ID: Oshkosh

W. Thatcher Peterson
Product Safety Manager
Oshkosh Truck Corporation
2307 Oregon Street
P.O. Box 2566
Oshkosh, Washington 54903-2566

Dear Mr. Peterson:

This responds to your letter of September 22, 2003, requesting confirmation of Oshkosh Truck Corporations (Oshkosh) understanding of its early warning reporting (EWR) responsibilities under the TREAD Act and 49 CFR Part 579 with regard to the military and civilian heavy trucks it manufactures. Your letter provided information concerning three categories of heavy vehicles, one of which was divided into two subcategories: one subcategory for vehicles restricted to off-road use, and one subcategory for vehicles used on public streets and highways. My responses are organized according to the categories you identified.

The first category you referenced concerned trucks built exclusively for military use with no civilian counterparts. As to this category, I confirm that your understanding is correct that such trucks, designed and manufactured exclusively for military use, and with no civilian counterparts, are not subject to the EWR requirements.See letter of May 21, 2003, to Stewart & Stevenson.

The second category you referenced concerned Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) trucks and snow removal trucks. These trucks were, in turn, broken into two subcategories. The first, you explained, includes ARFF and snow removal equipment used exclusively for off-road service and almost exclusively at airports to perform such tasks as fighting airplane fires and removing snow. You stated that it is Oshkoshs understanding that it has no EWR responsibilities for such vehicles in light of their off-road use. The second, you explained, includes snow removal trucks used in on-road service to clear public roads. You stated that it is Oshkoshs understanding that it must report EWR information on these trucks because they are civilian vehicles engaged in on-road work.

Oshkoshs understanding as to both subcategories of trucks is correct, based on the descriptions that you provided. As to the first subcategory, we have previously interpreted the term "motor vehicle" to exclude vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use, and have referenced airport runway vehicles as one example of such vehicles.See letter of June 12, 1995, to Mr. Andrew Grubb. By contrast, the snow removal trucks conducting on-road work would be considered motor vehicles for EWR purposes.

The third category you referenced included trucks designed for and used in the on-road civilian market. You gave an example of concrete placement trucks and stated Oshkosh builds approximately 700 of these trucks each year. You explained that it was Oshkoshs understanding that it would have EWR responsibilities for these trucks because they are civilian and engaged in on-road work. I confirm that your understanding is correct.

We also note that, based on the annual production information provided in your letter, Oshkosh must submit quarterly EWR information for the two categories of heavy trucks covered by the EWR regulation, as required by 49 CFR 579.22. More specifically, the determinant between full and limited reporting (i.e., as small volume manufacturer under Section 579.27) is the total aggregate production for each reporting category of vehicle defined by the EWR regulation. See letter of August 20, 2003, to Mr. Rod Nash. In this case, it appears Oshkosh produces an estimated 950 medium-heavy vehicles per year, and therefore qualifies as a larger volume manufacturer of medium-heavy vehicles under Section 579.22.

If you have any further questions, please contact Andrew DiMarsico of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:579
d.11/6/03

ID: Oshkosh_NEW

W. Thatcher Peterson
Product Safety Manager
Oshkosh Truck Corporation
2307 Oregon Street
P.O. Box 2566
Oshkosh, Washington 54903-2566

Dear Mr. Peterson:

This responds to your letter of September 22, 2003, requesting confirmation of Oshkosh Truck Corporations (Oshkosh) understanding of its early warning reporting (EWR) responsibilities under the TREAD Act and 49 CFR Part 579 with regard to the military and civilian heavy trucks it manufactures. Your letter provided information concerning three categories of heavy vehicles, one of which was divided into two subcategories: one subcategory for vehicles restricted to off-road use, and one subcategory for vehicles used on public streets and highways. My responses are organized according to the categories you identified.

The first category you referenced concerned trucks built exclusively for military use with no civilian counterparts. As to this category, I confirm that your understanding is correct that such trucks, designed and manufactured exclusively for military use, and with no civilian counterparts, are not subject to the EWR requirements. See letter of May 21, 2003, to Stewart & Stevenson.

