ID: 21885r.ztv

LeAnn M. Johnson-Koch, Esq.
Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe LLP
1200 Nineteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036-2412





Dear Ms. Johnson-Koch:

This is in reply to your letter of July 13, 2000, to Taylor Vinson of this Office, on behalf of your client, Harvest Drivemaster USA, requesting our opinion that Samsung Concrete Pumping Cranes, Models PX362 and PX321, are not "motor vehicles" under the laws that we administer. These vehicles are trucks which have cranes mounted to the bed behind the cab.

As Mr. Vinson explained to your associate, Ms. Dykes, we have no record of receiving either your original letter of May 22, 2000, or its followup of June 12, 2000, in spite of your delivery confirmation slips. I apologize for any inconvenience our delay may have caused you.

We have learned that the United States Attorneys in Baltimore, Denver, Dallas, and Atlanta are conducting criminal investigations into the possibly illegal importation into the United States of concrete pump trucks manufactured in Korea by Samsung and Daewoo, some of which were imported at Baltimore. The United States Attorney in Baltimore has identified the importing companies as "Harvest" and "Drivemaster" among others. Samsung and Daewoo have not manufactured these vehicles for sale in the United States or imported and sold them here. They have been imported by entities other than the manufacturers or their representatives. We assume that the concrete pump cranes about which you inquire are a subject of this investigation, and we understand the importance of our interpretation, both to your clients and to the investigation.

As you are aware, a motor vehicle under our principal vehicle safety statute is defined as a vehicle that has been "manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways." (49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(6)). Further, if a vehicle is a "motor vehicle," it must comply with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards in order to be imported into the United States (49 U.S.C. 30112(a)). You believe that the Samsung Concrete Pumping Cranes are not "motor vehicles," because they are mobile construction equipment. You have cited Koehring Co. v. Adams, 452 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Wisc. 1978), affirmed 605 F. 2d 280 (7^th Cir. 1979) and agency interpretations in support of your belief.

We have reviewed Koehring. The plaintiffs were seven manufacturers who sought a declaratory judgment that the mobile cranes, mobile excavators, and mobile drill wells which they manufactured were not "motor vehicles" subject to 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq., the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (recodified as 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 in 1994) ⁽¹⁾. The manufacturers had admitted that their vehicles used the public roads, and the parties stipulated that the typical item of the construction equipment at issue traveled an estimated average of 2,100 to 2,200 miles per year under its own power on the public roads, and spent a majority of its operation time off the public roads.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and declared "that mobile construction equipment which is designed to perform work on a construction site and which normally uses the public streets, roads or ways only for travel between job sites, is not a vehicle which has been manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads and highways" (op. cit. at 638). Although conceding that the equipment possessed design features required for on-road travel such as rubber tires, the capability of traveling at highway speeds and conforming to government regulations for vehicle width, the court stated that the record before it was clear that operation on the public roads was "decidedly" an incidental activity and that "the greater percentage of these vehicles' operation is on off-highway construction sites rather than on public roads." On a limited interpretation of the term "primarily" in the definition of " motor vehicle," the court held that the mobile cranes, excavators and drill wells at issue were not "motor vehicles." The 7^th Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Although we did not agree with the courts, we have not undertaken to reconsider Koehring in our interpretations involving construction equipment.

We continue to be concerned with the Koehing decision, particularly because we have received information indicating that concrete pump cranes manufactured by Samsung and others are using the public roads far more frequently than they appear to have done at the time of the Koehring decision. We are not bound by Koehring because it was not based on an analysis consistent with Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Committee, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). However, the importers of Samsung concrete pump cranes may have imported their vehicles pursuant to Koehring's classification of mobile cranes as "mobile construction equipment," in accordance with that court decision. Since our interpretations are in accord with that decision and we have not undertaken to distinguish it, we do not view the importation and use of the Samsung concrete pump cranes as a violation of 49 U.S.C. 30112(a).

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

ref:571
d.3/21/01





---

1. The citation of "15 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(3) (1999)" on page 2 of your letter of May 22, 2000, should be "49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(6) (1999)" as 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq. was revoked in 1994.

