ID: SILVERMA.GM

Howard A. Silverman, Esq.
General Motors Corporation
Mail Code 480-106-304
30500 Mound Rd.
Warren, Michigan 48090-9055

Dear Mr. Silverman:

This responds to your June 24, 1996, fax asking about a requirement in Standard 213, "Child Restraint Systems," for labeling "built-in" child seats, i.e., a seat designed to be "an integral part of and permanently installed in a motor vehicle" (S4, Standard 213).

Paragraph S5.5.4(b) and S5.5.5(f) of Standard 213 require built-in seats to be labeled with a statement about the manufacturer's recommendations for the mass, weight and height of children who can safely occupy the system. There are several statements set forth in S5.5.5(f), each with blanks for the manufacturer to insert the recommended values. To illustrate, the statement of S5.5.5(f)(2) is as follows:

This child restraint is designed for use only by children who weigh between ____ and ____ pounds (insert appropriate metric values; use of word "mass" is optional) and whose height is (insert appropriate values in English and metric units) or less and who are capable of sitting upright alone.

(Italics in text.)

In the statements of S5.5.5(f), the English unit (weight) unit is specified first, and the metric unit (mass), second. You ask whether this order may be reversed. You explain that Canada requires the metric measurements to be stated first. You indicate that if the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) were to permit the metric unit to be first, GM could use "a common label on built-in child restraints installed on vehicles destined for the United States and Canada."

Our answer is that you may specify the metric unit first. Standard 213 does not specify the sequence of the required information. Further, prior to the requirement that metric values be included on the label, a manufacturer asked NHTSA whether it could voluntarily provide metric units on the label in addition to the English units. NHTSA stated that the metric units may be provided, "[a]s long as the information is presented in a manner that is not likely to cause confusion . . . ." (April 17, 1989 letter to Robert Craig, copy enclosed.) The agency did not indicate that providing the metric unit before the English unit would cause confusion, nor do we believe it likely that such labeling would.

We emphasize, however, that regardless of which unit is provided first, the agency will refer only to the metric value to determine which dummy will be used to test a child restraint. This decision was thoroughly discussed in the final rule adopting the requirement that child seat labels provide both metric and English units. 60 FR 35126, 35131; July 6, 1995.

If you have further questions, please contact Deirdre Fujita of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Samuel J. Dubbin
Chief Counsel

ref:213
d:7/24/96

ID: Silverman1

Howard A. Silverman, Esq.
General Motors Corporation
Legal Staff
Mail Code: 482-C24-D24
300 GM Renaissance Center
Detroit, MI 48265-3000




Dear Mr. Silverman:

This responds to your letter of January 7, 2005, asking us to reconsider our February 4, 2003 letter of interpretation to Ms. Erika Z. Jones regarding the definition of the term "Model Year" in 49 C.F.R. Part 565, Vehicle Identification Number Requirements (VIN). In our letter to Ms. Jones, we addressed whether 49 C.F.R. 565.6(d)(1) permits a manufacturer to designate vehicles as belonging to a single Model Year, where the production period for such vehicles falls within three different calendar years, but runs for less than 24 months in total. In our letter, we said the answer was no. We interpreted "Model Year," as defined in 49 C.F.R. 565.3(j), as a production period of less than two calendar years (i.e. , a time period limited by year designation rather than a maximum number of days). For the reasons that follow, we have decided to rescind our earlier letter and instead to interpret "Model Year" as a period not to exceed 24 months.

In your letter, you explained how our February 2003 interpretation of the term "Model Year" for VIN recordation purposes was contrary to actual, long-standing industry practices, and discussed the substantive impacts of the interpretation. According to your letter, it had been the industrys understanding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has granted vehicle manufacturers flexibility in determining when to start production for a given Model Year, provided that such period may not exceed 24 months, and manufacturers scheduled their production in a manner consistent with this timeframe.

As discussed in our earlier letter, the VIN requirements were originally contained in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 115, until the agency promulgated a final rule shifting such requirements to a new regulatory section at Part 565 (48 FR 22567, May 19, 1983). The exact definition of "Model Year" did change slightly in its migration from FMVSS No. 115 to Part 565, adding the word "calendar" to the requirement that the actual period of production be "less than two calendar years. "However, the final rule stated that "[t]he basic substantive requirements of Standard 115 are unchanged by this action". 48 FR 22567, 22567. It also stated, "The new Part 565 would not have any requirements not in FMVSS 115 prior to today". Id. at 22569. That is, it was not the agencys intention to change the substantive requirements of the VIN regulation or to alter existing industry practices.

