NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
|---|---|
ID: itemco.jegOpen Mr. Maury Solel Dear Mr. Solel: This responds to your letter asking about the implications of "supplying to the automotive aftermarket a generic air bag." I apologize for the delay in responding. You ask whether the requirements of Standard No. 208 apply to such air bags. Based on a telephone conversation between you and Edward Glancy of my staff, we understand that you contemplate supplying replacement air bag modules for vehicles whose air bags have deployed in crashes. Your question is addressed below. By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized under Title 49, Chapter 301 of the U.S. Code (Motor Vehicle Safety) to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) that apply to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. The FMVSSs apply in different ways. Some apply only to new motor vehicles ("vehicle standards"), others apply to new items of motor vehicle equipment ("equipment standards"), while others apply to both new vehicles and new equipment. One of the standards established by NHTSA, Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208), requires air bags to be installed in cars and light trucks. This standard sets forth a number of performance requirements related to air bags. With one exception, Standard No. 208 is a vehicle standard. Manufacturers of new vehicles are required to certify that their vehicles comply with Standard No. 208. The exception is paragraph S9, which is also an equipment standard. This paragraph specifies requirements for pressure vessels and explosive devices for use in air bag systems. Therefore, manufacturers of pressure vessels and explosive devices must certify that they comply with the requirements of S9 of Standard No. 208. You could not sell a replacement air bag module with these components unless the new components were certified as meeting the requirements of S9. At this time, there are no other Federal motor vehicle safety standards that apply to air bags as items of motor vehicle equipment. However, a manufacturer of a replacement air bag module would be a motor vehicle equipment manufacturer and would be subject to the notification and remedy requirements for products with defects related to motor vehicle safety (49 U.S.C. 30118-30121). A "defect" includes "any defect in performance, construction, a component, or material of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment." "Motor vehicle safety" is defined as "the performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in a way that protects the public against unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance." 49 U.S.C. 30102. If the manufacturer or NHTSA determined that the product had a defect related to motor vehicle safety, the manufacturer would have to notify all product purchasers of the defect, and either: 1. Repair the product so that the defect is removed; or 2. Replace the product with an identical or reasonably equivalent product that does not have the defect. The manufacturer would have to bear the full expense of the recall campaign, irrespective of the option chosen, for any owner who purchased the product less than 10 years before the determination that the defect existed. There is also a statutory provision that limits how certain entities may modify motor vehicles. Manufacturers, distributors, dealers and motor vehicle repair businesses are prohibited from knowingly making inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard (49 U.S.C. 30122). This provision would generally prohibit one of these entities from removing a functional air bag that was installed in compliance with Standard No. 208. Your letter raises the issue of whether, when a deployed air bag is replaced, Federal law requires use of a replacement air bag that will enable the vehicle to comply with Standard No. 208. The answer to this question is no. Our statute does not require a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business to return a vehicle to compliance with a standard if a device or element of design has been "made inoperative" by another agent, such as a crash. Thus, Federal law does not require that deployed air bags be replaced or regulate the manner in which such air bags are replaced. However, as explained above, replacement bags must be free of safety-related defects. In addition, some States may have requirements applicable to such replacements. Furthermore, we emphasize our concern that in order for a replacement air bag to provide protection to vehicle occupants, it is essential that the replacement be properly completed. The repair should be performed according to the procedures specified by the vehicle manufacturer. This may require replacement of system components in addition to the air bag inflator module such as crash sensors, wiring and other electronic components as specified by the manufacturer. Moreover, since air bags are