ID: Ravens

Mr. Jeff Shahan
Engineering Manager
Ravens, Inc.
1400 Fairchild Avenue
Kent, OH 44240-1818





Dear Mr. Shahan:

This is in response to your letter requesting an interpretation of the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 224, "Rear Impact Protection," as applied to the Ravens Steel Dump trailer with an 18-inch deep spreader pan bolted or welded to the rear of the trailer. As explained below, the Ravens Steel Dump trailer equipped with such a spreader pan will be required to incorporate a rear impact guard that complies with FMVSS No. 223, "Rear Impact Guards."

You provided a drawing of the Steel Dump trailer with an 18-inch deep spreader pan bolted or welded to the rear of the trailer. According to that drawing, the spreader pan extends across the full width of the rear of trailer, and the top rear edge of the spreader pan is 52 and 3/4 inches above the ground.

FMVSS No. 224 requires most trailers and semitrailers with a gross vehicle weight rating of over 10,000 pounds to be fitted at the rear with an underride guard complying with FMVSS No. 223. The standard does not apply to pole trailers, pulpwood trailers, low chassis vehicles, special purpose vehicles, wheels back vehicles, or temporary living quarters. None of these exclusions apply to the Steel Dump trailer depicted in your drawing.

The Steel Dump trailer clearly does not qualify as temporary living quarters or as a pole trailer, pulpwood trailer, or low chassis vehicle. As explained below, it also does not qualify as a special purpose vehicle or a wheels back vehicle.

S4 of FMVSS No. 224 defines a "special purpose vehicle" as "a trailer or semitrailer having work-performing equipment that, while the vehicle is in transit, resides in or moves through the area that could be occupied by the horizontal member of the rear underride guard, as defined by S5.1.1 through S5.1.3." The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) interprets the words "work-performing" to mean that the equipment must actively perform its function, and that the function must involve exerting force or moving something. A spreader pan does not perform work in this sense. Therefore, we do not consider the spreader pan to be work-performing equipment, and the Steel Dump trailer does not meet the definition of a "special purpose vehicle."

Moreover, according to the drawing you provided, the spreader pan does not, while the vehicle is in transit, reside in or move through the area that could be occupied by the horizontal member of the rear underride guard. In an interpretation letter issued to the National Truck Equipment Association on September 9, 1998, NHTSA stated that the area that could be occupied by the horizontal member of the rear underride guard, or "guard zone," is the cubic area extending (1) vertically from the ground to a horizontal plane tangent to the bottom of the trailer; (2) laterally to the side extremities of the trailer as defined in S4 of FMVSS No. 224; and (3) from the rear extremity of the trailer, as defined in S4 of FMVSS No. 224, to a transverse vertical plane 12 inches forward. The spreader pan does not reside in this zone; thus the Steel Dump trailer does not meet the definition of a "special purpose vehicle."

S4 of FMVSS No. 224 defines a wheels back vehicle as "a trailer or semitrailer whose rearmost axle is permanently fixed and is located such that the rearmost surface of tires . . . is not more than 305 mm [12 inches] forward of the transverse vertical plane tangent to the rear extremity of the vehicle." A vehicle's "rear extremity" is defined as

the rearmost point on a vehicle that is above a horizontal plane located 560 mm [22 inches] above the ground and below a horizontal plane located 1,900 mm [75 inches] above the ground when the vehicle is configured as specified in S5.1 of this section and when the vehicle's cargo doors, tailgate, or other permanent structures are positioned as they normally are when the vehicle is in motion. Nonstructural protrusions such as taillights, rubber bumpers, hinges and latches are excluded from the determination of the rearmost point.

Since the rearmost axle on the Steel Dump trailer is located such that the rearmost surface of the tires is only 3 and 7/8 inches forward of the rear of the tailgate, but 21 and 7/8 inches forward of the rear of the spreader pan, the question becomes whether the spreader pan is structural and, therefore, constitutes the rear extremity of the trailer.

