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NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

Search Tool

NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 10861 - 10870 of 16490
Interpretations Date

ID: onlinetireregistration

Open

    Ms. Ann Wilson
    Sr. Vice President, Government Affairs
    Rubber Manufacturers Association
    1400 K Street, NW
    Washington, DC 20005

    Dear Ms. Wilson:

    This responds to your request for an interpretation of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administrations (NHTSA) tire information regulation, 49 CFR 574.7. You asked whether the regulation permits tire manufacturers to offer electronic registration in addition to the required mail-in form. You state that no more than 10% of tire registration cards are currently returned to manufacturers and that the information provided on these cards is often inaccurate, incomplete, or illegible. RMA believes that offering registration via the Internet, by telephone, or by other electronic means would improve the registration return rate and aid manufacturers in fulfilling notification requirements.

    As explained below, we interpret the regulation to permit electronic registration as a supplement to the required mail-in form for independent distributors and dealers.

    By way of background, Part 574 establishes a registration program for new tires. NHTSA implemented this program to improve the effectiveness of manufacturer campaigns to recall tires that contain a safety-related defect or fail to conform with applicable safety standards. By identifying new tire purchasers, the program increases the manufacturers ability to inform owners of tires about defects or noncompliances in those tires.

    Part 574 establishes the following requirements:

    New Tire manufacturers, new tire brand name owners. Except as noted, new registration forms are to be provided for independent dealers. All of those forms are required to be identical in format and content and within the size range specified in the interim final rule. Alternatively, the manufacturer can provide independent dealers with pre-addressed envelopes in which tire purchasers could mail the mandatory registration forms.

    Independent distributors and dealers. These dealers are required to record the tire identification number(s) of the tire(s) sold along with their name and address on a registration form and give the form to the tire purchaser.

    Other distributors and dealers. They must record the purchaser's name and address, the tire identification number(s) of the tire(s) sold, and a suitable identification of themselves as the selling dealer on a tire registration form and return the completed forms to the tire manufacturers or their designees.

    Section 574.7 prescribes the content and format of the registration forms provided by tire manufacturers to all distributors and dealers. Paragraph (a)(2) of this section states that the registration form provided to independent distributors and dealers must conform to the examples provided in that section. Paragraph (a)(4) of this section provides that the registration form must contain space for recording the following information: 1) name and address of the tire purchaser, 2) tire identification number, and 3) name and address of the tire seller or other means by which the tire manufacturer can identify the tire seller. Under section 574.7, no other information than that prescribed in the section is permitted to appear on the form.

    RMA asks that we interpret the regulation to permit manufacturers to provide independent dealers and distributors with a supplemental form, in addition to the form required under section 574.7(a)(2), that notifies consumers that they may also register their tires by electronic means; e.g., by directing the consumer to a website or a toll-free telephone registration line. RMA cites to two recent interpretation letters issued by our office with respect to the electronic registration of child restraint systems under FMVSS No. 213, Child Restraint Systems (letter to John K. Stipancich, January 3, 2003; letter to Mark A. Rosenbaum, Esq., April 12, 2001). These letters conclude that child restraint manufacturers "may include a supplemental form that encourages electronic registration" if the following two conditions are met:

    1. The registration card required by FMVSS No. 213 does not bear any information or writing beyond that required to be on the form, and
    2. The additional information is presented in a manner not likely to confuse consumers about the purpose of the required form or to obscure the importance of owner registration.

    Subsequent to RMAs interpretation request, Computerized Information Management Services, Inc. ("CIMS"), a tire registration agent for tire manufacturers and/or brand name owners, submitted a letter dated April 23, 2003, urging that "web-based tire registration is a bad idea" and that the interpretation that RMA is requesting should be denied. More specifically, CIMS argues that a web-based system would create significant confusion for the tire dealer and the consumer, would place an additional paperwork burden on the tire dealer, and would place an additional burden on the consumer to correctly enter all of the required tire registration information.

    After considering the issues raised by your letter and also by CIMS, we agree that the rationales of the aforementioned FMVSS No. 213 interpretation letters are also applicable to interpreting Part 574. We therefore interpret Part 574 to permit electronic registration as a supplement to the required mail-in form, subject to the two considerations noted above for FMVSS No. 213. We do not agree with CIMS that supplemental electronic registration would create confusion, given these considerations. Moreover, since electronic registration would be supplemental and voluntary, it would not result in additional burdens.

    This interpretation does not relieve non-independent distributors and dealers from the requirements of section 574.8(b) that they themselves record the purchaser's name and address, the tire identification number(s) of the tire(s) sold, and a suitable identification of themselves as the selling dealer on a tire registration form and return the completed forms to the tire manufacturers or their designees. While we would interpret Part 574 to permit non-independent distributors and dealers to accomplish these tasks by electronic means, they may not transfer this responsibility to consumers.

    If you have any questions or need additional information, feel free to contact Nancy Bell of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

    Sincerely,

    Jacqueline Glassman
    Chief Counsel

    cc: CIMS
    ref:109
    d.7/18/03

2003

ID: nht90-4.84

Open

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: December 14, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Roger C. Fairchild -- Shutler and Low

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 10-5-90 from R.C. Fairchild to P.J. Rice (OCC 5287)

TEXT:

This responds to your request for my opinion of whether a particular vehicle (the Pinzgauer) would be considered a "motor vehicle" for the purposes of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. When NHTSA previously considered this question, we stated in a March 25, 1982 letter to Mr. Leonard Fink that the Pinzgauer would be considered to be a motor vehicle, based on the information that was available to the agency at that time. However, that letter also stated that the agency would be willing to reconsider this conclusion if additional information were provided regarding the vehicle's marketing, advertising, and actual use. Your recent letter set forth three additional factors that you suggested might lead the agency to change its previous conclusion that the Pinzgauer was a motor vehicle. As explained in detail below, this agency reaffirms the previous conclusion that the Pinzgauer appears to be a motor vehicle.