When drafting the letter to Ms. Jones, we did not fully appreciate the impacts that our interpretation would have on vehicle manufacturers production processes. These impacts suggest that our February 2003 interpretation would result in substantive changes to the VIN requirements, the type of changes that, according to the 1983 notice, were not intended to result from the addition of the word "calendar" to the regulation. Substantive changes to our regulations are conducted through the rulemaking process, with an opportunity for public notice and comments.

Accordingly, we have decided to rescind our earlier interpretation of the definition of "Model Year" contained within Section 565.3(j), and instead, we will interpret that term as any 24-month period from the starting point determined by the manufacturer, thereby permitting a full two-year period for all such manufacturer designations. To do otherwise would change the substance of the VIN requirement and could result in widely disparate treatment of different vehicles in terms of VIN requirements related to Model Year designation, depending upon when the manufacturer begins production, and would unnecessarily restrict manufacturers discretion in setting their own production schedules.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Eric Stas of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

cc: Erika Z. Jones, Esq.
ref:565
d.2/15/05

ID: speedrestrictedtires

Stephen M. Padula
Michelin North America
One Parkway South
P.O. Box 19001
Greenville, SC 29602

Dear Mr. Padula:

This responds to your letter asking whether a manufacturer may make certain statements about using 315/80R22.5 LR L truck tires marked with a 55 miles per hour (mph ) speed restriction on the sidewall ("speed-restricted tires") at speeds above 55 mph. You note that a competitor has made these or similar statements in technical information about the tires, and you want to know whether the statements are permitted. Our answer is the statements are not permitted for speed-restricted tires.

You ask about two statements in the manufacturers technical information about the tire. The first concerns information stating that the tire bearing a maximum speed marking of 55 mph, rated at 10,000 pounds/tire at a cold pressure of 130 psi "may not be operated at a sustained speed in excess of 55 mph. Sustained speed is defined as continuous operation at that speed for over one hour. The absolute maximum speed for tires with 55 mph speed restrictions is 65 mph." The second relates to statements that the "tires are speed restricted as listed below [55 mph]. This is due to very high loads associated with these Load Range L tires. When these tires are operated at or below the Load Range "J" (18 PR) loads, they can be operated at 65 mph and the listed speed restriction does not apply."

Standard No. 119, New Pneumatic Tires for Motor Vehicle Other Than Passenger Cars (49 CFR 571.119), permits speed-restricted tires, but only under certain conditions. Under S6.5(e) of the standard, the speed restriction must be marked on the tire sidewall. In describing the information that must be marked, S6.5(e) states: "The speed restriction of the tire, if 55 mi/h or less, shown as follows: Max speed ____ mph."^[1] In other words, the speed restriction must not exceed 55 mph. Speed-restricted tires are generally excluded from the high speed performance requirements of S6.3 of Standard No. 119. In addition, they are subject to a less stringent endurance test schedule (a lower test speed and fewer total revolutions of the test wheel), as shown in Table III of the standard. Since the requirements for speed-restricted tires reflect their anticipated speed-restricted use, it is important that there is an appropriate safeguard ensuring that the tires will not be used at higher speeds. Labeling the tires with a maximum 55 mph speed restriction helps to ensure that the tires will not be used under conditions exceeding the speed restriction marked on the tires.

The first group of statements you describe instruct that the tire may be operated at speeds up to 65 mph for periods not to exceed one hour. We believe that the statements about using the tires at speeds up to 65 mph conflicts with the 55 mph speed restriction labeled on the tire. If the statements are provided, we will not consider the tire to be speed-restricted since it is recommended for use above 55 mph. Thus, the tire would have to meet the requirements that apply to a non-speed-restricted tire.

