ID: nht76-5.47

DATE: 11/10/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R. L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: Department of California Highway Patrol

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Thank you for your August 12 and September 28, 1976, letters to our Office of Standards Enforcement concerning possible noncompliance of certain air-braked school buses with Standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems. At issue is the functioning of a "double check valve" between the two tanks of an air brake system designed to meet S5.7.2 of the standard (as it was in effect prior to September 1, 1976). The valve serves to provide air pressure from either supply reservior to hold off the spring brakes while guarding the air brake system from air loss through either one of the reservoirs. The identified problem stems from construction or installation of the valve such that it does not necessarily operate to seal off the brake system from a loss of air in one of the tanks, permitting loss of air from both reservoirs unless the rate of air loss is substantial. Your letter advises that the State of California is permitting the continued operation of the school buses in question pending receipt of a response from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).

I would like to address the findings you raise in the order in which they are listed on page two of your letter. I interpret your first finding to be that the "split system" designs used in compliance with Standard No. 121 may be incapable of meeting the stopping distance requirements set forth in S5.7.2. You question whether S5.7.2 adequately specifies a "back up" braking capability that is not cancelled out by a single failure of air pressure components, citing cases where a substantial rate of loss from one tank (introduced as a failure in accordance with S5.7.2.3) draws down the air pressure in both halves of a split system.

The general requirement of S5.7.2.3 (of the now superseded text) is that the vehicle, in one out of six attempts under specified conditions, must be capable of stopping from 60 mph within a distance of 613 feet "with a single failure in the service brake system of a part designed to contain compressed air or brake fluid. . . ." To provide this performance (and meet the other requirements of S5.7.2) manufacturers have provided "split systems" modulated by the service brake control. As a matter of general compliance with this requirement, you have asked if any single failure (other than failure of common components) can be introduced into the system as a test of its compliance. The answer to your question is yes. The NHTSA does not know the basis of Ford Motor Company's contention that the "failure" introduced in the system must be at least 50 psi/min from an initial reservoir pressure of 120 psi.

A noncompliance with S5.7.2.3 occurs only if the vehicle, with the failure introduced, is incapable of stopping within the prescribed distance in one out of six attempts. Thus, an extremely small failure which is easily overcome by compressor pressure would be one way of testing for compliance with S5.7.2.3, but it would not, in all likelihood, result in the demonstration of a noncompliance. As you noted in the second paragraph of page 3 of your letter, a noncompliance with stopping distance requirements may depend (largely because of a compressor's ability to overcome air loss) on the rate of leakage introduced and the time allowed between introduction of the failure and application of the emergency brake. The standard does not (except for the provision of S6.1.14 for towing vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1976) provide detailed specification of procedures, particularly the time between failure and brake application. The agency therefore must utilize a reasonable procedure that does not unfairly test the system. In this case, the agency considers the introduction of any size leak, followed by brake application as soon as the low pressure warning activates, to be a reasonable procedure, approximating what would occur in the event of actual failure on the highway. The agency would find a noncompliance with S5.7.2.3 if the school buses are incapable of stopping within the required distance when the described procedure is followed.

Your second finding is that a particular double check valve installation can cause noncompliance with S5.7.2.3. Consistent with our general discussion of compliance with S5.7.2.3, stopping tests are the means to discover whether the buses in question comply. We are analyzing your data, and a noncompliance investigation has been opened. We have notified Ford Motor Company of its commencement. We have also forwarded data to our Office of Defects Investigation to see if the check valve problem constitutes a safety-related defect apart from the issue of compliance.

Your last three findings address the separate question of whether the concept of a split system is adequately interfaced with the parking brake requirements of Standard No. 121. First you make the general point that, if S5.7.2.3 permits a substantial loss of air from both sides of a split system, the benefit of redundant lines is negated and the split system requirement is unjustified. The agency understands your position and believes that a stricter control on the amount of permissible leakage (perhaps by means of a limitation on compressor replenishment or a longer period before emergency brake application) may be justified. Particularly important is your point that a compressor loses capability as it grows older, and that this is not accounted for in new-vehicle tests. At the same time, however, larger failures do occur and we continue to view the split system as extremely important for these cases. The split system provides extremely good protection against failures such as rupture of a line or brake chamber diaphragm.

With regard to your point that split systems do not guard against failure of components common to the two systems as they are presently constructed (such as the compressor drive belt), I must agree with your point that no brake system can guard against every conceivable failure completely. It is for these cases, in fact, that the agency considers the automatic application of the parking brake system beneficial following loss of the other two capabilities.

You make the further point that, in cases of marginal compliance (i.e., the compressor can replace most but not all air loss from both sides of the split system), the gradual loss of system pressure permits parking brake application that interferes with modulation of the emergency capability. While S5.7.2 was designated as "Modulated emergency braking system", no specification for modulation was set forth in its requirements. The agency intended that a system conforming to S5.7.2 would be controlled by the driver instead of by automatic application. Our review of the systems you tested indicates that they are "modulated systems" as contemplated by the agency.

The present emergency brake requirements only state that the system "be applied and released, and be capable of modulation, by means of the service brake control." While further specification of this requirement may be in order, I believe it is the early application of the parking brake that actually concerns you, as it affects the application and release of the emergency braking capability.