Section 102(3) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1391(3)) defines a "motor vehicle" as

any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.

NHTSA has interpreted this language as follows. Vehicles that are equipped with tracks or are otherwise incapable of highway travel are plainly not motor vehicles. Further, vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use (e.g., airport runway vehicl es and underground mining devices) are not considered motor vehicles, even though they may be operationally capable of highway travel. Vehicles that have an abnormal body configuration that readily distinguishes them from other highway vehicles and a ma ximum speed of 20 miles per hour (mph) are not considered motor vehicles, because their use of the public roads is intermittent and incidental to their primary intended off-road use.

On the other hand, vehicles that use the public highways on a necessary and recurring basis are motor vehicles. For instance, a utility vehicle like the Jeep is plainly a motor vehicle, even though it is equipped with special features to permit off-road operation. If a vehicle's greatest use will be off-road, but it will spend a substantial amount of time on-road, then NHTSA has interpreted the vehicle to be a "motor vehicle". Further, the agency has determined that a vehicle such as a dune buggy is a motor vehicle if it is readily usable on the public roads and is in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of owners, regardless of the manufacturer's stated intent regarding the terrain on which the vehicle is to be operated.

Vehicles such as the Pinzgauer are not easily classified under either of these groupings. On the one hand, the Pinzgauer is obviously designed to have substantial off-road capabilities, as evidenced by high ground clearance, deep water fording capabilit ies, and all-wheel drive. According to its manufacturer, 95 percent of the annual production of Pinzgauers is purchased by armed forces worldwide. These factors suggest that the Pinzgauer should not be classified as a motor vehicle. On the other hand, the available information shows the Pinzgauer is suitable for use on-road. The vehicle has a top speed of nearly 70 miles per hour. Page 4 of Enclosure 1 of your letter shows that the Pinzgauer is equipped with turn signals and states that the power st eering minimizes steering effort "both in difficult terrain and when parking." Page 4 of Enclosure 3 with your letter describes the serviceability of the Pinzgauer "with ordinary on- and off-road usage." These factors suggest that the vehicle is design ed and intended to be routinely used on the public roads, which suggests that it should be classified as a motor vehicle.

In instances where the agency is asked whether something is a motor vehicle, when the vehicle has both on-road and off-road operating capabilities, and about which there is little or no evidence about the extent of the vehicle's on-road use, NHTSA has ap plied five factors to reach its conclusion. These factors are:

1. Whether States or foreign countries have permitted or are likely to permit the vehicle to be registered for on-road use.

2. Whether the vehicle is or will be advertised for use on-road as well as off-road, or whether it is or will be advertised exclusively for off-road use.

3. Whether the vehicle's manufacturer or dealers will assist vehicle purchasers in obtaining certificates of origin or title documents to register the vehicle for on-road use.

4. Whether the vehicle is or will be sold by dealers also selling vehicles that are classified as motor vehicles.

5. Whether the vehicle has or will have affixed to it a warning label stating that the vehicle is not intended for use on the public roads.

When NHTSA previously considered whether the Pinzgauer should be considered a motor vehicle, the available information regarding these factors showed that the manufacturer had equipped the vehicle with side marker lights, the manufacturer expected the ve hicle to be used on-road, and that it would be sold by dealers that also sell vehicles that are clearly motor vehicles.

In your letter, you enclosed some additional information and brochures from the manufacturer that show the manufacturer continues to expect Pinzgauers to be used both on- and off-road. Since the manufacturer does not now expect to sponsor the vehicle's sale in the U.S., no information is available on the anticipated dealers. The additional information enclosed with your letter did not specifically address any factors on

which no information was previously available to NHTSA. Hence, the agency has no basis for changing its previous conclusion that the Pinzgauer appears to be a motor vehicle.

You suggested three reasons that might lead the agency to reverse its previous conclusion. First, you suggested that the 6-wheeled version of the Pinzgauer has a unique body configuration which distinguishes it from typical, on-road vehicles and makes i t particularly well suited to off-road use. You correctly noted that the agency's 1982 letter addressed both the 4-wheeled and 6-wheeled version of the Pinzgauer. However, for the purposes of this analysis, there is no attribute of the 6-wheeled versio n that would lead the agency to conclude that it should be classified differently than the 4-wheeled version of the Pinzgauer. Many vehicles that are clearly motor vehicles have 6 wheels. In all other respects, the 4- and 6-wheeled Pinzgauers have simi lar on-road capabilities, including a top speed of more than 65 miles per hour.

Second, you suggested that NHTSA concluded that the Unimog is not a "motor vehicle" in a February 7, 1984 letter, and that the Unimog and Pinzgauer are comparable vehicles. In the February 7, 1984 letter to Mr. Karl-Heinz Faber to which you refer, NHTSA stated that it had no basis for changing its previous conclusion that the Unimog was not a "motor vehicle." NHTSA also noted that this conclusion was based upon the assumptions that Unimog vehicles would continue to be marketed through dealers of farm machinery and heavy equipment and that Unimog vehicles would have a label affixed stating that the Unimog is not manufactured for highway use. In other words, the information available for Unimog (especially regarding factors number 4 and 5 above) was s ufficient to lead the agency to conclude that it was not a motor vehicle, even though Unimogs are operationally capable of on-road use. By way of contrast, either no information is available for Pinzgauer vehicles regarding the five factors identified a bove or, if information is available for a factor, it suggests that the Pinzgauer should be treated as a motor vehicle. Since the Pinzgauer is operationally capable of on-road use, and there is no indication that the manufacturer does not intend for it to spend a substantial amount of time on-road, NHTSA reaffirms its previous statement that these vehicles appear to be "motor vehicles," within the meaning of the Safety Act.

