ID: 23685

J. Atary, Projects Manager
Elco Industries Ltd.
17 Haneviim Street
PO Box 1176
Ramat Hasharon 4711
Israel





Dear Dr. Atary:

This is in response to your fax dated October 14, 2001, in which you ask whether your Mobile Transformer is a motor vehicle that must comply with Federal motor vehicle safety standards. As discussed below, the answer appears to be no.

In your fax, you describe the Mobile Transformer as a large transformer and the associated equipment, such as breakers, switch gears, and control cabinets, that are permanently mounted on a semi-trailer. The semi-trailer is oversized and requires permits from State Departments of Transportation and an escort vehicle when driving on public roads. Since the equipment is permanently mounted to the semi-trailer, the semi-trailer cannot be used to transport goods.

You state that the Mobile Transformer is not intended primarily for highway use. It normally stays at work sites the majority of the time and is infrequently transported on public roads between these sites. These work sites are permanent substations where the Mobile Transformer is brought for replacing broken down transformers or to enable maintenance work to be performed on the substation's permanent transformer.

By way of background information, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act) authorizes our agency to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. (49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq.) NHTSA has no authority to approve or certify any commercial product. Instead, manufacturers are required to certify that their vehicles or equipment meet all applicable standards. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter.

The term "motor vehicle" is statutorily defined as "a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, but does not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line." (49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(6)).

Whether we consider the Mobile Transformer to be a motor vehicle depends on its use. For example, we interpret our statutory definition not to encompass mobile construction equipment, such as cranes and scrapers, which use the highway only to move between job sites and which typically spend extended periods of time at a single job site. In such cases, the on-highway use of the vehicle is merely incidental and is not the primary purpose for which the vehicle was manufactured. In contrast are instances where vehicles, such as dump trucks, frequently use the highway going to and from job sites, and stay at a job site for only a limited time. Such vehicles are considered motor vehicles for purposes of the statute we administer because the on-highway use is more than incidental.

Based on the available information, it appears that your Mobile Transformer is not a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of the Safety Act. This conclusion is based on the statements in your letter that the Mobile Transformer uses the highway only to move between job sites and typically spends extended periods of time at a single job site. Thus, the agency would consider the use of your device on the public roads to be incidental and not its primary purpose. Since your device is not a motor vehicle, it would not be subject to our Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.

If the agency were to receive additional information indicating that your Mobile Transformer used the roads more than on an incidental basis, then the agency would reassess this interpretation.

I hope you find this information useful. If you have any further questions, please contact Mr. Dion Casey in my office at (202) 366-2992.






Sincerely,

John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel

ref:571
d.11/16/01

ID: 2911yy

Mr. Gregory J. Vonderheide
Vice President Sales
Markets Unlimited Group, Inc.
P.O. Box 289
Conestoga, PA 17516

Dear Mr. Vonderheide:

This responds to your letter of March 6, l99l, asking for the "application(s) necessary for the Department of Transportation approval of a new product." The product is described only as a "Safety Light."

The Department has no authority to approve or disapprove items of motor vehicle equipment. Pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration establishes the Federal motor vehicle safety standards that apply to motor vehicles and/or motor vehicle equipment, and which must be met by the manufacturers of any vehicles or equipment to which the standards apply.

Unless your product is intended to replace an existing light found on motor vehicles, it would not appear to be directly covered by Standard No. l08, which establishes Federal requirements for motor vehicle lighting. If indeed it is intended as an additional light, under Standard No. 108 supplementary lighting equipment is permissible as original equipment on motor vehicles provided that it does not impair the effectiveness of lighting equipment required by the standard. Supplementary lighting equipment is also permissible under the Act for vehicles in use, provided its installation by a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business does not render wholly or partially inoperative any element of design or device installed in accordance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard. Without knowing more of your device, we can provide you only this general guidance.

The use of equipment on bicycles is under the authority of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 5401 Westbard Avenue, Bethesda, Md. and we are unable to advise you of their requirements.

The use of supplementary lighting equipment is also regulated by the individual States. We are unable to advise you on these laws, and suggest you consult the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 4600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22203.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

ref:l08 d:3.29/9l

ID: nht91-3.3

DATE: March 29, 1991

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Gregory J. Vonderheide -- Vice President Sales, Markets Unlimited Group, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 3-6-91 from Gregory J. Vonderheide to NHTSA (OCC 5835)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter of March 6, 1991, asking for the "application(s) necessary for the Department of Transportation approval of a new product." The product is described only as a "Safety Light."

The Department has no authority to approve or disapprove items of motor vehicle equipment. Pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration establishes the Federal motor vehicle safety standards that apply to motor vehicles and/or motor vehicle equipment, and which must be met by the manufacturers of any vehicles or equipment to which the standards apply.