Merely because an object is attached to the vehicle's body does not mean that the object is a nonstructural protrusion. The attributes that the examples of nonstructural protrusions listed in the definition of "rear extremity" have in common are that they are relatively small and localized and would not have a major impact on a colliding passenger vehicle. The spreader pan is 18 inches in depth and extends the full width of the trailer. Consequently, it cannot be considered relatively small or localized. In addition, according to your drawing, the spreader pan is located 52 and 3/4 inches above the ground. At this height, and without a rear underride guard, the spreader pan could penetrate the passenger compartment of a colliding passenger vehicle. For these reasons, we do not consider the spreader pan to be nonstructural. Thus, the Steel Dump trailer equipped with a spreader pan does not meet the definition of a "wheels back vehicle."

Since the Steel Dump trailer equipped with a spreader pan does not qualify for any of the exclusions, it must be equipped with a rear underride guard that complies with FMVSS No. 223.

I hope this letter answers your question. If you have any further questions concerning this matter, please feel free to contact Mr. Dion Casey in the Office of the Chief Counsel at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,





John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

ref:224
d.1/25/01

ID: RECARO_e-registration7970

Mr. Dan Mullins
RECARO North America, Inc.
3275 Lapeer Road West
Auburn Hills, MI 48326




Dear Mr. Mullins:

This replies to your inquiry as to whether the recent amendments to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 213 require your company to revise its on-line registration form. As explained below, so long as online registration information is not provided on the paper registration form, your electronic registration form is not subject to the format requirements of the standard.

To improve the effectiveness of manufacturer campaigns recalling child restraint systems (CRSs) that contain a safety defect or fail to conform to FMVSS No. 213, manufacturers are required to provide a registration form (hereafter referred to as a "paper form") with each restraint (S5.8). The paper form must conform in size, content and format to the form depicted in the standard (figures 9a and 9b). To minimize the potential for confusion, no other information is permitted to appear on the paper form except for information that distinguishes a particular restraint from other systems.

In your e-mail you indicate that RECARO provides an electronic registration form on its website and that the internet address for the electronic form is provided in the CRS instruction manuals. You further state that the internet address is not provided on the paper form. You then ask if recent amendments to FMVSS No. 213 would subject RECAROs electronic registration form to the standards format requirements under this scenario.

On September 9, 2005, we amended FMVSS No. 213, in part, to permit the inclusion of an internet address for electronic registration of a CRS on the paper form (70 FR 53569). If a manufacturer chooses to provide such information, the website address must also be provided in the instruction manual (S5.6.1.7 and S5.6.2.2) and the format of the electronic registration form must conform to S5.8.2 (S5.8.1(d)).

However, S5.8.2 is only applicable if a manufacturer voluntarily provides an internet address for electronic registration on the paper form. We noted in the final rule that the amendments did not establish any new requirements for CRS manufacturers. If a manufacturer does not include an internet address on the paper form, then the electronic registration requirements do not apply even if the manufacturer elsewhere provides information on electronic registration.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any additional questions, please contact Mr. Chris Calamita of my staff at (202) 366-0536.

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Wood
Acting Chief Counsel

ref:213
d.1/24/06

ID: reed.ztv

Mr. Eric Reed
P.O. Box 138
Bondurant, WY 82922

Dear Mr. Reed:

This is in reply to your letter of November 18,1999. We regret the delay in responding, but as Taylor Vinson of this Office explained to you on January 27, 2000, your letter was misassigned.

With respect to S5.5.4 of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, "Lamps, Reflective Devices and Associated Equipment," you have asked whether you are correct in assuming that stop lamps must remain "activated" "as long as the service brake is applied." You comment that "the regulations do not address any duration of burn time or delay in de-activation of the stop lamps after the service brakes are released."

Standard No. 108 incorporates by reference SAE Standard J586 FEB84 "Stop Lamps for Use on Motor Vehicles Less Than 2032 mm in Overall Width" and SAE Standard J1398 MAY85 "Stop Lamps for Use on Motor Vehicles 2032 mm or More in Overall Width." Paragraph 2.1 of each of these standards defines a stop lamp in part as a lamp that indicates "the intention of the operator of a vehicle to stop or diminish speed by braking." Thus, S5.5.4 requires the stop lamps to activate when the service brakes are applied. The activation of the stop lamps at that point indicates that the driver intends to slow down or stop, and the stop lamps must remain activated as long as the service brake is applied. When the force that applies the service brakes is removed, the stop lamps are deactivated, as the operator's intent has become something other than to stop or diminish speed by braking. Continued activation of the stop lamp of any duration, in the absence of service brake application, is therefore not permitted by Standard No. 108.

