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NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

Search Tool

NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 6781 - 6790 of 16514
Interpretations Date
 search results table

ID: nht92-7.31

Open

DATE: April 23, 1992

FROM: John J. Duncan, Jr. -- Member of Congress, House of Representatives, Washington, DC

TO: Jerry R. Curry -- Administrator, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 5/29/92 from Jerry Ralph Curry to John J. Duncan, Jr. (A39; Part 571.3)

TEXT:

I am writing in regard to a problem which has been brought to my attention by Clarence Lowe of the Campbell County Comprehensive High School.

Attached is correspondence received from Mr. Lowe in which he outlines the difficulties being experienced in using vans for the Campbell County School System.

As you may know, Campbell County made the national news recently when they simply ran out of funds for bus transportation to get children to school. Campbell County is a very rural area. Furthermore, because of economic hardships, the average income per capita is very low making it even more difficult for parents to get their children to school if transportation is not provided by the school system.

Even though bus transportation was restored recently, another problem has arisen with regard to using vans to transport students for such things as off-campus curriculum experiences or extra-curricular activities. In the instance of extra-curricular activities, many times, because of this restriction, this means splitting the students up and transporting them in automobiles so they will be able to get to the event.

Although none of us want to put our children at risk, I wonder what the logic of this restriction is if, in fact, it only results in either restricting a child's education, such as off-campus curriculum, or transporting children in an even less safe manner by reverting to individual cars filled to capacity.

Unfortunately, with the financial restraints we are all witnessing at the federal, state and local government levels the added costs of trying to convert these vans to meet the standards set forth by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) appear to have put an unrealistic and unsurmountable burden on our schools.

Attached is a copy of a letter from Mr. Ernest Farmer, Director of Pupil Transportation for the State of Tennessee. Mr. Farmer appears to agree that there may be reason to investigate this matter. At present, Mr. Farmer feels that he has no alternative but to comply with these federal mandates unless directed otherwise by NHTSA. In telephone discussions with your Chief Counsel, Ken Weinstein, there was some question as to whether these restrictions were on the manufacturers of these vans or on the school systems that were using older, previously purchased vans for transportation of students.

Your response specifically outlining what federal requirements must be complied with would be sincerely appreciated. Also, it would be appreciated if you would advise me as to whether or not any changes in regard to the use of older, previously purchased vans were done through specific legislative changes or through regulations.

Your assistance in this matter would be greatly appreciated. With best wishes and personal regards, I am your truly.

Attachments

Letter dated 2/2/192

To: Congressman John J. Duncan, Jr.

House of Representatives Attention Judy Whitbred Washington, DC

Dear Congressman Duncan:

The purpose of this letter is to clarify our conversation last week concerning the problem of vans held for use in our vocational programs in the Campbell County (Tennessee) School System.

As you are aware, the Campbell County Board of Education elected to end all bus transportation for its students in late October due to severe budget deficits. This caused a great hardship for our schools, students, parents, and the county in general. Last week the County Commission approved budget transfers within the school budget to allow the restart of bus transportation on February 12, for 37 school days. We still face a possibility of no bus transportation at the end of those 37 days.

The next day after buses stopped running in our county, Tennessee State Department of Education officials within the Pupil Transportation Division informed our county education department that all school vans must be pulled off the road. They cited regulations of the U.S. Department of Transportation based on congressional legislation concerning the use of vans to transport students. I forwarded to you, after our conversation, copies that I obtained from our vocational director that related to this matter and seemed to be the basis for which the state department made its decision.

Our county vocational department had assisted our two high schools with the purchase of four vans for the purpose of transporting general building trades students from the school to the job site and back to school each day. This hands-on work experience is vital to teaching students the building trade skill. In addition, the county vocational department purchased another van for use by all vocational programs to transports students to off-campus curriculum experiences (such as clinical training for our health occupations students), meetings, conferences, conventions, and other school related functions. The building trades program has always had some types of vans for transportation purposes. Also, our athletic department has their own vans for transporting student athletes to the game sites. They too were pulled off the road. In a

time of no bus transportation and critical budget cuts, another hardship was imposed upon our educational programs.

