ID: nht90-1.16

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: JANUARY 12, 1990

FROM: SAMUEL KIMMELMAN -- ENGINEERING PRODUCT MANAGER, IDEAL CORPORATION

TO: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA

TITLE: N

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 3-30-90 TO SAMUEL KIMMELMAN FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD; (A35; STD. 108) TEXT:

Several vehicles manufactured in the last several years contain dash board turn signal indicators in the shape of arrows that increase in size, through three (3) growth stages, during the "on" time of the corresponding flashing turn signal lamps. When th e turn signal lamps go "off" the dash board arrow goes "off" and begins the next growth cycle when the turn signal lamps go "on". The dash board turn signal arrow follows the "on-off" cycling of the corresponding turn signal lamps.

In turn signal operation when a turn signal lamp fails the original equipment flasher changes to a higher flash rate, shorter "on" and "off" times, thereby preventing the corresponding dash board indicator arrow from reaching the 3rd growth stage. This is an indication to the driver that a turn signal lamp has failed.

We manufacture aftermarket variable load turn signal flashers and hazard warning flashers, certified as meeting the requirements of FMVSS-108, for use as replacements to original equipment flashers. However, due to differences in operating characteristi cs between our variable load flashers and the original equipment flashers used in these vehicles, we cannot guarantee our flashers will provide sufficient "on" time to allow the dash board indicator arrows to reach the 3rd stage as the corre- sponding tu rn signal lamps flash within the requirements of FMVSS-108.

Can we list our valuable load flashers as replacement flashers for vehicles having three (3) growth stage dash board turn signal arrows?

ID: nht90-1.17

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: JANUARY 16, 1990

FROM: SATOSHI NISHIBORI -- VICE PRESIDENT, INDUSTRY-GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS

TO: ROBERT F. HELLMUTH -- DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF VEHICLE SAFETY COMPLIANCE, NHTSA

TITLE: NEF-31 GEN/NCI 3092

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 3-15-90 TO SATOSHI NISHIBORI FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD; [A35 REDBOOK; STD. 120]

TEXT: This responds to your October 31, 1989, letter regarding the compliance of 1989 Nissan pickup trucks with FMVSS 120. In my December 19th letter to you, I confirmed an extension until January 16, 1990, to respond to your request.

Nissan's responses to your questions regarding the 1989 Nissan truck are set forth in the Attachment. We wish to emphasize, however, that, based on our reading of FMVSS 120, it is not clear that the vehicles in question fail to comply with that stand ard. Nissan has followed a procedure whereby tire inflation pressures specified on FMVSS 120 tire/rim information labels are determined based on the tire's ability to support their share of the vehicle's gross axle weight rating (GAWR). The load carryi ng capacity of the tires at various pressures is determined by reference to data in tire industry standarization manuals; such as the Tire and Rim Association (TRA) Yearbook. Once a minimum pressure that is adequate to carry the GAWR is determined, Nissa n considers other factors, such as vehicle ride characteristics, to select the recommended pressure. This process results in the selection of a recommended pressure that will permit the tires to carry safely GAWR loads and will provide good vehicle ride characteristics. Nissan believes that the procedure it followed resulted in the recommendation of a tire pressure that is consistent with safe vehicle operation and is permitted under FMVSS 120.

Based on our reading of the Agency contractor's test report on this matter, it appears that the contractor has interpreted FMVSS 120 in a manner different from Nissan. However, we believe that our own reading of FMVSS 120 is consistent with the langu age used in that standard. In particular, based on our reading, we conclude that:

1. the tire label need not show the tire's maximum inflation pressure; and

2. the 1.1 adjustment factor in section 5.1.2 of the standard applies for tire selection purposes only. Nothing in FMVSS 120 requires that the relationships between tire inflation pressure and load, as specified by tire manufacturers in standardizat ion manuals or otherwise, must be universally adjusted by use of this factor. We read FMVSS 120 to require, in practical terms, that when a passenger car tire is to be used on a truck, a slightly larger capacity tire must be selected than would be the c ase if the tire were to be used on a similar size passenger car. Based on Agency statements in Federal Register notices regarding FMVSS 120, the standard apparently requires this difference in tire selection due to the greater potential for off-road use and heavy load operation (perhaps above the vehicle's rated load capacity) for trucks than for passenger cars, and not due to any inherent difference in load-pressure relationships for the vehicles.

It is our understanding that the Agency's test report concludes that the 1989 Nissan truck that was inspected by the Agency's contractor does not conform to S.5.3.5 of FMVSS 120. Section 5.3.5 specifies that the vehicle's tire/rim selection label mus t show the "cold inflation pressure for [the] tires". This provision does not specify how the "cold inflation pressure" is to be determined, or for which driving conditions the pressure must be appropriate. FMVSS 120, as originally proposed, specified t hat the label must show the "maximum cold inflation pressures of the tires with which the vehicle is equipped, as marked on the tires. . ." See 36 Federal Register 14273-4, August 3, 1971, emphasis added. In a subsequent proposal, the requirement was re vised to specify that the label must show the "maximum tire inflation pressure", deleting the reference to the tires actually on the vehicle at the time of sale. See 39 Federal Register 19505, 19507, June 3, 1974. This revision was made to recognize and continue to permit the practice of dealers changing tire sizes prior to delivery of trucks to the purchaser. 39 Federal Register 19505. The final rule establishing FMVSS 120 adopts the current language of

section 5.3.5 (as paragraph 5.3(c)), i.e., "cold inflation pressure", but the preamble does not explain the deletion of the term "maximum" with regard to the inflation pressure. See 41 Federal Register 3480, January 23 1976. Nevertheless, the change in wording suggests that the tire label must reflect some pressure other than the maximum pressure.