ID: 11896.ZTV

R. Wender
P.O. Box 456
Flushing, NY 11365-0456

Dear Sir or Madam:

Your letter of April 26, 1996, to the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance has been forwarded to this Office for reply. You have asked whether there are any Federal regulations that apply to an aftermarket accessory center highmounted stop lamp (we refer to it as a "CHMSL") that you have bought for use on a used station wagon that you bought. As you describe it, the CHMSL is ten inches long, one inch wide, and one inch deep. Mounted inside the rear window, the CHMSL contains four bulbs. When the brake pedal is depressed, each of the four bulbs is lit sequentially, from right to left then back to right.

Each passenger car manufactured on and after September 1, 1985, must be equipped with a CHMSL that conforms to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108. Further, any aftermarket CHMSL that is intended to replace the original CHMSL must also meet the requirements of the standard. One of the requirements is that the CHMSL be steady burning when the brake pedal is applied, that is to say, that all light sources must illuminate simultaneously when the brake pedal is applied, and be extinguished simultaneously when the brake pedal is released. The purpose of this is to ensure that the CHMSL is instantly recognized as part of the stop lamp system, so that the driver following can apply the brakes without hesitation or take evasive action if needed. In the aftermarket CHMSL you describe, the four light sources are not illuminated or extinguished simultaneously, and for this reason the lamp could not be used as a replacement CHMSL on cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1985.

Apparently your station wagon was manufactured before September 1, 1985, since its manufacturer did not provide it with a CHMSL. In this situation, the accessory lamp is not replacement equipment covered by Standard No. 108 since it is not replacing an item of required equipment with which the car was originally equipped. However, we administer a law that forbids manufacturers, dealers, distributors, or motor vehicle repair businesses from making modifications that "make inoperative" any original safety equipment on the vehicle installed in accordance with a Federal safety standard. Because of the potential of a flashing CHMSL to cause confusion with the pair of steady-burning stop lamps mounted lower on each side of the vehicle, it is our opinion that the installation of the aftermarket CHMSL would make the regular stop lamps partially inoperative within the meaning of the prohibition.

The prohibition does not apply if the modifications to a vehicle are done by its owner, and you would not be in violation of the Federal statute if you personally installed the CHMSL. However, whether it is legal to use it depends upon the law of the state where the CHMSL is operated. We are not able to advise you about the applicability of New York law to the light and suggest that you contact the state Department of Motor Vehicles for an answer.

If you have any questions, you may refer them to Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

Samuel J. Dubbin Chief Counsel

ref:108 d:6/6/96

ID: shulman.crs

Mr. Burt Shulman
15D Van Horn Circle
Beacon, NY 12508
Dear Mr. Shulman:

This is in response to a letter that you sent by fax on August 5, 1999, requesting an interpretation of NHTSA's vehicle importation regulations at 49 CFR Part 591. Section 591.5(d) permits the importation of a vehicle that does not conform to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety, bumper, and theft prevention standards if the importer files a declaration at the time the vehicle is offered for importation that states that the importer is a nonresident of the United States, "is temporarily importing the vehicle for personal use for a period not to exceed one year," will not sell the vehicle during that time, and will export the vehicle not later than one year from the date of entry. You have asked whether the term "personal use," as found in this provision, would preclude anyone other than the nonresident importer from driving the vehicle while it is in the United States. You have more particularly asked whether the nonresident importer would have to be in the vehicle if it is driven by his consignee. In your fax, you have cited 19 CFR 12.73 and 148.45 in support of your belief that a consignee may drive a vehicle imported by a non-resident for "personal use." However, as you have noted, the regulations you cite are not those of the Department of Transportation, and we have no knowledge of how the Customs Service may have interpreted them.

The Department of Transportation's importation regulations and the statute that they implement (49 U.S.C. 30141 through 30147) distinguish between vehicles that are imported "for personal use," and those that are imported "for resale." The term "personal use," as found in these provisions, identifies the purpose for which the vehicle is imported. Sec. 591.5(d) was adopted in recognition of international treaties to which the United States is a party, which are intended to assure the free flow of international road traffic. The primary beneficiaries of these treaty provisions are citizens of other countries who tour the United States and who wish to import their personal vehicles to use during their visits. These provisions also benefit American citizens who are in the United States temporarily between work assignments outside the United States and bring their vehicle with them.

