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NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

Search Tool

NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 14871 - 14880 of 16514
Interpretations Date
 search results table

ID: nht95-7.42

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: November 21, 1995

FROM: Samuel J. Dubbin -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: A.D. Fisher

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 10/11/95 LETTER FROM A.D. Fisher to John Womack

TEXT: Dear Mr. Fisher:

This is in reply to your letter of October 11, 1995, asking for our comments on the relationship of your lighting invention, "The Enlightener," to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 108.

The Enlightener is intended to replace the center highmounted stop lamp. The lens has two colors, divided between amber at the top and red at the bottom. The amber portion is lit in a steady burning mode when both the accelerator and brake are not depressed, and in a flashing mode when the transmission lever is in Referse. The red portion is lit when the brake pedal is depressed and amber is extinguished.

This devise would not be permissible under FMVSS No. 108. The center highmounted stop lamp must stand alone; the lamp cannot serve another function, and paragraph S5.4(a) prohibits combining it with any other lamp.

In addition, the backup function on motor vehicles is furnished by a steady burning white lamp, required by FMVSS No. 108. The presence of a flashing amber lamp operating simultaneously would impair the effectiveness of the backup lamp by sending a conflicting signal.

I am sorry that we cannot provide you a more positive response. If you have any questions, you may refer them to Taylor Vinson of this office by calling (202) 366- 5263.

Sincerely,

ID: nht95-7.43

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: November 21, 1995

FROM: Samuel J. Dubbin -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Eric D. Swanger -- Engineering Manager, Specialty Manufacturing Co.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 8/8/95 LETTER FROM Eric D. Swanger to John Womack

TEXT: Dear Mr. Swanger:

This responds to your request for an interpretation of the conspicuity requirements in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 131, School Bus Pedestrain Safety Devices. According to your letter, a State has requested that you use light-emitting diodes (LEDs) to outline the word "STOP" on the stop arm blade. That State believes such lighting would increase the sign's conspicuity in certain weather conditions. In your letter and in an October 2, 1995, telephone conversation with Mr. Paul Atelsek of my staff, you expressed your concerns that using LEDs on stop signal arms may cause confusion and asked whether they are permitted. You raised three specific issues relating to viewing angles, legibility from certain distances, and inconsistencies among various jurisdictions.

The short answer to your question is that the LEDs could comply with out standard, but only under certain conditions. As you are aware, S5.3 Conspicuity states that "The stop signal arm shall comply with either S5.3.1 or S5.3.2, or both." Either method of providing conspicuity is by itself sufficient. I will discuss how the presence of LEDs relates to each of these options and then address your specific questions below.

Section S5.3.1 sets forth the requirements of the reflectorization option, stating that "[t]he entire surface of both sides of the stop signal arm shall be reflectorized with type III retroreflectorized material . . . ." LEDs would appear on the surface of the arm but could not, as far as we know, qualify as type III retroreflectorized material. Therefore, LEDs are not permissible when compliance depends upon the reflectorization option.

Section S5.3.2, which references S6.2, sets forth requirements addressing flashing lamps. Section S6.2, sets forth requirements addressing flashing lamps. Section S6.2 specifies the lamp's color, flash rate, and on-off time. These rather specific requirements reflect the importance of consistency in any signage or labeling requirement. However, we do not see

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anything intrinsic about LEDs that would preclude their use in stop signal arms with flashing lamps. As long as the familiar flashing lamps are used, we do not believe that interstate confusion would result from the addition of LEDs. Note that we do not consider the use of LEDs as an "optional" method of compliance with S5.3.2, because the LEDs would not be centered on the vertical centerline at the top and bottom of the stop arm.

You expressed concerns in your letter about the narrow viewing angle of LEDs compared to incandescent lights, and about the legibility of the LEDs at a distance. Since the LEDs would be used as a supplement to a standard method of compliance (i.e., flashing lamps), a diminished viewing angle is not important. We assume manufacturer's quality control practices would prevent uneven viewing angles from LED to LED within a given stop arm. While your concerns about the legibility of the word "STOP" at a distance are important, they do not seem to relate to the presence or absence of the LEDs unless the LEDs reduce the legibility of the word. If you have data indicating that the size or spacing of the letters need to be increased to achieve greater legibility at a distance, you may petition NHTSA to revise the standard.

