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NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

Search Tool

NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 1131 - 1140 of 16490
Interpretations Date

ID: 11879B.jeg

Open

Joseph W. Phebus, Esq.
Phebus, Winkelmann, Wong & Bramfeld
136 West Main Street
P.O. Box 1008
Urbana, Illinois 61801-9008


Dear Mr. Phebus:

This responds to your letter of May 7, asking about warning requirements for the lap belts provided with "motorized passive seat belts, such as utilized by Ford Motor Company." We assume that you are referring to a seating position equipped with both a motorized automatic shoulder belt certified to the automatic protection requirements of Standard No. 208, and with a separate manual lap belt. You ask whether certain warnings about fastening the lap belt were (a) required, (b) permitted, or (c) prohibited.

The lap belt for such a seating position was not required by the Federal motor vehicle safety standards but was instead voluntarily provided by the vehicle manufacturer to provide additional occupant protection. While automatic belts are required to have a special warning system (see S4.5.3.3 of Standard No. 208), no warning requirement applied to the voluntarily provided lap belt.

While none of the warnings you ask about were required, there is an issue, discussed further below, of whether they were permitted. Manufacturers may provide features in addition to those required by a standard, as long as the standard's requirements are met.

The specific warnings you ask about are as follows:

1. "That the chime that sounds when the lap belt is not buckled should be repeated at least twice at intervals of approximately one minute if the belt is not buckled."

Such a warning would not be permitted. S4.5.3.3 requires a warning system for automatic belts that, among other things, "activates a continuous or intermittent audible signal for a period of not less than 4 seconds and not more than 8 seconds and that activates a continuous or flashing warning light visible to the driver for not less than 60 seconds," to warn that the belt is not in use. Since the purpose of the audible signal is to

remind the driver to buckle up, it would be permissible to use the same signal to warn that the voluntarily provided lap belt is not in use. However, since the audible signal could not be activated for a period of more than 8 seconds, the system you describe would not be permitted.

I also note that NHTSA is limited by its authorizing statute as to what types of audible signals it may require, or permit as a means of compliance, to indicate that a safety belt is not in use. Under 49 U.S.C. 30124, a motor vehicle safety standard "may not require or allow a manufacturer to comply with the standard by using ... a buzzer designed to indicate a safety belt is not in use, except a buzzer that operates only during the 8-second period after the ignition is turned to the "start" or "on" position." (Emphasis added.)

2. "The seat belt symbol light should remain on for at least one minute after the ignition is turned on and then flash off and on at 0.5 CPS for about 30 seconds and then remain lighted if the lap belt is not buckled. Further, the brightness of the signal should be increased when the dashboard lights are not on."

Assuming that the seat belt symbol light is only activated if the seat belts are not in use, such a system would be permissible. Since the purpose of the warning light for automatic belts is to remind the driver to buckle up, it would be permissible to use the same warning light to indicate that the voluntarily provided lap belt is not in use. Unlike the time period specified for audible signals, S4.5.3.3 specifies a minimum but not a maximum time for activation of the warning light. Therefore, the warning light could remain activated to indicate that a lap belt is not buckled.

3. "There should be an express instruction "fasten lap belt" which is located so as to be easily observed by both the driver and the occupant of the right front seat."

The Federal motor vehicle safety standards would not prohibit such a message.

4. "That sun visor warnings other than those used by Ford may be used which would employ colors and signal words and would communicate the nature of the hazards and potential consequences associated with not wearing the lap belts."

The sun visor warnings provided by Ford were provided voluntarily, and the Federal motor vehicle safety standards would not prohibit different messages. We have assumed that the vehicle does not have air bags. Standard No. 208 requires

specific sun visor warnings for vehicles equipped with air bags and restricts any additional information on the visor. See S4.5.1(b).

