NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
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ID: aiam4419OpenMr. Robert K. St. Francis, Director, Office of Fleet Management, Delivery Services Department, United States Postal Service, 475 L'Enfant Plaza, SW, Washington, DC 20260-7200; Mr. Robert K. St. Francis Director Office of Fleet Management Delivery Services Department United States Postal Service 475 L'Enfant Plaza SW Washington DC 20260-7200; Dear Mr. St. Francis: This is in reply to your letter of March 26, 1987, regarding deliver vans constructed to Postal Service specifications. You have asked for relief from the requirement that these vehicles be delivered with a license plate lamp because, except in the District of Columbia (DC), the Postal Service is not required to license its vehicles. According to contract specification with the manufacturer of the vehicles, Grumman Allied Industries, Inc., the license plate bracket and lamp assembly are not required, however, the Postal Service has required the wiring and identification of its location for installations for DC service, and for future use after disposal by the Postal Service.; As you know, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 *Lamps Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment* requires motor vehicles to be manufactured with license plate lamps meeting the requirements of SAE Standard J587 OCT81; License Plate Lamps (Rear Registration Plate Lamps)*. Paragraph 2 o SAE J587 defines a license plate lamp as 'a lamp used to illuminate the license plate on the rear of a vehicle.' If a manufacturer knows that the vehicle, as sold it its first purchaser, will not be required to bear a rear registration plate, then it may produce the vehicle without a license plate lamp, and this omission will not constitute a failure to comply with Standard No. 108.; Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam2934OpenMr. Richard D. Phillips, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 66, Ludowici, GA 31316; Mr. Richard D. Phillips Attorney at Law P.O. Box 66 Ludowici GA 31316; Dear Mr. Phillips: This responds to your December 15, 1978, questions about the status o school buses subject to recall for antilock malfunction now that the 'no lockup' requirement of Standard No. 121, *Air Brake Systems*, has been invalidated in the cases of trucks and trailers. You also ask whether the antilock systems in question must be reconnected, whether the vehicles would thereby be made more or less safe, and what the effect of continued disconnection might be on liability considerations.; I have enclosed the agency's official interpretation of the effect o the invalidation on the operational status of vehicles equipped with antilock. In the case of vehicles subject to recall, we stated that section 154 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1414) mandates an 'adequate repair,' and that, in the NHTSA's view, the benefits of 'no lockup' performance mandate the offer of repair and reconnection.; The letter also states that disconnection, consistent with regulation of other authorities and the instructions of the manufacturer, would not violate the Vehicle Safety Act. While the NHTSA finds that the repair would provide desirable 'no lockup' performance, we are unable to counsel you on the Long County Board of Education's liability if the system were not reconnected.; Sincerely, Joseph J. levin, Jr., Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam0909OpenMr. David J. Humphreys, Recreational Vehicle Institute, Inc., Suite 406, 1140 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, DC 20006; Mr. David J. Humphreys Recreational Vehicle Institute Inc. Suite 406 1140 Connecticut Avenue Washington DC 20006; Dear Mr. Humphreys: Your letters of September 8 and October 16, 1972, raise a questio concerning the applicability of S4.3 of Standard 207 to certain folding seats in recreational vehicles. Your position is that the typical dinette seat that folds down to form a bed is 'a seat having a back that is adjustable only for the comfort of its occupants' and is therefore excepted from the restraining device requirement of S4.3.; In a letter that we sent to Auto Top, Inc. on September 8, 1972, w distinguished between excepted seats and non-excepted seats on the basis of the degrees of arc through which the back could be adjusted,(sic) A back adjusting only a few degrees would be excepted under this interpretation, while a seat that folded flat to make a bed would not be excepted and would therefore have to have a restraining device. After reconsidering the background of these exceptions, we have decided to modify that interpretation. Although there is likely to be a difference between these seats in the degree of protection they give the occupant, we cannot find that this difference was reflected in the drafting of the S4.3 exceptions.; The S4.3 exceptions were created by a notice of rulemaking publishe April 4, 1967 (32 F.R. 5498). The exception in issue here was adopted in response to a petition by the Rover Company, who requested special treatment for a seat with a back that had a range of adjustment from 77 degrees to the horizontal down to 19 degrees to the horizontal. In granting an exception to the type of seat depicted by Rover, the agency therefore included seats with backs that folded until they were substantially horizontal. We must thus conclude that a seat whose back folds backward with respect to the seat cushion to form a bed is not required under S4.3 to have a device to restrain the backward folding of the seat back.; However, the exemption granted in response to the Rover petition doe not cover the case you have described. A seat having a back that folds for the occupant's comfort but that also folds in another manner is required to have a restraining device for the second folding mode. The usual example of such a seat is a front seat in a two-door sedan that folds forward for entry to the rear and has a back that adjusts through a rearward arc for the occupant's comfort. Such a seat must have a restraining device to prevent forward movement because the adjustment of the back is not 'only' for the occupant's comfort. A dinette seat that has an additional folding or hinging mode must therefore have a restraining device to guard against the effects of the seat's folding in this mode during a crash. For example, a seat whose base is hinged to move the bottom cushion into the space between the dinette seats must be restrained by a device conforming to S4.3.; With specific reference to the type of seat shown in the attachments t your letters, the downward motion of the seat back would be exempt under S4.3, but the motion of the bottom cushion is such that it would have to have a restraining device conforming to S4.3.; As you describe the seat, a restraining device is provided. However without subjecting it to a compliance test under S4.3.2 we are unable to say whether it conforms to S4.3.