You asked Mr. Vinson whether it is permissible for the hazard warning signal lamps to be automatically activated by a sensor to warn drivers approaching from the rear that their closing speed is excessive. Standard No. 108 incorporates by reference SAE Recommended Practice J910 "Vehicular Hazard Warning Signal Operating Unit," January 1966. Paragraph 1 of J910 defines the unit as "a driver controlled device which causes all turn signal lamps to flash simultaneously to indicate to the approaching drivers the presence of a vehicular hazard." An automatic activation of the hazard warning unit would not be "driver controlled" and is therefore not permitted.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
ref:108
d.2/29/2000

ID: reposses.etl

Ms. Valerie Phillips
101 Rocky View Drive
Cold Spring, KY 41076

Dear Ms. Phillips:

This is in response to your telephone request for information concerning whether the Federal odometer disclosure law requires an individual whose vehicle has been repossessed by a lender to provide the repossessing lender with an odometer disclosure statement.

The answer to your question is that the Truth in Mileage Act of 1986, as amended (49 U.S.C. 32701-711), the Federal statute that establishes requirements for odometer disclosure, and NHTSA's odometer disclosure regulations (49 CFR Part 580) do not require an odometer disclosure statement from the debtor when a vehicle is repossessed.

NHTSA has stated this position in an official interpretation letter to the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators dated November 8, 1994. I have enclosed a copy of that letter for your information. The agency's statement that Federal odometer disclosure requirements do not apply to vehicle repossessions appears in the first full paragraph on the third page.

In addition, I have enclosed a copy of section 580.3 of NHTSA's odometer disclosure regulations. That section specifically provides that creation of a security interest in a vehicle does not make the parties to the transaction "transferors" and "transferees" who are required to complete and sign an odometer disclosure statement. It follows that if the creation of a security interest does not require an odometer disclosure statement, no such statement is needed for an action taken to protect that interest, such as repossession.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any further questions on this matter, please contact Eileen Leahy, an attorney on my staff, at this address or by telephone at 202-366-5263.

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosures (2)
ref:580
d:1/10/97

ID: reversibleseat

Mr. Michael S. Hemenway
8389 Pleasantview Drive
Mounds View, MN 55112




Dear Mr. Hemenway:

This responds to your letter concerning the concept of "reversible front automobile seating".You stated that the concept involves an automobile seat that can be manipulated to face either the normal, forward-facing direction or a rear-facing direction, allowing the occupant to face the second row of seating. You specifically asked whether such a reversible automobile seat would be "allowed in the marketplace without . . . crash testing," if it was clearly stipulated that the reversible seat can only be used (1) when the vehicle is not in a drive gear ("Park" or "Neutral" w/parking brake), and (2) when the reversed seat is unoccupied by a person during travel.

By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to ensure that its vehicles or equipment comply with all applicable requirements.

We have issued a number of safety standards related to seats and occupant protection, including, but not limited to, Standard No. 201, Occupant protection in interior impact, Standard No. 207, Seating systems, Standard No. 208, Occupant crash protection, Standard No. 209, Seat belt assemblies, Standard No. 210, Seat belt assembly anchorages.

In asking whether a reversible automobile seat would be allowed in the marketplace without crash testing in certain situations, I assume you are asking whether the vehicle would be subject to our crash test requirements with the seat in the rear-facing position. I note that the general issue of how a vehicle with reversible seats would be tested is relevant not only to crash test requirements, but also to various other requirements such as ones on seat strength, seat belts, and so forth.

In order to provide a complete answer to your question, it would first be necessary to identify and analyze each potentially relevant requirement, including any specified test procedures, to determine how the requirement would generally apply to a reversible seat in the rear-facing position. It would then be necessary to analyze whether the requirement would apply differently in special situations. While we are able to respond to specific requests for interpretation, we do not have the resources to provide this type of detailed analysis.

