NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
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ID: leesOpen
Via Federal Express
Ms. Susan L. Lees General Counsel Allstate Insurance Company 3075 Sanders Road Northbrook, IL 60062
Dear Ms. Lees:
We have received reports that certain insurance companies may be engaging in transactions that violate Federal odometer disclosure law with respect to vehicles damaged in Hurricane Sandy. Although we are not asserting that your company is engaging in such practices, we are writing to a number of auto insurance companies to remind them of the Federal odometer disclosure law requirements and ask them to review their practices regarding odometer disclosures. These letters do not accuse your company, or any other company, of violating the law.
We understand that when a flood-damaged vehicle is declared a total loss, the insurance company pays the insured the value of the vehicle, becomes the owner, and acquires control over the vehicle from the insured. However the reports we have received indicate that instead of completing the required odometer disclosure, some companies ask the insured to complete the odometer disclosure statement without listing the insurance company as the transferee. According to these reports, the insurance company will not sign the title, make an odometer disclosure, or transfer title. The insurance company then sells the vehicle at auction, keeps the proceeds from the auction, and provides the title with the odometer disclosure statement as signed by the insured to the auction buyer. The next person in the chain of title of the vehicle will be the buyer at auction. The insurance company will essentially be omitted from the chain of title.
In the circumstance described above, an insurance company is considered a transferee when it pays the insureds claim (in return it obtains ownership of the vehicle), and a transferor when it sells the vehicle at auction. See 49 C.F.R. 580.3. As a transferor, the insurance company is required to make certain disclosures.
Under federal odometer disclosure law, 49 U.S.C. 32705, a person transferring ownership of a motor vehicle shall give the transferee written disclosure of the cumulative mileage registered on the odometer. More specifically, under 49 C.F.R. 580.5, each transferor shall disclose the mileage to the transferee in writing on the title or on the document being used to reassign the title [t]his written disclosure must be signed by the transferor, including the printed name. The transferee must sign the disclosure statement, print his name, and return a copy to his transferor.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Marie Choi of my staff at (202) 366-1738 or via email at marie.choi@dot.gov.
Sincerely,
O. Kevin Vincent Chief Counsel
d: 12/20/12
Identical letters sent to:
Mr. Dana Proulx General Counsel GEICO Corporation One Geico Plaza Washington, DC 20076
Mr. Charles E. Jarrett Chief Legal Officer The Progressive Corporation 300 North Commons Blvd., OHF 11 Mayfield Village, OH 44143
Mr. Christopher C. Mansfield General Counsel Liberty Mutual Group 175 Berkeley Street Boston, MA 02117
Ms. Patricia R. Hatler Chief Legal and Governance Officer Nationwide One Nationwide Plaza Columbus, OH 43215
Mr. Garrett Paddor General Counsel Farmers New World Life Insurance Company 4680 Wilshire Blvd, 2nd Fl. Los Angeles, CA 90010
Mr. Steven A. Bennett General Counsel United Services Automobile Association (USAA) 9800 Fredericksburg Road San Antonio, TX 78288
Mr. Jeffrey W. Jackson General Counsel State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company One State Farm Plaza Bloomington, IL 61710
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ID: paddorOpen
Via Federal Express
Mr. Garrett Paddor General Counsel Farmers New World Life Insurance Company 4680 Wilshire Blvd, 2nd Fl. Los Angeles, CA 90010
Dear Mr. Paddor:
We have received reports that certain insurance companies may be engaging in transactions that violate Federal odometer disclosure law with respect to vehicles damaged in Hurricane Sandy. Although we are not asserting that your company is engaging in such practices, we are writing to a number of auto insurance companies to remind them of the Federal odometer disclosure law requirements and ask them to review their practices regarding odometer disclosures. These letters do not accuse your company, or any other company, of violating the law.