If you have any further questions, please feel free to call Edward Glancy of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,



Samuel J. Dubbin

Chief Counsel

ref:208

d:8/7/96

1996

ID: Hyundai_S7v2

Open

    Mr. Robert Babcock
    Hyundai American Technical Center, Inc.
    5075 Venture Drive
    Ann Arbor, MI 48108


    Dear Mr. Babcock:

    This responds to your request for an interpretation regarding the seat belt warning provisions of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 208, Occupant crash protection, that pertain to the audible warning requirement. You asked if a two-second delay is permissible before the audible signal is activated. As explained below, a system as you described would not comply with the audible warning provision of FMVSS No. 208.

    S7.3 of FMVSS No. 208 establishes a warning requirement to alert vehicle drivers that their seat belt is not fastened. S7.3 provides manufacturers with several options for complying with this requirement. Under each option, a continuous or intermittent audible signal must activate when the vehicle ignition is moved to the "on" or "start" position and drivers safety belt is not in use (S7.3(a)(1) and (2)). The audible signal must sound for a period of not less than four seconds and not more than eight seconds.

    In your letter, you asked if a delay was permitted between the time a vehicles ignition is moved to the "on" or "start" position and when the audible signal is activated (assuming the drivers seat belt is not fastened). You stated that self-diagnostic programs may cause a short delay (up to 2 seconds) prior to the vehicle system being capable of functioning fully, and thus may delay the activation of the audible warning for that same period. You asked if this delay, which occurs after the ignition switch is moved to the "on" or "start" position, is permitted under S7.3 of FMVSS No. 208.

    As explained above, S7.3 requires the audible signal to activate when the vehicle ignition is moved to the "on" or "start" position. Therefore, the short delay you described would not be permissible.

    If you have any additional questions, please contact Mr. Chris Calamita of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

    Sincerely,

    Stephen P. Wood
    Assistant Chief Counsel
    for Vehicle Safety Standards and Harmonization

    ref:208
    d.8/12/05

2005

ID: 7714

Open

Dale E. Dawkins, Director
Vehicle Compliance and Safety Affairs
Chrysler Corporation
CIMS 414-01-22
12000 Chrysler Drive
Highland Park, MI 48288-0857

Dear Mr. Dawkins:

This responds to your September 4, 1992 letter, in which you notified the agency of your intention to modify the Hybrid III dummies to be used in your company's certification testing for Standard No. 208. You stated your opinion that the Hybrid III test dummy currently specified in 49 CFR Part 572 Subpart E is unacceptable for determining whether vehicles equipped with two-point automatic belt systems comply with the injury criteria in Standard No. 208. This opinion is based on the chest deflection measurements you have obtained, which you characterize as "erroneous, erratic, and nonsensical."

You indicated your belief that the inaccurate measurements arise because the ball on the end of the slider rod of the chest deflection transducer "frequently" will pop out of its guide track. According to Chrysler, this occurs because the rubber bump stops on the dummy's sternum act as a fulcrum to pry the ball on the end of the slider rod out of its guide track during crash tests, during which the two-point torso belt deflects the dummy chest in both the fore-aft and lateral directions.

Chrysler believes that this problem can be solved simply by modifying the thorax of the Hybrid III dummy by moving the rubber bump stops from the specified location on the sternum to the spine box of the dummy. Your letter indicates your belief that such a modification will not affect the calibration or measurement accuracy of the chest deflection transducer or the biofidelity of the Hybrid III thorax. You indicated that Chrysler intends to make this modification to the Hybrid III dummy thorax and use the modified dummy for Chrysler's certification testing of a 1994 model year vehicle for purposes of Standard No. 208.

NHTSA's position on the issue of what steps manufacturers must take before certifying that their vehicles or equipment comply with an applicable safety standard has been often stated and applies with equal force in this situation. The compliance test procedures set forth in Standard No. 208 must be followed by this agency during our compliance testing. In this instance, that means that NHTSA's compliance testing will be conducted using the Hybrid III test dummy specified in Part 572, Subpart E, with the rubber bump stops in the location specified therein.

