NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
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ID: aiam2162OpenMr. Melvin R. Stahl, Vice President, Government Regulations, Motorcycle Industry Council, Inc., 1001 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, DC, 20036; Mr. Melvin R. Stahl Vice President Government Regulations Motorcycle Industry Council Inc. 1001 Connecticut Ave. N.W. Washington DC 20036; Dear Mr. Stahl: This is in reply to your letter of December 30, 1975, asking whethe Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, which permits the manufacture of motor-driven cycles whose top speed is 30 mph, without turn signal lamps, preempts a State requirement that all motor vehicles be equipped with such lamps.; The answer to your question is yes. Even though a State as in you hypothetical may not have defined 'motor vehicle,' or its definition of a vehicle category differs from a definition in 49 CFR 571.3(b) (e.g. where a State defines a motor-driven cycle as a 'bicycle'), it is preempted by Section 103(d) from establishing or maintaining in effect a safety standard that differs from a Federal standard covering the same aspect of performance. Accordingly, since S 4.1.1.26 of 49 CFR 571.108, Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, *Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment* excuses low speed motor- driven cycles from the requirement that they be equipped with turn signal lamps, a State cannot require them on identical vehicles.; I hope this answers your question. Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam2498OpenMr. Allan Cheshire, Market Research Analyst, Robert Bosch Corporation, 2800 South 25th Avenue, Broadview, IL 60153; Mr. Allan Cheshire Market Research Analyst Robert Bosch Corporation 2800 South 25th Avenue Broadview IL 60153; Dear Mr. Cheshire: This is in response to your letter of January 26, 1977, asking fo confirmation of several interpretations of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 *Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment*.; You are correct that, as an equipment standard, Standard No. 10 applies only to replacement of equipment that was originally mounted on the vehicle to enable it to comply with the requirements of the standard. It does not apply to items not covered by the standard, but which are frequently provided as new vehicle options, such as fog lamps and cornerning (sic) lamps. Any item of lighting equipment not required is permissable (sic) to be installed, as you also noted, if it does not impair the effectiveness of the required lighting equipment (paragraph S4.1.3). Additional lighting equipment is otherwise subject to State regulation.; You also asked 'what would be the NHTSA's stand on products where SA standards do not exist, for example halogen headlights?' A halogen headlamp that does not comply with Standard No. 108 and is intended as a replacement headlamp may not be imported and sold for this use. On the other hand, halogen fog lamps may be imported and sold, subject to State regulations.; I hope this answers your questions. Yours truly, Frank Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam2532OpenMr. John O. Bohmer, President, Bohmer - Reed, Inc., Motorhome Conversions, Brooten, MN 56316; Mr. John O. Bohmer President Bohmer - Reed Inc. Motorhome Conversions Brooten MN 56316; Dear Mr. Bohmer: This responds to your February 25, 1977, letter asking whether you motor home conversions make you a manufacturer or an alterer for purposes of compliance with the regulations of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).; In your conversion of motor homes, you install used bodies on ne chassis. The NHTSA considers the mounting of a used body on a new chassis to be the manufacture of a new motor vehicle that requires certification. This makes you a manufacturer rather than an alterer. The rules for certification are found in Part 567, *Certification*, and Part 568, *Vehicles Manufactured in Two or More Stages*. I have enclosed copies of these regulations for your information.; Your second question asks whether the converted vehicle must compl with Standard No. 302, *Flammability of Interior Materials*, even though the original body was manufactured prior to the effective date of the standard. Vehicles must comply with all standards in effect on the date of their manufacture. For vehicles that you complete by mounting a body on a new chassis, you are permitted to treat as the date of manufacture, the date of manufacture of the incomplete vehicle (as defined in Part 568), the date of final completion of the vehicle, or a date between those two dates. Therefore, it appears that the vehicle you manufacture would be required to comply with Standard No. 302.