NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
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ID: nht91-3.42OpenDATE: May 8, 1991 FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA TO: Dan P. Strauser -- Manager, Research and Development, Elgin Sweeper Company TITLE: None ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 3-25-91 from Dan P. Strauser to Paul Jackson Rice (OCC 5940) TEXT: This responds to your letter of March 25, 1991 regarding the applicability of this agency's safety standards to a number of models of Elgin and Ravo street sweepers. In general, all vehicles classified as "motor vehicles" are subject to safety standards. Section 102(3) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Act) defines the term "motor vehicle" as follows: "Motor vehicle" means any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails. Under a longstanding policy, this agency has regarded vehicles not to be "motor vehicles" within the meaning of the Act and therefore not subject to safety standards, despite their use on the highways, if they (1) have an unusual body configuration which sets the vehicles apart from typical highway traffic and (2) have a maximum speed capability of 20 mph or less. Based upon the literature you provided, the Pelican "SE" and Pelican "P" 3-wheel street sweepers appear to meet these criteria. If the advertised speed ("Up to 20 mph") is the maximum speed these vehicles are capable of, these vehicles would not be considered "motor vehicles" and therefore would not be required to comply with the safety standards. Since the advertised speed of the Whirlwind, Crosswind, and Eagle 4-wheel street sweepers, and the Ravo Model 5000 street sweeper exceeds 20 mph (or the description, i.e., "legal highway speeds", suggests that the vehicle is capable of exceeding 20 mph), these vehicles would be considered "motor vehicles." The information you enclosed on the Ravo Model 4000 street sweeper did not indicate its maximum speed capability. If this vehicle is capable of speeds in excess of 20 mph, it would also be considered a "motor vehicle."
Street sweepers which are considered to be "motor vehicles" would be classified as "trucks" and required to comply with all safety standards applicable to trucks. The Federal motor vehicle safety standards are contained in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 571. You may find a copy of 49 CFR Part 571 at a Federal Depository Library in your State. If you so choose, you may purchase a copy of the volume of Title 49 which includes Part 571 from the United States Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 20402, (202) 783-3238. I hope you find this information helpful. If you have further questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. |
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ID: nht92-7.8OpenDATE: May 11, 1992 FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA TO: Eileen Mathews -- Industry Manager, Hose and Tubing, General Electric Company TITLE: None ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 11/18/91 from Eileen Mathews to James Scapellato (OCC 7034) TEXT: This concerns your letter to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) asking about FHWA's regulation 393.45 (49 CFR S393.45) and NHTSA's Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 106, Brake Hoses. FHWA provided us a copy of its March 6, 1992 response on regulation 393.45. This letter answers your question about Standard 106. You ask about S7.3.6, 7.3.10 and 7.3.11 of the standard. Those sections set forth performance requirements for limiting the amount a hose may change in length under specified conditions (S7.3.6), for the tensile strength of a hose assembly (S7.3.10), and for the tensile strength of an assembly after immersion in water (S7.3.11). Each of these sections excludes certain items from the requirement. Your question relates to those exclusions. S7.3.6 excludes coiled nylon tubes for use in assemblies that meet the FHWA requirements of S393.45. S7.3.10 excludes coiled nylon tube assemblies that meet S393.45. S7.3.11 excludes coiled tube assemblies that meet S393.45. You ask whether those exclusions in S7.3.6, 7.3.10 and 7.3.11 "require compliance with 393.45." The answer is no. Standard 106 does not require tubing to meet 393.45. Instead, compliance with 393.45 is a condition for excluding the item from S7.3.6, 7.3.10 or 7.3.11. The other condition, relevant for S7.3.6 and 7.3.10, is that the brake hose be coiled NYLON tubing. According to your letter, the brake hose (tubing) of your concern would be made from a material other than nylon. Since the second condition would not be satisfied, such hose would not qualify for the S7.3.6 exception, and an assembly made from such hose would not qualify for the 7.3.10 exception, regardless of whether the hose meets regulation 393.45. Thus, S7.3.6 and 7.3.10 would apply to hose and assemblies made from your product, without exception. S7.3.11 does not specify that the coiled tubing must be nylon to qualify for the exception. While NHTSA intended to specify nylon (see, preamble to rule adopting the exclusion, 39 FR 28436; August 7, 1974) as adopted, S7.3.11 excludes a "coiled tube assembly" that meets regulation 393.45 from its requirements. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact Deirdre Fujita of my staff at (202) 366-2992. |
