NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
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ID: hatlerOpen
Via Federal Express
Ms. Patricia R. Hatler Chief Legal and Governance Officer Nationwide One Nationwide Plaza Columbus, OH 43215
Dear Ms. Hatler:
We have received reports that certain insurance companies may be engaging in transactions that violate Federal odometer disclosure law with respect to vehicles damaged in Hurricane Sandy. Although we are not asserting that your company is engaging in such practices, we are writing to a number of auto insurance companies to remind them of the Federal odometer disclosure law requirements and ask them to review their practices regarding odometer disclosures. These letters do not accuse your company, or any other company, of violating the law.
We understand that when a flood-damaged vehicle is declared a total loss, the insurance company pays the insured the value of the vehicle, becomes the owner, and acquires control over the vehicle from the insured. However the reports we have received indicate that instead of completing the required odometer disclosure, some companies ask the insured to complete the odometer disclosure statement without listing the insurance company as the transferee. According to these reports, the insurance company will not sign the title, make an odometer disclosure, or transfer title. The insurance company then sells the vehicle at auction, keeps the proceeds from the auction, and provides the title with the odometer disclosure statement as signed by the insured to the auction buyer. The next person in the chain of title of the vehicle will be the buyer at auction. The insurance company will essentially be omitted from the chain of title.
In the circumstance described above, an insurance company is considered a transferee when it pays the insureds claim (in return it obtains ownership of the vehicle), and a transferor when it sells the vehicle at auction. See 49 C.F.R. 580.3. As a transferor, the insurance company is required to make certain disclosures.
Under federal odometer disclosure law, 49 U.S.C. 32705, a person transferring ownership of a motor vehicle shall give the transferee written disclosure of the cumulative mileage registered on the odometer. More specifically, under 49 C.F.R. 580.5, each transferor shall disclose the mileage to the transferee in writing on the title or on the document being used to reassign the title [t]his written disclosure must be signed by the transferor, including the printed name. The transferee must sign the disclosure statement, print his name, and return a copy to his transferor.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Marie Choi of my staff at (202) 366-1738 or via email at marie.choi@dot.gov.
Sincerely,
O. Kevin Vincent Chief Counsel
d: 12/20/12
Identical letters sent to:
Mr. Dana Proulx General Counsel GEICO Corporation One Geico Plaza Washington, DC 20076
Mr. Charles E. Jarrett Chief Legal Officer The Progressive Corporation 300 North Commons Blvd., OHF 11 Mayfield Village, OH 44143
Mr. Christopher C. Mansfield General Counsel Liberty Mutual Group 175 Berkeley Street Boston, MA 02117
Ms. Susan L. Lees General Counsel Allstate Insurance Company 3075 Sanders Road Northbrook, IL 60062
Mr. Garrett Paddor General Counsel Farmers New World Life Insurance Company 4680 Wilshire Blvd, 2nd Fl. Los Angeles, CA 90010
Mr. Steven A. Bennett General Counsel United Services Automobile Association (USAA) 9800 Fredericksburg Road San Antonio, TX 78288
Mr. Jeffrey W. Jackson General Counsel State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company One State Farm Plaza Bloomington, IL 61710
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ID: headstart3OpenHelen H. Taylor, Associate Commissioner Dear Ms. Taylor: This responds to your request that this agency revise its interpretation of the term "school" to exclude Head Start Programs. This would allow the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to implement a rule requiring that Head Start children be transported in vehicles that meet the Federal school bus safety standards other than those requiring traffic control devices. I regret the delay in responding to your request. You based your request on the Coats Human Services Reauthorization Act of 1998. In that Act, Congress amended section 636 of the Head Start Act (42 U.S.C. 9831) to provide that "[i]t is the purpose of this subchapter to promote school readiness by enhancing the social and cognitive development of low-income children through the provision, to low-income families, of health, educational, nutritional, social, and other services that are determined, based on family needs assessments, to be necessary." You believe that by employing the term "school readiness," Congress was distinguishing Head Start programs from school programs. In considering your request, we reviewed the basis for our existing interpretation of Head Start as a "school." That interpretation was based on the former National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (now codified at 49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq. ("the Vehicle Safety Act")). The Vehicle Safety Act defines "schoolbus" to mean a passenger motor vehicle designed to carry a driver and more than 10 passengers, that the Secretary of Transportation decides is likely to be used significantly to transport preprimary, primary, and secondary school students to or from school or an event related to school. (49 U.S.C. 30125(a)(1)) In applying the term to Head Start, we equated the provision of educational services with the status of being a school, and concluded that Head Start programs were functioning as preprimary schools. On December 29, 1977, NHTSA