ID: 8111

Mr. Daniel K. Upham
President
Sys Tek Corporation
444 N. Zachary, Suite 111
Moorpark, CA 93021

Dear Mr. Upham:

This responds to your letter of December 9, 1992, with respect to whether a "portable lighted message display using L.E.D. technology" is permissible under Federal law. The product would be sold in the aftermarket. As you indicate, "[i]t will be either battery powered or it will be powered using the vehicle power source via cigarette lighter or directly to the car's electrical harness." It will be installed in either the side rear or rear window.

We assume that battery-powered devices, and those activated through the cigarette lighter, are so simple that the vehicle owner can install and use the device without resorting to the assistance of others. Under this circumstance, there is no restriction that applies to this device under the laws administered by this agency. Nevertheless, the device may be subject to restrictions imposed by a State in which it is operated.

However, if attaching the device to the car's electrical harness is a task that may be performed by a person other than the vehicle owner, a different consideration applies. A manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or motor vehicle repair business may not install the device if it renders inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed in accordance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard. Examples of equipment added pursuant to a Federal standard and that could be affected by the sign board are the stop lamps, both center highmounted and conventional, and the inside rear view mirror. I enclose a copy of an interpretation of the agency dated August 17, 1989, to Mr. Alan S. Eldahr, and call your attention to our views on impairment by message boards expressed on the second page. This letter also provides the address of an organization that you may consult on applicable State laws.

Installation of the message board in a side rear window by a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business would appear permissible. The only required side lighting equipment are front and rear lamps and reflectors, intended to mark the extremities of the vehicles, and we do not believe that their function would be negatively affected by installation of the message board.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

Enclosure ref:108 d.12/28/92

ID: 8112

Mr. William R. Willen
Managing Counsel
Product Legal Group
American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
1919 Torrance Boulevard
Torrance, CA 90501-2746

Dear Mr. Willen:

This responds to your letter of December 7, 1992 requesting an interpretation of the definition of "designated seating position" in 49 CFR Section 571.3. You request confirmation of your belief that a proposed Honda seat design would have two designated seating positions. For the proposed design, "(t)he hip room is 44.2 inches over the length of the seat, and the seat width is only 39 inches. The seat is flat and does not have stiff inboard seat belt receptacles."

The term "designated seating position" is defined at 49 CFR 571.3 as:

any plan view location capable of accommodating a person at least as large as a 5th percentile adult female, if the overall seat configuration and design is such that the position is likely to be used as a seating position while the vehicle is in motion, except for auxiliary seating accommodations such as temporary or folding jump seats. Any bench or split-bench seat in a passenger car, truck or multipurpose passenger vehicle with a GVWR less than 10,000 pounds, having greater than 50 inches of hip room (measured in accordance with SAE Standard J1100(a)) shall have not less than three designated seating positions, unless the seat design or vehicle design is such that the center position cannot be used for seating.

If the seat has only 44.2 inches of hip room, the seat would probably qualify as having only two seating positions, since this value is below the 50-inch specification in the definition of "designated seating position." Please note, however, that the 50-inch specification does not mean that some vehicle seats with less than 50 inches of hip room should not also have more than two designated seating positions if the vehicle and seat design is such that three positions would likely be used. The specification is merely the amount of space the agency will consider as conclusive evidence that there should be at least three designated seating positions.

You ask if our answer would be different if fixed or movable armrests were provided. A fixed armrest does affect the measurement of designated seating position, since a fixed armrest would impede a person from sitting in the center position. NHTSA has stated in the preamble to the rule adopting the definition of designated seating position that the space occupied by a fixed, stationary armrest "would not be considered hip room and would not be included in the measurement of the 50-inch limitation." 44 FR 23229; April 19, 1979. A fixed armrest on your seat would show your intent that the position is not intended to be used as a seat.

Your letter also asked if the interpretation would be different if the seat width was greater than 39 inches. The number of designated seating positions is determined by the hip room, therefore, if the hip room remained the same, the seat would have the same number of designated seating positions even if the seat width was increased. Finally, you asked if the interpretation would be different if the seat were installed in a wider vehicle or positioned differently in the vehicle. Again, those modifications would only require an increase in the number of designated seating positions if the hip room were increased by these changes.