The second category you referenced concerned Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) trucks and snow removal trucks. These trucks were, in turn, broken into two subcategories. The first, you explained, includes ARFF and snow removal equipment used exclusively for off-road service and almost exclusively at airports to perform such tasks as fighting airplane fires and removing snow. You stated that it is Oshkoshs understanding that it has no EWR responsibilities for such vehicles in light of their off-road use. The second, you explained, includes snow removal trucks used in on-road service to clear public roads. You stated that it is Oshkoshs understanding that it must report EWR information on these trucks because they are civilian vehicles engaged in on-road work.

Oshkoshs understanding as to both subcategories of trucks is correct, based on the descriptions that you provided. As to the first subcategory, we have previously interpreted the term "motor vehicle" to exclude vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use, and have referenced airport runway vehicles as one example of such vehicles. See letter of June 12, 1995, to Mr. Andrew Grubb. By contrast, the snow removal trucks conducting on-road work would be considered motor vehicles for EWR purposes.

The third category you referenced included trucks designed for and used in the on-road civilian market. You gave an example of concrete placement trucks and stated Oshkosh builds approximately 700 of these trucks each year. You explained that it was Oshkoshs understanding that it would have EWR responsibilities for these trucks because they are civilian and engaged in on-road work. I confirm that your understanding is correct.

We also note that, based on the annual production information provided in your letter, Oshkosh must submit quarterly EWR information for the two categories of heavy trucks covered by the EWR regulation, as required by 49 CFR 579.22. More specifically, the determinant between full and limited reporting (i.e., as small volume manufacturer under Section 579.27) is the total aggregate production for each reporting category of vehicle defined by the EWR regulation. See letter of August 20, 2003, to Mr. Rod Nash. In this case, it appears Oshkosh produces an estimated 950 medium-heavy vehicles per year, and therefore qualifies as a larger volume manufacturer of medium-heavy vehicles under Section 579.22.

If you have any further questions, please contact Andrew DiMarsico of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:579
d.11/6/03

ID: MOPOA.ETL

Ms. Patricia Libbert
Administrator
Motor Vehicle Bureau
State of Missouri Department of Revenue
P. O. Box 100
Jefferson City, MO 65105-0100

Dear Ms. Libbert:

This responds to your letter requesting guidance from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") on the proper use of the secure power of attorney for odometer disclosure statements that is authorized by sections 580.13 through 580.15 of NHTSA's odometer disclosure regulation (49 CFR Part 580).

The question you ask is whether it is permissible under these regulations for a transferee who has authority to execute the odometer disclosure statement on behalf its transferor by virtue of a secure power of attorney, to use a general power of attorney to appoint a third party (such as a lienholder) to execute the odometer disclosure statement on its behalf.

The answer to your question is no. As you know, Federal Odometer Disclosure Regulations promulgated pursuant to the Truth in Mileage Act ("TIMA") (49 U.S.C. Chapter 327) forbid the same party from signing an odometer disclosure statement as both transferor and transferee. 49 CFR 580.5(h). This provision implements TIMA's goal of reducing odometer fraud by making illegal the execution of an odometer disclosure statement when only one of the two parties to the vehicle transfer would be aware of previous mileage disclosures. 53 Fed. Reg. 29471

(Aug. 5, 1988). An amendment to TIMA created the secure power of attorney as a limited exception to this prohibition. 49 U.S.C. 32705(b)(2)(A). That section authorizes one party to a vehicle transfer to use a power of attorney to delegate to the other party its responsibility for executing the odometer disclosure statement (i.e., to execute the odometer disclosure statement as both transferor and transferee), but only if the title is not available at the time of transfer because it is in the hands of a lienholder. Id. NHTSA regulations implementing

this provision also permit the use of the secure power of attorney when the title is unavailable at the time of transfer because it is lost. 49 CFR 580.13.

The purpose of the secure power of attorney provision is two-fold: to reduce undue interference with dealers' ability to promptly resell vehicles taken in trade that might arise from the requirement that the odometer disclosure be made on the title at the time of transfer and the prohibition against transferees executing the disclosure on behalf of transferors; and to preserve the protection against odometer fraud that is afforded by TIMA's provisions requiring odometer disclosure on the title and prohibiting the same party from signing the disclosure as transferor and transferee.