It is in the public interest that there be consistency among Federal regulations to the extent that this is possible. We have reviewed 19 CFR 148.45's provisions and believe that they are consistent with the purpose of Sec. 591.5(d). Sec. 148.45 exempts from duties automobiles imported by nonresidents "in connection with the arrival of the nonresident to be used in the United States only for the transportation of the nonresident, his family and guests, and such incidental carriage of articles as may be appropriate to his personal use of the conveyance." If we adopt a similar meaning for "personal use" for purposes of Sec. 591.5(d), we would say that "guests" means people unrelated to the nonresident's family who are being transported by the nonresident, and that "guests" does not refer to a "consignee" operating the vehicle.

We understand from discussions with our Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC) that you have inquired about the various means by which you may import a 1999 Smart passenger car that does not conform to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards. In the course of your discussions with OVSC, you have indicated that you may wish to take advantage of the exemption from the prohibition on importing such a vehicle that is provided by Sec. 591.5(d) by finding a nonresident to import the vehicle, but then using the vehicle yourself as its "consignee." If this is in fact your intent, we wish to advise you that we would not regard the importation of the Smart by the non-resident, or you as the "consignee," as being an importation for the importer's "personal use" within the meaning of Sec. 591.5(d) as interpreted in this letter.

If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please contact Coleman Sachs or Taylor Vinson of my staff at 202-366-5263.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
ref:591
d.9/2/99

ID: nht87-2.95

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/18/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: J. Douglas Hand -- General Motors Legal Staff

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

ATTACHMT: 10/15/87 letter from Erika Z. Jones to G.T. Doe (Std. 208; Std. 216); 2/5/87 letter from G.T. Doe to Erika Z. Jones (occ 176)

TEXT:

J. Douglas Hand, Esq. Legal Staff General Motors Corporation P.O. Box 33122 Detroit, MI 48232

This responds to your letter seeking an interpretation of Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR S571.208). Specifically, you asked whether General Motors Corporation (GM can be deemed the manufacturer of passenger cars produced by Lotus Car s Limited (LCL) for the purposes of S4.1.3.5, the manufacturer attribution provisions of Standard No. 208. After we received your letter, you made us aware of certain changed circumstances. In your letter, you stated that GM did not own the entity that w as the exclusive importer of Lotus Vehicles, and that GM owned 96 percent of LCL. Subsequently, you have told us that GM wholly owns the companies that import and market Lotus vehicles in the United States and that GM wholly owns LCL. This letter of inte rpretation is based on the GM -Lotus corporate relationship described in this letter. To the extent that the description in this letter differs from the description set forth in your August, 1986 letter, if reflects our understanding of the change circum stances. Our conclusion is that, since GM sponsors the importation, distribution, and marketing of these cars, GM may be considered the manufacturer of cars produced by LCL for the purposes of standard No. 208.

You explained that LCL is a part of Group Lotus, a United Kingdom company that provides engineering services to various motor vehicle manufactures and produces fewer than a thousand passenger cars a year. Group Lotus is a wholly-owned subsidiary of GM, a lthough LCL designs, builds, and certifies its cars without GM's advice. Approximately 200 Lotus Performance Cars, Limited Partnership (LPC), a wholly-owned subsidiary of GM. Lotus cars are marketed and distributed in the United States by Lotus Cars USA, Inc., another wholly-owned subsidiary of GM. Hence, GM owns the company that designs and assembles these cars, and GM owns the companies that import and market the vehicles.

Section 102(5) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1391(5)) defines "manufacturer" as many person engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, including any person importing motor ve hicles or motor vehicle equipment for resale." Under this definition, both LCL and LPC are statutory manufacturers of Lotus passenger cars. LCL designs and assembles the cars, and has filed a designation of agent for service of process with this agency, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1399(e). By filing a designation of agent, LCL has acknowledged that it is offering its cars for importation into the United State. LPC imports those cars into the United States.

Section S4.1.3.5 of Standard No. 208 sets forth provisions for instances in which passenger cars have more than one statutory "manufacturer." That section provides that the manufacturers may execute an express written contract to specify the manufacturer s to which the cars shall up attributed. In the absence of such a contract, S4.1.3.5.1(a) provides that imported passenger cars will be attributed to the importer. Since there is no such contract in this instance, application of this provision means that the Lotus passenger cars, which are produced in the United Kingdom, would be attributed to LPC, the GM subsidiary which imports the cars into the United States.