The second group of statements includes an instruction that, "When these tires are operated at or below the Load Range J (18 PR) loads, they can be operated at 65 mph and the listed speed restriction does not apply." We would not consider the tire to be speed-restricted when the manufacturer has provided that statement. The tire would be tested to the requirements for non-speed-restricted tires under the appropriate load.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions or need additional information, feel free to contact Nancy Bell of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

ref:119

d.8/6/02

^[1] Effective May 27, 2003, this section will read: "The speed restriction of the tire, if 88 km/h (55 mph) or less, shown as follows: Max speed __ km/h (___mph)."

ID: Spelcast5635

Mr. Derek Fletcher
Snug Seat
12801 E. Independence Blvd.
PO Box 1739
Matthews, NC 28106

Dear Mr. Fletcher:

This responds to your e-mail letter and phone conversation with Ms. Deirdre Fujita of my staff, in which you requested a temporary exemption from the child restraint anchorage system requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 213, Child restraint systems. The agency does not have authority to grant exemptions to equipment manufacturers. However, in this limited instance, we will exercise our discretion not to institute enforcement proceedings with respect to the Spelcast special needs child restraint system (CRS).

In your letter, you explained that the Spelcast is specifically designed to safely transport children in hip spica casts or with other lower extremity casting. You stated that typically, a child only uses the Spelcast for a period of 6 to 8 weeks while in a cast. According to your letter, hospitals temporarily loan the Spelcast to individuals with children in casts. You describe the loans as being administered by trained hospital staff, who provide instruction on the restraints installation and use.

Under FMVSS No. 213, all CRSs (except harnesses, car beds, and belt-positioning seats) manufactured on or after September 1, 2002, must be equipped with a means of attaching to a vehicles child restraint anchorage system [1] . This requirement, along with vehicle anchorage requirements, improves the compatibility of vehicle seats and CRSs and provides a universal system for installing CRSs. Increasing the ease of installation reduces the instances of incorrectly installed restraints. Improved compatibility and proper installation increase the effectiveness of a CRS in preventing death or injury.

You indicated that the Spelcast is currently not offered for sale because it does not meet the LATCH requirements of FMVSS No. 213. However, you stated that when the Spelcast was sold, it was primarily sold to hospitals and child passenger safety agencies and was not available through any retail outlet. You stated that there are currently no other CRSs available that accommodate the needs of children in casts and that the only alternative is ambulance transport.

As a CRS, the Spelcast must meet all applicable provisions of FMVSS No. 213, including those for the child restraint anchorage system attachments. When a Federal motor vehicle safety standard contains a requirement applicable to a product, Federal law prohibits any person from manufacturing, selling, or importing a new product that does not comply with that requirement. See, 49 U.S.C. 30112. The Federal law governing our agency does not explicitly provide for exempting manufacturers of equipment items, such as CRSs, from the application of the standards.

However, we believe that flexibility is called for to accommodate the special medical needs of the individuals who rely on your product. The Spelcast provides a transportation option for a small population that has very limited alternatives. One of the objectives of the LATCH requirements is to minimize improper installation of CRSs. Because of the distribution methods for the Spelcast, users receive personal instruction from qualified staff. This instruction, combined with the limited and controlled distribution of the child restraint, reduces the chance that a Spelcast will be improperly installed. However, to continue to ensure that only properly instructed individuals would use these seats and to prevent the seats general use, a system is needed to ensure that a loaned seat is returned to the hospital or agency once a child can be accommodated by a CRS certified to all the requirements of FMVSS No. 213.

In your phone conversation, you explained that the seat is being redesigned in cooperation with another CRS manufacturer to comply with the LATCH requirements, but that the availability of the new seat is still about 8 months away. Based on this and other information mentioned in this letter, we will exercise our discretion not to enforce the child restraint anchorage system requirements of FMVSS No. 213 against the Spelcast for a period of 8 months from the date of this letter. This will provide an alternative to ambulance transport until the redesigned seat is available. Note that this determination applies only to the child restraint anchorage provisions of FMVSS No. 213 and that the Spelcast must still comply with all other relevant portions of the standard.

I hope that this letter resolves your problem. If you have any further questions, please contact Mr. Chris Calamita of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:213
d.10/1/03





---

[1] This is commonly referred to as the LATCH (lower anchors and tether for children) requirement.