Third, you suggested that NHTSA's 1982 conclusion did not include a consideration of the primary design intent of the Pinzgauer for military purposes and the high percentage of its total sales to the military. NHTSA's 1982 conclusion and this reconsidera tion both are addressed only to the non-military versions of the Pinzgauer. The military versions of the Pinzgauer would not be subject to the safety standards if their sales satisfied 49 CFR S571.7(c). In both the 1982 and this examination of whether the non-military versions of the Pinzgauer are motor vehicles, the agency fully considered the substantial off-road capabilities of these vehicles. However, absent indications that the manufacturer does not intend the Pinzgauer to spend substantial peri ods of time on-road, NHTSA concluded in 1982, and reaffirms at this time, that the non-military versions of the Pinzgauer appear to be "motor vehicles" within the meaning of the Safety Act.

I hope this information is useful. If you have any further questions or

need some additional information on this topic, please feel free to contact Steve Kratzke of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: 2787y

Open

Roger C. Fairchild, Esq.
Shutler and Low
14500 Avion Parkway
Suite 300
Chantilly, VA 22021-1101

Dear Mr. Fairchild:

This responds to your request for my opinion of whether a particular vehicle (the Pinzgauer) would be considered a "motor vehicle" for the purposes of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. When NHTSA previously considered this question, we stated in a March 25, 1982 letter to Mr. Leonard Fink that the Pinzgauer would be considered to be a motor vehicle, based on the information that was available to the agency at that time. However, that letter also stated that the agency would be willing to reconsider this conclusion if additional information were provided regarding the vehicle's marketing, advertising, and actual use. Your recent letter set forth three additional factors that you suggested might lead the agency to change its previous conclusion that the Pinzgauer was a motor vehicle. As explained in detail below, this agency reaffirms the previous conclusion that the Pinzgauer appears to be a motor vehicle.

Section 102(3) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1391(3)) defines a "motor vehicle" as

any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.

NHTSA has interpreted this language as follows. Vehicles that are equipped with tracks or are otherwise incapable of highway travel are plainly not motor vehicles. Further, vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use (e.g., airport runway vehicles and underground mining devices) are not considered motor vehicles, even though they may be operationally capable of highway travel. Vehicles that have an abnormal body configuration that readily distinguishes them from other highway vehicles and a maximum speed of 20 miles per hour (mph) are not considered motor vehicles, because their use of the public roads is intermittent and incidental to their primary intended off-road use. On the other hand, vehicles that use the public highways on a necessary and recurring basis are motor vehicles. For instance, a utility vehicle like the Jeep is plainly a motor vehicle, even though it is equipped with special features to permit off-road operation. If a vehicle's greatest use will be off-road, but it will spend a substantial amount of time on-road, then NHTSA has interpreted the vehicle to be a "motor vehicle". Further, the agency has determined that a vehicle such as a dune buggy is a motor vehicle if it is readily usable on the public roads and is in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of owners, regardless of the manufacturer's stated intent regarding the terrain on which the vehicle is to be operated.

Vehicles such as the Pinzgauer are not easily classified under either of these groupings. On the one hand, the Pinzgauer is obviously designed to have substantial off-road capabilities, as evidenced by high ground clearance, deep water fording capabilities, and all-wheel drive. According to its manufacturer, 95 percent of the annual production of Pinzgauers is purchased by armed forces worldwide. These factors suggest that the Pinzgauer should not be classified as a motor vehicle. On the other hand, the available information shows the Pinzgauer is suitable for use on-road. The vehicle has a top speed of nearly 70 miles per hour. Page 4 of Enclosure 1 of your letter shows that the Pinzgauer is equipped with turn signals and states that the power steering minimizes steering effort "both in difficult terrain and when parking." Page 4 of Enclosure 3 with your letter describes the serviceability of the Pinzgauer "with ordinary on- and off-road usage." These factors suggest that the vehicle is designed and intended to be routinely used on the public roads, which suggests that it should be classified as a motor vehicle.

In instances where the agency is asked whether something is a motor vehicle, when the vehicle has both on-road and off-road operating capabilities, and about which there is little or no evidence about the extent of the vehicle's on-road use, NHTSA has applied five factors to reach its conclusion. These factors are:

1. Whether States or foreign countries have permitted or are likely to permit the vehicle to be registered for on-road use.

2. Whether the vehicle is or will be advertised for use on-road as well as off-road, or whether it is or will be advertised exclusively for off-road use.

3. Whether the vehicle's manufacturer or dealers will assist vehicle purchasers in obtaining certificates of origin or title documents to register the vehicle for on-road use.

4. Whether the vehicle is or will be sold by dealers also selling vehicles that are classified as motor vehicles.

5. Whether the vehicle has or will have affixed to it a warning label stating that the vehicle is not intended for use on the public roads.

When NHTSA previously considered whether the Pinzgauer should be considered a motor vehicle, the available information regarding these factors showed that the manufacturer had equipped the vehicle with side marker lights, the manufacturer expected the vehicle to be used on-road, and that it would be sold by dealers that also sell vehicles that are clearly motor vehicles.

In your letter, you enclosed some additional information and brochures from the manufacturer that show the manufacturer continues to expect Pinzgauers to be used both on- and off-road. Since the manufacturer does not now expect to sponsor the vehicle's sale in the U.S., no information is available on the anticipated dealers. The additional information enclosed with your letter did not specifically address any factors on which no information was previously available to NHTSA. Hence, the agency has no basis for changing its previous conclusion that the Pinzgauer appears to be a motor vehicle.

