NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
|---|---|
ID: righthanddriveOpenMr. Michael Dropik Dear Mr. Dropik: This responds to your e-mail message to the Federal Highway Administration, dated October 27, 2005. Your message was forwarded to our office for a response. In your message, you asked whether it was legal for a vehicle manufacturer to install the steering wheel on the right side of the vehicle instead of the left. Yes, it is legal to install the steering wheel on the right side of a motor vehicle. By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has the authority to prescribe motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA does not, however, approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial products. Instead, manufacturers of motor vehicles are required to certify that their vehicles comply with the mandatory safety standards. As NHTSA has not issued safety standards that prohibit the use of a right hand drive steering system on a motor vehicle, manufacturers are permitted to install the steering wheel on the right or left side of a vehicle. I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any further questions please contact Mr. Edward Glancy of my staff, at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood ref:571 |
2006 |
ID: rmaltrjul25.ztvOpenMs. Ann Wilson Dear Ms. Wilson: This is in reply to your letter of July 25, 2003, requesting an interpretation of certain provisions of NHTSAs early warning reporting (EWR) regulation, subpart C of 49 CFR Part 579. You have expressed six concerns. Your first concern involves "Updates of deaths and injuries." If a tire manufacturer is not aware of the tire identification number (TIN) at the time an incident involving death or injury is initially reported, Section 579.28(f)(2)(i) requires the manufacturer to "submit an updated report of such incident in its report covering the reporting period in which the . . . TIN is identified." You interpret this as meaning that if a tire manufacturer receives TIN information after the close of the reporting period in which the manufacturer receives a claim or notice of death or injury, it must "provide NHTSA with the TIN in the report covering the reporting period in which the TIN information is identified by the manufacturer." However, you observed that at the public meeting conducted by NHTSA on June 18, 2003, a NHTSA employee "stated that tire manufacturers must submit the TIN by updating the entire death and injury file for the reporting period in which the original claim of death or injury was reported." You ask for clarification of this requirement. The requirement was properly communicated at the public meeting. Pursuant to Section 579.29(a), EWR information must be submitted on templates provided on the NHTSA website. The same template that is used for the original report is used for updated reports. The initial submission would be identified as "Version 1." The first updated report would be identified as "Version 2," and so on. You expressed concern with a statement at the June 18 public meeting that a manufacturer could not delete a claim that had been reported in a previous period, "even if the manufacturer subsequently discovered that the claim was erroneous (i.e., did not involve the manufacturers tire or did not involve a death or injury)." You have asked for confirmation that "this is the official interpretation of this rule." The updating provisions of Section 579.28 do not address the issue of correction of information once the information has been reported to NHTSA. Practical considerations limit our ability to make corrections to EWR data in our data warehouse. The Office of Defects Investigations current plan is to allow manufacturers that identify significant errors to request the opportunity to submit corrected data templates. We will respond to such requests on a case-by-case basis. Your second concern is labeled "Scope of information on deaths and injuries." We amended Section 579.26(b) in a Federal Register notice of June 11, 2003 (68 FR 35132). The amended regulation clarifies that reporting of incidents involving deaths and injuries applies to "all tires manufactured during a production year covered by the reporting period and the four production years prior to the earliest production year in the reporting period."We also amended Section 579.4(c) to define "production year" for tires to mean "the calendar year in which the item was produced." Your members believe that reporting relative to certain production years is subject to different interpretations. You understand that NHTSA intends reporting under Section 579.29 to encompass "tires produced in the current production year and . . . tires produced in the previous four years." You asked for confirmation of your understanding. Applying the EWR regulations definition of "production year," the reporting requirement for tire manufacturers may be read to apply to all tires manufactured during a calendar year covered by the reporting period and the four calendar years prior to the earliest calendar year in the reporting period. Because EWR reporting is on a quarterly basis, there will never be more than one calendar year during a reporting period. Thus, the four calendar years prior to the earliest calendar year in the reporting period will be the four calendar years before the calendar year of the report. Thus, we confirm your understanding of this requirement. Your third concern relates to "Tire type code."Tire manufacturers must provide the "tire type code" as part of their quarterly report on production information. The EWR regulation does not define "tire type code," but you pointed out that the preamble to the final rule indicates that "tire type code" means the third grouping of the TIN (67 FR at 45862). You asked for confirmation. We noted in the preamble to the final rule that we would use RMAs preferred term of "tire type code," instead of "serial code" as we had proposed, and that the term "corresponds to the third grouping of identification requirements as specified in 49 CFR 574.5(c)." 