In the April 11, 1985, proposal to establish attribution requirements in the case of vehicles that have more than one statutory "manufacturer" (50, FR 14589), NHTSA stated that it considers the statutory definition of "manufacturer" to be sufficiently br oad to include sponsors, depending on the circumstances. See 50 FR 14596. The agency stated that if a sponsor contracts for another manufacturer to produce a design exclusively for the sponsor, the sponsor may be considered the manufacturer of those vehi cles, applying basic principles of agency law. On the other hand, the agency stated that the mere purchase of vehicles for resale by a company which also is a manufacturer of motor vehicles does not make the purchaser the manufacturer of those vehicles.

Applying these principles to your case, we conclude that GM sponsors the importation of the Lotus vehicles. Both LCL, the actual assembler, and LPC, the actual importer, are wholly-owned subsidiaries of GM. By itself, GM's ownership of both the producer and importer of these care might not be sufficient to establish that GM was the sponsor of these vehicles for the purposes of Standard No. 208. In addition, however, another GM wholly-owned subsidiary distributes and markets the vehicles in the United St ates. GM coordinates the activities of all these subsidiaries. Since GM wholly owns the actual producer of these vehicles and is actively involved in the importation, distribution, and marketing of these vehicles, we believe that GM should be considered to sponsor the importation of the Lotus vehicles. Accordingly, GM rather than LPC, may be considered the importer and manufacturer of these vehicles.

If you have any further questions, please let me know.

Sincerely.

Erika Z. Jones

Chief Counsel

August 29, 1986 Erika Z. Jones, Esq. Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington, DC 20590

Dear Ms. Jones:

Re: Interpretation of Multiple Manufacturer

Provision of FMVSS 208 Phase-In

This letter is written to request an interpretation of S4.1.3.5 of FMVSS 208. As you will recall, this portion of the standard provides that where more than one manufacturer is involved in the production of a passenger car, the manufacturers are permitte d to determine between or among themselves, by express written contract, which of them shall be deemed the manufacturer of the vehicle for purposes of meeting the phase-in requirements of FMVSS 208. In the absence of such an agreement, domestic passenger cars produced by more than one manufacturer are attributed to the manufacturer marketing the vehicles, and imported ones are attributed to the manufacturer importing them.

The specific subject matter of the interpretation we are requesting in this letter was discussed at a meeting held at the NHTSA on August 27, 1986. Messrs. Wood, Oesch, and Vinson of your staff represented the agency; Mr. R. F. Humphrey of General Motors Washington Office and I represented GM; and Mr. G. E. Atkin represented Lotus Cars Limited. After a discussion of the issues involved, the members of your staff suggested that a written request for interpretation would be appropriate. This letter is a r esult of that suggestion. The facts comprising the issue we are concerned with, and our specific request for an interpretation of the phase-in provisions of FMVSS 208, are as follows.

Lotus Cars Limited (Lotus) is part of Group Lotus, a United Kingdom firm that provides engineering services to various motor vehicle manufacturers and itself produces several hundred passenger cars each year. Lotus passenger cars are imported into the Un ited States under a contract between Lotus and Lotus Performance Cars (LPC), an American limited partnership. The contract gives LPC the exclusive right to distribute Lotus passenger cars in the United States, and LPC is the importer of record of Lotus p assenger cars. GM has recently purchased substantially all of the shares (approximately 96 percent) of Group Lotus. Neither GM nor Lotus owns any interest in LPC.

Of the somewhat less than 1,000 passenger cars produced by Lotus each year, approximately 200 are imported into the United States. In light of this fact, the phase-in requirements of FMVSS 208, which would obligate Lotus to install passive restraints on approximately 20 vehicles in model year 1987, 50 vehicles in 1988, and 80 vehicles in 1989, can be seen to impose an inordinate financial burden on Lotus.

The multiple manufacturer provision of FMVSS 208 was promulgated to give manufacturers the flexibility to deal with the uncertainties and anomalies created by the phase-in scheme for passive restraint requirements. In furthering this purpose, we believe that the agency should use reasonable flexibility in its interpretation of statutory and regulatory terms and definitions, viewing the business arrangements between manufacturers so as to fulfill the intent of the multiple manufacturer provision.