Allowing a transferee who has received a secure power of attorney for the purpose of odometer disclosure to use a general power of attorney to appoint a third party to make the odometer disclosure would render the fraud protections in the Federal regulations governing secure powers of attorney completely ineffectual. The general power of attorney would not be on secure paper, on a form issued by the state; and would not contain any of the additional provisions in NHTSA's regulations that are designed to protect against fraud. These include the requirements that the transferor who is giving the power of attorney disclose the mileage at time of transfer on the power of attorney form, sign the form (including the printed name), give the transferee's name and address, the date of transfer, and a certification as to whether the odometer reading reflects actual mileage (49 CFR Section 580.13(b) - (d)); and the requirements that the transferee sign the form (also including the printed name), return a copy of the form to the transferor, enter the mileage on the title exactly as it is disclosed by the transferor on the secure power of attorney form, and return the original secure power of attorney form to the state that issued it, along with a copy of the title or the original title, whichever is applicable (49 CFR 580.13(e),(f)).

In the absence of these safeguards, the recipient of the general power of attorney would be able to execute the odometer disclosure statement on behalf of both the original transferor and the original transferee, without having to comply with the Federal regulations governing the use of powers of attorney for odometer disclosure. Essentially, allowing a secure power of attorney to be transferred by means of a general power of attorney would accomplish indirectly what TIMA prohibits -- permitting the same party to sign an odometer disclosure as

transferor and transferee -- while providing none of the protections against fraud afforded by the secure power of attorney.

In any event, there should be no need for a dealer to execute a power of attorney transferring its secure power of attorney to a lienholder for the purpose of odometer disclosure. If the dealer has a buyer for a vehicle for which it has not yet received the title from the lienholder, the regulations provide that it may accomplish odometer disclosure by using Part B of the secure power of attorney form, by which it in turn designates its transferee as its attorney in fact for the purpose of odometer disclosure.

I hope this information adequately addresses your questions. If you have any legal questions concerning the Federal odometer disclosure law and regulations, please contact Ms. Eileen Leahy, an attorney on my staff, at 202-366-5263. Any questions or concerns regarding odometer fraud or the Federal odometer enforcement program may be directed to Mr. Richard Morse, Chief of NHTSA's Odometer Fraud Staff, at 202-366-4761.

Sincerely,

John Womack

Acting Chief Counsel

ref:580

d:9/19/96

ID: 1983-3.31

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 12/08/83

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: TWI Inc. -- Bill Perzinsky, President

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Dear Capt. Perzinsky:

This is in reply to Your letter of October 14, 1983, to Mr. Vinson of my staff regarding your F-S-700 A flasher. The device is essentially a slender bar of lights mounted on the rear panel shelf of a passenger car. The left and right sides blink to indicate turns in the appropriate direction. The entire bar lights up when the brake pedal is applied. You ask for our "approval" of this device.

The Federal motor vehicle safety standard on lighting forbids the installation of motor vehicle equipment that impairs the effectiveness of lighting equipment required by the standard. Stop lamps are required by the standard. They must be red. They must go on when the brake pedal is applied. The stop signal put out by the F-S-700 flasher is amber, not red. Therefore, an amber signal coming on at the same time as a red one would impair the effectiveness of the red stop lamp by creating confusion.

The Federal lighting standard allows either amber or red turn signal lamps. There is obviously a potential for confusion if your amber light device is on a vehicle whose turn signals are red. But an even greater problem with interior-mounted lamps, whatever their color, is the reflection that they cause in the rear glass, particularly when it's raining or snowing, interfering with the rear vision of the vehicle's driver.

For the reasons given above the F-S-700 A flasher causes us some concern. Further, you should investigate whether the laws of the jurisdiction where you wish to sell this device will permit its installation and use.

Sincerely,

Oct. 14th, 1983

Dear Mr. Vinson:

We are sending you a flyer of our new product. F-S-700 A 4 star flasher.Would like to know if this type of light would meet standard safety.I would like to send you a sample of this light, as you would be amazed what this light can save lot of lifes and accidents.

I have one installed in my car, every one that see me with it wants on his car. I can't sell them until I get approval from Highway Traffic Safety. Please Let me hear from you at your earlest convenient time, thank you. If you need a sample let me know.

2. Flyers enclosed

Sincerely,

Capt. Bill Perinszy President TWI INC.

ID: 2897yy

Mr. Leonard M. Anderson
Vice President, Engineering
Miller Trailers, Inc.
P. O. Box 511
Bradenton, Florida 34206

Dear Mr. Anderson:

This responds to your request for an interpretation of 49 CFR Part 565, Vehicle Identification Number - Content Requirements. More specifically, you asked whether a world manufacturer identifier (WMI) that was assigned to one manufacturer may continue to be used by a different manufacturer when it purchases the assets of the manufacturer to which the WMI was assigned. As explained below, the answer to your question is no.