67 FR at 45862. Section 574.5(c) identifies the third group as a "descriptive code;" Figure 1 thereof clearly depicts the four information groups of the "Tire Identification Number," and identifies the third group as "Tire Type Code." Thus, we confirm your interpretation. You are next concerned with reporting "plant of manufacture" for imported tires. Section 579.26 requires a tire manufacturer to include in its reporting of information under paragraph (a) "the plant where [the tires were] manufactured." You asserted that in most cases, with respect to tires that they import, "U.S. tire manufacturers do not know the TIN, the date of manufacture, or the plant of manufacture for such tires." Thus, without the TIN, the manufacturer will be unable to provide NHTSA with the name of the plant where the tire was manufactured. You requested that manufacturers be allowed to provide the country of origin (and date of importation) rather than plant and date of manufacture, when the TIN is unknown. We concur in your suggestion that in the context presented, the report on country of origin and date of importation satisfies the regulation. Your next request concerned "Production information." You cited Section 579.26(a), which requires manufacturers to submit "cumulative warranty production" and "cumulative total production through the end of the reporting period." However, you assert that the preamble to the amendments of June 11, 2003 "states that tire manufacturers must submit data only for the quarterly reporting period and not 'year-to-date' ('YTD') or cumulative data," and you believe that a handout by NHTSA at the public meeting on June 18 was subject to varying interpretations. The regulation establishes the reporting requirement, and we do not find it open to the interpretation that you suggest. Under the introductory text of Section 579.26 and paragraph (a), a tire manufacturer must report "the quarterly reporting period, the tire line, . . . the production [calendar] year, the cumulative warranty production, and the cumulative total production through the end of the reporting period." This means, for example, that a manufacturers report for the third quarter of a calendar year would contain the total warranty production and the total production for a tire line for the first three quarters of the calendar year. Separately, a manufacturer would also report, for that tire line (as further delineated and subcategorized in the rule), information described in Section 579.26 that includes "the model year of tire manufactured during the reporting period and the four calendar years prior to the earliest model year in the reporting period . . . .""Model year" is defined to mean "the year that [a tire] was produced." See Section 579.4, 68 FR 35142. Thus, each quarterly report in a calendar year would also include the total warranty production and the total production for each of the four previous calendar years for a tire line for which information is being reported under paragraphs (a) or (c). This includes tire lines no longer in production. We contrast this with the numbers of property damage claims and warranty adjustments that a tire manufacturer must report under Section 579.26(c). These numbers are reported on a quarterly basis, and not cumulatively. Finally, you expressed concern with "Appropriate entry code for unknown data." Your members have been advised that they must not leave any cells blank on the EWR templates in order for their reports to be accepted. You have asked whether unknown data should be reported as "UNK," as indicated on the EWR templates previously posted on NHTSAs website, or "U," as indicated at the June 18 public meeting, or in some other format. Section 579.26(a) was amended in a June 11, 2003 Federal Register Notice, to add the requirement that if a manufacturer is not certain whether a particular group of tires is used as original equipment on a motor vehicle, it shall state "U" in the reporting field (68 FR at 35144). In reporting incidents involving deaths or injuries under Section 579.26(b), a manufacturer must use code 99 if no component of the tire is specified in the claim or notice (i.e., if the relevant component is unknown to the manufacturer). In reporting under Section 579.26(c), the regulation specifies that no reporting is necessary if the system or component involved is not specified in the codes (i.e., the final template should not contain a blank cell since no reporting is required). If you have further questions, you may phone Andrew DiMarsico of this Office (202-366-5263). Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman ref:579 |
2003 |
