ID: nht72-3.7

DATE: 11/14/72

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of September 13, 1972, on the subject of S3.5.1(b) of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 201.

The terms "energy absorbing material" and "rigid material", as used in Standard 201, are not rigorously defined. According to your letter, the material used in the arm rest can be depressed to within 1.25 inches of the test surface by an evenly distributed force that does not exceed 100 pounds per square inch. This force does not appear to be excessive, and we would therefore consider the material to be "energy absorbing material".

The "rigid material" with which contact is prohibited at distances greater than 1.25 inches from the test surface would include such components as brackets, channels and braces, most of which are commonly metallic. We do not rule out the possibility that in some instances a metallic component may be used expressly to absorb energy, but in the usual case a metallic part would be considered "rigid material" and contact with it would result in violation of S3.5.1(b).

TRULY YOURS,

NISSAN MOTOR CO., LTD.

September 13, 1972

Lawrence R. Schneider National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Mr. Schneider:

Subject: Interpretation of MVSS 201; Occupant Protection In Interior Impact

This is to ask your interpretation of MVSS 201; S3.5.1(b) (armrests) which states, "It shall be constructed with energy absorbing material* that deflect or collaspses to within 1.25 inches of . . .without permitting contact with any rigid material. '* is not distinguishable, therefore the following is our own interpretation:

a) If the surface pressure which is calculated from the load equivalent to deflection 1.25 inches on the load-deflection curve measured during the test as shown in Figure 1, is not more than 100 pounds per square inch, we consider the tested material as the energy absorbing material.

b) We consider metalic material as rigid material.

If you feel you could improve upon the above, your prompt reply would be greatly appreciated.

* The underscoring is for your personal reference.

Tatsuo Kato Engineering Representative Liaison Office in USA

[GRAPHICS OMITTED]

ID: nht72-2.39

DATE: 06/13/72

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R. B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Lox Equipment Company

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of May 17, 1972, concerning problems you are having establishing gross axle weight ratings on vehicles you manufacture. You indicate that the problem occurs because brake drums which you use do not come with manufacturer's ratings, but are merely recommended for use with certain axles. You also ask whether a motor vehicle safety standard will require a 40-foot stopping distance from 20 mph.

Your understanding that brake drum capability does not have to be considered in determining gross axle weight rating is not entirely correct. The gross axle weight rating, which is the load carrying capacity of a single axle system (49 CFR 571.3), is a measure of the safe load-carrying capacity of the entire axle system. Manufacturers should include components in their vehicles that are designed to handle loads up to these ratings. Normally an assembler can rely on the specifications or the advice of a reputable supplier as to the capacity of the supplier's components. We expect manufacturers to exercise due care in ensuring that purchased components are adequate and safe for the vehicles they are used on, in accordance with careful business practices. These do not necessarily have to take the form of formal "ratings."

With reference to your question regarding stopping distance, Standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems, effective September 1, 1974 (not July 1, 1972) will, among other things, require a vehicle to stop from 20 mph in 33 and 54 feet on surfaces with skid numbers of 75 and 30 respectively.

ID: kane.ztv

Barry C. Kane, Esq.
Miller, Johnson, Snell & Cummiskey, P.L.C.
P.O. Box 306
Grand Rapids, MI 49501-0306

Dear Mr. Kane:

This is in reply to your letters of June 9 and 10, 2003, which asked for an interpretation of terminology in 49 CFR Part 579 and Part 573. These letters were identical, with the exception noted below under the discussion of Section 579.4(d)(2). Your Part 579 questions related both to the reporting obligations under Subpart B pertaining to foreign safety campaigns, and the reporting obligations under Subpart C, the Early Warning Reporting (EWR) requirements. You wrote on behalf of "divers automotive-related clients," including "original equipment manufacturers, as well as first and second tier providers of parts and/or services."

For purposes of EWR, your clients are considered manufacturers of original equipment (OEM) and thus are covered by 49 CFR 579.27. In response to your initial inquiry, if an OEM does not receive a claim or notice of death in any quarterly reporting period, it is not required to report that fact to NHTSA.