designed for specific vehicles, taking into consideration such factors as the seats, steering column crush stroke force resistance, location of the air bag, location and nature of knee bolsters, and compartment acceleration responses in frontal crashes, we strongly believe that only air bags which are designed for the vehicle in question should be used. Finally, after the air bags are replaced, it is important that the air bag readiness indicator be in good working order to alert the occupants of any future malfunction of the air bag system. I also note that, during the past several years, this agency and the industry have focused a great deal of attention on ensuring that air bags are designed to create less risk of serious air bag-induced injuries for persons who are close to the air bag at time of deployment. Among other things, manufacturers have reduced the power of many of their air bags and have used innovative fold patterns to reduce the aggressivity of air bags. The fold patterns may be unique to a specific vehicle model. We would suggest that you carefully consider this issue in designing your product. Enclosed for your information is an information sheet titled "Information for New Manufacturers of Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment." Finally, you may wish to consult a private attorney concerning the state law implications of supplying replacement air bag modules, including possible tort liability implications. I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Edward Glancy of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Enclosure |
2001 |
ID: jackOpen Paul Jackson Rice, Esquire Dear Mr. Rice: This responds to your letter of August 30, 1995, concerning a June 6, 1995 letter from this office to C. Rufus Pennington, III. You asked us to confirm that the agency did not take a position as to whether there are "designated seating positions" in the rear of the 1979 911 SC Porsche. You are correct. As the letter clearly states, "NHTSA cannot make a determination as to whether a vehicle complied with applicable safety standards outside a compliance proceeding." I hope this information has been helpful. Sincerely,
John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:208 d:8/30/95
|
1995 |
ID: jacksonOpen
Via Federal Express
Mr. Jeffrey W. Jackson General Counsel State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company One State Farm Plaza Bloomington, IL 61710
Dear Mr. Jackson:
We have received reports that certain insurance companies may be engaging in transactions that violate Federal odometer disclosure law with respect to vehicles damaged in Hurricane Sandy. Although we are not asserting that your company is engaging in such practices, we are writing to a number of auto insurance companies to remind them of the Federal odometer disclosure law requirements and ask them to review their practices regarding odometer disclosures. These letters do not accuse your company, or any other company, of violating the law.
We understand that when a flood-damaged vehicle is declared a total loss, the insurance company pays the insured the value of the vehicle, becomes the owner, and acquires control over the vehicle from the insured. However the reports we have received indicate that instead of completing the required odometer disclosure, some companies ask the insured to complete the odometer disclosure statement without listing the insurance company as the transferee. According to these reports, the insurance company will not sign the title, make an odometer disclosure, or transfer title. The insurance company then sells the vehicle at auction, keeps the proceeds from the auction, and provides the title with the odometer disclosure statement as signed by the insured to the auction buyer. The next person in the chain of title of the vehicle will be the buyer at auction. The insurance company will essentially be omitted from the chain of title.
In the circumstance described above, an insurance company is considered a transferee when it pays the insureds claim (in return it obtains ownership of the vehicle), and a transferor when it sells the vehicle at auction. See 49 C.F.R. 580.3. As a transferor, the insurance company is required to make certain disclosures.
Under federal odometer disclosure law, 49 U.S.C. 32705, a person transferring ownership of a motor vehicle shall give the transferee written disclosure of the cumulative mileage registered on the odometer. More specifically, under 49 C.F.R. 580.5, each transferor shall disclose the mileage to the transferee in writing on the title or on the document being used to reassign the title [t]his written disclosure must be signed by the transferor, including the printed name. The transferee must sign the disclosure statement, print his name, and return a copy to his transferor.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Marie Choi of my staff at (202) 366-1738 or via email at marie.choi@dot.gov.
