NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
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ID: aiam1039OpenMr. Warren M. Heath, Commander, Engineering Section, Department of California Highway Patrol, P. O. Box 898, Sacramento, CA 95804; Mr. Warren M. Heath Commander Engineering Section Department of California Highway Patrol P. O. Box 898 Sacramento CA 95804; Dear Mr. Heath: This is in reply to your letter of February 28th to Mr. Douglas W Toms, Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, concerning the mounting of lamps and reflectors on mini-pickup trucks.; The December 8, 1972, letter from Commissioner W. Pudinski was place in Docket 69-19, Notice No. 3. We inadvertently failed to knowledge this action to Mr. Pudinski.; The visibility requirements of lamps and reflectors in Standard No. 10 are predicated on the normal driving or closed tail gate position. Since the use of motor vehicles, including driving with tail gates down or trunk lids open or otherwise having lights and reflectors obscured by a particular load on the vehicle, is under the jurisdiction of the individual states, we do not anticipate rule making on this subject.; Sincerely, E. T. Driver, Director, Office of Operating Systems, Moto Vehicle Programs; |
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ID: aiam0782OpenMr. Jacinto Navarro, 1701 E. Frierson Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33610; Mr. Jacinto Navarro 1701 E. Frierson Avenue Tampa Florida 33610; Dear Mr. Navarro: I am writing in response to your letter of July 5, 1972, regardin Standard No. 125, Warning Devices. You ask whether the manufacture of the warning device you propose would be permitted under the standard. As stated in my letter to you dated July 11, 1972, the device must meet the requirements of Standard 125. It appeared from the picture of your device which you submitted that the device would fail to meet a number of these requirements.; You also ask what type of energy the phrase, 'self-contained energ source' refers to. The phrase refers to energy used by a device to provide a warning signal, as contrasted with reflective or luminous devices that utilize exogenous light. Thus the fact that your device utilizes compressed air and contains a magnet does not make it a device with a self-contained energy source within the meaning of Standard 125,; Sincerely, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam1890OpenMr M. J. Denholm, Power Controls Division, Midland-Ross Corporation, 490 South Chestnut Street, Owosso, MI 48867; Mr M. J. Denholm Power Controls Division Midland-Ross Corporation 490 South Chestnut Street Owosso MI 48867; Dear Mr. Denholm: This responds to Midland-Ross' March 19, 1975, questions whether S5.7. of Standard No. 121, *Air brake systems*, (as effective September 1, 1976) specifies reservoirs that are charged to 100 psi before or after introduction of a failure as specified in S5.7.1, static or dynamic testing of emergency brake system application and release, and design limits of 1 to 60 psi for emergency brake system application and release. You also asked whether S5.7.4(c) requires modulation of the towed vehicle emergency system in cases of control line failure, and whether such a failure qualifies as a 'single failure in the service brake system' for purposes of emergency brake system performance under S5.7.1.; Section S5.7.3 specifies emergency application and release capabilit with all air reservoirs charged to 100 psi, followed by introduction of a failure. The vehicle is tested for this application and release capability statically. In our reconsideration of this amendment, NHTSA will consider a clarification of this language.; The maximum of 1 psi for pressure release and minimum 60 psi fo pressure application are intended only as objective measures of what constitute an application or a release. In the petitions for reconsideration of this amendment, it has been suggested that the ability to move the vehicle and then stop it after an emergency brake application would permit greater design freedom in the design of emergency brake systems. This issue will be addressed in our response to petitions for reconsideration.; Section S5.7.4(c) requires that a towing vehicle be capable o modulating the air in the supply or control line following a single failure in the service brake system on the towing vehicle, but does not require modulation of the towed vehicle emergency brake system under any circumstance (including control line failure).; This language is intended to assure that a single failure in the truc itself will not prevent modulation of an unimpaired system from the tractor protection system rearwards. A clarification of this language may be necessary.