Your next question was postulated on the assumption that section 579.27 requires OEMs to report information about injuries allegedly caused by their products. However, that is incorrect. Section 579.27 requires your clients to report "on each incident involving one or more deaths . . . that is identified in a claim . . . or in a notice . . . which notice alleges or proves that the death was caused by a possible defect in the manufacturers . . . equipment" (emphasis added) (if the incident occurred in the United States, the manufacturer must also report the number of injuries, if any). You asked for confirmation "that an incident in which a manufacturers component is involved that did not initiate the sequence of events leading to [a death] has not to be reported because such a component does not meet the definition of involving in 579.27."

We have not defined "involving" and a definition of the term is not required to respond to your question. Whether a component initiated a sequence of events that led to a death (and injury) may be a question of fact or law (e.g., proximate cause) that is not developed or resolved at the time a manufacturer receives a claim or notice about a death. Regardless, if the document received by the OEM meets the definition of "claim" or "notice" and identifies the OEMs equipment with "minimal specificity," as those three terms are defined in Section 579.4(c), the OEM must report to NHTSA in the manner prescribed by Section 579.27.

You have also asked a question about the application of Section 579.4(d)(2)s definition of identical or substantially similar motor vehicle equipment to a hypothetical situation. Equipment sold or in use outside the United States is deemed to be "identical or substantially similar" to equipment sold in the United States if the equipment has "one or more components or systems that are the same, and the component or system performs the same function" in vehicles sold in the United States (Section 579.4(d)(2)). In your hypothetical, identical fasteners would be used in an air-conditioning unit and an alternator. In your letter of June 9, you stated your belief that "`substantial similarity looks at the assembly as a whole and not to the components forming the assembly to determine the similarity unless it is the particular fastener in this example that is the rudimentary cause of the failure in one of the components." However, on June 10, you advanced a modified view of "substantial similarity" and concluded that "all these different assemblies incorporating such fasteners are substantially similar irrespective of whether the cause of the failure is another part of the assembly," and you asked whether your clients are "obliged to report all these assemblies . . . although the cause of the defect is not the fastener."

We addressed these situations in the preamble to the EWR final rule (67 FR 45822 at 45844). With respect to the view in your letter of June 9, we remarked that we read the word "equipment" both as the completed item of motor vehicle equipment and as each individual component that comprises the item. With respect to your modified view of June 10, the Motorcycle Industry Council (MIC) had asked "if the only commonality [in equipment] is a single type of fastener that neither failed nor contributed to the incident, are the components or equipment substantially similar?" We replied that the equipment incorporating the fasteners would be substantially similar for EWR purposes, "unless the claim [or notice] specifically identified a non-common component as the source of the failure" (p. 45844).

With respect to the phrase "sold or offered for sale" as it appears in the definition of "identical or substantially similar," a client has asked you "if the rule covers the situation where an automobile is manufactured outside the United States and has been privately imported by an individual consumer." It is your suggestion that "the rule does not apply to this situation," and that it "is intended to apply to manufacturers who intentionally enter the market in this country rather than low volume imports arranged by private consumers." We understand that this question relates to Smart cars, manufactured by DaimlerChrysler A.G. in Europe. That company does not sell these cars or offer them for sale in the United States, but at some future time they may be imported by a Registered Importer.

Although, as a factual matter, a Smart car sold outside the United States would be identical or substantially similar to a Smart car sold or offered for sale by a person in the United States other than its fabricating manufacturer (e.g., a Registered Importer), we do not intend the rule to impose a reporting obligation upon a manufacturer who is not marketing an identical or substantially similar vehicle in the United States. Thus, the EWR rule does not require DaimlerChrysler to report incidents of deaths outside the United States involving Smart cars, unless and until DaimlerChrysler imports the Smart car into the United States (see definition of "manufacturer," Section 579.4(c)).

You next asked "whether a supplier of parts to OEMs or Tier 1 suppliers is ever required to notify the Administration of the recall under the rule since they do not decide on or carry out a recall themselves, but solely sell their products via the OEMs/Tier 1." Part 579 does not require an OEM to notify NHTSA that a person is conducting a defect notification and remedy campaign on products that incorporate equipment which the OEMs have supplied. Defect reporting obligations arise under another regulation, 49 CFR Part 573, Defect and Noncompliance Responsibility and Reports. In some instances, these obligations apply to, or may be assumed by, OEMs (see Section 573.3).