You suggested three reasons that might lead the agency to reverse its previous conclusion. First, you suggested that the 6-wheeled version of the Pinzgauer has a unique body configuration which distinguishes it from typical, on-road vehicles and makes it particularly well suited to off-road use. You correctly noted that the agency's 1982 letter addressed both the 4-wheeled and 6-wheeled version of the Pinzgauer. However, for the purposes of this analysis, there is no attribute of the 6-wheeled version that would lead the agency to conclude that it should be classified differently than the 4-wheeled version of the Pinzgauer. Many vehicles that are clearly motor vehicles have 6 wheels. In all other respects, the 4- and 6-wheeled Pinzgauers have similar on-road capabilities, including a top speed of more than 65 miles per hour.

Second, you suggested that NHTSA concluded that the Unimog is not a "motor vehicle" in a February 7, 1984 letter, and that the Unimog and Pinzgauer are comparable vehicles. In the February 7, 1984 letter to Mr. Karl-Heinz Faber to which you refer, NHTSA stated that it had no basis for changing its previous conclusion that the Unimog was not a "motor vehicle." NHTSA also noted that this conclusion was based upon the assumptions that Unimog vehicles would continue to be marketed through dealers of farm machinery and heavy equipment and that Unimog vehicles would have a label affixed stating that the Unimog is not manufactured for highway use. In other words, the information available for Unimog (especially regarding factors number 4 and 5 above) was sufficient to lead the agency to conclude that it was not a motor vehicle, even though Unimogs are operationally capable of on-road use. By way of contrast, either no information is available for Pinzgauer vehicles regarding the five factors identified above or, if information is available for a factor, it suggests that the Pinzgauer should be treated as a motor vehicle. Since the Pinzgauer is operationally capable of on-road use, and there is no indication that the manufacturer does not intend for it to spend a substantial amount of time on-road, NHTSA reaffirms its previous statement that these vehicles appear to be "motor vehicles," within the meaning of the Safety Act.

Third, you suggested that NHTSA's 1982 conclusion did not include a consideration of the primary design intent of the Pinzgauer for military purposes and the high percentage of its total sales to the military. NHTSA's 1982 conclusion and this reconsideration both are addressed only to the non-military versions of the Pinzgauer. The military versions of the Pinzgauer would not be subject to the safety standards if their sales satisfied 49 CFR 571.7(c). In both the 1982 and this examination of whether the non-military versions of the Pinzgauer are motor vehicles, the agency fully considered the substantial off-road capabilities of these vehicles. However, absent indications that the manufacturer does not intend the Pinzgauer to spend substantial periods of time on-road, NHTSA concluded in 1982, and reaffirms at this time, that the non-military versions of the Pinzgauer appear to be "motor vehicles" within the meaning of the Safety Act.

I hope this information is useful. If you have any further questions or need some additional information on this topic, please feel free to contact Steve Kratzke of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

ref:VSA#571 d:l2/l4/90

1970

ID: 2788y

Open

Roger C. Fairchild, Esq.
Shutler and Low
14500 Avion Parkway
Suite 300
Chantilly, VA 22021-1101

Dear Mr. Fairchild:

This responds to your request for my opinion of whether a particular vehicle (the Pinzgauer) would be considered a "motor vehicle" for the purposes of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. When NHTSA previously considered this question, we stated in a March 25, 1982 letter to Mr. Leonard Fink that the Pinzgauer would be considered to be a motor vehicle, based on the information that was available to the agency at that time. However, that letter also stated that the agency would be willing to reconsider this conclusion if additional information were provided regarding the vehicle's marketing, advertising, and actual use. Your recent letter set forth three additional factors that you suggested might lead the agency to change its previous conclusion that the Pinzgauer was a motor vehicle. As explained in detail below, this agency reaffirms the previous conclusion that the Pinzgauer appears to be a motor vehicle.

Section 102(3) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1391(3)) defines a "motor vehicle" as

any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.

NHTSA has interpreted this language as follows. Vehicles that are equipped with tracks or are otherwise incapable of highway travel are plainly not motor vehicles. Further, vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use (e.g., airport runway vehicles and underground mining devices) are not considered motor vehicles, even though they may be operationally capable of highway travel. Vehicles that have an abnormal body configuration that readily distinguishes them from other highway vehicles and a maximum speed of 20 miles per hour (mph) are not considered motor vehicles, because their use of the public roads is intermittent and incidental to their primary intended off-road use. On the other hand, vehicles that use the public highways on a necessary and recurring basis are motor vehicles. For instance, a utility vehicle like the Jeep is plainly a motor vehicle, even though it is equipped with special features to permit off-road operation. If a vehicle's greatest use will be off-road, but it will spend a substantial amount of time on-road, then NHTSA has interpreted the vehicle to be a "motor vehicle". Further, the agency has determined that a vehicle such as a dune buggy is a motor vehicle if it is readily usable on the public roads and is in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of owners, regardless of the manufacturer's stated intent regarding the terrain on which the vehicle is to be operated.

Vehicles such as the Pinzgauer are not easily classified under either of these groupings. On the one hand, the Pinzgauer is obviously designed to have substantial off-road capabilities, as evidenced by high ground clearance, deep water fording capabilities, and all-wheel drive. According to its manufacturer, 95 percent of the annual production of Pinzgauers is purchased by armed forces worldwide. These factors suggest that the Pinzgauer should not be classified as a motor vehicle. On the other hand, the available information shows the Pinzgauer is suitable for use on-road. The vehicle has a top speed of nearly 70 miles per hour. Page 4 of Enclosure 1 of your letter shows that the Pinzgauer is equipped with turn signals and states that the power steering minimizes steering effort "both in difficult terrain and when parking." Page 4 of Enclosure 3 with your letter describes the serviceability of the Pinzgauer "with ordinary on- and off-road usage." These factors suggest that the vehicle is designed and intended to be routinely used on the public roads, which suggests that it should be classified as a motor vehicle.

