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Interpretations Date

ID: aiam5470

Open
Mr. Forbes Howard Goodlife Motors Corporation Route 3, Box 250-5 Boone, North Carolina 28607; Mr. Forbes Howard Goodlife Motors Corporation Route 3
Box 250-5 Boone
North Carolina 28607;

"Dear Mr. Howard: This responds to your request for an interpretatio whether the 'super golf car' your company is developing is a motor vehicle subject to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). As explained below, since your golf car does not have an unusual configuration and is designed to attain speeds in excess of 20 miles per hour for use on the public roads, we would consider your golf car to be a motor vehicle. In your letter to us, you stated that your company's super golf cars 'will have a top speed of 29 miles per hour.' You enclosed three photographs, each of 'one model of our vehicles.' One photograph shows a man sitting in the driver's seat. The size of the man in relation to the golf car makes it appear that the golf car is somewhat smaller than compact passenger cars. The styling of your golf car is not unlike that of the prototype Volkswagen Concept 1 car, unveiled by Volkswagen at the January 1994 Detroit Auto Show. (Automotive News article with photograph of car enclosed.) Unlike conventional golf carts with straight sides, the sides of your golf cars are curved, resembling passenger cars. The photographs of all three golf cars show a raked windshield, with a single windshield wiper, front headlights, two seats, and four wheels. At least one outside rearview mirror is shown on each golf car. Two golf cars have side doors. The third has no doors. Two golf cars have no roof or other overhead cover. The third includes what appears to be a removable top, similar to that on a convertible automobile. Based on conversations between you and Dorothy Nakama of my staff, it appears that you expect that purchasers would use your 'super golf cars' to travel regularly on the public roads. In this connection, we note that you mentioned that Arizona has registered more than 23,000 golf carts for on-road use. Arizona officials have informed us that these golf carts must have motorcycle license plates. The FMVSS apply to 'motor vehicles,' within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(6). 'Motor vehicle' is defined at section 30102(a)(6) as: a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, but does not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line. In past interpretation letters, NHTSA has stated that vehicles that regularly use the public roads will not be considered 'motor vehicles' if such vehicles have an abnormal configuration that readily distinguishes them from other vehicles and have a maximum attainable speed of 20 miles per hour or less. Applying these criteria to your products, we note that the 'super golf cars' do not have an unusual configuration, making them readily distinguishable from other motor vehicles on the road. The styling and features of your 'super golf cars' make them resemble the prototype Volkswagen passenger car. Although the golf cars may be smaller than passenger cars, we cannot say that the golf cars are significantly smaller. Further, while the weight of your vehicles (1,100 lbs. for the electric 'super golf car' and 950 lbs. for the gas powered 'super golf car') is less than that of most, if not all, current passenger cars, low weight alone is insufficient to prevent a vehicle from being regarded as a 'motor vehicle.' At one time, NHTSA excluded small motor vehicles, i.e., those whose curb weight was 1,000 lbs. or less, from the application of our safety standards. However, that exclusion was rescinded in a final rule published May 16, 1973 (38 FR 12808)(copy enclosed). Moreover, you have stated your golf cars can attain a maximum speed of 29 miles per hour (mph). Twenty nine mph significantly exceeds 20 mph, the maximum speed at which NHTSA has stated that a vehicle designed to travel on the public roads would not be considered a 'motor vehicle.' Twenty nine mph is also almost the same speed (30 mph) specified for some compliance testing of passenger cars for such FMVSS as Standard No. 301, Fuel system integrity and Standard No. 208, Occupant crash protection. For these reasons, we conclude that the 'super golf car' as described above is a 'motor vehicle' subject to all applicable FMVSS. As a manufacturer of a motor vehicle, you have several options. One is, of course, to comply with the current safety standards. Another is to petition the agency to amend the current standards so as to accommodate any special compliance problems that a small car might experience. In the 1973 finalrule terminating the exclusion of lightweight vehicles, NHTSA stated that a manufacturer has the option of petitioning for amendment of any standard it feels is impracticable or inappropriate for lightweight vehicles. Finally, you may have the option of petitioning for temporary exemption from one or more standards upon one of the bases provided in 49 U.S.C. 30113 General exemptions. The petitioning procedure is described in NHTSA's regulations at 49 CFR part 555 Temporary Exemption from Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. You should understand that exemptions are primarily granted as an interim measure to give small manufacturers a chance to come into compliance. You should also understand that exemptions are typically given for only a select number of the standards applicable to an exempted vehicle. Across-the-board exemptions from all standards have not been granted. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Philip R. Recht Chief Counsel Enclosures";

ID: aiam5658

Open
Jane Thornton Mastrucci, Esq. Thornton, Mastrucci & Sinclair 4699 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, FL 33146-2188; Jane Thornton Mastrucci
Esq. Thornton
Mastrucci & Sinclair 4699 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Coral Gables
FL 33146-2188;