With respect to the obligation under Section 579.5(b) to provide copies of each communication relating to a customer satisfaction campaign (as defined in Section 579.4(d) to include other terms as well) within five days after the end of each month, you suggest that "this rule only needs compliance when indeed such customer satisfaction campaigns exist." This is correct. We need not be informed that there were no customer satisfaction campaigns in the previous month. It is also your tentative view that "the campaigns need only be reported when there is "communication with two or more of those involved in the distribution chain for the assembly in the U.S." That is incorrect. If a communication is "issued to, or made available to, more than one dealer, distributor, lessor, lessee, other manufacturer, owner or purchaser, in the United States," a copy of the communication must be furnished to us. See Section 579.5(b).

Your last question is "whether we should consider additional rules, statutes, or provisions promulgated by the individual states or whether this rule supercedes individual state requirements." We are unaware of any State requirements that address the same issues as Part 579.

If you have any questions, you may phone Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:579
d.8/8/03

ID: nht91-5.47

DATE: September 12, 1991

FROM: Robert A. Adams -- Vice President, Solar Car Corporation

TO: Administrator -- NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 10-21-91 from Paul Jackson Rice to Robert A. Adams (A38; Part 555; Part 555.6(c))

TEXT:

Solar Car Corporation is a small corporation located at 1300 Lake Washington Road, Melbourne, Florida 32935, and chartered under the laws of the State of Florida. The company retrofits standard gasoline powered vehicles to electric and solar electric configuration for short range use by individuals and fleet operators. Information on the company and photos of our vehicles are herewith enclosed. Safety features inherent in the frame and body of the vehicle are maintained without alteration.

We hope to retrofit about 100 vehicles during the next twelve months, including Ford Festivas, Dodge Colts and Chevy S 10 pickup trucks. Not more than 2,500 exempted vehicles will be sold in the United States in any 12 month period for which an exemption may be granted pursuant to paragraph (C)(5) of 555.6 of the Code. It is the intention of Solar Car Corporation to conform with the safety standards of the Code at the end of the exemption period.

Solar Car Corporation hereby respectfully petitions the NHTSA for a temporary exemption for three years from federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined in Part 555 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 49 - Transportation on the basis of low emission engine features.

Electric and solar electric vehicles are inherently free from polluting emissions. A typical solar electric retrofit by Solar Car Corporation of a Ford Festiva has been subjected to substantial engineering tests at the California Air Resources Board facility in El Monte, California. Results of those tests and the judgement of CARB relative to the safety of the vehicle should be available to you from CARB.

Granting of an exemption would be in the public interest for several reasons, including current and proposed legislation (brief summary attached) either requiring or encouraging the use of low and zero emission vehicles, the environmental and health needs to reduce or eliminate pollution, and the need to reduce dependence on overseas sources of a rapidly depleting world supply of petroleum.

Granting of an exemption would also be consistent with the objectives of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act as these non internal combustion powered vehicles are inherently safer than those traditionally using gasoline. I, in my lifetime, have, on three separate occasions, witnessed automobile accidents in which an ill fated driver is seen sitting in his car, engulfed in gasoline flames, with bystanders helpless to rescue him.

Our electric vehicles differ from a conventional gasoline powered vehicle in that an Advanced D.C. Motors, Inc. electric motor (description enclosed herewith) replaces the standard internal combustion engine and is coupled to the standard transmission by means of a heavy cast aluminum adapter plate. A Curtis electronic controller controls the electricity between the motor and batteries. We currently use ten batteries, most of which are secured in a heavy duty fiberglass container in the rear portion of the vehicle.

Solar Car Corporation has reason to believe that a temporary exemption will facilitate the development and field evaluation of its electric and solar electric vehicles. Several municipal and utility company fleet managers have serious interest in acquiring our vehicles for demonstration and field testing, and the Arizona Public Service Company has placed an order with us. The Energy Office of the State of Arizona has encouraged us over the past two years to produce and sell these vehicles in Arizona, and, as a matter of record, the Governor of Arizona rode in one of our prototype solar electric cars during the dedication ceremonies for the completion of the final segment of Interstate 10 which runs from Florida to California. We are an accredited vendor for the State of Arizona which will be purchasing fleets of electric vehicles during the next 12 months, subject to the exemption petitioned hereby. In addition to Arizona, municipal and utility fleet operators in California, Nevada, and Connecticut have expressed interest in our supplying purchase proposals that will allow them to further comply with mandates and incentives relative to the implementation of electric and solar electric vehicles as additions to their fleets.