In instances where the agency is asked whether something is a motor vehicle, when the vehicle has both on-road and off-road operating capabilities, and about which there is little or no evidence about the extent of the vehicle's on-road use, NHTSA has applied five factors to reach its conclusion. These factors are:

1. Whether States or foreign countries have permitted or are likely to permit the vehicle to be registered for on-road use.

2. Whether the vehicle is or will be advertised for use on-road as well as off-road, or whether it is or will be advertised exclusively for off-road use.

3. Whether the vehicle's manufacturer or dealers will assist vehicle purchasers in obtaining certificates of origin or title documents to register the vehicle for on-road use.

4. Whether the vehicle is or will be sold by dealers also selling vehicles that are classified as motor vehicles.

5. Whether the vehicle has or will have affixed to it a warning label stating that the vehicle is not intended for use on the public roads.

When NHTSA previously considered whether the Pinzgauer should be considered a motor vehicle, the available information regarding these factors showed that the manufacturer had equipped the vehicle with side marker lights, the manufacturer expected the vehicle to be used on-road, and that it would be sold by dealers that also sell vehicles that are clearly motor vehicles.

In your letter, you enclosed some additional information and brochures from the manufacturer that show the manufacturer continues to expect Pinzgauers to be used both on- and off-road. Since the manufacturer does not now expect to sponsor the vehicle's sale in the U.S., no information is available on the anticipated dealers. The additional information enclosed with your letter did not specifically address any factors on which no information was previously available to NHTSA. Hence, the agency has no basis for changing its previous conclusion that the Pinzgauer appears to be a motor vehicle.

You suggested three reasons that might lead the agency to reverse its previous conclusion. First, you suggested that the 6-wheeled version of the Pinzgauer has a unique body configuration which distinguishes it from typical, on-road vehicles and makes it particularly well suited to off-road use. You correctly noted that the agency's 1982 letter addressed both the 4-wheeled and 6-wheeled version of the Pinzgauer. However, for the purposes of this analysis, there is no attribute of the 6-wheeled version that would lead the agency to conclude that it should be classified differently than the 4-wheeled version of the Pinzgauer. Many vehicles that are clearly motor vehicles have 6 wheels. In all other respects, the 4- and 6-wheeled Pinzgauers have similar on-road capabilities, including a top speed of more than 65 miles per hour.

Second, you suggested that NHTSA concluded that the Unimog is not a "motor vehicle" in a February 7, 1984 letter, and that the Unimog and Pinzgauer are comparable vehicles. In the February 7, 1984 letter to Mr. Karl-Heinz Faber to which you refer, NHTSA stated that it had no basis for changing its previous conclusion that the Unimog was not a "motor vehicle." NHTSA also noted that this conclusion was based upon the assumptions that Unimog vehicles would continue to be marketed through dealers of farm machinery and heavy equipment and that Unimog vehicles would have a label affixed stating that the Unimog is not manufactured for highway use. In other words, the information available for Unimog (especially regarding factors number 4 and 5 above) was sufficient to lead the agency to conclude that it was not a motor vehicle, even though Unimogs are operationally capable of on-road use. By way of contrast, either no information is available for Pinzgauer vehicles regarding the five factors identified above or, if information is available for a factor, it suggests that the Pinzgauer should be treated as a motor vehicle. Since the Pinzgauer is operationally capable of on-road use, and there is no indication that the manufacturer does not intend for it to spend a substantial amount of time on-road, NHTSA reaffirms its previous statement that these vehicles appear to be "motor vehicles," within the meaning of the Safety Act.

Third, you suggested that NHTSA's 1982 conclusion did not include a consideration of the primary design intent of the Pinzgauer for military purposes and the high percentage of its total sales to the military. NHTSA's 1982 conclusion and this reconsideration both are addressed only to the non-military versions of the Pinzgauer. The military versions of the Pinzgauer would not be subject to the safety standards if their sales satisfied 49 CFR 571.7(c). In both the 1982 and this examination of whether the non-military versions of the Pinzgauer are motor vehicles, the agency fully considered the substantial off-road capabilities of these vehicles. However, absent indications that the manufacturer does not intend the Pinzgauer to spend substantial periods of time on-road, NHTSA concluded in 1982, and reaffirms at this time, that the non-military versions of the Pinzgauer appear to be "motor vehicles" within the meaning of the Safety Act.

I hope this information is useful. If you have any further questions or need some additional information on this topic, please feel free to contact Steve Kratzke of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

ref:VSA#571 d:l2/l4/90

1970

ID: nht70-2.17

Open

DATE: 07/21/70

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Lawrence R. Schneider; NHTSA

TO: Mr. James Deifster

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Your request for information on requirements for camper manufacturers has been referred to this office for reply. The information we have received states that you are a manufacturer of campers, selling them to dealers, and also installing them on trucks.

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. @(Illegible Word) et seq., (copy enclosed) requires manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment to manufacture their products so that they comply, and to "certify" that they comply, with applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards. Camper bodies for both slide-in and chassis-mount camper installation are items of motor vehicle equipment and must comply with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205, will be certified by their manufacturer that they comply with the standard. I enclose a copy of the standard and the regulations governing certification for your information, Standard No. 205 incorporates by reference the USA Standard(Illegible Words) "Safety Code for Safety Glazing Materials for Glazing Motor Vehicles Operating on Land Highways." This USAS standard can be obtained for a small fee from the USA Standards Institute, 10 East 40th Street, New York, N.Y. 10016.