Thus, the purpose of my contacting your office is to see if the regulations mandated concerning school van usage is still applicable and if so, might there be some relief at the federal level to allow us to use the vans or bring them into compliance without placing our school system in danger of tort liability. We would hope that the cost to comply would not prohibit our using the vans. Due to limited funds and lack of budgeted monies this may not even be an option.

The vans purchased by our vocational department are 15 passenger type. Vans are classified as either multi-purpose passenger vehicles or van conversions. Vans containing more than ten seating accommodations must meet Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. All vans in questions were purchased prior to the November 14, 1990 memo from the Tennessee Department of Education addressing the use of vans. Thus, it appears that our school officials had no knowledge that such regulations applied. Further, a state inspection was held on May 3, 1988, of all buses and vans in our county. All of our vans and the athletic vans passed this inspection. The only requests made of us was to number the vans, install a fire extinguisher and a first-aid kit. Only one of the vocational vans in question was in service at that time. This van, a 1987 Dodge, is held for use by all vocational programs was inspected and passed. Following that time, four new vans were purchased to replace older vans in the general building trades program. Purchased on December 8, 1988, were two 89 Ford vans, on March 21, 1989, one 89 Ford van, and on January 12, 1991, one 90 Ford Van. I am enclosing supporting memos of this inspection and related van purchase transactions.

Upon order from state officials, our vocational director, Miss Sharon Mills, stopped all vocational instructors from using the vans to transport students. Since that time our building trade students have not been to a job site for training. There is no way to transport them. Using school buses is much too expensive as those buses are privately owned. An off-campus building project had to be canceled due to the transportation problem. Their vans sit parked on the campus. An option might be to sell all the vans and use the money received from the sale toward purchase of "approved" vans. That might sound good, but there is no way to replace like numbers and the cost of new vehicles would not be something affordable in our already strapped school budget.

The van which I am most familiar with is the 1987 Dodge. I have used this van to take students to leadership conferences, conventions, competitive events, and other related programs that concern the area which I teach. This van has a tag attached which classifies it as a bus and states that this vehicle conforms to all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety standards on the date of manufacture.

To cite an example of our dilemma, on February 6, 1992, I had to use private automobiles to transport 12 students to a competitive event in Knoxville (some 40 miles) while the van could only be used to carry our computer equipment. No students were allowed to ride in the van. This is the same problem that our athletic teams face on a regular basis while their vans sit parked or carry their equipment. The burden of getting transportation has

placed many restrictions upon our curricula and extra-curricula activities. Our students stand again to be the losers in the whole matter. I am already faced with finding suitable transportation for my students to their state competition in Nashville on March 12-14, and the national competition in Cincinnati in late April. This is a similar problem faced by Several of my colleagues in our county and apparently across the state.

I would greatly appreciate your assistance in investigating this matter. Please let me know if I can supply additional information. You may reach me at (615) 562-9118 (school) or (615) 562-1303 (home). You can reach the vocational director Sharon Mills, at (615) 562-8377.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence Lowe, Instructor Office Education/Computer Technology

Letter dated 3/20/92

To: Congressman John Duncan House of Representatives 115 Cannon Building Washington, D.C. 20515

Attention: Ms. Judy Whitbred

Dear Congressman Duncan:

In 1975 the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) amended its definition of a school bus to include vehicles that are "likely to be significantly used" for pupil transportation. The memo, in an effort to further clarify the agency's action, noted that "VAN TYPE VEHICLES, USED FOR MANY PURPOSES, WILL BE PARTICULARLY AFFECTED BY THE NEW AMENDMENT --- SINCE THEY ARE NOT DESIGNED FOR, OR INTENDED TO BE USED AS, A PRIMARY SOURCE OF TRANSPORTATION FOR SCHOOL CHILDREN. THE AMENDMENT MAKES THE VANS SUBJECT TO FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS (FMVSS) if they are SOLD FOR USE AS A SCHOOL BUS". (The effective date of this amendment to the Motor vehicle and School Bus Safety Act, AS AMENDED IN 1974, is OCTOBER 27, 1976). (See Attachment #1)

