ID: nht89-1.65

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/04/89

FROM: NANCY L. BRUCE -- OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

TO: CHESTER ATKINS -- MEMBER, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 06/09/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO BLANCHE KOZAK; REDBOOK A33 [2]; VSA 108 [A] [1] [A]; LETTER DATED 03/29/89 FROM CHESTER G. ATKINS -- HOUSE TO NANCY BRUCE -- DOT, RE MRS. BLANCHE KOZAK; LETTER DATED 09/26/88 FR OM BLANCHE KOZAK TO BERRY FELRICE; LETTER DATED 10/16/79 FROM EDWIN P. RIEDEL; REPORT UNDATED; LETTER DATED 08/09/88 FROM BLANCHE G. KOZAK TO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

TEXT: Dear Mr. Atkins:

Thank you for your letter forwarding correspondence from your constituent, Mrs. Blanche Kozak.

I have transmitted your inquiry to the appropriate Departmental officials who are familiar with this matter and they will respond to you directly.

I appreciate your contacting me and hope you will not hesitate to call if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,

ID: nht89-1.66

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/04/89

FROM: CARLOS CHAVEZ -- FHASA - WAGNER

TO: NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 08/17/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO CARLOS CHAVEZ R -- FHASA-WAGNER; REDBOOK A34; PART 566

TEXT: Gentlemen:

Our company FHASACV is manufacturing automotive parts as brake fluid, hydraulic brake rubber cups & boots, brake hose and flashers in Mexico.

We would like to get a registration on U.S. DOT, but do not know which paper work and samples we must submitt with our application and also would like to get information on their cost.

We know our products fill DOT requirements but anyway we would want to update our information on them.

Please inform us the best way to obtain your last specs.

Thanking in advance for your prompt repply.

Sincerely,

P.S. FHASA is a Licensee of Wagner Division Cooper Industries, Inc.

ID: nht89-1.67

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/05/89

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA

TO: JAMES L. OBERSTAR -- U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 03/07/89 FROM JAMES L. OBERSTAR TO ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA

TEXT: Dear Mr. Oberstar:

Thank you for your recent letter on behalf of Mr. Joseph Mikoll regarding occupant protection devices for school buses with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less. You indicated that you had read my November 3, 1988 letter to Mr. Mikoll. In that letter, I explained that Mr. Mikoll's "safety bar" devices could not be installed in small school buses in place of safety belts at every seating position, but that "safety bars" could be installed in addition to the required safety belts. I a m pleased to have this opportunity to answer your two additional questions on this subject.

Question 1: Is there a procedure that [Mr. Mikoll's company] could follow to request a waiver of the provisions of Standard No. 222 which would allow its safety bar devices to be the sole passive restraint on small buses?

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains only one provision that would allow this agency to exempt vehicles from compliance with Standard No. 222 or any other applicable Federal motor vehicle Federal safety standard. Under the condition s specified in section 123 of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1410), a motor vehicle manufacturer could file a petition asking this agency to temporarily exempt a group of motor vehicles from compliance with a safety standard or standards. Thus, a school bus manufacturer that wishes to install "safety bars" in some of its buses in lieu of the safety belts required by Standard No. 222 could seek a temporary exemption from Standard No. 222 for some of its buses.

It is my understanding that, while Mr. Mikoll's company manufactures the "safety bars" and other motor vehicle equipment, it does not manufacture any motor vehicles. If this understanding is correct, Mr. Mikoll's company is not eligible to file for a temporary exemption.

Question 2: Are DOT funds available to firms such as [Mr. Mikoll's company] to do rigorous testing and R&D on passive restraint systems?

This agency generally does not provide research and development support for unsolicited proposals, although we may solicit research proposals and award such contracts on a competitive basis. In addition, the Department has a Small Business Innovation Re search Program that Mr. Mikoll may wish to learn more about. I have enclosed a guide on submitting proposals. This program is administered by the Transportation Systems Center, Kendall Square, MA 02142. Dr. George Kovatch is the Program Coordinator. H owever, Mr. Mikoll should be aware that funds for unsolicited proposals and small business development are extremely limited right now.