I want to raise one potential safety issue, in case you receive a request to design an LED-equipped stop signal with flashing lamps. Certain arrangements of LEDs might affect compliance by impairing the effectiveness fo the stop signal arm's flashing lamp. Very closely spaced red LEDs could enhance the readability fo the letters in poor visibility conditions. On the other hand, red LEDs spaced every few centimeters around the outline of the 15 cm high letters could appear as a random field of lights (like a Christmas tree), distracting the observer and resulting in diminished readability. Similarly, different flash rates or on-off speeds from installed incandescent lamps might detract from readability by creating a distracting double-flash effect, as you suggest. Whether a particular LED-equipped stop signal arm complies with Standard No. 131 as a matter that can be determined only in the context of an enforcement proceeding.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Paul Atelsek at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

ID: nht95-7.44

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: November 21, 1995

FROM: Samuel J. Dubbin -- Chief Counsel; NHTSA

TO: Rita Cola Carroll -- Chairperson, Bus Safety Committee, Great Valley School District, Paoli, PA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 10/9/95 LETTER FROM Rita Cola Carroll to NHTSA

TEXT: Dear Ms. Carroll:

This responds to your question whether a child sitting on a school bus seat with part of his body extending into the aisle, is afforded the compartmentalization protection of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 222, School bus passenger seating and crash protection.

We have addressed this issue in an October 26, 1994; letter to Ms. Debra Platt of Stuart, Florida, and have enclosed a copy of our response for your information. In the Platt letter, NHTSA agrees that it is far less safe for children to sit on the edge of school bus seats, rather than face forward. We are enclosing a copy of Highway Safety Program Guideline No. 17, Pupil Transportation Safety, which is referenced in the Platt letter. Guideline 17 uses specific wording with regard to seating of school children. It says: "Seating should be provided that will permit each occupant to sit in a seat intended by the vehicle's manufacturer to provide accommodation for a person at least as large as a 5th percentile adult female, as defined in 49 CFR 571.208."

We are also enclosing a copy of a report prepared by this agency entitled School Bus Safety Report, and a copy of a Report Summary prepared by the Transportation Research Board in May 1989. The latter two reports give a good overview of school bus safety issues, and they and Guideline 17 contain recommendations to the various states in developing their own pupil transportation safety programs.

As noted in the Platt letter, since the States regulate school bus use, we recommend that you contact your State and/or local pupil transportation or school officials to inform them of your concerns. The Pennsylvania Governor's highway safety representative is:

Mr. Michael Ryan governor's Highway Safety Representative Deputy Secretary Highway Safety Administration Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1220 Transportation & Safety Building Harrisburg, PA 17120 Telephone: (717) 787- 6815

I hope the enclosed information is helpful to you. Should you have any other questions or need additional information, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366- 2992.

Sincerely

ID: nht95-7.45

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: November 27, 1995

FROM: Erika Z. Jones -- Mayer, Brown and Platt

TO: Samuel Dubbin, Esq. -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: FMVSS 207/Request for Interpretation

ATTACHMT: 1/4/96 letter from Samuel J. Dubbin to Erika Z. Jones (A44; Redbook 2; Std. 207)

TEXT: I am writing to request an interpretation of FMVSS 207 S4.4, pertaining to labelling of certain motor vehicle seats.

S4.4 provides that:

"Seats not designated for occupancy while the vehicle is in motion shall be conspicuously labeled to that effect."

It is my understanding that S4.4 does not require designated seating positions to be labeled, even if those seating positions are equipped with a folding seat back that enables that seat to be converted to a bed.

This conclusion is consistent with a letter from your office to Mr. Richard Moss, dated June 30, 1971, in which the Acting Chief Counsel advised that FMVSS 207 does not require designated seating positions to be labeled.

The vehicle seat at issue in my question is generally intended for occupancy while the vehicle is in motion, while it is configured as a bench seat. The bench seat contains several "designated seating positions" equipped with safety belts, and the seat is otherwise certified to FMVSS 207 requirements in the seat configuration. When the seat is converted to a bed by folding down the seat back, however, it is no longer "an occupant seat," as that term is defined in FMVSS 207.

Under these circumstances, it is my understanding that the labeling requirement in S4.4 does not apply, and I respectfully seek your concurrence in this conclusion.

Please let me know if I can obtain any additional information for you. I look forward to your response.

ID: nht95-7.46

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: November 28, 1995

FROM: Samuel J. Dubbin -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Phyllis Armstrong -- General Sales Manager, Saturn of Puyallup, Inc., Washington

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 5/17/95 LETTER FROM Phyllis Armstrong to Phillip Reckt; Also attached to 7/20/89 letter from Kathleen DeMeter to B.L. Swank

TEXT: Dear Ms. Armstrong:

This is in response to the letter in which you requested this office to confirm in writing that the information you received from Mr. Richard Morse, Chief of the Odometer Fraud Staff of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), concerning the proper completion of odometer disclosure statements for Saturn vehicles that have been towed. The question arises because the odometer on the Saturn is designed not to register miles when the vehicle is being towed.