Unless your product is intended to replace an existing light found on motor vehicles, it would not appear to be directly covered by Standard No. 108, which establishes Federal requirements for motor vehicle lighting. If indeed it is intended as an additional light, under Standard No. 108 supplementary lighting equipment is permissible as original equipment on motor vehicles provided that it does not impair the effectiveness of lighting equipment required by the standard. Supplementary lighting equipment is also permissible under the Act for vehicles in use, provided its installation by a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business does not render wholly or partially inoperative any element of design or device installed in accordance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard. Without knowing more of your device, we can provide you only this general guidance.

The use of equipment on bicycles is under the authority of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 5401 Westbard Avenue, Bethesda, Md. and we are unable to advise you of their requirements.

The use of supplementary lighting equipment is also regulated by the individual States. We are unable to advise you on these laws, and suggest you consult the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 4600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22203.

ID: nht90-3.94

TYPE: Interpretation--NHTSA

DATE: September 10, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Edward Kultgen -- Secretary, Bird-Kultgen Ford-Volkswagen

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 5-29-90 from E. Kultgen to S.P. Wood (OCC 4843); Also attached to letter dated 5-10-82 from F. Berndt (Signature by S.P. Wood) to M.V. Chauvin; Also attached to letter dated 3-27-78 from J.J. Levin, Jr. to B. Nanninga ( VSA 102(14)); Also attached to letter dated 8-3-77 from J.J. Levin, Jr. to J.L. O'Connell (VSA 102(14)); Also attached to letter dated 7-12-77 from J.J. Levin, Jr. to J. Thomason (VSA 102(14))

TEXT:

This is in response to your letter to Stephen Wood of this office concerning the applicability of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act) to the sale of used vehicles used to transport students. Specifically, you asked whether sec tion 108(b)(1), or any other section of the Safety Act, applies to the retail sale of used vehicles. As an example, you gave a small, church-related school seeking to buy a used 15 passenger van for purposes that included the transportation of students. You also requested a definition of "student" as that term is used in determining the applicability of Federal requirements relating to school buses.

For purposes of this discussion, it is helpful to distinguish between two separate sets of regulations which may be applicable to school buses. The first set consists of the motor vehicle safety standards we issued under the Safety Act, and which apply t o the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles. Under the Safety Act, manufacturers are required to certify that their new vehicles meet all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards, and sellers and lessors of new motor vehicles are required to sell or lease only complying vehicles.

Since NHTSA's standards do not apply to used motor vehicles-- i.e., motor vehicles that have been purchased for the first time in good faith for purposes other than resale--or to the use of motor vehicles, sales transactions involving used school buses a re not covered by Safety Act requirements. Thus, the used vans you asked about are not required by federal law to comply with the FMVSS when they are sold to subsequent purchasers.

The second set of regulations which may be applicable to school buses are a set of guidelines issued by this agency for State highway safety programs under the authority of the Highway Safety Act of 1966. These guidelines, called Highway Safety Program G uidelines, cover a wide range of subjects. Individual States have chosen to adopt some or all of these guidelines as their own policies governing their highway safety programs. In particular, Guideline No. 17, Pupil Transportation Safety, could affect t he use of used vehicles to transport students. A review of state law would determine which of the Guideline's recommendations have been adopted by Texas as a part of its highway safety program.

Your second question asked whether students enrolled in an MHMR developmental learning program, community college, church youth groups or after-school or summer day camps would be considered "students" in determining the applicability of the Federal stan dards. Although I cannot address the first example without knowing the nature of a "MHMR children's developmental learning program," I believe the remaining examples are discussed in the enclosed letters of interpretation issued by this office, includin g the May 10, 1982 letter to Martin Chauvin, the March 27, 1978 letter to Bill Nanninga, the August 3, 1977 letter to John O'Connell, and the July 12, 1977 letter to Jim Thomason.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have further questions, please do not hesitate to contact David Greenburg of my staff, at (202) 366-2992.

ID: 14308.drn

Robert M. Kampfer, Esq.
Attorney at Law
Strain Building, Suite 613
P. O. Box 1946
Great Falls, MT 59403-1946

Dear Mr. Kampfer:

This responds to your request for an interpretation whether your client, which intends to transport adults and children to and from activities at a church camp, must purchase a school bus. Since the camp appears to be neither a school nor school-related, NHTSA does not consider the vehicles used to transport the children to be school buses. However, state law determines vehicle use, so Montana's laws determine the answer to your question.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has issued Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles, including school buses. It is a violation of Federal law for any person to sell any new bus that does not meet all Federal school bus safety standards if that person is aware that the purchaser intends to use the vehicle as a school bus. NHTSA defines "school bus" as a motor vehicle designed for carrying 11 or more persons, including a driver, and sold for purposes that include transporting students to and from "school or school-related events." Whether your client must be sold school buses depends on whether the camp is considered a "school or school-related event."

