NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
|---|---|
ID: WRL3229OpenBryce Pfister, P.E. Dear Mr. Pfister: This responds to your letter requesting an interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 206, "Door Locks and Door Retention Components."Specifically, you ask whether a door configuration used in your school buses is a "folding door" excluded from the requirements of Standard No. 206. As discussed below, we believe the door you describe in your letter is a folding door for purposes of Standard No. 206. You explain in your letter that the Collins Bus Corporation manufacturers school buses with gross vehicle weight ratings (GVWR) ranging from 9,500 to 19,500 pounds.One of your customers needs a vehicle with a passenger capacity of nine passengers, for the purposes of transporting pre-schoolers.You plan to sell the same basic vehicle you ordinarily would sell as a school bus, but with a reduced passenger capacity. Because the vehicle will only accommodate nine passengers, you will have to classify these vehicles as multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs) rather than as school buses. [1]However, in a telephone conversation with Rebecca MacPherson of this office, you stated that, with the exception of the requirements for flashing lights and stop arms, these vehicles meet all Federal requirements for school buses. You describe the door used in these vehicles as follows: The typical passenger entrance door configuration of the Collins school bus includes two door leafs, each pivoting along its outer edge, and each attached to the door jamb at one upper and one lower pivot point.Both door leaves pivot outward toward a boarding passenger, and the door opening is formed between the two door leaves in their outward position.A hand-operated linkage extending from the drivers seating position opens and closes the forward door.An overhead linkage connecting to the forward door controls the rear door motion.The doors are latched in the closed position by a device attached to the door operating linkage near the drivers seat. Standard No. 206 specifies requirements for door locks and door retention components to minimize the likelihood of occupants being thrown from the vehicle in the event of a crash.The standard applies to passenger cars, trucks, and MPVs, but not to school buses.S4(c) of Standard No. 206 specifically excludes "folding doors" from the standard's requirements.The door described in your letter is a type of door typically used in school buses rather than MPVs. As to whether the door is a "folding door" for purposes of Standard No. 206, we note that the standard does not include a definition of that term. Unlike some of the doors typically used for the same purpose in school buses, your door does not consist of two leaves that are hinged together and "fold" in on themselves.Rather, the two leaves in your door are separate.Each pivots outward. Nonetheless, considering the total design of your door as described above, including (but not limited to) the facts that both door leaves pivot outward toward a boarding passenger to form an opening, and both leaves operate together (through a linkage) by means of the same hand-operated control, we believe your door comes within the meaning of "folding door" for purposes of Standard No. 206. I hope you find this information helpful.If you have any further questions on this subject, please feel free to contact Rebecca MacPherson in my office at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman ref:206
[1] 49 CFR 571.3 defines a "multipurpose passenger vehicle" as "a motor vehicle with motive power, except a low-speed vehicle or trailer, designed to carry 10 persons or less which is constructed either on a truck chassis or with special features for occasional off-road operation." |
2002 |
ID: X PrizeOpenKenneth N. Weinstein, Esq. Mayer Brown LLP Dear Mr. Weinstein: This responds to your request, on behalf of the Progressive Insurance Automotive X Prize (PIAXP) for a statement and/or interpretation from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) concerning the implications under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Vehicle Safety Act) of vehicles participating in the PIAXP competitions operating on the public roads. You asked this question in light of the fact that the vehicles would not necessarily comply with applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs). The issues raised by your request are addressed below. In short, given the specific facts related to the PIAXP competitions that you provided, including the limited nature of the operation of these vehicles on the public roads and the fact that the roads will be closed under local or State government supervision, it is our opinion that the Vehicle Safety Act would not have the effect of preventing these vehicles from participating in the competitions. Our opinion is based on the facts you provided and the analysis set forth below. The PIAXP is, as described in information available on the PIAXP website[1]: An international competition designed to inspire a new generation of viable, super fuel-efficient vehicles. The independent and technology-neutral competition is open to teams from around the world that can design, build and bring to market 100 MPGe (miles per gallon energy equivalent) vehicles that people want to buy, and that meet market needs for price, size, capability, safety and performance. The