ID: nht70-2.19

DATE: 05/26/70

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Rodolfo A. Diaz; NHTSA

TO: Oliver and Sons Inc.

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of February 25, 1970, to the National Highway Safety Bureau, that has been referred to this office, in which you enclose certification labels you are(Illegible Word) using to fulfill the requirement of Section 118 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. Your letter did not reach me until now, and I apologize for delay in responding.

You really did not comply enough information for us to properly evaluate your situation. You state that you are a distributor of truck bodies, but you as not say whether you install the bodies yourself.

If you do, in fact assemble a truck body to a chassis-cab, you are considered to be a manufacturer under the Act. As the statutory manufacturer of the vehicle, you are required to certify that the completed assemblage meets all the standards in effect on the date of manufacture of the chassis-cab.

The primary responsibility for conformity of the chassis-cab, however, falls on the manufacturer of it (generally a major automotive manufacturer and under the regulations, that manufacturer is required to affix a label to the chassis-cab listing the standards to which it conforms. Under Section 108(b)(2) of the Act, such a certification protects subsequent persons in the chain of distribution from liability for nonconformity of which they have no knowledge. Thus, they body assembler to directly responsible for comformity of the finished vehicle with (1) any applicable standards to which the chassis-cab manufacturer was not certified, and (2) any other standards conformity to which is affected by what the(Illegible Word) door to the vehicle, his certification must be for all standards, in the language specified in the certification regulations;(Illegible Word) he can rely on the chassis-cab manufacturer's label for the standard it covers, as(Illegible Word) as he does not know of any nonconformity.

The(Illegible Word) being used on your labels does not fulfill the requirements of the certification regulations that becomes effective as to(Illegible Word)(Illegible Word) after August 11, 1969 (49 C.F.R. 367).

A truck body is not a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Act and the regulations, and therefore is not covered by the present certification regulations. Although it is motor vehicle equipment such equipment is only required by the Act to be certified where there is a safety standard applicable to it or to equipment, such as glazing, that is part of it. When the body is assembled to the chassis, the completed vehicle must be certified in accordance with the certification regulations, as explained above.

It is not clear what you mean by the phrase "modification label." You may be referring to Section 367.6 of the certification regulations, which is intended for the use of distributors who alter a previously certified vehicle that has been completed by another manufacturer. In any event, the nonenclosure does not meet the requirements of the section.

We are enclosing the following publications:

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.

The Certification Regulations (49 C.F.R. Part 367).

A sample certification label.

A publication having to do with the availability of the latest edition of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and Regulations.

Mailing List Questionnaire.

A new proposal having to do with vehicles manufactured in two or more stages (35 F.R. 4639 through 4641).

Please cobalt a copy of your label that has been revised to fulfill the requirements.

We trust this will clarify the situation for you. We will be pleased to answer any additional questions that you might have.

ENCLOSURES

ID: nht94-4.68

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: October 28, 1994

FROM: Philip R. Recht -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Honorable Frank Lautenberg -- United States Senator

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 9/26/94 FROM FRANK LAUTENBERG TO SUSAN SLYE

TEXT: We are responding to your further correspondence on behalf of your constituent, Dr. Mark L. Bauman of Marlton, which was addressed to the Federal Highway Administration. On July 28, 1994, the Deputy Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety A dministration (NHTSA) wrote you about Dr. Bauman's courtesy light. I believe that letter fairly states NHTSA's views on the process the government generally follows for mandating items of safety equipment. This letter will explain what Dr. Bauman may n ow do if he wishes to sell his invention as an item of optional motor vehicle lighting equipment, without the necessity of Federal involvement.