It is clear that Lotus, the designer and producer of Lotus passenger cars, is a manufacturer of those cars under the Safety Act and safety standards. It is also clear that LPC, the importer of Lotus passenger cars, is a statutory manufacturer. The interp retation we request from the agency is that General Motors, by virtue of its nearly total ownership of Lotus, may also be deemed a manufacturer of Lotus passenger cars for purposes of the multiple manufacturer provision of FMVSS 208.

Because it owns 96 percent of the shares of Group Lotus (an ownership level which will reach 100 percent within the foreseeable future), GM has a substantial and abiding concern in the long-term viability of Lotus, a concern that extends to the extraordi nary difficulties imposed upon Lotus by the phase-in provisions of the passive restraint rule. By permitting GM to substitute its vehicles for those of Lotus in determining compliance with the phase-in requirements, the NHTSA would do no violence to the language or spirit of the Safety Act, which is expansive enough to encompass the changing business relation-ships among manufacturers. The agency would also be fulfilling the intent of the multiple manufacturer provision of FMVSS 208, and would be rectif ying a particularly egregious example of the kind of inequity implicitly recognized by the adoption of the multiple manufacturer provision. Finally, this interpretation would not result in any reduction in the number of vehicles required to be equipped w ith passive restraints during the phase-in period. For all these reasons, we ask that the NHTSA issue the interpretation of the multiple manufacturer provision of FMVSS 208 that we have requested.

The other issue discussed during the August 27 meeting was the situation of Lotus in the event that the agency finds itself unable to concur with the interpretation of FMVSS 208 that I have outlined above. Lotus has concluded that if the agency is unable to issue our requested interpretation, Lotus finds it necessary to file a petition for exemption from the first year of the phase-in requirements of FMVSS 208 (that is, the requirement that 10 percent of the vehicles produced by each manufacturer during the period September 1, 1986 through September 1, 1987 be equipped with passive restraints). We are therefore enclosing with this letter a petition by Lotus for exemption from those requirements, as prescribed in 49 CFR Part 555. If the NHTSA is able to render the interpretation of FMVSS 208 that we have requested, the enclosed petition will be moot, and in that case, GM and Lotus request that the agency disregard the petition. If, however, the agency does not issue the interpretation we have requested above, Lotus requests that the agency act upon the enclosed petition and determine Lotus' entitlement to an exemption as expeditiously as possible.

If you have any questions about our request for an interpretation of FMVSS 208, please direct them to me. If the enclosed petition is not rendered moot by your interpretation of FMVSS 208, and you have any questions about the petition, please direct them to Mr. Graham Atkin of Lotus. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely, J. Douglas Hand JDH: kt Attorney

Enclosure

ID: 20949.ztv

Mr. William T. Smith
110 Spear Street
Metuchen, NJ 08840-2126

Dear Mr. Smith:

This is in reply to your letter of November 3, 1999, to the agency on daytime running lamps (DRLs). It was your impression that all 2000 model year passenger cars were required to have DRLs, and you ask if you may have them installed on your new Mercury without voiding the vehicle's warranty.

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices and Associated Equipment, requires motor vehicles to be manufactured in compliance with its specifications. Under Standard No. 108, DRLs are not a required lighting system, but the standard permits manufacturers to install a DRL system if they wish. If the manufacturer exercises this option, the DRL system must comply with the requirements specified in Standard No. 108.

Ford Motor Company, the manufacturer of your new car, chose not to equip it with a DRL system. This agency does not regulate or review vehicle warranties. It is possible that certain aspects of your vehicle warranty could be voided by altering the vehicle wiring were you to have a DRL system installed by a person not authorized by Ford. We recommend that you contact Ford's Zone Office for its opinion.

Your local mechanic is allowed to install a DRL system on your car under Federal law, provided that the mechanic does not make inoperative any element of design or device installed in accordance with one of the Federal motor vehicle safety standards. We interpret this to mean that an aftermarket DRL system is permissible as long as it does not interfere with the performance of other lighting equipment and conforms to the specifications of Standard No. 108 for an original equipment DRL system. Our greatest concern is that an aftermarket DRL system not exceed the maximum luminous intensity limits. For example, a lower beam headlamp may be wired to operate as a DRL at full voltage, but an upper beam headlamp may not.

If you have further questions, you may call Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
ref:108
d.4/27/00

ID: nht76-2.8

DATE: 10/07/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Truck Body and Equipment Association, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of August 24, 1976, in which you ask whether emergency exits required by a State beyond those required by Standard No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release, are subject to the performance requirements outlined in S4(b) of Standard No. 220, School Bus Rollover Protection.