nature of the competition is described, in draft guidelines available on the PIAXP website, as follows: The competition will comprise two vehicle classes: Mainstream and Alternative. Mainstream vehicles will be required to carry four or more passengers, have four or more wheels, and allow for a 200-mile range. Alternative-class vehicles will be required to carry two or more passengers, have no constraints on the number of wheels, and allow for a 100-mile range. All vehicles will need to meet requirements for performance and features to make the cars attractive to consumers. The competition will culminate with two dramatic, long-distance stage races in 2009-2010 a Qualifying Race and the Grand Prize Final Race. Race courses will reflect typical consumer driving patterns during numerous stages, in varied terrain, communities, and weather conditions. To win, vehicles must complete both races with the lowest overall time averaged over all scoring stages while still meeting the requirements for 100 MPGe fuel economy and low emissions of carbon dioxide and other pollutants. The $10 million prize purse will be split 3:1 between the winners of the Mainstream and Alternative classes. You provided the following description of the manner in which the PIAXP races would be conducted: Competition vehicles will participate in stage races designed to test the vehicles under typical driving conditions. To ensure adequate safety, pre-race inspections will verify that vehicles have PIAXP-required safety equipment and features. And pre-race performance tests will verify that the vehicles meet PIAXP braking and stability requirements. These safety requirements were established by a Working Group that includes current and former NHTSA experts. Some race stages will be conducted on closed tracks, others on public roads. For the stages conducted on public roads, vehicles will start one-at-a-time and will be timed separately. No side-by-side driving will be permitted, with strict rules on giving way to a faster vehicle. Vehicles will have to obey all speed limits and other traffic regulations. The public roads will be closed to all non-race traffic during the race stages (these may be rolling closures that cover the full extent of the PIAXP vehicles on the course as is often done for running and cycling events). Road closures will be supervised by local city and state governments, and implemented by local police and other agencies. Vehicles will also participate in non-race demonstration events to showcase them to the public, to government officials, and to the media. These events will largely take place at closed public-private venues e.g., large parking lots. If any of these non-race demonstrations do take place on public roads, they will do so under the same conditions described above (closed roads supervised by local city and state governments). Most vehicles will be shipped from one event to the next, rather than driven. We may organize a PIAXP-sponsored [convoy] to drive in parade-format from one event to the next, but any such [convoy] will likewise occur over closed roads, as described above. Any team that wishes to drive a noncompliant vehicle independently between events (or under any other circumstances on public roads) is responsible for obtaining any necessary exemptions and/or permits that might be needed to meet all legal requirements. As indicated above, you asked us to address the implications under the Vehicle Safety Act of operation on the public roads of vehicles participating in the PIAXP competitions in light of the fact that the vehicles would not necessarily comply with applicable FMVSSs. Under 49 U.S.C. 30112(a), with certain exceptions, a person may not manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or import into the United States any motor vehicle unless it complies with applicable FMVSSs and is so certified. The primary issue raised by your request is whether operation on the public roads of vehicles participating in the PIAXP competitions would constitute introducing the vehicles in interstate commerce. Since we are only addressing the implications of the Vehicle Safety Act with respect to the operation of these vehicles in the PIAXP competitions, the prohibitions on manufacturing for sale, selling, offering for sale, and importing noncomplying vehicles are not relevant to the analysis. Given the limited nature of the operation of these vehicles on the public roads as part of participating in the PIAXP competitions, including the fact that the roads will be closed under local or State government supervision for the races, possible demonstrations, and convoys between events, it is our opinion that such operation on the public roads would not constitute an introduction into interstate commerce for purposes of the Vehicle Safety Act. We note that this opinion does not cover independent driving on the public roads by teams between events, or other activities not specifically addressed in this letter. I hope this information is helpful. Sincerely yours, Anthony M. Cooke Chief Counsel ref:VSA d.1/16/09 |
2009 |