Sincerely,
O. Kevin Vincent Chief Counsel
d: 12/20/12
Identical letters sent to:
Mr. Dana Proulx General Counsel GEICO Corporation One Geico Plaza Washington, DC 20076
Mr. Charles E. Jarrett Chief Legal Officer The Progressive Corporation 300 North Commons Blvd., OHF 11 Mayfield Village, OH 44143
Mr. Christopher C. Mansfield General Counsel Liberty Mutual Group 175 Berkeley Street Boston, MA 02117
Ms. Patricia R. Hatler Chief Legal and Governance Officer Nationwide One Nationwide Plaza Columbus, OH 43215
Ms. Susan L. Lees General Counsel Allstate Insurance Company 3075 Sanders Road Northbrook, IL 60062
Mr. Garrett Paddor General Counsel Farmers New World Life Insurance Company 4680 Wilshire Blvd, 2nd Fl. Los Angeles, CA 90010
Mr. Steven A. Bennett General Counsel United Services Automobile Association (USAA) 9800 Fredericksburg Road San Antonio, TX 78288 |
|
ID: jan26'95Open Mr. Fredd Scheys Dear Mr. Scheys: This responds to your FAX of January 25, 1995, to John Womack of this Office asking whether the interpretation letter sent to you on November 16, 1992, and confirmation letter sent you on March 8, 1993, remain valid. This confirms that these letters remain valid. We note that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.) was recodified in July 1994. The correct citation today is 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 - Motor Vehicle Safety. The first full paragraph of the second page of the November 16, 1992, letter refers to "Title 15, United States Code, section 1397(b)(2)." Under the recodification, the citation has become "Title 49 United States Code, section 30122(b)". Further, the quoted phrase in that paragraph that reads "knowingly rendering inoperative in whole or in part any device of element of design installed in accordance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard" has been restated to read "knowingly make inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard." But the meaning remains the same and there is no substantive change in the prohibition. Sincerely, Philip R. Recht Chief Counsel ref:VSA d:1/27/95
|
1995 |
ID: JAPIA.ajdOpenKeiko Utsunomiya
Dear Ms. Utsunomiya: This is in reply to your e-mail letter of November 18, 2003, to Mr. Jonathan White of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administrations (NHTSA) Office of Defects Investigations requesting a clarification of several requirements of NHTSAs regulation on reporting of information and communications about potential defects, 49 CFR Part 579. In your e-mail to Mr. White, you asked whether a supplier has an obligation to report under the following scenario:
You also stated that your understanding of the above hypothetical is that supplier C does have an obligation to report to NHTSA and requested that we provide you with the legal authority to require that report. Your question is unclear as to what you understand supplier C needs to report to NHTSA. Based upon the facts in the hypothetical you present, it appears that you pose two questions. First, does a supplier of motor vehicle equipment have an obligation to report a recall campaign that is conducted by a vehicle manufacturer who does not sell motor vehicles in the United States? Pursuant to Subpart B of 49 CFR Part 579, supplier C would not have an obligation to report the recall of the vehicles with part X to NHTSA because OEM A, not supplier C, determined that a safety-related defect existed in part X. See 49 CFR 579.11. In addition, since a foreign government did not require supplier C to conduct a safety-related recall, supplier C is not obligated to report the recall. See 49 CFR 579.12. Second, does a supplier of motor vehicle equipment have to report a claim of a fatal accident received by a vehicle manufacturer who does not sell motor vehicles in the United States? Pursuant to Subpart C of 49 CFR Part 579, supplier C does not have an obligation to report the fatality claim, since the claim was made against and received by OEM A. See 49 CFR 579.27(b). If you have any questions, you may phone Andrew DiMarsico of my staff at (202) 366-5263. Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman ref:579 |
2003 |
ID: jarrettOpen
Via Federal Express Mr. Charles E. Jarrett Chief Legal Officer The Progressive Corporation 300 North Commons Blvd., OHF 11 Mayfield Village, OH 44143 Dear Mr. Jarrett: We have received reports that certain insurance companies may be engaging in transactions that violate Federal odometer disclosure law with respect to vehicles damaged in Hurricane Sandy. Although we are not asserting that your company is engaging in such practices, we are writing to a number of auto insurance companies to remind them of the Federal odometer disclosure law requirements and ask them to review their practices regarding odometer disclosures. These letters do not accuse your company, or any other company, of violating the law. We understand that when a flood-damaged vehicle is declared a total loss, the insurance company pays the insured the value of the vehicle, becomes the owner, and acquires control over the vehicle from the insured. However the reports we have received indicate that instead of completing the required odometer disclosure, some companies ask the insured to complete the odometer disclosure statement without listing the insurance company as the transferee. According to these reports, the insurance company will not sign the title, make an odometer disclosure, or transfer title. The insurance company then sells the vehicle at auction, keeps the proceeds from the auction, and provides the title with the odometer disclosure statement as signed by the insured to the auction buyer. The next person in the chain of title of the vehicle will be the buyer at auction. The insurance company will essentially be omitted from the chain of title. In the circumstance described above, an insurance company is considered a transferee when it pays the insureds claim (in return it obtains ownership of the vehicle), and a transferor when it sells the vehicle at auction. See 49 C.F.R. 580.3. As a transferor, the insurance company is required to make certain disclosures. Under federal odometer disclosure law, 49 U.S.C. 32705, a person transferring ownership of a motor vehicle shall give the transferee written disclosure of the cumulative mileage registered on the odometer. More specifically, under 49 C.F.R. 580.5, each transferor shall disclose the mileage to the transferee in writing on the title or on the document being used to reassign the title [t]his written disclosure must be signed by the transferor, including the printed name. The transferee must sign the disclosure statement, print his name, and return a copy to his transferor. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Marie Choi of my staff at (202) 366-1738 or via email at marie.choi@dot.gov. Sincerely,