If you install slide-in camper bodies on pick-up trucks only, you are not subject to additional requirements. However, if you install chassis-mount camper bodies onto truck chassis, you are in addition to being a manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment, a manufacturer of motor vehicles, specifically, multipurpose passenger vehicles, and are required to comply with regulations and standards applicable to manufacturers of multipurpose passenger vehicles. Copies of these requirements, which have been promulgated pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and codified in Chapter 5 (formerly Chapter 3) of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, are available from the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 20402, under the title Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. The price is $ 8.00, which includes a subscription for one year to receive copies of amendments.

Because of the relative length and complexity of these requirements, it is difficult to summarize them for you here. Many trade associations have familiarized themselves with them in order to assist their membership in complying with them. If after studying the materials you have specific questions concerning their application to you, we will be pleased to answer them.

I have also enclosed a mailing list questionnaire. If you will complete and return it to the address indicated thereon, you will receive future notices pertaining to those areas you have marked.

ENCLOSURES

ID: 2988yy

Open

Mr. Stephen Mamakas
AIR Inc.
1517 West 9 Street
Brooklyn, NY 11204

Dear Mr. Mamakas:

This responds to your letter asking what Federal standards apply to the "repair" of deployed air bags. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our laws and regulations to you.

Section 103 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act; 15 U.S.C. 1392) authorizes this agency to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. We have exercised this authority to issue Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208). Standard No. 208 requires, among other things, that passenger cars provide automatic crash protection. Light trucks will also be required to provide automatic crash protection, beginning with the 1995 model year. Vehicles equipped with automatic crash protection protect their occupants by means that require no action by vehicle occupants. The compliance testing of vehicles to the requirement of Standard No. 208 is determined in a dynamic crash test. That is, a vehicle must comply with specified injury criteria (as measured on a test dummy) when tested by this agency in a 30 mph barrier crash test. The two types of automatic crash protection currently offered on new passenger cars are automatic safety belts (which help to assure belt use) and air bags (which supplement safety belts and offer some protection even when safety belts are not used). Automatic crash protection will save thousands of lives and prevent tens of thousands of serious injuries each year.

Note that the automatic crash protection requirement applies to the performance of the vehicle as a whole, instead of setting requirements for the air bag as an individual item of equipment. This approach permits vehicle manufacturers to "tune" the performance of the air bag to the crash pulse and other specific attributes of each of their vehicle models. However, this approach also means that the Federal standards do not specify specific performance attributes for air bags such as inflated dimensions, actuation time, and the like. Hence, there are no specific performance attributes with which repaired air bags must comply. The only Federal requirement that might affect your planned operation would be the "render inoperative" prohibition in section 108(a)(2)(A) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)). That section provides that, "No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle . . . in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard ..." In this case, air bags are a "device or element of design" installed in passenger cars in compliance with Standard No. 208. Hence, your repair business would violate Federal law if it were to remove, deploy, disable, or otherwise "render inoperative" air bags installed in passenger cars.

However, your letter gives no indication that your company intends to perform repairs or other operations on air bags that have not yet deployed. Instead, your letter asks only about performing repairs on air bags that have already deployed. Deployed air bags have been "rendered inoperative" by the forces that caused deployment, not by anything a repair business does after that deployment. Thus, it seems unlikely that any repairs your company performs on deployed air bags would violate the "render inoperative" section of Federal law.

Although there is no Federal law prohibiting the sort of repairs you asked about, your planned "repair" of deployed air bags gives rise to a host of safety concerns. You will need to contact the manufacturer of each vehicle on which you repair an air bag to learn the exact formula and amount of gas generant in the inflator canister for each air bag. This would be necessary to ensure that the "repaired" air bag will inflate at the time and in the manner intended by the original manufacturer. Additionally, you will need to replace the crash sensors, the inflation mechanism, and other electronic parts. Again, you will need to contact the vehicle manufacturer to obtain specifications for the performance of these electronic components. You will also need to refold and lubricate the fabric of the air bag in the same manner as the original air bag. If you fail to exactly duplicate the equipment and procedures used in the original air bag, your company could significantly reduce or even eliminate the protection that would have been provided by the original air bag. This, in turn, could expose your company to substantial liability under State laws for such repairs. You may wish to consult a private attorney for more information in this regard.

I hope this information is helpful.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

ref:208#VSA d:5/l3/9l

1970

ID: nht91-3.50

Open

DATE: May 13, 1991

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Stephen Mamakas -- AIR Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to 01/01/91 (EST) letter from Stephen Mamakas to Whom it May Concern (OCC 5875)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter asking what Federal standards apply to the "repair" of deployed air bags. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our laws and regulations to you.

Section 103 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act; 15 U.S.C. 1392) authorizes this agency to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. We have exercised this authority to issue Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208). Standard No. 208 requires, among other things, that passenger cars provide automatic crash protection. Light trucks will also be required to provide automatic crash protection, beginning with the 1995 model year. Vehicles equipped with automatic crash protection protect their occupants by means that require no action by vehicle occupants. The compliance testing of vehicles to the requirement of Standard No. 208 is determined in a dynamic crash test. That is, a vehicle must comply with specified injury criteria (as measured on a test dummy) when tested by this agency in a 30 mph barrier crash test. The two types of automatic crash protection currently offered on new passenger cars are automatic safety belts (which help to assure belt use) and air bags (which supplement safety belts and offer some protection even when safety belts are not used). Automatic crash protection will save thousands of lives and prevent tens of thousands of serious injuries each year.

