ID: nht92-4.45

DATE: August 7, 1992

FROM: Barry Felrice -- Associate Administrator for Rulemaking, NHTSA

TO: Donald W. Vierimaa -- Vice President - Engineering, Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 6/25/92 from Donald W. Vierimaa to Fred Grubbe

TEXT:

This letter denies your June 25, 1992, petition to extend the comment period for Docket No. 92-29, Notice 1 for an additional 60 days. That docket was established for comments received in response to an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) in which the agency stated that it was considering measures to improve the stability and control performance characteristics of heavy vehicles during braking. The agency sought responses to 32 questions about equipping medium and heavy vehicles, including trailers, with antilock braking systems (ABS), or other measures to improve the stability and control of heavy vehicles.

Your organization, the Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association (TTMA), stated that the 60-day comment period was inadequate since the advance notice involved what you termed a "major" rulemaking. You also questioned the ANPRM's timeliness, given that neither the testing nor the test reports have been completed related to this rulemaking. You indicated that 120 days would provide sufficient time to allow TTMA to coordinate the responses from its members and submit these comments to the docket.

After reviewing the relevant information, the agency has decided to deny your request to extend the ANPRM's comment period. Please be advised that the agency's regulations specify that a petition for extending the comment period should only be granted if the petitioner shows good cause for the extension and if the extension is consistent with the public interest (49 CFR S 553.19).

The Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 requires the agency to complete this rulemaking within 18 months after its initiation (with a limited extension permissible.) Thus, extending the comment period to 120 days would make it more difficult to complete the rulemaking within the prescribed statutory time frame. We further believe that the 60 day comment period provided in the ANPRM gives industry and other interested parties sufficient time to respond.

Based on the considerations outlined above, we have decided to deny your petition to extend the comment period an additional 60 days.

ID: nht89-1.28

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/27/89

FROM: PETER J. YANOWITCH -- DAVIS MARKEL AND EDWARDS

TO: ERICA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

TITLE: IMPORTATION OF PORSCHE MODEL 959

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 03/20/89 FROM ERIKA Z. JONES TO PETER J. YANOWITCH, RE IMPORTATION OF PORSCHE 959, REDBOOK A33 (2), IMPORT REGULATIONS

TEXT: Dear Ms. Jones:

I represent a non-resident of the United States who intends to import a Porsche Model 959 under the United States Customs' Procedure 19 CFR Part 1280 (b)(1)(v), which permits such individuals to import an automobile for personal use for a period not t o exceed one year from the date of entry so long as the automobile is not sold within the United States.

I respectfully request that you confirm to me in writing that if a non-resident of the United States utilizes this United States Customs Procedure, the Department of Transportation would not have jurisdiction to impound, confiscate, destroy, require a bond, or otherwise take any action with respect to the vehicle, so long as the non-resident fully complies with the provisions of 19 CFR Part 1280 (b)(1)(v).

I further request that you confirm that the Department of Transportation would not object to the non-resident driving this vehicle on the road during the one year period.

My client is prepared to confirm to your agency by sworn testimony that he will comply with the requirements of the United States Customs Regulations. Due to certain time constraints, I would appreciate your response by March 10, 1989.

Thank you for your cooperation. I have enclosed a self-addressed Federal Express Airbill which will be charged to my firm for your convenience.

ID: nht93-4.3

DATE: May 19, 1993

FROM: Edward F. Conway, Jr. -- Assistant General Counsel, Recreation Vehicle Industry Association

TO: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 6-15-93 from John Womack to Edward F. Conway, Jr. (A41; Std. 108; VSA Sec. 108(a)(2)(A))

TEXT: The purpose of this letter is to seek official clarification of the center high mounted stop requirements with respect to truck campers prescribed in FMVSS 108, (49 CFR 571.108).