Finally, I emphasize that this letter only represents the agency's opinion based on the information supplied in your letter. NHTSA does not pass approval on any vehicle design, prior to the actual events that underlie certification. It is up to the manufacturer to determine whether its vehicles comply with all applicable safety standards and regulations, and to certify its vehicles in accordance with that determination.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:571.3 d:2/24/93

ID: 8125a

W.C. Burke, Captain
Department of California Highway Patrol
P.O. Box 942898
Sacramento, CA 94298-0001

Dear Mr. Burke:

This responds to your letter requesting an interpretation of FMVSS No. 205, Glazing Materials (49 CFR 571.205). This interpretation is based on my understanding of the statements in your letter as well as statements made by Mr. Greg Bragg of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) in a telephone conversation with Mr. Clarke Harper of this agency's Office of Vehicle Safety Standards and Mr. Marvin Shaw of my staff.

You ask about the marking responsibilities of glass installers who put replacement glass in school buses. CHP personnel have found school buses with replacement glass that is not marked. You ask whether an installer who cuts sections of glass from a larger, marked section is required by S6.4 of FMVSS No. 205 to mark each individual smaller section (if not already marked) prior to installing them as replacement windows. As explained below, the answer to your question is yes.

The person who cuts a section of glazing to size for installation in a motor vehicle is considered a manufacturer of the glazing. This is because the item of glazing is not considered manufactured until it is in the form that it will actually be sold for installation into a motor vehicle. This position that the person cutting the glazing is a manufacturer was stated early in the history of Standard No. 205, in a letter to Donald Counihan (May 9, 1968). The agency has stated frequently since then that persons cutting sections of glazing are manufacturers, most notably in a preamble for a 1972 rule on Standard No. 205 adopting the requirements of S6.4. (37 FR 24035, November 11, 1972) NHTSA stated that S6.4 requires "persons who cut glazing" to include the markings required by Standard No. 205 "on each cut piece."

S6.4 requires each person who cuts glazing to mark the piece with the markings required by section 6 of American National Standard (ANS) Z26. Section 6, ANS Z26 requires the following information: (1) the words "American National Standard" or the characters "AS," (2) a number identifying the item of glazing, (3) a model number assigned by the manufacturer that identifies the type of construction of the glazing material, and (4) the manufacturer's distinctive designation or trademark. Section S6.5 of Standard No. 205 also requires that person to certify the material in accordance with section 114 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

While your letter refers to persons cutting sections of glazing from larger sections, we note that it is possible that an item of replacement glazing was designed for a specific vehicle by a "prime glazing material manufacturer" (i.e., "one who fabricates, laminates, or tempers the glazing material," see S6.1 of Standard No. 205). If the item was so designed by such a manufacturer, the item must be marked and certified in accordance with S6.1 and 6.2 of Standard No. 205. A person other than a prime glazing material manufacturer installing the glazing without cutting it would have no marking requirement under Standard No. 205.

I hope that you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mr. Shaw at (202) 366- 2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:205 d:3/31/93

ID: 8126

Mr. Eugene Berk
Food and Drug Administration
Center for Devices and
Radiological Health
Office of Compliance and Surveillance
1390 Piccard Dr.
Rockville, MD 20850

Dear Mr. Berk:

This follows up on telephone conversations between you and Deirdre Fujita of my staff about a letter you received from the Medical Device Inspection Company (MDI) concerning the "Tumble Forms LifeSeat." While much of the information in the letter is subject to a claim of confidentiality, Ms. Carolann Kotula-Cook of MDI told us that we can provide, for purposes of a letter that will be placed in the public docket, the following description of the LifeSeat. The LifeSeat is described by MDI as "a safety seat designed to protect children who are riding in emergency medical vehicles. The seat is designed to be secured to the ambulance stretcher or cot... [and] may also be secured to the vehicle's captain's chair." You ask whether the LifeSeat is a "child restraint system" regulated by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, "Child Restraint Systems." As discussed below, the answer is yes.