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam3626OpenMr. F. Michael Petler, Head, Administration, Government Relations Department, Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., P.O. Box 1100, Brea, CA 92621; Mr. F. Michael Petler Head Administration Government Relations Department Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd. P.O. Box 1100 Brea CA 92621; Dear Mr. Petler: This responds to your October 27, 1982, letter asking for permission t place the certification labels for certain motorcycles produced by Suzuki Motor Co. in locations not previously permitted by Part 567, *Certification*.; You request alternative locations, because some motorcycles ar equipped with fairings as standard equipment. These fairings would obscure the certification labels if the labels were to be installed in their required location. You propose, as an alternative, the installation of the labels on the down tubes in front of the engine on either the right or left side. In consideration of the problems of installing the certification labels in their normal positions on vehicles equipped with fairings and since the agency desires that these labels be easily readable, we grant your request to install your labels in these limited instances in the alternative locations that you suggested.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam3333OpenMr. Kenneth D. Uding, Project Manager, Amerace Brands Division, Amerace Corporation, 1201 Mark Street, Elk Grove Village, Illinios(sic) 60007; Mr. Kenneth D. Uding Project Manager Amerace Brands Division Amerace Corporation 1201 Mark Street Elk Grove Village Illinios(sic) 60007; Dear Mr. Uding: This responds to your July 15, 1980, letter asking whether Standard No 125, *Warning Devices*, permits the manufacture of a device that must be assembled by the user prior to use. The device that you describe would require its base to be attached to a triangular section by the use of a threaded stud and a wing nut.; Standard No. 125 states in section S5.1.3 that '[t]he warning devic shall be designed to be erected, and replaced in its container, without the use if tools.' This statement implies that some manual operation to erect a warning device is permissible as long as the assembly does not require the use of any tools. For the device that you mention, it would appear that its two section would be coupled together by the use of a wing nut which would be tightened manually without the use of tools. If this description of your device is accurate, it is permissible to produce a warning device in this manner.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam2871OpenMr. Charles J. Kerr, Southwest Research Institute, 6220 Culebra Road, Post Office Drawer 28510, San Antonio, TX 78284; Mr. Charles J. Kerr Southwest Research Institute 6220 Culebra Road Post Office Drawer 28510 San Antonio TX 78284; Dear Mr. Kerr: This responds to your June 27, 1978, letter concerning the requirement of Safety Standard No. 207 as they would apply to pedestal seat assemblies for use in van vehicles. You ask whether your test methodology is consistent with the requirements of the standard and whether the pedestal base is considered part of the seat assembly.; As you know, the agency does not approve a manufacturer's test methods A manufacturer must exercise due care to ascertain that his product is in compliance with all applicable motor vehicle safety standards and regulations. While your test methods appear to be reasonable, the agency will test seats in the vehicle rather than on a surrogate test frame. You must exercise due care to assure that your simulated test is a true determination whether the seats would comply with the standard when tested as provided in that standard. (The vehicle manufacturer is, of course, responsible for compliance with Standard 207.); Regarding your second question, the pedestal base would be considere part of the seat assembly for purposes of Standard 207. This means that the agency would test the entire assembly by applying a force of 20 times the combined weight of the seat and the pedestal, contrary to your simulated test procedure of using only the weight of the seat frame and adjuster, without the pedestal base attached.; Finally, the force requirements of Safety Standard No. 210, *Seat Bel Assembly Anchorages*, (5,000 pounds) are applied simultaneously with the force requirements in Standard No. 207, if the anchorages are connected to the vehicle seat, to the pedestal, or to the pedestal base.; Please contact this office if you have any further questions, an please excuse the delay in this response.; Sincerely, Joseph J. Levin, Jr., Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam3763OpenMr. Richard P. Keim, Manager of Automotive Glass, Replacement Services, Libby=Owens-Ford Company, 811 Madison Avenue, P.O. Box 799, Toledo, OH 43695; Mr. Richard P. Keim Manager of Automotive Glass Replacement Services Libby=Owens-Ford Company 811 Madison Avenue P.O. Box 799 Toledo OH 43695; Dear Mr. Keim: This responds to your letter of September 26, 1983, regarding th certification and marking requirements for glazing under S6 of Safety Standard No. 205, *Glazing Materials*. You stated that you are interested in 'out-sourcing some of your replacement auto glass requirements' to other manufacturers and sought clarification on four points concerning glazing identification.; Section 6 of Standard No. 205 deals specifically with the certificatio and marking requirements for glazing materials. The standard incorporates by reference the American National Standard 'Safety Code for Safety Glazing Materials for Glazing Motor Vehicles Operating on Land Highways,' Z26.6-1966 (ANS Z26). You ask whether it is permissible under National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) regulations to allow another manufacturer, using its own DOT code mark, to put an LOF