You make the observation that early application of the spring brakes in response to air pressure loss permits them to drag, become overheated, and fade, making them useless before they can be utilized. A related issue is that the spring brakes will apply shortly after emergency brake availability (even before activation of the low air pressure warning), immobilizing the vehicle with no capability to release the parking brakes. You suggest implementation of a parking brake arrangement that would keep the spring brakes off longer or provide an isolated source of air pressure to permit their release when they do lock up.

Analysis of your test reports leads me to agree that some specification to limit the early application of spring brakes would be in order. Of course, as you are well aware, notice to interested persons of any change in the standard is required, along with an opportunity for comment. I believe that such rulemaking could be joined with the earlier rulemaking undertaken in response to a California Highway Patrol (CHP) petition (Docket 75-16, Notice 04).

Your final point is that, as long as early application of the parking brake is permissible, an isolated tank of air should be available to permit release of the parking brake from the driver's position. With regard to an isolated tank, the NHTSA continues to maintain its view set forth in our November 29, 1974, letter to Donald Gibson of the CHP that the second side of the split system provides more capability than the old systems (with an isolated tank) to avoid a lockup following a service brake failure. However, you have clearly demonstrated that the capability can be essentially negated by early application of the parking brake. I believe that limitations on early application of the parking brake would be a superior correction to the problem than the addition of more components (and complexity) to the existing systems.

Because school buses are involved in the problems you cite, you are no doubt aware that @ 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, while preemptive of State regulations or laws of general applicability that are not identical to Federal standards on the same aspect of performance, does not prevent a State or political subdivision from specifying a higher level of brake performance in vehicles "procured for its own use." Thus, the State of California may wish to order school buses with the additional isolated reservoir that you have recommended. The addition of a third tank to a system that complies with the standard's requirements would not be prevented by @ 103(d).

I appreciate the constructive approach being pursued by the State of California in enforcement of Standard No. 121. Our Office of Standards Enforcement will keep you advised of the results of its investigation.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL

September 28, 1976 File No.: 1.A218.A3107

Francis Armstrong -- Office of Standards Enforcement, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Mr. Armstrong:

In this Department's letter of August 12, 1976, we brought to your attention a problem with the air brakes on school buses built on Ford chassis. We since have allowed the buses to temporarily continue in operation pending a decision by your agency as to their compliance with FMVSS No. 121.

At a meeting on September 2, in Sacramento with engineers from Ford Motor Company and Bendix-Westinghouse, this Department took the position that the Ford system did not operate as required by FMVSS No. 121 and did not protect the brakes against a single failure. Ford contended that the system was safe and complied with FMVSS No. 121. They further were of the opinion that a leak in a hose, fitting, or diaphragm of less than 50 psi/min from an initial reservoir pressure of 120 psi was not a "failure" as contemplated in FMVSS No. 121 and, in any event, could be overcome by the continuous operation of the air compressor.

The matter was pursued in considerable detail with no meeting of minds. It was found that the vehicle manufacturers' conclusions were based solely on laboratory and static tests and that no failures involving a continuous leak had been simulated on a moving vehicle. They were of the opinion that the usual vibration of the moving vehicle might result in the check valve responding more rapidly in normal service than in static tests. Although we believed the buses did not comply with FMVSS No. 121, we did not desire to keep them out of service if it could be reasonably avoided. On the other hand, we did not wish to allow them to operate if they were imminently unsafe, even if they complied with FMVSS No. 121.

We immediately scheduled dynamic tests for the following day to obtain some of the answers. Our investigation showed that the system did not function any better in tests of the moving vehicle than in stationary tests. The same situation was found to exist on other makes of school buses using similar designs. In our opinion, the systems on these buses do not comply with FMVSS No. 121 or are otherwise deficient for the following reasons:

1. It is highly doubtful that the vehicles can meet the emergency stopping distance in FMVSS No. 121 with a single failure in the air system.

2. Some double check valves are so mounted that they shuttle rapidly in one direction and are essentially inoperative in the other direction.

3. The emergency system is not capable of modulation by the service brake control as required by FMVSS No. 121 when loss of air in the service brake reservoirs results in the spring brakes beginning to apply.

4. If the driver does not react rapidly to a low pressure indication, the spring brakes can drag and overheat so as to be ineffective when they are eventually fully applied.

5. Upon failure of a compressor belt, as in the Martinez accident, the depletion of air in the service brake system upon a few brake applications could cause the spring brakes to lock with the vehicle in a hazardous location such as in a tunnel or on railroad tracks.

The results of our tests on Ford, International and Gillig buses are shown in the enclosed report. We found that all of the buses had insensitive double check valves between the primary and secondary split system. Although the buses were released for operation by the school district, we still have serious concern that this type of system does little good as an emergency brake system.

We ask that you give immediate consideration to a recall investigation to determine if air brakes using the double check valve piping system comply with FMVSS No. 121 and have an effectively-operating emergency stopping system. Our request is based on the following observations during our dynamic tests:

1. The double check valves are not sensitive enough to protect one-half of the dual system against either a mild or substantial air leak in the other half. A leak through a broken hose at a brake chamber with either partial or full foot-brake application did not cause the check valve to shuttle. If the vehicle was going downgrade with the brakes applied, the air would leak out of both systems down to the pressure at which the compressor could keep up with the leak. This ineffective dual system is a waste to the bus or truck operator, as he is no better off than with a single system with no double check valve.