ID: RMAmetric22869Open Mr. Steven Butcher Dear Mr. Butcher: This responds to your March 12, 2001 letter asking whether four labeling sample proposals, subject to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 119, New pneumatic tires for vehicles other than passenger cars (571.119), are acceptable in terms of placement of the metric units under the Final Rule for the Metric Conversion of Tire Standards, Docket No. NHTSA-98-3837, Notice 1 ("Final Rule") (May 27, 1998, 63 FR 28912). The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not issue advance approval of compliance by manufacturers with motor vehicle safety standards or regulations. The agency, however, will give an informal opinion as to whether your sample markings appear to comply with the requirements of FMVSS No. 119, as amended by the Final Rule. A review of the labeling illustrations you supplied indicates that you have used a different format than illustrated in our Final Rule of May 27, 1998. For example, the amended FMVSS No. 119 does not dictate repetition of the existing English measurement label after the metric measurement label, e.g. "MAX LOAD 1020 KG AT 350 KPA COLD (MAX LOAD 2250 LBS AT 50 PSI)" but, rather, the placement of the existing English measurement in parenthesis after the metric measurement, e.g. "MAX LOAD 1020 KG (2250 LBS) at 350 KPA (50 PSI) COLD". This specification resulted from comments by manufacturers that unnecessary words needlessly increase the amount of labeling required on the tires. The example of marking information shown in S5.6 of FMVSS No. 119 in the Final Rule is intended only as a guide to manufacturers. A manufacturer can vary the illustrated format somewhat as long as the requirements of S5.6, as amended, are satisfied. Since the additional words in your proposed labels do not obfuscate the required markings, the labels appear to comply with the requirements of FMVSS No. 119, as amended by the Final Rule. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions or need additional information, feel free to contact Nancy Bell of my staff at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack ref:119 |
2001 |
ID: Robert BabcockOpenRobert Babcock, Senior Manager Regulation and Certification Division Hyundai-Kia America Technical Center, Inc. 6800 Geddes Road Superior Township, MI 48198 Dear Mr. Babcock: This responds to your November 26, 2008 letter, as well as an earlier letter from Hyundai-Kia America Technical Center, Inc., concerning a petition you submitted requesting an exemption from the parts marking requirements of Part 541, Federal Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard, for the Kia Amanti beginning with the 2009 model year. Under 49 CFR Part 543.5(a), a manufacturer may, for each model year, petition the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) for an exemption of one vehicle line from the requirements of the Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard. Because our agency had already granted a petition submitted by Hyundai-Kia American Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI) for the 2009 Hyundai Genesis, NHTSA staff informally advised HATCI that it appeared to be ineligible for a second exemption for the same model year. You asked us to reconsider this position. This letter provides our response. As discussed below, based on available information, we believe that Hyundai and Kia are eligible as separate manufacturers for parts marking exemptions. We have previously addressed the issue of how related companies are treated for purposes of parts marking exemptions in an interpretation to Patrick M. Raher, Esq., dated July 12, 2007. We explained: The definition of manufacturer for the theft prevention standard program is set forth at 49 U.S.C. 32101(5), and reads as follows: manufacturer means a person (A) manufacturing or assembling passenger motor vehicles or passenger motor vehicle equipment; or (B) importing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for resale. In considering whether related companies are separately eligible for parts marking exemptions, we believe it is appropriate to consider two issues. First, we consider whether the companies are structured such that they can be considered separate persons under the statutory definition. Second, assuming the answer is yes, we look beyond the corporate structure and consider whether the companies are operationally independent from each other. It is necessary to consider this since a manufacturer could be highly integrated in operation but, for variety reasons, use multiple corporations. Also, we separately consider, with respect to the vehicles for which an exemption is sought, whether the vehicles can be considered to have more than one manufacturer and, if so, whether that would affect eligibility for the requested exemption. We note that the statutory provision does not indicate that a person is a manufacturer of a vehicle solely by virtue of ownership or control of another person that is a manufacturer. In your letter arguing that Kia Motors Corporation (KMC) and Hyundai Motor Company (HMC) should be considered separately eligible for parts marking exemptions, you provided the following explanation of the relationship between KMC, HMC, and HATCI: KMC is an independent original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of passenger automobiles and light trucks. HMC is also an independent OEM of passenger automobiles and light trucks. HATCI is a Michigan based corporation headquartered and incorporated in the State of Michigan, USA with additional offices and facilities in the State of California. HATCI is an authorized representative of both HMC and KMC (the Companies), doing business pursuant to independent contracts with both Companies. An analogy of HATCIs relationship with HMC and KMC would be that of a law firm representing two separate clients that produce similar products. HATCI performs engineering and design services for both Companies. Such activities are performed on behalf of, and independently for, the Companies. HATCIs financial structure provides for independent budgeting, billing, and operational financing of the activities performed for each of the Companies. The Companies are separately capitalized and operate independently and autonomously; having separate management, administrative