We believe that the context of section 5.3.5 may provide some additional guidance as to which pressure must appear on the label. Section 5.3.1 specifies that the information required under section 5.3.3 through 5.3.5 must appear either "after each GA WR" in the case of a certification label or must be "appropriate for each GVWR-GAWR combination", if a combined certification/120 label format is used. Thus, the "cold inflation pressure" selected should be consistent with the GAWR of the vehicle. This conclusion is supported by a subsequent NHTSA preamble, which states that the section 5.3.5 pressure need not be the maximum pressure, "but, the pressure specified by the tire manufacturer as sufficient to carry the load specified by the vehicle manufac turer as the tire's share of the assigned GAWR". 42 Federal Register 7143, February 7, 1977.

The 1989 Nissan truck inspected by the Agency is equipped with Firestone WR-12, P 195/75R14 M+S tires. The tires have a maximum load rating of 1400 pounds. The certification label on the vehicle specifies a cold inflation pressure of 34 psi for the rear tires and a GAWR of 2544 pounds for the rear axle. The key issue raised by NHTSA is whether the 34 psi pressure on the label is a pressure "specified by the tire manufacturer as sufficient to carry" half the GAWR, or 1272 pounds.

The regulations do not specify a procedure by which the tire manufacturer must articulate whether the tire, inflated to 34 psi, will support a 1272 pound load. For example, we believe this information could be obtained from tire industry standardizat ion manuals or from direct discussions between the vehicle and tire manufacturers.

Data in the 1989 Tire and Rim Association (TRA) yearbook show that the tires in question will support a load of 1279 pounds at 29 psi, with higher loads supportable at higher pressures. Therefore, the 1989 Nissan truck would appear to comply with sec tion 5.3.5. Moreover, the manufacturer of the tires used as original equipment on the vehicle has confirmed that the tires inflated to 34 psi, will carry 1383 pounds (which is more than half the GAWR) on this vehicle (see Enclosure 1).

However, NHTSA has apparently interpreted the required calculation procedure differently. As we understand the procedure used by NHTSA's contractor in its test report, it first calculated a "tire load limit" at 34 psi by interpolating between the loa d limits at 32 psi and at 35 psi, as specified in the TRA tables. Assuming that a linear interpolation is appropriate, the 34 psi maximum load would be 1381.67 pounds. NHTSA's contractor then proceeds to divide the interpolated load by 1.1, yielding 125 6.06 pounds. Since this figure is less than the tire's share of the GAWR (1272 pounds), the contractor concludes that a violation has occurred. Assuming that linear interpolation between the table values is appropriate and the contractor's procedure is correct, a pressure of 34.956 pounds would be required to support 1272 pounds.

We believe that the procedure followed by the contractor is not specified in FMVSS 120. In particular, we object to the contractor's application of the 1.1 adjustment factor to intermediate tire loads and for purposes other than tire selection, since the standard does not specify these procedures.

The use of a 1.1 factor is specified in section 5.1.2 of the standard for tire selection purposes. That section provides that the sum of the load ratings of the tires fitted to an axle must be not less than the GAWR. Prior to calculating the sum, th e tire's load rating shall be reduced by dividing by 1.1 if the tire is listed in Appendix A of Standard 109 and is installed on a truck, bus, MPV, or trailer. However, no specific tires are listed in Appendix A of Standard 109. It is our understanding that prior to the early 1980s, that Appendix did list certain tire sizes for use on passenger cars. Therefore, section 5.1.2 may suggest that when passenger tires are used on trucks, the tire's load rating must be reduced by the 1.1 factor prior to det ermining whether the tires are adequate to support the GAWR. According to the 1977 preamble, the purpose of applying the 1.1 factor is "to account for the generally harsher treatment (impulse and surge loading in the case of MPV's off-road) to which the tires of a vehicle other than a passenger car are exposed that is not accounted for in passenger car tire rating". Supra. Thus, it appears that the purpose for the 1.1 factor is not to deal with a difference in the ability of a tire to support a given load at a particular pressure when the tire is used on a car as compared to use on a truck. Rather, the stated intent seems to be to deal with the greater off-road use (or possibly more frequent overload situations) to which vehicles other than passeng er cars are subjected. n1

n1 It is important to note that the 1989 Nissan truck meets the tire selection criteria of section 5.1.2. If the tires' maximum load rating (1400#) is divided by 1.1, and the adjusted sum (2545#) of the two tires' load ratings exceeds the GAWR (2544# ).

The use of the 1.1 factor for tire selection purposes only is also suggested by the language of section 5.3.3. That provision references section 5.1.2 (and, thereby, the 1.1 factor) in determining whether the tire size is appropriate for the GAWR. H owever, the absence of the parenthetical reference to section 5.1.2 in section 5.3.5 suggests that the application of the 1.1 factor is not required for determining whether the tire pressure on the label is appropriate for the GAWR.