Manufacturers certifying compliance with the safety standards are not required to follow exactly the compliance test procedures set forth in the applicable standard. In fact, manufacturers are not even required to conduct any actual testing before certifying that their products comply with applicable safety standards. However, to avoid liability for civil penalties in connection with any noncompliance that may be determined to exist, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act) requires that the manufacturer exercise "due care" to assure compliance and in making its certification. It may be simplest for a manufacturer to establish that it exercised "due care" if the manufacturer has conducted testing that strictly followed the compliance test procedures set forth in the standard. However, "due care" might also be shown using modified test procedures if the manufacturer could demonstrate that the modifications were not likely to have had a significant impact on the test results. In addition, "due care" might be shown using engineering analyses, computer simulations, and the like.

In this case, then, the relevant issue is not whether Chrysler uses a modified version of the Hybrid III test dummy for its certification testing. Instead, the issue is whether Chrysler can show that it would exercise "due care" despite using a modified Hybrid III test dummy for its certification testing. This agency does not make any determinations as to whether "due care" has been exercised except in the context of an enforcement proceeding. Hence, Chrysler will have to make the initial decision as to whether a certification based on the modified Hybrid III dummy could be made in the exercise of "due care." Your letter states that Chrysler's modifications to the test dummy "will not affect the calibration or measurement accuracy of the chest deflection transducer or biofidelity of the Hybrid III thorax." If Chrysler can demonstrate that these statements are correct, Chrysler may be able to show that it exercised "due care" in connection with the use of the modified Hybrid III dummy.

Of course, a manufacturer that can show it exercised due care would still be subject to the statutory obligation to notify owners and remedy any vehicles that are determined not to conform to Standard No. 208. However, this same obligation would apply even to manufacturers that had conducted testing using an unmodified Hybrid III test dummy.

Turning from Chrysler's particular question to the standard in general, NHTSA notes that it has undertaken research examining the issue of chest deflection measurements by the Hybrid III test dummy. An extensive discussion of the agency research and analysis of this issue may be found in the interim final rule postponing the use of the Hybrid III dummy in vehicles that do not use either seat belts or air bags (55 FR 39280; September 26, 1990; copy enclosed). In that notice, NHTSA indicated that it had received significant data from sources outside the agency, including General Motors, Mercedes-Benz, Toyota, INRETS (a French government research and development group), and the Motor Industry Research Association (a British group).

The agency would be very interested in examining any data or test results that Chrysler may have on this subject, especially the assertion that the ball on the end of the chest deflection rod comes out of its track during crash test conditions. Please send all such information to: Barry Felrice, NHTSA Associate Administrator for Rulemaking, Room 5401, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

I hope this information is helpful. Please let me know if you need any further information or have some further questions on this subject.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

Enclosure

ref:208#572#VSA d:10/2/92

1992

ID: nht92-3.29

Open

DATE: October 2, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Dale E. Dawkins -- Director, Vehicle Compliance and Safety Affairs, Chrysler Corporation

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 9/4/92 from D. E. Dawkins to Paul Jackson Rice (OCC-7714)

TEXT:

This responds to your September 4, 1992 letter, in which you notified the agency of your intention to modify the Hybrid III dummies to be used in your company's certification testing for Standard No. 208. You stated your opinion that the Hybrid III test dummy currently specified in 49 CFR Part 572 Subpart E is unacceptable for determining whether vehicles equipped with two-point automatic belt systems comply with the injury criteria in Standard No. 208. This opinion is based on the chest deflection measurements you have obtained, which you characterize as "erroneous, erratic, and nonsensical."

You indicated your belief that the inaccurate measurements arise because the ball on the end of the slider rod of the chest deflection transducer "frequently" will pop out of its guide track. According to Chrysler, this occurs because the rubber bump stops on the dummy's sternum act as a fulcrum to pry the ball on the end of the slider rod out of its guide track during crash tests, during which the two-point torso belt deflects the dummy chest in both the fore-aft and lateral directions.