and operational structures, financing, marketing, product planning and human resources organizations. The Companies produce, market, and sell separate vehicles, parts, and services. While some products (individual models) are based on core components including engines, transmissions, body structures, and components, these core products are sourced independently and each product is independently designed, engineered, tested, calibrated, and manufactured. Two exceptions exist regarding these matters. The Hyundai Entourage is produced for HMC under contract by KMC, and is a functional duplicate of the Kia Sedona with the exception of basic calibration and tuning. However, the Entourage is produced for HMC under contract by KMC, and is marketed, sold, and serviced independently by HMC. There are contractual agreements between HMC and KMC making HMC responsible for all aftermarket issues regarding the Entourage including any warranty and recall responsibilities. The other exception to this arrangement relates to the Research and Development (R&D) function of the Companies. While each company maintains separate management, financial, and operational departments, many of the R&D functions are performed by a unified R&D Group with its own President and Administrative offices. As a practical matter, this group operates as an independent contractor performing functions related to research, development, and testing utilizing highly-capitalized equipment and facilities to ensure appropriate economy. While performed by a unified group, these operations and functions are separately financed and invoiced for each company. Based on this information, you stated that it is HATCIs contention that both HMC and KMC should be considered and treated as separate companies for the purposes of the consideration of the exemption qualifications of 49 CFR Part 541, and that it be understood that HATCI is merely operating as the authorized representative of KMC regarding this matter. As indicated above, in considering whether related companies are separately eligible for parts marking exemptions, we believe it is appropriate to consider two issues. First, we consider whether the companies are structured such that they can be considered separate persons under the statutory definition. In considering this question, we consider the structuring of the companies both in the United States and abroad. In a December 19, 2007 letter on this subject, signed by Jeffrey R. Smith, HATCI provided the following information concerning the corporate structure of Hyundai and Kia in Korea: Hyundai Motor America is a wholly owned subsidiary of Hyundai Motor Company of the Republic of Korea. Kia Motors America is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kia Motors Corporation of the Republic of Korea. Hyundai Motor Company owns less than forty percent of Kia Motors Corporation stock in the Republic of Korea. Based on the information provided by you and by Jeffrey R. Smith, we believe the companies are structured such that they can be considered separate persons under the statutory definition. As indicated above, in situations where companies can be considered separate persons under the statutory definition, we look beyond the corporate structure and consider whether the companies are operationally independent from each other. We believe it is necessary to consider this since a manufacturer could be highly integrated in operation but, for variety reasons, use multiple corporations. We note that the maintenance of separate brand identities and distribution systems does not by itself indicate operational independence. We believe the issue of whether Hyundai and Kia are operationally independent under this test is a close case. The information provided in your letter indicates that the corporate structure of HMC and KMC have been formed to provide for operational independence in the vast majority of areas. On the other hand, Hyundai and Kia are part of the same automotive group in Korea: the Hyundai-Kia Automotive Group. Moreover, HATCI is also part of the Hyundai-Kia Automotive Group and provides services for both Hyundai and Kia in North America. After considering the available information in the specific context of eligibility for parts marking exemptions, we have concluded that there is sufficient separation between Hyundia and Kia in operations to treat them as two separate manufacturers. Finally, as indicated above, we separately consider, with respect to the vehicles for which an exemption is sought, whether the vehicles can be considered to have more than one manufacturer and, if so, whether that would affect eligibility for the requested exemption. However, based on the information you provided, this does not appear to be a relevant consideration for this requested exemption. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Kia is separately eligible for a theft exemption for the Amanti, without regard to Hyundais petition for an exemption for the Genesis. The agency will therefore process your petition for the Kia Amanti. We note that the analysis presented in this letter is limited to eligibility for theft exemptions. Before deciding whether the analysis would apply in other contexts, we would want to carefully evaluate the relevant statutory and regulatory requirements and purposes. If you have questions about this or related issues, please feel free to contact Edward Glancy of my staff at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely yours, Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel ref:543 d.7/24/09
|
2009 |