I would observe that, assuming a vehicle is subject to a particular test requirement with a reversible seat in the rear-facing position, the vehicle would not be excluded from that requirement merely because a warning was provided that the seat was not to be occupied in that position when the vehicle was in motion. A vehicle might be excluded if the reversible seat could only be used in its forward-facing position while the vehicle is in motion. However, we would need to know more about the specific vehicle design before providing an interpretation, and would only provide it in the context of a specific test requirement.

Enclosed is an information sheet for new manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. I hope you find this information helpful. If you have further questions, you may contact Edward Glancy of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

Enclosure
ref:208
d.7/11/05

ID: RIBILL23454

Mr. Charles F. Dolan
Administration
State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations
Division of Motor Vehicles
286 Main Street
Pawtucket, RI 02860

Dear Mr. Dolan:

This responds to your letter, and to telephone calls from John DiTomasso of your staff, asking whether a Rhode Island state law would be preempted by Federal law, in light of a possible inconsistency with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 205. Your correspondence attached a copy of the law, and expressed concern regarding a subsection that allows the ownership and operation of motor vehicles with a light transmittance of less than 70 percent by persons with a physical condition that "makes it necessary to equip the vehicle with a sunscreening device." Based on our understanding of your correspondence, we believe that the legislation would not be preempted.

BACKGROUND

According to your correspondence, Section 31-23.3-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws prohibits persons from owning and operating any motor vehicle with nontransparent or sunscreen material to cover the front windshield, the side windows immediately adjacent to the right and left of the driver's seat, and other windows in a vehicle, unless the material has a total visible light transmittance of not less than seventy percent. ⁽¹⁾

Subsection (7) of Section 31-23.3-4 exempts from the 70 percent light transmittance for tinting material requirement "a motor vehicle registered in this state in the name of a person, or the person's legal guardian, who has an affidavit signed by a physician or an optometrist licensed to practice in this state indicating that the person has a physical condition that makes it necessary to equip the motor vehicle with a sunscreening device which may exceed federal standards."

The State law pertains to the light transmittance of glazing in motor vehicles, which is an aspect of performance regulated by FMVSS No. 205, Glazing Materials (49 CFR 571.205). The standard incorporates by reference an industry standard, the American National Standard "Safety Code for Safety Glazing Materials for Glazing Motor Vehicles Operating on Land Highways (ANSI Z26), and specifies performance requirements and permissible locations for the types of glazing that may be installed in motor vehicles. The standard requires some glazing to allow at least 70 percent of the incident light to pass through. For passenger cars, the standard specifies the 70 percent light transmittance requirement for all glazing at levels requisite for driving visibility. For buses, trucks, and multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs), the standard specifies the 70 percent light transmittance requirement for glazing installed in the windshield, the windows to the immediate left and right of the driver, and any rear window that is used for driving visibility.

ANALYSIS

The provision of our statute referring to Federal preemption is section 30103(b) of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301, which states in part:

when a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State . . . may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) safety standards apply to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. (49 U.S.C. 30112.) Thus, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30103(b), State laws that apply to the manufacture and sale of new vehicles, and to the same aspect of performance, must be identical to the FMVSS. Thus, if the Rhode Island provision applied to the sale of vehicles in Rhode Island, it would be preempted since it would purport to allow the sale of vehicles with light transmittance below that required by FMVSS No. 205.

However, NHTSA does not regulate the operation (i.e., use) of motor vehicles, which is generally under the jurisdiction of the States. Section 30103(b) does not require Rhode Island to set operational requirements that are "identical" to the FMVSS. Nonetheless, there are limits on State operational requirements, in that general principles of preemption law apply. These principles preclude States from adopting operational requirements that are more stringent than the requirements applicable to new vehicles under the FMVSS, because more stringent State requirements would have the effect of precluding the use of a Federally compliant vehicle in that State. The proposed Rhode Island law appears to be less stringent than the FMVSS, in that it would allow a light transmittance of less than 70 percent in certain areas of glazing where the Federal requirement is 70 percent. As such, the proposed State law would not preclude the use of vehicles certified to FMVSS No. 205, and thus would not be invalid under general principles of preemption. This conclusion is consistent with a 1996 letter to Betsy Dittmore, in which we stated that Iowa legislation allowing drivers with "light-sensitive disorders permits" to have darkened windows generally would not conflict with Federal laws. (See enclosed letter, dated November 18, 1996.)