The FORD RENT-A-CAR SYSTEM, a division of the FORD MOTOR COMPANY, issued a bulletin (FRCS Bulletin #923) to its members instructing them not to rent their CLUB WAGONS and SUPER WAGONS for the transportation of PRE PRIMARY, PRIMARY OR SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS to and from school or school related events since they fall, by virtue of their seating capacity, within the definition of a bus. (Ten (10) capacity or greater) (49 Code of Federal Regulations S 571.3). (See Attachment #2)

In November 1990, we issued a follow-up memo on the subject to all Superintendents/Directors of schools with programs of pupil transportation service in an effort to bring them into total compliance with the provisions of this NHTSA Amendment. (See Attachment #3)

The memo, perhaps, understandably became one of the most, if not the most, controversial memos ever issued from this office for several reasons. In the first place, the use of van type vehicles for school transportation purposes dates from the years of World War II when it was virtually impossible to purchase newly manufactured, or even factory reconditioned, buses. In the next place, these units (VANS) are much more "economical" to purchase than the specially constructed "VAN CONVERSIONS" hence the basis of their growing popularity among school officials as "extracurricular vehicles". Finally, school officials are hard pressed to find accidental data that conclusively supports this highly questionable action on the part of the NHTSA. Few, if any, can document, from personal experience in their own school systems, multifatality accidents involving their useage. They have no problem, however, detailing accidents, though fortunately not multi-fatal at this time, involving the operation of passenger cars, station wagons and other type vehicles placed in service to compensate for their loss.

As the State Director of Pupil Transportation, I have no alternative, as I see it, but to comply with such Federal Regulations unless directed to do otherwise which is something that I do not see forthcoming. I must, therefore, continue my enforcement efforts until the amendment is withdrawn by the NHTSA, which is something else that I do forsee as happening.

Again, thank you for your interest in pupil transportation and for your efforts to assist our school officials in maintaining an "acceptable" level of service for their public school children.

Sincerely yours,

Ernest Farmer, Director of Pupil Transportation

cc: Wayne Qualls Captain Ralph Swift

NHTSA 12/30/75 press release

Concerns the definition of school bus. (Text omitted)

ID: nht92-7.32

Open

DATE: April 22, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Mark A. Sedlack -- Product Design Manager, Century Products Co.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 3/11/92 from Mark A. Sedlack to Paul J. Rice (OCC 7079)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter seeking an interpretation of Standard No. 213, Child Restraint Systems (49 CFR S571.213). More specifically, you asked how compliance testing would be conducted for a rear-facing child restraint labeled for use by children weighing up to 25 pounds.

The initial question we must address is what size test dummy would be used for compliance testing. S7.1 of Standard No. 213 provides that the six-month-old dummy is used for testing a child restraint system that is recommended by its manufacturer for use by children in a weight range that includes children weighing not more than 20 pounds. S7.2 of Standard No. 213 provides that the three-year-old dummy is used for testing a child restraint system that is recommended by its manufacturer for use by children in a weight range that includes children weighing more than 20 pounds. Since the rear-facing child restraint in your example is recommended for use both by children weighing less than and more than 20 pounds, either the six-month-old or the three-year-old dummy could be used in the agency's compliance testing, as provided in S6.1.2.3 of the standard.

Your letter stated that you understood that this rear-facing child restraint would be subject to testing using the three-year-old dummy. However, you indicated that neither your company nor a testing facility understood how the three-year-old dummy could be installed in a rear-facing child restraint. You asked for clarification of how the three-year-old dummy could be installed.

At the outset, I must note that it is impossible for me to offer any guidance for how to install the test dummy in your particular rear-facing child restraint because I do not know the details of your design. I can offer general guidance that you should be able to apply to your particular design.

The procedures to be followed in positioning the three-year-old dummy in any child restraint other than a car bed are set forth in S6.1.2.3.1 of Standard No. 213. If the rear-facing child restraint does not physically permit the three-year-old dummy to be positioned in accordance with S6.1.2.3.1, then that rear-facing child restraint cannot be recommended by its manufacturer for use in the rear-facing position by children weighing more than 20 pounds. This conclusion is similar to the agency conclusion announced in a July 8, 1988 letter to Mr. Donald Friedman that an infant restraint so small it cannot accommodate the six-month-old test dummy cannot be certified as complying with Standard No. 213.