"Dear Ms. Mastrucci: This responds to your request for a interpretation as to which passenger vehicles and which multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs) meet the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs). You ask this since Florida law allows transportation of pupils in MPVs that meet 'all federal motor vehicle safety standards for passenger cars.' As explained below, in recent years many of the FMVSSs have been amended to have the same requirements for passenger cars and MPVs. However where differences exist, the only way your client, Dade County School Board, will be able to determine that a specific MPV meets the FMVSSs applicable to passenger cars would be to contact the vehicle's manufacturer. NHTSA is authorized under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 Motor Vehicle Safety to issue FMVSSs for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. The FMVSSs are codified at Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 571. There are presently 53 FMVSSs. Each FMVSS's applicability section specifies the motor vehicles and/or equipment to which it applies. Under 49 U.S.C. section 30112, a person may not manufacture or sell any motor vehicle unless the vehicle meets all applicable FMVSSs and is so certified. Section 30115 establishes a self-certification system whereby the vehicle manufacturer is responsible for certifying that the vehicle meets the safety requirements in the standards applicable to the vehicle. In the certification, the manufacturer must specify the vehicle type (e.g., passenger car, MPV, truck, bus) of the vehicle. Each vehicle type's definition is found at 49 CFR Part 571.3 Definitions. Thus, a new passenger car sold in the U.S. must be certified by the manufacturer as meeting the FMVSSs applicable to passenger cars, and a new MPV must be certified as meeting the standards applicable to MPVs. In recent years, many FMVSSs have been amended to specify the same requirements for passenger cars and MPVs. For example, for model year 1998 vehicles, Standard No. 208, Occupant crash protection will specify identical requirements for passenger cars and MPVs. For Standard No. 214, Side impact protection, in July 1995, NHTSA issued a final rule in which MPVs manufactured after September 1, 1998 would be required to meet the same dynamic testing requirements as passenger cars. However, some safety standards that apply to both passenger cars and MPVs do not specify identical requirements for each vehicle type. For example, Standard No. 103 Windshield defrosting and defogging systems applies to passenger cars and MPVs, but specifies different requirements for each vehicle type. There is no easy way to determine whether a particular MPV meets the passenger car safety standards. Because of differences in FMVSS requirements for passenger cars and MPVs, for information whether a particular MPV meets the passenger car standards, you should contact the MPV's manufacturer. Please note that for some safety standards such as Standard No. 208, a manufacturer may have phased-in the compliance of its MPVs with the safety standard over several years. Therefore, some MPVs manufactured in a particular year may meet the newer standard but other MPVs may not. For information about whether a specific MPV meets the passenger car standards, the manufacturer should be provided with the MPV's seventeen digit vehicle identification number (VIN), which can be found on the vehicle's certification label on the hinge pillar, the door-latch post, or the door edge that meets the door-latch post, next to the driver's seating position. I hope this information is helpful. If you need any further information, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Samuel J. Dubbin Chief Counsel";

ID: aiam3690

Open
Mr. F. Michael Petler, Head, Administration, Government Relations Department, Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 3251 E. Imperial Highway, Brea, CA 92621; Mr. F. Michael Petler
Head
Administration
Government Relations Department
Suzuki Motor Co.
Ltd.
3251 E. Imperial Highway
Brea
CA 92621;

Dear Mr. Petler: This responds to your recent letter requesting information concernin the requirements for seat belt anchorages in passenger cars under Safety Standard No. 210. Specifically, you ask whether only Type 1 seat belt anchorages are required in rear seating positions in passenger cars.; The answer to your question is no. Under paragraph S4.1.1 of standar 210, Type 2 seat belt anchorages (for combination lap and shoulder belts) are required as follows: at each front and rear forward-facing outboard designated seating position in passenger cars other than convertibles, and at each front forward-facing outboard designated seating position in vehicles other than passenger cars where Type 2 belts are required by Safety Standard No. 208. All other seating positions in both passenger cars and other vehicles may be equipped with anchorages for either Type 2 belts or Type 1 belts (lap belts). Safety Standard No. 208, *Occupant Crash Protection*, requires Type 2 belts only in *front* outboard designated seating positions in passenger cars, but passenger cars still must be equipped with anchorages for Type 2 belts in rear outboard designated seating positions.; As to your reference to discussion of anchorages in the agency' November 2, 1981 denial notice to Toyo Kogyo (46 FR 54391), that discussion was misleading because it did not provide complete information or distinguish adequately between passenger cars and other types of vehicles. The agency intended to refer to the type of belts required by Safety Standard No. 208, i.e., Type 2 belts in front outboard designated seating positions and Type 1 belts in front center and all rear seating positions.; I hope this has clarified any misunderstanding you may have ha concerning the anchorage requirements. Please contact Hugh Oates of my staff if you have any further questions (202-426- 2992).; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel

ID: aiam4785

Open
Mr. William T. Mullen Undersheriff of McHenry County, Illinois 2200 N. Seminary Ave. Woodstock, IL 60098; Mr. William T. Mullen Undersheriff of McHenry County
Illinois 2200 N. Seminary Ave. Woodstock
IL 60098;

"Dear Mr. Mullen: This responds to your letter asking about Federa requirements for safety belts in police cars. Specifically, you asked if your police department could legally remove the automatic belts that are installed and replace them with manual lap/shoulder safety belts. You stated that the reasons for making such a substitution would be to alleviate two problems your police officers have experienced with the automatic belts that were not present in older models that had manual lap/shoulder belts at the front seating positions. First, you said that the automatic belts result in a blind spot on the driver's left side. Second, you said that the automatic belts 'prevent left arm movements' of your taller officers. I appreciate this opportunity to respond to your concerns. I have enclosed copies of two previous letters we have written on the subject of removing or replacing occupant protection features from police cars. The first of these is a July 29, 1985 letter to Corporal Frank Browne and the other is a May 25, 1989 letter to Senator Harry Reid. These letters explain that new vehicles purchased by police departments must be certified as complying with the occupant crash protection standard (Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208). All cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1989 must provide automatic crash protection for front seat occupants. To date, manufacturers have provided automatic crash protection either by installing air bags or automatic safety belts. General Motors, the manufacturer of the police cars in question, has chosen to comply with the requirement for automatic crash protection by installing automatic safety belts in these cars. Federal law prohibits any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business from replacing the automatic belts in these police cars with manual lap/shoulder belts. Thus, none of these commercial entities could make such a replacement on behalf of the County without violating Federal law. However, Federal law does not prohibit individual vehicle owners from removing safety features from their own vehicles. Thus, McHenry County itself can replace the automatic belts in its own cars without violating any Federal law, just as any resident of McHenry County can remove any safety equipment they like from their own vehicles without violating any Federal laws. Such actions may, however, violate the laws of the State of Illinois. I recommend that you carefully consider the effects of replacing the automatic belts in your police cars, even though Federal law does not prohibit the County itself from making these modifications to its own vehicles. The automatic belts in these cars help to assure safety belt use by police officers on the job. Particularly since the McHenry County police officers face the possibility of becoming involved in high speed pursuit situations, we believe it is important that they use safety belts for effective protection in case of a crash. If you decide to replace the automatic belts in these vehicles with manual lap/shoulder belts, we would urge you to take some actions to assure that the police officers will use the manual lap/shoulder belts every time they ride in the police cars. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need some additional information on this subject, please let me know. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel Enclosures";

ID: aiam4784

Open
Mr. William T. Mullen Undersheriff of McHenry County, Illinois 2200 N. Seminary Ave. Woodstock, IL 60098; Mr. William T. Mullen Undersheriff of McHenry County
Illinois 2200 N. Seminary Ave. Woodstock
IL 60098;

"Dear Mr. Mullen: This responds to your letter asking about Federa requirements for safety belts in police cars. Specifically, you asked if your police department could legally remove the automatic belts that are installed and replace them with manual lap/shoulder safety belts. You stated that the reasons for making such a substitution would be to alleviate two problems your police officers have experienced with the automatic belts that were not present in older models that had manual lap/shoulder belts at the front seating positions. First, you said that the automatic belts result in a blind spot on the driver's left side. Second, you said that the automatic belts 'prevent left arm movements' of your taller officers. I appreciate this opportunity to respond to your concerns. I have enclosed copies of two previous letters we have written on the subject of removing or replacing occupant protection features from police cars. The first of these is a July 29, 1985 letter to Corporal Frank Browne and the other is a May 25, 1989 letter to Senator Harry Reid. These letters explain that new vehicles purchased by police departments must be certified as complying with the occupant crash protection standard (Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208). All cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1989 must provide automatic crash protection for front seat occupants. To date, manufacturers have provided automatic crash protection either by installing air bags or automatic safety belts. General Motors, the manufacturer of the police cars in question, has chosen to comply with the requirement for automatic crash protection by installing automatic safety belts in these cars. Federal law prohibits any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business from replacing the automatic belts in these police cars with manual lap/shoulder belts. Thus, none of these commercial entities could make such a replacement on behalf of the County without violating Federal law. However, Federal law does not prohibit individual vehicle owners from removing safety features from their own vehicles. Thus, McHenry County itself can replace the automatic belts in its own cars without violating any Federal law, just as any resident of McHenry County can remove any safety equipment they like from their own vehicles without violating any Federal laws. Such actions may, however, violate the laws of the State of Illinois. I recommend that you carefully consider the effects of replacing the automatic belts in your police cars, even though Federal law does not prohibit the County itself from making these modifications to its own vehicles. The automatic belts in these cars help to assure safety belt use by police officers on the job. Particularly since the McHenry County police officers face the possibility of becoming involved in high speed pursuit situations, we believe it is important that they use safety belts for effective protection in case of a crash. If you decide to replace the automatic belts in these vehicles with manual lap/shoulder belts, we would urge you to take some actions to assure that the police officers will use the manual lap/shoulder belts every time they ride in the police cars. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need some additional information on this subject, please let me know. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel Enclosures";