We understand that when a flood-damaged vehicle is declared a total loss, the insurance company pays the insured the value of the vehicle, becomes the owner, and acquires control over the vehicle from the insured. However the reports we have received indicate that instead of completing the required odometer disclosure, some companies ask the insured to complete the odometer disclosure statement without listing the insurance company as the transferee. According to these reports, the insurance company will not sign the title, make an odometer disclosure, or transfer title. The insurance company then sells the vehicle at auction, keeps the proceeds from the auction, and provides the title with the odometer disclosure statement as signed by the insured to the auction buyer. The next person in the chain of title of the vehicle will be the buyer at auction. The insurance company will essentially be omitted from the chain of title.
In the circumstance described above, an insurance company is considered a transferee when it pays the insureds claim (in return it obtains ownership of the vehicle), and a transferor when it sells the vehicle at auction. See 49 C.F.R. 580.3. As a transferor, the insurance company is required to make certain disclosures.
Under federal odometer disclosure law, 49 U.S.C. 32705, a person transferring ownership of a motor vehicle shall give the transferee written disclosure of the cumulative mileage registered on the odometer. More specifically, under 49 C.F.R. 580.5, each transferor shall disclose the mileage to the transferee in writing on the title or on the document being used to reassign the title [t]his written disclosure must be signed by the transferor, including the printed name. The transferee must sign the disclosure statement, print his name, and return a copy to his transferor.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Marie Choi of my staff at (202) 366-1738 or via email at marie.choi@dot.gov.
Sincerely,
O. Kevin Vincent Chief Counsel
d: 12/20/12
Identical letters sent to:
Mr. Dana Proulx General Counsel GEICO Corporation One Geico Plaza Washington, DC 20076
Mr. Charles E. Jarrett Chief Legal Officer The Progressive Corporation 300 North Commons Blvd., OHF 11 Mayfield Village, OH 44143
Mr. Christopher C. Mansfield General Counsel Liberty Mutual Group 175 Berkeley Street Boston, MA 02117
Ms. Patricia R. Hatler Chief Legal and Governance Officer Nationwide One Nationwide Plaza Columbus, OH 43215
Ms. Susan L. Lees General Counsel Allstate Insurance Company 3075 Sanders Road Northbrook, IL 60062
Mr. Steven A. Bennett General Counsel United Services Automobile Association (USAA) 9800 Fredericksburg Road San Antonio, TX 78288
Mr. Jeffrey W. Jackson General Counsel State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company One State Farm Plaza Bloomington, IL 61710
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ID: nht72-2.36OpenDATE: 12/08/72 FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R. B. Dyson; NHTSA TO: P. F. Middleton, Esq. TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of November 22, 1972 to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration asking "whether when a school bus is being used to transport pupils, the red lights must go on when the entrance door is opened without exception." If the system is one of red lamps only, its activation according to SAE Standard J887 is not automatic but manual. The situation differs with respect to the combination amber and red lamps system. Paragraph S4.1.4(b)(ii) of Standard No. 108 effective January 1, 1972, which you reference, states "The school bus signal lamp system shall be wired so that the amber signal lamps are activated only by manual or foot operation, and if activated, are automatically deactivated and the red signal lamps automatically activated when the bus entrance door is opened." This means that the red lamps are only activated if the amber lamps have been activated before the door is opened. Activation of the red lamp system is thus dependent upon the action of the bus operator in prior activation of the amber lamp system. From the standpoint of safety we hope that his activation of the amber lamp system will be "without exception" whenever he is transporting pupils. Because paragraph S3.1.3.2 of Standard No. 108 as it was in effect from January 1, 1969 to January 1, 1972, which you also reference, could mistakenly be interpreted to require activation of the red lamp system without exception whenever the door was opened, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration adopted the language of S4.1.4 to clarify the ambiguity.