O. Kevin Vincent Chief Counsel d: 12/20/12 Identical letters sent to: Mr. Dana Proulx General Counsel GEICO Corporation One Geico Plaza Washington, DC 20076
Mr. Christopher C. Mansfield General Counsel Liberty Mutual Group 175 Berkeley Street Boston, MA 02117 Ms. Patricia R. Hatler Chief Legal and Governance Officer Nationwide One Nationwide Plaza Columbus, OH 43215
Ms. Susan L. Lees General Counsel Allstate Insurance Company 3075 Sanders Road Northbrook, IL 60062
Mr. Garrett Paddor General Counsel Farmers New World Life Insurance Company 4680 Wilshire Blvd, 2nd Fl. Los Angeles, CA 90010
Mr. Steven A. Bennett General Counsel United Services Automobile Association (USAA) 9800 Fredericksburg Road San Antonio, TX 78288
Mr. Jeffrey W. Jackson General Counsel State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company One State Farm Plaza Bloomington, IL 61710 |
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ID: jensen.drnOpen Mr. Chris S. Jensen Dear Mr. Jensen: This responds to your recent letter requesting NHTSA's assistance to alter your MY 1996 Kia Sportage to accommodate your needs. Your letter informed us that you need to install a hand brake in your car in order to assist your driving, and to do this, you must remove a "knee airbag," installed at knee level at the driver's seating position. You ask us for written permission that would permit you to go to a dealership to disconnect the driver's side knee air bag. This letter grants the permission you request. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208, Occupant crash protection, requires that certain new vehicles be equipped with automatic crash protection at the front outboard seating positions. The air bag in your car was installed as one means of complying with that requirement. Removing or deactivating an air bag by a vehicle dealer is prohibited by Section 30122(b) of Title 49 of the United States Code, the title under which Standard No. 208 was issued. That section provides in part that--
However, in limited situations in which a vehicle must be modified to accommodate the needs of a person with a particular disability or a person's special medical needs, NHTSA has in the past stated that it would consider violations of the "make inoperative" prohibition as purely technical ones justified by public need, and that it would not institute enforcement proceedings. This is to advise you that we would regard a deactivation of the driver's side knee air bag in your Sportage in the same way. NHTSA considers your special medical needs as sufficient justification for not taking enforcement action against a dealer that deactivates the knee air bag in your car in order to install the hand brake. Please show this letter to your dealer or repair business when you take your car to have the driver's side knee air bag deactivated. If the dealer or repair business wishes to verify the authenticity of this letter, they may call the telephone number below. I hope this letter resolves your problem. If you have any other questions, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, |
1997 |
ID: josephOpenMrs. Margaret Joseph Dear Mrs. Joseph: This responds to your inquiry concerning the condition of the van that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania uses to transport your 11-year old daughter, who is blind and uses a wheelchair, to and from school. I regret the delay in responding. You explain that the van is operated by a taxi service, presumably under contract with the State. Our agency is authorized to improve traffic safety by issuing Federal motor vehicle safety standards that apply to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles, including new school buses. A "school bus" is a vehicle designed for carrying more than ten (10) persons, which is likely to be used significantly to transport school students to or from school or related events. We believe that school buses are one of the safest forms of transportation in this country. We therefore strongly recommend that all buses that are used to transport school children be certified as meeting our school bus safety standards. Because our standards apply only to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles, we do not have the authority to require Pennsylvania to provide school bus transportation for your daughter. Moreover, it is the States, and not our agency, that apply and enforce regulations concerning vehicles in use. Thus, we suggest that you contact your local school district or the Pennsylvania Director of Pupil Transportation about your concerns. The Director is:
I hope this information is helpful. Regrettably, we have been unable to reach you by telephone to discuss your concerns. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, |
1999 |
ID: K.Dziczek Part 583Open
Ms. Kristin Dziczek Director, Labor and Industry Group Center for Automotive Research 3005 Boardwalk, Suite 200 Ann Arbor, MI 48108
Dear Ms. Dziczek,
This letter is in response to your April 10, 2012 email to Thomas Healy of this office. In your email you ask several questions about the requirements of 49 C.F.R. Part 583, Automobile Parts Content Labeling. The responses to your questions are provided below.