I hope you find this information helpful. Please let me know if you have any further questions or need some additional information.

Sincerely,

ENCLOSURE

ID: nht89-1.68

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/05/89

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA

TO: MILTON GURNY -- HEIN, SMITH, BEREZIN, MALOOF & SPINELLA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 12/16/88 FROM MILTON GURNEY TO JOAN CLAYBROOK -- NHTSA, RE SCHWANEWEDE VS MARBELL INC. ET AL, FILE NO 34577, OCC 2936

TEXT: Dear Mr. Gurny:

This responds to your letter asking whether a 1975 Chevrolet Impala was required to have lap and shoulder belts installed in it. I regret the delay in responding.

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.; the Safety Act) authorizes this agency to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. We have exercised this authority to es tablish Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR @ 571.208). Standard No. 208 required all 1975 model year cars to either be equipped with:

a. an automatic occupant protection system, such as air bags or automatic safety belts, or

b. lap and shoulder belts at both front outboard seating positions and either lap belts or lap and shoulder belts at all other seating positions.

Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) provides that no person shall "manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or import into the United States, any motor vehic le . . . manufactured on or after the date any Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect under this title unless it is in conformity with with such standard except as provided in subsection (b) of this section." This language prohibited any pers on from manufacturing, delivering, selling or importing any 1975 Chevrolet Impala that did not have lap and shoulder belts or an automatic occupant protection system installed at both front outboard seating positions.

However, section 108(b)(1) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(b)(1)) provides that the prohibitions in section 108(a)(1)(A) "shall not apply to the sale, offer for sale, or the introduction or delivery for introduction in interstate commerce of any motor vehicle after the first purchase of it is in good faith for purposes other than resale." In other

words, once the 1975 Impala was sold and delivered to its first retail purchaser, the vehicle was no longer required by Federal law to comply with Standard No. 208.

After the first purchase of a vehicle in good faith for purposes other than resale, the only provision in Federal law that refers to a vehicle's continuing compliance with an applicable safety standard is set forth in section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety A ct (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)). That section provides that:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle . . . in compliance with an applicable Federal motor veh icle safety standard, . . .

This section would prohibit any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business from removing a lap and shoulder belt that was originally installed in the motor vehicle, unless the business replaced the safety belt with another lap and shoulder bel t. Please note that this statutory language does not impose any obligations on individual vehicle owners to avoid "rendering inoperative" their vehicle's compliance with a safety standard. Thus, any person may remove the safety belts from his or her ow n vehicle without violating Federal law.

Further, the "render inoperative" provision does not impose an affirmative duty on the listed commercial entities to replace equipment that was previously removed by someone else. Thus, if a car dealer purchases, as a used car, a 1975 Chevrolet Impala t hat was originally equipped with lap and shoulder belts and if those belts are not present at the time of such purchase, Federal law does not require the dealer to install safety belts in the care before reselling it.

The individual States have authority to regulate the modifications that can be made to vehicles by individual owners and to require that used cars have certain equipment installed when they are sold. You may wish to contact the appropriate State Departm ent of Motor Vehicles to learn if any applicable laws or regulations were violated in this instance.

I hope this information is useful. Please feel free to contact this office if you have any further questions on this topic.

Sincerely,

ID: nht89-1.69

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/11/89

FROM: EDWARD P. KIRBY -- MASSACHUSETTS SENATE

TO: BARRY FELRICHE -- ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR RULE MAKING NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 06/16/89 ESTIMATED FROM BARRY FELRICE -- NHTSA TO EDWARD P. KIRBY -- SENATE; REDBOOK A33[4][B]; STANDARD 108

TEXT: Dear Mr. Felriche:

I enclose herewith a copy of a bill which I filed in the Massachusetts General Court and which has been referred to our Committee for Public Safety concerning the use of amber colored rear directional signals.

Obviously my legislation can only be a gesture since such matters are reserved for the Federal government under the Interstate clause of the United States Constitution. I filed it to make a point to have a forum in which to discuss it. As a result, I have learned that your department is considering a change in Section 571.108 of 47 CFR V regarding just that point.