Dr. Bauman's light would be mounted in the front of a vehicle so that its driver, stopped at an intersection, can advise pedestrians or other drivers to proceed with caution. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 Lamps, Reflective Devices and As sociated Equipment governs the installation of lighting equipment on new motor vehicles. Since Standard No. 108 does not require a front courtesy light, the light is considered supplementary lighting equipment, one for which no standards have been estab lished. Supplementary lighting equipment is permissible provided that it does not impair the effectiveness of the lighting equipment that the standard does require, in this instance, the other lighting equipment on the vehicle's front, specifically park ing lamps, turn signal lamps, and headlamps (paragraph S5.1.3, Standard No. 108). The vehicle manufacturer is required to certify upon the vehicle's completion that it complies with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards. With respect to certification of a vehicle on which the courtesy light has been installed, a manufacturer would be certifying under S5.1.3 that the light does not impair the effectiveness of the required lighting equipment. NHTSA will not question the certification un less it appears to be clearly erroneous. Thus, any tests that Dr. Bauman may conduct with the courtesy light should address the basic issue of impairment. A dealer in motor vehicles must not negatively affect the vehicle manufacturer's certification. Thus, if a dealership installs the courtesy light, it should ensure that there is no impairment within the meaning of S5.1.3 before offering the vehicle for sale and selling it. Our regulations make a distinction between modifications to new vehicles an d those that have been sold, but similar considerations apply. If a dealership installs the courtesy light on a used car, it must ensure that it does not "make inoperative" any of the required lighting equipment (49 U.S.C. 30122). We have interpreted t his, where possible, to be the equivalent of the "impairment" prohibition applicable to new vehicles. This prohibition applies to manufacturers, distributors and motor vehicle repair businesses as well.

However, the prohibition does not extend to the vehicle owner. If Dr. Bauman intends his courtesy light solely for the aftermarket and the device is such that it would ordinarily be installed by the vehicle owner, the legality of its use is determined b y the laws of the States in which it is operated. We are unable to advise Dr. Bauman on whether the laws of the individual States would permit use of his invention, and recommend that he write for an opinion to the American Association of Motor Vehicle A dministrators, 4600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. 22203.

I hope that this responds to Dr. Bauman's concerns.

ID: nht93-9.2

DATE: December 2, 1993

FROM: James E. Shlesinger -- Shlesinger, Arkwright & Garvey

TO: Walter K. Myers -- Office of the General Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: None $125(Y) OCC-9388

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 3/21/94 from John Womack to James E. Schlesinger (A42; Redbook; Part 575.104), letter dated 12/23/92 from James E. Shlesinger to Walter Myers, and letter dated 2/23/93 from John Womack to James E. Schlesinger

TEXT:

This is to follow-up on prior correspondence and discussions pertaining to regulatory standards for tires and manufacturer and tire brand name owner requirements in the areas of treadwear, traction and temperature resistance. Previously, we requested an opinion concerning the Uniform Tire Quality Grading Standards (UTQGS) as it applied to a certain fact situation. Copies of our letter dated December 23, 1992, and Chief Counsel's letter of February 23, 1993 in response are enclosed for your reference.

Our present request is directed to an interpretation of the language of 49 C.F.R. S575.104(c)(2) and the qualifications as a limited production tire exception to the requirement that the UTQGS information be molded onto or into the tire sidewall and be provided by means of a paper label affixed to the tread surface of the tire. We also seek confirmation of violations of 49 C.F.R. S575.6(b) and 575.6(d)(2) in the case below wherein a brand name owner of tires both fails to provide the consumer and the Administrator consumer information applicable to tires offered for sale. Finally, we request a brief comment concerning the penalties for violation of the UTQGS as set forth in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 U.S.C. S1381 et seq., as amended (hereinafter "Act").

For the purpose of convenience and clarification, we present the following background information which we believe forms the basis for a violation of the Act subjecting the violator to civil penalties for each violation.

Companies A and B are wholly owned Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. companies. A and B manufacture tires for Company C for sale and distribution in Canada. The tires produced by A and B for C carry C's brand name on both the tire sidewall and the paper tread label affixed to the tread surface of the tire. C retails and sells tires through stores which C own and operate throughout Canada. All of the tires in question carry the "DOT" certification and the Canadian National Tire Safety mark which is evidenced by a maple leaf. However, the tires manufactured by A and B for C do not contain UTQGS information on either the tire sidewall or the paper tread label affixed to the tires. We believe the reason for this is because Canada does not require UTQGS information be molded into the sidewall of the tire or be placed on the paper tread label for the tire, and that the tires manufactured by A and B were produced for C for sale within its stores in Canada.

