ID: Std. No. 202(a)

ID: steffy

Mr. J. L. Steffy
Triumph Designs Ltd.
Jacknell Road
Dodwells Bridge Industrial Estate
Hinckley, Leics. LE10 3BS
England

Dear Mr. Steffy:

This responds to your FAX of May 5, 1994, to Taylor Vinson of this Office, requesting an interpretation of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108.

You enclose a motorcycle headlamp design that "contains asymmetrical shaped lenses." The headlamp itself is a symmetrical unit mounted on the motorcycle's vertical centerline. It is your interpretation that this lamp is permitted under Standard No. 108 "as long as we do not create an asymmetric lighting arrangement physically where dipped beam is on one side only and main beam on one side only."

I enclose a copy of a recent interpretation to Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A. with respect to a headlamp similar to yours. If this does not answer your question, we shall be pleased to consider the matter further.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure ref:108 d:6/28/94

ID: Strauser_ltr

Mr. Dan Strauser
Manager--Research and Development
Federal Signal Corporation
1300 West Bartlett Road
Elgin, IL 60120-7529





Dear Mr. Strauser:

This is in reply to your letter asking how various models of Ravo street sweepers would be treated under our current regulations and interpretations. Specifically, you have inquired about the Ravo 3-series, 4-series, and 5-series models, which are more fully described in the brochures you enclosed with your letter.

From the brochures, it is apparent that these Ravo street sweepers are 4-wheeled vehicles that vary considerably in terms of maximum speed capacity. The Ravo 3-series street sweeper is available in two speed versions: one with a maximum speed capacity of 32 kilometers per hour (km/h) (20 mph) and one with a maximum speed capacity of 40 km/h (25 mph). The Ravo 4-series (Ravo 4000) street sweeper appears to be available in only one speed version with a maximum speed capacity of 30 km/h (19 mph). The Ravo 5-series street sweeper is available in three speed versions: one with a maximum speed capacity of 32 km/h (20 mph), one with a maximum speed capacity of 40 km/h (25 mph), and one with a maximum speed capacity of 62 km/h (39 mph).

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) regulates "motor vehicles." A "motor vehicle" is defined in part as one which is "manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways." 49 U.S.C. 30102(6). Vehicles that operate on the public streets, roads, and highways, as one of their primary uses ("on-road vehicles"), are generally subject to the Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS). This agency has used various tests for determining whether an on-road vehicle is a motor vehicle. For example, NHTSA has consistently determined that on-road vehicles with a maximum speed capacity greater than 32 km/h (20 mph) are motor vehicles and therefore subject to the FMVSS. With regard to certain low-speed on-road vehicles, we have, in past interpretations, concluded

that those with a maximum speed capacity of 32 km/h (20 mph) or less and an abnormal configuration that distinguished them from the traffic flow were not subject to the FMVSS. During the 1997 low-speed vehicle rulemaking ⁽¹⁾ and in at least one subsequently-issued interpretation, ⁽²⁾ however, this agency announced its intention to abandon "abnormal configuration" as a test for future interpretations.

It is against this backdrop that we consider whether the Ravo street sweepers about which you inquire are subject to the FMVSS. This agency has consistently stated, over the years, that street sweepers are "motor vehicles" because they are manufactured for the purpose of cleaning city streets and spend their entire functional life on public streets. The next question to be addressed, therefore, is whether they are subject to the FMVSS and, if they are, how they are classified for compliance purposes.

Consistent with past interpretations, we consider the Ravo street sweepers with a maximum speed capacity greater than 32 km/h (20 mph) to be subject to the FMVSS. This conclusion is based on long-standing agency policy subjecting all on-road vehicles with a maximum speed capacity greater than 32 km/h (20 mph) to the FMVSS. As to the proper classification of these vehicles, we consider them to be "trucks" because they are four-wheeled vehicles designed primarily for the transportation of street sweeper brushes, which we have long considered to be "special purpose equipment." (A "truck" is defined as a "motor vehicle . . . designed primarily for the transportation of property or special purpose equipment." See 49 CFR Part 571.3(b).)