In my experience as a driver I have seen numerous cases in which the lack of amber colored directional signals has led to confusion, when someone is pumping the brakes rhythmically on a vehicle equipped only with red signal lights on the rear. This l eads to the transmission of ambiguous indications of the driver's intent.

As a lawyer I have had two occasions to see the ambiguity resulting from brake pumping in cases in which some of the red rear signal bulbs were not working. At least when one yellow turn signal is not working one is not led to believe that the preced ing driver is planning a turn when he is not. He may be planning a turn that you cannot detect but you are not led to believe he will turn right when he is actually planning to turn left.

I hope that the regulations will be changed so that American manufacturers will place safety above their misguided application of aesthetic considerations. Frankly, I even think that amber signals' are themselves more attractive because they make sens e.

Thank you very much for your consideration of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure: Senate Bill No. 1217

By Mr. Kirby, a petition (accompanied by bill, Senate, No. 1217) of Edward P. Kirby for legislation relative to the use of amber-colored directional signals on new motor vehicles. Public Safety.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts

In the Year 1989

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

Notwithstanding any general or special law, rule or regulation to the contrary, all new motor vehicles made or sold in the Commonwealth shall have amber-colored directional signals. this act shall take effect as of January 1, 1990.

ID: nht89-1.7

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 01/25/89

FROM: GARRY O. MCCABE

TO: MIKE TRENTACOSTE -- DIRECTOR -- OFFICE OF MOTOR CARRIER STANDARDS HCA -- 10

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 06/19/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO GARRY O. MCCABE; REDBOOK A33(2); STANDARD 301 LETTER DATED 06/06/89 FROM MICHAEL F. TRENTACOSTE TO STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA, REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION OF FHWA AND NHTSA REGULAT IONS

TEXT: Dear Mr. Trentacoste:

The Wiggins Connectors Division of IMO Delaval is working with the Automation R&D Group of United Parcel Service to develop a rapid fueling system for their truck fleet.

The concept is to retrofit the existing fuel tanks to accommodate a dry break quick disconnect fitting. The mating half of this fitting is attached to a standard dispensing nozzle. The vacuum sensing line runs coaxilly through the entire assembly.

At this point it is agreed that we should proceed with a test installation at a small UPS distribution center. The question that arises is what do we need in the way of approvals or sanctions to run a testing program.

We realize that later once the design has been groomed and before it is marketed formal testing and approval is required.

I have discussed this situation briefly with Bob Hagen and as suggested I am enclosing some system drawings of what we are proposing.

After you have had an opportunity to review this information I would appreciate your advice as to what steps should be taken to proceed.

Sincerely,

ID: nht89-1.70

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/13/89

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA

TO: MABEL Y. BULLOCK -- ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER FROM MABEL Y. BULLOCK AND LACY H. THORNBURG TO SUSAN SCHRUTH -- NHTSA RE WINDOW TINTING, FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION OF STATE REGULATIONS, OCC 2142; NORTH CAROLINA STATUTE REGULATING WINDOW TINTING; LETTER DATED 12/18/87 FROM LACY H. THORNBURG A ND MABEL Y. BULLOCK, SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLES REGULATIONS OF DARK SHADED WINDOWS; PREEMPTION; LETTER DATED 05/06/88 FROM DAIRL BRAGG TO WILLIAM S. HIATT; LETTER DATED 10/28/82 FROM FRANK BERNDT -- NHTSA TO LAWRENCE T. HIROHATA, NOA-30; LETTER DATED 04/04/8 5 FROM JEFFREY R. MILLER TO ARMOND CARDARELLI; REGULATIONS DATED 07/01/85 EST, FEDERAL AUTO SAFETY LAWS AND MOTOR VEHICLE WINDOW TINTING.