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam0278OpenMr. Gerhard P. Riechel, Volkswagen of America, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ 07632; Mr. Gerhard P. Riechel Volkswagen of America Inc. Englewood Cliffs NJ 07632; Dear Mr. Riechel: In your letter of June 7, 1971, you asked for confirmation of you understanding that under the NHTSA regulation (49 CFR S 553.39) interpreting section 105(a)(1) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, a petition for judicial review of Standard No. 208 would be considered timely if filed within 60 days after the publication in the *Federal Register* of the Administrator's decision on any petitions for reconsideration of that standard.; Your understanding is correct. As the standard currently stands, w consider it (that is, the standard as it becomes effective January 1, 1972) a 'single rule', to use your phrase, and the judicial review period will not begin to run until the publication of the decision on any timely-filed petitions for reconsideration of any part of it. If at a future date we wish to sever any portion of the standard for judicial review purposes, and consider it 'final' despite pending action on other portions, we will give explicit notice of that action in the *Federal Register*.; We are pleased to be of assistance. Sincerely, Lawrence R. Schneider, Acting Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam5580OpenMr. John N. Quinata Customs and Quarantine Agency Government of Guam Suite 225, 2nd Floor, GITC Bldg. Tamuning, Guam 96911; Mr. John N. Quinata Customs and Quarantine Agency Government of Guam Suite 225 2nd Floor GITC Bldg. Tamuning Guam 96911; Dear Mr. Quinata: This responds to your letter asking whether use Nissan Truck Crane Lorries from Japan are subject to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). I apologize for the delay in our response, but we had difficulty contacting Nissan for some information we needed to answer your question. From your letter, I assume that Sanko Bussan Guam has imported this vehicle for use in the dock area, and that your agency is holding the vehicle pending this interpretation because the vehicle is not certified as complying with the FMVSS. The short answer to your question is that the truck crane is a motor vehicle, subject to the FMVSS. I will outline the applicable law and point out some of our regulations that you should consider. The issue you raise is whether the truck crane is a 'motor vehicle,' since the regulations you ask about apply only to motor vehicles. Title 49 of the U.S. Code, section 30102(a)(6), defines a motor vehicle as 'a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways . . . .' Work-related vehicles generally are 'motor vehicles' for purposes of our statute if they frequently use the highway going to and from job sites and stay at a job site for only a limited time. We believe the truck crane is a motor vehicle. Nissan Diesel North America informs us that this truck crane is a general purpose medium-duty crane that can be used for short-duty jobs and driven from site to site on the public roads. The photographs you enclosed show the crane mounted on what appears to be a conventional truck chassis. The vehicle appears to be manufactured for use on the highways, and is thus a motor vehicle. The vehicle is a 'truck' under our regulations, and must meet the FMVSSs for trucks that were in effect on the vehicle's date of manufacture. As you know, NHTSA has regulations related to the importation of vehicles. They appear in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), at parts 591 to 593. In particular, note the declarations in 49 CFR 591.5 that are required for importation. Since your letter says that you enforce the FMVSSs in 49 CFR Part 571, I assume you have a copy of Parts 591-593. If you do not, we can send one to you. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please contact Paul Atelsek of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel NCC-20:PAtelsek:62992:OCC 10868:5/22/95:revised 7/3/95; |
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ID: aiam2245OpenMr. Martin V. Chauvin, Chief, Carrier Safety Bureau, Department of Transportation, 1220 Washington Avenue, State Campus, Albany, NY 12226; Mr. Martin V. Chauvin Chief Carrier Safety Bureau Department of Transportation 1220 Washington Avenue State Campus Albany NY 12226; Dear Mr. Chauvin: This responds to your February 20, 1976, question whether this agenc considers Standard No. 222, *School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection*, preemptive of New York State law or regulations mandating a 28-inch-high back and armrests for school bus passenger seating. Section 103(d) provides (15 U.S.C. S1392(d)):; >>>S 103<<< >>>(d) Whenever a Federal Motor vehicle safety standard under thi subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the Federal Government or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof from establishing a safety requirement applicable to motor vehicle equipment procured for its own use if such requirement imposes a higher standard of performance than that required to comply with the otherwise applicable Federal standard.