ID: sponorship_rbm

Erika Z. Jones, Esq.
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw
1909 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006-1101

Dear Ms. Jones:

This letter responds to a recent request you made regarding the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) interpretation of the term "motor vehicle manufacturer" as it relates to compliance with the phase-in requirements of various Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS). Your immediate concern is whether a vehicle may be deemed to be manufactured by more than one manufacturer if there is an agreement between two separate companies under which both companies provide financial and engineering resources for the development of a vehicle model that will be assembled by one company for the exclusive marketing by the other. If the answer to that question is yes, you ask whether either company could take credit for those vehicles for the purpose of complying with the phase-in requirements of a safety standard, as long as they filed a contract with NHTSA specifying who was taking such credit. I am pleased to provide an explanation of NHTSA's position on these issues, which we refer to as "sponsorship."

NHTSA first articulated its position on sponsorship in 1985 when it proposed to phase-in the new passive restraint requirements of FMVSS No. 208, Occupant crash protection. See 50 Fed. Reg. 14589, 14596 (April 12, 1985). In that rulemaking, NHTSA allowed consensual attribution of a vehicle when there was more than one manufacturer of the vehicle. Specifically, NHTSA developed a regimen under which a passenger car produced by more than one manufacturer would be attributed for phase-in purposes to a single manufacturer, as specified by an express written contract provided to NHTSA. In the absence of a written contract, the attribution would go to the importer, in the case of an imported vehicle, or to the manufacturer that marketed the vehicle, in the case of a vehicle manufactured in the United States. See 49 CFR 571.208, S4.1.3.5. The same regimen has been adopted for subsequent phase-ins of other requirements of FMVSS No. 208 (S4.1.5.2, S4.2.5.6, S4.2.6.1.2, S14.3.1, and S14.3.3.1), as well as those of other safety standards (FMVSS No. 201, Occupant protection in interior impact, at S6.1.6; FMVSS No. 214, Side impact protection, at S8.4; and FMVSS No. 225, Child restraint anchorage systems, at S14.2).

The term "manufacturer" is defined by statute as "a person manufacturing or assembling motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment; or importing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for resale." 49 U.S.C. 30102. The NHTSA regulations governing vehicle certification of a completed vehicle require the assembler of the vehicle to certify the vehicle as the manufacturer. Three exceptions apply to the general requirement: first, a non-assembling manufacturer may certify compliance when it controls the corporation assembling the vehicle and agrees to assume all legal responsibilities associated with certification; second, a manufacturer that fabricates and sends a vehicle in an unassembled form such that it can be assembled without any special machinery or tools may name itself as the vehicle manufacturer; and third, a trailer manufacturer may certify compliance for a trailer that it did not manufacture, but for which it accepts legal responsibility associated with certification. See 49 CFR 567.4(g). The manufacturer identified on the certification label generally bears full legal responsibility for any notifications and remedies resulting from a determination of a noncompliance with a FMVSS or a safety-related defect. See 49 CFR 573.3.

In the 1985 FMVSS No. 208 NPRM, the agency acknowledged that there were instances in which a vehicle could arguably have more than one manufacturer. One example of this situation could be when there was an existing parent/subsidiary relationship. However, there could also be instances where the relationship between the two possible manufacturers was not based on control of the company, but rather on control of the production of a specific vehicle model. We determined that, under certain circumstances, the definition of manufacturer in 49 U.S.C. 30102 was sufficiently broad to include this scenario. The example we gave in explaining our position was a company, which we refer to as a "sponsor," that contracts with another manufacturer to produce a design exclusively for the sponsor. However, the agency went on to state, "the mere purchase of vehicles for resale by a company which is also a manufacturer of motor vehicles does not make the purchaser the manufacturer of those vehicles." See 50 Fed. Reg. 14589, 14596.

To date, NHTSA has examined the sponsorship question, based on particular sets of circumstances, only four times. In the first instance, the agency evaluated the relationship between General Motors and Lotus Cars Ltd. See August 15, 1987, letter from NHTSA to General Motors. We determined that since GM sponsored the importation, distribution, and marketing of the Lotus vehicles in the United States, it could be considered the manufacturer of the vehicles for the FMVSS No. 208 phase-in requirements. In making its decision, NHTSA noted that Lotus was a wholly-owned subsidiary of GM and the vehicles were marketed in the United States by another wholly-owned subsidiary of GM, providing sufficient indicia of GM's active role in bringing the vehicles to market.

