ID: 0722

Herr Tilman Spingler
Robert Bosch GmbH
FAX 49-7121-35-1792

Dear Herr Spingler:

We have received your FAX of February 15, 1995, asking whether a proposed design "for a lens-reflector-joint can be considered as conforming to the appropriate definition in FMVSS 108."

The agency does not advise manufacturers whether particular designs are regarded as "conforming." That determination is to be made by the manufacturer in certifying that its product conforms to all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. However, we can provide you with an interpretive guideline. Section S4 defines a "replaceable bulb headlamp" as a headlamp "comprising a bonded lens reflector assembly and one or two replaceable light sources." The intent of the definition was that the lens and reflector assembly be an indivisible unit upon manufacture of the headlamp. This means that, if a lens is broken, the entire lens reflector assembly must be replaced. If your design is such that the lens cannot be removed from the reflector assembly for replacement, it would appear to meet the definition in S4.

As you are well aware, NHTSA granted your company's petition for rulemaking, and, in November 1994, proposed an amendment of the definition of "replaceable bulb headlamp" that would allow a replaceable lens if the headlamp incorporates a vehicle headlamp aiming device conforming to S7.8.5.2. Comments were due on this proposal February 21, 1995. In due course, after review of the comments, NHTSA will decide whether it will pursue further rulemaking or terminate the rulemaking action.

Sincerely,

Philip R. Recht Chief Counsel ref:108 d:3/8/95

ID: nht95-1.92

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: March 8, 1995

FROM: Philip R. Recht -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Tilman Spingler -- Robert Bosch GmbH

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 2/15/95 FAX FROM TILMAN SPINGLER TO NHTSA CHIEF COUNSEL

TEXT: We have received your FAX of February 15, 1995, asking whether a proposed design "for a lens-reflector-joint can be considered as conforming to the appropriate definition in FMVSS 108."

The agency does not advise manufacturers whether particular designs are regarded as "conforming." That determination is to be made by the manufacturer in certifying that its product conforms to all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. Howe ver, we can provide you with an interpretive guideline. Section S4 defines a "replaceable bulb headlamp" as a headlamp "comprising a bonded lens reflector assembly and one or two replaceable light sources." The intent of the definition was that the lens and reflector assembly be an indivisible unit upon manufacture of the headlamp. This means that, if a lens is broken, the entire lens reflector assembly must be replaced. If your design is such that the lens cannot be removed from the reflector assembl y for replacement, it would appear to meet the definition in S4.

As you are well aware, NHTSA granted your company's petition for rulemaking, and, in November 1994, proposed an amendment of the definition of "replaceable bulb headlamp" that would allow a replaceable lens if the headlamp incorporates a vehicle headlamp aiming device conforming to S7.8.5.2. Comments were due on this proposal February 21, 1995. In due course, after review of the comments, NHTSA will decide whether it will pursue further rulemaking or terminate the rulemaking action.

ID: schaub.ztv

Mr. Frank A. Schaub
319 Burton Road
Beacon Falls, CT 06403

Dear Mr. Schaub:

We are replying to your e-mails of February 27 and March 4, 2003, with reference to your citation by local authorities who concluded that the modulating headlamp on your motorcycle was a flashing light and prohibited under the laws of Connecticut. You have asked for our assistance.

We have not reviewed Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles Regulation Section 14-137-99 which you reference, as we do not provide interpretations of State laws. However, I am enclosing a copy of a letter from this Office, dated June 20, 2000, to Michael L. Wagner which, based on facts you present, is squarely on point with your situation. In brief, we informed Mr. Wagner that, under Federal law, modulating headlamps are not flashing headlamps; modulating headlamps that comply with applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards adopted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) are permissible for use on motorcycles; and a State (or a political subdivision of a State) is preempted by Federal law from having a local law that has the effect of prohibiting a motorcycle headlamp modulating system meeting Federal specifications. The letter to Mr. Wagner contains appropriate legal citations. This interpretation of June 20, 2000, remains in effect today.