ID: Xiao.1OpenMr. Xiaoda Xiao Dear Mr. Xiao: This responds to your letter seeking an evaluation of your product (the Vector Blind Spot Mirror enclosed with your letter), in order to determine whether the mirror, when properly installed, blocks the front windshield or shakes during driving. Because, we do not conduct certification testing or offer product endorsements, we are unable to provide such an evaluation. The following discussion briefly explains how our Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) operate and how they may pertain to your product. By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue FMVSSs that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Instead, it is the responsibility of manufacturers to certify that their products conform to all applicable safety standards (see 49 CFR Part 571) before they can be offered for sale. NHTSA enforces compliance with the standards by purchasing and testing vehicles and equipment, and we also investigate safety-related defects. As you are probably aware, FMVSS No. 111, Rearview Mirrors, sets forth requirements for mirrors on new passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, school buses, and motorcycles in order to provide a clear and reasonably unobstructed view to the rear (49 CFR 571.111). New vehicles must be certified as complying with the requirements of FMVSS No. 111, as well as all other applicable standards. However, the packaging and descriptions of your product suggest that it would not be installed on the vehicle as original equipment, but instead, it would be sold as aftermarket equipment. Accordingly, we believe that your product would be a supplemental mirror that is not covered by FMVSS No. 111, so you would not have any corresponding certification responsibilities under our standards. With that said, there are certain limitations on aftermarket installation of motor vehicle equipment. For example, a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or vehicle repair business may not knowingly "make inoperative" any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle in accordance with any FMVSS. 49 U.S.C. 30122. Although the "make inoperative" provision does not apply to equipment attached to or installed on or in a vehicle by the vehicle owner, NHTSA urges vehicle owners not to degrade the safety of any system or device in their vehicles. Beyond compliance with relevant federal safety standards, manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment have additional responsibilities, including a requirement to notify purchasers about safety-related defects and to provide a remedy free of charge, even if their equipment is not covered by a safety standard. 49 U.S.C. 30118-30120. In addition, States have the authority to regulate the use and licensing of vehicles operating within their jurisdictions. Therefore, you may wish to check with the Department of Motor Vehicles in any State in which the equipment will be sold or used regarding any such requirements. For your further information, I am enclosing a fact sheet we prepared titled Information for New Manufacturers of Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment. I hope you find this information useful. We are also returning to you the sample mirror provided with your letter. If you have further questions, please feel free to contact Eric Stas at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman Enclosures |
2005 |
ID: XSCIOpen Mr. Dan Goor Dear Mr. Goor: This responds to your September 21, 2000, letter to Ms. Heidi Coleman of my staff, informing the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) of your intent to file an "application for rulemaking" concerning our safety standard for child restraint systems (Standard No. 213, 49 CFR 571.213). You have developed a rear-facing child restraint which you believe is "compatible with an airbag." You would like NHTSA to adopt a regulation under which a manufacturer could certify rear-facing seats as "acceptable for use an air bag" if the seats meet certain performance requirements. You state: The Application for RuleMaking [sic] will propose: That providing, based on NHTSA approved testing, any given rear-facing infant seat/restraint which performs within CRABI performance guide-lines (as may be modified by NHTSA) when interacting with an airbag, be accredited, and labeled in a similar manner to: Certified acceptable for front seat placement. Additionally, such seats will not be required to carry labels to the contrary. Standard No. 213 requires rear-facing child restraints to be conspicuously labeled with warnings to consumers not to place the restraint on the front seat with an air bag (S5.5.2(k)(4)). Assuming that you wish to change this requirement, the procedure for petitioning NHTSA for a change to the Federal motor vehicle safety standards is set forth in 49 CFR Part 552 (copy enclosed). NHTSA does not approve, disapprove, or certify motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. It is important for you to note that your child restraints must have the air bag warning label specified in S5.5.2(k)(4) in the absence of an amendment to the standard. You are not permitted to change the content of the label. Further, you should not assume that your petition will result in the amendment you seek. Our decision whether to grant your petition, should you decide to submit one, will be made in the context of an administrative proceeding, in accordance with statutory criteria. If you have further questions, please contact us at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Enclosure ref:213 |
2000 |
