NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
|---|---|
ID: featherlite(9-15-03).mtgOpenMr. Norman L. Helmke Dear Mr. Helmke: This is in reply to your letter of September 15, 2003, with regard to the reporting of property damage claims under the early warning reporting (EWR) regulation (Subpart C of 49 CFR Part 579). You advised us that Featherlite, Inc. manufactures a wide variety of trailers, including horse and livestock trailers. You indicated that the company receives property damage claims involving injuries to horses hauled in horse trailers, but that the injuries are not caused by failed components of the trailer. You explain that the injuries, in almost every case, are caused by the actions of the horse itself. With this background you ask whether an injury to a horse, not attributable to a failed component of the trailer, is a reportable property damage claim, and, if so, what is the proper code to use. Under 49 CFR 579.24(c), a manufacturer of 500 or more trailers per year is required to make
Property damage is defined as physical injury to tangible property. See 49 CFR 579.4(c). A horse is tangible property. However, based on your premise that the claim did not refer to a system or component set forth in section 579.24(b)(2) or a fire, no report is necessary under the EWR regulations. The last sentence of section 579.24(c) specifically confirms that no reporting is necessary in this instance as does the preamble to the final rule where we stated that "we will require reporting of property damage claims only when one or more specified vehicle components or systems has been identified as giving rise to the incident or damage, or there was a fire . . . ." 67 FR 45822, 45846. Please note that in the event that a system or component referred to in Section 579.24(b)(2) was identified in the claim, you would have to report it even if it is disputed. If you have any questions, you may call Andrew DiMarsico of this Office (202-366-5263). Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman ref:579 |
2003 |
ID: FERBLTR.CRSOpenGabriel J. Ferber, Esquire Re: Superior Auto Sales, Inc. NSA-32 RSH; RII-10/R93-017 Dear Mr. Ferber: This is in response to your letter of August 27, 1996, to Marilynne E. Jacobs, Director of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA's) Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC), regarding 117 vehicles that were imported from Canada by your client, Superior Auto Sales, Inc. (Superior). As described in your letter, and in prior correspondence with OVSC, these vehicles, which consisted of 1994 and 1995 Model Year Plymouth Acclaims, Dodge Spirits, and Mazda Protégés, were not equipped with automatic restraints in the front outboard passenger seating position, as required by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection. You nevertheless contend that all of these vehicles should be deemed in compliance with that standard, with the exception of seven Mazda Protégés that are the subject of separate correspondence. To support this contention you cite paragraph S4.1.4.1 of the standard, which provides, in relevant part: A vehicle shall not be deemed to be in non-compliance with this standard if its manufacturer establishes that it did not know in the exercise of due care that such vehicle is not in conformity with this standard. Your letter contends that Superior is a manufacturer within the meaning of this provision by virtue of the fact that it is a vehicle importer. Moreover, you claim that even though Superior exercised due care, it did not know that the vehicles in question did not comply with FMVSS No. 208. In support of this claim, you note that OVSC released the vehicles in question even though the conformity packages that Superior submitted for them included a vehicle identification number (VIN) deciphering chart that provided the means for the agency to ascertain that each of those vehicles was equipped with a driver side air bag and a passenger side manual seat belt. To further support your claim that Superior did not have knowledge of the noncompliance in issue, you describe the standard as containing language "so obtuse (sic) as to defy understanding." You characterize "the complexity of the language" found in FMVSS No. 208 as "the very reason that NHTSA incorporated the 'due care' provisions of the Safety Act into the regulation." To support this contention, you cite language from the preamble of a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend the standard that was issued by NHTSA in 1985. That language states The agency recognizes that because of the complexity of the requirements of Standard No. 208, manufacturers are concerned that the rule state that the due care provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act . . . applies to compliance with [this] standard. 50 FR 14589, 14592 (April 12, 1985). You interpret this statement as representing NHTSA's "recogni[tion] at the outset that the language of Standard 208 was so complex that mistakes in interpretation were likely to occur" and that "it would be unfair to penalize affected parties who made such mistakes notwithstanding due care." Accordingly, you assert that the vehicles that Superior "imported in the exercise of due care and without knowledge of their nonconformity must . . . be deemed to be in compliance with Standard 208." Contrary to your interpretation, NHTSA did not incorporate the due care provision of the Safety Act into FMVSS No. 208 to relieve manufacturers from liability for noncompliances resulting from mistaken interpretations of the standard's language. The agency instead added the due care provision to address a concern expressed by manufacturers, grounded on the belief (disputed by NHTSA) that there was excessive variability in FMVSS No. 208 crash test results, that a noncompliance might be determined to exist on the basis of a single test failure, even though the vast majority of similar vehicles actually complied. NHTSA stated its intention to amend the standard to incorporate the due care provision in the final rule reinstituting the automatic restraint requirements published at 49 FR 28962 on July 17, 1984. As reflected in the enclosed excerpt from that document (at 49 FR 29006), NHTSA was motivated to add the due care language to assure manufacturers