By way of background, pursuant to the American Automobile Labeling Act, Part 583 requires passenger motor vehicles to be labeled with five items of information related to the countries of origin of those vehicles. The items of required information are:
On a carline basis:
U.S./Canadian parts content
Major sources of foreign parts content
For the vehicle:
Final assembly point
Country of origin for the engine
Country of origin for the transmission.
An explanatory note concerning the meaning of parts content is also required on the label. See 583.5(a) and (b).
You first asked whether the parts percentage on the label includes the content of the engine and transmission. The answer is yes.
As indicated above, the first item of information required on the label is U.S./Canadian parts content. As indicated by 583.5(a)(1), this term refers to (t)he overall percentage, by value, of the passenger motor vehicle equipment that was installed on vehicles within the carline of which the vehicle is part, and that originated in the United States and/or Canada. Passenger motor vehicle equipment is defined at 583.4(b)(7) as any system, subassembly, or component received at the final assembly point for installation on, or attachment to, such vehicle at the time of its initial shipment by the manufacturer to a dealer for sale to an ultimate purchaser. Passenger motor vehicle equipment also includes any system, subassembly, or component received by an allied supplier from an outside supplier for incorporation into equipment supplied by the allied supplier to the manufacturer with which it is allied. The engine and transmission of a passenger motor vehicle would be considered a system, subassembly, or component of a passenger motor vehicle. They therefore come within the definition of passenger motor vehicle equipment and are included when calculating U.S./Canadian parts content.[1]
You next ask that if the engine and transmission content are included in the overall percentage of parts of the vehicle, whether the component content of the engine and transmission is used in calculating the contribution of these components to the overall parts content of the vehicle, or whether the entire engine and transmission is considered as a whole from the country of origin of these components. You also ask whether the country of origin for the engine and transmission is determined by the point of final assembly of these components or based on their parts content percentage.
The procedure for determining U.S./Canadian parts content (the first item of information on the label) is set forth at 583.6.[2] As part of that procedure, the procedure for determining the U.S./Canadian percentage of the value of an item of equipment, such as an engine or transmission, is set forth in 583.6(c). The procedure varies depending on whether the equipment is supplied by an outside supplier or an allied supplier.[3] Equipment supplied by an outside supplier is considered 100 percent U.S./Canadian if 70 percent or more of its value is added in the U.S. and/or Canada, and to otherwise have the actual percent of its value added in the U.S. and/or Canada rounded to the nearest five percent. See 583.6(c)(1). Equipment supplied by an allied supplier is considered to have the actual percent of its value added in the U.S. and/or Canada. See 583.6(c)(2).