NHTSA's interpretation of the Truth in Mileage Act of 1986 ("TIMA," 49 U.S.C. Chapter 327) and the regulations implementing TIMA (49 CFR Part 580) is that when a vehicle has been towed, but its odometer is not capable of registering towed mileage, the proper way to complete the odometer disclosure statement is to record the number of miles showing on the odometer. It is permissible in such a situation for the transferor to certify that this number is the actual mileage on the vehicle, assuming there are no other reasons to believe that the reading on the odometer does not reflect actual miles driven.

The situation you describe is comparable to that in which the odometer is disconnected and the drive wheels of the vehicle are off the pavement while it is being towed. In a 1989 interpretation letter, the Chief Counsel of NHTSA stated that when the vehicle is being towed with its drive wheels off the pavement and the odometer disconnected, the mileage driven while being towed does not count, and need not be added to the mileage showing on the odometer. That letter also stated that the transferor may certify in this circumstance that the mileage on the odometer, exclusive of the towed mileage, is the actual mileage. I have enclosed a copy of that letter for your information.

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I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any further questions on Federal odometer disclosure requirements, you may contact Mr. Morse or Ms. Eileen Leahy, an attorney on my staff, at the above address. You may reach Ms. Leahy at (202) 366-5263, and Mr. Morse at (202) 366-4761.

Sincerely,

ID: nht95-7.47

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: November 28, 1995

FROM: Samuel J. Dubbin -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Ben Ray

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 9/18/95 LETTER FROM Ben Ray to John Womack (OCC 11244)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Ray:

This responds to your letter asking about Federal requirements for automatic brake adjusters on log trailers. According to your letter, you manufacture log trailers, using used axles that already have what you call "regular" (i.e., manual) brake adjusters on them. In an October 13, 1995 telephone conversation with Mr. Marvin Shaw of my staff, you further stated that the wheels, brakes, and suspension are typically used, but that occasionally you use new brake systems. You also clarified that these trailers are used on the public roads as well as in the woods for transporting logs to the mills. You asked whether it is permissible to use manual brake adjusters instead of automatic adjusters. The answer depends it is permissible to use manual brake adjusters instead of automatic adjusters. The answer depends on whether your log trailers are equipped with new or used components and the trailer continues to use the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) and to be owned by the user of the reassembled vehicle.

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issues safety standards for new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle equipment. The agency does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Instead, manufacturers are required to certify that their vehicles or equipment meet all applicable standards. Once such standard is Standard No. 121, Air brake system, which requires new trailers to be equipped with automatic brake adjusters. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter.

NHTSA's regulations specifically address the question of when trailers produced by combining new components and used materials are considered to be new trailers. Section 49 CFT 571.7(f) states that when new and used components are used in trailer manufacture, the trailer will be considered "newly manufactured" unless each of the following three conditions is true with respect to the trailer. First, the trailer running gear assembly, which includes the axle(s), wheels, braking and suspension, is not new and was taken from an existing trailer. Second, the existing trailer's identity is continued in the reassembled vehicle with respect to the VIN. Third, the existing trailer is owned or leased by the user of the reassembled vehicle.

In other words, a log trailer will generally be considered newly manufactured, unless all these conditions are met. If a trailer is considered newly manufactured, then it must comply with the

P2 current requirements applicable to trailers. Among other things, this means that the trailer must be equipped with automatic adjusters. If a trailer meets these three conditions, then it is considered not newly manufactured and may be equipped with manual adjusters.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Marvin Sahw at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

ID: nht95-7.48

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: November 28, 1995

FROM: Samuel J. Dubbin -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Paul Danner, Esq. -- General Claim Counsel, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 8/31/95 LETTER FROM Paul Danner to John Womack; Also attached to 8/9/89 letter from Kathleen DeMeter to Madeline Flanagan

TEXT: Dear Mr. Danner:

This is in response to your letter of August 31, 1995, to John Womack, then Acting Chief Counsel of this office, in which you asked for an interpretation of the proper application of Federal odometer disclosure requirements in a situation where an insurer is settling with a vehicle owner on a Claim for theft of the vehicle. Specifically, your letter requests confirmation that the information given to you over the telephone by Mr. Richard Morse, Chief of the Odometer Fraud Staff of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) accurately reflects the agency's interpretation of these requirements. For the sake of clarity, I will address the proper procedures to be followed, rather than your letter's rendition of Mr. Morse's advice.