that the agency would exercise appropriate discretion in compliance cases based on apparent failures to satisfy the performance requirements of the standard in OVSC crash tests. We agree that Superior is a "manufacturer" within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(5) because it imports motor vehicles for resale. However, the due care language in FMVSS No. 208 cannot be relied upon by registered importers (RIs) to insulate themselves from liability for importing vehicles from Canada that do not comply with the standard. To properly exercise its responsibilities, an RI must be aware of the standards that apply to each of the vehicles that it imports and conform the vehicle to those standards when necessary. The principal difference between vehicles manufactured for the U.S. and the Canadian markets is that Canadian vehicles are not required to comply with the automatic restraint requirements of FMVSS No. 208. For that reason, the only passenger cars manufactured for the Canadian market that NHTSA has determined to be eligible for importation into the United States are those manufactured before September 1, 1989, the date on which the automatic restraint requirements were extended to a manufacturer's entire passenger car production, or those manufactured after that date that are equipped with an automatic restraint system that complies with FMVSS No. 208. Before importing a vehicle from Canada manufactured on or after September 1, 1989, the RI must therefore ensure that it complies with the automatic restraint requirements in the same manner as FMVSS No. 208 allows for vehicles produced for the U.S. market on the vehicle's date of manufacture. As a factual matter, we dispute your assertion that the operative language of FMVSS No. 208 is "complex" or "obtuse." It is clear from S4.1.4.1 of FMVSS No. 208 that the authority to manufacture vehicles with a driver's side air bag and no automatic protection on the passenger side expired as of September 1, 1993 (i.e., it did not apply to model year 1994 or newer vehicles). Even if it could not discern those requirements from the language of the standard, Superior could have made appropriate inquiry with the vehicle's manufacturer or with NHTSA. Finally, if an RI is in fact confused as to the automatic restraint requirements that pertain to any given vehicle, it could not demonstrate that it exercised due care by importing the vehicle despite that confusion. Your letter implies that Superior was misled by OVSC's "approval" of compliance packages that it submitted for vehicles that were not equipped with required passenger side automatic restraints. The conformity statements included in those packages contained Superior's certification that those vehicles were manufactured in compliance with FMVSS No. 208. OVSC's approval of the compliance packages was predicated on that certification by Superior. OVSC cannot be charged with knowledge that the vehicles it approved for release were not equipped with required automatic restraints simply because a VIN deciphering chart that would have revealed that information was included in the compliance packages. Given the thousands of compliance packages that it must process each month, OVSC cannot be expected to decipher every VIN to ensure that the RI's certification contains no inaccuracies. It is perverse to assert that merely because OVSC did not catch Superior's false statements, Superior is excused from having made them. Moreover, in each case, Superior's false certification preceded OVSC's release of the vehicle, so that release cannot have provided any basis for Superior's actions. Your letter further cites NHTSA and Center for Auto Safety research reports for the proposition that automatic seat belts, the devices that Superior apparently would install in the vehicles in question in the event of a recall, are less safe than the manual seat belts with which those vehicles are now equipped. In light of these reports, you contend that it would be arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion for NHTSA to order a recall. On the contrary, it would be improper for the agency not to require compliance with the existing requirements of a standard in its administration of the vehicle importation program. FMVSS No. 208 requires that passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1993 be equipped with passenger side automatic restraints regardless of whether they have a driver's side air bag. This requirement was adopted in a protracted rulemaking proceeding in which the agency solicited and addressed numerous comments from the public. The requirement for automatic restraints in both front outboard seating positions is buttressed by the action of Congress in enacting the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, section 2508(a)(1), which mandated that FMVSS No. 208 be amended to require air bags in those locations. (See 49 U.S.C. 30127.) Your letter requests a hearing if NHTSA believes that Superior has not established that in the exercise of due care it did not have reason to know that the vehicles it imported were not in conformity with FMVSS No. 208. We have provided you with our analysis of this issue, as presented in your letter. Based on that analysis, it is unlikely that any further discussion would alter our opinion that the due care defense is unavailable to Superior and similarly situated RIs in this circumstance. Therefore, we decline to hold the hearing you have requested. If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please contact Coleman Sachs of my staff at 202-366-5238. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel Enclosure ref:208 d:10/25/96 |
1996 |