The procedures for determining the countries of origin for the engine and transmission, i.e., the last two items of information on the label, are set forth in 583.8. The procedures are significantly different from those used in connection with determining U.S./Canadian parts content. Moreover, as indicated earlier, while U.S./Canadian parts content is calculated on a carline basis, the determinations of country of origin of the engine and transmission are not. Section 583.8(e) specifies that the country of origin of the engine and the country of origin of the transmission is the country that contributes the greatest amount of value added to that item of equipment, with the U.S. and Canada being treated separately. The country of origin of the engine/transmission is determined based on the country of origin and value of each component and the assembly and labor costs incurred during final assembly of the engine/transmission, not simply the point of final assembly. See 583.8(b)-(d).
You also point out that 49 C.F.R 583.6 contains a procedure under which manufacturers may submit a petition to the agency to calculate the U.S./Canadian parts content and major sources of foreign parts of a vehicle carline using alternative methods. You inquire whether any manufacturers have submitted petitions to calculate the U.S./Canadian parts content and major sources of foreign parts of a vehicle carline using an alternative method. The agency is not aware of any petitions that manufacturers have submitted to calculate the U.S./Canadian parts content and major sources of foreign parts of a vehicle carline using alternative methods.
If you have further questions, you may refer them to Thomas Healy of this Office (202-366-2992).
Sincerely,
O. Kevin Vincent Chief Counsel
Ref: Part 593 Dated: 5/31/12
[1] The second item on the label is major sources of foreign parts content. As indicated by 583.5(a)(2), this term refers to (t)he names of any countries other than the United States and Canada which contributed at least 15 percent of the average overall percentage, by value, of the passenger motor vehicle equipment installed on vehicles within the carline of which the vehicle is part, and the percentages attributable to each such country ... . Again, since engines and transmissions come within the definition of passenger motor vehicle equipment, they are included in making the calculations for this item of information. [2] The procedure for determining major foreign sources of passenger motor vehicle equipment is set forth in 583.7. [3] The terms allied supplier and outside supplier are defined in 583.4. |
2012 |
ID: kane.ztvOpenBarry C. Kane, Esq. Dear Mr. Kane: This is in reply to your letters of June 9 and 10, 2003, which asked for an interpretation of terminology in 49 CFR Part 579 and Part 573. These letters were identical, with the exception noted below under the discussion of Section 579.4(d)(2). Your Part 579 questions related both to the reporting obligations under Subpart B pertaining to foreign safety campaigns, and the reporting obligations under Subpart C, the Early Warning Reporting (EWR) requirements. You wrote on behalf of "divers automotive-related clients," including "original equipment manufacturers, as well as first and second tier providers of parts and/or services." For purposes of EWR, your clients are considered manufacturers of original equipment (OEM) and thus are covered by 49 CFR 579.27. In response to your initial inquiry, if an OEM does not receive a claim or notice of death in any quarterly reporting period, it is not required to report that fact to NHTSA. Your next question was postulated on the assumption that section 579.27 requires OEMs to report information about injuries allegedly caused by their products. However, that is incorrect. Section 579.27 requires your clients to report "on each incident involving one or more deaths . . . that is identified in a claim . . . or in a notice . . . which notice alleges or proves that the death was caused by a possible defect in the manufacturers . . . equipment" (emphasis added) (if the incident occurred in the United States, the manufacturer must also report the number of injuries, if any). You asked for confirmation "that an incident in which a manufacturers component is involved that did not initiate the sequence of events leading to [a death] has not to be reported because such a component does not meet the definition of involving in 579.27." We have not defined "involving" and a definition of the term is not required to respond to your question. Whether a component initiated a sequence of events that led to a death (and injury) may be a question of fact or law (e.g., proximate cause) that is not developed or resolved at the time a manufacturer receives a claim or notice about a death. Regardless, if the document received by the OEM meets the definition of "claim" or "notice" and identifies the OEMs equipment with "minimal specificity," as those three terms are defined in Section 579.4(c), the OEM must report to NHTSA in the manner prescribed by Section 579.27. You have also asked a question about the application of Section 579.4(d)(2)s definition of identical or substantially similar motor vehicle equipment to a hypothetical situation. Equipment sold or in use outside the United States is deemed to be "identical or substantially similar" to equipment sold in the