In our letter to Mr. Friedman, the agency indicated that rulemaking could be initiated to sanction the use of an additional test dummy to evaluate the performance of a child restraint. However, that rulemaking would have to

include an agency determination that this additional test dummy is a reliable surrogate for measuring the system's performance in an actual crash. We can make the same statements with regard to the situation described in your letter. You stated in your letter that you have tested your company's existing convertible seats in the rear-facing position "with a CAMI dummy modified to 25 pounds with satisfactory results." If you have any information or test data showing that the CAMI dummy so modified is a reliable surrogate for measuring the performance of your convertible systems in the rear-facing position, such information might be helpful to this agency in deciding whether to initiate rulemaking in this area. Until such a rulemaking action were completed and amended provisions in effect, however, you cannot recommend that a child restraint be used for children weighing more than 20 pounds if that child restraint cannot accommodate the three-year-old test dummy.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need some additional information on this subject, please feel free to contact Deirdre Fujita of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht92-7.33

Open

DATE: April 21, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Allan Schwartz -- President, Tron Industries, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 2/29/92 from Allan Schwartz to Taylor Vinson (OCC 7064)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter of February 29, 1992, to Taylor Vinson of this Office, with respect to the acceptability of your product, Lumitron, under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108.

Lumitron is described as "an electronic neon lighting kit for vehicles which is sold and installed as an automotive aftermarket product." You state that it is "legal for street use as long as it is installed below bumper level and under the vehicle." You further state that both the Florida Highway Patrol and Kevin Cavey of this agency "confirmed" your findings that Lumitron "falls under" Standard No. 108. However, the State of Louisiana has "not uniformly adopted or follow the Code of Federal Regulations, 49 CFR Ch. V as it pertains to automotive aftermarket lighting." It appears that authorities in Louisiana believe Lumitron is legal but it has to be approved by the Commissioner. You have asked us for "a letter confirming what we already understand about this regulation that we could submit to the Commissioner. He would then be able to adopt it as Louisiana Law thus making our product legal for use in that state."

Contrary to your assumption and those of the officials you mention, Lumitron is not covered by Standard No. 108. The only aftermarket equipment directly regulated by the standard is equipment intended to replace original equipment required by Standard No. 108, such as headlamps. Such is not the case with Lumitron.

Standard No. 108 was issued under the authority of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. We have interpreted that Act as prohibiting the installation on a vehicle of aftermarket equipment by a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business that, in the words of the statute, "render inoperative in whole or in part" any of the vehicle's required lighting equipment. We understand that Lumitron casts a light on the pavement under the vehicle. We would, of course, be concerned if the intensity of that light served to mask the intensity of such required lighting items as turn signal and stop lamps, or served to distract other drivers so that the lamps required lamps might be considered partially inoperative.

Regulation of aftermarket equipment such as Lumitron is within the jurisdiction of each State where Lumitron is sold and used, and the Commissioner in Louisiana may proceed as he deems fit. We are unable to advise you on State laws, but if you are interested in how the laws of other jurisdictions may affect Lumitron, we suggest that you write for an opinion to the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 4600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22203.

ID: nht92-1.34

Open

DATE: December 8, 1992

FROM: George D. James, Jr. -- Safety Chairman, Unit 169 WBCCI

TO: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, U.S. Department of Transportation, NHTSA; Attention: Stephen P. Wood -- Assistant Chief Counsel for Rulemaking, U.S. Department of Transportation, NHTSA

TITLE: RE Tekonsha Electronic Brake Control ("Control")

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 5-21-93 from John Womack to George D. James, Jr. (A41; Std. 108)

TEXT: Thank you for your 12/4/92 reply to my 10/24/92 letter objecting to your "approval" of this brake controller. Because your agency does not "approve", "endorse" or offer assurance of compliance of any M.V, equipment, I err in thinking you have "approved" these controllers.

I still believe that using trailer brakes without activating the STOP LIGHTS is an unsafe procedure AND you imply approval.

You state that "at this time we do not have any data indicating a real-world safety problem created by the use of the Tekonsha brake control".

What data do you need to realize that a rear end collision (or a following vehicle choosing to leave the road to avoid one) or chain-reaction collisions caused by a slowing or stopping vehicle WITHOUT STOP LIGHTS BEING ACTIVATED is not a "real world" safety problem?