ID: firestonelaser-2OpenMichael D. Kane Dear Mr. Kane: This responds to your question whether laser etching of the tire identification number (TIN) date code is permitted by the tire marking and tire labeling requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 139 and 49 CFR 574.5, respectively, that go into effect on September 1, 2004. You raised these questions in an April 29, 2003 meeting with us and in a letter of the same date. As explained below, the answerto your question is "yes." Beginning September 1, 2004, paragraph S5.5 of FMVSS No. 139, "Tire Markings," requiress that each tire must be "marked" with certain information and that "the tire identification and DOT symbol labeling must comply with part 574" of 49 CFR. With respect to the TIN in particular, S5.5.1 of FMVSS No. 139 requires that "each tire must be labeled with the tire identification number required by 49 CFR part 574 on the intended outboard side of the tire." Part 574.5 requires that "each tire manufacturer shall conspicuously labelby permanently molding into or onto the sidewall, in the manner and location specified in Figure 1, a tire identification number containing the information set forth in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section." The TIN contains the manufacturers identification code, the tire size, an optional manufacturer code, and a 4-digit date code representing the week and year of manufacturer. In comments on the Tire Safety Information rulemaking, the Rubber Manufacturers Association (RMA) had stated that, under the new labeling requirements, molding the date code portion of the TIN on the intended outboard side of the tire would make it necessary for technicians to change the date code plate in the upper half of the tire mold on a weekly basis. You state that Bridgestone/Firestone has been exploring the possibility of using laser technology as a means of etching the tire identification number into the tire sidewall. This process would involve a diode pumped, solid state laser beam that etches tire letters or numerals into the rubber with the required character heights and to the required character depths. You state that this technology would avoid the risk that would otherwise result from technicians having to make the weekly date code change in the top half of the tire mold. That risk has been the weekly date code change in the top half of the tire mold. That risk has been a safety concern to the tire industry. You also state that the laser etched characters, while "not molded," are permanent and that the characters are sharp, easy to read, and conform to the letter styles specified in Notes to Figure 1 of 574.5. Finally, you note that paragraph S5.5 of FMVSS No. 139 states that the tire must be "marked" with certain information, instead of "permanently molded." The latter is the language in paragraph 4.3 of FMVSS No. 109, the standard that has been largely superseded by FMVSS No. 139 As a general matter, the term "molding" does not include laser etching. However, in the context of the situation you describe, we would consider permanent laser etching of the date code portion of the TIN to be a satisfactory method of complying with paragraph S5.5 of FMVSS No. 139, so long as it occurred in-line, i.e., as part of the manufacturing process of the tire.In responding to petitions for reconsideration, we will amend the regulatory text to make it clear that this is permissible. If you have any questions or need additional information, feel free to contact Nancy Bell of my staff at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman ref:109 |
2003 |
ID: flahertyOpenLt. Col. Steve Flaherty, Director Dear Col. Flaherty: This is in reply to your recent e-mail regarding "undercover type warning lights." By this phrase, we understand you to mean the system under discussion in our letter of July 3, 2001, to Col. Massengill of the Virginia State Police (the "Massengill letter."). When activated, that system, would cause the taillamps and side marker lamps of otherwise conventional passenger cars to flash as strobe lights. You have informed us that there is "pre-filed" legislation in the Virginia House of Delegates which would permit the use of undercover type warning lights "on fire fighting apparatus and fire department vehicles." You have further informed us that "these are all classified under state law as emergency vehicles and are entitled to use traditional type warning lights." Present Virginia law "specifically requires conformance to federal requirements." You understood the Massengill letter to restrict undercover type warning lights to law enforcement vehicles, and have asked whether state-regulated fire fighting/department vehicles be equipped with these lights and still conform to Standard No. 108. The question is not really whether such vehicles equipped with the strobe light system would still conform to Standard No. 108; clearly they would not because they are causing lamps to flash that Standard No. 108 requires to be steady burning. The real question is whether the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration would provide the same interpretation regarding the use of strobe lights on state-regulated fire fighting/department vehicles as it had in the Massengill letter for police vehicles. And our answer is yes. As noted in that letter, our traditional position is that we defer to the judgment of States as to the installation and use of emergency lighting devices on its vehicles. We also noted that, under Federal law (49 U.S.C. 30122), the State, as the owner of a vehicle, may itself modify a vehicle after its purchase even if this modification results in a noncompliance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard. With these factors in mind, we believe that a law allowing use of the strobe system on state-regulated fire fighting/department vehicles is acceptable. The emergency vehicles discussed in the Massengill letter were not of a traditional nature. They were unmarked Ford Crown Victoria sedans identical in exterior appearance to Crown Victorias sold to the public and which were intended for sale to the public at the end of their useful life with the State Patrol. For these reasons, we developed the rationale expressed in the Massengill letter under which we could justify deferring to the judgment of the State for the use of these vehicles. Perhaps this led you to conclude that we had advised that the use of strobe lights should be restricted to law enforcement vehicles. We contrast the Crown Victorias with fire fighting apparatus, the former often intended for undercover use, the latter, never. Thus, we surmise that fire fighting apparatus would not use strobe lights for "undercover" purposes, but as an added warning when they are endeavoring to reach a fire or other emergency site through traffic as rapidly as possible. We see no reason to question the judgment of the State in allowing strobe lights on fire vehicles, if such legislation is enacted in Virginia. Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman ref.108 |