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ID: 3143oOpen Mr. Hiroshi Kato Dear Mr. Kato: This is in response to your letter of April 19, 1988, concerning whether a Mitsubishi Motors Corporation SH27 lightweight industrial truck that you intend to offer for sale in the United States should be classified as a motor vehicle under Section 102(3) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("Safety Act"). You stated that this vehicle is intended for "general or carrier work for off-road applications," and that it is capable of a maximum speed of approximately 25 mph. You further explained that your company planned to advertise, promote, and market this vehicle as an off-road vehicle. Based on the information provided in your letter, it appears that the SH27 would not be a motor vehicle under the Safety Act. Section 102(3) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1391(3)) defines a "motor vehicle" as any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails. NHTSA has interpreted this language as follows. Vehicles that are equipped with tracks or are otherwise incapable of highway travel are plainly not motor vehicles. Further, vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use (e.g., airport runway vehicles and underground mining devices) are not considered motor vehicles, even though they may be operationally capable of highway travel. Vehicles that have an abnormal body configuration that readily distinguishes them from other highway vehicles and a maximum speed of 20 miles per hour (mph) are not considered motor vehicles, because their use of the public roads is intermittent and incidental to their primary intended off-road use. On the other hand, vehicles that use the public highways on a necessary and recurring basis are motor vehicles. For instance, a utility vehicle like the Jeep is plainly a motor vehicle, even though it is equipped with special features to permit off-road operation. If a vehicle's greatest use will be off-road, but it will spend a substantial amount of time on-road, then NHTSA has interpreted the vehicle to be a "motor vehicle". Further, the agency has determined that a vehicle such as a dune buggy is a motor vehicle if it is readily usable on the public roads and is in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of owners, regardless of the manufacturer's stated intent regarding the terrain on which the vehicle is to be operated. Your vehicle is not easily classified under either of these groupings. On the one hand, your vehicle has a body configuration nearly identical to standard trucks, can be registered for use on the highways of several foreign countries, and can obtain a a maximum speed of approximately 25 mph. These factors suggest that the vehicle should be classified as a motor vehicle. On the other hand, you stated that this vehicle is intended to be used only for off-road applications and that this vehicle will be advertised and promoted for off-road purposes only and will contain four warning labels stating "Warning: Off Road Use Only." These factors suggest that the vehicle should not be classified as a motor vehicle. In instances where the agency is asked whether a vehicle is a motor vehicle when it has both off-road and on-road operating capabilities, and about which there is little or no evidence about the extent of the vehicle's on-road use, the agency has applied five factors in offering its advice. These factors are: 1. Whether States or foreign countries have permitted or are likely to permit the vehicle to be registered for on-road use. You noted that several foreign countries including Japan and Taiwan register for on-road use the general export configuration of this vehicle. This suggests that your vehicle should be considered a motor vehicle. You attempted to distinguish this fact by stating that the vehicle to be sold in the United States has different specifications than the general export vehicles. The differences are that the United States version has a maximum speed of 25 mph while the general export version can achieve speeds of greater than 55 mph, the engine displacement in the United States version has an engine of 548 cc rather than the 796 and 783 cc for the general export version, and the United States version has an hourmeter (similar to agricultural vehicles) rather than a speedometer. You stated that these differences mean that there is little basis for assuming that the experience in other countries would correlate to the likelihood of States permitting the vehicle to be registered for highway use in the United States. Since the vehicle closely resembles a small truck for highway use, we believe it is likely that States would permit it to be registered for highway use, just as other countries have. Therefore, this factor suggests that your vehicle should be considered a motor vehicle. 2. Whether the vehicle is or will be advertised for use on-road as well as off-road, or whether it is or will be advertised exclusively for off-road use. You stated that your advertising and promotional materials will state that your vehicle should be used only for off-road purposes and will not depict or suggest that the vehicle can be used on-road. This factor suggests that the vehicle should not be considered a motor vehicle. 3. Whether the vehicle's manufacturer or dealers will assist vehicle purchasers in obtaining certificates of origin or title documents to register the vehicle for on-road use. You stated that your dealers will be instructed that this vehicle is to be used solely for off-road purposes and that no assistance should be given to obtain a title for the vehicle or to register the vehicle in this country. Your company also will state on any ownership document that this vehicle is not intended for on-road use. Therefore, this factor would indicate that the vehicle should not be considered a motor vehicle. 