2. It appears questionable whether the vehicles will meet the 60 mph, 613-foot stopping test of Section 5.7.1 of FMVSS No. 121 with a leak equal to the maximum before shuttle movement when the reservoir pressure is stabilized at the compressor output volume. If the vehicles in fact meet this performance requirement under these conditions, the "dual" components are a nonfunctional appendage. With this size leak, the pressure in the "protected" system will eventually be no higher than that in the failed system. Passage of the stopping distance test apparently depends entirely on how quickly the brake pedal is applied after the failure is initiated.

3. Double check valves are installed at the factory in mounting positions that interfere with their operation and any effectiveness that they might have. Some valves were installed with the shuttle axis vertical so that a leak needed to shut off air flow to one reservoir is far less than that at which air flow is shut off to the other reservoir. One ball-check valve was mounted at about a 45-degree angle so the ball immediately shut off a very small leak on the down-hill side but would not shut off the maximum leak that we could reproduce on the uphill side. As a vehicle gets older, contaminates and corrosion products in the system could cause the normally inactive double check valve to hang up when most needed. Even in our tests on a comparatively new vehicle, one of the check valves did not operate nearly as well upon the first simulated leak as on subsequent ones.

4. When a leak occurs, both systems drain down to the point where the spring brakes begin to drag just before the low air pressure indicator comes on. If the driver does not react to the signal, the spring brakes drag more and more as the pressure slowly drops, thereby overheating the linings and drums and destroying the effectiveness of the brakes when they finally are completely on.

5. The driver cannot modulate the brakes with a moderate leak in a supply line in either side of the dual system. The air pressure drops to the point where the spring brakes come on, even with no brake application by the driver. He can then apply the brakes harder by the foot valve, but he cannot release them below the force applied by the spring brakes. The FMVSS No. 121 amendments that became effective September 1, 1976, removed all reference to automatic emergency stopping systems which, if used, were previously required to be releasable by the driver after at least one full application. This feature apparently was intended to be taken care of in the current standard by the modulation requirement. In the systems we tested, the spring brakes could automatically apply with no action by the driver and then could not be released by the modulated treadle valve.

We realize that no system can protect against every conceivable possibility and that compromises are necessary because economical protection against one problem may result in an unavoidable creation of a smaller problem. A brake standard cannot meet every need of users and manufacturers under every possible situation, but the standard should be precise enough so users can follow its requirements and are aware of the limited assumptions on which it is based. To this end, we offer the following items that came to light in our tests. If during your investigation, you also find them to be a problem, you might wish to propose solutions to the Office of Crash Avoidance for consideration during the next revision of FMVSS No. 121.

1. Ford Motor Company contended that a leak through a damaged line, hose, diaphragm, etc., was not a "failure" as intended in FMVSS No. 121 unless the line or hose completely severed to produce a pressure drop of at least 50 psi/min from an initial reservoir pressure of 110 psi. We believe a much smaller initial leak of, say, 6 to 10 psi/min should be considered a failure for which the emergency system must compensate. With these differences of opinion, it is essential that the size of leak that constitutes a failure be specifically defined by NHTSA.

2. The stopping distance test conditions of the emergency system should be spelled out in more detail in FMVSS No. 121. The systems we checked would not isolate the protected half of the dual system under the more common failures of hoses and diaphragms. Also, the functioning of the double check valves was dependent upon their mounting position. A manufacturer's test that might be conducted to show compliance with the stopping distance standard with one system completely vented and the other with full air pressure (as would be assumed if the check valve was sensitive) is not realistic.

3. Ford Motor Company contends that their dual system is modulated as required by the standard. We contend that the system is not modulated, or only partially so, when an air leak developes which stabilizes the pressure at less than the 68-psi spring brake initial pressure. The regulation should spell out test conditions sufficient to control the intended degree of modulation.

4. The Ford system depends on compressor output to limit the extent of pressure drop in the system and, consequently, the amount of uncontrolled spring brake application. A new compressor with a 12 cfm rating can, when in good condition, keep up with a considerable air leak, but the emergency stopping system should not be dependent upon this factor. Some compressors are almost too small for some systems and many lose much of their capacity after they are in service over a period of time.

The deficiencies in the present split-air system would not be so important if a protected air tank was added to allow the spring brakes to release after the automatic application that occurs when one leak causes the air to be drained from both systems. The driver would then be able to release the spring brakes to remove the vehicle from a potentially hazardous location. Other modifications might be desirable such as the use of pressure protection valves shown in the enclosed Bendix-Westinghouse school bus system which was developed in accordance with California law a few years back.

I am sure you are aware of the intense national interest in school bus defects since the Martinez charter bus accident in which 29 persons were killed. The news media is sensitive to matters of school bus operation and may request information concerning our evaluation and recommendations to your agency. The possibility of such inquiry provides additional reason for your expeditious review and resolution of this matter.