I trust that the above information will allow you to make a favorable judgement in granting to Solar Car Corporation its request for a temporary exemption from federal motor vehicle safety standards on the basis of low emission engine features.

ID: 1985-02.22

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 05/01/85 EST

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Jeffrey R. Miller; NHTSA

TO: Dick Kruse -- Secondary Schools Principals Association

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Dick Kruse Secondary Schools Principals Association 1904 Association Drive Reston, Virginia 22091

This responds to your May 1, 1985 telephone call to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) regarding the Federal motor vehicle safety standards applying to buses used for school extracurricular activities. You were especially interested in the agency's regulatory definition of "school bus" which was adopted pursuant to enactment of the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974 (Public Law 93-492; hereinafter "the Schoolbus Safety Amendments").

In the Schoolbus Safety Amendments, Congress defined "school bus" as:

a passenger motor vehicle which is designed to carry more than 10 passengers in addition to the driver, and which the Secretary determines is likely to be significantly used for the purpose of transporting primary, preprimary, or secondary school students to or from such schools or events related to such schools.

The legislative history of the Schoolbus Safety Amendments shows that Congress chose to specify a broad definition of a school bus, so as to require vehicles used solely for extracurricular activities to meet the same safety standards as buses used to transport the children to and from school. Congress intended NHTSA to set forth a regulatory definition of a school bus that encompassed any bus likely to be significantly used for student transportation.

The agency's definition of a school bus is in accordance with the Congressional definition of that term. The agency definition is found in the definitions section of our motor vehicle safety standards (Volume 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 571.3). A school bus is defined as:

a bus that is sold, or introduced in interstate commerce, for purposes that include carrying students to and from school or related events, but does not include a bus designed and sold for operation as a common carrier in urban transportation.

Our regulations further define "bus" as "a motor vehicle with motive power, except a trailer, designed for carrying more than 10 persons."

The enclosed materials include a Federal Register notice (40 FR 60035; December 31, 1975) amending the agency's definition of school bus to conform to the mandate of the Schoolbus Safety Amendments, and materials on the legislative history of Title II of the Amendments, Schoolbus Safety. Pursuant to your request, I have also enclosed a copy of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended, and information describing our motor vehicle safety standards and how you csn obtain copies of those standards.

You expressed an interest in Secretary Dole's response to Representative Cheney's recent letter regarding NHTSA's regulations for activity buses used by school districts. A copy of that letter is enclosed.

Please let me know if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely, Jeffrey R. Miller Chief Counsel Enclosures

THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590 MAY 14, 1985 The Honorable Dick Cheney House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Dick:

Thank you for your letter requesting clarification of the Department's regulations pertaining to the use by school districts of commercial-type buses as activity buses. appreciate this opportunity to respond to your concerns.

You requested clarification of whether the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act prohibits the sale of a used commercial-type bus to a school district for use on activity trips. The Act only applies to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles. Thus, persons selling a used bus to a Wyoming school district are not subject to the Act's requirement to sell certified school buses, and a used commercial-type bus, regardless of its model year, may be sold as an activity bus.

You also had several questions about Highway Safety Program Standard No. 17, Pupil Transportation Safety. You are correct that states have discretion to adopt all or part of Standard No. 17, and that the standard has no direct effect on the purchase of used buses by local school districts. Congress has given the Department the discretion under the Highway Safety Act not to insist that a State comply with every requirement of the highway safety standards. While the Department has stressed the importance of a strong pupil transportation program, consistant with Standard No. 17, the Department has not insisted that the States comply with every feature of the standard.

You asked whether Wyoming school districts can obtain an administrative waiver from the requirements of Standard No. 17 if Wyoming has adopted the standard as its own policy. Since a state has the discretion to adopt and amend Standard No. 17 as it determines to be necessary for its highway safety program, the effect of Standard No. 17 on Wyoming school districts is a matter for the state to decide. An administrative waiver from NHTSA is therefore not necessary.