ID: aiam5358

Open
Lance Tunick, Esq. Bugatti 1919 Mount Zion Golden, CO 80401; Lance Tunick
Esq. Bugatti 1919 Mount Zion Golden
CO 80401;

"Dear Mr. Tunick: This responds to your letter concerning low volum CAFE exemptions. I apologize for the delay in our response. You asked whether Bugatti Automobili S.p.A. (Bugatti) and Lotus Cars, Ltd. (Lotus), both of which are controlled by the same holding company, may submit separate low volume CAFE exemption petitions requesting two separate alternative standards. As discussed below, the answer to this question is no. Since any alternative CAFE standard would apply to Bugatti and Lotus together, a single combined petition must be submitted for a single alternative standard. According to your letter and a separate one received from Lotus, General Motors sold Lotus to Bugatti International Holding, SA, in August 1993. That holding company also controls Bugatti, which is planning to enter the U.S. market in the near future. Lotus and Bugatti intend to submit petitions for low volume CAFE exemptions. Moreover, the joint annual production of Bugatti and Lotus is far below the 10,000 vehicles per year eligibility threshold for low volume CAFE exemptions. In a telephone conversation with Edward Glancy of my staff, you indicated that Lotus cars are imported by Lotus USA. You also indicated that Bugatti cars could be imported by Lotus USA, or could be imported by a new company that would be established by Bugatti, e.g., 'Bugatti USA.' Finally, you indicated that Lotus USA is not in a control relationship with any other auto manufacturers. In addressing whether Bugatti and Lotus would be eligible for two separate standards, I will begin by identifying the statutory provisions which are relevant to determining who manufactures the vehicles at issue. Under section 501(8) of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, '(t)he term 'manufacturer' means any person engaged in the business of manufacturing automobiles.' Under section 501(9), '(t)he term 'manufacture' (except for purposes of section 502(c)) means to produce in the customs territory of the United States, or to import.' Under section 501(10), '(t)he term 'import' means to import into the customs territory of the United States.' Under these sections, the company which imports foreign-built cars into the United States is the manufacturer of those automobiles. Thus, if Lotus USA imported Lotus cars and Bugatti cars, Lotus USA, rather than Bugatti Automobili S.p.A. and Lotus Cars, Ltd., would be considered the manufacturer of those vehicles for CAFE purposes. Since Lotus USA would be the manufacturer of all the vehicles under this scenario, and CAFE standards apply to all passenger automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer, there would be no basis for Bugatti and Lotus to request two separate standards. Instead, a single alternative standard would need to be requested for Lotus USA, which would cover all automobiles imported by that company. This result would not change if Bugatti established a new company, Bugatti USA, for importing cars into the U.S. This is because of the operation of section 503(c), which provides that any reference to 'automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer' is deemed to include all automobiles manufactured by persons who control, are controlled by, or are under common control with, such manufacturer. Since Lotus USA and Bugatti USA would presumably be under common control (traced back to Bugatti International Holding, SA), their fleets would be combined for CAFE purposes. Since many of the arguments you raise in your letter are relevant to this type of scenario, i.e., one in which Lotus and Bugatti cars would be considered to be manufactured by manufacturers within a control relationship, I will assume it for the rest of this letter. As you noted in your letter, NHTSA addressed the issue of how alternative CAFE standards apply to manufacturers within a control relationship in a July 1991 decision concerning low volume exemption petitions submitted by Ferrari. Ferrari and Alfa Romeo were under the common control of Fiat. We stated the following: Because of the operation of section 503(c), Ferrari and Alfa Romeo are in essence the same manufacturer for purposes of CAFE standards. As discussed below, under section 502, the same CAFE standard should apply to both manufacturers together. This is true for both generally applicable standards and alternative standards. Section 502(a), in setting forth the generally applicable standard, specifies a standard for 'passenger automobiles manufactured by any manufacturer.' Section 502(c)(1), in setting forth requirements relating to low volume exemptions, specifies that such exemptions may not be granted unless the Secretary establishes, by rule, alternative average fuel economy standards for 'passenger automobiles manufactured by manufacturers' which receive exemptions under this subsection. Under 503(c)(1), any reference to 'automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer' is deemed to include all automobiles manufactured by persons who control, are controlled by, or are under common control with, such manufacturer. Thus, any CAFE standard which applies to Ferrari should apply to Ferrari and Alfa Romeo together. Therefore, granting Ferrari a low volume exemption in MY 1988 would create a paradox, since Alfa Romeo is indisputably not eligible (given its own worldwide production) for an exemption. A similar paradox would arise in the context of determining compliance with the statute. Under section 503(a), neither manufacturer may have an independent CAFE value. Instead, by operation of section 503(c), they share a CAFE value that is based on the total volume of cars imported by both companies. Thus, a decision to grant an exemption to Ferrari while applying the generally applicable standard to Alfa Romeo would cause compliance enforcement difficulties by compelling the agency to try to compare a combined CAFE value to separate CAFE standards. 