I urge you to take immediate steps to require air brake systems of the types described in the enclosed report to be redesigned to comply with FMVSS No. 121 and to effectively protect the vehicles against brake failure.

Very truly yours,

G. B. CRAIG -- Commissioner

Enclosures

DEPARTMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL

INSPECTION OF DUAL AIR BRAKE SYSTEMS ON SCHOOL BUSES

ENFORCEMENT SERVICES DIVISION

SEPTEMBER 1976

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT 1 BACKGROUND 1 PROCEDURE 4 TEST RESULTS 4 I. Tests of 1976 Bluebird School Bus on a Ford Chassis 4 II. Tests of 1976 Superior School Bus on a Ford Chassis 6 III. Tests of 1975 Ward School Bus on an International Chassis 8 IV. Tests of 1976 Gillig School Bus 10 DISCUSSION 11 CONCLUSION 14

[REPORT OMITTED]

ID: nht76-5.48

DATE: 09/14/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: R. J. Hurlbutt

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of August 13, 1976, asking whether Federal regulations prohibit the installation, by a dealer, of a rear seat in a 1976 Chevrolet Blazer.

Federal regulations do not prohibit such installation by a dealer. If a dealer installs a seat prior to first purchase of the vehicle, the seat must comply with the performance requirements of Standard No. 207, Seating Systems, 49 CFR 571.207.

In this case, you have already taken possession of your vehicle and desire that the dealer now install the seat. Section 108(a)(2)(A) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1381, et seq.) provides that no manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative any device or element of design installed in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard. This does not prohibit a dealer from installing seats in a vehicle that has already been purchased. It simply means that such installation cannot destroy the vehicle's compliance with any motor vehicle safety standard.

Please contact us if we can be of any further assistance.

SINCERELY,

Hugh Oates, Attorney National Highway Traffic Safety Bureau

August 13, 1976

Ref: motor vehicle seat installation regulations

I would like to thank you for your time and interest during our conversation last week.

On May 10, 1976, I took delivery of my factory order 1976 Chevrolet Blazer. I ordered this vehicle with a rear seat, but the seat was left off the order form by the salesman. I took delivery of the vehicle only on the salesman's assurance that the seat could be ordered and installed at the dealership. Several weeks later, when I went back to check on the progress, I was informed by both salesman and parts manager that it was against Federal Safety Regulations for a dealership to install the seat. The dealer "restated" this position to me again on August 9, 1976. The dealer did, however, offer to help locate a used seat through a salvage yard and install it. I think that you would agree that this is a very confusing situation.

I would request your staff to follow whatever course they deem reasonable. I would also ask for a written opinion from you in regard to the Federal Regulations. I would appreciate this orinion as soon as possible.

Thanking you in advance for your expected help and co-operation, I am, Robert J. Hurlbutte

ID: nht76-5.49

DATE: 04/07/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R. L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: HON. M. L. Esch - H.O.R.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: The Secretary of Transportation has asked me to respond to your March 16, 1976, request for all information submitted to him since December 31, 1975, concerning the safety and economic feasibility of air cushion restraint systems or, in the alternative, the specific basis for withholding particular documents. We interpret your request to include documents submitted to the Office of the Secretary or to the public docket on passive restraints.

All materials concerning the safety and economic feasibility of air cushion systems that have been placed in the public docket are enclosed. These documents include all material on air cushion systems provided to the Assistant Secretary for Systems Development and Technology and to the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Consumer Affairs during their recent visits to General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and Chrysler Corporation. Films submitted to the docket that support this material are available for viewing at your request.

The NHTSA has provided material to the Office of the Secretary that discusses the value of requiring passive restraints in motor vehicles. All of this material consists of intra-agency memoranda that contain the opinions of agency staff on the considerations underlying a decision concerning passive restraints. The preparation of this material involved choosing and weighing data and making certain assumptions. I conclude that it is important to have full and free staff input to this decision-making process. Accordingly, I deny your request for this information pursuant to the exemption in the Freedom of Information Act for intra-agency memoranda (5. U.S.C. @ 552(b)(5)). I am the person responsible for this decision.

Pursuant to the Regulations of the U.S. Department of Transportation (49 CFR 7), this decision, to the extent information you seek is not released, may be appealed to John Hart Ely, Esq., General Counsel of the Department, whose decision will be administratively final. Your application for reconsideration must be made in writing within sixty days from the date of receipt of the original denial and must include all information and arguments relied upon in your original request. Such application must indicate that it is an appeal from a denial of a request made under the Freedom of Information Act and the envelope in which the application is sent must be prominently marked with the letters "FOIA".

Sincerely,

Enclosures

ID: nht76-5.5

DATE: 11/10/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: General Motors Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your September 14, 1976, request for confirmation that seat belt webbing with one woven selvage and one knitted selvage qualifies as "webbing", as that term is defined in paragraph S3 of Safety Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies.

The definition of "webbing" in Standard No. 209 does not specify that selvages must be woven. Rather, the definition only specifies that selvages be "finished", for the purpose of ensuring that the webbing will not ravel. We conclude that the new webbing you submitted, with one woven and one knitted selvage, has "finished selvages" and would qualify as "webbing" within the meaning of Standard No. 209.