2003 |
ID: fordaOpen Mr. Richard J. Kinsey Dear Mr. Kinsey: This responds to your letter requesting our concurrence on a procedure for determining the domestic content and country of origin for foreign-sourced allied and outside supplier components. I apologize for the delay in our response. You stated that you would like to obtain the relevant information from your present purchasing systems rather than by soliciting the information from your foreign suppliers. You stated that both processes will result in the same information, and that you believe requiring your foreign suppliers to respond to requests for information would impose costly and unnecessary burdens on those suppliers. We are now in the process of completing our response to several petitions for reconsideration of the final rule on domestic content labeling. Your question is sufficiently related to some of the issues raised by the petitions that we believe it should be addressed in the context of that response, rather than in a separate letter. We realize, however, that manufacturers and suppliers have an immediate need for guidance regarding the procedures for making content determinations for the 1996 model year. In a recent letter (copy enclosed) to the American Automobile Manufacturers Association, we advised that NHTSA had decided to give manufacturers and suppliers for model year 1996 the same alternative they had last year, i.e., in lieu of following the required procedures, they may use other procedures that are expected to yield similar results. Therefore, your planned approach will not raise any concerns for model year 1996. I hope this information has been helpful. If you have any other questions or need some additional information in this area, please contact Edward Glancy of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Philip R. Recht Chief Counsel Enclosure ref:583 d:3/8/95
|
1995 |
ID: FordTHINKNeighbor.CRSOpen Mr. James P. Vondale Director, Automotive Safety Office Dear Mr. Vondale: This responds to your letter of August 17, 2001 to Dr. Jeffrey W. Runge, requesting the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to approve an alternate location for placement of the certification label on the THINK Neighbor low speed vehicle. NHTSA's regulations at 49 CFR 567.4(c) prescribe specific locations for the installation of vehicle certification labels, and provide that if none of those locations are practicable, the manufacturer may suggest an alternate location for the agency's approval. As stated in your letter and illustrated in accompanying photographs, the THINK Neighbor is not equipped with doors, and consequently lacks hinge pillars and door-latch posts. You further state that the instrument panel and the seat stanchion cover are plastic components that can be easily removed and would therefore not be permanently affixed to the vehicle. In light of these circumstances, you state that "Ford recommends attaching the label to the inside surface of the roof in the left rear corner." You contend that in this location, "[t]he label will be permanently affixed to an integral component of the structure and is easily readable without moving any part of the vehicle." You further note that "other manufacturers have utilized a similar location" for the certification label. In specifying locations for the placement of vehicle certification labels, NHTSA's objective is to ensure that those labels may be easily read. The location that you have proposed for the THINK Neighbor would meet this objective. NHTSA therefore approves your request. If you have any further questions regarding vehicle certification requirements, feel free to contact Coleman Sachs of my staff at 202-366-5238. Sincerely, John Womack ref:567 |
2001 |
ID: FREIGHTLINER.CRSOpen Mr. Bob Johnson Dear Mr. Johnson: This responds to your letter of April 16, 2001, requesting the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to approve an alternate location for placement of the certification label on the new Freightliner Sprinter vehicle. NHTSA's regulations at 49 CFR 567.4(c) prescribe specific locations for the installation of vehicle certification labels, and provide that if none of those locations are practicable, the manufacturer may suggest an alternate location for the agency's approval. Your letter states that DaimlerChrysler engineers in Germany attempted to position the label in one of the locations specified in section 567.4, but were not successful owing to the size of the label, the lack of available space to accommodate the label at some of those locations, and the presence of removable padding on the surface at other of those locations. The alternate location for which you have requested approval is below the driver's seat on an outward facing portion of the mounting pillar. You state that the pillar is a permanent part of the vehicle's floor structure, and that at this location, the label can be easily read and is well protected from weathering and abrasion. In specifying locations for the placement of vehicle certification labels, NHTSA's objective is to ensure that those labels may be easily read. The location that you have proposed for the new Freightliner Sprinter would meet this objective. NHTSA therefore approves your request. If you have any further questions regarding vehicle certification requirements, feel free to contact Coleman Sachs of my staff at 202-366-5238. Sincerely, John Womack ref:567 |
1970 |
ID: Full Display Mirror System 1 GM Feb 11Open
Brian Latouf, Director Global Vehicle Safety General Motors LLC 30001 Mound Road Warren, MI 48090
Dear Mr. Latouf:
Thank you for your letter informing us about the new Full Display Mirror system that your company plans to install inside a passenger car model, the 2016 MY Cadillac CT6. I want to thank you especially for the initiative your company took in engaging with this agencys staff regarding your mirror system. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) seeks to facilitate innovative safety technologies. This type of exchange between your company and NHTSA about new technologies is an example of how we can work toward improving vehicle safety.