For various reasons, C rejected a large number of tires manufactured for it by A and B during the period 1990-1991 and these tires ultimately found their way into the U.S. market. Specifically, C rejected tires manufactured

for it by A or B in three instances. In the case of an overrun of tires to the extent that C was unable to absorb the volume, C permitted A or B to market and sell the tires in the United States or countries other than Canada. Second, C did not accept blem tires for sale through its stores in Canada. Blem tires would initially be offered for sale to an associate of C in Canada, but if the associate rejected the offer, then A and B were free to dispose of the blem tires provided said tires were not disposed of in Canada. Third, in the case of an end of the line run of a certain brand of tires, when C decided to discontinue the line, A and B were allowed to sell the excess of the discontinued line to countries other than Canada.

All of the tires shipped to the U.S. by A or B which carried C's brand name on them during this period were passenger car tires. None of the tires were deep tread, winter type snow, space-saver, or temporary use spare tires. Also, none of the tires were with nominal rim diameters of 10-12 inches. (See 49 C.F.R. S575.104(c)).

As noted previously, none of the tires in question contained information pertaining to treadwear, traction and temperature resistance, either by means of a label affixed to the tread surface of the tire or molded onto or into the tire sidewall as set forth in the requirements governing UTQGS at 49 C.F.R. S575.104. Further, C, the brand name owner of the tires did not file any documents or any submissions to the Administrator at any time prior to or concurrent with the shipment of tires into the U.S. as noted in the requirements set forth at 49 C.F.R. S575.6(d)(2) which specify that a brand name owner of tires must submit to the Administrator ten (10) copies of information specified in subpart B that is applicable to tires offered for sale at least thirty (30) days before it is first provided for examination by prospective purchasers. Nor was any of this information provided to purchasers.

With this information, our specific inquiry is directed to the "limited production tires" exception to the requirement to meet UTQGS set forth at 49 C.F.R. S575.104(c)(2)./1 The specific language is as follows:

(2) "Limited production tire" means a tire meeting all the following criteria, as applicable:

(iii) the tire's size was not listed as a vehicle manufacturer's recommended tire size designation for a new motor vehicle produced in or imported into the U.S. in quantities greater than 10,000 during the calendar year preceding the year of the tire's manufacture;...

COMPANY A

Approximately 6,975 tires were shipped to the U.S. in April 1990 and 2,947 tires were shipped to the U.S. in November 1991, all with the tire size P225/75R15. This size refers to a tire size listed as a vehicle manufacturer's recommended tire size designation for the calendar year preceding the year of the tire's manufacture. For example, P225/75R15 is a

1/ For the purpose of this inquiry, it can be assumed that the criteria set forth at S575.104(c)(2)(i), (ii) and (iv) are met by Companies A and B.

vehicle manufacturer's recommended tire Size for the 1988 Buick LeSabre, Buick Electra Estate Wagon, Cadillac Brougham (4-door) Sedan, and Oldsmobile Custom Cruiser Wagon; the 1989 Buick Electra Estate Wagon, LeSabre Estate Wagon, Cadillac Brougham (4-door), Chevrolet Caprice Wagon, and Oldsmobile Custom Cruiser Wagon; and the 1990 Chevrolet Caprice, Cadillac Brougham and Buick Estate Wagon. These motor vehicles were produced in or imported into the U.S. in quantities greater than 10,000 during the respective years. We therefore believe that the limited production tire exception of 575.104(c)(2) does not apply because criteria (iii) of the exception was not met.

COMPANY B

Approximately 6,164 tires were shipped to the U.S. in June 1990 with various tire sizes. The tire sizes for these tires were acceptable substitute sizes for a given tire size listed as a vehicle manufacturer's recommended tire size designation for new motor vehicles produced in or imported into the U.S. in quantities greater than 10,000 during the calendar year preceding the year of the tire's manufacture. For example, some of the tires shipped to the U.S. in June 1990 were of the tire size P255/6OR15. P255/6OR15 is an acceptable substitute tire size for the P225/75R15 referred to above.