ID: Robert Linton drnOpenBMW of Oyster Bay 145 Pine Hollow Road Oyster Bay, NY 11771 RE: 2007 BMW 760Li Sedan VIN: WBAHN03547DD98859 Dear Mr. Ploetner: This responds to your letter of June 26, 2007, requesting the National Highway Traffic Safety Administrations (NHTSAs) assistance regarding lowering the light transmittance through the rear side windows and rear window in the above-cited Model Year (MY) 2007 BMW 760Li Sedan to accommodate the medical needs of its owner, Mr. Robert Linton. This letter provides the relief you and Mr. Linton seek. In your letter, you state: Mr. Linton suffers from leukemia, which makes him particularly sensitive to light, and would like his 2007 BMW 760Li sedan modified to accommodate his disability. As such, we are requesting that NHTSA not enforce the make inoperative prohibition regarding FMVSS 205 in this particular case. The vehicle is for Mr. Lintons personal use only and he is seeking a light tint in all rear windows of the vehicle, so that he may ride comfortably in the rear seats. In a June 27, 2007 telephone conversation with Dorothy Nakama of my staff, Mr. Linton stated that he wishes to have changed in the sedan, only the rear window and side windows to the right and left of the rear seat passengers. Mr. Linton stated that his medical condition made his eyes so sensitive to light that he cannot be driven in a passenger car with glazing that meets NHTSA standards. Mr. Linton further advised Ms. Nakama that he will not drive himself, and has hired a driver. We would like to explain that NHTSA is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. Manufacturers are required to certify that their products conform to our safety standards. After the first sale of the vehicle, Section 30122(b) of Title 49 of the United States Code provides in part that: A manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business may not knowingly make inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter The make inoperative prohibition requires businesses which modify motor vehicles to ensure that they do not remove, disconnect, or degrade the performance of safety equipment installed in compliance with an applicable standard. Violations of this prohibition are punishable by civil penalties. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials requires that safety glazing materials or multiple glazed units intended for use at levels requisite for driving visibility in the motor vehicle shall show regular (parallel) luminous transmittance of not less than 70% of the light, at normal incidence, both before and after irradiation. All glazing in a passenger car is deemed to be requisite for driving visibility. In certain limited situations, NHTSA has exercised its discretion in enforcing our requirements to provide some allowances to a business which cannot conform to our requirements when making modifications to accommodate the special needs of persons with disabilities. In situations such as that of Mr. Linton, where a vehicle must be modified to accommodate the needs of a particular disability, we have been willing to consider violations of the make inoperative prohibition to be justified by public need. Accordingly, NHTSA will not institute enforcement proceedings against a commercial entity that changes Mr. Lintons BMW sedan so that the light transmittance through the glazing is less than 70% for the glazing to the right and left of the rear seat passengers and the rear window. After the light transmittance in the glazing is lowered, if Mr. Linton wishes to sell or otherwise transfer the BMW 760Li sedan, we would encourage that the glazing in the rear side windows and rear windows be restored to 70% light transmittance. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact Ms. Dorothy Nakama at this address or at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely yours, Anthony M. Cooke Chief Counsel ref:205 d.7/30/07 |
2007 |
ID: Roberts.1.wpdOpenMr. Mark Roberts Dear Mr. Roberts: This responds to your letter asking whether it would be permissible for a member of the transit bus industry to replace a required passenger-side, flat unit magnification mirror installed on new buses having a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of more than 4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) with a 40" to 60"-radius convex mirror. As discussed in a conversation with Eric Stas of my staff, your company manufactures the aftermarket mirrors in question, and you seek confirmation of "What is [a] legal and an illegal mirror once the buses are in revenue service?" We would like to begin by explaining that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. Manufacturers are required to certify that their products conform to our safety standards before they can be offered for sale. One of the safety standards we have issued is FMVSS No. 111, "Rearview Mirrors" (49 CFR 571.111). FMVSS No. 111 sets different requirements for buses depending on the GVWR. Buses, other than school buses, with a GVWR of more than 4,536 kg must meet the requirements of S7.1, which requires outside mirrors of unit magnification, each with not less than 323 cm2 of reflective surface, installed with stable supports on both sides of the vehicle. Vehicle manufacturers must install mirrors that comply with S7.1 in order to certify new buses covered under the standard. After the first sale of the vehicle, manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and repair businesses are prohibited from "knowingly making inoperative" any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable standard. 