issued an opinion that Head Start facilities are functioning as preprimary schools, and that buses transporting children to and from those schools are functioning as school buses, under the Vehicle Safety Act and accordingly are subject to the Federal school bus safety standards. Specifically, the letter stated: NHTSA interprets the term "school" broadly, because the agency believes that this is the intent of the Motor Vehicle and School Bus Safety Amendments of 1974 (Pub. L. 93-492) which directed the creation of the school bus safety standards. Since the Head Start program is basically an educational program for preprimary students, the agency had determined that those facilities are schools and buses transporting children to and from them must comply with the Federal school bus safety requirements if they transport 10 or more passengers. Subsequently, in a May 10, 1982, opinion, we distinguished day care centers from Head Start facilities on the basis that "facilities which are essentially custodial, even though they have some educational components, are not considered to be schools." In light of the 1998 amendment to section 636 of the Head Start Act, we have concluded that the linkage we have made in the case of Head Start between educational services and schools is no longer valid. We believe that it is clear from the language of that section that Congress has made a distinction between Head Start programs and school programs. Accordingly, we are revising our interpretation of "school" to exclude Head Start. Consistent with the evident intent of section 636, we conclude that a Head Start agency is not operating a "school" for the purposes of the Vehicle Safety Act. This means that buses sold to transport children to and from a Head Start site will no longer be required under the Vehicle Safety Act to meet the Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to school buses. In revising our interpretation, we act with the knowledge that HHS intends to implement a rule requiring that Head Start children be transported in vehicles meeting the Federal school bus safety standards other than those for traffic control devices. This will serve to ensure the children's safety. Sincerely, Frank Seales, Jr. ref:VSA |
2000 |
ID: Heller2OpenMr. Peter E. Heller Logo Brake Light 216 Redwood Road Sag Harbor, NY 11963 Dear Mr. Heller: This responds to your letter requesting clarification regarding how Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment, applies to your patented product, the Logo Brake Light. Your letter described the Logo Brake Light as the merger of the center high mounted stop lamp with the automobile manufacturers logo, symbol or trademark. On a vehicle equipped with your product, when the service brake pedal is depressed, the lighted portion of the center high-mounted stop lamp (CHMSL) will illuminate in a shape representing the vehicle manufacturer or its brand. You enclosed three product samples (two in red and one in a combination of red and yellow). Based on the information you have provided to the agency and the analysis below, we have concluded that your product would not comply with Standard No. 108. By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue FMVSSs that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment (see 49 U.S.C. 30111 and 49 CFR Part 571). It is the responsibility of manufacturers to certify that their products conform to all applicable safety standards before they can be offered for sale (see 49 U.S.C. 30115 and 49 CFR Part 567). FMVSS No. 108 sets forth the requirements for both new and replacement motor vehicle lighting equipment. Turning to the specific issues raised by your letter, FMVSS No. 108 specifies requirements for CHMSLs in light vehicles. First, paragraph S5.1.1.27(a) of FMVSS No. 108 specifies that each CHMSL shall: (1) have an effective projected luminous lens area of not less than 2903 square mm (4.5 square inches); (2) meet the visibility requirements such that a signal is visible from 45 degrees to the left to 45 degrees to the right of the longitudinal axis of the vehicle; and (3) have minimum photometric values in the amount and location listed in Figure 10 of the standard. In addition, Table III, Required Motor Vehicle Lighting Equipment, specifies that the CHMSL must be red.[1] (A CHMSL produced using a combination of red and another color, such as yellow or silver, would not comply with the color requirement set forth in Table III.) Because we have not had the opportunity to examine your product in use, we cannot offer an opinion as to whether your product would meet the applicable area, visibility, and photometric requirements of Standard No. 108. However, we note that your product appears to violate the color restrictions set forth in Table III. Furthermore, in discussing your request with the agency in phone conversations, you directed us to your website, www.logobrakelight.com. Upon review of this site, we saw examples of your product mounted below the rear glass (one on a trunk lid and another on an SUV liftgate). We note that your product apparently would not comply with paragraph S5.3.1.8(a)(2), which requires that no portion of the lens [CHMSL] shall be lower than 6 inches below the rear window on convertibles, or 3 inches on other passenger cars. Thus, the applications of your Logo Brake Light CHMSL currently shown would likely violate this location requirement. Finally, we should also observe that a lighting standard is premised upon consistency of the message intended to warn or alert other drivers or pedestrians. We are concerned that the presence of both regular red and multicolor stop lamps with logos on them could result in confusion of other drivers or pedestrians. Please note that we are returning your product samples to you under separate cover. If you have further questions, please feel free to contact Eric Stas of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Anthony M. Cooke Chief Counsel ref:108 d.2/7/07
