Part 581; 591; CSA S106 And Letter Dated 4/29/94 From William Blake To U.S. DOT

TEXT: Gentlemen:

Enclosed please find a copy of mine of April 29, 1994 to which I received no reply whatsoever.

Please give me a call upon receipt of this letter and send me a reply in writing at your earliest convenience.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Yours very truly,

Enclosure

ID: nht94-2.79

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: May 12, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Hamilton K. Pyles -- Cairncross & Associates, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 4/5/94 from Hamilton K. Pyles to NHTSA Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance

TEXT:

This responds to your letter of April 5, 1994 to the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance. You would like to import into the United States "a kit for a compact custom truck bed". You ask what Federal laws and regulations govern the importation, sale, an d installation of wooden pickup bed kits. You also ask what you must do, initially, to import a trial sample bed into the United States.

You have described the kit as consisting of plans and instructions in English, wooden and plywood parts of the bed, unspecified "metal parts," fastenings, wiring and "lights."

As a general rule, all motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment must conform (and be certified by their manufacturer to conform) to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards issued by this agency in order to be imported into the Un ited States and sold here. The only motor vehicle equipment in your kit that is covered by a Federal standard is "lights." They are subject to our Standard No. 108 LAMPS, REFLECTIVE DEVICES AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT (49 CFR 571.108), and, thus, must confo rm and be certified as conforming in order to be imported into the United States. Certification is indicated either by a DOT symbol on the equipment, or by a statement of compliance attached to the equipment or on the container in which it is shipped.

If the lighting equipment does not conform, or if you are unsure whether it does, you are permitted by 49 CFR 591.5(j) to import one or more sample beds or kits for "research, investigations, studies, (or) demonstrations" for a period of up to three year s after first obtaining written approval from the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance. If the lighting equipment does conform, there is no limitation upon the number of items you may import.

You have also written that the truck bed will be offered to the general public as a replacement for existing truck beds, and to "manufacturers who place specialized beds (campershells, utility company boxes, etc.) on pick-up frames that they buy new with out factory installed beds."

Although you have no responsibility under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act for compliance of a vehicle with the Federal safety standards when the conversion work is completed, we should like to apprise you of the obligations of a convert er, since the converter will look to you to provide it with complying lighting equipment. With respect to the general public, under section 108 (a) (2) (A) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 1397 (a) (2) (A)) , the removal of the old truck bed and lights and

installation of the new truck bed kit by a "manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business" must not "knowingly render inoperative in whole or in part any device or element of design installed in accordance with" a Federal motor vehi cle safety standard. For example, one of the named parties would violate the Act if it removed the old bed with complying lamps and installed a new bed with noncompliant lamps if that person knew that the lamps did not comply. Similarly, if the bed in so me manner obscured the center highmounted lamp which is now required for pickups manufactured after September 1, 1993, that could be a violation of the Act. If a manufacturer is installing the truck bed on a new chassis, it becomes responsible for ensuring that the completed vehicle fully meets the Federal motor vehicle safety standards, and for certifying its compliance.

Finally, as the importer of the kit, you become its "manufacturer" under our laws and may have some responsibility for notification and remedy of safety related defects or noncompliances that are discovered in the kit either before or after its installat ion on motor vehicles.

I enclose an information sheet for your information, and hope that this letter has been helpful to you.

ID: nht94-2.8

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: March 31, 1994

FROM: Mark M. McGregor

TO: Office of Chief Counsel -- NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 4/28/94 from John Womack to Mark M. McGregor (A42; Std. 108; VSA Sec. 108(a)(2)(A))

TEXT:

I have been instructed to contact your office in an effort to determine any federal regulations that may apply to a new invention, which I wish to market in the United States.