trademark and logo on its glass.; Section 6 of ANS Z26 states that a manufacturer shall mark safet glazing materials with its own 'distinctive designation or trademark.' The purpose behind these markings was to aid in the tracing of glazing materials and the enforcement of applicable standards. Your letter states that the other manufacturer will place their DOT code mark on the safety glass. Since the other manufacturer is using its own DOT code mark, the tracing and enforcement policies will not be circumvented. Therefore, under these circumstances, the use of LOF's logo and trademark is not violative of Standard No. 205.; Further, you ask whether another glass manufacturer can use LOF's 'M number on his glass with LOF's permission. As long as the model number is an accurate description of the specific glazing material being produced, the other manufacturer may use it.; Lastly, you ask if the name of the country of manufacture must appea on the safety glass if not manufactured in the United States. The standard does not mandate that the country of manufacturer be marked on the safety glazing materials.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam3299OpenMr. Milton M. Singleton, Vice President, Yarbrough Manufacturing Co., Inc., P.O. Box 848, Arlington, Texas 76010; Mr. Milton M. Singleton Vice President Yarbrough Manufacturing Co. Inc. P.O. Box 848 Arlington Texas 76010; Dear Mr. Singleton: This will confirm your telephone conversation of April 23, 1980, wit Mr. Nelson Erickson of the Office of Vehicle Safety Standard concerning Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 115 - Vehicle identification number.; The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does no give advance approval of a manufacturer's compliance with motor vehicle safety standard or regulations, as it is the manufacturer's responsibility under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act to ensure that its vehicles comply with the applicable safety standards. However, my office has reviewed your proposed system. Based on our understanding of the information which you have provided, your system apparently complies with Standard No. 115.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam2522OpenMr. Arthur Wolinsky, President, Treon Mfg. Corp., 8000 Cooper Avenue, Glendale, NY, 11227; Mr. Arthur Wolinsky President Treon Mfg. Corp. 8000 Cooper Avenue Glendale NY 11227; Dear Mr. Wolinsky: This responds to your February 4, 1977, question whether Standard No 302, *Flammability of Interior Materials*, applies to materials supplied to the aftermarket for use in vans.; Standard No. 302 does not directly apply to aftermarket materials o components. As a vehicle standard it applies only to those original components or materials of new vehicles specified in paragraph S4.1 of the standard and installed in a vehicle prior to its first sale for purposes other than resale (15 U.S.C. S1397(b)(1)). Therefore, materials that you supply to the final vehicle purchaser are not subject to the requirements of the standard.; I would also note that, with regard to the installation of interio materials in motor vehicles after the first sale for purposes other than resale, no manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business may knowingly render inoperative a device or element of design (such as flame retardant materials) installed in compliance with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard (15 U.S.C. S1397(a)(2)(A)). Therefore, although the materials you produce may not always be required to meet the requirements of the standard when sold in the aftermarket, there may be situations in which the materials could not be legally installed by a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business unless they were in compliance with the standard.; Sincerely, Frank A. Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam2172OpenMr. Frank W. Allen, Assistant General Counsel, General Motors Corporation, General Motors Building, Detroit, Michigan 48202; Mr. Frank W. Allen Assistant General Counsel General Motors Corporation General Motors Building Detroit Michigan 48202; Dear Mr. Allen: This is in response to your letter of December 2, 1975, asking thi agency's opinion as to whether Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 115, *Vehicle Identification Number*, would preempt any differing State law or regulation specifying the content of a vehicle identification number. You asked the question in the context of a vehicle equipment Safety Commission action recommending such a regulation to the States.; Standard No. 115 requires a vehicle identification that is unique to manufacturer during any ten-year period. It does not specify the length or the content of the number. The question, therefore, becomes whether the Federal safety standard on vehicle identification numbers was intended generally to cover all aspects of those numbers, and preempt any differing State rules, analogously to the situation in which Standard 108 was held to be preemptive in *Motorcycle Industry Council v. Younger*, No. CIV S74-126 (E. D. Cal. 1974). The guiding rule, as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-142 (1963), is 'whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing federal superintendence of the field.' Under the accepted doctrines as set forth in cases such as *Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham*, 393 U.S. 268 (1969), and *Chrysler v. Tofany*, 419 F.2d 499, 511-12 (2d Cir. 1969), the interpretation of this question by the administering agency is 'of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'; The NHTSA has determined that the safety standard on vehicl identification numbers, No. 115, is intended to cover all aspects of vehicle identification numbering relative to the vehicles to which it applies, and that any aspects for which there are no specific requirements were intended by this agency to be left to the discretion of the manufacturers. State regulations differing from the Federal standard on this subject are found to 'impair the federal superintendence of the field,' within the meaning of the *Florida Lime* doctrine, and any such State regulation would be preempted under section 103(d), 15 U.S.C. 1392(d).; Sincerely, Frank A. Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel |
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Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.