To summarize, the language used in FMVSS 120 to describe the process to be used in determining the cold inflation pressure under section 5.3.5 is ambiguous at best, and contrary to the procedure used by NHTSA's contractor at worst. These deficiencies are exhibited with regard to the following determinations:

1. Whether the 1.1 adjustment factor is to be used for purposes other than tire selection;

2. Which tires are subject to the 1.1 factor (Appendix A, standard 109);

3. The source of information on the tire manufacturer's load limit for the tire, at various pressures; and

4. The procedure for interpolating information derived from the TRA tables.

Of these factors, we believe the first to be the most significant, but all contribute to the ambiguity of the standard.

It is our understanding that at least one other vehicle manufacturer has interpreted section 5.3.5 in a manner inconsistent with NHTSA's contractor. This suggests that a problem may exist with the wording of the standard and that more is involved than a single party's misreading of clear regulatory language. If the contractor's interpretation were the only acceptable interpretation, approximately 700,000 Nissan vehicles produced as far back as 1983 could be implicated (see Attachment).

Response 5 in the Attachment lists additional vehicle/tire combinations where Nissan's specified tire pressure differs from that determined under the contractor's procedure. Nissan is now conducting additional tests to verify that these tires will su pport higher test loads. We expect that the results of this testing will demonstrate that the tires used on Nissan's vehicles have

sufficient load capacity to support their share of the vehicles' GAWR at the recommended inflation pressures. The procedure being followed involves testing the tires to FMVSS 109 procedures, but increasing test loads by multiplying them by an overload f actor. The overload factor is calculated by multiplying the GAWR by 0.5 and dividing the product obtained by the tires' load rating at the pressure shown on the vehicle's tire label (calculated according to NHTSA's contractor's procedure, i.e., using th e 1.1 factor).

The results of this testing should be available by January 31st. However, one of the affected tires (7.00 x 14) is no longer in production; therefore, a special batch of those tires is being produced. The test results for this one tire size should b e available by mid-February.

Nissan wishes to work cooperatively with NHTSA to resolve this matter. However, we believe that the language of section 5.3.5 does not clearly provide a basis for finding the 1989 Nissan truck to be in noncompliance, or for conducting a notification a nd remedy campaign under the the Safety Act.

We request that NHTSA consider the issues raised above and the results of our ongoing testing, and that the Agency concur that the Nissan vehicles comply with FMVSS 120. We request the opportunity to meet with you after you have considered the matter s raised in this letter, so that we can answer any questions you may have and discuss a resolution of the matter.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Kazuo Iwasaki of my staff, at 202/466-5284.

Sincerely,

ENC.

ID: nht90-1.18

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: January 18, 1990

FROM: Robert E. Meadows -- Engineering Manager, Wayne Corporation

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 1-8-90 from R. Marion to C. Karl; Also attached to memo dated 11-28-8? from C. Karl to All School Bus LCR II's; Also attached to letter dated 11-27-90 from P.J. Rice to C. Karl (A36; Std. 217); Also attached to letter d ated 12-7-82 from F. Berndt to M.B. Mathieson; Also attached to letter dated 1-29-90 from C. Karl to M. Shaw (OCC 4403)

TEXT:

This certifies that Accessories KE06-08 and ME06-01, Vandal Locks, meet all requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 217, and Minnesota and Iowa standards.

The above options are comprised of:

1. A key lock for the front door

2. A rear slide bolt on the rear door (no rear key is required), hooked into starter interlock system so that the engine cannot be started 3. A buzzer in the driver's area tied in with the interlock that would warn the driver if anyone was trying to lock the door after the engine was started The above systems have been used by Wayne Corporation since 1977.

ID: nht90-1.19

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 01/19/90

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA

TO: LINDA L. CONRAD -- NIVES FORD, INC.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED AUGUST 17, 1989 TO S. WOOD, NHTSA, FROM L. CONRAD, NIVES FORD, INC., ATTACHED; [OCC-3863]

TEXT: This responds to your letter asking what legal obligations are imposed on car dealers to replace air bags on used vehicles accepted as trade-ins. Your letter explained that your dealership has received, as a trade-in, a 1989 car that had a driver-side a ir bag as original equipment. According to your letter, the car had been in a crash and the air bag was deployed. Hence, when this car was taken in trade by your dealership, its air bag was not functional. You asked whether any law requires you to rep lace the deployed air bag with a new air bag before selling the car.

In response to your question, we can advise you as follows: (1) Federal law does not require a car dealer to replace a deployed air bag in a used vehicle; (2) a dealer may be required by State law to replace that equipment, or be liable for failure to do so; and (3) our agency strongly encourages dealers to replace deployed air bags whenever vehicles are repaired or resold, to ensure that the vehicles will continue to provide maximum crash protection for occupants.