Standard No. 220 requires that all emergency exits provided in accordance with Standard No. 217 must meet certain minimum performance levels during and after the simulated rollover test. Additional emergency exits mandated by State law are not exits "provided in accordance with Standard No. 217" and, therefore, would not be subject to the requirements of S4(b) of Standard No. 220.

You should note that Standard No. 217, in addition to mandating the provision of certain school bus doors and exits under S5.2, also regulates certain aspects of all emergency exits under other provisions of the regulation.

SINCERELY,

TRUCK BODY AND EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATION, INC.

August 24, 1976

Frank Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

FMVSS 220 "School Bus Rollover Protection" scheduled to become effective on April 1, 1977 will require the operation of each emergency exit during and after the simulated rollover test. This requirement is cited in FMVSS 220, S4 Requirements (b) and reads as follows:

"(b) Each emergency exit of the vehicle provided in accordance with Standard No. 217 (@ 571.217) shall be capable of opening as specified in that standard during the full application of the force, and after release of the force. A particular vehicle (i.e., test specimen) need not meet the emergency exit opening requirement after release of force if it is subjected to the emergency exit opening requirements during the full application of the force."

The State of New York has also issued regulations governing school buses bought in for use in that state (see NY 721.36 K and Z enclosed).

In order for a school bus manufacturer to comply with New York's specifications the bus must be built with roof hatches in addition to standard emergency exits as provided in FMVSS 217.

Our question is as follows:

Will additional emergency exits specified by a state over and above those required in FMVSS 217 be subjected to the performance requirements found in FMVSS 220 S4 (b)?

THANKING YOU IN ADVANCE.

Byron A. Crampton Manager of Engineering Services

ENC.

[New York Regulations Omitted.]

ID: 86-1.40

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/21/86

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Dean Hansell, Esq.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Dean Hansell, Esq. Messrs. Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine 555 South Flower Street Los Angeles. California 90071

Dear Mr. Hansell:

This is in reply to your letter of January 14, 1986, asking whether Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 permits headlamps to be nonrectangular.

Standard No. 108 prescribes dimensions only for sealed beam headlamps, in accordance with the terms of the standard and the materials of the Society of Automotive Engineers incorporated by reference. Under these requirements, sealed beam headlamps must be either circular or rectangular according to either the diameters or length/width dimensions specified.

In 1983 Standard No. 108 was amended to allow additional headlighting systems (see paragraph 54.1.1.36) incorporating a replaceable light source with an "0" ring seal. Dimensions are prescribed for this light source. With this type of system, the emphasis on standardization of lighting equipment shifts from size and shape of the unit to the light source itself. This allows the headlamp designer freedom to choose the headlamp size and shape most acceptable to his client within the constraints of the standardized replaceable light source and the photometric requirements of the standard which are essentially the same for all headlamps. Further, such headlamps must be capable of mechanical aim just like sealed beam units.

I hope that this answers your question.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

January 14, 1986

Erika Z. Jones, Esq. Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 4000 Seventh Street, S.W. Room 5219 Washington, D.C. 20590

Re: FMVSS 108 - Request for Interpretation

Dear Ms. Jones:

We seek the Agency's interpretation concerning FMVSS 108 (Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment). Our question is whether headlamps can be nonrectangular.

We find nothing in FMVSS 108 mandating a specific shape for a headlamp. However, the illustrations in FMVSS 108 (for example, figures 11 and 12) all show rectangular headlamps. Although this is presumably due to the fact that only rectangular headlamps were available at the time the regulations were initially written, it did raise a question whether some intention to limit the shape of headlamps was being indicated. In any case, it is now our understanding that in connection with the rewriting of FMVSS 108, the size and shape of headlamps has been "deregulated".

We do understand that, if an alternate shaped headlamp is used, the beam pattern and photometric output specifications of FMVSS 108 must be followed and the headlamp must be capable of being used with a standardized universal adapter (or have an "O" ring).

Thank you for your assistance on this matter.

Yours truly,

Dean Hansell

DH:l

cc: Jere Medlin Crash Avoidance Division

ID: 77-4.2

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/13/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Joan Claybrook; NHTSA

TO: Hon. Lamar Gudger - H.O.R.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Please excuse the delay in my response to your letter of June 15, 1977, addressed to Mr. Norman Sultan, with a copy to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) regarding the Federal requirement for registration of tires.