Chrysler believes that this problem can be solved simply by modifying the thorax of the Hybrid III dummy by moving the rubber bump stops from the specified location on the sternum to the spine box of the dummy. Your letter indicates your belief that such a modification will not affect the calibration or measurement accuracy of the chest deflection transducer or the biofidelity of the Hybrid III thorax. You indicated that Chrysler intends to make this modification to the Hybrid III dummy thorax and use the modified dummy for Chrysler's certification testing of a 1994 model year vehicle for purposes of Standard No. 208.

NHTSA's position on the issue of what steps manufacturers must take before certifying that their vehicles or equipment comply with an applicable safety standard has been often stated and applies with equal force in this situation. The compliance test procedures set forth in Standard No. 208 must be followed by this agency during our compliance testing. In this instance, that means that NHTSA's compliance testing will be conducted using the Hybrid III test dummy specified in Part 572, Subpart E, with the rubber bump stops in the location specified therein.

Manufacturers certifying compliance with the safety standards are not required to follow exactly the compliance test procedures set forth in the applicable standard. In fact, manufacturers are not even required to conduct any actual testing before certifying that their products comply with applicable safety standards. However, to avoid liability for civil

penalties in connection with any noncompliance that may be determined to exist, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act) requires that the manufacturer exercise "due care" to assure compliance and in making its certification. It may be simplest for a manufacturer to establish that it exercised "due care" if the manufacturer has conducted testing that strictly followed the compliance test procedures set forth in the standard. However, "due care" might also be shown using modified test procedures if the manufacturer could demonstrate that the modifications were not likely to have had a significant impact on the test results. In addition, "due care" might be shown using engineering analyses, computer simulations, and the like.

In this case, then, the relevant issue is not whether Chrysler uses a modified version of the Hybrid III test dummy for its certification testing. Instead, the issue is whether Chrysler can show that it would exercise "due care" despite using a modified Hybrid III test dummy for its certification testing. This agency does not make any determinations as to whether "due care" has been exercised except in the context of an enforcement proceeding. Hence, Chrysler will have to make the initial decision as to whether a certification based on the modified Hybrid III dummy could be made in the exercise of "due care." Your letter states that Chrysler's modifications to the test dummy "will not affect the calibration or measurement accuracy of the chest deflection transducer or biofidelity of the Hybrid III thorax." If Chrysler can demonstrate that these statements are correct, Chrysler may be able to show that it exercised "due care" in connection with the use of the modified Hybrid III dummy.

Of course, a manufacturer that can show it exercised due care would still be subject to the statutory obligation to notify owners and remedy any vehicles that are determined not to conform to Standard No. 208. However, this same obligation would apply even to manufacturers that had conducted testing using an unmodified Hybrid III test dummy.

Turning from Chrysler's particular question to the standard in general, NHTSA notes that it has undertaken research examining the issue of chest deflection measurements by the Hybrid III test dummy. An extensive discussion of the agency research and analysis of this issue may be found in the interim final rule postponing the use of the Hybrid III dummy in vehicles that do not use either seat belts or air bags (55 FR 39280; September 26, 1990; copy enclosed). In that notice, NHTSA indicated that it had received significant data from sources outside the agency, including General Motors, Mercedes-Benz, Toyota, INRETS (a French government research and development group), and the Motor Industry Research Association (a British group).

The agency would be very interested in examining any data or test results that Chrysler may have on this subject, especially the assertion that the ball on the end of the chest deflection rod comes out of its track during crash test conditions. Please send all such information to: Barry Felrice, NHTSA Associate Administrator for Rulemaking, Room 5401, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

I hope this information is helpful. Please let me know if you need any

further information or have some further questions on this subject.

ID: 9123

Open

Mr. Jack McIntyre
Vice President
Tie Tech Inc.
Post Office Box 5226
Lynnwood, WA 98046-5226

Dear Mr. McIntyre:

This responds to your letter in which you withdrew your petition for rulemaking of August 18, 1993, and requested an agency interpretation instead.

