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NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

Search Tool

NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 13031 - 13040 of 16490
Interpretations Date

ID: nht90-1.62

Open

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: March 5, 1990

FROM: Jeffrey Donaldson -- Human Factors Engineer, Arcad

TO: Steve Wood --Office of the Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 10-17-90 from P.J. Rice to J. Donaldson (A36; Std. 101)

TEXT:

In a March 2, 1990 phone conversation with Mr. Roman Brooks, he instructed me that any questions concerning motor Vehicle Safety Standards (MVSS) 101 were to be submitted in writing to you.

My inquiry is in reference to MVSS 101 and its application to the Instrument Panel Illumination Intensity Control (Dimmer Switch). Paragraph S5.1 reads as such:

"S5.1 location. Under the conditions of S6, each of the following controls that is furnished shall be operable by the driver and each of the following displays that is furnished shall be visible to the driver. Under the conditions of S6, telltales are c onsidered visible when activated."

Later in paragraph S5.3.3 (a):

"S5.3(a) Means shall be provided for making controls, gauges, and the identification of those items visible to the driver under all driving conditions."

Given these statements, the question remains, is the instrument panel illumination intensity control required to be visible to the driver under the requirements of MVSS 101?

I appreciate your prompt attention to this and look forward to your response. Please feel free to contact me at (313) 458-6951 with any questions.

ID: 86-4.13

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/15/86

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA

TO: JAMES J. DABROWSKI -- REGULATIONS STATISTICS COORDINATOR JAGUAR CARS

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 06/12/86, TO ERIKA Z. JONES, FROM JAMES J. DABROWSKI, OCC - 0838; RECALL LETTER TO GRAY MARKET VEHICLE OWNERS FROM JAGUAR CARS INC AND RELEASE DOC, DATED 06/12/86 EST

TEXT: Dear Mr. Dabrowski:

This is in reply to your letter of June 12, 1986, asking for confirmation that "Jaguar Cars is not bound by normal NHTSA recall procedures" with reference to cars imported through the Gray Market.

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act requires that a manufacturer must provide notification and remedy, when the determines that a vehicle or an item of motor vehicle equipment "manufactured by him" contains a safety related defact or noncompliance with an applicable standard. (15 U.S.C. 1411). A "manufacturer" is defined under the Act as "any person engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of motor vehicles..., including any person importing motor vehicles... for resale." (15 USC 1391(5)).

We understand Jaguar Cars, Inc. to be a corporation incorporated in the United States for the purpose of importing and selling motor vehicles that are made in another country by another legal entity. Because it does not manufacture or assemble motor vehicles, Jaguar Cars, Inc., is responsible as a "manufacturer" for notification and remedy only for the motor vehicles that it has imported.

I hope that this clarifies the matter for you.

Sincerely,

ID: nht87-2.34

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/09/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Mr. David O. Johnson

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. David O. Johnson 135 Karen Drive Washington, PA 15301

Dear Mr. Johnson:

This responds to your April 22, 1987, letter asking about the legality of transporting people in fifth wheel trailers. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is responsible for promulgating safety standards for the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles. The use of a motor vehicle, such as a trailer, is a matter over which we have no jurisdiction.

Because the legality of carrying people in trailers might be governed by State law, we suggest you contact State officials with your questions. Additionally, questions you might have about the operation of interstate motor carriers should be directed to Mr. Ton Kozlowski of the Office of Motor Carrier Standards (Room 3403 ), Federal Highway Administration, at this address.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

135 Karen Drive Washington, PA 15301

April 22, 1987

Gentlemen:

Please send any information concerning regulations governing the legality of transporting people in a fifth wheel trailer with an intercom between the travel trailer and the towing vehicle.

My understanding is that the Navy transports personnel in this manner which leads me to believe it is legal to do so.

Your prompt attention will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

David O. Johnson

ID: nht75-1.28

Open

DATE: 09/29/75

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Continental Hydraulic Hose Corp.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your letter of August 28, 1975, concerning the banding requirement of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 106-74, Brake Hoses.

Notice 18 (40 FR 38159, August 27, 1975) amended the standard to facilitate the depletion of inventories of brake hose, end fittings, and assemblies which do not meet certain labeling requirements. With regard to the assembly banding requirement, the amendment merely extends the period during which vehicle manufacturers may use unbanded assemblies which were manufactured before March 1, 1975. There is no change in the requirement that assemblies manufactured on and after that date (other than those assembled and installed by a vehicle manufacturer in vehicles manufactured by him) be labeled with a band as specified in S5.2.4 of the standard.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

August 28, 1975

Office of the Chief Council -- National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Gentlemen:

Would you please render a legal interpretation on Notice 18 of MVSS 106. The specific question is if assembliers of hydraulic brake hose assemblies are still required to "label by means of a band around (hydraulic) brake hose assembly" as orginally required in S 5.2.4 of MVSS 106. We are currently labeling by such a band.