Mr. Sultan has reported a tire registration of 10 percent in his area of operation which is considerably less than the national figures of 30 percent for retreads and 70 percent for new tire replacements developed in our studies. Mr. Sultan is urging a change in the law to permit voluntary registration of all tires.

Mr. John Snow, my predecessor, reported to the Honorable Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman of the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, that consideration would be given to changing Regulation Part 574 allowing voluntary registration of retreaded tires in lieu of mandatory registration. Since taking office, I have devoted considerable attention to reviewing and analyzing the pertinent factors related to tire registration. I am convinced of the safety benefits of registering new tires and I consider the mandatory recordkeeping provision essential to the purpose of the Vehicle Safety Act. However, because retreaded tires are individually manufactured and therefore could not be recalled as are mass produced items, I am considering proposing revocation of the mandatory recordkeeping requirement for retreaded tires.

For your information I am enclosing a copy of my recent letter to Senator Magnuson in response to his questions on this subject. You may be interested to know that a recent meeting with representatives of the National Tire Dealers and Retreaders Association (NTDRA) provided an opportunity to discuss basic clerical problems associated with registration. As a result, an interpretation of the regulation was reached which would permit the tire purchaser personally to complete the registration form. Although dealer responsibility remains, the interpretation is considered by NTDRA to provide considerable relief to dealers in time and cost. Hopefully this action will offset much of the objections to the current tire registration process.

SINCERELY,

Encls. Constituent's LTR. To Sen. MAGNUSON DATED AUG. 3, 1977

Congress of The United States House of Representatives

June 15, 1977

Norman Sultan

First, let me apologize for my delay in responding to your letter of May 27, 1977. I have noted your concern over the provision of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 requiring tire registration and the fact that the rate of response is now less than ten percent and that the added expense for such return "is simply just not worth it".

We were in contact with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration regarding the study which you cited which is to be conducted on the advisability of making such program voluntary and were informed that this has been under consideration for some time. In an effort to be of assistance in this matter, I am today taking the liberty of forwarding a copy of your letter to the appropriate officials at this Administration in order that they might have the benefit of your views and an opportunity to supply up-to-date infromation on the study. Upon receipt of a response I will forward you a copy. I also appreciate having your views in regard to an Agency for Consumer Advocacy. Fortunately in Western North Carolina and in many other areas, the Better Business Bureau and private agencies are working effectively to protect the consumer from fraud and oppression. Moreover, the North Carolina Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney General each maintain an assistant or a division to prosecute persons who defraud the public by false and fradulent sales practices. For these reasons and because I generally oppose creating new federal agencies and imposing more bureaucratic regulations, I expect to vote against the Agency for Consumer Advocacy.

The House Government Committee reported H. R. 6805 May 10th and it could reach the House Floor soon. I will certainly keep your observations about the bill in mind when it comes up for a vote.

With best wishes and kind personal regards.

Lamar Gudger Member of Congress

bcc: NHTSA CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON

May 27, 1977

The Honorable Lamar Gudger House of Representatives House Office Building

In 1966 the Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains a provision on tire registration. The law went into effect six years ago and has caused tire dealers a lot of expense and very little satisfaction. Our rate of response from small dealers in this registration card mailing is now probably running less than 10% and, in my opinion, during the six years, we feel that the added expense for the return is simply just not worth it.

I have just recently learned that the National Highway Traffic Administration will conduct a study on the advisability of making this program voluntary. We hope that the law can be changed to make the registration voluntary because as we said before, the expense is unnecessary and the customer does not want it.

While I am at it, I might as well tell you that I think the passage of the Consumer Agency Billing which creates an independent agency for consumer advocacy. I am against the creation of this agency because I firmly believe that communications between consumers and retailers, particularly in my industry, can be improved by the establishment of a consumer council "which can be adapted and run by local and area tire dealer groups". You fellows must not have thought too much about this agency yourselves since it only passed by one vote.

I am sure you have gotten acclamated to the ways of Washington by now so with best regards to you and yours.

Norman Sultan

ID: nht79-4.8

DATE: 03/13/79

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Thomas Built Buses Inc.

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your February 28, 1979, letter asking about the remanufacturing of vehicles using old chassis and new bodies. In particular, you ask whether these vehicles must comply with the new safety standards.