Note that the automatic crash protection requirement applies to the performance of the vehicle as a whole, instead of setting requirements for the air bag as an individual item of equipment. This approach permits vehicle manufacturers to "tune" the performance of the air bag to the crash pulse and other specific attributes of each of their vehicle models. However, this approach also means that the Federal standards do not specify specific performance attributes for air bags such as inflated dimensions, actuation time, and the like. Hence, there are no specific performance attributes with which repaired air bags must comply.

The only Federal requirement that might affect your planned operation would be the "render inoperative" prohibition in section 108(a)(2)(A) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)). That section provides that, "No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle . . . in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard ..." In this case, air bags are a "device or element of design" installed in passenger cars in

compliance with Standard No. 208. Hence, your repair business would violate Federal law if it were to remove, deploy, disable, or otherwise "render inoperative" air bags installed in passenger cars.

However, your letter gives no indication that your company intends to perform repairs or other operations on air bags that have not yet deployed. Instead, your letter asks only about performing repairs on air bags that have already deployed. Deployed air bags have been "rendered inoperative" by the forces that caused deployment, not by anything a repair business does after that deployment. Thus, it seems unlikely that any repairs your company performs on deployed air bags would violate the "render inoperative" section of Federal law.

Although there is no Federal law prohibiting the sort of repairs you asked about, your planned "repair" of deployed air bags gives rise to a host of safety concerns. You will need to contact the manufacturer of each vehicle on which you repair an air bag to learn the exact formula and amount of gas generant in the inflator canister for each air bag. This would be necessary to ensure that the "repaired" air bag will inflate at the time and in the manner intended by the original manufacturer. Additionally, you will need to replace the crash sensors, the inflation mechanism, and other electronic parts. Again, you will need to contact the vehicle manufacturer to obtain specifications for the performance of these electronic components. You will also need to refold and lubricate the fabric of the air bag in the same manner as the original air bag. If you fail to exactly duplicate the equipment and procedures used in the original air bag, your company could significantly reduce or even eliminate the protection that would have been provided by the original air bag. This, in turn, could expose your company to substantial liability under State laws for such repairs. You may wish to consult a private attorney for more information in this regard.

I hope this information is helpful.

ID: 9883

Open

Mr. Hamilton K. Pyles
Cairncross & Associates, Inc.
2990 Mission Blvd.
San Diego, CA 92109

Dear Mr. Pyles:

This responds to your letter of April 5, 1994, to the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance. You would like to import into the United States "a kit for a compact custom truck bed". You ask what Federal laws and regulations govern the importation, sale, and installation of wooden pickup bed kits. You also ask what you must do, initially, to import a trial sample bed into the United States.

You have described the kit as consisting of plans and instructions in English, wooden and plywood parts of the bed, unspecified "metal parts," fastenings, wiring and "lights."

As a general rule, all motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment must conform (and be certified by their manufacturer to conform) to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards issued by this agency in order to be imported into the United States and sold here. The only motor vehicle equipment in your kit that is covered by a Federal standard is "lights." They are subject to our Standard No. 108 Lamps, Reflective Devices and Associated Equipment (49 CFR 571.108), and, thus, must conform and be certified as conforming in order to be imported into the United States. Certification is indicated either by a DOT symbol on the equipment, or by a statement of compliance attached to the equipment or on the container in which it is shipped.

If the lighting equipment does not conform, or if you are unsure whether it does, you are permitted by 49 CFR 591.5(j) to import one or more sample beds or kits for "research, investigations, studies, [or] demonstrations" for a period of up to three years after first obtaining written approval from the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance. If the lighting equipment does conform, there is no limitation upon the number of items you may import.

You have also written that the truck bed will be offered to the general public as a replacement for existing truck beds, and to "manufacturers who place specialized beds (campershells, utility company boxes, etc.) on pick-up frames that they buy new without factory installed beds."

Although you have no responsibility under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act for compliance of a vehicle with the Federal safety standards when the conversion work is completed, we should like to apprise you of the obligations of a converter, since the converter will look to you to provide it with complying lighting equipment. With respect to the general public, under section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)), the removal of the old truck bed and lights and installation of the new truck bed kit by a "manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business" must not "knowingly render inoperative in whole or in part any device or element of design installed in accordance with" a Federal motor vehicle safety standard. For example, one of the named parties would violate the Act if it removed the old bed with complying lamps and installed a new bed with noncompliant lamps if that person knew that the lamps did not comply. Similarly, if the bed in some manner obscured the center highmounted lamp which is now required for pickups manufactured after September 1, 1993, that could be a violation of the Act.

If a manufacturer is installing the truck bed on a new chassis, it becomes responsible for ensuring that the completed vehicle fully meets the Federal motor vehicle safety standards, and for certifying its compliance.

Finally, as the importer of the kit, you become its "manufacturer" under our laws and may have some responsibility for notification and remedy of safety related defects or noncompliances that are discovered in the kit either before or after its installation on motor vehicles.

I enclose an information sheet for your information, and hope that this letter has been helpful to you.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure ref:591#VSA d:5/12/94

1994

ID: nht94-5.36

Open

DATE: May 12, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Hamilton K. Pyles -- Cairncross & Associates, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 4/5/94 from Hamilton K. Pyles to NHTSA Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance

TEXT:

This responds to your letter of April 5, 1994 to the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance. You would like to import into the United States "a kit for a compact custom truck bed". You ask what Federal laws and regulations govern the importation, sale, and installation of wooden pickup bed kits. You also ask what you must do, initially, to import a trial sample bed into the United States.

You have described the kit as consisting of plans and instructions in English, wooden and plywood parts of the bed, unspecified "metal parts," fastenings, wiring and "lights."