Thank you,

CONTINENTAL HYDRAULIC HOSE CORP. -- John H. Elgin, Vice President

Attachment Omitted.

ID: 9950

Open

M. Guy Dorleans
Valeo Vision
34, rue St-AndrJ
93012 Bobigny Cedex
France

Dear M. Dorleans:

This responds to your FAX of April 20, 1994, to Mike Perel of this agency, asking for an interpretation of Standard No. 108.

The drawing in your letter depicts a four-lamp headlamp arrangement in which the outermost lamps (lower beam) incorporate HB4 light sources, and the innermost lamps (upper beam), HB3 light sources. In operation, the outermost lamps alone provide the lower beam. However, when the upper beam switch is thrown, all lamps are energized. You ask for confirmation of your interpretation that "outer unit must fulfill table 15a for Low Beam, an (sic) also that inner must fulfill with HB3 alone table 15a High Beam."

Paragraph S7.5 of Standard No. 108 specifies requirements for four-lamp replaceable bulb headlamp systems such as the one you describe. The photometrics that apply to such systems are set forth in paragraph S7.5(b): "The photometrics as specified in subparagraphs (c) through (e) of this paragraph (depicted in Figure 26) . . . ." Because subparagraph (d) applies to a headlamp equipped with dual filament replaceable light sources and Types HB3 and HB4 are single filament sources, the applicable subparagraph is (e), and, more specifically, the four-headlamp specifications of (e)(3).

This will confirm your understanding. Under S7.5(e)(3), the lower beam is to be produced by the outermost lamps and designed to conform to the lower beam requirements of Figure 15; the upper beam by the innermost lamps and designed to conform to the upper beam requirements of Figure 15. This is confirmed in Figure 26. However, the photometrics of Figure 15A will apply on and after September 1, 1994, (Paragraph S7.1).

Simultaneous activation of both upper and lower beams is permitted by S5.5.8 of Standard No. 108 for headlighting systems designed to conform to Figure 15. Later this year, we will amend Standard No. 108 to substitute Figure 15A for Figure 15, effective September 1, 1994.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:108 d:6/6/94

1994

ID: Cormier.ajd

Open

    Steven M. Cormier, Esquire
    General Counsel
    KME Fire Apparatus
    One Industrial Complex
    Nesquehoning, PA 18240

    Re: Request for Interpretation of Part 579

    Dear Mr. Cormier:

    This is in reply to your letter dated January 22, 2004 seeking an interpretation of 49 CFR Part 579, Reporting of Information and Communications About Potential Defects. You seek a clarification on the issue of whether to report an incident involving a death identified in a claim pursuant to 49 CFR 579.27.

    You describe KME Fire Apparatus (KME) as a manufacturer of less than 500 vehicles per year, and your website indicates that you are a custom manufacturer of fire fighting vehicles. You also state that KME installs certain components or systems on vehicles that are directly related to the vehicles use as firefighting equipment.

    You seek an interpretation of the Early Warning Reporting (EWR) rule as applied to a particular type of claim. By way of example, you note that your products typically have a fire pump that is used by fire fighters to discharge water through a hose or other device with a nozzle to fight a fire. You state that a defect in such a device could potentially give rise to a claim for injury or death that is wholly unrelated to the safety of vehicle. To clarify, you provided an example that a claim may allege that a failure of the pump resulted in the death of a person in a building or car fire, where the alleged defect did not, itself, cause the fire. You state that it is your understanding that such a claim would not be reportable under the EWR rule.