After a vehicle has been stolen, it is of course unavailable to the insured-transferor at the time of title transfer to the insurer. Therefore, when completing the odometer disclosure needed to transfer ownership to the insurance company, the insured-transferor may enter a figure that is his or her "best guess estimate" of the mileage on the odometer at the time the vehicle was stolen, not at the time of transfer to the insurer-transferee. In addition, the odometer disclosure must be dated as of the date of the theft, not as of the date of the transfer to the insurance company. The insured must certify on the odometer disclosure as to whether the odometer reading at the limits of the odometer, as appropriate.

In 1989, the agency issued an interpretation letter stating that this was the proper procedure for a lessee to follow when completing a disclosure to the lessor under 49 CFR @580.7 for a vehicle that had been stolen. That interpretation is equally applicable to the situation in which the owner, rather than the lessee, is making an odometer disclosure for a stolen vehicle. I have enclosed a copy of that interpretation letter fro your information.

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As for the other issues raised in your letter, the following interpretation applies. Once the insured-transferor has completed the odometer disclosure and otherwise complied with requirements of state law for title transfer, the insurer-transferee should then follow the procedures required by the appropriate state law to obtain title to the vehicle. If the vehicle is subsequently recovered and the insurer sells it for salvage, the insurer (which in this transaction will be the transferor) must inspect the vehicle and record the mileage that appears on the odometer at that time. If the insurer has no reason to believe that the mileage on the odometer is not the actual mileage on the vehicle, it must certify on the odometer disclosure that the mileage is the actual mileage on the vehicle. However, if the insurer does have reason to believe that the mileage shown on the odometer is not actual (e.g., if it is less than the mileage shown on the odometer disclosure statement provided to the insurer by the insured when title was transferred to the insurance company), it must so certify on the odometer disclosure statement given to its transferee (the salvage company in your example), and indicate on the statement that there is an odometer discrepancy.

I hope this letter answers your questions about the procedures to be followed by the parties to the transactions you describe. If you have any further questions regarding legal interpretations of the Federal odometer statute and regulations, please contact Eileen Leahy, an attorney on my staff, at the above address or at 202-366-5263.

Sincerely,

ID: nht95-7.49

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: December 1, 1995

FROM: Samuel J. Dubbin -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Edward Mansell -- Chief Engineer, Polar Tank Trailer, Inc.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 10/10/95 LETTER FROM Edward Mansell to Philip R. Recht (OCC 11305)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Mansell:

This is in reply to your letter of October 10, 1995, to Philip R.Recht, former Chief Counsel of this agency. You seek an interpretation of the conspicuity requirements of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 as they apply to some Food Grade Tank Trailers (FGTTs).

Paragraph S5.7.1.4.1(a) requires conspicuity sheeting to be placed "across the full width of the trailer" and "as close as practicable to not less than 375 mm and not more than 1525 mm above the road surface." You indicate that for many trailers the rear bumper is the closest practicable location (approximately 500 mm), but that, on some FGTTs, the load/unload ports are directly above the center portion of the rear bumper. The hot water to which the bumper is exposed degrades the conspicuity sheeting. "Since installation of sheeting subject to frequent hot water run off is not sheeting to be "applied from the extreme ends of the bumper to points no more than 6 inches (150 mm) to the left or right of the area directly below the load/unload area." You also state that "otherwise, the center section of the sheeting should be located on the tank, above the load/unload area."

We believe that this interpretation meets the intent of the standard. Under paragraph S5.7.1.4.1(a), the mounting height of the conspicuity material is based upon practicability, but the application "across the full width of the trailer" is absolute. We interpret "across the full width" to mean that the sheeting must cover the entire width of the vehicle, though not necessarily on the same plane or continuously. Thus, mounting above the load/unload area would be acceptable as a practicable location. Generally, the agency defers to a manufacturer's determination of practicability and will not question it if it is not clearly erroneous. It is not the intent of the standard that manufacturers "redesign trailers to redirect the flow of wash water."

You also believe that, for FGTTs which use a cabinet to enclose the load/unload area, "conspicuity sheeting should be

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mounted on the cabinet doors to augment the sheeting on the bumper." Although you did not enclose a drawing of this configuration, it appears acceptable. We assume that, when viewed from the rear, the sheeting has the appearance of extending across the full width of the vehicle, even if the section on the cabinet doors is not on the same plane as that on the bumpers. This, too, is acceptable as a manufacturer's determination of practicability.