Although your letter did not expressly request our views about the status of your mirror system under the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs), subsequent discussions with your company indicate that it does, in fact, desire our views. Based on the information in your letter and on our observation of the system during a demonstration has your company conducted near our headquarters, our understanding is that the Full Display Mirror system has two modes: (1) In one mode, it acts as a conventional mirror and shows a reflected image of the rear of the vehicle interior and of objects behind the vehicle at unit magnification; and (2) In the other mode, which the driver can activate, it provides an unobstructed, video-generated image provided by a camera located at the rear of the vehicle. When the driver activates the second mode and looks at the mirror system, he or she sees the video-generated image, instead of the reflected image, in that location. The field of view angle (measured from the focal point of the camera) in the video-generated image is considerably larger than that in the reflected image (measured from the projected eye point).
S5.1-S5.1.2 of FMVSS No. 111, Rear Visibility, require each passenger car to have an inside rearview mirror of unit magnification meeting certain field of view and mounting requirements:
S5.1 Inside rearview mirror. Each passenger car shall have an inside rearview mirror of unit magnification.
S5.1.1 Field of view. Except as provided in S5.3, the mirror shall provide a field of view with an included horizontal angle measured from the projected eye point of at least 20 degrees, and a sufficient vertical angle to provide a view of a level road surface extending to the horizon beginning at a point not greater than 61 m to the rear of the vehicle when the vehicle is occupied by the driver and four passengers or the designated occupant capacity, if less, based on an average occupant weight of 68 kg.
S5.1.2 Mounting. The mirror mounting shall provide a stable support for the mirror, and shall provide for mirror adjustment by tilting in both the horizontal and vertical directions. If the mirror is in the head impact area, the mounting shall deflect, collapse or break away without leaving sharp edges when the reflective surface of the mirror is subjected to a force of 400 N in any forward direction that is not more than 45 from the forward longitudinal direction.
However, as you point out in your letter, the inside rearview mirror of a passenger car need not meet any field of view requirements in S5.1.1 if the car also has a passenger side outside rearview mirror meeting the requirements in paragraph S5.3 regarding magnification, stability, absence of sharp points and edges and adjustability. We assume that you pointed this out because the 2016 MY Cadillac CT6 will have such a passenger side outside rearview mirror. S5.3 provides in full:
S5.3 Outside rearview mirrorpassenger's side. Each passenger car whose inside rearview mirror does not meet the field of view requirements of S5.1.1 shall have an outside mirror of unit magnification or a convex mirror installed on the passenger's side. The mirror mounting shall provide a stable support and be free of sharp points or edges that could contribute to pedestrian injury. The mirror need not be adjustable from the driver's seat but shall be capable of adjustment by tilting in both horizontal and vertical directions.
While your Full Display Mirror system incorporates a variety of innovations, we believe that the narrow question you have effectively raised in your letter is whether the Full Display Mirror system can be regarded as an inside rearview mirror of unit magnification within the meaning of S5.1.[1] We have carefully considered that narrow question and provide the following opinion, which is limited to the applicability of Standard No. 111 to your mirror system and to the unique facts set forth in your letter.