In the April 19, 1991, issue of the Federal Register (pp. 16015-16021), your agency published a final rule that amended FMVSS 108 to provide that trucks whose overall width is less than 80 inches and whose GVWR is 10,000 pounds or less, manufactured on or after September 1, 1993, must be equipped with a center high mounted stop right (CHMSL).

On page l6Ol8, your agency responded in part to the concern expressed by the Recreation Vehicle Industry Association and others that CHMSLs would be obscured by aftermarket slide-in campers, as follows:

Under the Vehicle Safety Act, manufacturers, dealers, distributors, or motor vehicles repair businesses, may not install campers or other equipment on new or used vehicles that would obscure the original mandated CHMSL, as this obscuration would be "rendering inoperative" a mandated safety device. However, this prohibition does not apply to vehicle owners. Therefore, they could use slide-in campers or caps that obscure the original CHMSL. However, the agency believes that slide-in campers, which are not part of the original pickup design and hence are accessory equipment, are typically intended for occasional use, and the CHMSL would only be obscured for a relatively short period of time on those vehicles whose owners have purchased them.

This agency response was not entirely dispositive of the slide-in truck camper issue. The CHMSL requirement for trucks manufactured on or after September 1, 1993, applies ONLY to trucks whose overall width is LESS THAN 80 inches and whose GVWR is less than 10,000 pounds.

A number of RVIA manufacturer members produce slide-in campers that are more than 80 inches wide. When such a side-in camper is installed in a pickup truck that is less than 80 inches wide, the overall width of the pickup truck is thereby increased to MORE THAN 80 inches. See the enclosed truck camper brochures for examples.

While such a slide-in camper does obscure the pickup truck's CHMSL, it does NOT "render inoperative" a MANDATED safety device. A CHMSL is NOT required on that pickup truck because its overall width is now MORE THAN 80 inches. Moreover, if and when the side-in camper is removed thereby reducing the overall width of that pickup truck to less than 80 inches, the mandated CHMSL is not obscured but is "fully operative".

Accordingly, RVIA believes that:

1) manufacturers, dealers, distributors and motor vehicle repair businesses MAY lawfully install a slide-in camper that is 80 or more inches wide on a new or used pickup truck that is less than 80 inches wide even though that camper obscures the truck's CHMSL; and

2) a side-in camper that is 80 or more inches wide, which obscures the CHMSL of a truck that is less than 80 inches wide, is NOT required by MVSS 108 to be equipped with a CHMSL.

Does your agency concur?

Since the CHMSL requirement will apply to trucks built on or after September 1, 1993, we would greatly appreciate an early reply.

ID: nht95-5.14

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: December 29, 1995 EST

FROM: Samuel J. Dubbin -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Mark Heminway -- Director of Fleet Operations, The Hertz Corporation

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: 8/24/95 letter from Mark Heminway to John Womack (OCC 11167)

TEXT: This is in response to your letter in which you requested from the Chief Counsel of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) an opinion as to whether a process Hertz has developed for digitally scanning original written and hand-printed signatures and applying the scanned signatures to odometer disclosure statements using a laser printer meets the requirements of 49 CFR Section 580.

The process you describe raises the issue of whether use of digitally-scanned and laser-printed reproductions of the signature and hand-printed name on odometer disclosures complies with the requirement of 49 CFR @ 580.5(c) and (f) for the signature and printed name of the transferor and transferee. After careful review of the sample Hertz submitted of a title completed using its process and the description of the process in your letter in light of the Federal odometer disclosure statute and regulation s, the agency concludes that the process of digital scanning and laser printing of the signatures on vehicle titles as described in your letter and exemplified by the accompanying sample you submitted fulfills the requirements of the Federal odometer dis closure law. It would be advisable, however, for Hertz to ascertain whether its process also meets applicable requirements of state laws governing motor vehicle titles. States may have different or additional requirements which would affect their willing ness to accept titles printed using the Hertz system.