56 FR 31461, July 10, 1991. You argued in your letter that, because of factual differences, the Ferrari/Alfa analysis should not be applied to the Bugatti/Lotus situation, and Bugatti and Lotus should be permitted to submit separate low volume CAFE exemption petitions requesting two separate alternative standards. While we agree that there are factual differences, e.g., Ferrari and Alfa Romeo together produced too many vehicles to meet the eligibility threshold while Bugatti and Lotus do not, the situations are identical with respect to the issue of how CAFE standards apply to manufacturers within a control relationship. In particular, since Lotus USA and Bugatti USA would be under common control and because of the operation of section 503(c), the two companies would in essence be the same manufacturer for purposes of CAFE standards. Any alternative standard issued under section 502 would apply to the two companies together. Moreover, neither manufacturer would have an independent CAFE value under section 503(a). Instead, by operation of section 503(c), they would share a CAFE value that is based on the total volume of cars imported by both companies. Therefore, the same CAFE standard would necessarily apply to the two companies together. You raised several other objections in your letter. First, you stated that the CAFE statute provides that 'a manufacturer' may submit a petition for a CAFE exemption, and a joint petition would not fall within this provision. In fact, any one of the related companies (Lotus, Lotus USA, Bugatti, the Bugatti U.S. subsidiary, or the holding company) could submit a petition on behalf of the combined companies. However, any such petition would apply to the combined fleet of both Bugatti USA and Lotus USA. You also stated that combining two small companies together would muddy the question of the best fuel economy that each company is capable of achieving. However, NHTSA would simply assess the 'maximum feasible average fuel economy level' that could be achieved by the combined Bugatti/Lotus fleet. We recognize that this level would be dependent on assumptions about the relative volumes of Bugatti USA and Lotus USA. However, the agency needs to take this factor into account in assessing the capability of any manufacturer which produces vehicles with varying fuel economy values. Finally, you stated that if a joint alternative standard was established, NHTSA would face a difficult enforcement situation in the event of a failure to comply with the standard. You asked how the agency would divide the civil penalties. It is our opinion that Lotus USA and Bugatti USA would be jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the civil penalty, although we would permit the two companies to divide the penalty between themselves. I would like to address two other issues that are raised by the factual situation described in your letter: (1) the immediate eligibility of Bugatti/Lotus given that Lotus was owned by General Motors until August 1993, and (2) the timing of petitions for low volume exemptions. As you know, section 502(c)(1) specifies that low volume exemptions are only available for manufacturers 'who manufactured ... fewer than 10,000 passenger automobiles in the second model year preceding the model year for which the application is made....' (Emphasis added.) During the time that Lotus was owned by General Motors, the combined companies manufactured far more than 10,000 vehicles. It is our opinion that Lotus does not have to wait two years from the date it ceased being in a control relationship with General Motors to be eligible, given the circumstances described above. In particular, we believe that the requirement that a manufacturer have manufactured fewer than 10,000 passenger automobiles in the second model year preceding the model year for which the application is made was intended to address varying production levels (above and below 10,000) and not a situation where a small manufacturer such as Lotus is sold by a large manufacturer. With respect to the timing of petitions, NHTSA's regulations at 49 CFR 525.6, Requirements for petition, state that petitions from low volume manufacturers for alternative fuel economy standards must be 'submitted not later than 24 months before the beginning of the affected model year, unless good cause for later submission is shown.' Clearly, the deadline for a timely submission for model years 1994-96 has passed. On the issue of 'good cause' for a later submission, we note that Lotus was not sold by General Motors until August 1993, and both Lotus and Bugatti requested our opinion concerning submitting a petition within three months of that sale. Under the circumstances, we conclude that, Lotus/Bugatti have, to date, taken reasonable measures to submit a petition in as timely a manner as possible. Therefore, if a petition that meets the requirements of 49 CFR Part 525 is submitted promptly after receipt of this letter, we will consider there to be good cause shown for submitting a late petition for model years 1994-96. I also note that a petition for model year 1997 would be due later this year. I hope this information is helpful. If there are any questions, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel";