TEXT: Dear Ms. Bullock:

Thank you for your letter to Ms. Susan Schruth of my staff, regarding North Carolina General Statute 20-127, Windshields must be unobstructed. I regret the delay in responding. You enclosed a copy of the statute, the regulations implementing it, a copy of a December 18, 1987 legal memorandum prepared by your department concluding that a State statute or regulation allowing 35% light transmittance through windows in motor vehicles would be preempted by current Federal safety laws and standards regulati ng this same subject matter, and a copy of a May 6, 1988 letter from the Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA) to Mr. William S. Hiatt, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for North Carolina, asserting that the North Carolina statute was no t preempted by Federal laws and regulations. You asked for my opinion as to whether the North Carolina statute conflicts with any provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1381 et seq.) or with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (49 CFR 571.1 et seq.).

Some background information on Federal motor vehicle safety laws and regulations may be helpful. As you are aware, our agency is authorized, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehic les and certain items of motor vehicle equipment. One of the standards that we have issued under this authority is Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials (49 CFR @ 571.205), which applies to all new vehicles and all new glazing materials for use in motor v ehicles. Among the requirements set forth in Standard No. 205 are specifications for minimum levels of light transmittance (70 percent light transmittance in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars).

Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) specifies that, "No person shall manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or

import into the United States, any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment manufactured on or after the date any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect under this title unless it is in conformity with such standard . . ." Because of this statutory requirement, any manufacturer, importer, or dealer that installs solar films or other sun screen devices on new glazing materials or the glazing installed in new vehicles must certify that the vehicle continues to comply with th e light transmittance and other requirements of Standard No. 205.

The requirement that a car comply with all applicable safety standards applies only until the car is first sold to a consumer. See section 108(b)(1) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(b)(1)). Both before and after a vehicle is first sold to a consumer, any modifications to the vehicle's windows, including tinting, are affected by section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)). That section prohibits any manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business from "rendering inoperative " any device or element of design installed in a vehicle in compliance with any safety standard. In the case of windows in a passenger car, this means that no manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business could install a sun screen device or win dow tinting that would result in a light transmittance of less than 70 percent for any window of the car, or otherwise cause the car to no longer comply with the other requirements of Standard No. 205. Violations of this "render inoperative" prohibition can result in Federal civil penalties to the manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business of up to $ 1000 for each noncomplying installation.

Please note that Federal law does not affect vehicle owners. Vehicle owners may alter their own vehicles and operate them on the highways as they please, even if the vehicle's windows no longer comply with the requirements of Standard No. 205. Hence, n o provision of a Federal statute or this agency's regulations prevents individual vehicle owners themselves from tinting the windows on their vehicles.

The authority of States to regulate glazing is affected by section 103(d) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d)). This section provides that:

[whenever] a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this title is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or ite m of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing any State from en forcing any safety standard which is identical to a Federal safety standard.

The effect of this provision of the Safety Act, with respect to the light transmittance requirements of Standard No. 205, is to expressly prohibit any State from specifying some level of light transmittance other than than 70 percent specified in Standar d No. 205 for new motor vehicles and

new glazing for the use in motor vehicles. Each of the individual States has authority to enforce identical standards (i.e., a minimum of 70 percent light transmittance) for new motor vehicles and new glazing for use in motor vehicles. Additionally, eac h of the individual States has the authority to regulate the modifications that may be made to vehicles by their owners and to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered in that State.

Having provided this background, we want to turn now to the results of our review of the North Carolina statute and regulations, along with your office's memorandum concluding that the statue is preempted by Federal law.

1. New vehicles and new glazing for use in vehicles. We concur with the conclusions in your memorandum that the North Carolina statute would be preempted if it specifies any requirements other than the requirements of Standard No. 205 (minimum of 70 per cent light transmittance) for new vehicles or few new glazing for use in motor vehicles. Section 108(a)(1) of the Safety Act and Standard No. 205 require all new vehicles and new glazing for use in motor vehicles to be delivered to the first purchaser w ith a light transmittance of at least 70 percent. Section 103(d) of the Safety Act expressly preempts any non-identical State standard on the subject of window tinting. Section 20-127(d) of the North Carolina statute appears to permit a single applicat ion of tinted film with a light transmittance of as little as 35 percent to be applied to vehicle glazing after factory delivery, but before sale to the public. This provision is preempted by Federal law, as is any other provision of North Carolina law which specifies that new glazing and glazing in new vehicles shall have some level of light transmittance other than the 70 percent minimum light transmittance requirement specified in Standard No. 205.