4. Whether the vehicle is or will be sold by dealers also selling vehicles that are classified as motor vehicles. You stated that this vehicle will only be sold by dealerships that sell vehicles other than motor vehicles, such as material handling equipment like lifts and agricultural equipment. This factor suggests that the vehicle should not be considered a motor vehicle. 5. Whether the vehicle has or will have affixed to it a warning label stating that the vehicle is not intended for use on the public roads. You stated that four warning labels will be affixed to the interior and exterior of the vehicle body. Labels stating "Off Road Use Only" will be applied to the exterior front panel of the cab, the rear gate, and the instrument panel. Additionally, a label stating "Warning: Off Road Use Only" will be affixed to the exterior rear panel of the cab. This factor would indicate that the vehicle is not a motor vehicle. Based on the representations in your letter, the agency believes that the Mitsubishi SH27 lightweight truck does not appear to be a motor vehicle under the Safety Act. However, we will reexamine this conclusion if we learn that, for example, the vehicle is in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of its owners. I hope this information is helpful. Sincerely,
Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel / ref:VSA d:l0/3l/88 |
1970 |
ID: nht78-2.47OpenDATE: 01/10/78 FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; J. J. Levin, Jr.; NHTSA TO: Briskin Manufacturing Company TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION TEXT: I would like to advise Briskin Manufacturing Company as a producer of air reservoirs for use on vehicles that comply with Standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems, that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has decided to withdraw its December 14, 1977, interpretation of the requirement that reservoirs "withstand" internal hydrostatic pressure (copy of interpretation enclosed). While the NHTSA simply intended to clarify its existing interpretation of the requirements, information brought to the agency's attention indicates that the revised interpretation would have the unintended effect of increasing the stringency of the requirements. Any such upgrading of the integrity requirements for air reservoirs would be preceded by notice and opportunity for public comment. The agency expects to publish notice that its interpretation is withdrawn in the Federal Register in the near future. |
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ID: nht69-2.10OpenDATE: 06/04/69 FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Howard A. Heffron; NHTSA TO: Concrete Plant Manufacturers Bureau TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of May 27, 1969, in which you submit information and photographs of mobile concrete plants, and ask whether they are "motor vehicles" within the meaning of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, with a view to determining whether comments should be submitted to Docket 1-11, Rear Underride Protection. The matter of whether pieces such as the subject concrete plants are motor vehicles within the meaning of section 102(3) of the Act, and also "trailers" within the meaning of the proposed underride standard, is presently under consideration by this Agency. We encourage your organization and its members to submit to the docket any materials that they consider relevant to the subject. |
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ID: nht76-5.33OpenDATE: 06/22/76 FROM: ROBERT L. CARTER FOR JAMES B. GREGORY -- NHTSA TO: American Motors Corporation COPYEE: STEVE JONAS -- AMC; ARCH DOTY -- MVMA; GEORGE NIELD -- AIA TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION TEXT: This responds to your telephone request of June 17, 1976, for confirmation that @ 575.101 of Part 575, Consumer Information, was recently revised to specify vehicle stopping distance information based on stops that may include wheel lockup under the conditions allowed by Standard No. 105-75, Hydraulic Brake Systems. You note that the text of @ 575.101(c)(5), and the accompanying illustration in Figure 1 of the section, describe the information provided as performance achieved "without locking the wheels." Your interpretation of the requirements of @ 575.101 is correct. In amending Part 575 to permit the use of stopping distance data collected in tests for Standard No. 105-75, the agency made all changes it believed necessary to provide for the use of stopping distance information gathered in connection with Standard No. 105-75 (41 FR 1066, January 6, 1976). The reference to "without locking the wheels" should have been deleted from the text of @ 575.101(c)(5) and Figure 1. A correcting amendment will be issued shortly. The correction of an omission from the text of the first paragraph of @ 575.101(c) will also be made at that time. In the last sentence of that paragraph, the concluding option (as published in the Federal Register) should read "under the procedures specified in paragraph (d) of this section and the conditions specified in paragraph (e) of this section." |
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ID: mansfieldOpen
Via Federal Express
Mr. Christopher C. Mansfield General Counsel Liberty Mutual Group 175 Berkeley Street Boston, MA 02117
Dear Mr. Mansfield:
We have received reports that certain insurance companies may be engaging in transactions that violate Federal odometer disclosure law with respect to vehicles damaged in Hurricane Sandy. Although we are not asserting that your company is engaging in such practices, we are writing to a number of auto insurance companies to remind them of the Federal odometer disclosure law requirements and ask them to review their practices regarding odometer disclosures. These letters do not accuse your company, or any other company, of violating the law.