[1] We note that there is a separate provision under S5.1.1.27(b) of Standard No. 108 that allows two CHMSLs (with specifications different from those above) on light vehicles other than passenger cars which have a vertical centerline that, when the vehicle is viewed from the rear, is not located on a fixed body panel but separates one or two movable body sections, such as doors, which lacks sufficient space to install a single CHMSL. Our analysis, however, would not differ for either version of the CHMSL. |
2007 |
ID: hen2.jegOpenLawrence F. Henneberger, Esq. Dear Mr. Henneberger: This letter follows up a meeting between you, your client, William A. Leasure, Jr., Executive Director of the Truck Manufacturers Association, and members of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) staff. In the meeting, you and Mr. Leasure raised concerns about our September 22, 1997, interpretation letter, addressed to Mr. Leasure, concerning Standard No. 208's air bag labeling requirements. The requirements at issue were established in a final rule published on November 27, 1996. In our interpretation letter, we recognized that the rulemaking establishing the requirements focused on light vehicles. However, based on the regulatory text and purpose of the requirements, we concluded that the requirements also apply to medium and heavy trucks equipped with air bags. You and Mr. Leasure raised several concerns about our conclusion. Among other things, it was argued that the air bags used on these vehicles are very different than the ones used on light vehicles, and that the specific attention-getting warning labels developed for light vehicles are not needed for medium and heavy vehicles. It was also noted that the "DATES" section of the final rule establishing the labeling requirements identified a compliance date for light vehicles but not for medium or heavy vehicles. Upon reconsideration, we have decided to revise our previous position and instead interpret the labeling requirements established in the November 27, 1996, final rule as applying only to passenger cars and to trucks, buses and multipurpose passenger vehicles with a GVWR of 8,500 pounds or less and an unloaded vehicle weight of 5,500 pounds or less. These are the vehicles that are required to have air bags under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (Pub. L. 102-40), and they are the ones that NHTSA intended to address in the rulemaking at issue. We believe that this is supported by the preamble and by the DATES section of the final rule. We agree with your view that different labels may be appropriate for different types of vehicles than the ones addressed in the rulemaking at issue. However, given our revised interpretation, we do not, at this time, see a need to address this subject in rulemaking. Under our interpretation, the labeling of these other vehicles is at the option of the manufacturer. Thus, if a manufacturer believes that the labels specified in Standard No. 208 are appropriate for other vehicles as well, it is free to use those labels. However, if the manufacturer believes that a different label is more appropriate, it is free to use that label. If you have any further questions about this subject, please feel free to call Edward Glancy of my staff at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, |
1999 |
ID: hendrixMS_law_v2OpenMr. William R. Hendrix Dear Mr. Hendrix: This responds to your letter in which you ask if the State of Mississippis motorcycle helmet law is preempted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 218, Motorcycle helmets. We regret that we are unable to answer your question at this time. By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS) that apply to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment (49 U.S.C. Chapter 301). Section 30103(b) of that Chapter states that when an FMVSS is in effect, a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the Federal standard. (There is an exception for state standards applicable to vehicles or equipment procured for the States own use that imposes a higher level of performance than the FMVSS. ) In your letter, you state that you believe Mississippis helmet law to be pre-empted by 30103(b) because the state standard requires use of a helmet inspected and approved by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA). You further state that AAMVA no longer "inspects and approves" motorcycle helmets. We have been unable to reach Mississippi state officials for more information about Mississippis motorcycle helmet law. We cannot address the preemption issue without more information. If you can provide further information, you may contact Mr. Chris Calamita of my staff at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman ref:218#VSA |
2004 |