With respect to the Ravo street sweepers with a maximum speed capacity of 32 km/h (20 mph) or less, we are currently in the process of considering what tests should be applied in determining whether on-road vehicles are motor vehicles. In the meantime, since we have previously concluded that street sweepers with a maximum speed capability of 32 km/h (20 mph) or less are not motor vehicles and therefore not subject to the FMVSS under the old line of interpretations, we are re-affirming that conclusion. We will maintain that position unless, and until, the agency announces a change in policy.

If you have any questions, you may contact Robert Knop of this Office at (202) 366-2992.





Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

ref:571
d.9/5/01





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1. ¹ See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 62 FR 1077 (January 8, 1997).

2. ² See November 20, 1997, letter to Mr. Gary Starr of ZAP Electric Bikes.

ID: subaru.cargocage

Mr. Don Bearden
Director, Governmental Affairs
Subaru of America, Inc.
P.O. Box 6000
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034-6000





Dear Mr. Bearden:

This is in response to your letter of July 2, 2001, requesting an interpretation of testing requirements for the Bumper Standard at 49 CFR Part 581.

You state that Subaru of America, Inc. ("Subaru") intends to introduce, in the latter part of 2002, a new "crossover" vehicle that will be classified as a passenger car for the purposes of Part 581 and other standards, but will have an open cargo area with rear access through a tailgate that will lie in a horizontal position when it is opened. You state that Subaru is investigating whether it should make available, for dealer or owner installation, an accessory for the new vehicle that you refer to as a "cargo cage." You describe this accessory as a "u-shaped tubular frame device that mounts in the rear of the vehicle when the tailgate is in its open, horizontal position for the purpose of restraining any cargo from falling out of the vehicle." You state that the cargo cage will be anchored to the sides of the cargo area by pins that will allow the cage to be "rotated between a horizontal position on top of the open tailgate and a horizontal stowed position within the vehicle cargo area," a maneuver that you state an adult can easily accomplish within 15 to 30 seconds.

Given the ease of stowing the cargo cage, you express the belief that owners who install the accessory will use it in its extended position, sitting on top of the open tailgate, only on occasions when additional cargo capacity is required. You observe that because the cargo cage is designed for easy removal, it is not a permanent part of the vehicle. You further state that the owner's manual to be supplied with the vehicle "will recommend that the cage be stowed and the tailgate placed in its upright locked position in normal usage."

You request confirmation that the cargo cage need not be installed in its extended position on top of the open tailgate when the new vehicle is tested for compliance with Part 581. The conditions for conducting Bumper Standard compliance tests are specified at 49 CFR 581.6. This section provides no guidance on whether a vehicle equipped with a device such as the cargo cage must be tested with the device in its deployed position. Although laboratory test procedures are issued as guidance for NHTSA's contractor laboratories and not to establish requirements that are binding on manufacturers, we note that the Laboratory Test Procedure for Part 581 (TP-581-01 dated April 25, 1990) specifies that a vehicle's hood, trunk, and doors are to be latched before pendulum impact and barrier tests are performed. Accepting this as the appropriate method for conducting Bumper Standard compliance tests, and relying on your description of the cargo cage as an easily removable accessory that will be sold with instructions that it be stowed with the tailgate in an upright locked position when not in use, we have concluded that the cargo cage need not be installed in its extended position on top of the open tailgate when the vehicles for which it is designed are tested for compliance with Part 581.

If you have any further questions regarding the Bumper Standard, feel free to contact Coleman Sachs of this Office at 202-366-5238.





Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

Ref:581
d.7/31/01

ID: SUBLEASE.ETL

Marian E. Baldwin, Esq.
Chadbourne & Parke LLP
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, NY 10112

Dear Ms. Baldwin:

This is in response to your letter of September 12, 1996, in which you request written confirmation from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") that the transfer of a leasehold interest in a motor vehicle that you describe in your letter "would not require compliance with the odometer disclosure requirements set forth in . . . 49 CFR Part 580 at the inception of the leasehold transaction," in those states which have given you official written notice that the transaction that you describe is not a transfer of ownership which would require issuance of a new title.