Standard No. 213 specifies requirements for child restraint systems used in motor vehicles and aircraft, to reduce the number of children killed or injured in motor vehicle crashes and in aircraft. The term "child restraint system" is defined in S4 of the standard as "any device except Type I or Type II seat belts, designed for use in a motor vehicle or aircraft to restrain, seat, or position children who weigh 50 pounds or less." As described in MDI's letter, the LifeSeat meets the child restraint system definition, since it is designed to restrain or seat a child in a motor vehicle. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, each child restraint system that is sold in or imported into the United States must be certified as complying with Standard No. 213. Since the LifeSeat is a child restraint system, it must be certified as complying with Standard No. 213.

We informed Ms. Kotula-Cook that it appears the LifeSeat would not comply with some of Standard No. 213's requirements. We have sent her a copy of the standard, and an information sheet for manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. The information sheet describes manufacturers' responsibilities under Federal law for manufacturing vehicles and items of equipment, such as the responsibility to ensure these products do not have any safety-related defects. Ms. Kotula-Cook said that MDI will be contacting us directly for more information about Standard No. 213 and these responsibilities.

We are returning the copy of MDI's letter you provided us. If you have any questions, please call Ms. Fujita at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

ref:213 d.1/8/93

ID: 8128

Kenneth A. Gallo, Esq.
Howrey & Simon
1730 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20006-4793

Re: Micho Industries and Safety Research Manufacturing Inc. Exemption Petition

Dear Mr. Gallo:

This responds to your petition of December 18, 1992, on behalf of your clients, Micho Industries and Safety Research Manufacturing, Inc. The petitioners are manufacturers of an item of motor vehicle equipment called the "R-Bar Restraining System." They asked for an exemption for the R-Bar

from compliance with the testing procedures set forth in 49 C.F.R. Sec. 571.222 subsections S5.1.4(c) and S5.1.4.1 & 2 (1991) for purposes of determining whether the R-Bar (when attached to a passenger seat) deflects to within four inches of any part of another passenger seat.

The petition was submitted pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(B). Alternatively, you request consideration pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1410(a)(1)(B). Preliminarily, let me note that the provisions of section 1397(a)(2) apply to vehicles originally manufactured to conform to the Federal motor vehicle safety standards but which are subsequently modified before or after their sale to a first purchaser for purposes other than resale. Section 1410(a) applies to a vehicle at the time of its manufacture.

Section 1397(a)(2)(A) provides, in pertinent part:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle . . . .

Section 1397(a)(2)(B) provides that:

The Secretary may by regulation exempt any person from [subparagraph (A)] if he determines that such exemption is consistent with motor vehicle safety and the purposes of this chapter. The Secretary may prescribe regulations defining the term "render inoperative".

Thus, your petition asks, in effect, that manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and motor vehicle repair businesses be permitted to install the R-Bar in a school bus in use, even if the installation may cause the vehicle to no longer comply with the requirements of Standard No. 222. Although section 1397(a)(2)(B) was added to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the "Act") in 1974, yours appears to be the first formal request for an exemption that the agency has received, and is therefore a case of first impression. Although NHTSA has provided advisory letters over the years interpreting "render inoperative," the NHTSA has not prescribed any "regulation" pertinent to section 1397(a)(2).

Congress did not write into the statute any limitation on the use of the section 1397(a)(2)(B) exemption authority apart from specifying that any exemption must be consistent with motor vehicle safety and the purposes of the Act. However, the committee report in the House, where the exemption provision arose, suggested a limited scope of authority. The report stated that "exemptions may be warranted for owners with special medical problems, who require special controls, or for emergency vehicles or police cruisers." While these purposes were not expressly incorporated in the statute as limitations on the exemption authority, the agency believes that it would not be appropriate to issue an exemption based on other grounds unless there were a strong, compelling reason to do so.

NHTSA does not believe that there is a strong, compelling basis for granting your clients' petition under section 1397(a)(2)(B). Indeed, NHTSA believes that the concept of using "safety bars" as occupant restraining devices in school buses raises significant safety concerns that would need careful evaluation before the agency would take any action to facilitate their use.