ID: nht76-5.50

DATE: 07/01/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; John Womack for F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: ROHR Industries, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to Rohr Industries' April 27, 1976, letter asking how to test an emergency exit that contains no glazing in conformity with the provision of Standard No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release, that specifies testing before and after a window retention test (S5.3.2.). You also ask whether the emergency exit identification requirements of S5.5.1 specify the placement of operating instructions at a designated seating position which does not qualify as an "adjacent seat" under the definition found in S4 of the standard.

The window retention requirement is not required in the case of an emergency exit that contains no glazing. Because this requirement is clearly inapplicable to such an exit, the emergency exit release requirements of S5.3.2 must be met, but without the need to conduct a window retention test.

In answer to your second question, S5.5.1 requires that a label indicating the location of the nearest exit release mechanism be placed at "adjacent seats" to any exit whose release mechanism is not located within the occupant space of that adjacent seat. There are no labeling requirements in S5.5.1 for seating that is not "adjacent" to the exit. As you note, some interior configurations result in seating whose "occupant space" is not within 10 inches of any emergency exit (measured as set forth in S4). Such seating would not have to be labeled with the location of the nearest release mechanism, although some manufacturers do provide this information voluntarily. The agency has evaluated a requirement for this labeling but considers present labelling practices adequate at this time.

SINCERELY,

April 27, 1976

Robert Williams Office of Crashworthiness National Highway Traffic Safety Administration U.S. Department of Transportation

Reference: FMVSS No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release

This letter is forwarded in response to your suggestion made during our telephone conversation of April 15, 1976, during which we discussed the interpretation of certain requirements contained in the referenced FMVSS. Our discussion concerned an emergency roof exit installed in an urban transit bus in accordance with paragraph S5.2.1, since the bus configuration precludes installation of an accessible rear emergency exit.

The roof exit under discussion is not a push-out window. No window glazing is involved. It is of a metal-foam-sandwich construction comparable to the surrounding roof. Paragraph S5.3.2 requires each emergency exit allow manual release of the exit "both before and after the window retention test required by S5.1". Clarification of the application of these window retention tests to the non-glazed roof hatch is requested.

a. Is it required that a non-glazed roof emergency exit be subjected to the window retention test specified by paragraphs S5.1?

b. If testing is required, which of the terminating events in S5.1 are applicable when testing a non-window type exit?

c. If testing is required, must the test be accomplished with the vehicle resting on it's side per Figure 3B, Roof Emergency Exit?

During our phone conversation referenced above, you expressed your unofficial interpretations as being that a non-glazed roof emergency exit would be subject to the release force requirements of the standard but not the retention force requirements or testing under S5.1.

Clarification with respect to emergency exit identification is also requested. Paragraph S5.1 states in part -

". . .When a release mechanism is not located within the occupant space of an adjacent seat, a label meeting the requirements of S5.5.2 that indicates the location of the nearest release mechanism shall be placed within that occupant space."

Paragraph S4 defines an "adjacent seat" and "occupant space" in a manner which indicates that a designated seating position is not to be identified as an "adjacent seat" unless some portion of it's occupant space is not more than ten inches from an emergency exit, for a distance of at least fifteen inches measured horizontally and parallel to the exit. As you know, certain bus seating configurations are such that some designated seating positions are directly adjoining fixed windows/piar panels (non-glazed areas between windows). These fixed (non-push-out) windows and pier panels are not designed as, nor marked as emergency exits. The occupant space of the adjoining designated seating position is not within ten inches of an emergency exit for a distance of at least fifteen inches measured horizontally and parallel to that exit. Therefore, it is our understanding that these seating positions are not, by definition, adjacent seats.

a. Do these non-adjacent seats adjoining a fixed window or a pier panel require emergency exit location referral labelling under the current edition of FMVSS No. 217?

b. If so, which paragraph specifies such a requirement?

c. If not, has such a requirement been considered?

Here also during our phone conversation previously referenced, you expressed an unofficial opinion that these particular seating positions were not covered by labelling requirements. Please confirm.

Your review of and assistance with above will be greatly appreciated.

R. L. Ratz Safety Engineering Specialist

ID: nht76-5.51

DATE: 03/23/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Department of Transportation - New York

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your February 20, 1976, question whether this agency considers Standard No. 222, School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection, preemptive of New York State law or regulations mandating a 28-inch-high seat back and armrests for school bus passenger seating. Section 103(d) provides (15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d)):

@ 103

(d) Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the Federal Government or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof from establishing a safety requirement applicable to motor vehicle equipment procured for its own use if such requirement imposes a higher standard of performance than that required to comply with the otherwise applicable Federal standard.

Standard No. 222 specifies a formula for minimum seat back height that necessitates a height of at least 20 inches. It is the opinion of the NHTSA that any State requirement relating to seat back height, other than one identical to the Federal formula that establishes a minimum height of 20 inches, is preempted under @ 103(d).

The second sentence of @ 103(d) clarifies that the limitation on safety regulations of general applicability does not prevent governmental entities from specifying additional safety features in vehicles purchased for their own use. Thus, New York State or its political subdivisions could specify a seat back height higher than 20 inches in the case of public school buses. The second sentence does not, however, permit these governmental entities to specify safety features that prevent the vehicle or equipment from complying with applicable safety standards. A school bus manufacturer must continue to comply with all applicable standards.