As you describe the transaction that is the subject of your request, the leasing company that owns motor vehicles already under lease to end-users ('the lease company") is to lease the leases of those vehicles to a special-purpose trust ("the trust") (formed for the sole purpose of executing this financial transaction), which will simultaneously sublease the vehicle back to the lease company. Your letter further states that the leases and subleases executed between the lease company and the trust are "subject to" the end-user leases of the customers who lease the vehicles from the automobile lease company. In your letter, you also indicate your understanding that the interpretation you are requesting would apply only with respect to transactions of the nature described in your letter that take place in states that have formally (i.e., in writing, over the signature of an authorized individual) determined that such transactions do not require a transfer of title.

With the above limitation, I can confirm that your understanding is correct. The statute that sets forth Federal odometer disclosure requirements is the Truth-in-Mileage Act of 1986 ("TIMA"), now codified at 49 U.S.C. Chapter 327. Section 32705 of that statute requires a transferor of a motor vehicle to make a signed disclosure of the vehicle's odometer reading at the time that he or she is transferring ownership of a motor vehicle. Section 32705(b) also requires that this disclosure must be made on the vehicle's title. The Federal odometer disclosure regulations implementing this provision (49 CFR Part 580) likewise make it clear that the requirement to disclose the odometer reading arises when there is a transfer that requires the state to issue a new title in the name of a different owner. See 49 CFR 580.5.

NHTSA recognizes that the laws of the individual states differ as to the types of transactions that require the issuance of a title in the name of a different owner. TIMA relies on disclosure of odometer information on the vehicle's title document at the time of title transfer as its principal means of reducing odometer fraud. The integrity of the "paper trail" of written and signed odometer disclosure statements on the vehicle title must be maintained in order to accomplish this purpose.

Accordingly, the critical issue that must be addressed in deciding whether to require an odometer disclosure in a given transaction is whether that transaction requires a transfer of title under state law. The only way to ensure the integrity of the paper trail is to require that an odometer disclosure be made any time there is a transaction involving a motor vehicle otherwise covered by Part 580, that requires retitling of the vehicle in a new name under state law.

In your letter you have attached letters from officials of the states of New York, New Jersey and Florida in which they have stated their determinations that the transaction that you described to them, which is the same as the one that you describe in your letter to NHTSA, is not one which would require issuance of a new title under the laws of those states. We have independently reviewed the information you submitted describing the nature of the transaction, as well as the reasons given by the states for their conclusions that the transaction did not require the issuance of a new title under their laws. We conclude that the conclusions reached by the states regarding the legal status of your proposed transaction are reasonable and well-founded.

The lease company is leasing, rather than selling, the leases it owns in certain vehicles to the trust, which in turn is subleasing that interest back to the lease company. The lease company does not in these transactions relinquish ownership of the vehicle itself, nor does it relinquish ownership of the lease to the end-user. Therefore, there is a reasonable basis for these states to conclude that neither the lease of the

lease to the trust, nor its sublease thereof back to the lease company, are events that constitute a change in ownership interest which would require retitling under their laws.

Therefore, the agency concludes that in the states that have concluded that these events do not require the issuance of a new title, there is no requirement for an odometer disclosure statement either when the leasing company leases its lease to the trust, or when the trust subleases the lease back to the lease company. This opinion is not intended in any way to require, or even suggest, that other states reach the same conclusion as to whether the transaction you describe requires a new title. Whether a transaction involving a motor vehicle requires the issuance of a new title is a matter for each state to decide for itself based on its own laws and regulations governing motor vehicle titling. Accordingly, the conclusions stated herein do not apply to transactions of the type you describe that take place in states other than those that have officially concluded that the transaction does not require retitling.

Your letter is correct in its statement of what the Federal odometer law requires when the trust expires. At that time, the leasing company has the option of whether to buy out the trust's sublease. If it does so, it still retains ownership of the vehicle and the underlying lease to the end-user. Since exercising the option to buy out the lease does not involve a change of ownership, it does not require an odometer disclosure statement. However, if the leasing company does not exercise this option when the sublease expires, the special-purpose trust would take possession of the vehicles and their leases. As your letter correctly points out, this transaction is a change which requires the trust to apply for a new title, which in turn triggers the obligation to comply with all elements of Part 580 that are applicable. This includes both obtaining from the end-user/lessee a disclosure of the odometer mileage in compliance with 49 CFR 580.7, Disclosure of odometer information for leased motor vehicles, as well as the disclosure made by the lease company to the trust pursuant to 49 CFR 580.5.