While the Full Display Mirror is an item of motor vehicle equipment that performs additional driver activated functions, we do not believe that the fact that it performs such functions alters its basic identity as an item that includes an inside rearview mirror of unit magnification.[2] Given that an inside rearview mirror of unit magnification is not (in the case of the CT6) required to meet any field of view requirements in S5.1.1 (although it might meet them), and given our assumption that the interior mirror meets the mounting requirements in S5.1.2, we believe that your Full Display Mirror system includes an inside rearview mirror of unit magnification within the meaning of paragraph S5.1 and that it meets the only applicable requirements of paragraph S5.1. This conclusion holds regardless of which mode or test condition your Full Display Mirror is in, i.e., in the Full Display Mirror on condition or in the Full Display Mirror off condition. [3]
Separately, given that the apparent sharpness of the video image provided by the video mode of your Full Display Mirror system, as observed during the NHTSA demonstration, we do not currently have safety concerns about your system. We note, however, if a manufacturer were to offer a system whose design, performance or usage was found to create an unreasonable risk to safety, that system would be subject to a recall.
We thank you for taking the time to consult with NHTSA regarding this new technology. As we stated above, NHTSA encourages technological innovations that have the potential to provide additional safety benefits to the American public. We look forward to working further with you and other automotive industry stakeholders on such matters.
If you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me.
Sincerely,
Paul A. Hemmersbaugh Chief Counsel
Dated: 2/22/16 Ref: Standard No. 111 [1] As stated above, we assume that your vehicle will have an passenger side outside rearview mirror meeting the requirements of S5.3 (and therefore is not subject to any field of view requirements in S5.1). We further assume that your Full Display Mirror system meets the mounting requirements in S5.1. [2] Fundamentally, the Full Display Mirror is an item of motor vehicle equipment that has a reflective surface showing an image of objects towards the rear of the vehicle at unit magnification. [3] See, for example, our October 2, 1990 letter to Mazda (Kadoya) regarding test conditions. See also the discussion in our October 7, 1994 proposal on manual air bag cutoff devices (59 FR 51158, 51160) of multiple test conditions in the section of the preamble entitled III. Legality of Air Bag Cutoff Devices. |
2016 |
ID: GAO telematics Sept 13OpenAshley G. Alley, Esq. Office of General Counsel Government Accountability Office (GAO) 441 G St., NW Washington, DC 20548 Dear Ms. Alley: This responds to your e-mail asking about the extent to which the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) can regulate wireless communication technologies in motor vehicles that might be sources of driver distraction. You asked us to address: 1) Integrated, in-vehicle technologies (e.g., OnStar); 2) Nomadic technologies (e.g., handheld cell phones); and 3) After-market technologies that are integrated after the vehicle is manufactured (e.g., a satellite TV). As you know, NHTSA has authority under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards for motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. As discussed below, the answer to the issue of whether that authority permits the agency to regulate the technologies you listed is dependent, first, on whether the items and systems are considered motor vehicle equipment under Chapter 301 and, second, if they are so considered, whether issuing a standard for the items and systems would meet the statutory requirements for a standard, especially the requirement of meeting the need for motor vehicle safety. NHTSAs Authority to Regulate Wireless Communication Technologies that might be Sources of Driver Distraction Background Based on the definitions of motor vehicle safety and motor vehicle safety standard in subsection 30102(a)(8) and (9),[1] the agency has authority to issue standards for motor vehicle equipment as well as motor vehicles. The question of whether something qualifies as motor vehicle equipment is addressed by the definition of that term in subsection 30102(a)(7): "(M)otor vehicle equipment" means-- (A) any system, part, or component of a motor vehicle as originally manufactured; (B) any similar part or component manufactured or sold for replacement or improvement of a system, part, or component, or as any accessory or addition to a motor vehicle; or (C) any device or an article or apparel ... that is not a system, part, or component of a motor vehicle and is manufactured, sold, delivered, offered, or intended to be used only to safeguard motor vehicles and highway users against risk of accident, injury, or death. (Emphasis added.) In order to issue a standard for motor vehicle equipment, the agency must show that the standard meets the requirements in subsection 30111(a). It states that (e)ach standard shall be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and be stated in objective terms. Discussion Integrated, in-vehicle technologies (e.g., OnStar) You first asked about integrated, in-vehicle technologies, e.g., OnStar. Given that you separately ask about after-market technologies, we assume that this question is limited to items and systems that are integrated into the vehicle prior to first retail sale. The initial issue for these items and systems is whether they are considered motor vehicle equipment