    We can understand how you could reach the conclusion that you reached. However, in enacting the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation (TREAD) Act, the Congress was concerned that NHTSA did not have the full range of information that was necessary to understand as soon as necessary that there potentially were defects in certain Firestone tires. To address the shortcomings of the operative statute (49 U.S.C. Chapter 301), Congress added early warning provisions. The early warning provisions broadly authorize NHTSA to obtain information received by the manufacturer to the extent that such information "may" assist in the identification of defects. 49 U.S.C. 30166(m)(3)(A). Also, the Act specifically refers to information on deaths and injuries. In adopting the EWR regulations relating to deaths, NHTSA recognized that it would have to obtain information based on claims and notices, regardless of whether the manufacturer admitted a problem, had determined that there was a safety-related defect or was able to confirm the cause of death. At the same time, NHTSA recognized that the existence of a claim did not mean that a vehicle or item of equipment contained a defect or, even if there were a defect, that it was safety-related. NHTSA also decided that it should have information on deaths even if the claim or notice did not identify any system or component in a vehicle. These are coded as code 99 in the early warning reporting rules. See also code 98 (systems and components identified in claim but not specifically identified in the early warning rule). Under the approach of the EWR rule, NHTSA would obtain a complete listing of death incidents based on claims and notices and NHTSA -- rather than the manufacturer -- would decide what is important. I should add that historically NHTSA has been concerned about equipment related to motor vehicles that could cause deaths. For example, NHTSA has investigated and obtained a recall on jack stands. Similarly, NHTSA has addressed various items of equipment in recreational vehicles such as those that could cause fires. E.g., space heaters, external generators not attached to the vehicles engine, external (110 volt) power supplies and associated wiring; fuel tanks not used by the vehicles engine. We further took into account potential burdens and, for small volume manufacturers (fewer than 500 vehicles per year) apparently including KME, only required reports involving deaths, and not other matters.

    As we explained in the preamble to the final EWR rule:

    We also addressed the suggestion by some manufacturers that the reportable incidents be limited to failures of or problems with certain vehicle systems. As discussed in the preamble to the NPRM and below, we believe that this approach is appropriate for certain types of information. However, while deaths and injuries are relatively rare, they are so significant that we want our information to be as complete as possible. Therefore, we proposed to require reporting of all deaths and injuries in the United States based on claims and notices, regardless of the implicated components.

    67 Fed. Reg. 45822, 45841 (July 10, 2002).

    In view of these concerns and the agencys decisions on the approach to the rule, the EWR rule requires that even if a claim of death does not directly involve operation of the vehicle itself, the claim must be reported. This conclusion follows from the EWR reporting requirement of 49 CFR 579.27(b), which states in pertinent part:

    For each reporting period, a manufacturer . . . shall submit a report . . . on each incident involving one or more deaths occurring in the United States that is identified in a claim against and received by the manufacturer or in a notice received by the manufacturer which notice alleges or proves that the death was caused by a possible defect in the manufacturer's vehicle or equipment .

    Furthermore, we have consistently interpreted the requirement for manufacturers to report a claim or notice of a death incident to NHTSA to mean that manufacturers must report claims and notices of incidents of death regardless of the manufacturers view of the underlying facts. We have advised manufacturers to report a claim or notice of death even if the manufacturers vehicle or equipment did not initiate the sequence of events that lead to the death (see letter of August 18, 2003 to Miller, Johnson, Snell & Cummiskey), or when a component did not fall within any of the defined components of EWR rule (see letter of July 21, 2003 to Halcore Group), or even if the claim arose out of the performance of an aftermarket part (see letter of May 14, 2003 to National Truck Equipment Association, p.6).

    In view of the foregoing, under the EWR rule, Kovatch/KME must report any claim alleging a death, including a death allegedly caused by a pump or other item of equipment on a fire truck.

    If you have any questions, you may phone Andrew DiMarsico of my staff at (202) 366-5263.

    Sincerely,

    Jacqueline Glassman
    Chief Counsel

    ref:579
    d.3/26/04

2004

ID: nht78-3.45

Open

DATE: 11/01/78

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; John Womack; NHTSA

TO: State Capitol; West Virginia

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your telephone conversation with Kathy DeMeter of my staff on October 11, 1978, concerning the Federal odometer law. You requested an interpretation of the first sentence in 49 CFR @ 580.7, which reads as follows:

Each dealer or distributor of a motor vehicle who is required by this Part to execute an odometer disclosure statement shall retain for four years each odometer mileage statement which he receives.

Specifically, you asked whether dealers and distributors are required to retain only those disclosure statements which they actually receive or whether they are under an affirmative duty to obtain a disclosure statement if none is offered by the transferor.

In the opinion of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, section 408 of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (15 U.S.C. 1988) creates an affirmative duty on the part of dealers and distributors to obtain disclosure statements. Section 408 states that:

No transferee who, for purposes of resale, acquires ownership of a motor vehicle shall accept any written disclosure required by any rule prescribed under this section if such disclosure is complete.

Part 580 of 49 CFR requires such written disclosure. If a disclosure statement, as required by Part 580, is provided to the transferee but is not filled out in its entirety, then the disclosure of the mileage the vehicle has been driven is not complete. Likewise, if no information at all is provided as to the mileage, then the disclosure is also incomplete. Therefore, in order for a dealer or distributor to be in compliance with section 408 of the Act, he must take steps to ensure that he receives a written disclosure and that it is complete in all respects prior to executing the transfer of ownership documents.