We will first address the Federal legal issues, since our agency administers the Federal vehicle safety law. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act; 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.) authorizes this agency to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA has exercised this authority to issue Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR @ 571.208). Among other things, Standard No. 208 requires that cars be equipped with automatic crash protection. "Automatic crash protection" means that a vehicle is equipped with occupant restraints that require no action by vehicle occupants. The performance of automatic crash protection is dynamically tested, th at is, the automatic systems are required to comply with certain injury reduction criteria as measured by test dummies in a barrier crash test at speeds up to 30 mph. The requirement for automatic crash protection was phased-in for passenger cars, begin ning with 1987

model year new cars. That phase-in is now completed, and a passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1989 are required to be equipped with automatic crash protection.

Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) specifies that, "No person shall manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or import into the United States, any motor veh icle or item of motor vehicle equipment manufactured on or after the date any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect under this title unless it is in conformity with such standard . . ." (Emphasis added) Because of this statutory r equirement, your dealership cannot legally sell or offer for sale a new car equipped with an air bag if you know that the air bag has been deployed.

However, section 108(b)(1) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(b)(1)) provides that the prohibitions in section 108(a)(1)(A) "shall not apply to the sale, offer for sale, or the introduction or delivery for introduction in interstate commerce of any motor vehicle after the first purchase of it in good faith for purposes other than resale." In other words, once the 1989 Chrysler LeBaron described in your letter was sold and delivered to its first retail purchaser, the vehicle was no longer required by Fede ral law to comply with Standard No. 208.

After the first purchase of a vehicle in good faith for purposes other than resale, the only provision in Federal law that affects a vehicle's continuing compliance with an applicable safety standard is set forth in section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)). That section provides that:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle . . . in compliance with an applicable Federal motor veh icle safety standard, unless such manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business reasonably believes that such vehicle . . . will not be used (other than for testing or similar purposes in the course of maintenance or repair) during the time such device or element of design is rendered inoperative.

In the case of passenger cars equipped with air bags pursuant to Standard No. 208, this section would prohibit any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business from removing, disabling, or otherwise "rendering inoperative" the air bags, except a s needed to make repairs to the car. When any such repairs are completed, the car must be returned to the customer with the air bag capable of functioning at least as well as it was able to do when the car was received by the manufacturer, distributor, dealer or repair business. Any violations of this "render inoperative" prohibition in the Safety Act would subject the violator to a potential civil penalty of up to $ 1,000 for each violation.

Please note that the "render inoperative" provision does not impose an affirmative duty on dealers to replace equipment that was previously removed by someone else, or to repair equipment that was damaged in a crash. Thus, if your dealership purchases a used car that was originally equipped with an air bag pursuant to Standard No. 208, and the air bag was deployed before your dealership took possession of the car, Federal law does not require your dealership to replace the deployed air bag with a funct ioning air bag before you resell the car.

Despite the absence of any requirement in Federal law, dealers may still be required by State law to replace deployed air bags, or they may be liable for failing to do so. You should be aware that the individual States have authority to require that use d vehicles have certain equipment installed and functioning when the used vehicles are sold. You may wish to contact the State of Illinois to learn if there are any applicable laws or regulations that would apply in these circumstances. Additionally, y ou may wish to consult a private attorney familiar with the law in the State of Illinois regarding potential liability in tort for your dealership in these circumstances. While such issues are beyond this agency's area of legal expertise, we do note tha t every State provides for some degree of civil liability for consumer products and repair work. The potential for finding a car dealer liable may be greater when that dealer sells a used vehicle without one of the originally-installed safety systems in tact and functional.

As a final note, and in addition to the legal considerations, it is NHTSA's strong policy recommendation that dealers always replace air bags following deployment, unless the vehicle is to be junked. Indeed, we have long recommended the repair, restorat ion, or replacement of all safety systems that may have been damaged in a crash, including the safety belts and brakes, as well as the air bag systems now being installed in passenger cars.

While air bags are in some respects "supplemental" to safety belts, in that the air bags provide additional protection, the air bags are nevertheless vitally important to the vehicle's overall capability to protect occupants in a crash. Those vehicles ar e designed so that the air bag will always work, even if the safety belt is not worn; and the safety belt system is designed to work in conjunction with the air bag in serious frontal crashes. Additionally, the consumer information available to the purc haser of the used car described in your letter -- in the vehicle owner's manual, from the carmaker and insurance companies, and from NHTSA and other safety groups -- would identify the car as one equipped with a driver-side air bag. The purchaser may we ll expect a used car to provide the safety equipment that was provided by the original manufacturer.

In short, from the standpoints of auto safety, dealer risk management, consumer protection, customer relations, and good business practices, NHTSA strongly advocates the replacement of deployed air bags.

I hope this information is useful. If you have any further questions or need additional information on this subject, please feel free to contact Steve Kratzke of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht90-1.2

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 01/01/90 EST

FROM: DAVID R. MARTIN

TO: NHTSA OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 05/17/90 FROM STEPHEN D. WOOD -- NHTSA TO DAVID R. MARTIN; REDBOOK A35; STANDARD 301; STANDARD 217

TEXT: I have which to me, is a very urgent and important question. To preface my question, I'd like to tell you that I was in the Navy in the early 1940's and was aboard a ship that exploded, and burned fiercely when strucks by a tarpedo.

Unfortunately, at the present time, I'm in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections, the reason for which I do not believe is pertenant to my question.