How many thousands of such accidents have already been recorded? How many violation citations with or without penalties have been made because of inoperating stop lights?

Mr. Wood, I've just talked with the Macon County Sheriff's Department and the State Highway Patrol (North Carolina) and they both confirm that:

1. There'll be a lot more collisions on the highways if vehicles are permitted to run with non-operating stop lights, and

2. Don't get caught here with stop lights not working or you'll for sure be ticketed.

Now by George, you KNOW this is right. YOU DON'T NEED "MORE DATA"! HOW CAN YOU SAY YOUR AGENCY'S GOAL IS MINIMIZING DEATHS AND INJURIES ON THE HIGHWAYS, and still defend your decision re these new brake controllers? HOW CAN YOU SAY YOU NEED MORE DATA INDICATING A POTENTIAL PROBLEM?

ID: nht92-1.35

Open

DATE: 12/07/92

FROM: PAUL JACKSON RICE -- CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA

TO: MARK V. SCHWARTZ -- ACCOUNT EXECUTIVE, ENTRAN DEVICES, INC.

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 10-28-92 FROM MARK V. SCHWARTZ TO PAUL J. RICE (OCC 7927)

TEXT: This responds to your October 28, 1992 letter, asking me to reconsider my September 29, 1992 letter to you interpreting 49 CFR Part 572, Anthropomorphic Test Dummies. More specifically, my September 29, 1992 letter addressed the requirement in @ 572.36(g) that the thorax and knee impactor accelerometers in the Hybrid III test dummy "shall have the dimensions and characteristics of Endevco Model 7231c or equivalent."

You had asked if one of your company's accelerometer models would be deemed "equivalent," within the meaning of @ 572.36(g), to the specified make and model accelerometer. I stated that Part 572 sets forth the specifications with which test dummies must comply if those test dummies are to be used in this agency's compliance testing. I further stated that the agency has always used the specified make and model accelerometer in the compliance testing conducted to date. Thus, it has not been necessary for the agency to make any determination of which accelerometers, if any, are "equivalent" to the specified accelerometer for agency compliance testing purposes. Until the agency makes a determination about equivalent accelerometers, I indicated that the matter is one to be worked out between your company and prospective users of your company's accelerometers. I also indicated that NHTSA will not review the use of any particular accelerometers in certification testing, including your company's accelerometers, unless the test results indicate a problem or problems caused by those accelerometers.

In your October 28, 1992 follow-up letter, you expressed that you were "extremely disappointed" with my September 29 letter. You stated that "[though] your letter states that users of accelerometers are free to define equivalence, the reality is that they will take no unnecessary course of action that varies from your compliance testing." You said that you had spoken with "technical decision makers" at Chrysler, Ford, and GM and all three indicated that they would not use an accelerometer for development and certification work, when a different accelerometer must be used in NHTSA's compliance testing. Accordingly, you again asked that the agency state whether a model of accelerometer manufactured by Entran is equivalent to the make and model of accelerometer specified for use in compliance testing.

In order to make a determination of which accelerometer models are "equivalent" to the make and model of accelerometer currently specified for use in compliance testing, NHTSA must conduct an analysis to identify the attributes that will ensure that an accelerometer measures results in the relevant crash environment that are equivalent to the results that would be measured in that crash environment by the currently specified accelerometer. This analysis would require an expenditure of agency time and resources, although the amount of the expenditure is currently not known. These expenditures would not benefit the agency's compliance testing efforts, since the currently specified accelerometer is readily available, nor would the expenditures contribute generally toward the agency's safety mission. Accordingly, the agency cannot justify the expenditure of resources needed to make an analysis of the equivalence issue at this time.

However, accelerometer manufacturers and other interested parties are free to make their own analyses of equivalence, using their resources. The interested parties may present their analyses of equivalence to potential users of a non-specified accelerometer, in order to demonstrate to the potential user that the non-specified accelerometer will be found equivalent to the specified accelerometer when NHTSA makes its determination of equivalence. If the potential user is convinced by such demonstration, that party can then use the non-specified accelerometer in its testing.