Section 580.5(c) of NHTSA's odometer disclosure regulation requires that the "written disclosure must be signed by the transferor, including the printed name." 49 CFR @ 580.5(c). Section 580.5(f) specifies the same requirement for the transferee signing the odometer disclosure. In the preamble to the final rule adopting these provisions, and in many interpretations of those requirements, the agency has stated that the signature and printed name requirement means that both the signatures and printed na mes of the transferor and transferee must be handwritten by the respective parties to the transaction. It has made it clear that entry of these items in typewriting, either manually or by means of a computer, does not satisfy the regulation.

Handwriting or handprinting, unlike typewriting, can be subjected to handwriting analysis which is an indispensable tool in identifying the actual individuals who complete fraudulent odometer disclosures. Thus, the agency views the handwriting and hand- printing requirements as essential to the successful identification and prosecution of perpetrators of odometer fraud.

It is our view that the Hertz system as described in your letter and evidenced by the sample you enclosed satisfies the need for an adequate handwriting sample, as well as protection against unauthorized use, and therefore NHTSA's regulations, permit its use. The digital scanning and laser printing of the signature and printed name provided by Hertz' system (as shown on the sample you provided to this office) produce a handwriting exemplar that is sufficiently clear for handwriting analysis. In additi on, the system you describe whereby access to use of the digitally-scanned signature is password-protected appears to provide adequate security against use of the signature and hand-printed name by anyone other than the person who wrote it.

We wish to caution that this opinion should not be construed as a blanket approval of the use of signature and hand-printed names that have been digitally scanned. It is based to a large extent on the quality of the example that you provided with your l etter. Both scanners and computerized printers vary considerably in the degree of resolution and clarity of the image, and scanners also vary in the accuracy with which they reproduce the image from the original.

Accordingly, we cannot assume that all combinations of scanners and printers would be capable of producing an image that will provide a handwriting and hand printing exemplar that is adequate for handwriting analysis. Therefore, if any changes are made in the process or the equipment used that make the signature and/or hand printed name less clear than they appear on its sample, Hertz should submit an example of the product of that change for review by NHTSA before using it on actual odometer disclosur es.

I hope this information is responsive to your request. If you have any further questions regarding this interpretation, or any other legal questions concerning the Federal odometer disclosure statute and regulations, please write to this office at the a bove address, or call Eileen Leahy, an attorney on my staff, at (202) 366-5263.

ID: nht95-4.22

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: September 18, 1995

FROM: Yoshiaki MATSUI -- Manager, Automotive Equipment, Stanley Electric Co.

TO: Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: Accessory Lamp with LEDs

ATTACHMT: Attached to 11/9/95 letter from Samuel J. Dubbin to Yoskiaki Matsui (Std. 108)

TEXT: We, a Japanese manufacturer of automotive lighting devices, are now developing a new type of combination rear lamp that contains red LEDs as accessory lamps. (Please refer to the attached drawing). Would you please advise us about the categorization of this kind of LED accessory lamps.

The operating condition of the LED accessory lamps are as follows,

a) Construction of the combination rear lamp

Tail & stop lamp and turn signal lamp vertically arranged. Red LEDs are disposed along the outer edge of the combination lamp to be used as accessory lamps.

Light source Colour of Colour of the lens light emitted Tail & stop Incandescent bulb Red Red Rear turn Incandescent bulb Amber Amber signal

b) Operating condition for the accessory lamps

When the tail lamp is switched on, the Accessory Lamp A of red LEDs, which is adjacent to the tail lamp, and the Accessory Lamp B of red LEDs, which is adjacent to the rear turn signal lamp, are lit.

Question 1: Red LEDs adjacent to the tail lamp (Accessory Lamp A)

The tail lamp is designed to comply with FMVSS No. 108 using incandescent bulb only, therefore red LEDs need not to be lit for the purpose of the regulatory requirements. Moreover, when the tail lamp and the red LEDs (Accessory Lamp A) are lit together, the intensity of the light emitted from them does not exceed the maximum intensity specified for one lighted section tail lamp.