You referred to the final rule issued by this agency on January 15, 1993 (58 FR 4585), which amended Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 222. Specifically, paragraph S5.4.2.(a)(1) of the amendment provides that wheelchair securement devices composed of webbing or straps must meet the requirements for Type I safety belt systems specified in S4.2, among others, of FMVSS 209. You stated that there is no need to specify a minimum width for wheelchair securement belts and that the current industry standard for securement belts is a 1-inch polyester belt. Finally, you stated that the 1-inch polyester belts have less stretch than the 1.8-inch nylon belts and that the 1-inch belts are easier and less cumbersome to connect to a wheelchair.

Paragraph S4.2(a), FMVSS 209, provides that seat belt webbing cannot be less than 1.8 inches wide, "except for portions that do not touch a 95th percentile adult male with the seat in any adjustment position and the seat back in the manufacturer's nominal design riding position . . . ." That means that seat belt webbing must be at least 1.8 inches wide whenever it touches the person of the seat occupant. The width of webbed wheel chair securement belts that do not touch the persons of the chair occupants is not specified in any standard. Therefore, wheel chair securement belts can be 1 inch or some other width, so long as they do not touch the persons of the chair occupants and meet the other requirements of applicable standards.

I hope this clarifies this matter for you. If you have any further questions or need any further information, please feel free to contact Walter Myers of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:209#222#571 d:11/23/93

1993

ID: nht90-2.58

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 05/30/90

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: TIMOTHY A. KELLY -- PRESIDENT SALEM VENT INTERNATIONAL, INC.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 01/29/90, FROM TIMOTHY A. KELLY TO DAVID A. GREENBURG -- NHTSA; RE SALEM BUS VENTILATOR/ESCAPE HATCH - FMVSS 217; OCC 4382; LETTER DATED 01/29/90 FROM TIMOTHY A. KELLY TO DAVID A. GREENBURG -- NHTSA; RE SALEM BUS VENTILATOR / ESCAP E HATCH - FMVSS 217

TEXT: This responds to your request for an interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 217; Bus Window Retention and Release as it applies to roof exits. You asked four specific questions which I have addressed below.

First, you asked for confirmation that the only specification in Standard No. 217 concerning the size of roof exits is the requirement that the exit be able to accommodate an ellipsoid with a major axis of 20 inches and a minor axis of 13 inches pushed h orizontally through the exit opening. Your understanding is not entirely correct. The ellipsoid requirement to which you refer, set forth in S5.4.1 of Standard No. 217, is the only provision in the standard that specifies a minimum size requirement for roof exit opening. Although there is no maximum size limit, you should be aware that S5.2 of Standard No. 217 provides that, in determining the total unobstructed openings for emergency exit provided by a bus, no emergency exit, regardless of its area shall be credited with more than 536 square inches of the total area requirement. Thus, if a roof exit is larger than 536 square inches, only 536 square inches will be counted for the exit in determining whether the bus complies with the unobstructed op enings requirement of S5.2 of Standard No. 217.

Second, you asked for confirmation that Standard No. 217 does not permit the use of escape hatches or ventilators in the roof of school buses as a substitute for any of the emergency exits required on school buses by S5.2.3 of Standard No. 217. This und erstanding is correct. Additionally, you should be aware that the agency has a longstanding position that any emergency exits, including any roof exits, installed on a school bus in addition to the emergency exits required by S5.2.3 must conform to the requirements of Standard No. 217 for emergency exits installed on buses other than school buses. See the enclosed July 6, 1979 interpretation to Robert Kurre on this issue.