Assuming that all of the tires aforementioned shipped to the United States by Companies A and B were sold in the United States, please advise on the following:

1. Is Company A in violation of the UTQGS set forth at 49 C.F.R. S575.104?

2. Is Company B in violation of the UTQGS set forth at 49 C.F.R. S575.104?

3. Is Company C in violation of 49 C.F.R. S575.6(b) and 575.6(d)(2) for the failure to provide consumer information and the failure to submit to the Administrator 10 copies of the information specified in Subpart B of the regulations applicable to the tires offered for sale?

4. In addition to the penalties for the violation of the UTQGS set forth in the Act under Section 109 (15 U.S.C. S1398(a)), are there additional sanctions (i.e., requiring the manufacturer or brand name owner to recall unlawful product or notification procedures intended to identify unlawful product in the marketplace?

Thank you for your consideration of this matter and we appreciate your kind assistance.

ID: 07-005005as

ID: 3036yy

Mr. Stephen Mamakas
AIR Inc.
1517 West 9 Street
Brooklyn, NY 11204

Dear Mr. Mamakas:

In a telephone conversation with Stephen Kratzke of my staff, you asked for a clarification of my May 13, 1991 letter to you. My May 13 letter explained that Federal law would not affect any plans to repair air bags, but that a host of safety concerns and potential product liability issues under State law would arise in connection with any planned operation to repair air bags.

You explained in your telephone conversation with Mr. Kratzke that the last paragraph of my May 13 letter to you suggests that I did not fully understand your company's plans. In that last paragraph, I referred to repacking a deployed air bag. In your telephone conversation, you explained that your company would not reuse any used equipment. Instead, you plan on installing the new air bags and new sensors recommended by the vehicle manufacturer. After your company completes its work on the vehicle, you are prepared to certify that the air bag will work as intended by the vehicle manufacturer. You asked how this difference would change the answer in my May 13 letter.

This new information would not affect my previous advice that Federal law does not affect your planned repair operations. However, the safety concerns I expressed in my previous letter would be addressed if your company's repairs used only the replacement parts for the air bag system recommended by the vehicle manufacturer and installed those parts in accordance with the vehicle manufacturer's instructions.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel ref:208#VSA d:6/ll/9l

ID: 77-4.48

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 12/06/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt for J. J. Levin, Jr.; NHTSA

TO: Ellcon National, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your September 2, 1977, letter concerning the applicability of Standard No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release, to a thermopane driver's window in a bus.

In response to your first question, the window to which you refer is required to comply with the requirements of the standard. The fact that it is a driver's window does not exempt it from the coverage of the standard.

Your second question asks how to test thermopane glazing. According to our enforcement staff, testing of thermopane windows can be conducted using the same criteria used for other window glazing. By following the procedures established in S5.1 of the standard, you should be able to accurately test thermopane glazing.

SINCERELY,

September 2, 1977

Frank A. Berndt Acting Chief Counsel U.S. Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

A question has arisen as to the qualification of an interpretation in a test to be performed on a driver window in a bus we are to supply to our customer.

Subject window is a dual slider containing thermopane glazing and we would appreciate clarification with regard to FMVSS 217. Is it necessary for a test performance in compliance to FMVSS 217?

If test is necessary, how should interpretation of force be measured with regard to thermopane which consists of two 3/16" thick pieces of glass with a 1/4" thick space sealed unit?

Your clarification in this matter would be appreciated. Thank you for assisting us in this matter.

ELLCON-NATIONAL, INC.

Stanley Brajer Project Engineer

ID: nht78-2.45

DATE: 01/06/78

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; J. J. Levin, Jr.; NHTSA

TO: Arent, Fox, Kenter, Plotkin & Kahn

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your December 1, 1977, request for agreement by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration that the installation as original or aftermarket equipment of an electric retarder on the driveline of an air-braked vehicle would not affect its compliance with Standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems.

Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1397(a)(1)(A)) requires, among other things, that no person manufacture or sell any motor vehicle manufactured on or after the date any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect unless it is in conformity with such standard. As your letter indicates, you are aware that this provision makes it impossible for the NHTSA to "approve" the compliance of a vehicle configuration in advance of manufacture of the vehicle, because there can be no certainty that the vehicle as manufactured will actually comply. In this case, for example, the retarder's weight or the manner in which it is mounted would affect the actual compliance of the vehicle in which it is installed.

Jacobs' September 20, 1977, analysis evaluated the likelihood that certain retarders to be imported or manufactured by Jacobs would affect compliance. With regard to these retarders, it appears that their installation as original equipment or in the aftermarket in the fashion described would not affect compliance of the vehicle with Standard No. 121. This finding is of necessity limited to the retarders evaluated in the September 20, 1977, analysis.

ID: 1982-3.7

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/30/82

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Hogan & Hartson

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in further response to your letter concerning the application of several Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards to mopeds. You asked whether Standard No. 108 and Standard No. 127 would preempt State statutes or regulations on the same subjects.

Your specific question on Standard No. 127 was whether section 3 of the standard, which excluded mopeds from the coverage of the standard, would preempt State laws that require all motor vehicles operated on the highways to be equipped with a speedometer. Subsequent to your letter, the agency rescinded Standard No. 127 (47 FR 7250). In rescinding the standard, the agency stated that it recognized that there is a nexus between having a speedometer and motor vehicle safety. Based on available information, however, the agency concluded that the specific requirements of the standard concerning the markings on a speedometer, such as the highlighting of the numeral "55", were not yielding and could not be expected to yield significant safety benefits. Because the marking requirements were not yielding safety benefits, the agency stated that it intended that other levels of government be preempted from establishing similar requirements. In preempting States from establishing marking requirements, the agency did not intend to preempt States from enforcing laws or regulations which only require the presence of a speedometer and do not set marking requirements for the speedometer.

Your final question concerned section 4.1.1.26 of Standard No. 108, which exempts motor-driven cycles whose speed attainable in one mile is 30 mph or less from the requirement that motor vehicles be equipped with turn signal lamps. You asked if that provision preempts State laws to the extent they require all motor vehicles to be equipped with turn signal lamps. The answer is yes.

In adopting section 4.1.1.26, the agency specifically addressed the issue of what turn signal requirements are necessary and appropriate for mopeds. The agency determined that the speed and weight characteristics of mopeds made the problems associated with hand signaling less significant than they are for larger motorcycles. The agency concluded that exempting mopeds from the turn signal requirement would ease the burden of compliance for moped manufacturers without jeopardizing safety. Since Standard No. 108 specifically addresses the issue of what turn signal requirements are applicable to mopeds, States are preempted from establishing or enforcing a safety standard on that aspect of performance that is not identical to the Federal standard.

If you have any further questions, please let me know.

ID: 21268.ztv

Mr. Lou McKenna
Emergency Vehicle Alarm
2800 N. Hamline Avenue, #130
Roseville, MN 55113

Dear Mr. McKenna:

We are replying to your letter of February 20, 2000, with a copy to Sante Esposito, as you requested. You have written us for an interpretation as to whether the proposed placement of your Emergency Vehicle Alarm (EVA) is acceptable under relevant Federal laws and regulations, as your long-range goal is "to have the EVA installed as an original equipment manufacturer device on all passenger vehicles."

The EVA has three principal features, two in the interior of a vehicle and one on the exterior. Inside the vehicle, a flashing red display of the words "Emergency Vehicle" on the instrument panel is triggered by a signal from an emergency vehicle. At the same time, "an animated siren also sounds inside the car." On the exterior, a "flashing white light" indicates to the driver of an emergency vehicle that the warning has been received. This lamp is located "to the left of the Center Highmounted Stop Lamp (CHMSL)" as viewed from the rear, "equidistant from the CHMSL and the "window corner and equal in height to the CHMSL."

None of the laws and regulations that we administer preclude a flashing red message on the instrument panel or an audible siren in or on a motor vehicle. This means that the legality of such devices must be determined under state and local laws. We are not conversant with these laws.