<<<; Standard No. 222 specifies a formula for minimum seat back height tha necessitates a heights of at least 20 inches. It is the opinion of the NHTSA that any State requirement relating to seat back height, other than one identical to the Federal formula that establishes a minimum height of 20 inches, is preempted under S 103(d).; The second sentence of S 103(d) clarifies that the limitation on safet regulations of general applicability does not prevent governmental entities from specifying additional safety features in vehicles purchased for their own use. Thus, New York State or its political subdivisions could specify a seat back height higher than 20 inches in the case of public school buses. The second sentence does not, however, permit these governmental entities to specify safety features that prevent the vehicle or equipment from complying with applicable safety standards. A school bus manufacturer must continue to comply with all applicable standards.; There are presently no requirements in Standard No. 222 dealing wit armrests on school bus passenger seating. The question, therefore, becomes whether the Federal safety standards on school bus seating performance were intended generally to cover this aspect of performance, analogously to the situation in which Standard 108 was held to be preemptive in *Motorcycle Industry Council v. Younger*, No. CIV 574-126 (E. D. Cal. 1974). The guiding rule, as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul*, 373 U.S. 132, 141-142 (1963), is 'whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing federal superintendence of the field.' Under the accepted doctrines as set forth in cases such as *Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham*, 393 U.S. 268 (1969), the interpretation of this question by the administering agency is 'of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'; The NHTSA has determined that the requirement for armrests by New Yor State does not conflict with or otherwise impair our present regulation of school bus passenger seating, and that armrests are not within the intended scope of the present Federal safety standards. Therefore, Standard No. 222 is not preemptive of the New York State regulation of armrests.; Yours truly, Frank Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam0628OpenG. E. Masters, General Manager, U. M. Electrical Distributors Ltd., UMED, Beaumont Road, Banbury, Oxon, ENGLAND; G. E. Masters General Manager U. M. Electrical Distributors Ltd. UMED Beaumont Road Banbury Oxon ENGLAND; Dear Mr. Masters: This is in response to your letter of March 6, 1972, concerning warnin buzzers for the automobile industry.; The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has issued tw safety standards which specify warning requirements. These requirements are given in Paragraph S4.4 of Standard 114 and Paragraph S7.3.1 of Standard 208. A copy of these two standards are enclosed for your review and further information.; You will note that these standards do not stipulate minimu requirements for the warning devices, and, at the present time, we have no plans to specify such requirements. The data sheet, however, which you enclosed will be useful to us should we specify such requirements in future amendments to these standards.; We appreciate your writing to us, and if we can be of any furthe service, please let us know.; Sincerely, E. T. Driver, Director, Office of Operating Systems, Moto Vehicle Programs; |
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ID: aiam2615OpenMr. L. M. Anderson, Vice President, Engineering, Miller Trailers, Inc., P.O. Box 511, Bradenton, FL 33506; Mr. L. M. Anderson Vice President Engineering Miller Trailers Inc. P.O. Box 511 Bradenton FL 33506; Dear Mr. Anderson: This is in response to your letter of May 6, 1977, concerning a vehicl manufacturer's responsibilities with regard to overloading.; You make reference to several recent interpretations from the Nationa Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) which stated that manufacturers must take reasonable steps to ensure that the vehicles they produce will not be overloaded by their users. Although we acknowledge that a manufacturer does not have direct control over the actual use of its vehicles, it does exercise indirect control over use through the vehicle's design.; The NHTSA has stated in the past that a vehicle's gross vehicle weigh rating (GVWR) is determined by the sum of its unloaded vehicle weight, 150 pounds for each designated seating position, and its rated cargo load. It is the cargo load rating that is most relevant to the problem of overloading. The rated cargo load should represent the manufacturer's assessment of the vehicle's cargo-carrying capacity and the maximum load at which the vehicle may be safely operated. A manufacturer must consider the maximum load capacity of the vehicle when it designs its cargo-carrying portion. If this is not done, the rated cargo load, and thus the GVWR, may be meaningless since the vehicle may have a cargo-carrying chamber which, if filled, would cause the vehicle to exceed its stated weight ratings.; An illustration of such a situation would be a tanker truck whic exceeds its GVWR when the tank is filled with a type of material appropriate for carrying in that cargo area. If the manufacturer could reasonably have anticipated that such cargo would be carried in the tanker, yet rated the vehicle with a GVWR which was less than the vehicle's weight when fully loaded with that cargo, a safety-related defect for which the manufacturer is responsible may be considered to exist.; The NHTSA does not expect manufacturers to be omniscient when it come to the use of the vehicles they produce. It does, however, expect the stated weight ratings to reflect the design