2. Modifications to vehicles and glazing by manufacturers, distributors, dealers and repair businesses after the first purchase of the vehicle or glazing in good faith for purposes other than resale. We concur with the conclusions in your memorandum tha t the North Carolina statute would be preempted by Federal law if it permits the commercial installation of sunscreen materials so that the combination of the sunscreen material and the existing glazing no longer meet the 70 percent light transmittance r equirement specified in Standard No. 205. This conclusion is based on the conflict between the North Carolina statute and the "render inoperative" provision of section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act. That provision prohibits any manufacturer, distributor , dealer, or repair business from rendering inoperative the compliance of a vehicle or an item of glazing with any of the requirements of Standard No. 205, including the minimum 70 percent light transmittance requirement.

Apart from the issue of preemption, I want to note that the provisions of State law cannot alter the effect of the "render inoperative" prohibition in Federal law. Regardless of how North Carolina law treats the combination of the glazing and the tintin g, if it results in less than 70

percent light transmittance, a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business that installed such tinting on a vehicle would be liable for the Federal civil penalty discussed above.

3. Modifications to vehicles and glazing by individual owners themselves after the first purchase of the vehicle or glazing in good faith for purposes other than resale. As noted above, Federal law does not regulate modifications that individual owners themselves make to their vehicles or glazing after the first purchase in good faith for purposes other than resale, even if those modifications result in the vehicles or glazing on longer complying with the requirements of Standard No. 205, including the requirement for at least 70 percent light transmittance. The State of North Carolina is free to establish whatever restrictions, if any, it deems appropriate on individual owner modifications, without regard to the requirements of Standard No. 205. To the extent that the North Carolina statute seeks to address these individual owner modifications, it would not be preempted by Federal law.

$4. Requirements for vehicles to be registered in the State of North Carolina. An individual State is free to establish whatever requirements it deems appropriate for vehicles to be registered in the State, provided that those State requirements would n ot prohibit the registration of vehicles that complied with the requirements of the Federal safety standards. Thus, the State of North Carolina is free to permit vehicles that do not comply with the requirements of Standard No. 205 to be registered in N orth Carolina. To the extent that the North Carolina window tinting statute seeks to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered in the State, it would not be preempted by Federal law.

We have also reviewed the May 6, 1988 letter from MEMA to Mr. Hiatt, in which MEMA discusses why it believes North Carolina's statute would not be preempted by Federal law. The MEMA discussion does not address the "render inoperative" provision in secti on 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act, which prohibits commercial businesses from adversely affecting the compliance of elements of design installed in a vehicle or item of equipment in compliance with a safety standards, regardless of whether the vehicle is new or used. As was previously stated, Federal law prohibits any manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business from ever installing window tinting material for the owner of a car if the combination of the original glazing and the tinting materi al results in less than 70 percent light transmittance through any window of the car.

To summarize, the North Carolina statute would be preempted to the extent that it seeks to permit some level of light transmittance other than that specified in Standard No. 205 for glazing in vehicles prior to the first purchase of the vehicles in good faith for purposes other than resale. Similarly, the statute would be preempted to the extent it seeks to permit the commercial installation of sunscreen materials with the result that the combination of the sunscreen material and the existing glazing n o longer complies with the requirements of Standard No. 205. However, the North Carolina statute would not be preempted to the extent that it seeks to regulate the modifications that owners themselves can make to

their vehicles or to the extent that it seeks to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered in the State, even if those requirements differ from those specified in Standard No. 205.

Sincerely,

ID: nht89-1.71

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/14/89

FROM: EUGENIA M. PIERAKOS; JAMES L. PIERAKOS -- SNOWLIFTING EQUIPMENT AND

TO: CONSULTANTS OF BUFFALO INC HENRY J. NOWAK -- 33RD CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, NY

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 06/27/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO HENRY J. NOWAK -- CONGRESS; REDBOOK A33; PART 571; LETTER DATED 04/30/89 FROM HENRY J. NOWAK -- CONGRESS TO JOHN STONNER -- DOT;

TEXT: Dear Congressman:

This firm is the Western New York State dealer for Jaeger Industries, Inc., manufacturers of curbside recycling equipment, brochure and specifications for same enclosed.