Your letter set forth the following information. Miller Trailer, Inc. (Miller) is a trailer manufacturer that has been assigned a unique WMI, in accordance with 49 CFR 565.5(c). Oshkosh Truck Corporation (Oshkosh) is a manufacturer of primarily trucks and some specialized trailers. Oshkosh has also been assigned a unique WMI in accordance with 49 CFR 565.5(c). Oshkosh is purchasing Miller. Your question is whether Oshkosh can continue to use Miller's WMI to identify trailers Oshkosh produces at the facilities that were formerly used by Miller.

To answer this question, we must apply the regulatory provision of 49 CFR 565.4(a). That section provides that the WMI "shall uniquely identify the manufacturer, make and type of the motor vehicle if the manufacturer produces 500 or more motor vehicles of its type annually." NHTSA has previously interpreted the requirement that the WMI "uniquely identify the manufacturer" as precluding the use of a WMI assigned to one manufacturer by any other manufacturer. For your information, I have enclosed a December 24, 1984 letter to Mr. Richard Bond, in which the agency explained that a newly-formed, wholly-owned subsidiary could not use the parent corporation's WMI to identify trailers formerly manufactured by the parent corporation.

With respect to your situation, this regulatory requirement means that the VIN assigned to each trailer manufactured by Oshkosh must identify Oshkosh as the manufacturer. This identification will facilitate the quick and accurate identification of the actual vehicle manufacturer in the event there is a need to do so.

Please note also that Oshkosh, upon manufacturing trailers that formerly were manufactured by Miller, has a responsibility to report any new types of motor vehicles that it produces. 49 CFR Part 566 requires manufacturers that have previously submitted identification information to keep their entries current by submitting revised information not later than 30 days after the relevant changes occur. A copy of this part is also enclosed for your information.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions on this subject, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

Enclosures

ref: Part 565 d:3/l9/9l

ID: nht79-4.25

DATE: 05/01/79

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Oestreicher; Sternberg & Manes

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of March 13, 1979, asking whether your client, a tire brand name owner, is permitted to bill its dealers and distributors directly for the costs of supplying Uniform Tire Quality Grading (UTQG) information pursuant to 49 CFR 575.104 and maintaining records of tire sales pursuant to 49 CFR 574.7.

The UTQG regulation requires that tire manufacturers and brand name owners "provide" grading information for each of their tires (49 CFR 575.104(d)(1)(i)). Similarly, the Tire Identification and Record Keeping regulation requires these parties to "provide" upon request tire registration forms to dealers and distributors (49 CFR 574.7(a)) and directs tire manufacturers and brand name owners to maintain or have maintained for them records of the information acquired on these registration forms (49 CFR 574.7(b)).

A billing arrangement of the type your client suggests would in effect make the tire manufacturer or brand name owner the agent of the dealer or distributor for purposes of grading and registering tires. Such a practice would run counter to the intention of the agency that manufacturers and brand name owners bear primary responsibility for implementation of tire grading and registration. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) will take whatever action is necessary, including possible revision of the regulations, to prevent manipulation of the tire regulations in this manner.

Apart from the legal implications of your client's proposa, NHTSA would question the soundness, from a business standpoint, of a plan for direct billing of UTQG and tire recordkeeping costs. Your client's proposed course of action appears to have the aim of generating dissatisfaction with Federal tire regulations among dealers and distributors, and could, by lessening cooperation at the retail level, interfere with your client's ability to fulfill its obligations under the regulations.

SINCERELY,

OESTREICHER, STERNBERG & MANES

March 13, 1979

Francis Armstrong, Director Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance Enforcement U.S. Department of Transportation National Highway Safety Administration

Dear Sir:

This office represents a corporation, which distributes private brand tires through its dealers on a wholesale basis. Grade labeling and registration of tires is an extremely expensive administrative procedure. My client certainly will comply with the law, however, answer to our inquiry would be appreciated.

Can the cost of grade labeling and registration be passed on directly to the wholesaler or purchaser of our dealers? The question is one of direct billing for such items rather than burying the cost of such administrative work in the cost of the tire.

Your prompt answer would be appreciated and any other information you feel might be helpful.