I trust this letter has clarified our regulations for school buses.

With best wishes. Sincerely, Elizabeth Hanford Dole

ID: 86-4.34

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 08/04/86

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Brian Peck

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Brian Peck President Rearscope International (U.S.A.) Ltd. 15255 Hesperian Boulevard San Leandro, CA 94578

Dear Mr. Peck:

Thank you for your letter of May 19, 1986, asking how our regulations apply to your product, which is called the "Rearscope Wide Angle Lens." Your letter and the brochure you enclosed describes your product as a wide angle acrylic lens which mounts on the rear window of a bus and gives the driver a wider field of view to the rear of the vehicle. I hope the following discussion answers your questions.

By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has the authority to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and certain items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA, however, does not approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial products. Instead the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act establishes a "self-certification" process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet our safety standards. The agency periodically tests vehicles and equipment items for compliance with the standards, and also investigates other alleged safety-related defects.

"We have issued Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials, which specifies performance and location requirements for glazing used in vehicles. These requirements include specifications for minimum levels of light transmittance (70% in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars) as well as other performance requirements for glazing.

Standard No. 205 does not directly apply to add-on window coverings, such as tinting films, sunscreening devices, and lens. However, no manufacturer or dealer is permitted to install a device on the glazing, such as the viewing lens described in your letter, in new vehicles without certifying that the vehicle continues to be in compliance with the light transmittance and other requirements of the standard.

After a vehicle is first sold to a consumer, modifications to a vehicle are affected by section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Vehicle Safety Act. That section prohibits commercial businesses from tampering with safety equipment installed on a vehicle in compliance with our standards. Thus, no dealer, manufacturer, repair business or distributor can install a device for the owner of the vehicle, if the device would cause the window not to meet the requirements of Standard No 205. Violation of section 108(a)(2)(A) can result in Federal civil penalties of up to $1,000 for each violation.

Section 108(a)(2)(A) does not affect vehicle owners, who may themselves alter their vehicles as they please, so long as they adhere to all State requirements. Under Federal law, the owner may install any type of device regardless of whether the installation adversely affects the performance of the window. Individual States govern the operational use of vehicles by their owners and therefore it is within the authority of the States to regulate the use of viewing devices in vehicles.

If you need further information, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

May 19, 1986

NHTSA Office of Chief Counsel 400 7th Street S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

REAR SCOPE WIDE ANGLE LENS

Dear Sirs,

As per letter dated 4/25/86 (copy enclosed) I am writing to determine the status of our product the "REARSCOPE WIDE ANGLE LENS" as to the requirements oF current Federal Glazing standards, Our product which mounts on the rear window of Bus r Coach is made of Diakon by I.C.I. Ltd. of Great Britain, This acrylic product is similar. to DuPonts "Lexan" with which you are undoubtedly familiar.

If you feel a need to examine the product I would be more than willing to mail you a lens for testing purposes, In the meantime I am enclosing a brochure so that you might evaluate the situation, I await your reply.

Sincerely,

Brian Peck President

April 25, 1986

Mr. Brian Peck Rearscope International Limited 15255 Hesperian Boulevard San Leandro, California 94578

Dear Mr. Peck:

This is in answer to your letter of April 2, 1986: concerning the use of the Rearscope Wide Angle Lense in Pennsylvania.

After receiving your letter, I contacted the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) to see if there were any applicable federal standards on glazing which had to be met. NHTSA indicated that they would review this request and suggested that you write to they for this information at the following address: NHTSA, Office of Chief Counsel, 400 7th Street S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

If you have already contacted NHTSA for approval, please forward their response to this Department. Pending receipt of this written notification from NHTSA, this Department will determine if your lens meets all Pennsylvania requirements.

Sincerely,

John A. Pachuta, Director Bureau or Motor Vehicles

ID: 2954o

Mr. M. Iwase, Manager
Technical Administrative Department
Koito Mfg. Co., Ltd.
Shizuoka Works
500, Kitawaki
Shimizu-shi, Shizuoka-Ken
Japan

Dear Mr. Iwase:

This is in reply to your letter of February 22, 1988, asking whether location of a stop and taillamp on a deck lid would comply with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. l08. In your opinion this is acceptable because the vehicle complies with the trunk lid closed. You have also asked, alternatively, whether the deck lid is an acceptable location for turn signal lamps.