49 U.S.C. 30122. In general, the "make inoperative" prohibition requires businesses which modify motor vehicles to ensure that they do not remove, disconnect, or degrade the performance of safety equipment installed in compliance with an applicable standard. If NHTSA determines that a business has violated the "make inoperative" provision, it may assess a civil penalty in the amount of $5,000 per violation (not to exceed $15,000,000 in the aggregate). 49 U.S.C. 30165(a)(1). Thus, a manufacturer of new transit buses or other commercial entity repairing or modifying such buses could not replace a mirror complying with FMVSS No. 111 with another mirror that does not comply with the standard. However, it would be permissible to install your convex mirror on the passenger side of the bus as a supplement to a unit magnification mirror that meets all applicable requirements of FMVSS No. 111. The "make inoperative" provision does not apply to the actions of a vehicle owner in modifying his or her own vehicle. Consequently, NHTSA regulations do not prevent transit bus companies from making changes to their own used buses in their own garages or repair and maintenance facilities, even if they cause a vehicle to no longer comply with NHTSA safety standards. However, we urge vehicle owners not to degrade the safety of any system or device on their vehicles, including those required by FMVSS No. 111. Further, I note that the Departments Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has jurisdiction over interstate motor carriers operating in the United States. Under FMCSA regulations, there is a provision related to "rear-vision mirrors" at 49 CFR 393.80, which provides in relevant part:
49 CFR 393.80(a). Thus, for vehicles covered under FMCSA regulations, there is an ongoing requirement for rear-vision mirrors that meet the requirements of FMVSS No. 111. You or transit bus owners should contact Larry Minor of the FMCSA at (202) 366-4009 for further information about this regulation and the vehicles to which it applies. In addition, States have the authority to regulate the use and licensing of vehicles operating within their jurisdictions. Therefore, you or transit bus owners should check with the Department of Motor Vehicles in any State in which the equipment will be sold or used regarding any such requirements. I hope you find this information useful. If you have further questions, please feel free to contact Eric Stas of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman ref:111 |
2003 |
ID: Roseman_ltrOpen Mr. Robert A. Roseman Dear Mr. Roseman: This responds to your letter to Stephen P. Wood of my staff asking two questions about Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 106, Brake Hoses (49 CFR 571.106). Both of your questions are answered below. You explain that your company manufactures boat trailers and that you have questions about a brake hose assembly "that does not meet Standard No. 106." You ask for confirmation of information you were given that "DOT doesn't apply to boat trailers because they are not for commercial use." As explained below, the information you were provided is incorrect. Question 1: Does 49 CFR 571.106 apply to boat trailers that are used on the public highways for non-commercial use? The answer is yes. All trailers, including boat trailers, manufactured for use on the public highways and all brake hoses, brake hose assemblies, and end fittings used on trailers and boat trailers must comply with FMVSS No. 106. (See S3 of FMVSS No. 106 regarding the applicability of the standard.) The term "boat trailer" is defined in 49 CFR 571.3, as "a trailer designed with cradle-type mountings to transport a boat and configured to permit launching of the boat from the rear of the trailer." (Emphasis added.) As a subcategory of "trailers," boat trailers must comply with all Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to trailers, including FMVSS No. 106. We note that our answer would be the same even if the boat trailers you manufacture were used on the public roads for commercial rather than non-commercial purposes. Question 2: What would my exposure for correction be if I simply began using the lower cost brake hose assemblies until the issue is clarified? Would I have to replace all those that I supplied? Under 49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq. (the Safety Act), you must use brake hose, end fittings and assemblies that comply with Standard No. 106. 49 U.S.C. 30112. Under 30115 of the Safety Act, manufacturers are required to certify that their motor vehicles and/or motor vehicle equipment comply with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards in effect at the time of manufacture. Section 30115 prohibits any person from issuing such certification "if, in exercising reasonable care, the person has reason to know the certificate is false or misleading in a material respect." Persons who knowingly certify compliance of vehicles containing non-compliant equipment are subject to the Act's civil penalty provisions. 49 U.S.C. 30165. Under 30165, anyone who violates 30112 or 30115 is subject to a civil penalty up to $5,000 per violation, up to a maximum penalty of $15,000,000 for a series of related violations. In addition, the Act prohibits the sale of non-compliant vehicles or equipment. The statute also requires manufacturers to notify consumers that a motor vehicle or item or equipment they purchased fails to comply with the FMVSSs or contains a safety-related defect, and requires manufacturers to remedy such noncompliances and defects without charge. We have enclosed an information sheet that briefly describes these and other manufacturer responsibilities. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions, please contact Robert Knop of this office at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman Enclosure |
2002 |