MARVIN G. MANES ATTORNEY AT LAW

ID: nht75-2.12

DATE: 09/11/75

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Armstrong Rubber Company

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your letter of May 30, 1975, concerning the standards applicable to a tire which you manufacture and sell with the designation L78-15LT, Load Range C.

You are mistaken in your assumption that a station wagon is classified as a multi-purpose passenger vehicle. Because it is constructed neither on a truck chassis nor with special features for occasional off-road operation, a station wagon is a passenger car rather than a multi-purpose passenger vehicle.

If, despite this misunderstanding, the L78-15LT tire in question is designated by you as primarily intended for use on lightweight trucks or multi-purpose passenger vehicles, then it is a light truck tire subject to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 119, New Pneumatic Tires for Vehicles Other than Passenger Cars.

Because a station wagon is a passenger car, Standard No. 110 requires that its original equipment tires comply with Standard No. 109. Standard No. 110 is not applicable to used cars, so there is no prohibition on the use of the L78-15LT tire as replacement equipment on a station wagon. However, because the informational placard on a station wagon would suggest to its owner the use of inflation pressures which are dangerously inadequate for light truck tires, we do not wish to encourage the sale of such tires as replacement equipment for use on station wagons.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

ARMSTRONG RUBBER COMPANY

May 30, 1975

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration U. S. Department of Transportation

Attention: Chief Counsel

Dear Sir:

We are manufacturing and selling in the replacement market only a truck tire described as a

L78-15 Light Truck 6-ply rated tire. This will be designated as a L78-15LT, C load range.

We have been informed by one of our large distributors that they intend to sell this tire as a replacement tire for use on station wagons. The rims used on station wagons are listed by The Tire and Rim Association as a rim size for this tire.

As we interpret the definition of a "Light Truck Tire" under Standard 119, this tire may be used on station wagons if qualified and labeled under MVSS 119 and need not be qualified or carry the labeling required under MVSS 109. We assume a station wagon to be a multi-purpose passenger vehicle.

We understand that our interpretation would not apply if the tire were supplied as original equipment.

We would appreciate your opinion in this matter.

Sincerely,

R. L. Donnelly -- SECRETARY

ID: nht89-1.81

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/27/89

FROM: P.H. Moes -- U.S. Trade Corp.

TO: Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: INTERPRETATION CAFE-REGULATIONS: OBLIGATIONS & RESPONSIBILITIES

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 06/22/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO P.H. MOES; REDBOOK A33; CSA 502 (9); CSA 505

TEXT: Dear Sir:

US Trade Corporation has been converting vehicles for their owners for many years.

We assisted with the importation and filled out the short form or HS-189 and HS-7 forms as per copies enclosed. The name of the importer is always the owner of the vehicle.

However, when an EPA-emission conversion has to be done as well, the EPA entry form 3520-1 will show our Company as the importer of record.

Some US Customs officers are now confused and sometimes require the customs broker to fill in the name of US Trade Corporation instead of the owner on the DOT forms.

We understand that the only vehicles that we have to list on the yearly CAFE form are the ones that we import with US Trade Corporation listed as owner.

In order to clarify this confusion, we would like to receive your confirmation on both issues on writing so that we can inform our brokers accordingly and know what to do with the CAFE form.

Sincerely,

ID: nht75-5.30

DATE: 04/28/75

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Jim Kielty

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of February 25, 1975, requesting information concerning the odometer disclosure requirements contained in Title IV of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (Pub. L. 92-513).

I have enclosed copies of the package that was sent to the State Attorneys General requesting their assistance in attacking the problem of odometer tampering and the report made by the agency pursuant to Section 413 of the Act.

You ask whether odometers are now tamper-proof and whether a Federal standard exists which requires their use. As far as we know, there is no item which could be called a "tamper-proof" odometer currently in use on motor vehicles. Some vehicle manufacturers have tamper-resistant odometers, but, I do not know if these are installed as standard equipment on vehicles. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has not promulgated a standard requiring the inclusion of tamper-resistant odometers in motor vehicles. The concept has been examined, but the problems inherent in specifying objective criteria for tamper-resistance appeared great. It became apparent that development of a "tamper-proof" odometer specification was not possible, since we are uncertain if there is any way of making an odometer truly tamper-proof. We are open to suggestions as to how we might develop criteria that would ensure some level of tamper resistance.