Sincerely,

ID: nht95-7.5

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: September 29, 1995

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Joseph J. Smith -- Assistant Chief Maintenance Officer, New York City Transit Authority

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 8/28/95 LETTER FROM JOSEPH J. SMITH TO JOHN WOMACK (OCC 11187)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Smith:

This responds to your inquiry about whether Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 302, Flammability of Interior Materials (49 CFR @ 571.302), applies to air conditioning return air filters. You state that these filters are placed on top of the air conditioning evaporator coil and are separated from the bus interior by a louvered panel. You were concerned that the filters may be subject to Standard No. 302 because they may be considered located in the "occupant compartment air space." As explained below, Standard No. 302 does not apply to air conditioning return filters.

By way of background information, NHTSA is authorized to issue Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA does not, however, approve or certify any vehicles or items of equipment. Instead, Congress has established a "self-certification" process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet all applicable safety standards. Since Standard No. 302 is a vehicle standard, the manufacturer of the vehicle, and not the manufacturer of the individual component, is responsible for certifying compliance with Standard No. 302. The agency periodically tests new vehicles and items of equipment for compliance with the standards.

Standard No. 302 specifies burn resistance requirements for materials used in the occupant compartment of new motor vehicles. Section S4.1 lists the components in vehicle occupant compartments that the vehicle manufacturer must certify as complying with the flammability resistance requirements of paragraph S4.3. The components listed include seat cushions, seat backs, seat belts headlining, convertible tops, arm rests, all trim panels including door, front, rear, and side panels, compartment shelves, head restraints, floor coverings, sun visors, curtains, shades, wheel housing covers, engine compartment covers, and any other interior materials, including padding and crash deployed elements, that are designed to absorb energy on contact by occupants in the event of a crash. Section S4.1 represents a complete listing of all components in new vehicles that must comply with the flammability resistance requirements. Any component not identified in section S4.1 is not subject to those requirements. Therefore, an air conditioning return filter is not subject to those requirements.

Please note that there are other NHTSA requirements that could affect the manufacture and sale of products related to motor vehicles. A motor vehicle or equipment manufacturer incorporating air conditioning filters in its vehicles or equipment would be subject to 49 U.S.C. @@ 30118-30121 to ensure that its vehicles or equipment do not contain any safety related defect. If the manufacturer or NHTSA determines that a safety related defect exists, the manufacturer would be responsible for notifying purchasers of the defective vehicle or equipment and remedying the problem free of charge.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht95-7.50

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: December 6, 1995

FROM: Jeffrey S. Bakst -- Attorney at Law

TO: Dorothy Nakama -- NHTSA

TITLE: FMVSS Standard 124 "Accelerator Control Systems"/Mitsubishi Motorist Corporation Carburetor

ATTACHMT: 12/28/95 letter from Samuel J. Dubbin to Jeffrey S. Bakst (A44; Redbook 4; Std. 124; VSA 30118)

TEXT: First, I want to inform you we are dealing with a 1988 Dodge Ram 50 truck manufactured by Mitsubishi in Japan, sold in July, 1988. The accident involved occurred in December, 1990. I would like to acquire the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's opinion on the following questions:

1. If the manufacturer discovers a safety-related problem after the vehicle has been sold to the first purchaser in good faith, does the manufacturer have a legal duty to notify NHTSA and/or the purchaser of this problem?

If yes, what must a manufacturer do for the purchaser?

2. Assume there is a safety-related defect in a brand new carburetor that results in engine overspeed. If the "two sources of energy" are not sufficient to return the throttle to idle position when the driver removes the actuating force from the accelerator control in use, does the carburetor fall to comply with FMVSS 124?

I can represent to you that we took a brand new carburetor and proved that if the secondary throttle plate were to get stuck shut for whatever reason, the primary throttle linkage would bind on the secondary throttle linkage, causing the primary throttle plate to get stuck in a wide open throttle position, which results in engine overspeed. In essence, the two sources of energy on this carburetor are not sufficient to return the throttle to the idle position whenever the driver removes the actuating force from the accelerator control. Mitsubishi's own test on a brand new carburetor proved that if there was a malfunction in the secondary throttle plate, that the two (2) sources of energy were insufficient to return the throttle to idle position.

As I explained, time is truly of the essence. Mr. Bode requested his letter to attach to his Appellate Brief. I now have to respond to his brief, and I must have your report by the end of this year, if I am going to be able to use it in the appeal.

If you need additional information, please let me know.

Request an Interpretation

You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:

The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.

Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.