Third, you asked for confirmation that Standard No. 217 permits the use of roof exits as a substitute for the rear exit door on buses other than school buses. This statement is not entirely correct. S5.2.1 of Standard No. 217 requires the use of a rear exit door on all non-school buses with a GVWR of more than 10,000 lbs., except where the configuration of the bus precludes the installation of an accessible rear exit. In that case, S5.2.1 requires the installation of a roof exit in the rear half of th e bus in lieu of the rear exit. This substitution of a roof exit for a rear exit door is allowed only where the bus design precludes the use of a rear exit (such as on rear-engine buses). It is not an option allowing the substitution of a roof exit for the rear door in any design.

Fourth, you asked whether the addition of more than one roof exit on a non-school bus would allow a manufacturer to delete any other required exits in addition to the rear door. It is possible that increasing the total exit space on the bus by adding ro of exits could enable a manufacturer to reduce the number or size of other emergency exits on the bus and still comply with the unobstructed openings requirement of S5.2. You should be aware that exit space provided by roof exits is not counted in deter mining compliance with the requirement in S5.2 that 40 percent of the total unobstructed openings be located on each side of the bus. Whether this substitution of additional roof exits could be made on any particular non-school bus would depend upon whe ther the bus complied with the exit space and location requirements of S5.2.1 (if the bus has a GVWR of more than 10,000 pounds) and the applicable requirements of S5.2.2 (if the bus has a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less).

I hope you have found this information helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact David Greenburg of my staff at (202) 366-2992 if you have any further questions or need additional information.

Sincerely,

ENCLOSURE

ID: nht71-4.40

Open

DATE: 11/05/71

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; C. A. Baker for E. T. Driver; NHTSA

TO: Truck-Lite Company

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of October 14, 1971, to Mr. Lewis Owen of this Office concerning an interpretation regarding your Truck-Lite No. 127 License plate light.

The requested interpretation concerns the 8 degree incident light angle specified in SAE J587, "License Plate Lamps," as follows:

"When a single lamp is used to illuminate the plate, the lamp and license plate holder shall bear such relation to each other that at no point on the plate will the incident light make an angle of less than 8 deg to the plane of the plate."

Since the 8 degree incident light angle is also a requirement of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, all license plate lamp designs must conform to it. It is our position that the angle be measured from the optical center of the lens; therefore, the Electrical Testing Laboratories' position is valid. That is, the incident light angle of your lamp, without the paint shield and when mounted as it will be installed on the vehicle, is below the 8 degree minimum requirement.

ID: 77-4.41

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 11/29/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R. L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: General Motors Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of June 3, 1977, to Ms. Joan Claybrook, requesting an interpretation of whether the release action of your "c-ring" seat belt latch mechanism qualifies as a push button action as specified in paragraph S7.2(c) of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection.

Your efforts to improve the comfort and convenience of belt systems thereby increasing the likelihood that they will be used is to be commended. I must point out, however, that the primary purpose of the requirement in paragraph S7.2(c) is to standardize the release method of all seat belts. This reduces the likelihood that occupants will become confused as to how to release a belt in a strange car or in an emergency situation.

We have reviewed the operation of your "c-ring" and conclude that the action necessary to release the mechanism does not constitute push botton action. However, incorporation of a push botton release, similar to the design being used in Saab automobiles, would bring your "c-ring" into conformance with S7.2(c) and permit its use.