The Department of Corrections operates a huge fleet of vans. The inmates of the system, when transported in these vans, rear handcuffs, waist-chains, and leg-irons. The vans themselves have steel mesh welded to all the windows, and a steel mesh part ition between the passenger compartment and the driver area. The vans are also padlocked from the outside, when in transit.

Having had first hand experience with a fuel (Illegible Word) fire, I am wondering how could the compliance by the department of Corrections with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 301 be ascertained? Is thero any way that your department can verify compliance?

I would appreciate your checking this out for me, and advising me as to your findings. (Illegible Lines)

ID: nht90-1.20

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 01/22/90

FROM: Stephen P. Wood -- NHTSA Acting Chief Counsel

TO: Mark F. Holmes

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: 1/1/90 (est.) letter from Mark F. Holmes to Stephen P. Wood (OCC 4210)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Holmes:

This is in reply to your recent undated letter, responding to our letter of October 31, 1989, with respect to your Strobalarm lighting device.

In that letter, we advised you that the clearance avoidance portion of the Strobalarm appeared intended to serve as a center highmounted stop lamp, and that under Standard No. 108, that lamp could not be combined with any other lamp or reflective device. Your recent letter and diagrams enclosed with it indicate that the strobe alarm and its LCD display "is wired and housed separately and functions independently from the collision avoidance light." However, your diagrams do not indicate the orientation of the device when installed. Further, your description is unclear. You state that the base will fit in front of the collision avoidance lamp, but you don't state whether the "front" of the lamp is the side nearest the front of the vehicle, or the side emitting light to the rear of the vehicle).

Nevertheless, your remarks do clearly respond to our earlier concern about combinations. Further, you have stated that the alarm and LED portion of the lamp will operate only when the vehicle is at rest, and not at times that the collision avoidance lam p is in operation. It therefore appears that installation and use of this device, as you have described it, would not violate any Federal regulation.

We note the comment in your enclosure that the device "has been designed to meet the department of transportation (lighting division) standards and regulations". This is somewhat inaccurate as there are no Federal specifications for the device to meet, o nly prohibitions to avoid. Thus, we believe it would be more accurate to say that the device "has been designed not to conflict with standards and regulations of the U.S. Department of Transportation."

Sincerely,

ID: nht90-1.21

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: JANUARY 23, 1990

FROM: GEORGE F. BALL -- GM LEGAL STAFF

TO: STEPHEN P. WOOD, ESQ. -- ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 2-27-90 TO GEORGE F. BALL FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD; (A35; STD. 201; PART 571.3

TEXT: General Motors Corporation is writing to obtain your interpretation of the scope and coverage of Standard 201 (49 CFR 571.201) as it applies to "interior compartment doors," and your interpretation of the definition of "interior compartment door," which is contained in 49 CFR 571.3.

General Motors plans to offer a convenience feature in one of its car lines planned for Model Year 1991. It is requested that the design details of the feature and the car line for which it is intended be treated by NHTSA as confidential business inform ation, as the information relates to a product plan for a specific model that is not yet publicly available. However, for purposes of this interpretation, the feature can be described generally as a cupholder permanently installed in the console assembl y between the driver and right front passenger. The cupholder assembly includes a pivot, which allows the cupholder to recess into the console when it is not needed. When the cupholder is recessed, the bottom face of the cupholder assembly is flush wit h the console assembly.

We are seeking your concurrence with our interpretation that the bottom face of the cupholder is not covered by @ 3.3 of FMVSS 201 because it is not an "interior compartment door" as defined by Part 571.3.

Part 571.3 provides:

Interior compartment door means any door in the interior of the vehicle installed by the manufacturer as a cover for storage space normally used for personal effects.

When the bottom of the cupholder is facing the driver and passenger (which is the only configuration it could be thought of as a cover), there is no storage space for personal effects. Thus, applying the language of the definition, the underside of the cupholder cannot be considered an "interior compartment door" because it is not "installed by the manufacturer as a cover for storage space normally used for personal effects."

Furthermore, General Motors believes this feature does not pose a hazard to occupants in crashes and is consistent with NHTSA's occupant protection interests. The purpose of the standard is to reduce the potential for injury from the interior surfaces o f the passenger compartment by encouraging the use of energy absorbing materials, rounded edges on exposed surfaces and similar designs. In its January 1988 evaluation of Standard 201, NHTSA describes the standard as:

". . . the synthesis of occupant compartment geometry, energy absorbing materials on the interior surfaces of the compartment and the integrity and controlled crush of the entire vehicle structure. It is all the parts of a vehicle - other than the re straint system - which, if well designed, combine to make the occupant compartment a potentially safe environment even in a severe crash."

(NHTSA Technical Report evaluating Standard 201, January 1988, DOT HS 807 203, page xv)

In the evaluation, NHTSA concluded that Standard 201 has been successful in improving the safety of the instrument panel, particularly for the right front passenger. NHTSA noted that much of the safety improvement is attributable to design changes made voluntarily by the manufacturers in areas not directly regulated by Standard 201, but which incorporate the instrument panel modifications contemplated by the Standard (such as use of energy absorbing materials).