As you requested, I am enclosing a copy of S7.9.4, Motorcycle headlamp modulation system, which is part of 49 CFR 571.108, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment. I am also enclosing a copy of the section of the Federal statute governing the relationship of the Federal motor vehicle safety standards with State motor vehicle safety standards, 49 U.S.C. 30103(b), Preemption.

If there are any questions, please contact Taylor Vinson, Senior Attorney, NHTSA, at (202)-366-5263.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

Enclosures
ref:108
d.3/24/03

ID: aiam0177

Dear Senator Proxmire: Thank you for your letter of August 27, 1969, to the Director Legislative Liaison, Department of Transportation, concerning Mr. Eugene J. Shermeister's comments on headlamps for motor vehicles.; Enclosed for Mr. Shermeister's information is a copy of Federal Moto Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 on lighting requirements for the vehicles specified in the standard. Standard No. 108 is applicable to new vehicles manufactured on or after the effective date of January 1, 1969. In accordance with the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, the initial safety standards were based on existing standards. Headlighting requirements, as specified in Standard No. 108, were therefore based on existing Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, certain State regulations and the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Standards. On this basis, Standard No. 108 specifies that headlamps for all vehicles except motorcycles conform to SAE Standards J579a and J580a, entitled, respectively, 'Sealed Beam Headlamp Units for Motor Vehicles' and 'Sealed Beam Headlamp.' To provide protection from blinding effects to oncoming drivers, SAE Standard J579a specifies a maximum lamp output of 37,500 candlepower. This candlepower value is considerably less than the candlepower output of quartz iodine type headlamps.; As indicated in paragraph S2 of Standard No. 108, the standard i applicable to lighting on new vehicles and not to replacement lighting equipment. Except for vehicles subject to the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, the requirements for replacement lighting equipment, as well as lighting requirements for vehicles in use, are those requirements as set by the regulatory agencies of the individual states.; The National Highway Safety Bureau is sponsoring a research contract o improved forward lighting for motor vehicles. Results of this contract will not only provide us with well-founded data for use in amending the standard, but will also assist us in evaluating the relative merits of sealed beam, quartz iodine and other types of headlamps.; Sincerely, W. M. Jacklin, Jr., Acting Director, Motor Vehicle Safet Performance Service;

ID: nht90-2.10

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: APRIL 9, 1990

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA

TO: M. IWASE -- GENERAL MGR., TECHNICAL ADMINISTRATION DEPT., KOITO MFG. CO., LTD. TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED OCTOBER 18, 1989 TO ERIKA Z. JONES FROM M. IWASE ATTACHED; (OCC-406). ALSO ATTACHED LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1988 TO M. IWASE FROM ERIKA Z. JONES AND LETTER DATED APRIL 8, 1988 TO ERIKA Z. JONES FROM M. IWASE TEXT: This is in reply to your letter asking for an interpretation of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, with respect to a vehicle headlamp aiming device (VHAD). I regret the delay in responding.

You have recently made some modifications in the design of a detachable spirit level, and you have asked whether the May 9, 1989, amendments to Standard No. 108 permit this design. Previously we had furnished you an interpretation based upon the VHAD pr oposal.

The rule of May 9 does not permit a separate VHAD such as a spirit level. You will note that S7.7.5.2(c)(3)(vii) (proposed S7.7.5.2(b)(7)) did not adopt the parenthetical phrase "(if the headlamp is separable or intended to be used with the VHAD)". Thi s proposed phrase was the basis of the statement in our letter of September 12, 1988, that a VHAD could be separate from the headlamp assembly.

Although S7.7.5.2(c)(1) of the final rule speaks of Ban integral or separate VHAD mechanism", as you noted, we have since clarified that a VHAD that is "separate" does not mean one that is detachable, but simply one that need not be integral with the hea dlamp housing itself. Thus a spirit level VHAD is permissible, but it must be permanently installed on the vehicle, though not necessarily on the headlamp housing. I enclose a copy of the amendments to Standard No. 108 published on February 2, 1990, ad opting definitions of "VHAD", "Direct Reading Indicator" and "Indirect Reading indicator".