ID: Yuen.1OpenMr. Derek Yuen Dear Mr. Yuen: This responds to your recent e-mail to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), in which you seek clarification regarding the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment, pertaining to motorcycle headlamps. Specifically, you asked whether a motorcycle (or a three-wheeled vehicle with two wheels at the front) may be equipped with a four-headlamp system (with two lower beams and two upper beams), and if so, whether it would be permissible to place one set of lamps (either the lower beams or upper beams) closer to the outer edge of the vehicle, provided that the other two lamps are within 200 mm of each other. As discussed below, FMVSS No. 108 does not permit a motorcycle headlamp system composed of more than two headlamps, so we need not consider the additional issue of spacing of a second pair of headlamps. By way of background, NHTSA is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. As an initial matter, you are correct in that the three-wheeled vehicle mentioned in your letter would be considered a "motorcycle" under our regulations. Under 49 CFR 571.3, "motorcycle" is defined as "a motor vehicle with motive power having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contract with the ground". The requirements for motor vehicle lighting are contained in FMVSS No. 108, with the headlighting requirements for motorcycles set forth in S7.9, Motorcycles. In particular, paragraph S7.9.6 requires that a headlighting system be located on the front of the motorcycle and, most pertinent to your proposed design, be installed in accordance with the requirements of S7.9.6.2. The requirements of S7.9.6.2 are as follows: (a) If the system consists of a single headlamp, it shall be mounted on the vertical centerline of the motorcycle. (b) If the system consists of two headlamps, each of which provides both an upper and lower beam, the headlamps shall be mounted either at the same height and symmetrically disposed about the vertical centerline or mounted on the vertical centerline. (c) If the system consists of two headlamps, one of which provides an upper beam and one of which provides the lower beam, the headlamps shall be located on the vertical centerline with the upper beam no higher than the lower beam, or horizontally disposed about the vertical centerline and mounted at the same height. Because the system your letter envisions consists of four headlamps, it would not meet the requirements of S7.9.6.2 of FMVSS No. 108. (We note further that the Japan Auto Parts Industries Association submitted a petition for rulemaking in 1998, which included a request to amend FMVSS No. 108 to allow four distinct headlamps on motorcycles, but the agency decided not to do so (see 69 FR 55993 (Sept. 17, 2004). ) Because such a system is not permitted under Standard No. 108, we need not analyze this system in terms of the motorcycle headlamp location requirements contained in paragraph S7.9.6 of the standard. If you have further questions, please feel free to contact Eric Stas of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood Enclosure |
2006 |
ID: Zimmer.rbmOpen Ms. Reneta Zimmerman Dear Ms. Zimmerman: The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) recognizes your concerns about placing your infant in front of the passenger-side air bag of your Mazda Miata. Since your vehicle has no back seat, NHTSA will grant an exemption to allow the dealer or a repair business to deactivate the passenger-side air bag. NHTSA is allowing this deactivation because an infant in a rear-facing child restraint should never be placed in front of an air bag and because it recognizes that you may be unable to replace your vehicle with a car equipped with a back seat. If it is possible to retrofit your car with the installation of a manual cutoff switch, this option should be pursued rather than a total deactivation of the air bag. Mazda should be able to tell you if a manual cutoff switch is available for your vehicle. If installation of a manual cutoff switch is not an option, you may choose to have your passenger-side air bag deactivated. Federal law now requires that new cars be equipped with air bags at the front outboard seating positions. The Federal law also prohibits dealers and repair businesses from knowingly making inoperative devices, such as air bags, installed to comply with a safety standard. However, in very limited situations in which a vehicle must be modified to accommodate a person's special physical needs, NHTSA has previously stated that it would consider violations of the "make inoperative" provision as technical and justified by public need, and that it would not begin enforcement proceedings. Since your vehicle does not have any back seat, NHTSA will consider the deactivation of the passenger-side air bag as a technical violation of the "make inoperative" provision that is justified by public need. Accordingly, it will not begin enforcement proceedings against any dealer or repair business which deactivates the passenger-side air bag. Please note, however, that the purpose of the "make inoperative" prohibition is to ensure, to the degree possible, that the current and subsequent owners and occupants of a vehicle are not deprived of the maximum protection afforded by the vehicle as newly manufactured. Accordingly, we strongly encourage you to have the air bag reactivated once your child is old enough to ride safely in the front seat or when it is returned to the company which leases it. In addition, I strongly encourage you to ensure that passengers in your vehicle use their safety belts and to tell them that the passenger-side air bag has been deactivated. I hope this letter resolves your problem. You should show this letter to the dealer or repair business when you take your car in for deactivation of the passenger-side air bag. If you have any other questions, please contact Rebecca MacPherson of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:208 d:11/19/96 |