ID: aiam4017

Open
Mr. K. Douglas Scribner, President, Mini City Ltd., 876 Turk Hill Road, Fairport, NY 14450; Mr. K. Douglas Scribner
President
Mini City Ltd.
876 Turk Hill Road
Fairport
NY 14450;

Dear Mr. Scribner: This responds to your recent letter seeking an interpretation o Standard No. 109, *New Pneumatic Tires--Passenger Cars* (49 CFR S571.109). Specifically, you were interested in learning whether that standard applies to tires for use on 'antique and classic automobiles.' You stated that your firm deals in tires which are authentic replacement tires for antique and classic cars, and that none of those tires has ever been marked with a DOT number. Standard No. 109 requires that all new pneumatic tires for use on passenger cars manufactured after 1948 be marked with DOT numbers, among other things, and there is no exception to this requirement for tires designed for 'classic' cars.; It is unclear when you refer to a 'DOT number' whether you ar referring to just the tire identification number, which is required to appear on all new tires for use on passenger cars manufactured after 1948 by 49 CFR Part 574, *Tire Identification and Recordkeeping*, or that identification number together with the symbol 'DOT.' The DOT symbol is a certification by the tire manufacturer that the tire complies with all the requirements of Standard No. 109. I have enclosed copies of both Standard No. 109 and Part 574 for your information.; In any event, Standard No. 109 applies to *all* new pneumatic tires fo use on passenger cars manufactured after 1948. Section S4.3.1 of the standard requires the DOT symbol to be permanently marked on the tire, while section S4.3.2 requires the tire identification number assigned to a manufacturer in accordance with Part 574 to be permanently marked on the tire. Standard No. 109 contains no provisions making an exception to these requirements.; Accordingly, if the antique and classic cars to which you refer wer manufactured in or before 1948, the tires are not subject to Standard No. 109 or Part 574. Sale of such tires would not violate any of this agency's requirements.; If, however, the tires are designed for use on cars manufactured afte 1948, the tires must comply with all requirements of Standard No. 109, including the requirements to have a DOT symbol and a tire identification number marked permanently on the sidewall. If you sell tires which are subject to, but do not comply with, the requirements of Standard No. 109, you would violate section 108(a)(1)(A) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)). Section 109 of that Act (15 U.S.C. 1398) specifies a maximum civil penalty of $1,000 for each violation of section 108, and this agency would consider each sale of a noncomplying tire to be a separate violation.; If you need any further information on this subject, please contac Steve Kratzke of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 426-2992.; Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel

ID: aiam4496

Open
Mr. Alberto Negro Director Fiat Research & Development -- U.S.A. Branch Parklane Towers West Suite 1210 Dearborn, MI 48126; Mr. Alberto Negro Director Fiat Research & Development -- U.S.A. Branch Parklane Towers West Suite 1210 Dearborn
MI 48126;

"Dear Mr. Negro: This responds both to your revised report, date January 20, 1988, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. Part 585, on behalf of Alfa Lancia Industriale S.p.A. (Alfa Romeo), covering compliance with the automatic restraint 'phase-in' requirements during the 1987 production year, and to your February 4, 1988, letter to Stephen Wood, our Assistant Chief Counsel for Rulemaking, seeking an interpretation of Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208). Specifically, your question concerns whether Fiat may exclude automatic restraint-equipped convertibles from its determinations of annual production for the purpose of calculating the number of passenger cars that must comply with the automatic restraints requirements during the phase-in period. Alfa Romeo, a subsidiary of Fiat, equipped some of its convertibles with automatic restraints during the 1987 model year, and Fiat counted those convertibles toward satisfying the requirement that 10 percent of 1987 production year cars be equipped with automatic restraints. You stated in your February 4 letter that you need clarification of whether Standard No. 208 permits you to exclude from your annual production calculations those convertibles that were equipped with automatic restraints and that were counted in determining whether the requisite percentage of production complied with the automatic restraint requirements. In other words, you wish to know whether Fiat may 'count' Alfa Romeo convertibles equipped with automatic seat belts for the purpose of satisfying the 10% 'phase-in' requirement for production year 1987, found at S4.1.3.1.2 of Standard No. 208, while excluding those same convertibles from the annual vehicle production calculations covering the 1987 production year. The answer to your question is that Standard No. 208 does not allow Fiat to exclude from its annual production calculations any convertibles that comply with the automatic restraint requirements set forth in S4.1.2.1 of the standard. Section S4.1.3.1.2 of Standard No. 208 specifies the amount of passenger cars that must comply with the automatic restraint requirements of S4.1.2.1 shall be not less than 10 percent of either the manufacturer's average annual production between September 1, 1983, and August 31, 1986, or the manufacturer's annual production between September 1, 1985, and August 31, 1986. Under these provisions, Fiat elected to use the average annual production from September 1, 1983, through August 31, 1986, for its 1987 production year report. The reference to production encompasses all passenger cars produced by the manufacturer during the relevant time period. Thus, absent an exception to S4.1.3.1.2, a manufacturer may not exclude any of its cars in determining either average annual production or annual production. For the period of September 1, 1986, to August 31, 1987, section S4.1.3.1.3 of Standard No. 208 provides a single exception from the requirement to include all of a manufacturer's cars in determining annual production. Under that exception, a manufacturer has the following option in calculating annual production: A manufacturer may exclude convertibles which do not comply with the requirements of S4.1.2.1, when it is calculating its average annual production under S4.1.3.1.2(a) or its annual production under S4.1.3.1.2(b). (Emphasis added.) The same single exception is set forth in section S4.1.3.2.3 for the September 1, 1987, to August 31, 1988 production year, and in section S4.1.3.3.3 for the September 1, 1988, to August 31, 1989 production year. This exception expressly permits manufacturers to exclude convertibles that do not comply with S4.1.2.1 from such calculations. However, this language does not permit manufacturers to exclude convertibles that comply with S4.1.2.1 from such calculations. An old principle of legal interpretation is expressed in the maxim 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius', literally, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Applying this principle to Standard No. 208, one would conclude that since the standard was drafted to provide one means of excluding convertibles from calculations of annual production, the standard does not allow any other means of excluding convertibles from those calculations. In other words, since the standard allows you to exclude convertibles that do not comply with S4.1.2.1 when calculating annual production, the absence of a similar provision for convertibles that comply with S4.1.2.1 means that complying convertibles cannot be excluded. This interpretation does not raise any questions about the January 20 report's exclusion of all convertibles produced between September 1, 1983, and August 31, 1986, since your letter states that none of those convertibles complied with S4.1.2.1. However, this interpretation does mean that Fiat cannot exclude the 803 Alfa Romeo convertibles it reported as complying with S4.1.2.1 when making its 1988 production year calculations, as required by S4.1.3.2, if Fiat again elects to base its calculations on the average annual production of passenger cars during the preceding three years, as permitted by S4.1.3.2.2(a). Similarly, if Fiat elects to base its calculations on the actual production between September 1, 1987, and August 31, 1988, as permitted by S4.1.3.2.2(b), Fiat cannot exclude convertibles that comply with the requirements of S4.1.2.1. In this letter, we have assumed that the Alfa Romeo convertibles that are equipped with automatic seat belts are certified as complying with the automatic restraint provisions of S4.1.2.1 of Standard No. 208. If this is not the case, then Fiat may not 'count' those vehicles as complying with the automatic restraint phase-in requirements of S4.1.3.1.2 of Standard No. 208. See attached letter dated April 18, 1988 to Mr. Robert Munson of Ford Motor Company. Please notify Mr. George L. Parker, NHTSA's Associate Administrator for Enforcement, within 10 business days of your receipt of this letter, whether the Alfa Romeo automatic seat belts are certified as complying with the automatic restraint requirements of S4.1.2.1 of Standard No. 208. If you have any further questions or need more information on this subject, please feel free to contact Steve Kratzke of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel";