I hope the information provided above is responsive to your request. If you have any further legal questions concerning the Federal odometer statute and regulations you may address them to this office at the above address, or telephone me at 202-366-9511 or Eileen Leahy, an attorney on my staff, at 202-366-5263.

Sincerely,

John Womack

Acting Chief Counsel

ref:580

d:10/25/96

ID: sues

Mr. James L. Sues
Freedman Seating Company
4545 West Augusta Blvd.
Chicago, IL 60651






Dear Mr. Sues:

This responds to your letter concerning the "Seat performance forward" requirements of S5.1.3 of Standard No. 222, School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection. I regret the delay in this response. You ask about testing a seat that is 444.5 millimeters (mm) (17 inches) wide.

Background
S5.1.3 requires seat backs to deflect in a controlled manner when specified loads are applied in the forward direction. The forces applied to the seat and the energy absorbed by the seat are given as multiples of "W." "W" represents the number of seating positions on a bench seat, and is calculated as the bench width in millimeters divided by 381 and rounded to the nearest whole number (S4.1 of Standard No. 222). For a seat that is 444.5 mm (17 inches) wide, W = 1.

The loads are applied through two loading bars. You ask about the load applied by the upper bar. The upper bar applies a forward horizontal force to the seat back until 452W Joules of energy have been absorbed in deflecting the seat back (S5.1.3.4). Under S5.1.3(a) and (b), "the seat back force/deflection curve shall fall within the zone specified in Figure 1 [of the standard]," and "seat back deflection shall not exceed 356 mm."

Discussion
You ask: "Is it permissible for the force/deflection curve of the W = 1 case to fall outside of the zone specified in Figure 1 provided 452 Joules of energy are absorbed by the seat?"

The answer is no. Figure 1 states: "Seat back force/deflection curve shall not enter shaded areas," i.e., outside of the zone specified in the figure. However, note that in order to meet the energy absorption requirement, a seat back in a school bus does not have to deflect the full 356 mm specified by S5.1.3. The energy absorption requirement will be met as long as the force applied through the upper loading bar and the resultant deflection of the seat back stay within the unshaded area shown in Figure 1 throughout the application of the force during the test, and the resultant energy "absorbed" by the seat is at least 452W Joules after the force applied by the upper bar returns to zero. The force on the upper bar and the deflection of the upper bar returning to zero force after the applied load is released are included in the calculation of applied load, and are not limited by the shaded areas shown in Figure 1. ⁽¹⁾

Your second question asks whether the applied force or the resultant deflection is "the more important parameter." I note that nowhere in Standard No. 222 is there language placing more importance on either the applied force or the resultant deflection. Therefore, both parameters must be satisfied.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel

Enclosure

ref:222
d.9/5/00

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1. We also note that only the "force applied" and the resultant seat back deflection are restricted in Standard No. 222. In a July 30, 1976 interpretation letter to Thomas Built Buses Inc. (copy enclosed), NHTSA noted that any recoil energy returned to the upper loading bar by the seat is not considered to be part of the absorbed energy. Specifically, the letter stated that seats have to "absorb" (i.e., receive without recoil) a specific amount of energy to provide adequate protection: "This value is represented by the amount of energy that is not returned to the loading bar as it is withdrawn. Described graphically, the area that represents returned energy under the seat back force/deflection curve must be subtracted from the entire area that lies under the curve in order to calculate the energy 'absorbed' by the seat back."