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ID: nht71-4.47OpenDATE: 11/13/71 FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; L. R. Schneider; NHTSA TO: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION TEXT: Thank you for your letter of September 17, 1971, asking if present Federal regulations would preempt the Massachusetts requirement that certain outside rearview mirrors be provided with reflective material over the rear surface. Section 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1392(d), states in pertinent part: "Whenever A Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . . is in effect, no State . . . shall have any authority . . . to establish . . . with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable tot he same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard." Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment, establishes requirements for reflective materials used on motor vehicles. The NHTSA considers this standard to include within its scope all reflective materials required to be used on motor vehicles to which it applies. Any State requirements that have the effect of regulating such reflective materials must therefore be identical to the relevant provisions of Standard No. 108. The Massachusetts statute that you have brought to our attention is not identical to the Federal standards relating to that aspect of performance, and must therefore be considered to be invalidated by the operation of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. |
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ID: nht73-1.32OpenDATE: 07/20/73 FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; L. R. Schneider for J. E. Wilson; NHTSA TO: Oregon Traffic Safety Commission TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION TEXT: Thank you for the copy of Oregon House Bill 2721 that you enclosed in your letter of June 25, 1973. We have reviewed it carefully, and have concluded that virtually all of Section 2 is preempted by 15 U.S.C. 1392(d) (copy enclosed). As you may know, this section of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act prohibits a State from having a safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance as a Federal safety standard unless it is identical to the Federal standard. In this instance, the relevant Federal standard is 49 CFR @ 511.108 Standard No. 108, Lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment. Section 2 of HB 2721 requires motor vehicles manufactured after October 1, 1975, to be equipped with a green-yellow-red rear mounted lighting system. The NHTSA considers Standard No. 108 to include within its scope all lighting equipment required to be used on the rear of motor vehicles to which it applies. Any State requirements that have the effect of regulating such equipment must therefore be identical to the relevant provision of Standard No. 108. Section 2 of HB 2721 is not identical to the Federal standard relating to that aspect of performance, and must therefore be considered as invalidated as that category of vehicle is expressly excluded from Standard No. 108. Portions of Section 3 (ORS 483.412(3)(a) and (b)) are invalidated for the same reason. The remainder of Section 3 and Section 4 does not conflict with the relevant provisions of Standard No. 108. The guiding principle that we have applied to this situation is that the State requirements that regulate the design of motor vehicles must be identical to the Federal standards. It was clearly the intent of Congress to provide for uniformity of regulation of the manufacturer in areas where the Federal agency has acted, and they did so by the identity requirements of section 1392(d). Sincerely, Enclosures OREGON TRAFFIC SAFETY COMMISSION June 25, 1973 James E. Wilson -- Associate Administrator for Traffic Safety Programs, U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Dear Mr. Wilson: The Oregon Legislature passed H.B. 2721 which allows a green, yellow and red taillight system. A copy is attached for your information. Sincerely, Gil W. Bellamy [Enclosure Omitted.] |
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ID: 18332.nhfOpenMr. Pierre Trudeau Dear Mr. Trudeau: This responds to your inquiry about whether several pieces of construction equipment manufactured by Allmand Bros., Inc. and portable compressor units manufactured by Atlas Copco Compressors, Inc. (Atlas) are considered motor vehicles under our statutes and regulations. I apologize for the delay in my response. According to the information provided with your letter, Allmand Bros., Inc. manufactures non-powered light towers, portable flashing arrowboards, and other non-powered construction equipment. Atlas manufactures trailer mounted compressor units for use as construction equipment. I can provide general information on how we analyze whether these types of units are considered motor vehicles. However, without specific information on a particular unit, we cannot provide an opinion as to whether it is a motor vehicle. By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issues and enforces the Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS). NHTSA's statute defines the term "motor vehicle" as follows:
Whether NHTSA considers various pieces of construction equipment and portable compressors to be motor vehicles depends on their use. In the past, we have concluded that this statutory definition does not encompass mobile construction equipment, such as cranes and scrapers, which use the highway only to move between job sites and which typically spend extended periods of time at a single job site. In such cases, the on-road use of the equipment is merely incidental and is not the primary purpose for which they were manufactured. Other construction vehicles, such as dump trucks, frequently use the highway going to and from job sites, and stay at a job site for only a limited time. Such vehicles are considered motor vehicles, since the on-highway use is more than "incidental." Based on the information you provided in your fax, we do not have sufficient information about the use of the construction equipment or the portable compressors to determine whether or not they are motor vehicles. I note, by way of guidance, that we concluded that mobile waterjet cutting and cleaning equipment were not motor vehicles, based on the fact that they appeared to stay on job sites for extended periods of time ranging from a week to over a year. If, however, certain construction equipment or portable air compressors are used frequently on the highways, they would be considered motor vehicles and would be required to comply with all applicable FMVSSs. I am also enclosing copies of several letters which address the issue of whether certain units, including portable compressors and construction equipment, are motor vehicles under our statutes and regulations. I hope this information is helpful to you. If you have further questions regarding NHTSA's safety standards, please contact Nicole Fradette of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, |
1999 |
ID: 20702.ogmOpenMark W. Peterson, Esq. Dear Mr. Peterson: This responds to your letter regarding the manufacture of motorcycles. You indicate that your client intends to manufacture and sell custom motorcycles. You ask that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration confirm your understanding that no certificate of authority or other similar document from the United States government is necessary before your client can hold itself out as a manufacturer of these vehicles. Your understanding is correct. There is no requirement that a manufacturer of vehicles obtain a certificate of authority before it can represent itself as a manufacturer of motor vehicles. There are, however, other requirements applicable to new manufacturers of motor vehicles which are addressed below. By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized by Congress (49 U.S.C. Chapter 301) to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and new items of equipment. NHTSA does not approve or certify any motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Instead, our statute establishes a "self certification" process under which each manufacturer has the responsibility to certify that its product meets all applicable standards. The following Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (49 CFR Part 571) apply to motorcycles: Standard No. 106, Brake hoses; Standard No. 108, Lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment; Standard No. 111, Rearview mirrors; Standard No. 116, Motor vehicle brake fluids; Standard No. 119, New pneumatic tires for vehicles other than passenger cars; Standard No. 120, Tire selection and rims for motor vehicles other than passenger cars; Standard No. 122, Motorcycle brake systems; and Standard No. 123, Motorcycle controls and displays. In addition, each motorcycle must have a unique vehicle identification number (VIN) in accordance with 49 CFR Part 565. Each motorcycle must be certified by its manufacturer as meeting all applicable safety standards. The certification must be made in accordance with 49 CFR Part 567, Certification. In addition, if a vehicle contains a safety-related defect, the vehicle manufacturer must notify all owners, purchasers, and dealers of the defect and provide a remedy without charge. A new manufacturer of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment must submit information identifying itself and its products to NHTSA not later than 30 days after it begins manufacture (49 CFR Part 566, Manufacturer Identification). I am, for your information, enclosing an information sheet, "Information for New Manufacturers of Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment" and another sheet that describes how you may obtain copies of NHTSA's standards. In addition, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has established motor vehicle noise and emission standards. For information on EPA's requirements, please contact: Office of Transportation and Air Quality I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Otto Matheke of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-5263. Sincerely, |
2000 |
ID: nht78-3.4OpenDATE: 04/13/78 FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; J. J. Levin, Jr.; NHTSA TO: Cars & Concepts, Inc. TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION TEXT: This responds to your letter of February 16, 1978, asking whether the certification markings required on glazing materials by Safety Standard No. 205 must remain visible from the interior or exterior of a vehicle after installation. The answer to your question is no. There is nothing in the certification requirements of section S6 of Standard No. 205 that requires the markings to remain visible after installation on the vehicle. As long as the glazing manufacturer has certified and marked his glazing in accordance with the standard and as long as these markings are not removed by the vehicle manufacturer there is no prohibition against covering the markings. Sincerely, ATTACH. Cars & Concepts, Inc. February 16, 1978 Mr. Oats -- Office of Chief Council, N.H.T.S.A. Dear Mr. Oats: Regarding your conversations with Ed Myjack of my office, it is his understanding that the Department of Transportation markings on glass need not be visible from the interior or exterior of a vehicle (providing the original manufacturer's marking do remain on the glass). As we provide vinyl top design and installations on some OEM vehicles, some of the designs may cover these markings on the quarter glass and/or backlights. Since we provide these type of installations to the OEM, they require written proof that such modifications are within the requirements of FMVSS No. 205. Thank you for your consideration of this matter. Sincerely, Moe Pare, Jr. -- Director of Design cc: D. Draper; E. Myjack |