In my previous letter to you, I stated that NHTSA will not review the use of any particular accelerometers in certification testing, unless the test results indicate a problem or problems caused by those accelerometers. This statement was included in that letter to make clear to all parties that the absence of a NHTSA determination of equivalence for a particular accelerometer model does not represent some sort of negative finding by the agency with respect to the performance or capabilities of that particular accelerometer. This statement has apparently served that purpose. For instance, it has come to our attention that Chrysler and General Motors have procured significant numbers of Entran accelerometers for use in vehicle crash tests. Thus, it appears that vehicle manufacturers and other potential users correctly understand the meaning of the current specification in Part 572 for one particular accelerometer model, and that the specification of one particular accelerometer model in Part 572 does not pose any insuperable obstacle to the use of other, non-specified accelerometer models for testing other than NHTSA's certification testing. There is, therefore, no compelling need for NHTSA to use its resources to conduct an analysis of accelerometer equivalence.

ID: nht92-1.36

Open

DATE: 12/07/92

FROM: PAUL JACKSON RICE -- CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA

TO: MARK W. RUSSO

COPYEE: MICHAEL F. HECKER -- MICHO INDUSTRIES

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 9-17-92 FROM MARK W. RUSSO TO WALTER MYERS (OCC 7817); ALSO ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 7-14-92 FROM PAUL J. RICE TO MICHAEL F. HECKER (STD. 222)

TEXT: This responds to your letter to Walter Myers of this office regarding the applicability of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 222 to the R-Bar Passenger Restraint System and related issues. I note that on July 13, 1992, I sent you copies of five previous NHTSA letters which addressed the use of "safety bars" in school buses. In your new letter, you expressed a number of safety concerns about the R-Bar and asked whether there have been any further development at NHTSA regarding the R-Bar subject since May 14, 1992, the date of the most recent of the five letters I sent to you.

We have issued one additional letter concerning Standard No. 222 and the use of "safety bars" in school buses. The letter (copy enclosed) was sent to Mr. Michael F. Hecker of Micho Industries on July 14, 1992, and concerned how the R-Bar should be positioned during testing under Standard No. 222. As discussed in that letter, a school bus must meet the requirements of Standard No. 222 with a "safety bar" in every position at which it may be placed.

I also note that manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment are subject to the defect provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. If data indicated that devices such as "safety bars" were exposing occupants to an unreasonable risk of injury, such as by excessive abdominal or leg loading during a crash, the agency might conduct a defect investigation which could lead to a safety recall.

If you have any further questions or need any additional information, feel free to contact Mr. Myers at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht92-1.37

Open

DATE: 12/07/92

FROM: PAUL JACKSON RICE -- CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA

TO: KENNETH W. WEBSTER II -- PROJECT ENGINEER, TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH CENTER INC.

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 10-15-92 FROM KENNETH W. WEBSTER, II TO PAUL J. RICE (OCC 7872)

TEXT: This responds to your letter to me dated October 15, 1992, seeking an interpretation of Standard No. 110, Tire Selection and Rims - Passenger Cars (49 CFR @ 571.110). More specifically, you were interested in a clarification of the test conditions for determining compliance with the requirement in S4.4.1(b) of Standard No. 110, which provides that each rim on a new passenger car shall "[in] the event of a rapid loss of inflation pressure with the vehicle traveling in a straight line at a speed of 60 miles per hour, retain the deflated tire until the vehicle can be stopped with a controlled braking application."

In your letter, supplemented by your November 2, 1992 telephone conversation with Mr. Walter Myers of my staff, you explained that your company, Transportation Research Center Inc., has conducted tests on a passenger car that is to be marketed in the United States. Two tire and rim configurations are available with the car: a steel rim mounted with a Goodyear tire, and a decorative aluminum rim mounted with a Michelin tire. I understand these tires and rims to be the same size and to have the same nominal dimensions. In addition, I understand the tires to be of the same type and construction. You stated that you tested both tires on both rims in accordance with this agency's test procedure for determining compliance with Standard No. 110 (TP-110-02). The tire/rim combinations being tested were mounted on the left front and right rear positions, but in some cases tires made by a different manufacturer, but of the same size, type, and composition as the tires at the test positions, were mounted at the other wheel positions. You asked whether all tire and rim configurations on the vehicle for testing under S4.4.1(b) of Standard No. 110 must be made by the same manufacturer and otherwise be exactly alike. The short answer to your question is no.