Two years later, NHTSA concluded that a contractual relationship whereby one manufacturer contracts with another to assemble vehicles, without more, was insufficient to establish a sponsorship relationship. The agency noted that a contract to assemble may be nothing more than the purchase of vehicles for resale. Without more information as to the details of the contract, NHTSA was unable to determine whether the non-assembly manufacturer exercised sufficient control over the production of the vehicle to be considered a sponsor for phase-in purposes. See September 7, 1989, letter from NHTSA to LAFORZA Automobiles, Inc.

In 1991, NHTSA determined that a joint venture agreement, under which one party provides design and development support, as well as major components, and the other party assembles the vehicle, was sufficient to allow the non-assembler to be considered as the manufacturer of the vehicle and to attribute the vehicle to its fleet for phase-in purposes. See October 28, 1991, letter from NHTSA to Nissan Research & Development, Inc.

Finally, we recently clarified our position that vehicles of related manufacturers may be grouped together for the purposes of meeting safety standard phase-in requirements, and expanded it beyond the findings of control described in the GM/Lotus letter. In a letter to the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, we noted that the manufacturer attribution provisions needed to be clear and easily applied. We stated that we believed there was sufficient interaction among related manufacturers, and direct involvement by parent corporations in the actions of their subsidiaries, that their fleets could be grouped together or treated as the vehicles of separate manufacturers, at the manufacturers' option. We also stated that if the fleets of motor vehicle manufacturers are considered to be within the same "control" relationship for the purposes of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) statute, 49 U.S.C. Chapter 329, their vehicles could be grouped together or treated as the vehicles of separate manufacturers for phase-in purposes, again at the manufacturers' option. See October 24, 2002, letter from NHTSA to the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers.

Thus, under existing interpretations, sponsorship could be found with respect to a vehicle model in three instances: first, if the vehicle were designed from the beginning exclusively for another manufacturer; second, if the fleets of the two companies are combined under the CAFE statute during the model year at issue; and third, if the vehicle were designed and produced pursuant to a joint venture agreement that reflected joint participation. Sponsorship would not be found, however, if a contract merely directed one company to assemble an existing model for another manufacturer without other evidence of the non-assembling company's control over the design and production process.

I now turn to the fact scenario presently before the agency. In your letter, you state that Company A has agreed to supply Company B with a vehicle model developed, in part, pursuant to an engineering agreement between the two companies. The new model is based in large part on an existing model that was designed and engineered by Company A. Company A has also marketed the existing model in the United States. However, a subsidiary or affiliate of Company B will have sole distribution and marketing rights for the new model.

Under the engineering agreement, Company B has provided exterior and interior specifications and requirements, prepared and provided detailed designs of modified interior and exterior parts, and assigned employees to participate actively in the design and development process. Additionally, Company B has committed to pay Company A a net total of $30 million to cover engineering and tooling costs for the vehicle.

I have determined that this arrangement is sufficient to establish a sponsorship relationship between Company A and Company B with respect to the vehicle, regardless of whether such a relationship could be found generally, as was the case with GM and Lotus or with fleets of vehicles that are grouped together under the CAFE statute. I have also determined that it is not necessary for Company B to have been actively involved in the initial development of the vehicle, as was the case in the Nissan joint venture. Rather, my decision is based on the presence of three separate factors: the would-be sponsor's commitment of substantial design and engineering resources, the significant financial contribution by Company B to the development of the vehicle, and Company B's exclusive marketing rights to the vehicle. I note that the absence of any one of these factors, particularly the commitment of design and engineering resources, could create a situation more akin to the situation with LAFORZA, where NHTSA expressed concern that the contractual relationship may not have amounted to more than a mere purchase for resale.

Please note that in order for Company B to take credit for the vehicles in question during the phase-in, the companies must submit a written contract to that effect with NHTSA. Moreover, we note that the entire production for a given production year (i.e., from September 1 of one year through August 31 of the next year) must be attributed to one manufacturer. We would not allow a company to "sponsor" only a portion of a given year's production.