However, the "flashing white light" is subject to our laws and regulations. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices and Associated Equipment (49 CFR 571.108), requires all lamps installed on "passenger vehicles" to be steady-burning in use, except for turn signals, hazard warning signals, and headlamps and side marker lamps flashed for signaling purposes. See S5.5.10. This requirement would preclude the use of the flashing-light feature of the EVA system either as original or optional equipment. We are also of the opinion that this feature could not realistically be offered as aftermarket equipment either. Under 49 U.S.C. 30122, a "manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business" may not "make inoperative" any element or device installed in accordance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard. Because the installation of the flashing white light would result in a noncompliance with Standard No. 108, we would consider that action to be a "making inoperative" within the meaning of that phrase, and a violation of Section 30122 if performed by one of the four persons named in the prohibition. The system appears too complex for installation by a person other than a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business (e.g., the vehicle owner).

Were the EVA reconfigured so that the white light is steady burning, the question would then arise whether it is acceptable under S5.1.3 of Standard No. 108 as optional new vehicle equipment. The test of permissibility under S5.1.3 is whether a lamp not required by Standard No. 108 impairs the effectiveness of equipment required by Standard No. 108. We believe that the EVA lamp could create confusion in a following driver other than that of an emergency vehicle. In this sense, the CHMSL and other stop lamps would be impaired if the following driver delayed in responding to a stop signal.

We note also that state laws often prohibit a white light to the rear, other than a license plate lamp, as do the Vienna Conventions on motor traffic.

If you have any questions, you may phone Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
Enclosure
ref:108
d.5/4/00

ID: nht91-4.5

DATE: May 23, 1991

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA; (Signature by S. Wood)

TO: Bill Lewandoski (Lewandowski) -- Account Manager, Kelsey Products Division

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 4-30-91 from Bill Lewandowski to Taylor Vinson; Also attached to letter dated 11-22-91 from Paul Jackson Rice to William J. Lewandoski (A38; Std. 108); Also attached to letter dated 7-9-91 from William J. Lewandowski to Robert Helluth (OCC 6245)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter of April 30, 1991, to Taylor Vinson of this Office with respect to the regulation of trailer stop lamp activation by Standard No. 108.

You have enclosed a photocopy of literature on the Tekonsha Voyager electronic brake control. This system incorporates a manual override side bar that manually activates the trailer brakes without a corresponding activation of the trailer stop lamps. The reason for this is the manufacturer's view that "STOPPING IS NOT THE INTENT. BY NOT DRIVING THE STOPLIGHTS DURING MANUAL ACTIVATION, THE VOYAGER ELIMINATES FALSE BRAKE LIGHT SIGNALS . . . ." The literature carries the notation that "THE VOYAGER AND VOYAGER XP MEET NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION (sic) SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (N.H.T.S.A.) REGULATIONS REGARDING TOW VEHICLE/TRAILER LIGHT APPLICATION." You have asked whether Standard No. 108 permits application of the trailer brakes without activation of the towing vehicle/trailer stop lamps.

It does not. Tekonsha misunderstands the function of a stop lamp. A stop lamp not only indicates the intent of the driver to stop, but also the intent of the driver "to diminish speed by braking." (see the definition of "stop lamp" in SAE Standard J568c, Stop Lamps, August 1970, incorporated by reference in Standard No.108). Paragraph S5.5.4 of Standard No. 108 requires that "The stop lamps on each vehicle shall be activated upon application of the service brakes." The Voyager electronic control applies the service brakes to diminish vehicle speed, and therefore the stop lamps are required to be activated.

The installation of the Voyager by a manufacturer or dealer before the initial sale of a trailer would therefore appear to be a violation of Standard No. 108 since its operation would create a noncompliance with the standard. As an aftermarket device, it is subject to the "render inoperative" prohibition of 15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A). Any manufacturer, distributor, dealer or motor vehicle repair business installing the device after the trailer's initial sale is, in effect, rendering the trailer's stop lamps inoperative when the device is used. Civil penalties are provided for with respect to violations of either Standard No. 108, or section 1397(a)(2)(A). The statement as to compliance with NHTSA regulations is wrong.

We appreciate your bringing this matter to our attention. I am forwarding a copy of your letter to our Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance for such further action as it deems appropriate.