1996 |
ID: Zozloski_1635OpenMr. Stanley J. Kozloski Dear Mr. Kozloski: This responds to your letter in which you asked about the applicability of Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) to "golf carts" with modified speed capabilities. Specifically you asked about the applicability of FMVSS No. 500, Low speed vehicles. You also raised several questions regarding the ability of Florida to regulate the operation of "golf carts."I have addressed your questions below. By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has authority to prescribe safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment (49 U.S.C. Chapter 301). Section 30102(a)(6) defines "motor vehicle" as:
Under this authority, NHTSA established FMVSS No. 500 (copy enclosed) to ensure that low-speed vehicles (LSVs) are equipped with an appropriate level of motor vehicle equipment for the purposes of safety. The agency defines an LSV as a 4-wheeled motor vehicle, except a truck, whose attainable speed in one mile is more than 20 miles per hour (mph) but less than 25 mph (49 CFR 571.3(b)). The FMVSSs generally apply to motor vehicles only prior to their first retail sale. However, manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or motor vehicle repair businesses are prohibited from knowingly making inoperative any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle that is in compliance with any applicable FMVSS (49 U.S.C. 30122; "make inoperative" provision). You indicated in your letter that your initial concern was the applicability of the Federal standards to "golf carts" that have had been modified after their first retail sale. You stated that local businesses are modifying golf carts through the installation of "high speed 5.5 hp motors, high speed gears, high speed controllers, oversize tires," and the modifying or disengaging of a speed controlling governor. Your letter further explained that these modifications are to increase the maximum speed capacity from just below 20 mph to one as high as upwards of 30 mph. I note that, in establishing FMVSS No. 500, NHTSA explained that the agency did not intend to regulate golf carts with a maximum speed capability of 20 mph or lower (63 Federal Register 33209; June 17, 1998; enclosed). The agency has determined that conventional golf carts (those with a maximum speed capacity of 20 mph and lower) are not motor vehicles for the purpose of our regulations. [1] The primary purpose of a conventional golf cart is not for operation on public roads, beyond that of an incidental nature. Therefore, they are not included in the definition of "motor vehicle." Because conventional golf carts are not motor vehicles, they are not subject to any FMVSS as originally manufactured. Therefore, a conventional golf cart cannot be taken out of compliance with an FMVSS, because none apply. As such, the "make inoperative" provision does not apply. The act of modifying a golf cart for use on the public roads would, however, create a motor vehicle to which new-vehicle FMVSSs would become applicable at the time of the modification. For purposes of compliance with NHTSAs regulations, we would regard the modifier as the manufacturer. As a motor vehicle manufacturer, the modifier would be responsible for certifying that the vehicle conformed to all applicable safety standards. These would vary depending on whether the vehicle was an LSV or some other type of motor vehicle. You indicated in your letter that many of your concerns relate to the operation of"golf carts" with modified speed capabilities. You specifically asked about the establishment and enforcement of State or local registration, inspection, insurance, and operational requirements. These areas are within the jurisdiction of the States. You may therefore wish to raise these concerns with your local or State representatives. If you have any further questions about our regulations, please contact Mr. Chris Calamita of my staff, at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman Enclosure [1] This does not imply that all vehicles with a maximum speed capability 20 mph and below are not motor vehicles. |
2004 |
ID: Alliance.jegOpenRobert S. Strassburger, Vice President Dear Mr. Strassburger: This responds to your letter seeking our concurrence that "Alliance members are allowed to combine the fleets of motor vehicle manufacturing subsidiaries owned by Alliance members for purposes of determining the overall fleet compliance with the compliance percentages set forth in various safety standard phase-in requirements." As discussed below, we generally agree with your suggested interpretation. In your letter, you note that, in our mid-1980s rulemaking establishing the phase-in requirements associated with automatic occupant protection requirements for passenger cars, we addressed the need to accommodate complex relationships among manufacturers. See NPRM proposing phase-in requirements for Standard No. 208, 50 FR 14589, 14595-97, April 12, 1985. In that rulemaking, we adopted an attribution rule that generally permits companies to agree among themselves