of the vehicles and the uses to which they can reasonably be anticipated to be put. Where the manufacturer has reason to know the specific commodity intended to be carried in its vehicles and those vehicles have a totally enclosed cargo area, as with a tanker, the rated cargo load is relatively easy to determine.; A manufacturer's responsibility for any subsequent overloading of th vehicles it manufactures would be determined by the reasonableness of its GVWR's and gross axle weight ratings (GAWR), given the size and configuration of its vehicles and the types of loads which they could reasonably be expected to carry. In the case of flat beds (no enclosed cargo area) a manufacturer would obviously not be able to provide weight ratings sufficiently high to prevent overloading in all instances. The design of flat beds necessarily permits overloading since the cargo area is unrestricted. Thus if the weight ratings specified appear to have been arrived at by a good faith determination based upon the types of loads the manufacturer anticipates will be carried, its responsibility with regard to weight rating specifications will have been satisfied and no safety-related defect will be attributable to it.; Sincerely, Joseph J. Levin, Jr., Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam3907OpenMr. Masaki Ogura, Manager, Truck Engineering, MMC Services Inc., 3000 Town Center, Suite 501, Southfield, MI 48075; Mr. Masaki Ogura Manager Truck Engineering MMC Services Inc. 3000 Town Center Suite 501 Southfield MI 48075; Dear Mr. Ogura: This responds to your letter concerning Federal Motor Vehicle Safet Standard No. 101, *Controls and Displays.* According to your letter, your trucks, which have a GVWR of more than 10,000 pounds, have a coolant temperature sensor for overheat warning and also a coolant level sensor for lack of engine coolant to prevent engine overheating. Both sensors are connected to the same telltale lamp, so that either excessive coolant temperature or lack of coolant will illuminate the telltale. Your letter noted that Standard No. 101 specifies an identifying symbol for coolant temperatures but not a symbol for coolant level. You asked whether a system displaying the symbol specified by Standard No. 101 for coolant temperature meets the requirements of the standard. As discussed below, while some of the Standard No. 101's requirements are applicable to your trucks, the standard's telltale requirements do not apply to truck with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or more.; Section 5, *Requirements,* states: >>>Each passenger car, multipurpose passenger vehicle, truck and bu manufactured with any control listed in S5.1 or in column 1 of Table 1, and each passenger car, multipurpose passenger vehicles and truck or bus *less than 10,000 pounds GVWR* with any display listed in S5.1 or in column 1 of Table 2, shall meet the requirements of this standard for the location, identification, and illumination of such control or display. (Emphasis added.)<<<; Thus, Standard No. 101's requirements for identification of control are applicable to trucks with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or more, but the standard's requirements for identification of internal displays are not applicable to such vehicles. Since telltales for coolant temperature are a type of internal display, that requirement of Standard No. 101 is not applicable to the vehicles (more than 10,000 pounds) described by your letter.; Sincerely, Jeffrey R. Miller, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam0106OpenMr. H.J.T. Young, Ontario Department of Transport, Parliament Building, Toronto 2, Canada; Mr. H.J.T. Young Ontario Department of Transport Parliament Building Toronto 2 Canada; Dear Mr. Young: This is in confirmation of our telephone conversation of August 26 1968, and in reply to your letter of July 22, 1968, in which you inquire as to the meaning of 'manufacturer' in the Tire Standard, No. 109, particularly in light of the practice of concealing the identity of the real maker of the tires.; The term 'manufacturer' employed in the labeling requirements sectio of that standard, by the rule set forth in 23 C.F.R. S255.3, is used in the meaning defined in section 102 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. S1391:; >>>'Manufacturer means any person engaged in the manufacturing o assembling of motor venicles(sic) or motor vehicle equipment, including any person importing motor vehicles or motor vehicles equipment for resale.'<<<; The clear implication of this definition is that we are to be concerne with the company that is the actual maker of the tires in question, not retail outlets, suppliers who are not manufacturers, or other parties who may misleadingly appear to be the manufacturer.; We are not aware of any situation where the ownership or control of th tire manufacturing operation is so fragmented as to leave the relevant identity of the manufacturer unclear, within the meaning of the above. If such a case is brought to our attention, we will deal with it in its own facts.; We are happy to be of assistance. Sincerely, Robert M. O'Mahoney, Assistant Chief Counsel for Regulations |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.