In such a condition, we believe the red LEDs (Accessory Lamp a) could be regarded as an accessory.

As for the safety, red LEDs (Accessory Lamp A) will contribute to safety by improving the comspicuity of the vehicle, when lit with the tail lamp.

If our interpretation is not acceptable, please inform us of the conditions required in order to regard the red LEDs portion (Accessory Lamp A) as an accessory.

Question 2: Red LEDs adjacent to the rear turn signal lamp (Accessory Lamp B)

Q2-1: As for the red LEDs adjacent to the rear turn signal lamp (Accessory Lamp B), the LEDs emit a red colour light through the amber lens. The lighted section of the red section of the turn signal lamp by a parting rib prepared in the housing, so that the red light from red LEDs will not be emitted through the lens area of the lighted section of the rear turn signal lamp. Therefore, we believe the light from the red LEDs (Accessory Lamp B) will not adversely affect the rear turn signal function even if the red LEDs (Accessory Lamp B) continues to operate when the rear turn signal lamp is operated. Please advise us if our interpretation is acceptable.

Q2-2: If our interpretation described in the above A2-1 is not acceptable, are the red LEDs (Accessory Lamp B) regarded as an accessory provided that the red LEDs (Accessory Lamp B) are turned off during the rear turn signal operation?

Following table shows the lighting condition of Accessory Lamps and our interpretation.

Tail lamp ON Operating Accessory Lamp A ON condition Accessory Lamp B ON OFF Rear turn signal lamp ON OFF ON OFF STANLEY's question Q2-1 Q2-2 Question STANLEY's interpretation OK OK OK OK NHTSA's answer

Your answer will be highly appreciated.

(Drawing omitted.)

ID: 2878o

Mr. Michael Rose
Technical Secretary for Executive Director
Jamaica Bureau of Standards
6 Winchester Road
Kingston l0
JAMAICA

Dear Mr. Rose:

This responds to your letter, addressed to the Director of the Office of the Federal Register, concerning Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. l09, New Pneumatic Tires. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is the Federal agency which issued and administers that standard. Your questions are addressed below.

By way of background information, NHTSA issues Federal motor vehicle safety standards under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, l5 U.S.C. l38l et seq. The term "motor vehicle safety standard" is defined by the Act as "a minimum standard for motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle equipment performance, which is practicable, which meets the need for motor vehicle safety and which provides objective criteria" (section l02(2)). NHTSA does not grant approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Instead, section ll4 of the Act requires manufacturers to certify compliance of each motor vehicle and item of equipment with all applicable standards. The Act requires that manufacturers exercise "due care" to ensure that their products conform to each applicable standard (section l08(b)(l)).

I will address your first two questions together. The questions are:

l. In the clause dealing with Test Sample, why are the batch size and sample size not mentioned?

2. Why does the standard make no reference to the frequency of testing.

As indicated above, Standard No. l09 is a minimum performance standard. All tires must be capable of meeting the standard's requirements.

The purpose of the test sample paragraph (S4.2.2.l) in Standard No. l09 is to indicate that a test set for a compliance test consists of three tires. One tire is checked for physical dimensions and is then subjected to resistance to bead unseating and strength, in sequence. The second tire is subjected to the endurance test, and the third tire is subjected to the high speed test.

Paragraph S4.2.2.l is not intended to address the question of how many sets of tires a manufacturer should test as a surveillance procedure during production or what batch size the test sets should be drawn from. A manufacturer is not required to conduct any particular frequency of testing or even to run the actual tests specified by Standard No. l09. Instead, a manufacturer must take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that each of its tires, if tested according to the requirements of the standard, would meet those requirements. (For test purposes, however, any one given tire would only be subjected to one of the three test sequences discussed above.) Since Standard No. l09 includes a number of specific test requirements, it is likely that a manufacturer would find it necessary to do some testing in order to ensure that a tire complied with the standard. For enforcement purposes, NHTSA would test a tire according to the specific test requirements of Standard No. l09.