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam1037OpenMr. W. A. Scott, Manger (sic), Tech. Service, Chrysler Leasing Corporation, P.O. Box 1057, Detroit, MI 48231; Mr. W. A. Scott Manger (sic) Tech. Service Chrysler Leasing Corporation P.O. Box 1057 Detroit MI 48231; Dear Mr. Scott: This will serve to confirm the advice given you by telephone on Marc 12, 1973, concerning the obligations of a leasing company under the Federal Odometer Requirements, 49 CFR Part 580.; The situation that concerns you is the transfer from the lessor to th lessee of a vehicle that has been wrecked or stolen while in the lessee's possession. In transfers of this type, the lessee often fails to tell the lessor the mileage on the vehicle, so that the mileage cannot be indicated on the disclosure form. It is our opinion that the lessor in this situation should leave the mileage blank and indicate that the true mileage is unknown.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4235OpenMr. Edwin C. Silverstein, 108 Mayfair Lane, Mt. Laurel, NJ 08054; Mr. Edwin C. Silverstein 108 Mayfair Lane Mt. Laurel NJ 08054; Dear Mr. Silverstein: Thank you for your letter of August 16, 1986, concerning how ou standards apply to a product you have invented. According to the literature you provided us, your product, 'Limo Leash' is a harness system used to secure an animal in a vehicle. The system consists of a piece of webbing which can be attached at either end to the 'clothes hooks' installed in a vehicle. A snap hook, which can be attached to the animal's collar, slides along the webbing to allow the animal to move back and forth.; There are no Federal motor vehicle safety standards that apply to harness system used for animals. However, since your product is sold as an accessory for use in a motor vehicle, we would consider it an item of motor vehicle equipment. Thus, the manufacturer of your product would be covered by the agency's regulations on safety-related defects that would pose a hazard to other vehicle occupants. I have enclosed an information sheet which describes those regulations.; Since there may be state regulations governing the manufacture or us of your product, I suggest you check with state transportation officials in the jurisdictions in which you intend to market your product.; If you have any further questions, please let me know. Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam1467OpenMr. James L. Greighton, Maxi-Cab Enterprises, 115G Harvey West Blvd., Santa Cruz, CA 95060; Mr. James L. Greighton Maxi-Cab Enterprises 115G Harvey West Blvd. Santa Cruz CA 95060; Dear Mr. Greighton: This is in reply to your letter of March 18, 1974, asking which Federa requirements apply to the Maxi- Cab, pictures of which you enclose. You describe the Maxi-Cab as a fiberglass shell that fits in the back of compact pickups, and indicate that it has been designed to be used to transport children.; Based on the pictures you have furnished, we have concluded that th Maxi-Cab is a 'pickup cover', which is defined in S4 of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205, 'Glazing Materials' (49 CFR 571.205), as 'a camper having a roof and sides but without a floor, designed to be mounted on and removable from the cargo area of a truck by the user.'; Since you describe the Maxi-Cab as designed to transport persons, th glazing material used in its construction must conform to Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205. No other Federal requirements administered by this agency apply to it.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4665OpenMr. Philip A. Hutchinson, Jr. Vice President, Public Affairs, General Counsel and Secretary Volkswagen of America, Inc. P.O. Box 3951 Troy, MI 48007-3951; Mr. Philip A. Hutchinson Jr. Vice President Public Affairs General Counsel and Secretary Volkswagen of America Inc. P.O. Box 3951 Troy MI 48007-3951; "Dear Mr. Hutchinson: Thank you for your letter to Administrator Curr inquiring about the status of Volkswagen's exemption from certain provisions relating to the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program. The Administrator has asked me to respond. Your letter requested NHTSA's position on the status of Volkswagen's exemption from the provisions of section 503(b)(1) of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (15 U.S.C 1901 et seq.), and indicated that Volkswagen considers the exemption moot and terminated. As explained below, NHTSA considers the exemption terminated as of the beginning of model year (MY) 1989. In 1981 (46 FR 54453, November 2, 1981), NHTSA granted Volkswagen's petition seeking an exemption from the general statutory provision that a manufacturer's domestically manufactured passenger automobiles and non-domestically manufactured passenger automobiles be