ID: nht73-2.17

DATE: 11/08/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; James B. Gregory; NHTSA

TO: Department of California Highway Patrol

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of October 1, 1973, in which you asked that we review an enclosed opinion by the California Attorney General on the question of preemption of California motor vehicle regulations by Federal standards. The opinion concluded that the California requirement that motorcycles be wired so that their headlamps are lit whenever their engines are running was not preempted. This conclusion was contrary to the position taken in an NHTSA letter of November 14, 1972, to Mr. Edward Kearney.

We adhere to the position stated in the November 14, 1972, letter that the California requirement is preempted, and consider the legal opinion by the California Attorney General to be an erroneous view of the Federal law.

The opinion properly viewed the question as turning on the application of the phrase in @ 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1392(d), "applicable to the same aspect of performance." If the Federal standard (Standard No. 108, 49 CFR 571.108) covers a given aspect of performance, any State requirement must be identical to it. The California opinion relied on the language in the main opinion of one of the Super Lite cases, Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (1969), that preemption should be "narrowly construed", and went on to find that since Standard 108 does not specifically address the matter of wiring the headlamps when the engine is running, that aspect of performance is not covered by the standard and the California law is valid.

More important, however, than the nebulous concept of whether preemption is "narrowly" construed (a concept with which Judge Friendly, concurring in Chrysler, did not agree) is the point made at the end of the main opinion, that the administering Federal agency was supporting the State's position regarding the scope of the Federal regulation. The Court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court in Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969):

[W]hen construing an administrative regulation,'a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt. . . .[T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'

In this case the situation is the opposite of that in the Super Lite cases. The NHTSA's position is that the standard does cover the aspect of performance in question. As stated in the NHTSA letter of November 14, 1972, the standard "establishes requirements for motorcycle headlighting, along with special wiring requirements for motorcycles and other vehicles." It is the intent of the NHTSA that its requirements for headlamp performance, configuration, and wiring cover all aspects of performance directly involving headlamps, and thus preempt any non-identical State Standards relating to headlamps.

The implication of the California opinion is that any mode of design or performance that is not expressly dealt with in the Federal standard is open to regulation by the States. Such a position is impractical, where the agency's intent is to have a comprehensive, uniform regulation in a given area. In order to preempt the field it would be necessary for a Federal agency to anticipate the imaginative regulatory impulses of future State agencies or legislatures and include in a standard such provisions as, "It is not required that motorcycle headlamps be wired to operate when the engine is running." Congress clearly intended the NHTSA to establish a single set of uniform standards to which manufacturers must comply, and that intent would tend to be defeated by the position taken in the California opinion. Federal regulation has a negative as well as a positive aspect: in determining that there should be certain requirements in an area, we also are deciding against imposing others. The only way to effectuate such a decision is to declare, as we have done here, that our regulation is intended to be exclusive, and to describe as necessary its outer limits.

The California opinion's factual comparison with the Super Lite cases is also inapt. The Super Lite itself was a new type of lighting equipment, a supplementary lamp, for which Standard 108 contained no requirements. Headlamps, by contrast, are comprehensively regulated by the standard.

For these reasons, we conclude that the California requirement that motorcycle headlamps be wired to operate when the engine is running is preempted by Standard 108, and void.

While we feel constrained by law to so conclude, I want you to know that I have instructed my staff to consider the merit of amending the Federal lighting standard to include the California requirement in 108.

Sincerely,

October 1, 1973

James B. Gregory -- Administrator, U. S. Dept. of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Dr. Gregory:

A copy of Mr. Douglas Toms' letter of November 14, 1972, to Mr. Edward Kearney expressing his opinion that a recently passed California law relative to motorcycle headlamps was preempted by Federal Standard 108, was received by this Department on November 20, 1972.

The opinion expressed by Mr. Toms prompted a request by this Department to the Office of the Attorney General of the State of California for an opinion on the question of federal preemption as related to this recently enacted statute. A copy of the Attorney General's Opinion on this matter is enclosed for your review.

You will notice that the Attorney General's Opinion is not in accord with that expressed by Mr. Toms; therefore, we are proceeding on the premise that all motorcycles first manufactured and registered in California after January 1, 1975, will be required to meet these headlamp requirements.