which entity will be treated as the manufacturer for purposes of meeting the phase-in percentages when any of those companies could be considered the "manufacturer." We have adopted similar attribution rules in subsequent rulemakings involving phase-ins. You state in your letter that "(a)s Alliance members have consistently interpreted these phase-in requirements, member companies with ownership interests in other motor vehicle manufacturers have been able to combine the fleets for reporting purposes to the agency." You note, however, that in a recent interpretation to Mr. Nakayama of Kirkland & Ellis regarding the status of certain small volume manufacturers, we observed: (T)he vehicles of related manufacturers are not ordinarily grouped together for purposes of determining compliance with phase-ins of new safety standards. We note that this is in contrast to determinations of compliance with fuel economy standards, where vehicles of related manufacturers are grouped together. However, the grouping of vehicles of related manufacturers for purposes of fuel economy standards is done pursuant to an explicit statutory provision. You state that the Alliance "understands the above observation reaffirms that vehicles of related manufacturers are not ordinarily required to be grouped together by the Safety Act, unlike the contrasting situation for fuel economy." You state further, however, that because of the potential for the first sentence of the quoted paragraph to be misunderstood, particularly if it is taken out of context, the Alliance "seeks confirmation that a group of related vehicle manufacturers may continue to choose, if they so desire, to combine fleets for safety standard phase-in purposes." In considering your letter, we note that, in interpreting the provision at issue, we have not taken the position that we would consider a particular vehicle to have been manufactured by two or more manufacturers solely based on the corporate relationships between those manufacturers. We considered this issue to some degree in a September 18, 1987, interpretation to General Motors (GM), addressing whether it could be deemed the manufacturer of passenger cars produced by Lotus for purposes of the phase-in of the automatic occupant protection requirements. In our interpretation, we noted that in the April 1985 NPRM proposing phase-in requirements for Standard No. 208, we had stated that we consider the statutory definition of "manufacturer" to be sufficiently broad to include "sponsors," depending on the circumstances. We stated in the NPRM that if a sponsor contracts for another manufacturer to produce a design exclusively for the sponsor, the sponsor may be considered the manufacturer of those vehicles, applying basic principles of agency law. We presented the following analysis to support our conclusion that GM could be considered the manufacturer of Lotus passenger cars: Both LCL, the actual assembler, and LPC, the actual importer, are wholly-owned subsidiaries of GM. By itself, GM's ownership of both the producer and importer of these cars might not be sufficient to establish that GM was the sponsor of these vehicles for the purposes of Standard No. 208. In addition, however, another GM wholly-owned subsidiary distributes and markets the vehicles in the United States. GM coordinates the activities of all these subsidiaries. Since GM wholly owns the actual producer of these vehicles and is actively involved in the importation, distribution, and marketing of these vehicles, we believe that GM should be considered to sponsor the importation of the Lotus vehicles. Accordingly, GM rather than LPC, may be considered the importer and manufacturer of these vehicles. Thus, in considering whether GM could be considered a manufacturer of Lotus passenger cars, we looked to GM's overall involvement with those vehicles and not merely to the fact that it owned the producer and importer of those vehicles. In now considering the Alliance's request for interpretation, we believe several factors are relevant. First, we believe that the application of the manufacturer attribution provisions applicable to phase-in requirements needs to be clear, without the necessity of addressing each specific situation by interpretation. Second, we believe that, as a practical matter, there is typically sufficient interaction among related manufacturers, and direct involvement by a "parent manufacturer" in the actions of its subsidiaries, that their fleets can reasonably be considered as a single fleet for purposes of complying with phase-in requirements. Third, from a public policy perspective, there is little (if any) difference in the number of compliant vehicles introduced into the fleet during the phase-in years between the case in which commonly owned manufacturers are permitted to combine their fleets and the case in which commonly owned manufacturers are permitted to separate their fleets for compliance purposes. Fourth, as a general matter, NHTSA does not have any interest under the Safety Act as to how companies choose to structure themselves, so long as Safety Act obligations are fully met. Thus, in a situation in which one manufacturer corporation buys another, NHTSA does not generally have any interest in whether the corporation that has been purchased becomes a division of the other manufacturer or is maintained as a subsidiary. Given the above considerations, we have concluded that vehicle manufacturers may