Section S4.3.1 of Standard No. 108 requires lighting devices to be mounted on "a rigid part of the vehicle...that is not designed to be removed except for repair". In past interpretations the agency has stated that a deck lid is "a rigid part of the vehicle", and that compliance with the standard will be determined with the deck lid closed. Thus, it may be used for mounting lamps and reflectors required by Standard No. 108. However, Table IV specifies the location for rear lamps. Stoplamps, taillamps, rear turn signal lamps, and rear reflex reflectors must be mounted "as far apart as practicable". Although the determination of practicability is initially made by the vehicle manufacturer, the agency in its enforcement efforts would consider whether lighting equipment mounted on the deck lid meets the requirements of Table IV. On the other hand, the separation requirement is not specified for backup lamps and license plate lamps.

I have enclosed for your information a copy of a l980 interpretation that addressed a similar question. As you will note, the agency raised some safety concerns in that letter which could also pertain to your design.

Operation of a motor vehicle in the United States is subject to the laws of the individual States, some of which may prohibit operation of a vehicle when its turn signals and stop lamps are not visible. In summary, we urge you to consider the issues described above, including those raised in the l980 letter, in deciding whether to proceed with this design.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

Enclosure

ref: 108 d:9/l5/88

ID: nht78-2.16

DATE: 06/02/78

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; J. J. Levin, Jr.; NHTSA

TO: State of Delaware

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of May 18, 1978 which asks the following questions:

"Is there a Motor Vehicle Safety Standard which requires all motorcycles to be equipped with turn signals, other than those expressly exempted under FMVSS 108 (whose speed atainable in 1 mile is 30 mph or less) S4.1.1.26?"

Yes. Paragraph S4.1.1 of Standard No. 108 requires, in part, that motor vehicles be equipped with the lamps specified in Table III. Turn signal lamps are required for motorcycles under Table III.

"Does the standard apply to only highway-use vehicles with trail-bikes exempted?"

Yes. The motorcycles covered by Standard No. 108 must be "motor vehicles" in the first instance, in order to be subject to the regulatory authority of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. A "motor vehicle" is one "manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads and highways". This would exclude a trail bike unless its manufacturer had certified it to meet all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards, indicating his intent that it be used on-road as well as off-road.

We are enclosing a copy of Standard No. 108 as you requested.

SINCERELY,

STATE OF DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

May 18, 1978

Joseph J. Levin, Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Mr. Levin:

The Delaware Division of Motor Vehicles would appreciate your assistance in determining the following:

Is there a Motor Vehicle Safety Standard which requires all motorcycles to be equipped with turn signals, other than those expressly exempted under FMVSS108 (whose speed attainable in 1 mile is 30 mph or less) S.4.1.1.26?

We would appreciate a copy if such a standard exists. Also, does the standard apply to only highway-use vehicles with trail-bikes exempted?

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Robert J. Voshell Director, Motor Vehicle Division

ID: 1983-1.29

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/21/83

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Smithers Scientific Services Inc.

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your letter to Mr. Kratzke of my staff, asking about the requirements of Safety Standard No. 119, New Pneumatic Tires for Motor Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars (49 CFR 571.119) (copy enclosed). Specifically, you are representing a towing trailer manufacturer which would like to mount aircraft tires on its trailers as original equipment.

Paragraph S5.1.1 of Standard No. 120, Tire Selection and Rims for Motor Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars, 49 CFR 571.120) specifies that new trailers shall be equipped with tires that meet the requirements of either Safety Standard No. 109, which applies to passenger car tires, or Safety Standard No. 119. Your client intends to meet this requirement by equipping the trailers with tires which comply with Standard No. 119. However, your tests showed that the aircraft tires which the trailer manufacturer wants to use on the trailers could not pass the high speed test in Standard No. 119. You asked if the high speed test requirement could be avoided if those tires were speed-restricted to 55 miles per hour (mph) or less.