After your review of the enclosed material, I would appreciate your comments on this very important issue.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

W. PUDINSKI Commissioner--Dept. of California Highway Patrol

Enclosure

cc: Senator Donald L. Grunsky; Edward Kearney

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

SAN FRANCISCO

September 13, 1973

W. Pudinski, Commissioner-- Department of California Highway Patrol

Dear Commissioner Pudinski:

You have requested the opinion of this office on the question of whether California Vehicle Code sections 25650.5 and 24253 are pre-empted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.

We conclude that these Vehicle Code provisions are not pre-empted by that Federal Act.

Our conclusion is based upon the following analysis:

In 1966 the Federal Government assumed a paramount role in the field of motor vehicle safety with the passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 15 U.S.C. @ 1381 et seq. (hereafter Federal Act). Basically this Act establishes a comprehensive system for the formulation and implementation of safety standards for the performance and equipment of new motor vehicles.

The enactment of such an extensive federal law naturally gave rise to the question of whether State legislation in the same field was pre-empted. n1E. g., see Chrysler Corporation v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (1969); Chrysler Corporation v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (1969).

n1 See U.S. Const. art. VI, @ 2, the so-called Supremacy Clause.

Congress anticipated the question in their enactment of a provision in the Federal Act expressly dealing with issue of pre-emption, 15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d). It provides: "(d) Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the Federal Government or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof from establishing a safety requirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment procured for its own use if such requirement imposes a higher standard of performance than that required to comply with the otherwise applicable Federal standard."

This pre-emption provision (15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d)) was succinctly summarized by the United States Court of Appeals in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofany, supra, 419 F.2d 499 (1969). In that case the Court declared:

"This provision indicates that state regulation of an item of motor vehicle equipment will be preempted only if the following factors appear in combination: (1) a federal standard in effect which covers that item of equipment; (2) a state safety standard . . . for the item which is not identical to the federal standard; and (3) application of the state and federal regulations to 'the same aspect of performance' of the item of equipment." 419 F.2d at 506.

In connection with the present inquiry, the question of federal pre-emption has arisen with respect to two provisions in the State Vehicle Code: Vehicle Code section 25650.5 (relating to the activation of motorcycle headlights) and Vehicle Code section 24253 (relating to the duration of tail lamp illumination). It is noted that there are federal standards issued pursuant to the Federal Act which are (1) applicable to the same "items of equipment" (viz., motor cycle headlights and tail lamps); and (2) which are "not identical" to the State regulations. Hence in determining whether or not the State regulations are preempted, the specific question here is whether the State and federal regulations apply to "the same aspect of performance" of these specified items of equipment. In making this determination, it would be appropriate to first ascertain whether the phrase "same aspect of performance" is to be given a narrow or broad construction; i.e., whether the pre-emptive effect of the Federal Act is to be narrowly or broadly applied.

This specific point was considered by the United States Court of Appeals in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, 419 F.2d 499. In evaluating Congressional intent with respect to the Federal Act's pre-emptive effect, the Court noted that "uniformity through national standards" was merely "a secondary objective." 419 F.2d at 511. On the other hand, the Court declared that "the clear expression of purpose in section 1381 and other evidence of legislative intent indicate that the reduction of traffic accidents was the overriding concern of Congress. We think that these expressions of legislative purpose should govern our assessment of the preemptive effect of the Act and the standards issued under it." 419 F.2d at 508. (See also Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lowery, 452 F.2d 431, 438 (1971), where the Court reiterates this conclusion.) Accordingly, the Court determined that "the 'aspect of performance' language in the preemption section of the Act must be construed narrowly." 419 F.2d at 510. The Court further stated: "If traffic safety is furthered by a traditional type of state regulation under the police power, . . . a narrow construction of the preemptive effect of the federal Act and [the standards issued pursuant thereto] is required." 419 F.2d at 511. n2.

n2 See Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, 340 F.Supp. 1120, 1124 (1972), which cites Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, for the proposition that "[w]here exercise of the local police power serves the purpose of a federal Act, the preemptive effect of that Act should be narrowly construed." See also Chrysler Corporation v. Rhodes, supra, 416 F.2d 319, 324, n. 8 (1969).