ID: 86-2.29

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/21/86

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Mr. S. Elvin-Jensen

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

April 21, 1986 Mr. S. Elvin-Jensen Safety Transport Inter (Pty) Ltd. P.O. Box 1513 Dassenberg 7350 SOUTH AFRICA Dear Mr. Elvin-Jensen: This responds to your letter dated August 28, 1985, asking whether a child booster seat marketed by your company complies with Standard No. 213, Child Restraint Systems. I regret the delay in replying to your letter. The descriptive materials accompanying your letter indicate that your child seat is secured by a vehicle's belt system, and has no harness of its own. Standard No. 213 applies to all child restraint systems. Those except Type II seat belts, designed for use in a motor vehicle to restrain, seat, or position children who weigh not more than 50 pounds." The information enclosed with your letter states that the child booster seat is intended to seat children weighing from 15 to 32 kg., which is equivalent to 33 to 70.5 pounds. This weight range includes children who weigh up to 50 pounds. Therefore, Standard No. 213 would apply to your product if it is marketed in this country. You ask if Standard No. 213 requires child restraint systems to have their own harness. The answer is no. the specific requirements of the standard on child restraint harness systems only apply if a manufacturer provides belts as a part of the system. Thus, for example, section 5.4.3.3 does not require that each child restraint be equipped with a harness meeting the requirements of that section. Instead, it provides that "each child restraint system...that has belts designed to restrain the child" must comply with those requirements. (Emphasis added.) Under S6.1 of the standard, your child booster seat would be tested with a Type I safety belt (i.e., lap belt) attached. Although abdominal loading is not specifically measured in the test, the agency is concerned that when a vehicle lap belt is used with a child restraint system to restrain a child, the belt be positioned so that it does not apply impact loads to the abdomen of the child. The abdomen is, of course, the area of the body most vulnerable to the forces imposed by the belt in a crash. thus, the agency believes that the lap belt should be held in place by the child restraint so that it passes over the pelvis and thighs of a child, areas of the body best able to withstand the forces imposed by the vehicle belt. Based on the photograph of your child booster seat, we are concerned that the vehicle lap belt may not be properly positioned and securely held by the restraint. Instead, the lap belt may allow submarining and may apply impact loads to the abdomen, unless the seating surface of the restraint is designed to prevent submarining. The agency is also concerned that the lap belt should be properly positioned and securely held so that no substantial inertial loads of the booster seat are applied to the child. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (the Act), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1391, et seq., under which Standard No. 213 was issued, provides for self-certification by manufacturers instead of the type-approval or homologation process used in Europe and elsewhere. Under the Act, manufacturers are responsible for certifying that their items of motor vehicle equipment, such as child seats, comply with the requirements of any applicable safety standard. If you plan to market your child safety seat in this country, you should ensure that your child safety seat complies with all of the applicable requirements of the standard, including the certification requirements of S5.5. Under the Act and our regulations, manufacturers also have the responsibility to conduct notification and remedy campaigns for safety related defects or noncompliances in their products (sections 151-159). The Act defines a manufacturer as "any person engaging in the manufacturing or assembling of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, including any person importing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for resale." In the event that neither the importer nor the assembling manufacturer met an obligation imposed on a "manufacturer" by the Act or our regulations, the agency would consider taking enforcement action against both parties. Any such obligation, however, could be satisfied by either party. In addition, there are two other regulations which affect manufacturers. Those regulations require manufacturers to provide the agency with certain identifying information (49 CFR Part 566), and, in the case of foreign manufacturers, to designate an agent for the service of process (49 CFR Part 551). Copies of Standard No. 213, the Act, Part 566, Part 551, 19 CFR 12.80 and an instruction sheet for new manufacturers are enclosed. I hope this information is helpful to you. Sincerely, Original Signed By Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel Enclosures

ID: aiam0437

Open
Armand F. Macmanus, Esq., Phillips Petroleum Company, Bartesville, Oklahoma 74004; Armand F. Macmanus
Esq.
Phillips Petroleum Company
Bartesville
Oklahoma 74004;