The answer is yes. Speed restrictions may only be placed on a tire by the tire manufacturer, and may only be specified at 35, 50, or 55 mph. To create a speed-restriction, paragraph S6.5(e) of Standard No. 119 requires the tire manufacturer to mark the notation "max speed 55 mph" on both sidewalls. When a tire is so marked, it is speed-restricted for purposes of Standard No. 119. Paragraph S6.3 of Standard No. 119 states that the high speed test requirement "applies only to motorcycle tires and non-speed-restricted tires."

Accordingly, no high speed tests are conducted on tires which are speed-restricted.

You should, however, be aware of the requirements of 49 CFR Part 567, Certification (copy enclosed). Specifically, section 567.4(g)(3) and (4) requires a vehicle manufacturer to show a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) and gross axle weight rating (GAWR) for each axle on the certification label required to appear on all new vehicles. The NHTSA requires that the GVWR and GAWR placed on the certification label be unqualified by any speed restrictions and be based on the 60 mph capabilities assigned to the tires and rims by the Tire & Rim Association. Other GVWR and GAWR values may be assigned by the manufacturer, but they must be listed after the information required on the certification label, and they do not form the basis for testing a vehicle's compliance with safety standards, such as Standard No. 120.

Finally, I wish to emphasize that if these towing trailers are likely to be used at speeds in excess of 55 mph, the use of tires which are speed-restricted to 55 mph might well be determined to constitute a safety-related defect in the vehicle, under the terms of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.). When a determination is made that a vehicle or item of equipment contains a safety-related defect, section 154 of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1414) requires the manufacturer to repair or replace the defective vehicle or item without charge to the purchaser.

Should you need any further information on this matter, please contact Mr. Kratzke at (202) 426-2992.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

December 21, 1982 Steven Kratzke -- Office of Chief Counsul, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, National Highway Traffic Safety Admn.

Dear Mr. Kratzke:

This letter will confirm our meeting held in your office on Dec. 7, 1982 in which Wim Hermans of Sedelmayer and myself discussed use of his "towing axle" in the United States. You will recall that Mr. Hermans showed you sales literature describing Sedelmayer's "towed axle" which has been in service in Europe for some 18 years.

Our main question to you was to identify the correct and proper method by which to consider the 5.00"x5" size Goodyear brand aircraft tires currently being used on this "towed axle." The primary use for this device has been in towing disabled or damaged passenger vehicles to a dealership or repair garage at speeds below the posted 55 mph speed limit currently in force throughout the United States. As such, Smithers felt that Sedelmayer needed to brand his tires "55 mph speed restricted" and have tires tested to the existing DOT 119 regulations as a speed restricted tire. Once laboratory testing confirmed Sedelmayer's tire as passing the DOT 119 regulation, Sedelmayer would need to have Goodyear (or any other supplier) supply tires labeled for speed restriction to be within compliance with DOT 119 for tires other than passenger tires used on public highways.

You confirmed Smithers' summary of Mr. Herman's situation and told us that to proceed in the above stated manner would satisfy your office and the DOT 119 regulations.

Would you please forward to the writer your written understanding of this matter so that our records and proper sequence methodology are accurate as stated? I await your reply. Should you require additional information in this matter, please advise.

Sincerely, SMITHERS SCIENTIFIC SERVICES, INC.; David E. Williams -- Marketing Manager cc: Wim Hermans, Sedelmayer

ID: LondonTaxi2

Via Facsimile and Regular Mail





Mr. Larry Smith
President and CEO
London Taxis North America, Inc.
80 Union Street
Sudbury, MA 01776

Dear Mr. Smith:

This is in response to your letter of November 26, 2001, requesting an interpretation of the vehicle certification regulations at 49 CFR Part 567. Section 567.4(g) of those regulations prescribes the contents of the certification label that manufacturers are required to affix to new motor vehicles. One item of information that the certification label must contain is the name of the vehicle's manufacturer. Section 567.4(g)(1) provides that the "full corporate or individual name of the actual assembler of the vehicle"> must be stated on the certification label, unless any of three specified exceptions apply. The only pertinent exception is the one stated at section 567.4(g)(1)(i). That section provides that "[i]f a vehicle is assembled by a corporation that is controlled by another corporation that assumes responsibility for conformity with the standards, the name of the controlling corporation may be used.">