There are presently no requirements in Standard No. 222 dealing with armrests on school bus passenger seating. The question, therefore, becomes whether the Federal safety standards on school bus seating performance were intended generally to cover this aspect of performance, analogously to the situation in which Standard 108 was held to be preemptive in Motorcycle Industry Council v. Younger, No. CIV 574-126 (E. D. Cal. 1974). The guiding rule, as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-142 (1963), is "whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing federal superintendence of the field." Under the accepted doctrines as set forth in cases such as Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969), and Chrysler v. Tofany, 419 F. 2d 499, 511-12 (2d Cir. 1969), the interpretation of this question by the administering agency is "of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."

The NHTSA has determined that the requirement for armrests by New York State does not conflict with or otherwise impair our present regulation of school bus passenger seating, and that armrests are not within the intended scope of the present Federal safety standards. Therefore, Standard No. 222 is not preemptive of the New York State regulation of armrests.

YOURS TRULY,

February 20, 1976

Robert L. Carter Associate Administrator Motor Vehicle Programs National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

In 1974 the New York State Legislature enacted a law that specified that all seats in school buses having a capacity of more than 11 passengers would have to be 28 inches high effective January 1, 1976. Recently the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration announced the adoption of a new Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 222 identified as School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection, and identified it as Section 751.222 of Part 751 of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, to become effective October 26, 1976, which specifies under S5.1.2 that the seat back height must be 20 inches.

It has been called to our attention that under Section 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act that whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard is in effect no state or political subdivision shall have any authority, either to establish or continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. To date we have had differing opinions from representatives of the Federal Department of Transportation as to how we are to interpret this clause. So that we may set the records straight, we would like an official determination from your agency as to whether or not New York State can legally retain the requirement of 28 inch high back seats once the Federal standard dealing with seat back heights becomes effective on October 26, 1976.

Although not specifically addressed in the section dealing with school bus passenger seating and crash protection, we would also like to know whether or not an additional requirement in New York dealing with armrests on all seats in school buses having a seating capacity of more than 11 persons would be considered contrary to the standard. Since the standard does not include provision for armrests, it is possible to interpret it as meaning that armrests are not allowed.

Should you have any question as to what we are attempting to resolve, please feel free to call me on Phone # A.C. 518 - 457-1010, and we would hope to hear from you in the near future as to your reaction to our questions. You can address your reply to Mr. Martin V. Chauvin, Traffic and Safety Division, Department of Transportation, 1220 Washington Avenue, Albany, New York 12232.

WILLIAM G. GALLOWAY, Director Traffic and Safety Division

By

MARTIN V. CHAUVIN, Chief Carrier Safety Bureau

ID: nht76-5.52

DATE: 06/15/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Topeka Metropolitan Transit Authority

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to the Topeka Metropolitan Transit Authority's May 17 and 18, 1976, letters asking whether the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) definition of school bus or its Standard No. 222, School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection, prevent the utilization of transit buses to transport students to and from school. You ask if a proposed amendment to Kansas statutes would conflict with Federal law or regulation if it exempts transit buses from a requirement that school bus seating be forward-facing.

Section 103 (d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Act) (15 U.S.C. @ 1392 (d)) does preempt State motor vehicle safety requirements of general applicability that are not identical to a Federal standard applicable to the same aspect of performance. In this case, the proposed section 10 appears to be identical to S5.1 of Standard No. 222 insofar as it addresses the direction in which school bus seating must face. It is the opinion of the NHTSA that this portion of the proposed section 10 would therefore not be preempted by Standard No. 222.

The second portion of section 10 provides an exception to the requirement for forward-facing seats, and it is the NHTSA's opinion that the exception is preempted insofar as it might apply to school buses purchased by a metropolitan transit authority after the October 26, 1976, effective date of Standard No. 222.

In the case of transit buses "designed and sold for operation as a common carrier in urban transportation," however, the exception does not apply to an aspect of performance regulated by a motor vehicle safety standard (i.e., the orientation of seating in transit buses). It would therefore not appear to be preempted by any Federal motor vehicle safety standard.

The NHTSA recently considered inclusion of transit buses in the definition of "school bus" but concluded that Congress' intent in broadening the definition of "school bus" did not address inclusion of transit buses involved in student transportation. I have enclosed a discussion of this issue that accompanied the redefinition of "school bus."

As you noted in your letter, Highway Program Safety Standard No. 17, Pupil Transportation Safety (23 CFR 1204), provides for the transportation of students in school buses and in transit buses.

SINCERELY,

TOPEKA METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY

May 18, 1976

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel U.S. Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

As Chairman of the Topeka Metropolitan Transit Authority please accept this cover letter to the attached legal request. Let me simply emphasize to you that the question of federal preemption has arisen from all quarters on the State and local level, revelant to our transit authority providing service to the local school board. Your response to our inquiry is of first importance and we appreciate your attention to this matter.

David L. Ryan Chairman

TOPEKA METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY

May 17, 1976

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel U.S. Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

The Topeka Metropolitan Transit Authority would appreciate an opinion from your office with respect to the use of urban mass transit vehicles in special school route service and school related charter activities.