For some time now, the manufacturer has attempted to obtain official information/data regarding their equipment, specifically the use of chain steering for dual steering applications; brakes, throttle, etc. They have spoken to various officials in NYSMV D with no success. They have been referred to NHTSA in Washington (202-366-2992), spoken with Asst. Chief Consul Steve Wood and Chief Consul Erika Jones, and no one has provide Jaeger with any definitive answers.

Since USDOT has no office in the Buffalo area, we are asking your help in obtaining the data/regulations that apply to this vehicle, especially the dual steering mechanism, brakes, throttle, etc.

We know you are vitally interested in the recyling programs in our area, and realize that its success is very dependent on good equipment. Several communities in the Buffalo area are planning to purchase these vehicles, but we must be sure that it meets all Federal and State standards. In view of the urgency of this matter, we would appreciate your office expediting same, so that we can have factual information as soon as possible. Your cooperation in this matter is greatly appreciated.

Respectfully,

enclosures omitted

ID: nht89-1.72

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/14/89

FROM: VIRVE AIROLA -- OY TOPPI AB FINLAND

TO: NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 05/31/90 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL TO VIRVE AIROLA; LETTER DATED 01/26/72 FROM RICHARD B. DYSON -- ASSISTANT CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA TO K. NAKAJIMA -- TOYOTA

TEXT: Gentlemen;

Our company, Oy Toppi Ab, is a Finnish producer of plastic tubes and hoses. One of our most important products is Air Brake Tubing made of Polyamide PA 11. We produce this tubing both conforming to SAE J 844 and to the German standard DIN 74324.

For some time ago we quoted our tubes to the Swedish truck and bus producer Saab-Scania AB and received their product standard. Among other things this standard states following:

Quote: the manufacturer shall be registered at NHTSA in USA and the symbol DOT constituting certification by the manufacturer that the hose conforms to all applicable FMVSS standards. quote

We have no doubt that we will fullfill the requirements for the register and would appreciate it if you could send us the application formula as soon as possible.

In case any information or details are needed, please let us know and we will send them for you immediately.

Brochures [OMITTED]

ID: nht89-1.73

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/17/89

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA

TO: ROBERT C. CRAIG -- QUALITY CONTROL MANAGER COSCO, INC.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 02/03/89 FROM ROBERT C. CRAIG TO GEORGE L. PARKER -- NHTSA, RE 49 CFR 571-213, STANDARD NO 213 CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS AT 5.5.1 LABELING, OCC 3119

TEXT: Dear Mr. Craig:

This responds to your February 3, 1989 letter to Mr. George Parker, our Associate Administrator for Enforcement, seeking an interpretation of Standard 213, Child Restraint Systems (49 CFR @ 571.213). Specifically, paragraph S5.5 of that standard require s each child restraint system to be permanently labeled with certain specified information. On of the items of information required to be permanently labeled on the child restraint is the manufacturer's recommendations for the maximum weight and height of children who can safely occupy the system, and those weight and height recommendations must be expressed in English units (pounds and inches). Your letter stated that your company would like to express its maximum weight and height recommendations in both English units and equivalent metric units (kilograms and meters), and asked whether this would be permitted by Standard 213. As long as the information is presented in a manner that is not likely to cause confusion, Standard 213 does not prohibit manufacturers from expressing required information in equivalent English and metric units.

For each of the labeling requirements set forth in NHTSA's regulations, this agency has consistently taken the position that manufacturers may present information in addition to the required information, provided that the additional information is presen ted in a manner that is not likely to confuse the user. Moreover, the agency has already concluded that passenger car tires may be labeled with required information expressed in equivalent English and metric units. See the enclosed April 5, 1979 letter to Mr. Michael Petler. We would apply the same reasoning in interpreting the labeling requirements of Standard 213. That is, Standard 213 permits manufacturers to present the required information in

both English and metric units, provided that the information is presented in a manner that is not likely to confuse persons using the child restraint system.

Sincerely,

ENCLOSURE