We understand that when a flood-damaged vehicle is declared a total loss, the insurance company pays the insured the value of the vehicle, becomes the owner, and acquires control over the vehicle from the insured. However the reports we have received indicate that instead of completing the required odometer disclosure, some companies ask the insured to complete the odometer disclosure statement without listing the insurance company as the transferee. According to these reports, the insurance company will not sign the title, make an odometer disclosure, or transfer title. The insurance company then sells the vehicle at auction, keeps the proceeds from the auction, and provides the title with the odometer disclosure statement as signed by the insured to the auction buyer. The next person in the chain of title of the vehicle will be the buyer at auction. The insurance company will essentially be omitted from the chain of title.
In the circumstance described above, an insurance company is considered a transferee when it pays the insureds claim (in return it obtains ownership of the vehicle), and a transferor when it sells the vehicle at auction. See 49 C.F.R. 580.3. As a transferor, the insurance company is required to make certain disclosures.
Under federal odometer disclosure law, 49 U.S.C. 32705, a person transferring ownership of a motor vehicle shall give the transferee written disclosure of the cumulative mileage registered on the odometer. More specifically, under 49 C.F.R. 580.5, each transferor shall disclose the mileage to the transferee in writing on the title or on the document being used to reassign the title [t]his written disclosure must be signed by the transferor, including the printed name. The transferee must sign the disclosure statement, print his name, and return a copy to his transferor.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Marie Choi of my staff at (202) 366-1738 or via email at marie.choi@dot.gov.
Sincerely,
O. Kevin Vincent Chief Counsel
d: 12/20/12
Identical letters sent to:
Mr. Dana Proulx General Counsel GEICO Corporation One Geico Plaza Washington, DC 20076
Mr. Charles E. Jarrett Chief Legal Officer The Progressive Corporation 300 North Commons Blvd., OHF 11 Mayfield Village, OH 44143
Mr. Christopher C. Mansfield General Counsel Liberty Mutual Group 175 Berkeley Street Boston, MA 02117
Ms. Patricia R. Hatler Chief Legal and Governance Officer Nationwide One Nationwide Plaza Columbus, OH 43215
Ms. Susan L. Lees General Counsel Allstate Insurance Company 3075 Sanders Road Northbrook, IL 60062
Mr. Garrett Paddor General Counsel Farmers New World Life Insurance Company 4680 Wilshire Blvd, 2nd Fl. Los Angeles, CA 90010 Mr. Steven A. Bennett General Counsel United Services Automobile Association (USAA) 9800 Fredericksburg Road San Antonio, TX 78288
Mr. Jeffrey W. Jackson General Counsel State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company One State Farm Plaza Bloomington, IL 61710
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ID: proulxOpen
Via Federal Express
Mr. Dana Proulx General Counsel GEICO Corporation One Geico Plaza Washington, DC 20076
Dear Mr. Proulx:
We have received reports that certain insurance companies may be engaging in transactions that violate Federal odometer disclosure law with respect to vehicles damaged in Hurricane Sandy. Although we are not asserting that your company is engaging in such practices, we are writing to a number of auto insurance companies to remind them of the Federal odometer disclosure law requirements and ask them to review their practices regarding odometer disclosures. These letters do not accuse your company, or any other company, of violating the law.