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ID: nht94-1.24OpenTYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA DATE: January 21, 1994 FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA TO: Kathy Rose -- Account Directive, FitzGerald Corporation TITLE: None ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 10/12/93 from Kathy Rose to Glen Beck (OCC 9528) TEXT: Your letter of October 12, 1993, to the office of Motor Carriers in Sacramento, has reached us for reply. Your company produces a "trailer skirting" for van trailers, and some of your customers have asked "whether it is legal to have the retroreflective tape (which is required by Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108) to be applied to the length of the trailer be placed below the trailer, on the trailer skirting." The letter does not indicate whether the skirting is intended as original or aftermarket equipment. If the skirting is original equipment that is added to the trailer at the time of its manufacture and intended to remain there for the life of the traile r, the conspicuity treatment required by the standard may be affixed to it, provided that it is mounted as near as practicable within a range that is not less than 375mm and not more than 1525mm (approximately 15 to 60 inches) above the road surface. Un der that condition, the portion of the trailer side that is above the skirting need not be equipped with the conspicuity treatment. If the skirting is aftermarket equipment, there is no requirement or restriction relating to conspicuity treatment of the skirting. We assume that the trailer to which it will be attached, if manufactured on or after December 1, 1993, will bear conspicuity markings in accordance with the standard. |
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ID: 86-4.14OpenTYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA DATE: 07/16/86 FROM: DALTON G. FEAGLER TO: ADMINISTRATOR -- NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION TITLE: NONE ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 12/22/86 TO DALTON G. FEAGLER FROM ERIKA Z. JONES, REDBOOK A29 (4); STD 108, VSA 108 TEXT: Dear sir or madam: Reference is made to 49 CFR 571, Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 108, Docket No. 69-18, revised May 22, 1985. Particular reference is made to paragraph S4.5.4, which is quoted: "The stoplights on each vehicle shall be activated upon application of the service brakes. The high-mounted stoplamp on each passenger car shall be activated only upon application of the service brakes." Living in metropolitan Atanta, Georgia, and its highly congested traffic, I soon learned that rear-end collisons, and resulting whip-lash injuries, are to be avoided. I resolved to decrease those possibilities. In short, I've come up with a switching device which activates the stoplights of a vehicle the moment pressure is released from the accelerator. This is installed without disconnecting, or altering, any functions or systems; the device merely accelerates, by approximately three-quarters of a second, the warning of deacceleration and stopping. Further, this advanced warning increases the safe stopping distance. We do not alter any of the vehicle's functions; the stoplamps of the vehicle remain activated upon application of the service brakes. We believe our device, known as the "Dee-Tailer", fully complies with cited Standard 108. Would your agency desire to road-test our device? Before proceeding further, we desire your asessment and comments. Awaiting your early reply. Sincerely, |
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ID: 9528Open Ms. Kathy Rose Dear Ms. Rose: Your letter of October 12, 1993, to the Office of Motor Carriers in Sacramento, has reached us for reply. Your company produces a "trailer skirting" for van trailers, and some of your customers have asked "whether it is legal to have the retroreflective tape [which is required by Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108] to be applied to the length of the trailer be placed below the trailer, on the trailer skirting." The letter does not indicate whether the skirting is intended as original or aftermarket equipment. If the skirting is original equipment that is added to the trailer at the time of its manufacture and intended to remain there for the life of the trailer, the conspicuity treatment required by the standard may be affixed to it, provided that it is mounted as near as practicable within a range that is not less than 375mm and not more than 1525mm (approximately 15 to 60 inches) above the road surface. Under that condition, the portion of the trailer side that is above the skirting need not be equipped with the conspicuity treatment. If the skirting is aftermarket equipment, there is no requirement or restriction relating to conspicuity treatment of the skirting. We assume that the trailer to which it will be attached, if manufactured on or after December 1, 1993, will bear conspicuity markings in accordance with the standard. Sincerely,
John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:108 d.1/21/94 |
1994 |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.