under the definition quoted above. Under 30102(a)(7), all items and systems that are integrated into a vehicle prior to its first retail sale are within the definition of motor vehicle equipment. Accordingly, the agency has authority to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards for integrated, in-vehicle technologies. However, given the requirement in subsection 30111(a) that each standard meet the need for motor vehicle safety, we can establish standards for these technologies only to the extent that we can show a safety benefit for those standards. A challenge in using our authority is that while research suggests that use of personal communication devices by drivers can adversely affect driving performance, it is difficult to find confirmation that these findings represent actual real-world crash risks. It would also be difficult to develop effective countermeasures for any risks whose existence we could demonstrate. Nomadic technologies (e.g., handheld cell phones) Next, you asked about nomadic technologies, e.g., handheld cell phones. Given your other questions, we assume that this question is limited to items and systems that are not integrated into the vehicle. Since these items and systems would not be integrated into the vehicle, they would be motor vehicle equipment under subsection 30102(a)(7) only if they were considered accessories under (a)(7)(B). NHTSA uses two criteria in determining whether a device is an "accessory." The first criterion is whether a substantial portion of the expected use of the item is related to the operation or maintenance of motor vehicles. We determine a product's expected use by considering product advertising, product labeling, and the type of store that retails the product, as well as available information about the actual use of the product. The second criterion is whether the product is purchased or otherwise acquired, and principally used, by ordinary users of motor vehicles. If a product satisfies both criteria, then the product would be an "accessory." Applying these criteria to cell phones, it is our opinion that a substantial portion of the expected uses of a cell phone would not be related to the operation or maintenance of motor vehicles. While a cell phone can be used in a motor vehicle, there is no particular nexus between the function of a cell phone and either the operation or the maintenance of motor vehicles. The cell phone performs the same function wherever it is taken by the user, e.g., on public sidewalks, in buildings, and so forth. Because the first prong of the two-part test for an accessory is not met, a cell phone is not an item of motor vehicle equipment. The same criteria would be applied in determining whether other items or systems incorporating nomadic technologies are accessories. We cannot provide a broad opinion covering all nomadic technologies, since specific information about the item or system and its expected uses is needed to apply these criteria. After-market technologies that are integrated after the vehicle is manufactured (e.g.., a satellite TV) You also asked us to address after-market technologies that are integrated after the vehicle is manufactured (e.g., a satellite TV). Given your other questions, we assume that this question is limited to items and systems that are integrated into the vehicle after first retail sale. Some items and systems incorporating these technologies would come within the subsection 30102(a)(7) definition of motor vehicle equipment. This would likely be the case for satellite TV systems marketed for use in motor vehicles. However, in order to provide a specific opinion, we would need detailed information about the specific product at issue. For those technologies that are items of motor vehicle equipment, the agency would face the same challenges described above in discussing integrated, in-vehicle technologies. Other Considerations We note that our safety standards generally apply to new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle equipment up to the time of first retail sale. Manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or motor vehicle repair businesses modifying a new or used vehicle are prohibited by section 30122 from knowingly making inoperative any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard. For example, installation of after-market technologies reduce the effectiveness of devices or elements of design installed pursuant to our crashworthiness standards would be prohibited. The make inoperative provision does not, however, apply to modifications made by vehicle owners themselves to their own vehicles. Thus, while we recommend that owners maintain the safety of their vehicles, Federal law does not prevent them from making modifications that take their vehicle out of compliance with a safety standard. The States, however, can regulate the changes that vehicle owners make to their vehicles. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSAs authority to regulate motor vehicle and motor vehicle equipment manufacturers, please contact Dorothy Nakama at (202) 366-2992. She may be reached at this address. Sincerely yours, Anthony M. Cooke Chief Counsel NCC-20:DNakama:62992:mar:jul/19/07:OCC#07-003616 [S:\NCC20\INTERP\VSA\07-003616 GAO drn.doc] cc:NCC-20, subj/chron, DN, NVS-100, NVS-200, NPO-100 Interps, VSA 102(4), Docket [1] (8) "motor vehicle safety" means the performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in a way that protects the public against unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle, and against unreasonable risk of death or injury in an accident, and includes nonoperational safety of a motor vehicle.