Thus in view of the judicial constraint upon the scope of the Federal Act's pre-emption provisions, it is apparent that the states are still afforded substantial leeway in the enactment of vehicle equipment safety regulations.

In this light we now compare the State statutes in question with the pertinent federal standards issued pursuant to the Federal Act to determine if they cover the "same aspect of performance."

With respect to motorcycle headlamps:

(1) State Law

Vehicle Code section 25650.5 provides that after January 1, 1975, all motorcycle headlamps shall "automatically turn on when the engine of the motorcycle is started and which remain lighted as long as the engine is running."

(2) Federal Standards

The standard pertinent to motorcycle headlamps is found in 49 CFR section 571.108, Standard 108, subsection S4.5.7(b). This standard provides: "When the headlamps are activated in a steady-burning state, the taillamps, parking lamps, license plate lamps and side marker lamps shall also be activated."

In comparing these two provisions, it can be seen that the State law relates to the mechanism or event of activation and duration of activation of the headlamps. The federal standard, on the other hand, is unconcerned with these factors. It merely constitutes a designation of other lamps whose activation is to accompany the activation of headlights. It would appear reasonable to conclude that these two provisions apply to different aspects of performance of motorcycle headlamps and that, accordingly, the State provision is not pre-empted. As will be seen, our conclusion is the same as to State law regulating taillamps.

With respect to taillamps:

(1) State Law

Vehicle Code section 24253 provides in essence that all motor vehicles and motorcycles shall be equipped with taillamps that will remain lighted at least one-quarter hour if the engine stops.

(2) Federal Standards

49 CFR section 571.108, Standard 108, subsections S4.5.3 and S4.5.7(b) provide that the taillamps shall be activated upon the activation of the headlamps. Subsection S4.5.7(a) provides that the taillamps shall be activated upon the activation of the parking lamps.

Thus the State law is solely concerned with the duration of illumination, while the federal standards are directed to the event of activation. Again, it would appear that, just as in the case of headlamps, these State and federal regulations are each addressed to separate and distinct aspects of taillamps performance. Accordingly then, the State provision is not pre-empted by the Federal Act.

Our conclusion that the State headlamp and taillamp regulations relate to aspects of performance different from those covered by federal standards, is fortified by the analysis engaged in by the Court in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, as it compared the state and federal standards at issue in that case. There state law prohibited a type of auxiliary headlight because of its unacceptable glare and dazzle effect (419 F.2d at 502, n. 5, 503) and because it emitted a blue light, a color of light which the states had reserved for emergency vehicles (419 F.2d at 503). The pertinent federal standards prohibited such auxiliary headlights only if they impaired the effectiveness of the required lights (419 F.2d at 506). The Court concluded that the federal standard applied to the impairment of light emission from the required headlights to the extent that such impairment affected the visibility of the driver of the car (419 F.2d at 511). On the other hand, the Court determined that the state provisions purported to regulate the effects of the light upon drivers of oncoming cars. The Court concluded that this was "a different aspect of performance" and thus the states' "attempts at regulation are not preempted." (Ibid.)

Thus we have a case where even though the state and federal regulations both related to the quality of the illumination itself which was emitted by the headlight, the Court nonetheless found that these regulations were directed to "different aspects of performance," because of the distinction between the effect of the illumination upon the driver of the car in question, and the effect upon drivers of oncoming cars.

If such closely related factors are deemed to constitute "different aspects of performance," a fortiori, such manifestly distinct elements of operation as the event or mechanism of light activation on the one hand, and the duration of illumination on the other hand, must be deemed to constitute "different aspects of performance."

In view of the explicit quality of this difference, our conclusion that it constitutes a different "aspect of performance" would appear to be warranted whether the phrase "aspect of performance," as used in the pre-emptive provisions of the Federal Act (viz., 15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d)), is given a narrow or broad construction. n3 It is thus our opinion that Vehicle Code sections 25650.5 and 24253 are not pre-empted.

n3 The concurring opinion in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, 419 F.2d at 512-515, argued that the pre-emptive provisions of the Federal Act should be broadly construed (419 F.2d at 512-513). Yet it concluded that the state regulations were not pre-empted because one of the basis for restricting the auxiliary headlight was the fact that it emitted light of a blue color (a color reserved for emergency vehicles), and that this was an aspect of performance different from that encompassed by the federal standard; viz., impairment of the effectiveness of the required lights (419 F.2d at 515). It would appear that the aspects of performance under consideration here are at least as distinct as those aspects of performance found to be different under the concurring opinion's broad construction of the Federal Act's pre-emption provisions.