Your third question is as follows:

3. Why does the standard make no reference to tolerances for tyre concentricity?

NHTSA's standards cover aspects of performance for which the agency has determined there is a safety need. To date, NHTSA has not determined that there is a need for requirements covering tire concentricity tolerances. We note that tire concentricity appears to be primarily an issue of occupant comfort rather than safety.

I hope this information is helpful.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

ref:109 d:7/11/88

ID: nht75-6.30

DATE: 06/10/75

FROM: NANCY KOLODNY -- STAFF ATTORNEY FORD MOTOR CO.

TO: RICHARD B. DYSON -- ASSISTANT CHIEF COUNSEL NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

TITLE: 1975 MONARCH REAR TAILLAMP PART NO. (2)(A)(2) - IP2R(2)S(3)T75CT

ATTACHMT: ATTACHES TO A LETTER DATED 8/18/75 FROM JAMES C. SCHULTZ -- NHTSA CHIEF COUNSEL TO NANCY KOLODNY -- FORD MOTOR'S GENERAL COUNSEL; N40 30(ZTV)

TEXT: We are writing to seek the express confirmation of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) of the preemptive effect of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 108, 49 CFR 571.108 ("Standard 108") on passenger car lighting, as was provided by NHTSA in Motorcycle Industry Council, Inc. v. Younger, No. Civ. S74-126 (D.C.E.D. Cal., Sept. 24, 1974).

This request is being made so that we may respond to the attached correspondence (Attachment I) from Mr. Warren M. Heath, Commander, California Highway Patrol, concerning compliance with Section 25950 * of the California Vehicle Code by the 1975 Monarch rear taillamps. Mr. Heath's letters of April 8 and May 25 contend that the amber lens applied over a red lens on one of the Monarch taillamp compartments violates that provision of the California Vehicle Code Section 25950 which does not permit a taillamp to be amber when unlighted. On this basis, Mr. Heath has stated that similarly equipped 1976 model year Monarchs will not be eligible for registration in California.

* Section 25950 provides in pertinent part: "(b) All lamps and reflectors visible from the rear of a vehicle shall be red, except that stop lamps, turn signal lamps and front side-marker lamps required by Section 25100 may show amber to the rear.

This section applies to the color of a lamp whether lighted or unlighted, and to any reflector exhibiting or reflecting perceptible light of 0.05 candlepower or more per foot - candle of incident illumination, except that taillamps, stop lamps and turn signal lamps visible to the rear may be white when unlighted."

We believe the provisions of Section 25950 are preempted by Standard 108, and that pursuant to Section 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 USC 1392(d)), California is precluded from the enforcement of any nonidentical standard.

As the NHTSA has confirmed on several occasions, the Standard's lighting requirements are intended to be comprehensive and exclusive, and leave no room for differing state standards. The statement of the Administrator cited by the Court in the Motorcycle Industry Council judgment is particularly pertinent here where California seeks to enforce a differing standard for the precise function (i.e., taillamp color) covered by Standard 108. (Letter from James B. Gregory, Administrator NHTSA, to W. Pudinski, Commissioner, Dept. of Highway Patrol, dated Nov. 8, 1973, N40-30 (RBD).)

Compliance of the Monarch rear lamps with the requirements of Standard 108 has been confirmed by tests conducted at Ford. (Attachment II) Therefore, we seek an opinion on the issue of preemption with respect to the differing California requirements of Section 25950.

For your assistance, we are enclosing color photos of the Monarch and Monarch Ghia rear lamps which demonstrate their appearance when lighted and unlighted. (Attachment III) Photo #1 is of the Monarch rear lamp unlighted. Photo #2 shows the taillamp (3 exterior red compartments) lighted. Photos #3 and #4 are of the Monarch Ghia.