One concern is whether the bar could result in excessive loads (e.g., abdominal, leg, or chest) on occupants during a crash, as a result of contact between the bar and the occupants. This is a complicated issue involving many variables, including type of crash (e.g., frontal, rear), positioning of occupants (sitting up straight, leaning forward, slouching, etc.), what happens when a large occupant is seated next to a small occupant (which could affect the position of the bar relative to the small occupant), and what happens if books, brief cases, lunch boxes, etc. are placed beneath the bar or on top of the bar (thereby affecting the position of the bar relative to the occupants and/or movement of the bar during a crash). Another concern is whether the bar could result in excessive loading of occupants' heads during a crash, from head contact with the seat back in front of the occupant, instead of loading that is spread more evenly over the occupant's body.

I note that NHTSA does not have the information that would be necessary to assess your client's product in relation to these safety concerns. The agency has not conducted any testing of safety bars, and the very limited test information submitted with your client's petition does not provide a basis to make such an assessment. It is clear, however, that Standard No. 222 has been effective in ensuring a high level of occupant protection in school buses. NHTSA believes it would be inappropriate to take any action to facilitate the use of a device that potentially could reduce school bus occupant protection.

Please note, as we have advised others, the prohibition in section 1397(a)(2)(A) does not extend to the owner of the vehicle. If a school bus authority has its own private service facilities, the installation of the R-Bar by the service facilities would not violate the prohibition. However, in view of our discussion above, we would not encourage a school bus authority to make that installation.

The petitioners have also asked to be exempted pursuant to section 1410(a)(1)(B). This section excuses a noncompliance if the exemption would facilitate the development and field evaluation of new motor vehicle safety features which provide a level of safety which is equal to or exceeds the level of safety established in the standard from which exemption is sought. However, a petitioner under section 1410(a) must be the manufacturer of the new motor vehicle for which an exemption is sought. Thus, NHTSA can not consider your clients' petition under that section. The agency would be able to consider a petition under section 1410(a)(1)(B) that is submitted by a school bus manufacturer which wished to install the R-Bar in its vehicles. However, any such petition should address the safety concerns discussed earlier in this letter.

We are returning the videotapes and two of the three copies of the petition that accompanied your letter. If you have any further questions, you may call Taylor Vinson of this office (202-366-5263), who spoke with you previously on this matter.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel Enclosure ref:VSA#555 d:2/19/92

ID: 8133

Mr. Dale E. Dawkins
Director
Vehicle Compliance and Safety Affairs
Chrysler Corporation
CIMS 415-03-17
1200 Chrysler Drive
Highland Park MI 48288-0857

Dear Mr. Dawkins:

This responds to your letter of December 16, 1992, to the Administrator informing the agency about the intent of Chrysler Corporation to manufacture 10 Chesapeake Consortium Electric Vehicles (CCEV) under NHTSA Temporary Exemption 92-1.

According to your letter, these vehicles are "almost identical" to the TEVans for which the agency granted the temporary exemption, except that they will utilize an AC electrical motor, while the ones which were the subject of the exemption petition will be powered by a DC electrical motor. You seek no broader exemption as the combined volumes of CCEVs and TEVans "will not exceed the maximum units of the petition that was granted." You have submitted this information to us so that NHTSA will have a clear understanding of the content of your electric vehicle development program and the extent of the exemptions under which these vehicles will be manufactured.

It appears that you would like confirmation from NHTSA that the CCEV vehicles are covered by Temporary Exemption 92-1. In order for the agency to provide this confirmation, it must determine that CCEV and TEVans are essentially the same vehicle and that none of the minor differences between the vehicles affects the findings made by the agency in issuing the TEVan exemption. In granting Chrysler's exemption petition covering three standards, the Administrator first found that the exemption would facilitate the development and field evaluation of a low emission motor vehicle. We do not believe that the change in electrical propulsion from DC to AC affects this finding. The Administrator next found that an exemption from the three standards would not unduly degrade the safety of the vehicle. You state that "[b]ased on our engineering judgement, there is no significant difference between the CCEV or TEVan in terms of overall vehicle safety." While you may have used the word "significant" in an excess of caution, it implies that there are differences between CCEV and TEVan and that there is a difference in overall vehicle safety between the CCEV and TEVan, although not an important one from Chrysler's viewpoint. We would appreciate your identification of the differences between the vehicles, and of the differences, if any, in the safety between the CCEVs and TEVans that may have led to Chrysler's engineering conclusion. With this information, we shall be better able to evaluate whether the two vehicles are essentially the same and whether there is any undue degradation in safety that might render it inappropriate to consider the CCEVs covered by the TEVan exemption.