combine the fleets of motor vehicle manufacturing subsidiaries they own for purposes of determining overall fleet compliance with the compliance percentages set forth in the various safety standard phase-in requirements, subject to the agreement of those other manufacturers. Moreover, recognizing the different levels of ownership that exist in the industry and wishing to avoid further requests for interpretation in this area, we take the following further position: For purposes of complying with phase-in requirements under Federal motor vehicle safety standards, vehicle manufacturers may combine, with their fleet, the fleets of motor vehicle manufacturers that are considered to be within the same "control" relationship for purposes of the CAFE standards (and which are in fact included in the same fleets under the CAFE statute), subject to the agreement of the other manufacturers. To the extent that the fleets of more than one manufacturer are so combined, we would consider each manufacturer jointly and severally liable for any failure to meet a relevant percentage phase-in requirement. Since this interpretation is based on specific factual determinations and policy concerns related to phase-ins of new safety requirements, it should not be considered as precedent for how we would interpret the term "manufacturer" in other contexts. I also note that this interpretation does not overturn the one we sent to Mr. Nakayama. In that interpretation, we addressed the status of certain small volume manufacturers in the context of ownership relationships with other manufacturers. Our conclusion that the small volume manufacturers at issue qualified for the special small volume implementation schedule reflected a number of considerations, including the operational independence of the companies. Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman ref: 208 |
2002 |
ID: alliance.march20OpenRobert Strassburger, Vice President Dear Mr. Strassburger: This is in response to your letter of March 18, 2003, in which you asked questions regarding our interpretation of certain provisions of the early warning reporting rules promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Subpart C of 49 CFR Part 579. You requested prompt turn around in view of the fact that the first reporting period will soon begin. This letter provides that response. I will first paraphrase your inquiries and then provide a brief statement of our interpretation. 1. Reporting Information on the Face of a Claim/Complaint. The Alliance inquired as to whether manufacturers must report complaints/claims based on the information contained on the face of the complaint or claim, rather than reporting on the basis of the manufacturers review or analysis of the complaint/claim. The answer is yes. Reporting is to be based on the information in the complaint or claim, rather than on the manufacturers assessment. Even if the manufacturer disagrees with the assertions of the consumer/claimant after conducting its analysis, the manufacturer must still report the complaint or claim. Each of the five examples given in your letter would be reportable as a "consumer complaint" under the early warning reporting rules. 2. Marketing Survey Information. The Alliance sought NHTSAs concurrence that marketing information purchased from third-party vendors (such as J.D. Power) or supplied by third parties (such as Consumer Reports magazine), which might contain information reflecting a consumers dissatisfaction with a product, is not reportable in the early warning program as a "consumer complaint," or otherwise, even if the information contains "minimum specificity" about the make, model, and model year of a vehicle. You also asked about complaints that are included in "marketing information" solicited by a manufacturer directly from the purchasers of its products. We concur with respect to third-party submissions, since they are not "addressed to the company . . . ." and therefore do not fall within the regulatory definition of "consumer complaint" in Section 579.4(c). However, if a manufacturer collects the information directly from its consumers, by itself or through a contractor, it would have to report any "complaints" included in that information, regardless of whether the primary purpose of the activity is marketing. As you note in your letter, consumers responding to such manufacturer surveys are "likely aware that they are communicating with the manufacturer." The fact that the comments are solicited by the manufacturer is not determinative, particularly since many consumers who make a complaint about a vehicle in this context will justifiably believe that they need not repeat that complaint to a different office within the company. 3.Dealer Repair Work Orders. The Alliance sought the agencys views on whether dealer repair work orders, if received in writing by a vehicle manufacturer, are reportable as " dealer field reports." These work orders are the dealers internal records of service performed at dealerships. As described in your letter, these work orders are not requested by, or provided to, manufacturers in the ordinary course of business, but might be submitted in the context of "lemon law" proceedings, product liability litigation, or similar proceedings, often many years after the service in question was performed. As such, we would not consider them to be "field reports" under the rule, and they would not have to be reported under that category. However, if the work had been performed under warranty, it would have to be reported as a warranty claim. 