If you have any questions on this matter, please so inform me. I may be reached by telephone at (313) 337-6462. We hope to receive a response at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

ID: nht88-4.25

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 12/01/88

FROM: CONRAD S. BROOKS -- ENGINEERING MANAGER FISHER ENGINEERING

TO: ERICKA Z. JONES CHIEF COUNCIL -- NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 03/20/89 FROM ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA TO CONRAD S. BROOKS, REDBOOK A33(8); STANDARD 205, STANDARD 120, PART 571.3

TEXT: Dear Ms. Jones:

I have heard differing opinions pertaining to federal regulation of four wheel drive vehicles with snowplows since becoming engineering manager at Fisher Engineering. Will you please furnish a written ruling on the following topics regarding snowplow ap plications:

Mr. Michael Kastner, the National Truck Equipment Association Government Affairs Coordinator, verbally confirmed the following statement yesterday as a result of phone conversation(s) with NHTSA. Please confirm in writing that the substructure for a sno wplow mounting that is permanently attached to a four wheel drive may be attached to and be forward of the front bumper without violating existing or proposed vehicle safety standards.

Is the snowplow blade, being detachable and used only a few hours each year, considered as part of the vehicle payload when it is attached? Does this exempt a vehicle, with the blade attached and raised, from having to meet the Front Gross Axle Weight R ating restrictions?

Is there a specific limitation of what percent of the vehicle curb weight that can be supported by the front axle? The Ford Truck and Body Builder Layout book specifies sixty-three percent maximum. If the portion of the curb weight on the front axle is only dictated by vehicle performance, can you suggest a source for some general guidelines to avoid performance testing?

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

ID: 8210a

Mr. Thomas L. Wright
Coordinator, Technical Support Unit
State of New Jersey
Department of Law and Public Safety
Division of Motor Vehicles
Trenton, NJ 08666

Dear Mr. Wright:

This responds to your letter to Patrick Boyd of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA's) Office of Vehicle Safety Standards, concerning window tinting. Your letter has been referred to my office for reply.

Your questions relate to a January 22, 1992 (57 FR 2496) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on the tinting requirements of Safety Standard No. 205, "Glazing Materials." You ask about the status of the NPRM. The agency received a large number of comments on this rulemaking. We have reviewed the comments and are analyzing the issues raised in this rulemaking.

You also ask about a statement in the NPRM about Federal preemption of state window tinting laws. You ask whether Federal law preempts a state law that permits add-on window tinting material for medical or aesthetic reasons.

As explained below, the answer is no, provided that the state law regulates conduct other than that regulated by Federal law. Your question was addressed in the NPRM's discussion of the Federalism implications of the proposed rule (p. 2507).

By way of background, NHTSA issued Standard 205 under the authority of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. The standard currently imposes a minimum level of light transmittance of 70% in all areas requisite for driving visibility (which includes all windows on passenger cars). The primary purpose of this requirement is to ensure adequate visibility through the windows, thereby reducing the risk of a motor vehicle crash.

Section 103(d) of the Safety Act provides that:

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard ... is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.

Whether state law is preempted under 103(d) depends in part on the conduct that is regulated by that law. Federal safety standards regulate the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. State law would be preempted to the extent it established performance requirements applicable to the manufacture of vehicles or glazing that differ from those in Standard 205. State law would also be preempted if it purported to allow the manufacture or sale of glazing materials or new vehicles containing glazing material that did not meet the specifications of Standard 205.

Federal law also regulates modifications made to new and used vehicles by motor vehicle manufacturers, distributors, dealers and repair businesses. Section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act provides that:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle ... in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard.

The effect of this is to impose limits on the tinting practices of businesses listed in 108(a)(2)(A). These businesses may not install tinting on new or used vehicles that reduces the light transmittance of windows covered by Standard 205 to a level below the Federal requirement of 70 percent. A state law would be preempted if it purported to allow modifications violating Standard 205 by these named businesses. Section 108(a)(2)(A) does not apply to actions by individual vehicle owners.