ID: Higuchi.1OpenMr. Kazuo Higuchi Dear Mr. Higuchi: This responds to your October 24, 2005, letter in which you seek clarification regarding the requirements for emergency-locking retractors (ELRs) under paragraph S4.3(j)(2)(i)(E) of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies. Specifically, you asked whether, for purposes of compliance with Standard No. 209, a vehicle acceleration-sensitive ELR, after being rotated to the locking point (i.e. , some angle more than 15 degrees), must then be rotated back to determine whether the ELR unlocks at an angle greater than 15 degrees from its initial orientation in the vehicle?The answer to your question is no. By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue FMVSSs that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. Standard No. 209 sets forth strength, elongation, webbing width, durability, and other requirements for seat belt assemblies. This standard applies to all seat belt assemblies as separate items of motor vehicle equipment, regardless of whether the belts are installed as original equipment in a motor vehicle or sold as replacements. As your letter points out, the agency published a final rule on August 22, 2005, which amended FMVSS No. 209 by redefining the requirements and establishing a new test methodology for ELRs (70 FR 48883). Under paragraph S4.3, Requirements for hardware, FMVSS No. 209 sets performance requirements for seat belt assemblies manufactured on or after February 22, 2007 (and ones produced by manufacturers opting for early compliance). Among those requirements, the standard states that for an ELR sensitive to vehicle acceleration installed as part of a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly, when tested in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph S5.2(j)(2) under zero acceleration loading, such ELR shall "not lock when the retractor is rotated in any direction to any angle of 15 degrees or less from its orientation in the vehicle" (see S4.3(j)(2)(i)(E)). The purpose of the requirement in S4.3(j)(2)(i)(E) is to prevent "nuisance locking" in situations where the vehicle experiences a minor change in orientation from its normal orientation on a flat roadway (e.g. , traveling on a moderate incline, hitting a pothole). However, once the ELR experiences a sufficient change in orientation, as specified in Standard No. 209, the retractor must lock. The standard contains no corollary provision for unlocking of the vehicle acceleration-sensitive ELR, either in the standards performance requirements or test procedures. If you have further questions, please feel free to contact Eric Stas of my staff at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood ref:209 |
2006 |
ID: hill.ztvOpen Senior Trooper W. L. Hill Dear Trooper Hill: This is in reply to your request to Taylor Vinson of this Office for our opinion on the following two questions regarding compliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment. You are requesting this information in connection with a court case in which a driver was cited for operating a vehicle equipped with a replacement taillamp consisting of a clear lens and a red bulb. You mentioned the driver's opinion that Mercedes-Benz was offering such a lamp. Your first question is whether, to the best of our knowledge, a motor vehicle taillamp is being manufactured, either as original or replacement equipment, which includes a red bulb and a clear lens, and which is certified as complying with Standard No. 108. Our answer is that, to the best of our knowledge, it is not economically feasible under the current state of the art to manufacture a taillamp with a red bulb and a clear lens that complies with Standard No. 108's taillamp requirements, and we are not aware of any such product. Your second question is whether red reflective tape that is affixed to a vehicle after a protective backing is removed can be a rear reflex reflector replacement under Standard No. 108. The tape has no DOT marking. The answer is no; the original rear reflex reflector, whether incorporated in the lamp or separately mounted on the body, would have been made of plastic in order to comply with SAE Standard J594f, Reflex Reflectors, incorporated by reference in Standard No. 108 as the requirement for reflex reflectors. A replacement rear reflex reflector would also need to be made of plastic to meet these requirements. If you have any further questions, you may call Taylor Vinson at 202-366-5263. Sincerely, Frank Seales, Jr. ref:108 |
2000 |
ID: HoganHartsonOpenPatrick M. Raher, Esq. Hogan & Hartson LLP Columbia Square 555 Thirteenth Street, NW Washington, DC 20004 Dear Mr. Raher: This responds to your letter of May 8, 2007, addressed to Ms. Julie Abraham, concerning the Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA) petition for exemption from the Vehicle Theft Prevention Standards parts marking requirements for the Mercedes-Benz C-Line Chassis vehicles beginning in model year 2008. Under 49 CFR Part 543.5(a), a manufacturer may, for each model year, petition the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) for an exemption of one car line from the requirements of the Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard.[1] You submitted your letter in response to an inquiry from NHTSA concerning whether MBUSA and DaimlerChrysler are eligible as separate manufacturers for such exemptions. Given the one car line limitation specified in Part 543, these companies must be eligible as separate manufacturers if they are both to receive an exemption for the same model year. After reviewing the information you provided in your letter and in a telephone conversation with Edward Glancy of my staff, and as discussed below, we conclude that MBUSA and DaimlerChrysler are eligible as separate manufacturers for parts marking exemptions. The definition of manufacturer for the theft prevention standard program is set forth at 49 U.S.C. 32101(5), and reads as follows: manufacturer means a person (A) manufacturing or assembling passenger motor vehicles or passenger motor vehicle equipment; or (B) importing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for resale. In considering whether related companies are separately eligible for parts marking exemptions, we believe it is appropriate to consider two issues. First, we consider whether the companies are structured such that they can be considered separate persons under the statutory