Part 580.7 of 49 CFR merely requires that those statements which the dealer or distributor is required to obtain are retained.

ID: nht69-1.45

Open

DATE: 09/11/69

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; H. M. Jackin for W. M. Jacklin, Jr.; NHTSA

TO: Hon. W. Proxmire - U.S. Senate

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Thank you for your letter of August 27, 1969, to the Director, Legislative Liaison, Department of Transportation, concerning Mr. Eugene J. Shermeister's comments on headlamps for motor vehicles.

Enclosed for Mr. Shermeister's information is a copy of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 on lighting requirements for the vehicles specified in the standard. Standard No. 108 is applicable to new vehicles manufactured on or after the effective date of January 1, 1969. In accordance with the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, the initial safety standards were based on existing standards. Headlighting requirements, as specified in Standard No. 108, were therefore based on existing Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, certain State regulations and the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Standards. On this basis, Standard No. 108 specifies that headlamps for all vehicles except motorcycles conform to SAE Standards J579a and J580a, entitled, respectively, "Sealed Beam Headlamp Units for Motor Vehicles" and "Sealed Beam Headlamp." To provide protection from blinding effects to oncoming drivers, SAE Standard J579a specifies a maximum lamp output of 37,500 candlepower. This candlepower value is considerably less than the candlepower output of quartz iodine type headlamps.

As indicated in paragraph S2 of Standard No. 108, the standard is applicable to lighting on new vehicles and not to replacement lighting equipment. Except for vehicles subject to the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, the requirements for replacement lighting equipment, as well as lighting requirements for vehicles in use, are those requirements as set by the regulatory agencies of the individual states.

The National Highway Safety Bureau is sponsoring a research contract on improved forward lighting for motor vehicles. Results of this contract will not only provide us with well-founded data for use in amending the standard, but will also assist us in evaluating the relative merits of sealed beam, quartz iodine and other types of headlamps.

ENCLOSURE

ID: nht72-5.14

Open

DATE: 11/22/72

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Truck Body & Equipment Association Inc.

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Thank you for your letter of November 15, 1972, and your kind words about my participation in your convention.

In your letter you asked a question that arose at the convention, concerning the responsibility of a tank manufacturer who completes a tank truck for a customer who carries both gasoline and fuel oil. You asked,

"Can a tank manufacturer by simply certifying the GVWR make a unit which will be legal at full load with gasoline, the lighter of the two products, and leave it to the user to ensure that he does not exceed the GVWR when he is carrying a mixed load or fuel oil only?"

On the specific and limited facts that you have given, the answer is that the manufacturer will not be in violation of the Certification regulations. There are two ways in which a manufacturer might find himself liable on slightly different facts, however. If in any way the manufacturer provides information to the purchaser, through owner's manuals, promotional materials, or otherwise, which could reasonably be considered a "rated cargo load", he will be in violation of @ 567.5(a)(5) if the GVWR does not reflect that figure. For example, if the vehicle were described explicitly as being capable of carrying 5,000 gallons of fuel oil, we would consider that to be the equivalent of a rating of that volume times the normal density of the oil.

The other possible liability would be for a safety-related defect. This would arise in a case where the vehicle was found to be unsafely equipped for carrying the loads that the manufacturer has reason to know would be imposed on it. Such a finding would depend on all the facts of an individual case.

Obviously, the best course for the manufacturer, from the standpoint of both safety and he avoidance of liability, is to equip his vehicles fully with equipment that is rated to carry the loads that he believes the vehicles will carry.

ID: nht67-1.19

Open

DATE: 12/22/67

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; William Haddon Jr. M.D.; NHTSA

TO: McIntosh Inc.

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Thank you for your letter of November 3, 1967, to Mr. Lowell K. Bridwell, requesting clarification on certain aspects of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

In answer to your specific questions, please be advised that the supplier of a component of a motor vehicle is a manufacturer within the meaning of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. However, he is not obligated to certify that the item of motor vehicle equipment he manufactures complies with the standard unless he is supplying that item to a distributor or dealer, and then only if there is an applicable Federal Standard.

As regards identification of parts, there is no specific requirement under the Act.

With reference to the entire matter of keeping of records under Section 112(c), this Bureau has under study an appropriate program based on evaluation of certification experience during the next few months that will load to specific regulations. It is contemplated that these regulations will have an effective date of January 1, 1969.

If there is any other information you would like, I hope you will let me know.

Request an Interpretation

You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:

The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.

Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.

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