Note, however, that a State law could not permit a modification that is prohibited by Federal law. Our statute at 49 U.S.C. 30122 provides that a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or vehicle repair business may not knowingly "make inoperative" any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle in accordance with any FMVSS. A State law that purported to permit the installation of dark tinting material by entities listed in 30122 where the tinting material results in a light transmittance through the glazing of less than 70 percent would not undermine the validity and enforceability of section 30122. ⁽²⁾ Nonetheless, in situations where a vehicle must be modified to accommodate the needs of a particular disability, we have been willing to consider any violations of the "make inoperative" prohibition a purely technical one justified by public need. In situations qualifying for exemption under your statute, NHTSA will not institute enforcement proceedings against a business that applies the tinting material to the vehicle to accommodate the condition warranting the exemption.

In closing, we understand your safety concerns about decreased visibility through dark tinting material and concur with them. We ask States to limit use of the tint material to the extent necessary and to ensure that their operational requirements are commensurate with the safe operation of vehicles.

If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Nancy Bell of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure
ref:205#VSA
d.2/14/02





---

¹ As we read Section 31-23.3-4(3), it allows the "use" of tinting material that has at least 70 percent light transmittance. Therefore, when this material is placed on an original equipment manufacturer window that is already at 70 percent light transmittance, the combined transmittance of the glazing and tinting material could be down to 49 percent. This ambiguity, however, does not affect the outcome of our analysis.

² The "make inoperative" provision does not apply to equipment attached to or installed on or in a vehicle by the vehicle owner. However, NHTSA urges vehicle owners not to degrade the safety of any system or device on their vehicles.

ID: righthanddrive

Mr. Michael Dropik
Goodyear Police Department
P.O. Box 5100
Goodyear, AZ 85338




Dear Mr. Dropik:

This responds to your e-mail message to the Federal Highway Administration, dated October 27, 2005. Your message was forwarded to our office for a response. In your message, you asked whether it was legal for a vehicle manufacturer to install the steering wheel on the right side of the vehicle instead of the left. Yes, it is legal to install the steering wheel on the right side of a motor vehicle.

By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has the authority to prescribe motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA does not, however, approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial products. Instead, manufacturers of motor vehicles are required to certify that their vehicles comply with the mandatory safety standards. As NHTSA has not issued safety standards that prohibit the use of a right hand drive steering system on a motor vehicle, manufacturers are permitted to install the steering wheel on the right or left side of a vehicle.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any further questions please contact Mr. Edward Glancy of my staff, at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Wood
Acting Chief Counsel

ref:571
d.4/7/06

ID: rmaltrjul25.ztv

Ms. Ann Wilson
Senior Vice President
Rubber Manufacturers Association
1400 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005

Dear Ms. Wilson:

This is in reply to your letter of July 25, 2003, requesting an interpretation of certain provisions of NHTSAs early warning reporting (EWR) regulation, subpart C of 49 CFR Part 579. You have expressed six concerns.

Your first concern involves "Updates of deaths and injuries." If a tire manufacturer is not aware of the tire identification number (TIN) at the time an incident involving death or injury is initially reported, Section 579.28(f)(2)(i) requires the manufacturer to "submit an updated report of such incident in its report covering the reporting period in which the . . . TIN is identified." You interpret this as meaning that if a tire manufacturer receives TIN information after the close of the reporting period in which the manufacturer receives a claim or notice of death or injury, it must "provide NHTSA with the TIN in the report covering the reporting period in which the TIN information is identified by the manufacturer." However, you observed that at the public meeting conducted by NHTSA on June 18, 2003, a NHTSA employee "stated that tire manufacturers must submit the TIN by updating the entire death and injury file for the reporting period in which the original claim of death or injury was reported." You ask for clarification of this requirement.