This invention is a "Safe Driving Distance Indicator Light." It is a simple electric light that can either be built into the rear of an automobile or installed on the rear bumper. This light would emit one color (possibly green), which could be seen by the driver of a following automobile. If the following automobile is following closer than the "predetermined" safe distance, the indicator light that is attached to the lead automobile would change color, possibly from the original green color to red. This new color (red) would then be viewed by the following automobile, indicating that he is following at an unsafe (too close) distance.

The goal of this invention is to reduce the number of rear-end automobile accidents in the United States. The shape and size can vary from a small square device to a long, thin shape. The light would come on automatically as soon as the engine is start ed and automatically dimmed when the headlights are turned on. Refinements could be made by the manufacturer, such as incorporation of a manual or automatic adjustment for various road conditions or speeds. Although since the object of the apparatus is to act as a reminder or warning and not as an accurate measuring instrument, I feel that these would be unnecessary.

I am considering applying for a U.S. patent on this invention and would greatly appreciate it if you could advise me of any and all legal restrictions or regulations that would apply.

If further information is necessary, please feel free to contact me. Your prompt attention on this matter would be greatly appreciated.

ID: nht94-2.80

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: May 12, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Nicholas S. Copass -- Sales Manager, Titeflex Industrial Americas

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 9/29/93 from Nicholas S. Copass to David Elias (OCC-9161), letter dated 3/6/91 from Anthony J. Laliko to Vernon G. Bloom, and letter dated 3/18/91 from Arthur H. Neill, Jr. to Anthony J. Lalikos

TEXT:

This responds to your letter to Mr. David Elias, formerly of this office, concerning the manufacture of hydraulic brake hose assemblies by Titeflex and Russell Performance Products. I regret the delay in responding.

We recently responded to a letter from Mr. Jim Davis of Russell about the labeling of the hose assemblies. I have enclosed a copy of that letter for your information. In that letter, we explain that both Titeflex's and Russell's designations need not b e marked on the assembly. Instead, since Russell is manufacturing the assemblies and will market the assemblies, Russell's designation must be marked. The designation will identify Russell as the manufacturer of the assembly in the event of a possible n oncompliance or defect with the assembly.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call Ms. Deirdre Fujita of my staff at (202)-366-2992.

ID: nht94-2.81

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: MAY 12, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Jim Davis -- President, Russell Performance Products

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 10/22/93 from Jim Davis to David Elias (OCC-9249), letter dated 10/22/93 from Jim Davis to NHTSA Office of Vehicle Safety Standards, Crash Avoidance Division, and letter dated 11/16/93 from Jim Davis to David Elias

TEXT:

This responds to your letters to Mr. David Elias, formerly of this office, about the requirements of Standard 106, "Brake Hoses," for labeling hydraulic brake hose assemblies. I apologize for the delay in responding.

You explain in your letters that Russell holds a license to manufacture brake hose assemblies from Titeflex Corporation, a manufacturer of brake hoses, end fittings and assemblies. Titeflex supplies Russell with braided hose, and Russell manufactures the end fittings that Titeflex designed, using Titeflex's engineering drawings. Russell assembles the Titeflex hose with the end fittings, and "markets these hose assemblies (in) the marketplace."

You ask about marking the hose assemblies with a designation that identifies the manufacturer of the assembly, pursuant to S5.2.4 of Standard 106. You ask whether both Russell's and Titeflex's designations are required to be labeled, or only the designat ion of Russell.

The answer is only Russell's designation is required to be marked. Russell is manufacturing the assemblies and will market the assemblies. Russell's designation will identify Russell as the manufacturer of the assembly in the event of a possible noncompl iance or defect with the assembly.

You also ask whether Titeflex's hose must be labeled with the information specified in *S5.2.1 and S5.2.2 of Standard 106. The first part of your question asks whether the labeling requirements apply to bulk brake hose "with a stainless braided outer cov ering." The answer is yes. The standard does not exclude braided brake hoses from the labeling requirements.