The Topeka MTA approached the Kansas Legislature in an effort to modify existing and proposed Kansas law so that it would be made clear that our buses can legally provide school related services. Basically our suggestions to the lawmakers would have changed state law so that it was more in line with federal provisions. However, the Director of Highway Safety for the Kansas Department of Transportation contended that the Transit Authority's position was in direct violation of federal law.

The Topeka Metropolitan Transit Authority believes that federal law allows urban mass transit vehicles to work with local school boards in solving their transportation problems. Please review the enclosed copy of the letter by Mr. Merrell, Kansas Director of Highway Safety, and the copy of our letter responding to such a position.

Needless to say, the view taken by the state agency is adversely affecting our revenue from school related services. The publicly supported transit system should be able to provide a variety of public services.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Your cooperation will be appreciated.

Michael D. Hood Legal Intern

KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

March 15, 1976

The Honorable Don E. Crumbaker Chairman, House Committee on Education

RE: House Education Committee Amendment to Senate Bill 623

Thank you for the opportunity this morning to discuss with you Senate Bill 623. As we discussed, problems arise regarding the amendment contained in Section 10 of the bill. The portion with which we are concerned is contained on page 10, lines 22 through 29, which follows in part;

Sec. 10. K.S.A. 8-2009 is hereby amended to read as follows; 8-2009. (a) All seats on school buses shall be forward-facing . . . except that the secretary may waive such requirement upon the request of a metropolitan transit authority established pursuant to article 28 of chapter 12 of Kansas Statutes Annotated.

The underscored portion above is the amendment added to the bill by House Committee.

The above amendment is in direct violation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 222, "School Bus Seating and Crash Protection," which was issued on January 22, 1976.

Section 5.1 of the Standard states as follows; S5.1 Seating requirements. School bus passenger seats shall be forward facing.

The Federal Register of January 28, 1976 (acopy of which is enclosed) contains a discussion of the Standard, including the following on page 4017 and 4018;

"The NHTSA (National Highway Traffic Safety Association) designed the seating system in this Standard for protection from fore and aft crash forces, and considers it necessary that the seats be forward facing to achieve the objective of occupant protection."

In addition to the above objection to the amendment, we would also like to point out that a metropolitan transit authority bus may not also operate as a school bus to transport school children to or from school. Recently the NHTSA amended its definition of a school bus. (A copy of which is enclosed.)

The NHTSA concluded that it was in the public interest to continue to excluded buses used in urban transportation from coverage in the new school bus definition, as had been the case in the prior definition.

The NHTSA has repeated frequently that the States must develop long range plans for achieving full compliance with these requirements within a reasonable period of time. The amendment contained in SB623 takes a big step backwards in complying with federal standards. My office has been told by the NHTSA that any state which moves backward instead of forward in complying with the Federal Safety Standards faces the possibility of having federal funding cut or withheld. To avoid that possibility I respectfully request that the amendments to SB623, to which we have referred, be deleted from the bill.

JERRY L. MERRELL, Ph.D. Director of Highway Safety

ATTACHS.

TOPEKA METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY

April 9, 1976

Representative Ron Hein

The amendment to Senate Bill Number 623 referred to in the letter written by Mr. Jerry Merrell, Director of Highway Safety, Kansas Department of Transportation, to Representative Don Crumbaker, Chairman, House Committee on Education, does not violate federal law nor would it cause the Kansas Department of Transportation to lose federal money. That amendment would have allowed the secretary of transportation to waive the requirement that all seats in urban transit buses be forward facing when those vehicles are providing school charter service.

In 49 CFR 571.3 (b) the federal definition of "school bus" is given. That provision states:

"School bus" means a bus that is sold, or introduced in interstate commerce, for purposes that include carrying students to and from school or related events, but does not include a bus designed and sold for operation as a common carrier in urban transportation.

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 222, "School Bus Seating and Crash Protection," which becomes effective October 26, 1976, provides:

Sec. 5.1 Seating Requirements. School Bus passenger seats shall be forward facing.

Since this safety standard speaks to seats in school buses and urban transit vehicles are expressly excluded from the "school bus" definition, there is no federal requirement that all seats in urban mass transit vehicles must be forward facing when those buses are used for school charters.

Furthermore, federal law, by excluding urban transit buses from the school bus definition, did not intend to exclude urban transit vehicles from providing school charter service. In fact, Pupil Transportation Safety Standard No. 17, which sets forth certain requirements with respect to the identification, operation, and maintenance of school buses, specifically recognizes that, because of the dual role they often play, urban transit buses are exempt from certain of those requirements when used for special school route service.

Federal law, then, recognizes the important function served by urban transit vehicles in the overall picture of urban transportation. Although not a "school bus", urban buses are sanctioned to perform school related services.

Senate Bill No. 623, on the other hand, does not recognize the ability of urban transit vehicles to provide school services. By withholding authority from the secretary of transportation to waive seating requirements on urban transit buses when those buses are used for school related services, Kansas may without logical reason, effectively prevent their public transportation systems from working with schools in meeting important public needs.