We understand that when a flood-damaged vehicle is declared a total loss, the insurance company pays the insured the value of the vehicle, becomes the owner, and acquires control over the vehicle from the insured. However the reports we have received indicate that instead of completing the required odometer disclosure, some companies ask the insured to complete the odometer disclosure statement without listing the insurance company as the transferee. According to these reports, the insurance company will not sign the title, make an odometer disclosure, or transfer title. The insurance company then sells the vehicle at auction, keeps the proceeds from the auction, and provides the title with the odometer disclosure statement as signed by the insured to the auction buyer. The next person in the chain of title of the vehicle will be the buyer at auction. The insurance company will essentially be omitted from the chain of title.
In the circumstance described above, an insurance company is considered a transferee when it pays the insureds claim (in return it obtains ownership of the vehicle), and a transferor when it sells the vehicle at auction. See 49 C.F.R. 580.3. As a transferor, the insurance company is required to make certain disclosures.
Under federal odometer disclosure law, 49 U.S.C. 32705, a person transferring ownership of a motor vehicle shall give the transferee written disclosure of the cumulative mileage registered on the odometer. More specifically, under 49 C.F.R. 580.5, each transferor shall disclose the mileage to the transferee in writing on the title or on the document being used to reassign the title [t]his written disclosure must be signed by the transferor, including the printed name. The transferee must sign the disclosure statement, print his name, and return a copy to his transferor.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Marie Choi of my staff at (202) 366-1738 or via email at marie.choi@dot.gov.
Sincerely,
O. Kevin Vincent Chief Counsel
d: 12/20/12
Identical letters sent to:
Mr. Charles E. Jarrett Chief Legal Officer The Progressive Corporation 300 North Commons Blvd., OHF 11 Mayfield Village, OH 44143
Mr. Christopher C. Mansfield General Counsel Liberty Mutual Group 175 Berkeley Street Boston, MA 02117
Ms. Patricia R. Hatler Chief Legal and Governance Officer Nationwide One Nationwide Plaza Columbus, OH 43215
Ms. Susan L. Lees General Counsel Allstate Insurance Company 3075 Sanders Road Northbrook, IL 60062
Mr. Garrett Paddor General Counsel Farmers New World Life Insurance Company 4680 Wilshire Blvd, 2nd Fl. Los Angeles, CA 90010
Mr. Steven A. Bennett General Counsel United Services Automobile Association (USAA) 9800 Fredericksburg Road San Antonio, TX 78288
Mr. Jeffrey W. Jackson General Counsel State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company One State Farm Plaza Bloomington, IL 61710 |
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ID: 77-3.23OpenTYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA DATE: July 12, 1977 FROM: Joseph J. Levin, Jr. -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA TO: Jim Thomason -- State Purchasing Office TITLE: None ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 9-10-90 from P.J. Rice to E. Kultgen (A36; VSA 108(b)(1); VSA 102(14); Part 571.3); Also attached to letter dated 5-29-90 from E. Kultgen from S.P. Wood (OCC 4843); Also attached to letter dated 5-10-82 from F. Berndt (signature by S.P. Wood) to M.V. Chauvin; Also attached to letter dated 3-27-78 from J.J. Levin, Jr. to B. Nanninga (VSA 102(14)); Also attached to letter dated 8-3-77 from J.J. Levin, Jr. to J.L. O'Connell (VSA 102(14)) TEXT: Pursuant to your telephone conversation of June 9, 1977, with Roger Tilton of my staff, I am enclosing a copy of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) interpretation that buses transporting people to and from college need not comply with the requirements of the new school bus safety standards. You also asked whether buses used to transport people to and from vocational school would need to comply with the school bus safety standards. The applicability of the standards to vehicles purchased by an institution depends upon the nature of the particular institution. The school bus safety standards apply to vehicles purchased by "primary, preprimary and secondary schools." Since the vocational school you describe involves the training of adults and other post-high school students, it would not fall within the categories of primary, preprimary or secondary schools. Accordingly, buses used by that school would not need to comply with the school bus safety standards. However, vocational schools connected with secondary schools would fall within the ambit of the standards. |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.