We appreciate your calling our attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:555 d:2/18/93

ID: 8133a

Mr. Dale E. Dawkins
Director
Vehicle Compliance and Safety Affairs
Chrysler Corporation
CIMS 415-03-17
1200 Chrysler Drive
Highland Park MI 48288-0857

Dear Mr. Dawkins:

We have received your letter of March 9, 1993, responding to mine of February 18.

On December 16, 1992, you informed the agency of the intent of Chrysler Corporation to manufacture 10 Chesapeake Consortium Electric Vehicles (CCEV) under NHTSA Temporary Exemption 92-1.

According to your December letter, these vehicles are "almost identical" to the TEVans for which the agency granted the temporary exemption, except that they will utilize an AC electrical motor, while the ones which were the subject of the exemption petition will be powered by a DC electrical motor. You seek no broader exemption as the combined volumes of CCEVs and TEVans "will not exceed the maximum units of the petition that was granted."

It appeared that you wished confirmation from NHTSA that the CCEV vehicles are covered by Temporary Exemption 92-1. As I informed you on February 18, in order for the agency to provide this confirmation, we must determine that CCEV and TEVans are essentially the same vehicle and that none of the minor differences between the vehicles affects the findings made by the agency in issuing the TEVan exemption. In granting Chrysler's exemption petition covering three standards, the Administrator first found that the exemption would facilitate the development and field evaluation of a low emission motor vehicle. We do not believe that the change in electrical propulsion from DC to AC affects this finding. The Administrator next found that an exemption from the three standards would not unduly degrade the safety of the vehicle. You stated that "[b]ased on our engineering judgement, there is no significant difference between the CCEV or TEVan in terms of overall vehicle safety." While you may have used the word "significant" in an excess of caution, it implied that

there were differences between CCEV and TEVan and that there was a difference in overall vehicle safety between the CCEV and TEVan, although not an important one from Chrysler's viewpoint. Therefore, we asked you to identify the differences between the vehicles, and of the differences, if any, in the safety between the CCEVs and TEVans that may have led to Chrysler's engineering conclusion.

Your letter of March 9 informs us that there are "no discernable safety differences" between TEVans and CCEVs. It further informs us, as before, that the only difference between the two programs of electric vehicle development is the propulsion motors and transmissions. Therefore, it appears that two vehicles are essentially the same in design and in terms of the level of safety provided, and that it is appropriate to consider the CCEVs covered by the TEVan exemption.

We appreciate your calling our attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:555 d:3/24/93

ID: 8136

Mr. Curtis J. Crist
Product Development
US Marine
P.O. Box 9029
Everett, WA 98206

Dear Mr. Crist:

This responds to your letter of December 10, 1992, in which you ask for confirmation that the provisions of paragraph S4.3.1.3 of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 relating to front side marker lamps for boat trailers remain unchanged from interpretations provided by this Office in 1976 and 1977.

I am pleased to confirm that these requirements remain the same. Paragraph S4.3.1.3, however, was renumbered S5.3.1.3 several years ago.

You have also asked as to what action you must take for elimination of the requirement for rear identification lamps on boat trailers 80 or more inches in overall width. You may file a petition for rulemaking requesting this change. I enclose a copy of 49 CFR Part 552, the regulation governing these petitions, which will advise you as to these procedures. Section 552.4 sets forth the information that the petition should contain, and the address to which it must be sent.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

Enclosure ref:108 d.12/29/92

ID: 8159

James E. Schlesinger, Esquire
Schlesinger, Arkwright & Garvey
3000 South Eads Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Schlesinger:

This responds to your letter addressed to Walter Myers of this office, requesting an opinion concerning the Uniform Tire Quality Grading Standards (UTQGS).