ID: sundown.ztv

Mr. Vic R. Cook
Sundown Trailers
HC 61 Box 27
Coleman, OK 73432

Dear Mr. Cook:

This is in reply to your inquiry that was filed on November 14, 2002, in our public docket on the early warning reporting (EWR) rulemaking (49 CFR 579, Subpart C). You have asked five questions with respect to this rule. The first question was:

The one time historical report requires production information for the previous (10) years; make, model, model year and service brake type. Is this correct and if so how should we handle missing information such as service brake type or possibly all information on such units? Do we submit partial information or leave those units out?

Under the one-time historical reporting provisions (Section 579.28(c)), Sundown Trailers (Sundown) must provide data as specified in Section 579.24; i.e., information "with respect to each make, model, and model year of trailer manufactured during the reporting period and the nine model years prior to the earliest model year in the reporting period, including models no longer in production" with respect to information required under Sections 579.24(a) and (c). Under Section 579.24(a), if a trailer model is or has been manufactured with more than one type of service brake system (i.e., hydraulic or air) production information must be reported by each of the two brake types. We do not understand how a manufacturer would not know what type of service brake system was installed on its vehicles. However, we note that in the preamble to the July 10, 2002, final rule (67 FR at 45859), we stated that "if a medium-heavy vehicle, bus, or trailer has a type of service brake system not readily characterized as an air or hydraulic brake system . . ., the manufacturer should indicate hydraulic service brakes on its report (Code 03)." This would also apply to any "unknown" type of service brake system.

The one-time historical report required by Section 579.28(c) also involves furnishing information with respect to warranty claims and field reports for a specified three-year period. Your second question was related to the first, how should Sundown treat warranty and field reports where certain required information is "missing." This information presumably would be identification of the system or component covered by the warranty claim or field report, specified by codes 02 through 21 in Section 579.24(b)(2), or a fire (code 23). We do not understand why this information would be missing, since it would be specified in the warranty data or on the field report. We note, however, that neither Section 579.24 nor Section 579.28(c) establish a code number for reporting where the system or component is unknown. However, if the component or system involved is not specified in such codes, and the incident did not involve a fire, Section 579.24(c) specifies that "no reporting is necessary." Your third question concerned field reports: "if they do not fall in any of the listed categories we are not required to list them?" That is correct; as noted above, if the component or system involved is not specified in such codes, and the incident did not involve a fire, Section 579.24(c) specifies that "no reporting is necessary."

Your fourth question also related to field reports: "we are to submit in conjunction with require data full reports of each entry. What format will be required? Will there be option for more than one?" I assume that this refers to non-dealer reports. As specified in Section 579.29(b), documents "may be submitted in digital form . . . or as an attachment to an e-mail message . . . ." However, this section also provides that "such documents may be submitted in paper form." Please note that we anticipate establishing a naming convention for field reports which will be set forth in the near future on the Office of Defects Investigation website.

Finally, you asked "what is a manufacturer to do if they either have no internet capabilities or have nothing more than a regular phone line service in their area? I understand that they cannot submit their report by mail." The regulations include vehicle production thresholds such that relatively small vehicle manufacturers will not be required to report, except as to claims and notices for incidents involving death (and injuries in an incident involving death). A small manufacturer that produces a quality product should expect few if any of these claims. In any event, a regular phone line will support internet access. A manufacturer could use an internet connection at a public facility, such as a library. In view of the number of manufacturers covered by the EWR regulations, and the volume of reports and data that they are required to provide, the only practicable way for NHTSA to receive these submissions is through standardized reporting templates on the NHTSA website transmitted electronically into the agencys central data repository.

If you have any questions, you may call Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:579
d.4/30/03

ID: Supreme_intl

Ms. Melissa A. Burt
Foley & Lardner, LLP
3000 K Street, NW, Suite 500
Washington, DC 20007-5143

Dear Ms. Burt:

This responds to your letter on behalf of your client, Supreme International Limited (Supreme). Supreme manufactures a Truck Mount Feed Processor, which is a livestock feed mixer mounted on a truck. You ask if the product is a "motor vehicle" subject to regulation by this agency. As explained below, our answer is yes.

You state that the Truck Mount Feed Processor is sold exclusively through farm equipment dealers and is not advertised for on-road use. You state that most of these vehicles never leave a farm after retail purchase, and that the vehicles travel on public roads on rare occasions for the purpose of transiting between farm locations or to obtain grain from a commodity barn. However, you also state that purchasers of these vehicles can obtain a certificate of title to permit registration and licensing under State motor vehicle laws.