As a general rule, all motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment must conform (and be certified by their manufacturer to conform) to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards issued by this agency in order to be imported into the United States and sold here. The only motor vehicle equipment in your kit that is covered by a Federal standard is "lights." They are subject to our Standard No. 108 LAMPS, REFLECTIVE DEVICES AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT (49 CFR 571.108), and, thus, must conform and be certified as conforming in order to be imported into the United States. Certification is indicated either by a DOT symbol on the equipment, or by a statement of compliance attached to the equipment or on the container in which it is shipped.

If the lighting equipment does not conform, or if you are unsure whether it does, you are permitted by 49 CFR 591.5(j) to import one or more sample beds or kits for "research, investigations, studies, (or) demonstrations" for a period of up to three years after first obtaining written approval from the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance. If the lighting equipment does conform, there is no limitation upon the number of items you may import.

You have also written that the truck bed will be offered to the general public as a replacement for existing truck beds, and to "manufacturers who place specialized beds (campershells, utility company boxes, etc.) on pick-up frames that they buy new without factory installed beds."

Although you have no responsibility under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act for compliance of a vehicle with the Federal safety standards when the conversion work is completed, we should like to apprise you of the obligations of a converter, since the converter will look to you to provide it with complying lighting equipment. With respect to the general public, under section 108 (a) (2) (A) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 1397 (a) (2) (A)) , the removal of the old truck bed and lights and

installation of the new truck bed kit by a "manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business" must not "knowingly render inoperative in whole or in part any device or element of design installed in accordance with" a Federal motor vehicle safety standard. For example, one of the named parties would violate the Act if it removed the old bed with complying lamps and installed a new bed with noncompliant lamps if that person knew that the lamps did not comply. Similarly, if the bed in some manner obscured the center highmounted lamp which is now required for pickups manufactured after September 1, 1993, that could be a violation of the Act. If a manufacturer is installing the truck bed on a new chassis, it becomes responsible for ensuring that the completed vehicle fully meets the Federal motor vehicle safety standards, and for certifying its compliance.

Finally, as the importer of the kit, you become its "manufacturer" under our laws and may have some responsibility for notification and remedy of safety related defects or noncompliances that are discovered in the kit either before or after its installation on motor vehicles.

I enclose an information sheet for your information, and hope that this letter has been helpful to you.

ID: nht95-4.94

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: December 8, 1995

FROM: Samuel J. Dubbin -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Mr.Peter F. Marthy -- New York State Automobile Dealers

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: 9/19/95 letter from John Womack to David Seagren

TEXT: This is in response to your letter requesting the Chief Counsel of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to explain the proper procedure to be followed in completing an odometer disclosure for a vehicle whose odometer had been previo usly been replaced and which has a sticker affixed to the inside left door jamb stating the actual mileage at the time the odometer was replaced. Specifically, you ask whether the transferee may enter on the disclosure statement a figure that is the tota l of the mileage on the new odometer and the mileage shown on the door sticker, and, if so whether the transferor can then certify that figure is the actual mileage the vehicle has traveled.

The reason that it is permissible to certify on the odometer disclosure that the total of the figure on the door sticker and the figure on the current odometer reading represents the actual mileage is that the combination of the sticker and the second od ometer contains sufficient information from which the transferor can calculate with precision the total actual mileage on the vehicle. Under 49 U.S.C. @ 32704(a)(2), the door sticker must show the mileage at the time the odometer was replaced; and the t ransferor can ascertain the reading on the current odometer by visual examination. Of course, if the transferor has knowledge that either figure does not represent actual mileage, he or she may not certify that a total of the two figures is the actual m ileage.

We consider this situation to be comparable to that in which a transferor converts an odometer registering kilometers to an odometer that registers miles, because in both situations, the transferor is able to arrive at the correct number of miles the veh icle has actually traveled simply by applying a mathematical formula to the numbers showing on the odometer. In a recent interpretation letter, the agency stated that a dealer which had converted a vehicle's odometer from kilometers to miles, and knew t he kilometer reading before the conversion, could certify that the odometer reading in miles represented "actual mileage" because the dealer knew the number of kilometers before the change and could be accurately calculate the number of miles by multiply ing that figure by 0.62. I have enclosed a copy of that letter for your information.

In answer to the question of whether or not the transferor should have the odometer replaced before the transfer with an odometer set to reflect the total number of miles on the vehicle, NHTSA believes that in the circumstances you describe, the transfer or should replace the odometer with one that reflects the total miles the vehicle has travelled. Replacing the odometer with one that shows all the miles the vehicle has traveled on both odometers has the advantage of reducing the possibility that the t ransferee in this or subsequent transactions would be misled by the number of miles showing on the odometer, or confused by the difference between that figure and the total shown on the title. This approach does require removal of the door sticker to av oid further confusing a subsequent purchaser. However, it is not illegal to remove such a sticker when there is no intent to defraud. 49 U.S.C. @ 32704(b).

The alternative, which the agency believes is not desirable, would be to leave the present odometer in the car set at its present reding, and leave the sticker on the door jamb. The problem with this option is that the sticker does not provide as durabl e a record of mileage as the odometer. A sticker can fall off, fade or be removed, creating the potential for confusion when the odometer reading is compared with the information on the title. The same confusion is possible even if the sticker is prese nt, because it might easily be overlooked.

I hope the information in this letter is helpful. If you have further questions concerning interpretation of the Federal odometer law and regulations, you may contact Eileen Leahy, an attorney on my staff, either at the above address or by telephone at (202) 366-5263. Other questions concerning the odometer fraud or the Federal odometer disclosure program may be directed to Mr. Richard Morse, Chief of NHTSA's Odometer Fraud Staff, at (202) 366-4761.

(Letter from Peter Marthy to NHTSA is not available.)

Request an Interpretation

You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:

The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.

Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.

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