Very truly yours,

EVELLE J. YOUNGER --

Attorney General,

VICTOR D. SONENBERG --

Deputy Attorney General

ID: 86-2.39

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/24/86

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Alan B. Wambold, Ph.D. -- Research Associate, Division of Legislative Services (Virginia)

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Alan B. Wambold, Ph.D. Research Associate Division of Legislative Services Box 3-AG Richmond, Va. 23208

This is in reply to your letter of December 16, 1985 to Jere Medlin of this agency with respect to whether the Commonwealth of Virginia is preempted under Federal law from prohibiting flashing headlamps on motor vehicles.

Section 1392(d) of Title 15 of the United States Code in essence prohibits a State from maintaining or enacting standards covering the same aspect of performance as a Federal motor vehicle safety standard unless it is identical to the Federal standard. Paragraph S4.5.11(c) of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment (formerly Paragraph S4.6(b)) states that "Headlamps...may be wired to flash for signaling purposes." S4.5.11(c) was not intended as a regulation of this aspect of vehicle performance, in the sense that it would preempt all State regulation of the sale or use of headlamp flashers. It is basically an exception to the requirement of paragraph S4.5.11(e) that all lamps (other than those specifically referenced in other subparagraphs of S4.5.11) be steady-burning when in use. The section, in other words, was included to make it clear that automatic headlamp flashers are not prohibited by the Federal standard. We have concluded therefore that State regulation of headlamp flashers is not preempted by the Federal standard.

I hope that this answers your question.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

December 16, 1985 Mr. Jere Medlin Safety Standards Engineer US Department of Transportation 400 7th. St.,SW Room 5307 Washington, DC 20590

Dear Mr. Medlin:

I spoke with you on the telephone in early October of this year regarding Virginia law's prohibition on flashing headlamp; on motor vehicles -- particularly ambulances and rescue squad vehicles. At that time I believe you told me that the language of S S4.6 in 49 CFR S571.108 preempted the Commonwealth in the matter or flashing headlamps for emergency vehicles.

Since that time I have looked at that section, and have been able to find language in it that, to my satisfaction, makes this preemption clear. It is possible that I either understood you, or that I have made a mistake the citation.

One of the members of the Virginia General Assembly is considering the introduction of legislation during the upcoming session of the legislature to conform Virginia law to the federal regulation, and, you are more familiar with the Code of Regulations than I am, I was wondering whether you be so kind as to send me a copy of the relevant sections or sections. I am certain that many people would be glad to see the discrepancy between the federal regulations and the Virginia law eliminated.

Sincerely yours,

Alan B. Wambold, Ph.D Research Associate

ID: nht75-3.4

DATE: 11/05/75

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: General Electric Company

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of July 8, 1975, to Ed Leysath of this agency concerning wattage requirements for Type 1A and 2A headlamps.

Your specific question is whether the wattage specifications in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 for Type 1A and 2A headlamps are design wattages or maximum wattages.

Paragraph S4.1.1.21(b) of Standard No. 108 specifies that, "Each Type 1A headlamp shall be designed for a maximum of 50 watts. Each Type 2A headlamp shall be designed for a maximum of 60 watts for each filament." (Emphasis added.) It follows, therefore, that the 50 - and 60-watt values are design wattages. You are correct in your interpretation that a tolerance of approximately 7.5% applies to these values, and that an ampere value of 4.20 for a 50-watt filament and 5.02 for a 60-watt filament is permitted. The 7.5% tolerance as you know is the average actual maximum wattage (as opposed to design wattage) rating of headlamps listed in Table 2 of SAE Standard J573 as determined by multiplication of the maximum amperage times the design volts.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

July 8, 1975

Ed Leyseth -- National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Department of Transportation

Subject: FMVSS 108 - Section 4.1.1.2.1

Dear Mr. Leyseth,

On March 26, 1975 I wrote to Bill Eason and requested an interpretation of the wattage requirements of the rectangular headlamp system. (copy enclosed). To date we have heard nothing and we urgently need your reply.