The requirement was properly communicated at the public meeting. Pursuant to Section 579.29(a), EWR information must be submitted on templates provided on the NHTSA website. The same template that is used for the original report is used for updated reports. The initial submission would be identified as "Version 1." The first updated report would be identified as "Version 2," and so on.

You expressed concern with a statement at the June 18 public meeting that a manufacturer could not delete a claim that had been reported in a previous period, "even if the manufacturer subsequently discovered that the claim was erroneous (i.e., did not involve the manufacturers tire or did not involve a death or injury)." You have asked for confirmation that "this is the official interpretation of this rule."

The updating provisions of Section 579.28 do not address the issue of correction of information once the information has been reported to NHTSA. Practical considerations limit our ability to make corrections to EWR data in our data warehouse. The Office of Defects Investigations current plan is to allow manufacturers that identify significant errors to request the opportunity to submit corrected data templates. We will respond to such requests on a case-by-case basis.

Your second concern is labeled "Scope of information on deaths and injuries." We amended Section 579.26(b) in a Federal Register notice of June 11, 2003 (68 FR 35132). The amended regulation clarifies that reporting of incidents involving deaths and injuries applies to "all tires manufactured during a production year covered by the reporting period and the four production years prior to the earliest production year in the reporting period."We also amended Section 579.4(c) to define "production year" for tires to mean "the calendar year in which the item was produced." Your members believe that reporting relative to certain production years is subject to different interpretations. You understand that NHTSA intends reporting under Section 579.29 to encompass "tires produced in the current production year and . . . tires produced in the previous four years." You asked for confirmation of your understanding.

Applying the EWR regulations definition of "production year," the reporting requirement for tire manufacturers may be read to apply to all tires manufactured during a calendar year covered by the reporting period and the four calendar years prior to the earliest calendar year in the reporting period. Because EWR reporting is on a quarterly basis, there will never be more than one calendar year during a reporting period. Thus, the four calendar years prior to the earliest calendar year in the reporting period will be the four calendar years before the calendar year of the report. Thus, we confirm your understanding of this requirement.

Your third concern relates to "Tire type code."Tire manufacturers must provide the "tire type code" as part of their quarterly report on production information. The EWR regulation does not define "tire type code," but you pointed out that the preamble to the final rule indicates that "tire type code" means the third grouping of the TIN (67 FR at 45862). You asked for confirmation.

We noted in the preamble to the final rule that we would use RMAs preferred term of "tire type code," instead of "serial code" as we had proposed, and that the term "corresponds to the third grouping of identification requirements as specified in 49 CFR 574.5(c)." 67 FR at 45862. Section 574.5(c) identifies the third group as a "descriptive code;" Figure 1 thereof clearly depicts the four information groups of the "Tire Identification Number," and identifies the third group as "Tire Type Code." Thus, we confirm your interpretation.

You are next concerned with reporting "plant of manufacture" for imported tires. Section 579.26 requires a tire manufacturer to include in its reporting of information under paragraph (a) "the plant where [the tires were] manufactured." You asserted that in most cases, with respect to tires that they import, "U.S. tire manufacturers do not know the TIN, the date of manufacture, or the plant of manufacture for such tires." Thus, without the TIN, the manufacturer will be unable to provide NHTSA with the name of the plant where the tire was manufactured. You requested that manufacturers be allowed to provide the country of origin (and date of importation) rather than plant and date of manufacture, when the TIN is unknown. We concur in your suggestion that in the context presented, the report on country of origin and date of importation satisfies the regulation.

Your next request concerned "Production information." You cited Section 579.26(a), which requires manufacturers to submit "cumulative warranty production" and "cumulative total production through the end of the reporting period." However, you assert that the preamble to the amendments of June 11, 2003 "states that tire manufacturers must submit data only for the quarterly reporting period and not 'year-to-date' ('YTD') or cumulative data," and you believe that a handout by NHTSA at the public meeting on June 18 was subject to varying interpretations.