Consistent with this observation, General Motors has incorporated the goals of Standard 201 in the design of the cupholder. For example, it is constructed of energy absorbing material, and with 1/8" radii on the cupholder corners facing the vehicle occu pant so as to prevent contact with sharp edges. General Motors notes that its cupholder, when in view, presents (in theory) no greater hazard than cupholders designed to be permanently fixed in place in a vehicle's console which would be allowed by FMVS S 201. In this connection, General Motors is not aware of any formal concerns expressed by NHTSA about the safety of permanently fixed cupholders. Additionally, inasmuch as the cupholder rotation is controlled by a viscous drive mechanism, it takes app roximately 3.5 seconds to open, which is substantially longer than the fraction of a second duration of an impact. This slow opening rate would negate concerns about the cupholder "flying open and striking an occupant in a crash." (See NHTSA 1/31/86 Let ter to Russ Bomhoff.)

Moreover, a review of the history of the "interior compartment door" provision of Standard 201 has persuaded General Motors that the standard was not intended to cover the bottom face of its cupholder.

When NHTSA (then the National Highway Safety Bureau) proposed to regulate the performance of glove compartment doors in 1967 (revised later in 1967 to read "interior compartment doors"), the agency received numerous public comments regarding the scope of the Standard. Many auto manufacturers and their trade associations pointed out that there was no definition of "interior compartment door" in the proposal, leading to the possible inclusion of such features as ash tray doors or covers for spare tire co mpartments. The Automobile Manufacturers Association (the predecessor to the MVMA) offered a suggested definition of "interior compartment door" which was intended to "ensure that interior compartment door assemblies not intended to come within the scop e of the Standard were not inadvertently included" in the Standard's coverage. The proposed AMA definition attempted to clarify the Standard's coverage by focusing on whether the "interior compartment door" was intended as a "closure for stowage space i ntended for personal belongings."

Although several commenters (including California Highway Patrol, the Vehicle Equipment Safety Commission and the State of Illinois) urged that the Standard should cover ash trays and other such compartments, the preamble to the final rule in October 196 8 agreed that interior compartments such as ash trays and spare tire covers were not included in the Standard's coverage. The Agency adopted a variation of the industry association definition, asserting that "it was not intended that ash receivers and s pare tire compartment doors in station wagons be included in the Standard and a definition has been added to clarify the application of the Standard." (33 Fed. Reg. 15794, Oct. 25, 1968). Indeed, NHTSA/NHSB's acknowledgement in the preamble to the final rule that ash trays and spare tire compartment doors were never intended to be covered by the Standard confirms that NHTSA/NHSB was not concerned with every item that may open in the occupant compartment; rather, NHTSA/NHSB was concerned with those door s (primarily, but not limited to, glove box doors) which could themselves induce injury during a crash.

The NHTSA has had few opportunities to interpret the definition of "interior compartment door" or the pertinent provisions of Standard 201; however, those which do exist support our conclusion that the design in question is not covered. One such interpr etation was issued to Russ Bomhoff of Precision Pattern, Inc. on January 31, 1986, and concluded that fold-down tables mounted in seat backs and doors are not "interior compartment doors," presumably because they are not covers for any storage space.

A July 3, 1984 interpretation to Bruce Henderson of Automobile Importers of America concluded that a fuse box cover was also beyond the purview of Standard 201, stating that: "The definition [of interior compartment door] is meant to include such storage areas as

the "glovebox" which has a larger door which could fly open i crash, and not a portion of the vehicle's electrical system such as a fuse box, which is not used as storage space."

In an August 21, 1985, interpretation to Mazda, the Agency found an interior compartment door in connection with an expandable magazine rack; this interpretation is distinguishable because both Mazda and the Agency concluded that the magazine rack was st orage space for personal effects.

In conclusion, after a review of the Standard, its regulatory history and applicable interpretations, General Motors concludes that the new design does not constitute an "interior compartment door" within the meaning of FMVSS 201 and its associated defin ition. We respectfully request your concurrence with this conclusion by March 1.

ID: nht90-1.22

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 01/25/90

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA

TO: LARRY S. SNOWHITE, ESQ. -- MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY AND POPEO, P.C.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED JULY 27, 1989 TO STEPHEN WOOD, NHTSA, FROM LARRY SNOWHITE, MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY AND POPEO, ATTACHED; [OCC - 3763]

TEXT: This replies to your letters asking for a determination "that the sale into the aftermarket as well as aftermarket installation of the Advanced Brake Light Device ('ABLD') . . . would not violate" any of this agency's statutes or regulations.

As you have described it, the ABLD "consists of a sensor attached to the accelerator pedal that senses the rate at which the foot releases the accelerator pedal. This signal is sent to a processor unit, which determines whether the brake lights should b e turned on, and the duration of the illumination until the brake is applied. The ABLD is set so that the brake light will go off unless the brake is applied within one second of the ABLD's activation . . . ." You believe that this avoids providing a mi sleading signal. You further indicate the manufacturer's willingness to alter the time interval if NHTSA's favorable opinion is required for it.

You have not defined the term "aftermarket", but we shall assume that you mean sales to vehicle owners of equipment for installation on their vehicles (as contrasted with sales to dealers for installation on new vehicles before their delivery). There is no Federal motor vehicle safety standard that applies to the system described in your letter. This means that there are no Federal restrictions upon the importation, manufacture, or sale of the ABLD. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (specifically, 15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)), as you surmise, modifications to vehicles by a person other than the vehicle owner are permissible as long as they do not "render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device . . . installed on . . . a motor vehicle . . . in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . . ."