ID: RUSHFORD.RBMOpen Ms. Lisa Rushford Dear Ms. Rushford: This is to acknowledge your letter concerning the problems with air bags. Please be assured that your comments and concerns will be taken into consideration as the agency develops a solution to these problems. Enclosed is a list of Questions and Answers regarding air bags that I hope will be helpful to you. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel Enclosure cc: The Honorable Charles W. Stenholm ref:208 d:11/27/96 |
1996 |
ID: RVIA-MonacoCoach.ekmyOpenLawrence F. Henneberger, Esq. Dear Mr. Henneberger: This is in response to your August 26, 2003 letter on behalf of the Recreational Vehicle Industry Association (RVIA) and Monaco Coach Company (Monaco), addressed to Mr. Kenneth N. Weinstein of this agency, in which you raised issues dealing with the submission of field reports under the National Highway Traffic Safety Administrations Early Warning Reporting (EWR) regulations. As you are aware, these issues were previously discussed during an August 5, 2003 meeting between NHTSA officials and representatives of RVIA and Monaco. You asked whether Pre-Delivery Inspection (PDI) forms, Dealer Acceptance forms (DAF), and any other pre-retail sale documents "related to recreational vehicles which are still in the direct control of the manufacturer or dealer" fall under the definition of "field reports" and therefore subject to the requirements of the EWR regulations. In your letter, you explained that recreational vehicle manufacturers, prior to retail sale of a recreational vehicle, typically require dealers to complete and provide back to the manufacturer what are known in the industry as PDIs, DAFs and similar materials. You further clarified that these "form documents . . . are essentially checklists for dealer completion which are intended to detect and correct, under warranty, any product deficiencies prior to retail sale of a recreational vehicle." As we explained in the preamble to the EWR Final Rule, the term "field report" was not intended to cover every dealer-to-manufacturer communication. See 67 Fed. Reg. 45,855 (July 10, 2002). In response to requests to clarify the Final Rule, we amended the definition of "field report" in an April 15, 2003 Final Rule to exclude vehicles that are still within the control of the manufacturer. As amended, a "field report" is defined as "[a] communication in writing, including communications in electronic form . . . with respect to a vehicle or equipment that has been transported beyond the direct control of the manufacturer . . . regarding the failure, malfunction, lack of durability, or other performance problem of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment, or any part thereof, produced for sale by that manufacturer, regardless of whether verified or assessed to be lacking in merit . . ." 49 C.F.R. 579.4(c), 68 Fed. Reg. 18,136 at 18,142 (April 15, 2003). Based upon your description of the documents identified in your letter, we confirm your understanding that those documents do not fall within the ambit of the EWR regulatory requirements. While vehicles in the possession of dealers are considered to be "beyond the direct control of the manufacturer" for recall purposes, NHTSA does not consider documents prepared by dealers that address particular vehicle prior to their first retail sale to be field reports for purposes of the EWR regulations. We also note that deficiencies would be corrected under warranty and therefore reported to NHTSA under the EWR provision pertaining to warranty claims. Should you have any further questions, please contact Andrew J. DiMarsico of my staff at (202) 366-5263. Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman ref:579 |
2003 |
ID: schaub.ztvOpenMr. Frank A. Schaub Dear Mr. Schaub: We are replying to your e-mails of February 27 and March 4, 2003, with reference to your citation by local authorities who concluded that the modulating headlamp on your motorcycle was a flashing light and prohibited under the laws of Connecticut. You have asked for our assistance. We have not reviewed Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles Regulation Section 14-137-99 which you reference, as we do not provide interpretations of State laws. However, I am enclosing a copy of a letter from this Office, dated June 20, 2000, to Michael L. Wagner which, based on facts you present, is squarely on point with your situation. In brief, we informed Mr. Wagner that, under Federal law, modulating headlamps are not flashing headlamps; modulating headlamps that comply with applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards adopted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) are permissible for use on motorcycles; and a State (or a political subdivision of a State) is preempted by Federal law from having a local law that has the effect of prohibiting a motorcycle headlamp modulating system meeting Federal specifications. The letter to Mr. Wagner contains appropriate legal citations. This interpretation of June 20, 2000, remains in effect today. As you requested, I am enclosing a copy of S7.9.4, Motorcycle headlamp modulation system, which is part of 49 CFR 571.108, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment. I am also enclosing a copy of the section of the Federal statute governing the relationship of the Federal motor vehicle safety standards with State motor vehicle safety standards, 49 U.S.C. 30103(b), Preemption. If there are any questions, please contact Taylor Vinson, Senior Attorney, NHTSA, at (202)-366-5263. Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman Enclosures |
2003 |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.