You stated in your letter that two tire manufacturers, A and B, both with production facilities in both Canada and the United States, produced tires for a brand name owner, Company C, in Canada. A, B, and C agreed that in the event of overproduction or if some of the tires were "blems" (Company C refuses to accept blems, which are tires with minor cosmetic blemishes but structurally sound), A and B were free to market their tires elsewhere, including the United States. The tires manufactured for Company C contain the DOT number and the Canadian National Tire Safety Mark, but not the UTQGS information, which is not required in Canada. You stated that over a period of 1 1/2 years, A imported 10,622 tires into the United States while B imported 12,856 tires, including 4,644 blems, into the country. All were passenger tires and all sales occurred in 1990 and 1991. You then posed three questions based on those facts, which I will answer below in the order presented.

First, by way of background information, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 U.S.C. 1381) et seq., as amended (hereinafter Act), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to all new motor vehicles and items of new motor vehicle equipment, which includes tires. Section 203 of the Act (15 U.S.C. 1423) directs the Secretary to prescribe, through standards established under Title I of the Act, a uniform quality grading system for motor vehicle tires. NHTSA issued the UTQGS under the authority of 203 and 112(d) (15 U.S.C. 1401(d)), which authorizes the Secretary to require manufacturers to provide performance and technical data to the first purchasers of motor vehicle equipment for purposes other than resale. The UTQGS may be found at 49 CFR 575.104.

The penalties for violation of the UTQGS are set forth in the Act. Section 108(a)(1)(E) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(E)) prohibits any failure to comply with any rule, regulation, or order issued under 112. Sanctions for violation of 108 are set forth in 109 of the Act (15 U.S.C. 1398(a)), which provides civil penalties of up to $1,000 for each violation of 108, up to a total maximum civil penalty of $800,000 for "any related series of violations." In addition, 110(a) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 1399(a)) gives U.S. district courts the jurisdiction to restrain any violation of Title I of the Act, or any rule, regulation, or order issued thereunder, which include the UTQGS.

With that background in mind, I turn now to your specific questions:

1. Is it unlawful to import, sell or distribute in the United States tires which do not have the UTQG information on the sidewall of the tire and/or on the paper tread label for the tire? ANSWER: Subject to the exceptions discussed in the answer to your question No. 3 below, 49 CFR 575.6(b) provides that: At the time a motor vehicle tire is delivered to the first purchaser for a purpose other than resale, the manufacturer of that tire or, . . . the brand name owner, shall provide to that purchaser the information specified in Subpart B of this part that is applicable to that tire.

Subpart B includes 575.104 which, at (d)(1)(i)(A), requires that the UTQG information be molded onto or into the tire sidewall. Where a new tire line is introduced into the United States for the first time, however, the tire manufacturer or brand name owner may, for the first six months after the tire's introduction, provide the UTQG information by means of a paper label affixed to the tread surface of the tire. After that six-month grace period, the required information must be molded onto or into the tire sidewall.

Although both the Act and the UTQGS are silent as to whether tires can be imported or distributed without the UTQGS information, there would be no point in doing so since the tires cannot legally be sold without that information.

2. If it is unlawful to import, distribute and sell tires in the United States without said UTQG information, what penalties are imposed on the manufacturer and/or brand name owner?

ANSWER: As discussed above, civil penalties of up to $1,000 for each violation of 575.6(b) may be imposed, up to a maximum of $800,000. In addition, U.S. district courts have jurisdiction to restrain any such violations. 3. Would any of the exceptions of 49 CFR 575.104(c) apply in this case, and, if so, in what way? Is there any legislative history or interpretation of the meaning of "limited production tires" as noted in this section, and what effects, if any, this limitation might have on the above fact situation?