The essential question then is whether the installation of the ABLD renders partially or wholly inoperative the vehicle's stop lamps. As you know, in our interpretations on lighting equipment, we have noted a close relationship between the statute's ren dering inoperative prohibition for

the aftermarket with the standard's impaired effectiveness prohibition for supplementary original equipment. Primarily, maintaining that relationship is done in order to avoid regulatory inconsistency with interpretations under which installation of an item of aftermarket equipment might be deemed acceptable under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, while its installation as original equipment would violate Standard No. 108.

There are two types of supplementary original, or aftermarket, lighting equipment: those that operate independently of the lighting equipment that Standard No. 108 requires, and those that operate in connection with that equipment. A separate red rear f og lamp would be an example of the former. The ABLD is an example of the latter, because it has a direct effect upon the operation of the stop lamp.

An aftermarket device that has an effect upon the operation of required lighting equipment cannot be deemed permissible unless that effect is consistent with the operation and purpose of the required equipment. As you stated, the SAE defines a stop lamp as one whose function indicates "the intention of the operator of a vehicle to stop or diminish speed by braking". You have argued that "The ABLD is consistent because it "clearly and unambiguously indicates" an operator's intent to apply the brake. Y our client, however, does not make that claim for the ABLD; it concedes that "there will be circumstances in which the brake will not be engaged after the ABLD is activated."

The heart of our concern is that while the standard requires the stop lamp to operate in only one particular circumstance, the ABLD causes the stop lamp to operate at an earlier time when the lamp is supposed to be unlighted. Further, the ABLD's activat ion of the stop lamp indicates only that the operator has released the accelerator. It does not necessarily follow that the brake pedal will later be applied. Under this fact situation, the stop lamps fulfill a purpose other than for which they are ins talled. This can only create the potential for confusion and dilution of the effectiveness of the stop signal. For the reasons stated above, we have concluded that installation of the ABLD in the aftermarket would render the stop lamps partially inopera tive. Because this conclusion does not depend upon whether the ABLD would be acceptable using the different parameters of performance to which it is apparently capable of being adjusted, there appears to be no reason to discuss this matter with you befo re completion of this interpretation, which would further delay our response.

We would like to discuss several other points. You have stated that "Illuminations of the brake lights for one second or less occur frequently during normal driving without the ABLD", and have sought to allay our concerns with the manufacturer's willing ness to reduce the stop lamp activation time from one second to something less if that is required for a favorable interpretation. You have also provided information that the ABLD comes into operation only when the foot is released from the pedal at a ra te consistent with an intent to apply the brake, as in an emergency situation.

While we appreciate these arguments, we do not find them persuasive. The short periods of illumination to which you refer are occasioned by application of the brake pedal, no matter how brief that application is. The offer to reduce the activation time of the ABLD if it is not followed by a brake application would reduce but not eliminate stop lamp activation for purposes other than to indicate a stop or diminished speed. As for foot-movement time, there appears to be no indication in the University of Michigan study that you submitted that the ABLD was activated in traffic emergencies. The foot-movement time measurements seem consistent with removal of the foot from the accelerator under ordinary traffic situations, and thus there should have been no instances of ABLD activation.

Your most recent letter contained a copy of a report of an independent field study of the ABLD in Israel, which "found that rear-end accidents were reduced by 75 percent." However, the report states that the ABLD-equipped vehicles ("except a few") were a lso equipped with center high-mounted stop lamps. Since any reductions in rear-end accidents that were experienced by the test fleets cannot be attributed solely to the ABLD, the data must be viewed as inconclusive.

The acceptability for use of the ABLD must also be determined under the laws of the individual States. We are unable to advise you on these laws, and suggest that you get in touch with the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) for further advice. Its address is 4600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22203.

ID: nht90-1.23

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: January 25, 1990

FROM: James R. Mitzenberg -- Project Engineer, The Flxible Corporation

TO: Steven P. Wood -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 9-26-90 from P.J. Rice to J.R. Mitzenberg (A36; Std. 108)

TEXT:

The Flxible Corporation is a city transit bus manufacturer and requests an interpretation concerning FMVSS 108, "Lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment".

An air brake system is used on our bus. As the driver starts to apply the service brake pedal to stop the bus, a service brake stop lamp switch is activated. The stop lamp switch is installed to comply with Section S5.1.7 of FMVSS 121, "Air brake syste ms". The stop lights are activated by the stop lamp switch.

The Flxible Corporation offers an optional transmission retarder for supplemental braking, to increase brake lining life. This retardation is over and above the normal service brake system. The transmission retarder is electrically operated during the initial travel of the service brake pedal. As the service brake pedal is further depressed, air is emitted from the brake valve and the service brakes are activated.

A ruling is requested on whether a non-compliance with Section S4.5.4 of FMVSS 108 would result, if the stop lamps were activated by engagement of the retarder, prior to the activation of the service brakes. Section S4.5.4 states: "The stop lamps on eac h vehicle shall be activated upon application of the service brakes". The driver is depressing the service brake pedal to stop or slow down the vehicle. However, if the stop lights are activated by the retarder, the stop lights could be illuminated wit hout the service brakes actually being applied during that initial travel of the service brake pedal, and up until the point in time air is actually emitted from the brake pedal and into the service brake system.