The second part of this question asks about the required labeling for hoses that are part of brake hose assemblies. You ask for confirmation that Standard 106 does not require the hose to be labeled once the hose is part of a brake hose assembly. Your u nderstanding is correct with regard to S5.2.2. The last sentence of that paragraph states: "The information (specified in S5.2.2) need not be present on hose that is sold as part of a brake hose assembly or a motor vehicle." (The quoted sentence was adop ted at 56 FR 50520, October 7, 1991, to replace the sentence you referred to.) Accordingly, the hose need not bear the labeling of S5.2.2 when the hose is part of an assembly. However, the hose must still bear the stripes required by S5.2.1 unless, to qu ote from S5.2.1, the hose is

"manufactured for use only in an assembly whose end fittings prevent its installation in a twisted orientation in either side of the vehicle."

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact Deirdre Fujita of my staff at the above address, or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht94-2.82

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: May 12, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Jerry Schwebel -- Executive Vice President, Travel Safety Children's Products, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached To Letter Dated 11/9/93 From Jerry Schwebel To Walter Myers (OCC-9316)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Schwebel:

This responds to your letter to Mr. Walter Myers of my staff asking about a particular feature of your "air-filled car seat" and how Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, "Child Restraint Systems," would apply. I apologize for the delay in resp onding.

Your letter and the promotional literature you enclosed describe the car seat as having a 5-point belt system to provide upper and lower torso restraint. The seat also has a strap that crosses in front of the child's chest, that attaches to each side of the child seat "to offer additional side impact protection by keeping the leading side of the seat attached to the opposite side so as to prevent the child from rolling out." You state that the strap is not part of the primary restraint system and is no n-load bearing in a frontal impact. You ask if there is any problem with the strap feature.

By way of background information, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. @ 1381, et seq. (Safety Act), authorizes the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards for new mo tor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA, however, does not approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial products. Instead, the Safety Act establishes a "self-certification" process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet all applicable safety standards. The following represents our opinion based on the facts set forth in your letter.

Standard 213 specifies requirements for child restraint systems used in motor vehicles and aircraft, to reduce the number of children killed or injured in motor vehicle crashes and in aircraft. S5.2.2, "Torso impact protection," states in part that each add-on, forward-facing child restraint system

shall have no fixed or movable surface . . . [d]irectly forward of the dummy and intersected by a horizontal

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line . . . parallel to the SORL [seat orientation reference line illustrated in Figure 1A of the standard] . . . and passing through any portion of the dummy, except for surfaces which restrain the dummy when the system is tested in accordance with S6.1. 2.1.2, so that the child restraint system shall conform to the requirements of S5.1.2 and S5.1.3.1.

The purpose of S5.2.2 is to prohibit child seats from having any surface or component that can be mistaken by motorists to be a means of adequately restraining the child occupant in a crash. 43 FR 21470, 21475 (May 18, 1978). A strap in front of the dum my would be prohibited by S5.2.2, unless it is provided to restrain the dummy in S6.1.2.1.2's dynamic test so that the system conforms to Standard 213's injury criteria for head and chest accelerations and occupant excursion. Since you indicate the stra p is not meant to be load bearing in a frontal impact, it does not appear that the strap would perform adequately. n1 Accordingly, it appears the strap is prohibited.

n1 The strap may be installed if it provides adequate protection. To measure the adequacy of the performance of a child seat with such a strap, the child seat will be tested at 20 mph with the strap placed in front of the child, but without the dummy strapped into the restraint system. The child seat must pass the occupant excursion and other dynamic performance requirements without use of the primary restraint system. See, test procedures for 20 mph test, S6.1.2.1.2, S6.1.2.3.1(c)(ii).

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need additional information, please call Ms. Deirdre Fujita of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

ID: nht94-2.83

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: May 12, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: David Fabrycky

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached To Letter Dated 12/4/93 From David Fabrycky To NHTSA Chief Counsel (OCC-9433)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Fabrycky:

This responds to your letter about an aftermarket product you wish to manufacture. The product is a child safety seat buckle shield, which is intended to prevent a child from opening the buckle on a child restraint system. You state that your device wou ld cover the buckle and prevent the child from gaining access to the pushbutton of a child seat buckle. To depress the pushbutton, the device requires that a latch be actuated and the cover pivoted away from the buckle. You indicated that the device re quires "manual dexterity to exert the forces in many directions simultaneously."

