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Interpretation ID: Alliance.jeg

    Robert S. Strassburger, Vice President
    Vehicle Safety and Harmonization
    Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
    1401 H Street, NW
    Suite 900
    Washington, DC 20005


    Dear Mr. Strassburger:

    This responds to your letter seeking our concurrence that "Alliance members are allowed to combine the fleets of motor vehicle manufacturing subsidiaries owned by Alliance members for purposes of determining the overall fleet compliance with the compliance percentages set forth in various safety standard phase-in requirements." As discussed below, we generally agree with your suggested interpretation.

    In your letter, you note that, in our mid-1980s rulemaking establishing the phase-in requirements associated with automatic occupant protection requirements for passenger cars, we addressed the need to accommodate complex relationships among manufacturers. See NPRM proposing phase-in requirements for Standard No. 208, 50 FR 14589, 14595-97, April 12, 1985. In that rulemaking, we adopted an attribution rule that generally permits companies to agree among themselves which entity will be treated as the manufacturer for purposes of meeting the phase-in percentages when any of those companies could be considered the "manufacturer." We have adopted similar attribution rules in subsequent rulemakings involving phase-ins.

    You state in your letter that "(a)s Alliance members have consistently interpreted these phase-in requirements, member companies with ownership interests in other motor vehicle manufacturers have been able to combine the fleets for reporting purposes to the agency."

    You note, however, that in a recent interpretation to Mr. Nakayama of Kirkland & Ellis regarding the status of certain small volume manufacturers, we observed:

      (T)he vehicles of related manufacturers are not ordinarily grouped together for purposes of determining compliance with phase-ins of new safety standards. We note that this is in contrast to determinations of compliance with fuel economy standards, where vehicles of related manufacturers are grouped together. However, the grouping of vehicles of related manufacturers for purposes of fuel economy standards is done pursuant to an explicit statutory provision.

    You state that the Alliance "understands the above observation reaffirms that vehicles of related manufacturers are not ordinarily required to be grouped together by the Safety Act, unlike the contrasting situation for fuel economy." You state further, however, that because of the potential for the first sentence of the quoted paragraph to be misunderstood, particularly if it is taken out of context, the Alliance "seeks confirmation that a group of related vehicle manufacturers may continue to choose, if they so desire, to combine fleets for safety standard phase-in purposes."

    In considering your letter, we note that, in interpreting the provision at issue, we have not taken the position that we would consider a particular vehicle to have been manufactured by two or more manufacturers solely based on the corporate relationships between those manufacturers.

    We considered this issue to some degree in a September 18, 1987, interpretation to General Motors (GM), addressing whether it could be deemed the manufacturer of passenger cars produced by Lotus for purposes of the phase-in of the automatic occupant protection requirements.

    In our interpretation, we noted that in the April 1985 NPRM proposing phase-in requirements for Standard No. 208, we had stated that we consider the statutory definition of "manufacturer" to be sufficiently broad to include "sponsors," depending on the circumstances. We stated in the NPRM that if a sponsor contracts for another manufacturer to produce a design exclusively for the sponsor, the sponsor may be considered the manufacturer of those vehicles, applying basic principles of agency law.

    We presented the following analysis to support our conclusion that GM could be considered the manufacturer of Lotus passenger cars:

      Both LCL, the actual assembler, and LPC, the actual importer, are wholly-owned subsidiaries of GM. By itself, GM's ownership of both the producer and importer of these cars might not be sufficient to establish that GM was the sponsor of these vehicles for the purposes of Standard No. 208. In addition, however, another GM wholly-owned subsidiary distributes and markets the vehicles in the United States. GM coordinates the activities of all these subsidiaries. Since GM wholly owns the actual producer of these vehicles and is actively involved in the importation, distribution, and marketing of these vehicles, we believe that GM should be considered to sponsor the importation of the Lotus vehicles. Accordingly, GM rather than LPC, may be considered the importer and manufacturer of these vehicles.

    Thus, in considering whether GM could be considered a manufacturer of Lotus passenger cars, we looked to GM's overall involvement with those vehicles and not merely to the fact that it owned the producer and importer of those vehicles.

    In now considering the Alliance's request for interpretation, we believe several factors are relevant.

    First, we believe that the application of the manufacturer attribution provisions applicable to phase-in requirements needs to be clear, without the necessity of addressing each specific situation by interpretation.

    Second, we believe that, as a practical matter, there is typically sufficient interaction among related manufacturers, and direct involvement by a "parent manufacturer" in the actions of its subsidiaries, that their fleets can reasonably be considered as a single fleet for purposes of complying with phase-in requirements.

    Third, from a public policy perspective, there is little (if any) difference in the number of compliant vehicles introduced into the fleet during the phase-in years between the case in which commonly owned manufacturers are permitted to combine their fleets and the case in which commonly owned manufacturers are permitted to separate their fleets for compliance purposes.

    Fourth, as a general matter, NHTSA does not have any interest under the Safety Act as to how companies choose to structure themselves, so long as Safety Act obligations are fully met. Thus, in a situation in which one manufacturer corporation buys another, NHTSA does not generally have any interest in whether the corporation that has been purchased becomes a division of the other manufacturer or is maintained as a subsidiary.

    Given the above considerations, we have concluded that vehicle manufacturers may combine the fleets of motor vehicle manufacturing subsidiaries they own for purposes of determining overall fleet compliance with the compliance percentages set forth in the various safety standard phase-in requirements, subject to the agreement of those other manufacturers. Moreover, recognizing the different levels of ownership that exist in the industry and wishing to avoid further requests for interpretation in this area, we take the following further position: For purposes of complying with phase-in requirements under Federal motor vehicle safety standards, vehicle manufacturers may combine, with their fleet, the fleets of motor vehicle manufacturers that are considered to be within the same "control" relationship for purposes of the CAFE standards (and which are in fact included in the same fleets under the CAFE statute), subject to the agreement of the other manufacturers. To the extent that the fleets of more than one manufacturer are so combined, we would consider each manufacturer jointly and severally liable for any failure to meet a relevant percentage phase-in requirement.

    Since this interpretation is based on specific factual determinations and policy concerns related to phase-ins of new safety requirements, it should not be considered as precedent for how we would interpret the term "manufacturer" in other contexts.

    I also note that this interpretation does not overturn the one we sent to Mr. Nakayama. In that interpretation, we addressed the status of certain small volume manufacturers in the context of ownership relationships with other manufacturers. Our conclusion that the small volume manufacturers at issue qualified for the special small volume implementation schedule reflected a number of considerations, including the operational independence of the companies.

    Sincerely,

    Jacqueline Glassman
    Chief Counsel

    ref: 208
    d.10/24/02