placed in separate fleets for purposes of determining compliance with CAFE standards. Such an exemption is authorized under section 503(b)(3)(A) of the statute. The statute prohibits a manufacturer so exempted from earning CAFE credits during the period of the exemption. At Volkswagen's request, NHTSA granted the exemption for the indefinite future, reserving the agency's right to reconsider its action if it appeared that the exemption was no longer consistent with the purposes of the Act. Your letter indicates that Volkswagen terminated the production of 'domestically manufactured' vehicles (i.e., vehicles whose domestic content exceeds 75 percent) on June 30, 1987, and that Volkswagen's U.S. production was terminated entirely effective July 14, 1988. You believe the exemption (including its prohibition on the accumulation of CAFE credits) should have ended on June 30, 1987, but in no event later than July 14, 1988. The primary legal issue raised by your letter is how exemptions can be terminated. Although the agency expects that exemptions will normally terminate only after affirmative agency action, automatic terminations are not precluded. However, we do not believe that an exemption terminates 'automatically' merely because a manufacturer terminates its production of vehicles with more than 75 percent domestic content or halts all U.S. production. To conclude otherwise could create confusion and result in exemptions being terminated in instances in which the exempted manufacturer wanted its exemption to continue. The possibility of such problems may be seen in a number of circumstances, e.g., if a manufacturer temporarily halts U.S. production and then resumes it, or if it permits domestic content to fall below 75 percent temporarily and then raises it. We note that, in situations in which a manufacturer allows the percent domestic content to fall below 75 percent and continues to produce vehicles in the U.S. with that level of domestic content, it is likely to be relatively easy for the manufacturer to raise the level back above 75 percent. There are circumstances in Volkswagen's case, however, that lead us to conclude its exemption terminated at the time Volkswagen's U.S. production terminated in its entirety (July 14, 1988). We believe it was evident at that time that Volkswagen was not merely halting U.S. production, but doing so with an intention to permanently abandon such production. We note, for example, that Volkswagen actively sought purchasers for its U.S. production facility in advance of its termination of U.S. production. While a manufacturer could change its mind after permanently abandoning U.S. production, resumption of U.S. production would be relatively difficult. Further, subsequent events, up to and including Volkswagen's February 1990 letter, have confirmed the appearances in 1988 of permanent termination of production. While it would have been preferable for those appearances to have been confirmed essentially contemporaneously, we conclude that Volkswagen terminated U.S. production with an intention to permanently abandon it, and that its exemption became moot at that time. Since Volkswagen could receive no benefit from the exemption, and clearly had no intention of resuming U.S. production, I conclude that the exemption should be considered terminated effective with the beginning of the first model year following the company's cessation of U.S. production, i.e., MY 1989. This decision is consistent with section 503(b)(3)(F) which provides that in any model year in which an exemption is effective, no credits may be earned. We interpret that section as requiring the bar to continue to the end of the model year in which the exemption terminated. Hence, the prohibition against earned credits is deemed to have ended with the beginning of the 1989 model year. I note that during MY 1989, Volkswagen accrued a CAFE credit excess of $28,798,575 for its passenger cars, and $56,310 for its light trucks. I hope you have found this information useful. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions concerning this matter. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel"; |