Chapter 301 of Title 49 of the U.S. Code ("the Safety Act") authorizes the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to establish Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) applicable to new motor vehicles. Section 30102(a)(6) of that chapter defines "motor vehicle" as:

[A] vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, but does not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line.

We have issued a number of letters addressing this language. We have stated that vehicles equipped with tracks, agricultural equipment, and other vehicles incapable of highway travel are not motor vehicles. We have also determined that certain vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use (e.g. , airport runway vehicles and underground mining vehicles) are not motor vehicles, even if they may be operationally capable of

highway travel. Also, vehicles are not motor vehicles if they were designed to be used primarily at off-road job sites and, although capable of being operated on public roads from one job site to another, their on-road use is only incidental to the primary purpose for which they were manufactured (e.g. , mobile cranes).

We would consider the feed mixer to be a "motor vehicle" for the purposes of our FMVSSs and regulations. The Truck Mount Feed Processors on-road use would be more than incidental. An incomplete motor vehicle (i.e. , a chassis cab) is used in its manufacture and, as you state, Supreme completes the vehicle in accordance with the incomplete vehicle document supplied by the chassis-cab manufacturer and can certify the vehicle as complying with the FMVSSs. No part of the manufacturing process alters the chassis cab such that its final configuration is limited to off-road use. You state that the vehicles may travel on public roads when traveling between farm locations or to obtain grain from a commodity barn. You also state that purchasers of these vehicles can obtain a certificate of title to permit registration and licensing as motor vehicles under State laws. Given these factors, we conclude that the vehicles are motor vehicles for purposes of the Safety Act.

If you have any additional questions, please contact Mr. Chris Calamita of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:567
d.1/12/05

ID: Supreme_intl_reconsidered

Ms. Melissa A. Burt
Foley & Lardner, LLP
Attorneys at Law
3000 K Street, NW, Suite 500
Washington, DC 20007-5143




Dear Ms. Burt:

This responds to your recent letters on behalf of your client, Supreme International Limited (Supreme), asking us to reconsider our January 12, 2005, letter to you concerning whether your clients Truck Mount Feed Processor ("TMFP") is a motor vehicle. You wrote us on January 28, 2005, and on February 15 and 16, following telephone conferences with my staff. (The February 16 letter corrected the letter sent the previous day.)In our January 12, 2005, letter we concluded that the facts indicated that the TMFP should be considered a motor vehicle for purposes of our regulations. After considering the information you provided in your follow-on letters, we have reconsidered our earlier determination and conclude that the TMFP is not a motor vehicle.

We made the determination in our earlier letter that the TMFP was a motor vehicle based on several factors. We believed that the vehicles on-road use would be more than incidental, as your original letter indicated that some portion of TMFPs in fact traverse public roads when traveling between "the feed barn and the livestock". Your follow-on letters clarified that the TMFP is used "to transport grain or other feed only on a farm from the silo or barn where the farmer stores his grain to the field" and that "[g]rain is delivered to the farmers farm by other means". You also state that the vast majority of TMFPs spend no time on the public roads, and that the on-road use "is, in the vast majority of cases, limited to crossing from one field to another". You further state that when Supreme sells a TMFP to a customer, the TMFP is usually shipped via flatbed truck to the customer.

Another factor that we had weighed from your original letter was that it appeared that the vehicle had all the features of a truck, could be certified (according to your letter) as meeting all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards, and did not have features that would distinguish the vehicle as not intended for on-road use. You provided information in your follow-on letters that shows that the vehicles are specially designed for their off-road purpose. The vehicles suspension can handle the weight of a mixer unit loaded with feed on rough and muddy terrain. The truck has a lower speed differential of 7.17 than that of on-road vehicles, which slows down the TMFP so that the vehicle can travel at very low speeds (1 to 2 miles per hour) to ensure a proper distribution of feed to the cattle. Further, the vehicles engine must be equipped with a front or rear end power takeoff that can run the mixers machinery in the farmers field.