I would appreciate your help in providing us with your interpretation as quickly as possible.

Very truly yours,

Frank W. Bowers -- Manager, Product Reliability

attach: copy of 3/26/75 letter March 26, 1975

William Eason -- National Highway Safety Administration, Department of Transportation

Subject: FMVSS 108 - Section 4.1.1.21

Dear Mr. Eason:

I have heard that the Department of Transportation has interpreted Section 4.1.1.21(6) of FMVSS as far as the wattage limitation on Type 1A and Type 2A rectangular headlamps is concerned.

It is my understanding that the 50 watt limit on the Type 1A and the 60 watt limit on the 2A apply as design maximums and that a tolerance of approximate 7.5% applies to these values. This, then, would permit a max. ampere value of 4.20 for a 50 watt filament and 5.02 for a 60 watt filament. If a 40 watt filament is used than its max. amperes would be 3.36.

I agree with this interpretation and understand that these are the figures that SAE is proposing.

I would appreciate it very much if you would confirm that this interpretation is correct since design and certification of the product depends upon an accurate interpretation of the standard.

Thanks very much for your help in this matter.

Very truly yours,

F. W. Bowers -- Manager, Product Reliability

bcc: R. G. Burnor #1200

ID: wagar.ztv

Mr. Terry W. Wagar
Vehicle Safety Technical Analyst III
Technical Services Bureau
Office of Vehicle Safety & Clean Air
Department of Motor Vehicles
State of New York
6 Empire State Plaza
Albany, NY 12228
FAX 518-473-9903





Dear Mr. Wagar:

This is in reply to your letter of June 18, 2001, to Thomas M. Louizou, NHTSA Regional Administrator, and confirms our telephone discussion of July 27, 2001.

You have written to us about several aspects of the relationship between State and Federal requirements for low-speed vehicles (LSV). Under Federal law, a "low-speed vehicle" is defined as a "4-wheeled motor vehicle, other than a truck, whose speed attainable in 1.6 km (1 mile) is more than 32 kilometers per hour (20 miles per hour) and not more than 40 kilometers per hour (25 miles per hour) on a paved level surface." A "truck" is a motor vehicle "designed primarily for the transportation of property or special purpose equipment." These definitions are found at 49 CFR 571.3(b). In addition, the enclosed letter of March 8, 2001, to Neil Mardell clarifies that a truck cannot be a LSV. At this time, we do not have sufficient information about the vehicles you describe as "small trucks" to offer an opinion as to whether they meet the Federal description of low speed vehicle or truck.

A vehicle that meets the definition of "low-speed vehicle" must be manufactured to conform to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 500, Low-speed vehicles (49 CFR 571.500). You have informed us that "New York State law and regulation recognize the vehicles that have speeds not to exceed 40 MPH as limited use vehicles and must be uniquely registered and operated." There is no conflict here between State and Federal authority. NHTSA has no authority to prescribe conditions for registration and operation of motor vehicles, and with respect to LSVs (as opposed to other types of motor vehicles), New York may adopt and enforce whatever conditions for registration and operation it deems appropriate, including a total prohibition against the use of these vehicles on public roads.

You relate your initial understanding that "where equipment was addressed under 500, New York State would be preempted and could not have more stringent standards." However, "more recently, the answer from NHTSA has been that low speed vehicles only have to meet a specific seatbelt and windshield glazing requirement." You ask for a clarification.

Under Federal law (49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1)), when a Federal motor vehicle safety standard is in effect, a State may prescribe its own standard "applicable to the same aspect of performance . . . only if the standard is identical to the [Federal] standard. . . ." Standard No. 500 requires LSVs to be equipped with a windshield of AS-1 or AS-5 composition, and a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly conforming to Standard No. 209. These are performance standards, and New York State's windshield glazing and seat belt standards as they apply to low-speed vehicles (i.e., limited use passenger-carrying vehicles with a maximum speed of more than 20 miles per hour but not more than 25 miles per hour) must be identical to those of Standard No. 500.