Before discussing your specific question, however, I would like to explain how the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) determines compliance in cases where a standard does not specify a particular adjustment position or test condition. In issuing Federal motor vehicle safety standards, NHTSA endeavors to specify all relevant adjustment positions or test conditions to ensure that our standards are objective and practicable. As a practical matter, however, it is not always possible to anticipate every conceivable adjustment position or test condition.

In those cases where a standard does not specify a particular adjustment or test condition, we consider several factors in interpreting the standard. We begin with the presumption that the requirements of the standard must be met regardless of such adjustment position or test condition, because the language of the standard does not limit the applicability of its requirements to any such adjustment position or test condition. NHTSA then examines the language of the standard as a whole and its purposes, to see if the language of the standard or its purposes indicate an implicit intent to limit such adjustment positions or test conditions and what limitation was intended.

Applying this approach in response to your inquiry, we believe that the language and the purpose of S4.4.1(b) of Standard 110 are clear, namely that the rim must retain the deflated tire until the vehicle can be stopped with a controlled braking application. The focus of the test is the ability of the rim to retain the deflated tire without unduly affecting the vehicle dynamics. Hence, the only limitation on the tire/rim combinations at the other wheel positions would be that those other tire/rim combinations that are not being tested must not unduly affect the dynamics of the vehicle (and, hence, the test result) when combined with the tire/rim combination being tested. Thus, unless testing the compact spare tire provided by the vehicle manufacturer, NHTSA would conduct its compliance testing for S4.4.1(b) of Standard 110 using tires of the same size, type (all-season, mud/snow, etc.), and construction (radial, bias-belted, etc.) as the tire being tested on the other three wheel positions. NHTSA would not, however, limit its testing to using only tires made by the same manufacturer as the tire being tested at the other three wheel positions.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Mr. Myers at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht92-1.38

Open

DATE: 12/07/92

FROM: PAUL JACKSON RICE -- CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA

TO: RICHARD HORIAN -- PRESIDENT, WOODLEAF CORP.

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 11-6-92 FROM RICHARD HORIAN TO PAUL J. RICE (OCC 7980)

TEXT: This responds to your two letters of November 6, 1992, with respect to the allowability under Federal regulations of the "Sudden Brake Indicator Hazard Light." As you describe it, "when a driver engages in hard braking, a circuit activates a separate lighting system to warn other drivers to pay special attention to a potentially hazardous situation."

This system will not utilize any of the existing rear lights on a vehicle, and will consist of a single lamp or pair of lamps, either mounted separately, or in the same housing as the center high-mounted stop lamp. The system will be red or amber in color, and either steady burning or flashing. The system is activated only when a predetermined threshold of pressure is reached upon depression of the brake pedal.

Supplementary lighting systems such as the one you have described are permissible as original motor vehicle equipment under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment if they do not impair the effectiveness of the lighting systems required by the standard, or if there is no provision of the standard that affects them. Paragraph S5.4 of Standard No. 108 specifically prohibits the physical combination of the center highmounted stop lamp with any other lamp or reflective device, thus your system could not be used in a common housing with the center light (see copy of enclosed letter to Mr. S. Suzuki on this subject). However, if the system is mounted separately, under the circumstances you have presented, we do not believe that there would be any direct impairment of the required rear lights, or indirect impairment such as might be created when confusion may result upon simultaneous operation of the supplementary light and any required light.

As the letter to Mr. Suzuki indicates, passenger cars manufactured before September 1, 1985, were not required to be equipped with the center lamp. This means that your light could be combined in the same housing as a center lamp intended for installation on vehicles manufactured before September 1, 1985, but it could not be part of a replacement center lamp intended for use on vehicles manufactured subsequently. In addition, with the exception just noted, installation of the system on a vehicle in use would not appear to affect the safety functioning of any safety system necessary for continued conformance of the vehicle, it would appear that your system is acceptable for sale and installation in the aftermarket as well. However, the individual States have the authority to regulate lamps for vehicles in use, and we suggest that you contact the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) for an opinion as to whether the system is permissible under State laws. AAMVA's address is 4600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22203.

ID: nht92-1.39

Open

DATE: 12/07/92

FROM: RICHARD LANGLAIS -- PRELCO, INC.