definition. Second, assuming the answer is yes, we look beyond the corporate structure and consider whether the companies are operationally independent from each other. It is necessary to consider this since a manufacturer could be highly integrated in operation but, for a variety of reasons, use multiple corporations. Also, we separately consider, with respect to the vehicles for which an exemption is sought, whether the vehicles can be considered to have more than one manufacturer and, if so, whether that would affect eligibility for the requested exemption. We note that the statutory provision does not indicate that a person is a manufacturer of a vehicle solely by virtue of ownership or control of another person that is a manufacturer. As to corporate structure, you indicated in your letter that MBUSA is the authorized importer of Mercedes-Benz and Maybach brand vehicles manufactured by DaimlerChrysler AG (DCAG) in Germany. You stated that DaimlerChrysler Corporation (DCC) builds, markets and sells Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep brands. You stated that MBUSA and DCC operate as separate corporate entities. Based on this information, we conclude that the companies are structured such that they can be considered separate persons under the statutory definition. As to whether the companies are operationally independent from each other, you stated in your letter that for purposes of design, development, marketing and selling, certifying compliance with safety regulations, compliance with NHTSAs enforcement program, and providing NHTSA with a manufacturer of record responsible for the vehicles, MBUSA and DCC operate as separate corporate entities. You also stated that MBUSA and DCC have different dealer networks, administer different warranty programs and are legally distinct corporate entities. You stated that MBUSA and DCC are linked only by virtue of the fact that both are within the larger corporate structure of DCAG. In a conversation with Edward Glancy of my staff, you discussed the issue of separation between MBUSA and DCC, with further consideration of DCAG, which manufactures the vehicles that are imported by MBUSA, and also Mercedes Benz U.S. International, Inc. (MBUSI). MBUSI manufactures certain Mercedes Benz vehicles in the United States, which are marketed by MBUSA. You indicated that considering all of these different companies, there is no operational linkage or integration between the companies responsible for Mercedes Benz vehicles and those responsible for DCC vehicles. Based on the information you provided and noted above, we conclude that MBUSA and DCC are operationally independent from each, and, therefore, separately eligible for theft exemptions. Finally, as indicated above, we separately consider, with respect to the vehicles for which an exemption is sought, whether the vehicles can be considered to have more than one manufacturer and, if so, whether that would affect eligibility for the requested exemption. For example, if the Mercedes-Benz C-Line Chassis could also be considered to be manufactured by a manufacturer other than MBUSA and that other manufacturers might also be applying for theft exemptions, we would want to consider the effect on eligibility. However, based on the information you provided, this does not appear to be a relevant consideration for this requested exemption. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that MBUSA is separately eligible for a theft exemption for the C-Line Chassis, without regard to petitions for exemption from DCC. We note that the analysis presented in this letter is limited to eligibility for theft exemptions. Before deciding whether the analysis would apply in other contexts, we would want to carefully evaluate the relevant statutory and regulatory requirements and purposes. If you have questions about this or related issues, please feel free to contact Edward Glancy of my staff at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely yours, Anthony M. Cooke Chief Counsel ref:543 d.7/12/07 |
2007 |
ID: HollidayOpenW. David Holliday, Esq. Attorney At Law 8330 Meadow Road, Suite 122 Dallas, TX 75231 Dear Mr. Holliday: This responds to your letter asking about Federal requirements for air bags. According to your letter, you are representing an individual who sustained a serious neck injury in a crash where the air bag in his 2000 Dodge Caravan which he was driving did not deploy. In your letter you asked questions related to the Federal motor vehicle safety standards as they existed at the time the vehicle was manufactured, January 2000. The issues raised by your letter are addressed below. By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issues Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) covering new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle equipment. One of the standards we issued, FMVSS No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208) requires passenger cars and other light vehicles to be equipped with an air bag and a manual lap/shoulder belt at both the driver and right front passenger seating positions. While these requirements were phased in over time, the phase-in had been completed by January 2000, the time period you ask about. I note that the Caravan was classified as a multipurpose passenger vehicle, and was among the light vehicles to which the standards air bag requirements applied. In a telephone conversation with Edward Glancy of my office, you clarified that while your letter includes various statements concerning your understanding of the FMVSSs, your primary question is whether FMVSS No. 208 established a frontal impact speed or crash severity threshold above which the air bag must be activated or below which it may not be activated. Among other things, Standard No. 208 specifies that vehicles meet certain performance requirements in crash tests. These tests are conducted with instrumented test dummies placed in the front outboard seating positions of the vehicle. During the tests, the forces measured on the dummies may not exceed specified limits. However, the standard does not specify any crash severity threshold or frontal impact speed where the air bag must, or must not, deploy. This was true in January 2000 and it remains true today, although we note that additional crash test and other requirements have been added since January 2000. If you have any further questions, please feel free to call Edward Glancy of my staff at 202-366-2992. Sincerely yours, Anthony M. Cooke Chief Counsel ref: 208 d.11.20/08 |