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ID: aiam3909OpenMr. Fred W. Bowditch, Vice President, Technical Affairs Division, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, 300 New Center Building, Detroit, MI 48202; Mr. Fred W. Bowditch Vice President Technical Affairs Division Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association 300 New Center Building Detroit MI 48202; Dear Mr. Bowditch: On October 29, 1984, the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association file a petition for rulemaking to amend Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, *Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment*. The petition requested 'removal from section 4.1.1.36(a)(2) of the limitation requiring the three aiming pads to be located on the exterior face of the headlamp lens.' You have suggested the mounting flange at the lens-reflector joint as an acceptable alternative location for the aiming pads. The language suggested in the petition for amendment of S4.1.1.36(a)(2) would also allow all three legs to be adjustable on the headlamp aimers.; The agency has proposed amendments to Standard No. 108 (49 FR 47880) t delete the final sentence of paragraph S4.1.1.36(a)(2) with reference to aiming locating plates, and to delete Figures 9-1 and 9-2. Thus, this aspect of your petition has already been granted. We have filed your petition as a comment in the docket to be considered in future rulemaking action on this subject. Further, we interpret the words 'The exterior face of each...lens' in paragraph S4.1.1.36(a)(2) to mean all portions of the lens face including the mounting flange which is a molded and indivisible part of the lens. Thus, no rulemaking is considered necessary to implement this item of your petition. Your request also included a suggestion that the minimum height of the lettering for the adjustment of the legs on the aimer adapter should be reduced from 0.25 inch to 4 mm. This is being addressed in pending rulemaking. Therefore, no further action is necessary at this time.; Sincerely, Barry Felrice, Associate Administrator for Rulemaking |
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ID: aiam1934OpenMr. Beller, Alfred Teves GMBH, 6 Frankfurt/Main 2, Postfach 119155, Germany; Mr. Beller Alfred Teves GMBH 6 Frankfurt/Main 2 Postfach 119155 Germany; Dear Mr. Beller: This responds to your April 29, 1975, question whether S5.4.3 o Standard No. 105-75, *Hydraulic brake systems*, permits a brake fluid warning statement on a filler cap to be partially obscured by two 'contact blades' on the cap which apparently are inserted into a receptacle attached to the vehicle. The description you enclose is similar to one submitted with an earlier request which we evaluated in a March 3, 1975, letter to your representative, Mr. Paul Utans.; Sections S5.4.3(b) requires that the statement be 'located so as to b visible by direct view.' As we noted in our March 3 letter, this requirement prohibits an arrangement which would obscure any parts of the statement. We also noted that S5.4.3(b) permits a location within 4 inches of the brake fluid reservoir filler plug or cap to accommodate arrangements which do not permit use of the filler cap as a location.; From the drawing you enclose, we conclude that the contact blade obscure part of the warning and it therefore would not comply with the requirement of S5.4.3(b). As an enforcement matter, we would find it impossible to allow a 'minor noncompliance' and still be able to enforce a standard objectively. We do not consider the ability to turn the cap to expose the warning to constitute 'visible by direct view.'; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam0626OpenMr. Leo P. Ziegler, Jr., Staff Engineer, Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., 18121 East Eight Mile Road, East Detroit, MI 48021; Mr. Leo P. Ziegler Jr. Staff Engineer Society of Automotive Engineers Inc. 18121 East Eight Mile Road East Detroit MI 48021; Dear Mr. Ziegler: This is in reply to your letter of February 7, 1972, to th Administrator, in which you requested 'clarification' of two requirements of Standard 207 that impose forces on rearward facing seats.; We do not believe that the requirements are unclear. S4.2(b) requires rearward facing seat to withstand a force of 20 times its weight applied in a rearward direction, while S4.3.2.2 requires the restraining device not to release or fail under an acceleration of 20 g's in the direction opposite to that in which the seat folds.; You suggest that these forces and accelerations are equivalent to thos in a 30 mph barrier impact, and point out that none of the existing standards provides for a 30 mph rear impact. The intent of the cited sections is to require rear facing seats to withstand the force of rear end collisions, which occur frequently and are often of considerable severity. We have some doubt that the 20 g acceleration is equivalent to a 30 mph rear barrier impact, frontal 30 mph impacts typically produce accelerations of 30 to 40 g's. Whether it is or not is irrelevant, however, to the validity of the standard. The standard is clear in its own terms, and in our judgment its requirements are appropriate and feasible.; Sincerely, Robert L. Carter, Acting Associate Administrator, Moto Vehicle Programs; |
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Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.