This approach to sponsorship for phase-in purposes is somewhat different from NHTSA's recently articulated position on the respective responsibilities of manufacturers under the early warning reporting rule. 67 Fed. Reg. 45833 (July 10, 2002). In that rule, we specifically addressed the obligations placed on manufacturers involved in joint ventures and production agreements. We noted that all manufacturers that are party to such ventures or agreements could assume responsibility for reporting consumer complaint and other relevant information to NHTSA. Under the early warning reporting rule, we described a production agreement as one in which one manufacturer agrees to produce vehicles for another under the second manufacturer's brand name. We did not premise our statement about the assumption of responsibility on whether the owner of the vehicle brand name had any control over the design or production of the vehicle, or whether the vehicle was designed exclusively for marketing by the brand name owner. We took this approach in the early warning reporting context because we believe the critical element is which company a consumer is more likely to notify in the event of a complaint or problem. We believe consumers would be most likely to notify the manufacturer whose name appears on the vehicle rather than the manufacturer whose name appears on the certification label. To that end, we also added a definition of "brand name owner" to mean "a person that markets a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment under its own trade name whether or not it is the fabricator or importer of the vehicle." This definition alone would be insufficient to establish sponsorship under the phase-in requirements of the various safety standards, because the mere branding of a vehicle does not demonstrate sufficient control or investment in the design and production of the vehicle.

I hope that this information is helpful. Should you have any further questions on this matter, please feel free to contact me or Rebecca MacPherson of my staff at the address given above or at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:VSA
d.12/10/02

ID: static1

Milford R. Bennett, Director
North American Operations Safety
Affairs and Regulations
General Motors Corporation
30200 Mound Road
Warren, Michigan 48090-9010

Dear Mr. Bennett:

This responds to General Motors' (GM's) inquiry, raised in a June 16, 1995 meeting with the agency, regarding the test procedures in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 114 for determining whether a vehicle is in the "park" position. Under those procedures, a vehicle is deemed to be in park if it ceases rolling within 150 mm. You were concerned that different methods of measuring this distance could result in some vehicles not complying with the requirement that the vehicle roll less than 150 mm.

The short answer to your question is that the test procedure is a "static" measurement procedure. In other words, the agency will not measure the distance that a vehicle has rolled until after the vehicle has completely ceased moving.

This agency recently amended Standard No. 114, adding test procedures to determine whether the key can be removed when the transmission is in positions other than the "park" position and that the transmission remains locked in "park" after key removal. (60 FR 30006; June 7, 1995) NHTSA initiated that action in response to a petition from the automotive industry alleging that such a procedure was needed to make the standard objective.

Section S4.2.1(a)(3) of the amended standard specifies that "[e]ach vehicle shall not move more than 150 mm on a 10 percent grade when the transmission or transmission shift lever is locked in "park." To demonstrate that the vehicle is in "park" prior to attempting to remove the key, the test procedures in S5.2(e) and S5.3(b) both state:

Drive the vehicle forward up a 10 percent grade and stop it with the service brakes. Apply the parking brake (if present). Move the shift mechanism to the "park" position. Apply the service brakes. Release the parking brake. Release the service brakes. . . . Verify that vehicle movement was less than or equal to 150 mm after release of the service brakes.

In the June 16 meeting with the agency, GM stated that vehicle movement could be measured in two different ways: dynamic or static. GM inquired as to which method NHTSA interpreted the standard as specifying, because the results using these two methods would be different. The "dynamic" method of measuring vehicle movement was described by GM as measuring the maximum play-out of a spool of wire attached to the front bumper after release of the service brakes. The "static" method would measure vehicle movement from a reference point on the wheels after the vehicle has come to a complete stop.

Under the dynamic method, a portion of the measured play-out would be due to the "rocking" motion of the vehicle's chassis on its suspension when the transmission engaged. The driveline components would also contribute some movement by temporarily storing some of the kinetic energy of the moving vehicle by flexing and twisting. However, both of these contributions to total rearward movement are temporary, disappearing after the vehicle comes to rest, as in the static measuring method. GM presented test data for certain vehicles and theoretical worst-case calculations of static roll distance on non-production hypothetical vehicles and one test vehicle. The test data showed that dynamic measuring produces larger measurements of roll than does static measuring.