Dear Mr. Macmanus: This is in reply to your letter of June 29, 1971, requesting that w reconsider certain opinions provided to you in a letter dated June 4, 1971, which was in response to your letter of May 11, 1971. The opinions you wish us to reconsider concern whether certain tires used by Phillips for experimental purposes must comply with Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109. The facts as you state them are the Phillips purchases new passenger car tires that have been certified as conforming to Standard No. 109, buffs them down, and then applies new tread, consisting of experimental rubber compounds, to them. You state that these experimental tires are tested by using them on the public roads, as well as by other methods.; In our letter to you of June 4 we stated that we consider these tire to be new pneumatic tires, and subject to Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109. The Further stated that we considered the testing of them on public highways to be an introduction of these tires in interstate commerce, and that if the tires failed to conform to the standard, then such testing would be in violation of S103(a)(1) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. S1397(a)(1)). For the reasons given below, we affirm our earlier opinion. In addition, while not stated in our earlier letter,the failure by Phillips to certify these tires as conforming to Standard No. 109, pursuant to section 114 of the Act (15 U.S.C. S1403), Standard No. 109, and the Tire Identification and Recordkeeping regulations (49 CFR Part 574) constitutes a violation of second 108(a)(3) of the Act (15 U.S.C. S1397(a)(3)). Each violation of section 108(a)(1) and 108(a)(3) is subject to a civil penalty, as provided in section 110 (15 U.S.C. SS1398,1399).; Your position appears to be that the tires in question are not covere by either Standard No. 109 or Standard No. 117 (retreaded Pneumatic Tires) as the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act does not apply to the use of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment after the first purchase for a purpose other than resale. You claim that Phillips' activity with respect to these tires is merely to use them and, citing section 108(b)(1) of the Act (15 U.S.C. S1397(b)(1)) takes place after the first purchase for a purpose other than resale and is consequently not within the scope of section 108(a)(1). The tires, therefore, need not comply with the standards.; You make a concurrent argument as well, in which you state that th prohibitions in section 108(a)(1) are 'restricted to controlling the sale or resale of tires in commercial channels.' You go on to state that if this were not true, the government would be forced to control the use and resale of the tires by the consumer. You feel that this argument is substantiated by the exemption in Standard No. 109 concerning the *sale* (your emphasis) of 'reclassified tires.'; Phillips' activity under the Act with respect to the tires in questio is not that of a user or consumer, but that of a manufacturer. According to your letter Phillips purchases new passenger tires for the purpose of transforming them into experimental tires. In this regard Phillips is manufacturing a new and different tire, and the original tires are no more than raw materials which become part of the final product manufactured by Phillips. Whether or not Phillips ultimately sells or intends to sell the tires is unimportant in determining whether Phillips is a statutory manufacturer, as the definition of 'manufacturer' under the Act (S102(3), 15 U.S.C. S1391(3)) does not require that the product be manufactured or assembled for sale.; Moreover, you are incorrect in you analysis of the provisions of th National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Section 108(a)(1) proscribed more than the manufacturing for sale, or the sale of motor vh(sic) and motor vehicle equipment. In clear language it also proscribed the introduction of such components in interstate commerce, and prohibits the latter as well as the former activities after the effective date of a motor vehicle safety standard, unless the vehicle or item of equipment conforms to the standard. Contrary to the arguments in your letter, the use of such components on the public highways is an introduction of them in interstate commerce and subject to the prohibitions of section 108(a)(1). The exception to this, 'after the first purchase...in good faith for purposes other than resale' (S108(b)(2)), is intended to exempt used vehicles (and equipment) manufactured after a standard's effective date, as a continued reading of the section, which authorizes the establishment of used vehicle standards, indicates. It allows, for example, a vehicle or item of equipment that was manufactured after the effective date of applicable standard to be resold without requiring the seller to ensure that the vehicle or equipment is in the same condition with regard to the standards as when it was new. this section is not intended to allow individuals to manufacture vehicles or equipment for their own use on public highways without complying with applicable standards.; Your reference to the treatment of reclassified tires is not in point The decision in that rulemaking action was to prohibit either the manufacturer or the sale of these tires, and the latter course was chosen so that manufacturers would not be required to destroy noncertified tires that would be inexpensive and not unsafe for a narrowly prescribed use. In no way does this exemption reflect the limitation that you suggest on the authority of the NHTSA.; As we started to you in our letter of June 4, 1971, the tires that yo manufacture are not retreaded tires as the casing used in their manufacture do not come from used tires. However, these tires are new pneumatic tires, and such are subject to Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109.; Sincerely, Lawrence R. Schneider, Chief Counsel

Request an Interpretation

You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:

The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.

Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.

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