You state that London Taxis North America, Inc. (LTNA) has entered into an agreement with London Taxis International (LTI), which you identify as the British manufacturer of "the well-known London Taxi TX1 vehicle (the "TX1")." You state that "[u]nder this agreement, LTNA has the exclusive right to import a U.S. specification TX1 into the United States," and that "LTNA is solely responsible for developing the design modifications to be incorporated into the U.S. version of the TX1, as well as for all testing and certification of the U.S. specification vehicle." You state that the U.S. version of the TX1 will be assembled by LTI in the United Kingdom and imported into the United States by LTNA. You state that LTI will assign vehicle identification numbers (VINs) to the U.S. version of the TX1, and that these VINs will incorporate the world manufacturer identifier (WMI) assigned to LTI.

In light of these circumstances, you have asked whether the certification label to be affixed to the U.S. version of the TX1 may identify the vehicle as being "Manufactured by London Taxis International for London Taxis North America, Inc., which is solely responsible for U.S. certification." You express the opinion that this wording would be appropriate because 49 U.S.C. 30115 requires the "manufacturer" of a vehicle, as opposed to its "assembler," to certify that the vehicle complies with applicable safety standards and, as defined in 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(5), the term "manufacturer" includes "importer." You also contend that some precedents exist for the wording you have proposed. Specifically, you note that the certification label affixed to model year (MY) 1997 Ford Aspire passenger cars identified those vehicles as having been "manufactured by Kia Motor Company for Ford Motor Company." You further note that in an October 13, 1981 letter to Paccar, Inc., this Office stated that Paccar's name could appear on the certification labels for vehicles assembled by Kenworth Mexicana, a Mexican affiliate.

Consistent with the wording used on the certification label for the 1997 Ford Aspire, the certification label for the U.S. version of the TX1 may identify the vehicle as being "Manufactured by London Taxis International for London Taxis North America, Inc." However, the additional wording that you have proposed, which would identify LTNA as being "solely responsible for U.S. certification" of the vehicle, may not be included on the label. There is no provision in the vehicle certification regulations for such additional wording to be included on the certification label. One purpose for including manufacturer information on the certification label is to identify the manufacturer who assumes legal responsibility for all duties and liabilities imposed under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, the provisions of which are now codified at 49 U.S.C.

30101 et. seq. (See, e.g., 49 CFR 567.4(g)(1)(iii), pertaining to trailers, and 49 CFR 567.5(e), pertaining to vehicles manufactured in two or more stages.) The additional wording that you have proposed for the TX1 certification label would create ambiguity as to whether it is LTI or LTNA that is assuming legal responsibility for all duties and liabilities imposed under the Safety Act. In this circumstance, it would be unclear to NHTSA and to the vehicle owner as to which entity would be responsible for conducting a safety recall campaign in the event that the vehicle is found to contain a safety-related defect or to be in noncompliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard.

The circumstances that permitted Paccar, Inc. to be identified as the manufacturer on the certification labels of vehicles assembled by Kenworth Mexicana are not present in this case. In addition to owning a 49 percent interest in Kenworth Mexicana, Paccar informed the agency that it was responsible for the design of the vehicles produced in Mexico and exercised control over all matters relating to their compliance with the safety standards. You have made no representations that LTNA has a similar relationship to LTI, or that it has exercised similar design responsibility and control over the U.S. version of the TX1. Accordingly, there is no basis for LTNA to be identified on the certification label as the vehicles' manufacturer under the exception in 49 CFR 567.4(g)(1)(i). Additionally, LTNA's status as the vehicles' importer provides no basis for it to identify itself as the manufacturer on the certification label. Even though the term "manufacturer" is defined in 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(5) to include the "importer" of a vehicle, 49 CFR 567.4(g)(1) explicitly requires the name of the "actual assembler" of the vehicle to be identified on the certification label, unless one of the three stated exceptions to that requirement apply. The regulation provides no exception for an importer to substitute its name for that of the actual assembler.

If you have any further questions regarding vehicle certification requirements, feel free to contact Coleman Sachs of my staff at 202-366-5238.

Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

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