Because Federal safety standards regulate the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles, state requirements applicable to the registration and inspection of motor vehicles after the first sale to a consumer are not preempted merely because they are not identical to the Federal safety standards, as long as they do not interfere with the achievement of the purposes of Federal law. Therefore, a state could permit the registration of a vehicle which had been altered by its owner by the addition of window tinting, even when the tinting reduces the light transmittance below the Federal standard. However, the state cannot legitimize conduct - the rendering inoperative of glazing by commercial businesses installing window tinting - that is illegal under Federal law.

I have enclosed a copy of the Report to Congress on Tinting of Motor Vehicle Windows which you requested. I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure

ref:205 d:3/11/93

ID: nht93-2.13

DATE: 03/11/93

FROM: JOHN WOMACK -- ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA

TO: THOMAS L. WRIGHT -- COORDINATOR, TECHNICAL SUPPORT UNIT, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY, DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 12-29-92 FROM THOMAS L. WRIGHT TO PATRICK BOYD (OCC 8210)

TEXT: This responds to your letter to Patrick Boyd of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA's) Office of Vehicle Safety Standards, concerning window tinting. Your letter has been referred to my office for reply.

Your questions relate to a January 22, 1992 (57 FR 2496) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on the tinting requirements of Safety Standard No. 205, "Glazing Materials." You ask about the status of the NPRM. The agency received a large number of comments on this rulemaking. We have reviewed the comments and are analyzing the issues raised in this rulemaking.

You also ask about a statement in the NPRM about Federal preemption of state window tinting laws. You ask whether Federal law preempts a state law that permits add-on window tinting material for medical or aesthetic reasons.

As explained below, the answer is no, provided that the state law regulates conduct other than that regulated by Federal law. Your question was addressed in the NPRM's discussion of the Federalism implications of the proposed rule (p. 2507).

By way of background, NHTSA issued Standard 205 under the authority of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. The standard currently imposes a minimum level of light transmittance of 70% in all areas requisite for driving visibility (which includes all windows on passenger cars). The primary purpose of this requirement is to ensure adequate visibility through the windows, thereby reducing the risk of a motor vehicle crash.

Section 103(d) of the Safety Act provides that:

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . . is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.

Whether state law is preempted under @ 103(d) depends in part on the conduct that is regulated by that law. Federal safety standards regulate the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. State law would be preempted to the extent it established performance requirements applicable to the manufacture of vehicles or glazing that differ from those in Standard 205. State law would also be preempted if it purported to allow the manufacture or sale of glazing materials or new vehicles containing glazing material that did not meet the specifications of Standard 205.

Federal law also regulates modifications made to new and used vehicles by motor vehicle manufacturers, distributors, dealers and repair businesses. Section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act provides that:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle . . . in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard.

The effect of this is to impose limits on the tinting practices of businesses listed in @ 108(a)(2)(A). These businesses may not install tinting on new or used vehicles that reduces the light transmittance of windows covered by Standard 205 to a level below the Federal requirement of 70 percent. A state law would be preempted if it purported to allow modifications violating Standard 205 by these named businesses. Section 108(a)(2)(A) does not apply to actions by individual vehicle owners.

Because Federal safety standards regulate the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles, state requirements applicable to the registration and inspection of motor vehicles after the first sale to a consumer are not preempted merely because they are not identical to the Federal safety standards, as long as they do not interfere with the achievement of the purposes of Federal law. Therefore, a state could permit the registration of a vehicle which had been altered by its owner by the addition of window tinting, even when the tinting reduces the light transmittance below the Federal standard. However, the state cannot legitimize conduct - the rendering inoperative of glazing by commercial businesses installing window tinting - that is illegal under Federal law.

I have enclosed a copy of the Report to Congress on Tinting of Motor Vehicle Windows which you requested. I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.