ID: aiam5059

Open
Mr. Ray Wyatt 5207 N. 33rd St. Phoenix, AZ 85018; Mr. Ray Wyatt 5207 N. 33rd St. Phoenix
AZ 85018;

Dear Mr. Wyatt: This letter responds to your inquiry regarding th conversion of race cars into cars for use on the public roads. I apologize for the delay in this response. As I understand the question, based upon your letter and subsequent telephone conversations with David Elias of my staff, you intend to convert a race car designed for use solely on a race track into a vehicle that can be used on the public roads. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our regulations for you. NHTSA has authority to regulate the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act) defines 'motor vehicle' as one 'manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways... .' 15 U.S.C. 1391(3). The Safety Act requires every manufacturer to certify that each of its new motor vehicles complies with all applicable safety standards (15 U.S.C. 1403) and prohibits any person from manufacturing, importing, or selling any new vehicle that does not comply with all applicable safety standards (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)). However, these requirements apply only until the first sale of the vehicle for purposes other than resale (15 U.S.C. 1397(b)(1)). After that first purchase, the Safety Act prohibits any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair shop from 'rendering inoperative' any device or element of design installed in or on the vehicle in compliance with an applicable safety standard (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)). Manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and repair shops are thus free to modify vehicles after the first purchase of the vehicle. However, these entities are prohibited from performing any modification that would result in the vehicle no longer complying with the safety standards. In addition, unlike the situation with new vehicles, manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and repair shops that modify used motor vehicles are not required to certify that the vehicle complies with all applicable safety standards. Hence, if these race cars had ever been certified as motor vehicles complying with the safety standards, your conversions would be subject only to the 'render inoperative' prohibition of the Safety Act. Your situation appears to be different, however, in that you wish to place a race car, which had never been certified, on the public roads. Race cars are not 'motor vehicles' within the meaning of the Safety Act, so no party has ever certified that these vehicles meet the applicable safety standards. This means that the first introduction into interstate commerce or sale of these converted race cars as 'motor vehicles' for the purposes of the Safety Act would be by you after you perform the conversion. Accordingly, you would be legally responsible for certifying that the converted race cars comply with all applicable safety standards, in accordance with the regulations set forth in 49 CFR Part 567. As a manufacturer of a new motor vehicle under the provisions of the Safety Act, you would also be subject to the notification and remedy requirements of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1411 et seq.) and 49 CFR Parts 573 and 577. This means that if either you or the agency determined that a non-compliance with a safety standard or safety related defect exists in your converted vehicles, you, as the manufacturer, would be required to notify purchasers of the determination and remedy the problem without charge to the purchaser. I have enclosed for your convenience an information sheet for new manufacturers that gives a brief overview of our laws and regulations and explains how to get copies of those regulations. You may also want to contact the State of Arizona to learn whether there are any state laws or regulations that would affect the conversion of a racing car to a passenger automobile, and its sale and registration in the state, as well as the insurance ramifications of such a conversion and sale. If you have any further questions or need any further information on this subject, please contact David Elias of my office at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel Enclosure;