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ID: honda-spw-jan172001Open William R. Willen, Esq. Dear Mr. Willen: This responds to your March 1, 2000, letter asking whether Honda's hybrid electric vehicles with "Idle Stop" automatic transmission systems are permitted under S3.1.3 of Standard No. 102, Transmission Shift Lever Sequence, Starter Interlock, and Transmission Braking Effect (49 CFR 571.102). Paragraph S3.1.3 states: "the engine starter shall be inoperative when the transmission shift lever is in a forward or reverse drive position." As explained below, we conclude that the systems on Honda's hybrid electric vehicles meet S3.1.3. You also asked about a 'gasoline engine version' of the Insight that Honda is developing. Detailed information, such as that provided to us regarding the automatic transmission hybrid electric vehicle Insight, is apparently not yet available for that version. Therefore, we will defer an opinion on that version until Honda can make available to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) similar information about it. As noted above, your letter described two future design vehicles that would use "Idle Stop" technology to conserve fuel and reduce exhaust emissions when the vehicle is normally stopped and idling. One is the Honda Insight hybrid-electric vehicle equipped with an automatic Continuously Variable Transmission (CVT). According to your letter, this vehicle uses both an electric motor and gasoline engine to provide motive power. The other vehicle is a "normal gasoline-engine vehicle" that would be equipped with an automatic transmission. Based on your letter and your discussions with NHTSA's engineers, we understand that the Honda Insight hybrid electric vehicle equipped with a CVT and Idle Stop Technology (IST) works as follows. The hybrid vehicle is designed so that the transmission shift lever must be placed in Park or Neutral when the driver manually uses the key to engage the starter to start the vehicle's gasoline engine. Honda believes this design feature enables the hybrid vehicle to comply with the original intent of S3.1.3. When the hybrid vehicle is driven with the transmission in Drive and the driver stops the vehicle with the brake, the IST shuts off the gasoline engine. When the driver subsequently removes his foot from the brake, the hydraulic brake fluid pressure is maintained, the transmission lever remains in Drive while the transmission itself electronically shifts internally from Drive to Neutral, the starter engages the gasoline engine, and the gasoline engine starts up. After the engine starts, the transmission shifts internally from Neutral back into Drive, the hydraulic brake fluid pressure is released, and the vehicle may start to creep forward. Honda engineers said that the vehicle will not lurch forward. To accelerate, the driver must depress the accelerator pedal. Honda believes that this automatic shut-off and restart sequence also meets S3.1.3, in that the driver's direct manual activation of the starter is not needed after the engine is initially engaged to start the vehicle. Toyota submitted a similar request for interpretation regarding its Prius hybrid vehicle. In an interpretation letter of October 22, 1999, to Toyota, NHTSA noted that the Prius has a drive train system that is more complex than those on vehicles that existed when Standard No. 102 was issued. The agency said that it will examine the requirements and conduct a rulemaking to update them as necessary. The agency concluded by saying: "Until that action is completed, we will interpret S3.1.3 of Standard No. 102 as requiring that driver activation of the engine starter must be inoperative when the transmission lever is in a forward or reverse drive position." (Emphasis added.) By "driver activation," we meant direct manual activation of the starter by the driver. Both the Prius and the Insight meet S3.1.3 as so interpreted. In stating this conclusion, NHTSA wishes to elaborate on its reasons for believing that there are safety concerns that must be addressed through rulemaking. The agency is aware that, besides Honda and Toyota, other vehicle manufacturers are currently designing vehicles with gasoline or diesel engine and hybrid propulsion plants that operate differently but attempt to achieve improved fuel economy. NHTSA does not wish to impede any of these efforts, but must be mindful of its safety responsibilities. The agency expects that those other vehicles, like the Prius and Insight, will have safety features that prevent sudden lurching forward or backward when the gasoline engine is restarted. Such lurching is a concern because it could result in a crash. Our rulemaking will address this and other potential issues. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama at this address or at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack ref:102 |
2001 |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.