ANSWER: 49 CFR 575.104(c) provides that the UTQGS apply to new pneumatic passenger car tires. The standards do not apply, however, to deep tread, winter type snow tires, space-saver or temporary use spare tires, tires with nominal rim diameters of 10 to 12 inches, or "limited production" tires. In order to qualify as a limited production tire, 575.104(c)(2) establishes four criteria, all of which the tires must meet:

(i) The manufacturer's annual domestic production or importation into the U.S. of tires of the same size and design as the tire does not exceed 15,000 tires;

(ii) The annual domestic purchase or importation by a brand name owner into the U.S. of tires of the same size and design as the tire does not exceed 15,000 tires;

(iii) The tire's size was not listed as a vehicle manufacturer's recommended tire size designation for a new motor vehicle produced in or imported into the U.S. in quantities greater than 10,000 during the calendar year preceding the year of the tire's manufacture; and

(iv) The total annual production or importation into the U.S. by the manufacturer or, if the tire is marketed under a brand name, the total annual domestic purchase or purchase for importation into the U.S. by the tire's brand name owner, of tires meeting the criteria of (i), (ii), and (iii) above, does not exceed 35,000 tires.

Section 575.104(c) also states that "tire design" is "the combination of general structural characteristics, materials, and tread pattern, but does include cosmetic, identifying or other minor variations among tires."

The factual scenario you described in your letter would suggest that the tires in question might meet the numbers criteria of (c)(2)(i) and (ii), but there is not sufficient information on

which to base an opinion as to whether they meet the other two criteria. There is likewise insufficient information to determine whether the exceptions relating to deep tread, winter-type snow tires, space-saver or temporary use spare tires, or tires with nominal rim diameters of 10 to 12 inches may apply to any or all the tires in question. The manufacturer(s) seeking to import those tires into the U.S. must make those determinations.

For your additional information, I am enclosing a copy of 45 FR 23442, dated April 7, 1980, the final rule which initially exempted limited production tires from the UTQGS. That notice explains the rationale for exempting limited production tires and other background information you may find helpful.

I hope the above information will be of assistance to you. Should you have any further questions or need additional information regarding this matter, please feel free to contact Walter Myers at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure ref:575 d:2/23/93

ID: 8162

7

Mr. David H. B. Lee President, Lee Family, Inc. 701 East 30th Hutchinson, KS 67502

Dear Mr. Lee:

This responds to your letter of December 29, 1992, with respect to a "Third Brake Light Conditions Sensor", for which you have requested a review and testing. You have also asked for our comments and advice on the sale and promotion of this product. We assume that you would like to sell it in the aftermarket to vehicle owners.

We have reviewed the videotape you enclosed, and are able to advise you on this basis. The tape shows that the device is intended for installation by the owner of the vehicle, and, when installed, causes the center highmounted brake lamp to flash in proportion to braking effort (i.e., a panic or quick stop produces a higher flash rate than a stop made at a slower vehicle deceleration).

Motor vehicle lighting in the United States is subject to both Federal and State requirements. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment are the Federal requirements to which I refer. Standard No. 108 prescribes requirements for center highmounted stop lamps that must be followed by the manufacturer of the vehicle, and met at the time the vehicle is sold by the dealer to its first owner. One of these requirements is that the center highmounted stop lamp be steady burning when it is in use. Because the Sensor creates a flashing light, a vehicle manufacturer would not be able to use it as original equipment on a vehicle subject to Standard No. 108's requirements for center lamps. These vehicles are passenger cars manufactured on and after September 1, 1985, and light trucks and vans manufactured on and after September 1, 1993.

The Safety Act governs modifications to vehicles after their initial sale. This Act does not prohibit a vehicle owner from modifications that affect compliance with Standard No. 108 (or any other Federal motor vehicle safety standard). Thus, a vehicle owner may install the Sensor without violation of Federal requirements. However, we interpret the Safety Act as prohibiting the installation of the Sensor by a manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or motor vehicle repair business. Under the Act, these persons shall not "render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed in accordance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard." In our view, this forbids the installation of equipment that would take a vehicle out of compliance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard. However, the Act does not forbid the sale of componentry such as the Sensor which creates a noncompliance once it is installed. In summary, under Federal law, any person may sell your device, but only a person other than a manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or motor vehicle repair business may install it.

We are unable to advise you as to whether the laws of any State prohibit the use of a flashing center highmounted stop lamp, and recommend that you consult the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators for an opinion. Its address is 4600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22203.

We are returning your videotape and sample Sensors.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

Enclosures ref:108 d.1/26/93