In view of federal law, Kansas is not prevented from allowing its franchised, publicly supported bus systems the ability to provide school charter services.

Moreover, there is no logical reason to withhold such permission. The Topeka Metropolitan Transit Authority has identified that urban transit vehicles are not only as safe as, but safer than the traditional "school bus". School related service by the Topeka Metropolitan Transit Authority is in the public interest.

David L. Ryan Chairman

Robert N. Salmon General Manager

cc: SHAWNEE COUNTY DELEGATION MEMBERS; JERRY MERRELL, DIR. OF SAFETY, KANSAS DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION; JIM GRAY, SUPT. OF SCHOOLS, U.S.D. 501

ID: nht76-5.53

DATE: 04/12/76

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD FOR FRANK A. BERNDT -- NHTSA

TO: Robert White

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of March 30, 1976, asking how United States importation regulations would affect your plan as a tourist to bring a 1964 Triumph motorcycle into the United States and to ride it to Mexico.

There are no Federal safety standards that apply to a motorcycle manufactured before January 1, 1969. Should you wish to import a motorcycle manufactured after that date, as a non-resident of the United States you would be allowed to keep it here for a period of up to one year after entry with the understanding that it would not be sold.

It is our understanding that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the other Federal agency regulating importation of motor vehicles, has no current regulations for motorcycles.

Brighton Sussex England 30.3.76

Dear Sir

Please could you send me Details concerning any salter or other type of regulation governing the importation of motor bikes int. the U.S.A. I plan to take the bike through to Mexico (Illegible Words) be sold in the U.S. It is a 1964 Triumph 500U of standard construction.

Your cooperation in this matter would be much appreciated

Robert White

ID: nht76-5.54

DATE: 02/03/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: U.S. Customs

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of January 12, 1976, asking about the applicability of Federal motor vehicle safety standards to motorcycles and mini-bikes.

You first asked "if any motorcycles are exempt" from the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. If the configuration of any motorcycle is such that it cannot be licensed for use on the public roads it is considered exempt. One example is a competition cycle intended solely for racing, conveyed by trailer or truck, which has no lights, and is equipped with special tires, and gear ratios rendering it unfit for low speed on-road traffic conditions. Another is the off-road machine with knobby tires, modified suspension and gear ratios, clearly intended for trail riding, hill climbing and the like. Motorcycles with a dual off-road on-road capability are, on the other hand, subject to the Federal motor vehicle safety standards.

You also asked for our "interpretation of and when a motorcycle or minibike would not be considered to have been manufactured primarily for use on the public roads." I enclose a copy of an interpretation issued in 1969 that reflects our views on this matter. As a general rule mini-bikes are not considered "motor vehicles", while most motorcycles do come within the definition. We consider both the C.B. 750 and Yamaha 90 to be "motor vehicles", even though we understand the latter is intended for dual-purpose use.

Enclosed is a Statement of Compliance for motorcycles.

Yours truly,

Enclosures

ATTACH.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE

GUAM

January 12, 1976

Administrator -- National Highway Traffic Safety Adm., Department of Transportation

Subject: National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.

I have been receiving inquiries regarding motorcycle imporations by military personnel reassigned from Japan to Guam, specifically, a C.B. 750 and Yamaha 90.

Would your office please advise if any motorcycles are exempt from the subject law excluding those manufactured prior to January 1968. Also, request your interpretation of and when a motorcycle or minibike would not be considered to have been manufactured primarily for use on the public roads and is not a "Motor Vehicle" as defined in Section 102 of PL 89-563.

Request a copy of the "Statement of Compliance" be furnished this office.

John J. Kralik -- U.S. Customs Military Advisor

ID: nht76-5.55

DATE: 02/19/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: E. D. Etnyre & Co.

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your letter of January 5, 1976, requesting information as to the criteria used to distinguish between a "new" or a "used" chassis, in regard to the certification requirements of 49 CFR Part 567 and 49 CFR Part 568.

You described a situation in which a chassis-cab comes to you "from the field," lacking both a certification label and an incomplete vehicle manual, under the claim that it is used, with the absence of a certification label explained by a statement that "a previous body was mounted and removed by the customer and the vehicle was not presented for resale by a distributor or dealer." You also add that "the vehicle reportedly has had extremely limited or no use."

It seems to us that the facts you are describing constitute a fairly obvious misrepresentation by your customer in order to circumvent the requirements of the standards. Even if the implausible allegation that the customer "mounted and removed" a body were true, it would not remove the requirement for the vehicle to bear a certification label. Our regulations do not limit the labeling requirement to the narrow language of section 114; any vehicle upon completion must be permanently labeled.

Furthermore, for a vehicle to be "used" today, it must be titled and registered under the laws of some State. Your letter does not discuss this, but we would assume that any vehicle whose owner cannot produce title and registration as a completed vehicle was never completed and used within the meaning of our regulations.

For these reasons, we would expect you as a final-stage manufacturer to treat as new a chassis-cab brought to you for completion under the conditions you described. If the chassis-cab were properly certified in a manner that evidenced prior use, or the customer were able to produce legitimate title/registration documentation showing significant previous use as a completed vehicle, the answer would of course be different.

Please let us know if we can be of further assistance.