Last, we considered the information you provided in your original letter that purchasers of the vehicles may request a certificate of title so that the TMFP can be registered and licensed under the motor vehicle laws of their respective States. You explained in your follow-on letters that for every ten TMFPs sold, Supreme will usually receive a request for one or two titles and that half of the requests for titles that Supreme receives comes from financial institutions needing a title for loan purposes. You estimate that probably 95 percent of the vehicles sold are never driven on public roads, even incidentally.

In consideration of the information you have provided in your follow-on letters, we now conclude that the TMFP is not a motor vehicle for purposes of our regulations. We believe that the TMFP is a type of farm equipment that is not manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways. It is thus excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle".

If you have any additional questions, please contact us at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:567
d.3/21/05

ID: surface_area_AGF

Mr. Gerald Plante
Governmental Affairs
Subaru of America, Inc.
P.O. Box 6000
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034-6000

Dear Mr. Plante:

This responds to your March 14, 2003, letter and e-mail and phone conversations with George Feygin of my staff concerning certain parts marking requirements found in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administrations (NHTSAs) Federal Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard, 49 CFR Part 541. The standard requires manufacturers to designate a "target area" on certain vehicle parts upon which identifying numbers are to be marked. You ask whether the surface area used in the "target area" computation is the overall surface area of a part, even if the part is multidimensional, such as an engine. The answer is yes.

By way of background, the target area designation requirement found in Part 541 was adopted under the Motor Vehicle Theft Law Enforcement Act of 1984. The purpose of the target area requirement was to facilitate quick identification checks by law enforcement personnel, where vehicles or vehicle parts are under suspicion of being stolen. The standard requires vehicle manufacturers to designate "target areas" where identifying numbers would be marked. These designations are then submitted to NHTSA and placed in the public docket. The information tells law enforcement personnel where to look for the identifying numbers and thus expedites the parts markings verification process.

Section 541.5(e)(1) requires a manufacturer to designate a "target area" on certain original vehicle parts, upon which identifying numbers are to be marked. That section also states: "The target area shall not exceed 50 percent of the surface area on the surface of the part on which the target area is located." Similarly, 541.6(e)(1) requires a manufacturer to designate a separate "target area" on certain replacement parts. That section states: "Such target areas shall not exceed 25 percent of the surface area of the surface on which the replacement part marking will appear." The original and replacement vehicle parts that must be marked are identified in 541.5(a) and 541.6(a), respectively.

In establishing Part 541, NHTSA originally proposed a target area for each vehicle part identified in 541.5(a) and 541.6(a) to be just 25 cm². Due to the industry comments on the restrictive nature of a 25 cm² target area, the final rule issued on October 24, 1985 (50 FR 43166), established the target area requirement for original parts of not more than 50% of the total surface area of a given vehicle part upon which the marking would appear. For replacement parts, the target area requirement was set at not more than 25% of the total surface area of a given vehicle part upon which the marking would appear.

The preamble to the final rule is silent as to the computation method for the target area. The regulatory text, however, is straightforward.

In the absence of any contrary guidance from the preamble, our answer is that the surface area used in the target area computation is the overall surface area of a specific vehicle part. We recognize that in the case of a multidimensional vehicle part such as an engine, the overall surface area may be difficult to calculate. We note, however, that the standard only requires that the target area not exceed 50% of the surface area, and does not prohibit designating a smaller portion of a surface area as the target area. Therefore, manufacturers are afforded a fair amount of flexibility in designating target areas. For example, a manufacturer can designate a much smaller target area located at a specific place and on a specific side of the engine. If the designated target area is obviously smaller than 50% of the overall surface area, there is no need for a precise calculation of the overall surface area.

As per our requirements, manufacturers submit their target area information to NHTSA. This information is publicly available through our Docket Management System at http://dms.dot.gov/. An examination of manufacturers submissions to the docket reveals that the majority of the manufacturers indeed avoid precise calculations of the overall surface areas for a given vehicle part, and instead choose to designate smaller target areas.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mr. Feygin at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:541
d.4/11/03