ID: nht90-1.24

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 01/26/90

FROM: Stephen P. Wood -- NHTSA Acting Chief Counsel

TO: John G. Sims -- Governmental Affairs Champion Motor Coach, Inc.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER FROM JOHN, G. SIMS -- CHAMPION MOTOR COACH INC. DATED 11/06/89 TO ROBERT F. HELLMUTH -- NHTSA; RE FMVSS 217; REFERENCE NO NEF-31 RSH; CIR 2996

TEXT: Dear Mr. Simms:

This responds to your November 6, 1989 letter to Robert Hellmuth, Director of NHTSA's Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC). In that letter, you stated that OVSC had misinterpreted and misapplied the requirements of S5.5.1 and S5.5.2 of Standard No . 217, Bus Window Retention and Release (49 CFR @ 571.217). I conclude that OVSC correctly interpreted those sections of Standard No. 217 and correctly applied those sections to your company's buses.

The buses in question are not school buses and have a gross vehicle weight rating of more than 10,000 pounds. For such buses, section S5.5.1 of Standard No. 217 provides that: " . . . each emergency door shall have the designation 'Emergency Door' or 'E mergency Exit' . . . followed by concise operating instructions describing each motion necessary to unlatch and open the exit, located within 6 inches of the release mechanism."

Your company has designated the door immediately adjacent to the driver's seating position in these buses as an emergency exit. Operating instructions for that emergency exit are located within 6 inches of the release mechanism. However, the designation of this door as an emergency exit appears on a label located on a stanchion immediately behind the driver's seat, facing the passenger seating area. This designation does not appear within 6 inches of the release mechanism. You suggest that this arran gement complies with Standard No. 217, because S5.5.1 requires only the operating instructions, and not the emergency exit designation, to be located within 6 inches of the release mechanism.

I disagree with your suggestion. While it might be possible to construe the language of S5.5.1 in the manner you suggest, the agency has consistently interpreted S5.5.1 as requiring that both the emergency exit designation and the operating instructions be located within 6 inches of the release mechanism. Nothing in the correspondence you refer to undermines this conclusion.

2

Contrary to the assertion in your letter, there is a clear safety basis for requiring the emergency exit designation to be within 6 inches of the emergency exit release mechanism. This ensures that any person reaching the exit can quickly find both the release mechanism and the instructions. In an emergency, persons are used to finding an emergency exit where they see a label with the designation "Emergency Exit." In your company's buses, a person seeing the emergency exit label located on the driver' s seat stanchion could be misled into thinking that there is an exit somewhere behind the driver's seat, rather than at the driver's door, thus wasting valuable escape time. This is exactly the type of situation S5.5.1 is intended to prevent.

Your letter also suggests that requiring the emergency exit designation within 6 inches of the release mechanism would substantially reduce the visibility of the emergency exit sign, since the operating mechanism is frequently located below the shoulder level of seated passengers. While this may be true in some cases, I do not believe it would be likely to impede emergency egress. In an emergency situation, the occupants of the seat adjacent to the exit are likely to be the first ones out of the exit, and would thus no longer impede the visibility of the exit designation for other passengers seeking to exit.

We are only focusing on the designation here. Also, once it is open, the instructions aren't needed.

Your letter also suggests that the emergency exit requirements for school buses, contained in S5.5.3, support your interpretation of S5.5.1, because the school bus emergency exit requirements specifically authorize the separation of the emergency exit de signation and operating instructions. I must again disagree with you on this point. NHTSA recognized the considerable differences between school buses and other buses when Standard No. 217 was being developed. S5.5.3 addresses a very different set of circumstances. School buses typically have one emergency door, located at or near the rear of the bus. The requirement in S5.5.3 that the designation be in letters at least two inches high "at the top of or directly above the emergency exit" is designe d to ensure that school bus passengers will be able to locate this exit from any seating position in the bus. This is not the case for your company's buses, which feature several window exits located throughout the bus, in addition to the exit at issue here.

The second issue raised in your letter concerns the requirements of S5.5.2 of Standard No. 217. That section requires that emergency exit "markings" be visible to occupants in specified locations, under lighting and occupant visual acuity conditions set forth in S5.5.2. You suggested that the emergency exit "markings" referenced in S5.5.2 refers only to the designation of an exit as an emergency exit, and not to the operating instructions for that emergency exit. I disagree with this suggestion as wel l.

3

As we noted earlier, S5.5.1 sets forth requirements for both emergency exit designations and emergency exit operating instructions. Immediately following these requirements, S5.5.2 specifies that "each marking shall be legible . . ." (emphasis added). S5.5.2 nowhere draws any distinction between markings designating an exit as an emergency exit and markings setting forth operating instructions for the emergency exit. Neither is any such distinction inherent in the use of the term "marking." According ly, the ordinary meaning of the term "marking" and the background of this regulatory provision show that as used in S5.5.2, the word "markings" refers to both the emergency exit designation and the emergency exit operating instructions required by S5.5.1 .

If you have any further questions concerning these issues, please feel free to contact David Greenburg of this office at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,