Standard No. 500 also requires LSVs to be equipped with certain items of lighting equipment, mirrors, and parking brakes, but it does not specify that these items must comply with Standards Nos. 108, 111, and 135, the Federal standards establishing performance requirements for lighting equipment, mirrors, and parking brakes. The American Association for Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) petitioned for reconsideration of Standard No. 500 and asked that States be allowed to establish their own performance requirements for these equipment items. We agreed, and on September 1, 2000, we published a notice (65 FR 53219), copy enclosed, saying (at 53221) that States "may adopt and apply their own performance requirements for required LSV lighting equipment, mirrors, and parking brakes until we have established performance requirements for those items of equipment." To date we have neither proposed nor established these requirements.

You mentioned that the GEM LSV appears to have a SAE "Y" symbol on the lens of its headlamp, indicating that the lamp is a driving light. As noted above, NHTSA has not proposed nor established requirements for the headlamp required by Standard No. 500, although we may do so in the future. A lamp with the SAE "Y" symbol on its lens is one that has been manufactured to comply with SAE Standard J581, Auxiliary Driving Lamps. The SAE defines an auxiliarly driving lamp as "a lighting device . . . intended to supplement the upper beam of a standard headlamp system. It is not intended for use alone or with the lower beam of a standard headlamp system." Thus, while the SAE clearly does not consider a driving lamp to be a headlamp, we have concluded that 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1) permits a State to make its own decision as to whether it will accept a driving lamp as a headlamp for low-speed vehicles.

You also mentioned bumpers. As with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards, "a State or political subdivision of a State may prescribe or enforce a bumper standard for a passenger motor vehicle or passenger motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to" 49 CFR Part 581, Bumper Standard (49 U.S.C. 32511(a)). However, Section 581.3 specifically excludes low-speed vehicles from the applicability of the bumper standard. This means that New York, or any other jurisdiction, may establish a bumper standard for low-speed vehicles until such time as NHTSA may prescribe its own.

If you have any further questions, you may call Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure

ID: nht90-1.88

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: MARCH 29, 1990

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA

TO: J. BRETTSCHNEIDER -- ROBERT BOSCH GMBH

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 8-31-89 TO RICHARD VAN IDERSTINE, NHTSA, FROM J. BRETTSCHNEIDER, ROBERT BOSCH GMBH, ATTACHED.

TEXT:

This is in reply to your letter to Mr. Van Iderstine of this agency, with reference to the performance of the impact test according to SAE J1383. I regret the delay in responding.

You state that according to paragraph 4.10.3 of J1383, the impact test is conducted along the mechanical axis, and that paragraph 2.14 of SAE J579 defines the mechanical axis as perpendicular to the aiming plane through the geometric center of the lens. With respect to this, you have asked two questions: "where is the geometric center of a lens without aiming pads?", and "where is the geometric center of a lens which moreover covers two compartments, one for the lower beam and one for the upper beam?"

First, we must advise you that the impact test of J1383 is not required for any headlamp covered by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108. The impact test that is required for integral beam and replaceable bulb headlamps is specified in section S8.8, and we shall answer your questions with respect to its provisions.

S8.8 states in part that "one impact shall be delivered to the center of the lens on the mechanical axis." This language originated in 1983 with the adoption of specifications for replaceable bulb headlamps, when a headlamp was not permitted to incorporate more than one light source. Thus, the lens center and mechanical axis were coincident. Now that Standard No. 108 permits two standardized replaceable light sources in a headlamp, there are two mechanical axes. We also note that lamps may now use Vehicle Headlamp Aiming Devices, and thus have lenses without aiming pads. As we understand your concern, you appear to be uncertain as to the location of the impact for the test of section S8.8.

After reviewing your letter, we have concluded that the language "on the mechanical axis" is a redundancy. Thus, the impact should be applied on the center of the lens, without reference to the mechanical axis. We consider the center of the lens to be the intersection of the lens and a line which is parallel to the longitudinal axis of the vehicle and passes through the centroid of the projected lens area as viewed on a plane perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the vehicle.

We shall be pleased to answer any further questions you may have.