(9) "motor vehicle safety standard" means a minimum standard for motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance. |
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ID: garbage.crsOpen Mr. Richard G. Parks Dear Mr. Parks: This is in response to your letter of April 18, 1997, requesting confirmation of an interpretation that you state I gave you over the telephone on March 5, 1997 regarding the required contents of an incomplete vehicle document specified at 49 CFR 568.4, and one of the requirements for seating systems specified in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 207, 49 CFR 571.207. Because your letter assumed knowledge of matters that we discussed on March 5 and because I did not recall that conversation in all particulars, I asked Coleman Sachs of my staff to contact you so that we could gain a better understanding of your request. You informed Mr. Sachs on June 3, 1997 that your company is providing consulting services for a party litigating an action involving a garbage truck rollover incident. You stated that the garbage truck was completed by a final stage manufacturer from a chassis cab furnished as an incomplete vehicle by a major truck manufacturer. You further stated that the final stage manufacturer removed the bench-style seat that was furnished with the chassis-cab and replaced it with a bucket-type seat at the driver's position. Additionally, you stated that the final stage manufacturer equipped the vehicle with a steering wheel and a complete second set of controls on the right side of the vehicle so that it could be operated from that side while picking up trash. You noted, however, that the vehicle was not equipped with a driver's seat where the auxiliary controls were located. You have raised two questions with regard to these modifications. The first concerns the contents of the incomplete vehicle document that the chassis-cab manufacturer was required to furnish under NHTSA's certification regulations for vehicles manufactured in two or more stages at 49 CFR Part 568. Section 568.4(a)(7) of those regulations requires this document to list each standard in effect at the time of manufacture of the incomplete vehicle that applies to any of the vehicle types into which the incomplete vehicle may be appropriately manufactured. As your letter notes, section 568.4(a)(7) further requires the incomplete vehicle document to state, alternatively, after each standard listed, either (i) that the vehicle when completed will conform to the standard if no alterations are made in identified components of the incomplete vehicle, (ii) the specific conditions of final manufacture under which the manufacturer specifies that the completed vehicle will conform to the standard, or (iii) that conformity with the standard is not substantially affected by the design of the incomplete vehicle, and that the incomplete vehicle manufacturer makes no representation as to conformity with the standard. You have asked whether the incomplete vehicle document must contain the statement specified in subparagraph (i) of section 568.4(a)(7) if a foreseeable modification of the incomplete vehicle involves moving the driver's seat. If the incomplete vehicle is equipped with a driver's seat, its manufacturer would ordinarily ensure that the driver's seat and its attachment assembly comply with FMVSS No. 207, and that the seat was installed in compliance with the standard. Assuming the manufacturer has taken these measures, the statement in subparagraph (i) of section 568.4(a)(7) would be the most appropriate of the three statements in that section to cover the vehicle's compliance with FMVSS No. 207. That answer would not change even if the incomplete vehicle manufacturer could reasonably anticipate that the driver's seat would be replaced or that other modifications would be made to the driver's seat at a subsequent manufacturing stage, since the incomplete vehicle document should properly reflect the compliance status of the incomplete vehicle at that stage of manufacture. If the final stage manufacturer replaces the driver's seat or makes other modifications to it, before that manufacturer certifies that the vehicle complies with all applicable standards, as required under 49 CFR 567.4, it must ensure that the new or modified seat and its attachment assembly comply with FMVSS No. 207 and that the seat is installed in compliance with the standard. Your second question is whether the final stage manufacturer was required to equip the garbage truck that is the subject of your inquiry with a driver's seat at the right-side location where auxiliary controls were installed. You note that paragraph S4.1 of FMVSS No. 207 provides that "[e]ach vehicle shall have an occupant seat for the driver." You interpret this language as requiring a seat for the driver "wherever the driver may be located," including two driver's seats if the vehicle may be operated from two separate locations. In the one previous opportunity that we have had to address this issue, we did not interpret the requirements of paragraph S4.1 in this way. In a letter dated July 30, 1975 to Mr. Byron A. Crampton (copy enclosed), we stated that "a garbage truck that contained an auxiliary driver's position on the right side of the vehicle, with a separate set of controls" did not require a seat at the auxiliary location. The letter explains that this conclusion was reached because this office considers "the standards relating to the driver's position as relating to the normal position, and not to an auxiliary driving position." Lending suport to this interpretation is a letter to Mr. Glenn S. Park (copy enclosed), in which we stated that a "stand-up, right-hand drive position in a truck with a mounted side loader" would not be considered a designated seating position under Federal safety standards. Consistent with our past interpretation, we must disagree with your conclusion that two separate driver's seats must be installed in the vehicle you have described. If you have any further questions about vehicle certification requirements, please call Coleman Sachs of this office at 202-366-5238. Any further questions that you may have regarding the seating system requirements of FMVSS No. 207 should be directed to Otto Matheke of this office at 202-366-2992. Sincerely, |
1997 |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.