ID: aiam4759

Open
Mr. Jack E. Eanes Chief, Vehicle Services State of Delaware Department of Public Safety Division of Motor Vehicles P. O. Box 698 Dover, Delaware, 19903; Mr. Jack E. Eanes Chief
Vehicle Services State of Delaware Department of Public Safety Division of Motor Vehicles P. O. Box 698 Dover
Delaware
19903;

"Dear Mr. Eanes: This is in response to your letter asking whether ver darkly tinted rear windows that obscure the center highmounted stop lamp (CHMSL) required in passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1985 would violate any Federal laws or regulations. Let me begin by apologizing for the delay in this response. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our laws and regulations for you. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act) authorizes this agency to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. We have exercised this authority to issue two safety standards that are relevant to your question. The first of these is Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment (49 CFR 571.108), which applies to all new vehicles and new replacement equipment for motor vehicles. Among the requirements set forth in this Standard is a requirement for all passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1985 to be equipped with a CHMSL of specified minimum size, brightness, and visibility from the range of locations set forth in the standard. The second relevant standard is Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials (49 CFR 571.205). This standard applies to all new vehicles and all new glazing for use in motor vehicles, and includes specifications for minimum levels of light transmittance of the glazing (70 percent light transmittance in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars). Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) provides that no person may manufacture or sell any vehicle unless it is in conformity with all applicable safety standards. A new passenger car with a rear window tinted so darkly that the CHMSL was not easily visible would probably not be in conformity with Standards No. 108 and 205, and so could not legally be manufactured or sold in the United States. However, this prohibition on the manufacture or sale of a nonconforming vehicle does not apply after a vehicle is first sold to a consumer. Both before and after the first sale of a vehicle, section 108(a)(2) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)) provides that: 'No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . .' If any of the listed commercial entities were to install tint film or otherwise darken the rear windows on passenger cars so that the light transmittance of that window plus the darkening material was below 70 percent, those entities would be 'rendering inoperative' the light transmittance of the rear window of the car, in violation of Federal law. This same prohibition in Federal law makes it unlawful for a service station to permanently remove the safety belts or permanently disconnect the brake lines on a car. Please note that the Safety Act does not apply to the actions of individual vehicle owners. Vehicle owners may alter their own vehicles and operate them on the highways as they please, even if the vehicle no longer complies with the safety standards after such alterations. Hence, no provision of the Safety Act or our safety standards makes it unlawful for vehicle owners themselves to tint or otherwise darken the rear window of their car so that its light transmittance is below 70 percent and/or its CHMSL is obscured. The individual States, however, do have authority to regulate the modifications that vehicle owners may make to their own vehicles. The States also have the authority to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered or operated in that State. You indicated in your letter that the State of Delaware 'allows vehicle rear windows to be tinted as dark as the owner desires.' While I am not familiar with Delaware law, I assume that this statute, and similar statutes adopted by other States, does not purport to legitimize conduct -- the rendering inoperative of glazing and CHMSLs by firms installing window tinting -- that is illegal under Federal law. In other words, any commercial firms installing window tinting that results in light transmittance of less than 70 percent and/or reduces the required brightness of the CHMSL would have violated the 'render inoperative' provision in Federal law, even if Delaware permits individual owners to make such modifications themselves and to register and operate vehicles with rear windows and CHMSLs that would not comply with the requirements of the Federal safety standards for new vehicles. Conversely, the Federal law setting requirements for the manufacture and sale of new vehicles and limiting the modifications commercial enterprises can make to those vehicles does not prohibit the State of Delaware from establishing lesser limits on owner modifications to their own vehicles and as the minimum requirements for vehicles to be operated and registered in the State of Delaware. Thus, there does not appear to be any legal conflict between Federal law and Delaware law, and Delaware would be free to enforce the provisions of its law. We would, however, urge the State of Delaware to carefully consider the adverse safety consequences that will result from the provision of its law. NHTSA has determined that a 70 percent light transmittance minimum for new vehicles is the appropriate level to assure motor vehicle safety, and that the CHMSL on passenger cars enhances motor vehicle safety. It is not clear why the State of Delaware would conclude that the safety need that justifies requiring not less than 70 percent light transmittance and CHMSLs in new passenger cars is satisfied by allowing far lower light transmittance levels and lower-brightness CHMSLs in passenger cars to be operated in the State. I hope that this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need additional information about this topic, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel";

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