4.Vehicle Inspections Conducted to Determine Eligibility for Insurance and/or Extended Warranty Coverage. Finally, the Alliance asked whether written reports of vehicle inspections conducted solely to determine eligibility for insurance and/or extended warranty coverage are reportable as "field reports." As described in your letter, these reports are not prepared in response to an assertion that a specific problem exists in a particular vehicle, which is the normal genesis of field reports. Thus, although it is possible that an inspection report might identify a problem in a vehicle, it would not be a "communication . . . regarding the failure, malfunction, lack of durability, or other performance problem . . . ." As such, these inspection reports would not have to be reported to us as field reports. If you have any questions, pleas call Taylor Vinson or Lloyd Guerci of this office at (202) 366-5263. Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman ref:579 |
1970 |
ID: alliance.ztvOpenMr. Robert S. Strassburger Dear Mr. Strassburger: This is in reply to your letter of January 13, 2003, asking two questions with respect to the final rules set forth in 49 CFR Part 579. Your first question cited a portion of the early warning reporting final rule, Section 579.21(b), which applies to "all light vehicles less than ten calendar years old at the beginning of the reporting period." Under subsection (b)(1), a manufacturer must report "each incident involving one or more deaths occurring in a foreign country . . . involving a manufacturers vehicle, if that vehicle is identical or substantially similar to a vehicle that the manufacturer has offered for sale in the United States." You asked that we concur in your understanding that the ten-year old limitation "applies both to the age of the vehicle in which the fatality occurred in a foreign country and to the offering for sale of a substantially similar vehicle in the United States." You presented a situation in which a fatality occurs in a vehicle that is substantially similar to a vehicle previously offered for sale in the United States but whose sale was discontinued more than ten years before the beginning of the reporting period. In this event, the Alliance understands that the "ten calendar year" limitation applies and that a manufacturer would not have to report the incident. You are correct that the purpose of the regulation is to identify potential defects in vehicles in the United States. Although safety defects can and have existed in vehicles older than ten calendar years, the early warning reporting requirements are intended to be consistent with the amendment to 49 U.S.C. 30120(g) under which the period for remedy of defective and noncompliant motor vehicles without charge was increased from eight to ten years. Therefore, we confirm your understanding that a claim involving a fatality or injury occurring in a foreign vehicle need not be reported if no sales of a substantially similar vehicle have occurred in the United States for more than ten years before the beginning of the reporting period. On the other hand, in a situation in which a fatality or injury occurs in a foreign vehicle that is more than ten years old and a substantially similar U.S. vehicle has been sold within a ten-year period before the reporting period, a related claim must be reported to us. This interpretation applies not only in the context of Section 579.21(b), but also with respect to the ten-calendar-year language of Sections 579.22(b), 579.23(b), and 579.24(b), and the five-calendar-year provisions of Section 579.25(b) and 579.26. Your second question arises in the context of the foreign defect reporting final rule. Section 579.11(d)(2) (as originally adopted) provided that a manufacturer need not report a foreign safety recall or other campaign to NHTSA if "the component or system that gave rise to the foreign recall does not perform the same function in any vehicles or equipment sold or offered for sale in the United States." It is your understanding that "no report would be required when a foreign campaign is conducted on a vehicle that is substantially similar to one offered for sale in the United States, but the component or system that gave rise to the foreign recall is not installed on the U.S. vehicles." In response to the Alliances petition for reconsideration of the foreign defect reporting final rule, we amended Section 579.11(d)(2) to state that a manufacturer need not report if "the component or system that gave rise to the foreign recall or other campaign does not perform the same function in any substantially similar vehicles or equipment sold or offered for sale in the United States." 68 FR 4111, January 28, 2003. Since we have clarified that we do not require reporting if a component or system is present on a substantially similar U.S. vehicle but does not perform the same function as on a foreign vehicle, we believe that it is also clear that a manufacturer need not report to us if the system or component leading to the foreign recall or other campaign is not installed at all on the substantially similar U.S. vehicle. If you have any questions, you may call Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263). Sincerely, Jacqueline Glassman ref:579 |
2003 |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.