The regulation establishes the reporting requirement, and we do not find it open to the interpretation that you suggest. Under the introductory text of Section 579.26 and paragraph (a), a tire manufacturer must report "the quarterly reporting period, the tire line, . . . the production [calendar] year, the cumulative warranty production, and the cumulative total production through the end of the reporting period." This means, for example, that a manufacturers report for the third quarter of a calendar year would contain the total warranty production and the total production for a tire line for the first three quarters of the calendar year. Separately, a manufacturer would also report, for that tire line (as further delineated and subcategorized in the rule), information described in Section 579.26 that includes "the model year of tire manufactured during the reporting period and the four calendar years prior to the earliest model year in the reporting period . . . .""Model year" is defined to mean "the year that [a tire] was produced." See Section 579.4, 68 FR 35142. Thus, each quarterly report in a calendar year would also include the total warranty production and the total production for each of the four previous calendar years for a tire line for which information is being reported under paragraphs (a) or (c). This includes tire lines no longer in production. We contrast this with the numbers of property damage claims and warranty adjustments that a tire manufacturer must report under Section 579.26(c). These numbers are reported on a quarterly basis, and not cumulatively.

Finally, you expressed concern with "Appropriate entry code for unknown data." Your members have been advised that they must not leave any cells blank on the EWR templates in order for their reports to be accepted. You have asked whether unknown data should be reported as "UNK," as indicated on the EWR templates previously posted on NHTSAs website, or "U," as indicated at the June 18 public meeting, or in some other format.

Section 579.26(a) was amended in a June 11, 2003 Federal Register Notice, to add the requirement that if a manufacturer is not certain whether a particular group of tires is used as original equipment on a motor vehicle, it shall state "U" in the reporting field (68 FR at 35144). In reporting incidents involving deaths or injuries under Section 579.26(b), a manufacturer must use code 99 if no component of the tire is specified in the claim or notice (i.e., if the relevant component is unknown to the manufacturer). In reporting under Section 579.26(c), the regulation specifies that no reporting is necessary if the system or component involved is not specified in the codes (i.e., the final template should not contain a blank cell since no reporting is required).

If you have further questions, you may phone Andrew DiMarsico of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:579
d.10/10/03

ID: RMAmetric22869

Mr. Steven Butcher
VP Technical and Standards
Rubber Manufacturers Association
1400 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005





Dear Mr. Butcher:

This responds to your March 12, 2001 letter asking whether four labeling sample proposals, subject to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 119, New pneumatic tires for vehicles other than passenger cars (571.119), are acceptable in terms of placement of the metric units under the Final Rule for the Metric Conversion of Tire Standards, Docket No. NHTSA-98-3837, Notice 1 ("Final Rule") (May 27, 1998, 63 FR 28912).

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not issue advance approval of compliance by manufacturers with motor vehicle safety standards or regulations. The agency, however, will give an informal opinion as to whether your sample markings appear to comply with the requirements of FMVSS No. 119, as amended by the Final Rule.

A review of the labeling illustrations you supplied indicates that you have used a different format than illustrated in our Final Rule of May 27, 1998. For example, the amended FMVSS No. 119 does not dictate repetition of the existing English measurement label after the metric measurement label, e.g. "MAX LOAD 1020 KG AT 350 KPA COLD (MAX LOAD 2250 LBS AT 50 PSI)" but, rather, the placement of the existing English measurement in parenthesis after the metric measurement, e.g. "MAX LOAD 1020 KG (2250 LBS) at 350 KPA (50 PSI) COLD". This specification resulted from comments by manufacturers that unnecessary words needlessly increase the amount of labeling required on the tires.

The example of marking information shown in S5.6 of FMVSS No. 119 in the Final Rule is intended only as a guide to manufacturers. A manufacturer can vary the illustrated format somewhat as long as the requirements of S5.6, as amended, are satisfied. Since the additional words in your proposed labels do not obfuscate the required markings, the labels appear to comply with the requirements of FMVSS No. 119, as amended by the Final Rule.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions or need additional information, feel free to contact Nancy Bell of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

ref:119
d.5/3/01

ID: Robert Babcock