Since the Federal odometer disclosure statement is mandatory throughout the United States, there is no pressure on States to make the Federal statement mandatory via State law. Some States have retained the odometer laws of disclosure that were in effect in their State prior to the enactment of the Cost Savings Act. In these States, the State law is not affected by the Federal requirements, as long as the Federal requirements are fulfilled. We do not know how many States have adopted disclosure requirements identical to the Federal ones. However, we support such a move, since it would then enable the State to enforce its provision and utilize any State remedies that might be available for noncompliance.

To date, the NHTSA has not prepared any model State odometer tampering legislation. We do, however, intend to develop a model State law sometime in the near future. Any State that requests assistance in preparing odometer tampering legislation for presentation to the State legislature would be provided with the model law.

Based on a survey conducted by the NHTSA concerning the level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the odometer law, it became apparent that a large number of used car dealers are not complying with the disclosure provisions. We have been attempting to solve this problem by enlisting the aid not only of the National Automobile Dealers Association but the Dealers Safety Mobility Council and the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators. In addition, a public information campaign has been initiated by the NHTSA that hopefully will ameliorate the current odometer disclosure problem.

Private civil actions have been brought under the Cost Savings Act. Since they are private actions, it would be very difficult for us to monitor them. Thus, we must rely on individuals to report cases to us. For this reason, we do not know how many actions have been initiated, nor how they have been resolved.

We have received numerous reports alleging repeated violations of the Act by single dealers. However, since we have no investigative authority under the Act, we are unable to investigate the reports to obtain evidence necessary to bring an injunctive suit (the only Federal enforcement remedy under the Act). We were able to obtain sufficient evidence to bring such a suit in Florida. That case is currently in progress and had the advantage of two informats who were prior employees of the defendant and willing to testify against him.

ID: 1983-1.38

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/05/83

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Flyer Industries Limited

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

APR 5 1983 NOA-30

W. E. J. Moss, P. Eng. Flyer Industries Limited 64 Hoka Street Box 245 Transcona P.O. Winnipeg, Manitoba Canada R2C 3T4

Dear Mr. Moss:

This responds to your January 27, 1983, letter asking about the application of Standard No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release, to the front entrance doors of buses. You ask that the window retention test not be applied to your bus, because application of the required amount of force will cause the door to open. You state further that if the door had no glazing, it would not be tested for retention and, therefore, would be acceptable under the standard.

Standard No. 217 states that all glazing that exceeds 8 inches in diameter shall be tested for retention. During that test, neither the glazing nor the surrounding frame shall open in a manner that would allow a 4-inch sphere to pass through the opening. The intent of this requirement is of course to prevent the ejection of occupants in accidents.

The agency does test the front door of buses for compliance with this section if they contain glazing that meets the size requirement. In tests that have been conducted, most front doors have complied. Accordingly, the proper construction of front doors in compliance with the requirement would not appear to be a problem. The agency does not believe that it would be in the interest of safety to exempt front door glazing from the test requirements. Although passengers are required to stand behind the standee line as you note in your letter, they may easily be thrown forward of that line in an accident. The agency considers it important to reduce the possibility of their being thrown from the vehicle if such a situation were to arise.

You are technically correct that an all metal door would not be tested for compliance with this retention provision since it would not contain glazing. However, the agency would not view favorably the installation of doors in buses that open so easily in an accident. Use of such doors might be considered to be a safety-related defect subject to the agency's recall and remedy authority.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

January 27, 1983

Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Attn: Mr. R. Tildon 400 Seventh Street S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 U.S.A.

Petition

Dear Sir:

I wish a clarification of FMVSS #217 on the front doors of a transit coach. This coach has two piece "slide glide" type doors.

If a solid aluminum door is used and tested to FMVSS 217 the door will deflect enough to permit passage of the 4" ball. In this case the door will pass FMVSS 217, as there is no glazing in the door.

In the case of glazing in the door, "this is necessary to allow the driver visability", the deflection will be the same magnitude as a solid door permitting the passage of a 4" diameter ball. This then does not pass the FMVSS test on this glazing, as the frame is not retained by its surrounding structure, nor can it be.

I ask for an exception for the front door glazing of a transit coach from FMVSS 217. This would not pose a danger as the passengers are asked to stand behind a whiter yellow line on the floor rearward of the front door area.

Yours truly,

W.E.J. Moss, P. Eng Test Engineer

/jc B-286