NHTSA interprets the limitation on vehicle movement specified in S4.2.1(a)(3) as referring to static movement. The agency did not contemplate using the dynamic method. The agency intends to measure only permanent components of total vehicle movement, using the "static" method. When conducting compliance testing, NHTSA will measure vehicle movement from a reference point such as the wheel centerline position. The starting time for the measurement will be at the moment before the service brakes are released. The ending time of the measurement will be when the vehicle has completely ceased moving, bouncing, and rocking (i.e., until the vehicle is again "static").

This agency believes that its confirmation that the static test method is the proper method should relieve any realistic concerns regarding compliance of the 1996 model year vehicles GM tested, and probably of any future vehicles as well. The actual tests GM conducted in preparation for the meeting with NHTSA all showed static roll distances well within the requirements of Standard No. 114.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Paul Atelsek of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:114 d:7/3/95 The parenthetical reference occurs only in S5.3(b). S5.2(e) and S5.3(b) refer to vehicles manufactured at different times.

ID: Std. No. 202(a)

ID: steffy

Mr. J. L. Steffy
Triumph Designs Ltd.
Jacknell Road
Dodwells Bridge Industrial Estate
Hinckley, Leics. LE10 3BS
England

Dear Mr. Steffy:

This responds to your FAX of May 5, 1994, to Taylor Vinson of this Office, requesting an interpretation of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108.

You enclose a motorcycle headlamp design that "contains asymmetrical shaped lenses." The headlamp itself is a symmetrical unit mounted on the motorcycle's vertical centerline. It is your interpretation that this lamp is permitted under Standard No. 108 "as long as we do not create an asymmetric lighting arrangement physically where dipped beam is on one side only and main beam on one side only."

I enclose a copy of a recent interpretation to Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A. with respect to a headlamp similar to yours. If this does not answer your question, we shall be pleased to consider the matter further.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure ref:108 d:6/28/94

ID: Strauser_ltr

Mr. Dan Strauser
Manager--Research and Development
Federal Signal Corporation
1300 West Bartlett Road
Elgin, IL 60120-7529





Dear Mr. Strauser:

This is in reply to your letter asking how various models of Ravo street sweepers would be treated under our current regulations and interpretations. Specifically, you have inquired about the Ravo 3-series, 4-series, and 5-series models, which are more fully described in the brochures you enclosed with your letter.

From the brochures, it is apparent that these Ravo street sweepers are 4-wheeled vehicles that vary considerably in terms of maximum speed capacity. The Ravo 3-series street sweeper is available in two speed versions: one with a maximum speed capacity of 32 kilometers per hour (km/h) (20 mph) and one with a maximum speed capacity of 40 km/h (25 mph). The Ravo 4-series (Ravo 4000) street sweeper appears to be available in only one speed version with a maximum speed capacity of 30 km/h (19 mph). The Ravo 5-series street sweeper is available in three speed versions: one with a maximum speed capacity of 32 km/h (20 mph), one with a maximum speed capacity of 40 km/h (25 mph), and one with a maximum speed capacity of 62 km/h (39 mph).

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) regulates "motor vehicles." A "motor vehicle" is defined in part as one which is "manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways." 49 U.S.C. 30102(6). Vehicles that operate on the public streets, roads, and highways, as one of their primary uses ("on-road vehicles"), are generally subject to the Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS). This agency has used various tests for determining whether an on-road vehicle is a motor vehicle. For example, NHTSA has consistently determined that on-road vehicles with a maximum speed capacity greater than 32 km/h (20 mph) are motor vehicles and therefore subject to the FMVSS. With regard to certain low-speed on-road vehicles, we have, in past interpretations, concluded

that those with a maximum speed capacity of 32 km/h (20 mph) or less and an abnormal configuration that distinguished them from the traffic flow were not subject to the FMVSS. During the 1997 low-speed vehicle rulemaking ⁽¹⁾ and in at least one subsequently-issued interpretation, ⁽²⁾ however, this agency announced its intention to abandon "abnormal configuration" as a test for future interpretations.

It is against this backdrop that we consider whether the Ravo street sweepers about which you inquire are subject to the FMVSS. This agency has consistently stated, over the years, that street sweepers are "motor vehicles" because they are manufactured for the purpose of cleaning city streets and spend their entire functional life on public streets. The next question to be addressed, therefore, is whether they are subject to the FMVSS and, if they are, how they are classified for compliance purposes.