United States if the equipment has "one or more components or systems that are the same, and the component or system performs the same function" in vehicles sold in the United States (Section 579.4(d)(2)). In your hypothetical, identical fasteners would be used in an air-conditioning unit and an alternator. In your letter of June 9, you stated your belief that "`substantial similarity looks at the assembly as a whole and not to the components forming the assembly to determine the similarity unless it is the particular fastener in this example that is the rudimentary cause of the failure in one of the components." However, on June 10, you advanced a modified view of "substantial similarity" and concluded that "all these different assemblies incorporating such fasteners are substantially similar irrespective of whether the cause of the failure is another part of the assembly," and you asked whether your clients are "obliged to report all these assemblies . . . although the cause of the defect is not the fastener." We addressed these situations in the preamble to the EWR final rule (67 FR 45822 at 45844). With respect to the view in your letter of June 9, we remarked that we read the word "equipment" both as the completed item of motor vehicle equipment and as each individual component that comprises the item. With respect to your modified view of June 10, the Motorcycle Industry Council (MIC) had asked "if the only commonality [in equipment] is a single type of fastener that neither failed nor contributed to the incident, are the components or equipment substantially similar?" We replied that the equipment incorporating the fasteners would be substantially similar for EWR purposes, "unless the claim [or notice] specifically identified a non-common component as the source of the failure" (p. 45844). With respect to the phrase "sold or offered for sale" as it appears in the definition of "identical or substantially similar," a client has asked you "if the rule covers the situation where an automobile is manufactured outside the United States and has been privately imported by an individual consumer." It is your suggestion that "the rule does not apply to this situation," and that it "is intended to apply to manufacturers who intentionally enter the market in this country rather than low volume imports arranged by private consumers." We understand that this question relates to Smart cars, manufactured by DaimlerChrysler A.G. in Europe. That company does not sell these cars or offer them for sale in the United States, but at some future time they may be imported by a Registered Importer. Although, as a factual matter, a Smart car sold outside the United States would be identical or substantially similar to a Smart car sold or offered for sale by a person in the United States other than its fabricating manufacturer (e.g., a Registered Importer), we do not intend the rule to impose a reporting obligation upon a manufacturer who is not marketing an identical or substantially similar vehicle in the United States. Thus, the EWR rule does not require DaimlerChrysler to report incidents of deaths outside the United States involving Smart cars, unless and until DaimlerChrysler imports the Smart car into the United States (see definition of "manufacturer," Section 579.4(c)). You next asked "whether a supplier of parts to OEMs or Tier 1 suppliers is ever required to notify the Administration of the recall under the rule since they do not decide on or carry out a recall themselves, but solely sell their products via the OEMs/Tier 1." Part 579 does not require an OEM to notify NHTSA that a person is conducting a defect notification and remedy campaign on products that incorporate equipment which the OEMs have supplied. Defect reporting obligations arise under another regulation, 49 CFR Part 573, Defect and Noncompliance Responsibility and Reports. In some instances, these obligations apply to, or may be assumed by, OEMs (see Section 573.3). With respect to the obligation under Section 579.5(b) to provide copies of each communication relating to a customer satisfaction campaign (as defined in Section 579.4(d) to include other terms as well) within five days after the end of each month, you suggest that "this rule only needs compliance when indeed such customer satisfaction campaigns exist." This is correct. We need not be informed that there were no customer satisfaction campaigns in the previous month. It is also your tentative view that "the campaigns need only be reported when there is "communication with two or more of those involved in the distribution chain for the assembly in the U.S." That is incorrect. If a communication is "issued to, or made available to, more than one dealer, distributor, lessor, lessee, other manufacturer, owner or purchaser, in the United States," a copy of the communication must be furnished to us. See Section 579.5(b). Your last question is "whether we should consider additional rules, statutes, or provisions promulgated by the individual states or whether this rule supercedes individual state requirements." We are unaware of any State requirements that address the same issues as Part 579. If you have any questions, you may phone Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263). Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman ref:579 |
2003 |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.