Although we understand your concern that young children not be able to easily unbuckle a child safety seat, we have reservations about devices that interfere with the unbuckling of the seats. I hope the following discussion explains those reservations a nd answers the questions in your letter about the effect of our regulations on your product.

Our agency has the authority to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. We have exercised this authority to establish Safety Standard No. 213, "Child Restraint Systems," which applies to all new child restraint systems sold in this country. However, Standard 213 does not apply to aftermarket items for child restraint systems, such as your buckle shield. Hence, you are not required to certify that this product complies with Standard 213 before selling the product.

Additionally, you are not required to get "approval" from this agency before selling the buckle shield. NHTSA has no authority to "approve" motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial product. Instead, the National Traff ic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act establishes a "self-certification" process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet our safety standards. The agency periodically tests vehicles and equipment items for compliance with the standards, and also investigates alleged safety-related defects.

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Although we do not have any standards that directly apply to your product, there are several statutory provisions that could affect it. Manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment such as your buckle shield are subject to the requirements in sections 151-1 59 of the Safety Act concerning the recall of products with defects related to motor vehicle safety. The agency does not determine the existence of safety defects except in the context of a defect proceeding, and thus is unable to say whether your produ ct might or might not contain such a defect. However, the agency is concerned that people be able to easily and quickly operate a child safety seat buckle in an emergency. As the agency said in a rule on the force level necessary to operate child restr aint buckles:

The agency's safety concerns over child restraint buckle force release and size stem from the need for convenient buckling and unbuckling of a child and, in emergencies, to quickly remove the child from the restraint. This latter situation can occur in instances of post-crash fires, immersions, etc. A restraint that is difficult to disengage, due to the need for excessive buckle pressure or difficulty in operating the release mechanism because of a very small release button, can unnecessarily endanger the child in the restraint and the adult attempting to release the child. (50 FR 33722; August 21, 1985)

It appears that your product could significantly increase the difficulty of using the buckle release and thus hinder a person attempting to release the belt in an emergency.

In addition, use of your product could be affected by section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act. That section prohibits commercial businesses from knowingly tampering with devices or elements of design installed in an item of motor vehicle equipment, such as a child safety seat, in compliance with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards. In determining the effect of a buckle shield on a child seat's compliance with Standard 213, NHTSA would evaluate the performance of the seat with the buckle shield i nstalled. Standard 213 specifies several elements of design with which a child restraint system is unlikely to comply if your buckle shield were installed. Section S5.4.3.5 of Standard 213 requires the pushbutton release for any buckle on a child restr aint to have a minimum area for applying the release force. Since your device will completely cover the buckle when installed, the buckle shield would cause the child restraint to no longer comply with this requirement. That section also requires the b uckle to release when a specified maximum force is applied. Your device will not allow the buckle to release when the force is applied because it will cover the buckle and require force to be applied "in many directions simultaneously." Your device woul d thus cause the child restraint to no longer comply with that requirement. Therefore, commercial establishments cannot

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legally install your device on customers' child safety seats. In addition, section S5.7 of Standard 213 requires each material used in a child restraint system to comply with the flammability resistance requirements of Standard 302, "Flammability of Int erior Materials." If your buckle shield does not comply with the requirements of Standard 302, commercial establishments cannot legally install your device.

The prohibition of section 108(a)(2)(A) does not apply to individual vehicle owners who may install or remove any items on child restraint systems regardless of the effect on compliance with Standard 213. However, our policy is to encourage child restra int owners not to tamper with or otherwise degrade the safety of their child restraints.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact Ms. Deirdre Fujita of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,