Consistent with past interpretations, we consider the Ravo street sweepers with a maximum speed capacity greater than 32 km/h (20 mph) to be subject to the FMVSS. This conclusion is based on long-standing agency policy subjecting all on-road vehicles with a maximum speed capacity greater than 32 km/h (20 mph) to the FMVSS. As to the proper classification of these vehicles, we consider them to be "trucks" because they are four-wheeled vehicles designed primarily for the transportation of street sweeper brushes, which we have long considered to be "special purpose equipment." (A "truck" is defined as a "motor vehicle . . . designed primarily for the transportation of property or special purpose equipment." See 49 CFR Part 571.3(b).)

With respect to the Ravo street sweepers with a maximum speed capacity of 32 km/h (20 mph) or less, we are currently in the process of considering what tests should be applied in determining whether on-road vehicles are motor vehicles. In the meantime, since we have previously concluded that street sweepers with a maximum speed capability of 32 km/h (20 mph) or less are not motor vehicles and therefore not subject to the FMVSS under the old line of interpretations, we are re-affirming that conclusion. We will maintain that position unless, and until, the agency announces a change in policy.

If you have any questions, you may contact Robert Knop of this Office at (202) 366-2992.





Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

ref:571
d.9/5/01





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1. ¹ See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 62 FR 1077 (January 8, 1997).

2. ² See November 20, 1997, letter to Mr. Gary Starr of ZAP Electric Bikes.

ID: subaru.cargocage

Mr. Don Bearden
Director, Governmental Affairs
Subaru of America, Inc.
P.O. Box 6000
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034-6000





Dear Mr. Bearden:

This is in response to your letter of July 2, 2001, requesting an interpretation of testing requirements for the Bumper Standard at 49 CFR Part 581.

You state that Subaru of America, Inc. ("Subaru") intends to introduce, in the latter part of 2002, a new "crossover" vehicle that will be classified as a passenger car for the purposes of Part 581 and other standards, but will have an open cargo area with rear access through a tailgate that will lie in a horizontal position when it is opened. You state that Subaru is investigating whether it should make available, for dealer or owner installation, an accessory for the new vehicle that you refer to as a "cargo cage." You describe this accessory as a "u-shaped tubular frame device that mounts in the rear of the vehicle when the tailgate is in its open, horizontal position for the purpose of restraining any cargo from falling out of the vehicle." You state that the cargo cage will be anchored to the sides of the cargo area by pins that will allow the cage to be "rotated between a horizontal position on top of the open tailgate and a horizontal stowed position within the vehicle cargo area," a maneuver that you state an adult can easily accomplish within 15 to 30 seconds.

Given the ease of stowing the cargo cage, you express the belief that owners who install the accessory will use it in its extended position, sitting on top of the open tailgate, only on occasions when additional cargo capacity is required. You observe that because the cargo cage is designed for easy removal, it is not a permanent part of the vehicle. You further state that the owner's manual to be supplied with the vehicle "will recommend that the cage be stowed and the tailgate placed in its upright locked position in normal usage."

You request confirmation that the cargo cage need not be installed in its extended position on top of the open tailgate when the new vehicle is tested for compliance with Part 581. The conditions for conducting Bumper Standard compliance tests are specified at 49 CFR 581.6. This section provides no guidance on whether a vehicle equipped with a device such as the cargo cage must be tested with the device in its deployed position. Although laboratory test procedures are issued as guidance for NHTSA's contractor laboratories and not to establish requirements that are binding on manufacturers, we note that the Laboratory Test Procedure for Part 581 (TP-581-01 dated April 25, 1990) specifies that a vehicle's hood, trunk, and doors are to be latched before pendulum impact and barrier tests are performed. Accepting this as the appropriate method for conducting Bumper Standard compliance tests, and relying on your description of the cargo cage as an easily removable accessory that will be sold with instructions that it be stowed with the tailgate in an upright locked position when not in use, we have concluded that the cargo cage need not be installed in its extended position on top of the open tailgate when the vehicles for which it is designed are tested for compliance with Part 581.

If you have any further questions regarding the Bumper Standard, feel free to contact Coleman Sachs of this Office at 202-366-5238.





Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

Ref:581
d.7/31/01