TO: MARVIN SHAW

TITLE: FVMSS 205

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 2-23-93 FROM JOHN WOMACK TO RICHARD LANGLAIS (A40; STD 205; PART SS2); ALSO ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 11-26-91 FROM KATHLEEN DEMETER TO RICHARD LANGLAIS

TEXT: Last year, I received the information regarding the procedure to follow in order to get a D.O.T. number (I have enclosed a copy).

Would it be possible for you to give me more details about items 5, 6 and 7? Who can be our agent? Do you know some agents or firms which are specialized in this kind of service?

I would appreciate if you could get back to me at your earliest convenience.

Thanking you in advance for your collaboration, I remain,

ID: nht92-1.4

Open

DATE: 12/29/92

FROM: PAUL JACKSON RICE -- CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA

TO: LEO WENSTRUP -- MANAGER - TECHNICAL SERVICES, EATON CORPORATION, AXLE AND BRAKE DIVISION

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 11-3-92 FROM LEO WENSTRUP TO NHTSA OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL (OCC 7963)

TEXT: This responds to your letter asking about the dynamometer requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems (49 CFR 571.121). You explained that you have experienced problems in conducting certification testing of brake lining for vehicles in a city refuse fleet. Specifically, you stated that while the fade portion of the dynamometer test specifies decelerations from 50 miles per hour (mph) to 15 mph, the trucks in question have a maximum vehicle speed governed to 45 mph. You asked at what speed should the fade portion of the test be conducted given that these trucks are governed to a lower speed. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our regulations to you.

Some background information on Federal motor vehicle safety laws and regulations may be helpful. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1381 et seq., Safety Act) authorizes this agency to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA, however, does not approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial products. Instead, the Safety Act establishes a "self-certification" process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet all applicable safety standards.

Manufacturers must have some basis for their certification that a product complies with all applicable safety standards. This does not necessarily mean that a manufacturer must conduct the specific tests set forth in an applicable standard. Certifications may be based on, among other things, engineering analyses, actual testing, and computer simulations. Whatever the basis for certification, however, the manufacturer must certify that the product complies with a standard as it is written, i.e., that the vehicle will pass all applicable requirements if it is tested exactly according to the standard's test conditions and other specifications.

Standard No. 121's dynamometer test requirements are set forth in section S5.4. That section specifies that brake assemblies must meet the requirements of S5.4.1 (brake retardation force--relevant only to towed vehicles), S5.4.2 (brake power), and S5.4.3 (brake recovery), under the conditions of S6.2. The purpose of the dynamometer test requirements is to help ensure that brakes retain adequate stopping capacity during and after exposure to conditions caused by prolonged or severe use, such as long, downhill driving. In particular, the specified decelerations are designed to heat the brakes to simulate such severe driving conditions.

In conducting a compliance test, NHTSA would follow the procedures set forth in Standard No. 121. The standard expressly provides that decelerations are made from 50 mph to 15 mph in the dynamometer tests. See, for example, S5.4.2 and S5.4.2.1. Nothing in Standard No. 121 specifies an exception for vehicles with a maximum speed below 50 mph. Moreover, since the tests in question are dynamometer tests and not road tests, there would be no difficulty in conducting the tests at a speed higher than the vehicle's maximum speed.

I note that this opinion assumes that Standard No. 121 applies to the vehicles in question. Certain vehicles with slow maximum speeds are excluded from the standard's coverage. See S3. However, these exclusions do not appear to apply to the refuse trucks in question.

Your letter appears to imply that Standard No. 121's dynamometer tests are inappropriate for vehicles which have a maximum speed governed to less than 50 mph. We note, however, that a governor set at 45 mph does not prohibit a vehicle from achieving speeds greater than 50 mph in certain situations such as driving downhill. In addition, as indicated above, the specified decelerations are designed to heat the brakes to simulate the severe driving conditions caused by prolonged and severe use and long downhill driving. The same degree of heating can occur at speeds below 50 mph. Therefore, we believe that the specified tests are appropriate for vehicles with a maximum speed governed to below 50 mph.

If you have any further questions, please feel free to call Mr. Marvin Shaw of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Request an Interpretation

You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:

The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.

Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.