The remanufacturing operation that you mention need not comply with the new safety standards. Such a remanufactured vehicle may need to comply with the safety standards in effect on the date of manufacture of the used chassis. Otherwise, there might be a rendering inoperative of the compliance of the vehicle with the safety standards. I am enclosing a copy of an interpretation that discusses the remanufacturing issue.

SINCERELY,

Thomas BUILT BUSES, INC.

February 28, 1979

Office Of The Chief Counsel U.S. Department of Transportation

Attn: Roger Tilton

Subject: Body Re-Mount

Dear Mr. Tilton:

We are inquiring with respect to the mounting of a "new" body on an "old" chassis.

In reviewing previous rulings, we find numerous references to the opposite e.g. "new" chassis - "old" body.

It is our understanding that the chassis since it constitutes what is considered the "motor vehicle" is the ruling factor. In other words, any replacement body should and must meet at least the Federal Standards in effect at the time of the manufacturing date of the chassis. It is preferred that the body meet the Federal Standards in effect at the time of body's manufacture.

While you personally may not handle this particular segment of the standards, we would appreciate your forwarding our inquiry to the proper party.

Thanking you in advance, we remain

James Tydings, Specifications Engineer

ID: nht73-1.28

DATE: 04/18/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R. B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: ADC Marketing, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of March 29, 1973, to Mr. Schneider asking for a clarification that the Front brake Light Adapter you describe "does not fall within the provisions of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108." The adapter, as we understand it, connects the stop lamps with the front turn signal lamps so that when the brakes are applied, the front turn signal lamps are activated in a steady-burning state, indicating that the vehicle is decelerating or has come to a halt.

In our opinion, use of the adapter as original equipment on a vehicle might be precluded by paragraph S4.1.3 of Standard No. 108 prohibiting devices that impair the effectiveness of the equipment required by the standard. The front turn signal lamp is a lamp that flashes in operation to indicate to oncoming drivers, or pedestrians, that the vehicle is preparing to turn, or that a potential hazard exists ahead (when the system is activated as a hazard warning system). Accordingly, when the brake pedal is applied, if the adapter overrides the flashing effect of the front signal lamps it would impair their effectiveness, and be prohibited by Standard No. 108.

The adapter would be permissable as original equipment, however, provided that the signals still flash when the brakes are applied, but a State would not be preempted from regulating it. Nothing in the standard precludes aftermarket sale of the adapter, but its use also would be subject to regulation by the individual States.

Yours truly,

March 29, 1973

U. S. Department of Transportation National Highway Safety Administration

Attention: Lawrence R. Schneider, Chief Counsel

Subject: Regulation Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 --

Front Brake Light Adapter

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to a meeting today with Mr. Lem Owen of the Lighting and Visibility Division and the suggestion that we place in writing our request for an official ruling that the Front Brake Light Adapter submitted does not come within or violate the provisions of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108. We have submitted samples and discussed the background of the Front Brake Light Adapter presently being marketed by ADC Marketing, Inc. with the Lighting and Visibility Division, and it has been verbally stated that in their opinion this does not apply to Regulation No. 108.

We believe that we have satisfactorily shown to your Lighting and Visibility Division that there is a definite safety factor involved and that the Adapter does not impair or change, in any manner whatsoever, the present function of the lighting system of any automobile and, therefore, does not violate any of the provisions in Regulation No. 108.

Recently we submitted Form 1171, Docket No. R3-73-163, an Application for Presenting New or Improved Articles, to the General Service Administration, Federal Supply Service requesting a Schedule Contract on the item. At this instance Standardization Division of GHA questioned whether this might come within the provision of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 and while the verbal opinion given us in todays meeting would suffice for our own information, we feel that a written ruling should be made.

This Front Brake Light Adapter was first submitted to your Division in 1970 and correspondence continued into 1971. At that time U.S. Senator E.S. Muskie referred Mr. Clarence C. Turner's inquiry to your Division with the request that this item be included in Motor vehicle requirements. We are not pressing in this request for such a consideration, however, we do need to have clarified that this Front Brake Light Adapter does not fall within the provisions of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108.

Very truly yours,

ADC MARKETING, INC.

LOUIS A. SISLER,

General Counsel

cc: Lloyd E. Singleton

Samuel P. Haines