For the following reasons, NHTSA does not consider the camp to be a "school." To determine whether the church camp is a school, the agency looks at whether the function of the facility is primarily educational or custodial in nature. In describing the camp's activities, your letter states: "There is no particular schooling involved as such, but the camp does include various religious and recreational activities." In a telephone conversation with Dorothy Nakama of my staff, you confirmed that the camp offers outdoor recreational activities and religious instruction, but offers no "academic education." Since you have indicated that academic instruction is not provided, it does not appear that the church camp is a school.

As to whether the church camp is a school-related event, the agency looks at the overall relationship between the program and the schools from which children are being transported to attend the program. Since the camp is not related to a school, NHTSA would not consider the camp to be a "school-related event."

Under Federal law, your client need not be sold school buses. However, each State has the authority to regulate the use of vehicles within its jurisdiction. Since the individual States have authority over the use of vehicles, you must look to the State law of your client's camp to determine if the camp may use vans to transport children.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,
John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel
ref:VSA#571.3
d:6/2/97

ID: 11497AWKM

Mr. Kenneth W. Obrycki
2433 Arlington Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15209

Dear Mr. Obrycki:

This responds to your January 16, 1996 letter to this agency suggesting that tire safety would be improved if we were to require a yellow line approximately 1/4 of an inch wide across the width of tires at the 3/32 of an inch tread depth level. You stated that such a requirement could enable consumers to tell when tires are unsafe and could enable state police and inspection stations to readily observe dangerous tread levels. You believe that this would enhance passenger safety because worn tires would be replaced sooner.

We have carefully reviewed your letter, but do not agree that the requirement you suggest is warranted at this time. Our decision is explained below.

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has the authority to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) applicable to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. Among other things, such standards must be reasonable, practicable, and appropriate for the particular type of motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment for which they are prescribed. Once a vehicle or item of equipment is sold to the consumer, NHTSA's authority generally terminates and with certain exceptions, use of that vehicle or item of equipment then becomes a matter of state jurisdiction.

NHTSA has issued a number of FMVSSs and related regulations applicable to tires, the pertinent ones here being FMVSS Nos. 109, New pneumatic tires, and 119, New pneumatic tires for vehicles other than passenger cars. Both standards require that all tires have treadwear indicators molded into the tread at the 2/32 of an inch tread depth level. This level was selected by NHTSA based on early studies that showed that when tread is worn to 2/32 of an inch, a tire rapidly loses its traction characteristics, thereby becoming unsafe. Although states, not NHTSA, have the authority to enforce tire removal when the tread depth becomes worn below a certain level, the agency has issued vehicle in use inspection standards at 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 570, for states to use as a guide in establishing their own vehicle inspection requirements.

You stated in your letter that Pennsylvania, and perhaps other states, has established minimum tread depth requirements at 3/32 of an inch. The state has the authority to do that, since it has jurisdiction over the use of vehicles and equipment. NHTSA has retained the 2/32 of an inch requirement for tread depth indicators, however, and recently denied a petition to raise the tread depth indicators to 3/32 of an inch because there was no proven safety need to do so. A copy of the denial notice is enclosed.

Although NHTSA has the authority to require a yellow line across the tire to highlight the tread depth indicators, the agency has no data suggesting a safety need for such action. The tread depth indicators currently required, even though unobtrusive from a distance, have been shown to be effective in alerting motorists, inspection stations, and law enforcement personnel to unsafe tire wear. Accordingly, without further data showing a safety need to do so, NHTSA does not believe that requiring yellow tread wear markings in addition to those already required would be reasonable at this time.

Thank you for your interest in motor vehicle safety.

Sincerely,

Samuel J. Dubbin Chief Counsel

Enclosure

Ref:109#119 ref:2/22/96

ID: nht87-2.88

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 09/03/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Walter Mayr -- Austrian Trade Commission

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Walter Mayr The Austrian Trade Commission 1875 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 1114 Washington, D.C. 20009

This responds to your August 5, 1987 letter to my office and August 14 telephone conversation between Ms. Schott of your staff and Ms. Hom of mine, concerning our regulations for motor vehicles. You enclosed a brochure from the Austrian firm, Reformwerke Wels, describing a "public utility vehicle." Subsequently, Ms. Schott indicated in her telephone call that Reformwerke Wels has informed her that the vehicles in question have a top speed of 15.53 miles per hour (mph). Based on this information, you asked whether the vehicle is a "motor vehicle" for the purposes of our reg ulations. The answer is no.

Under a longstanding policy, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has regarded vehicles not to be "motor vehicles" within the meaning of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, and therefore not subject to our motor vehicle safet y standards, if they (1) have an unusual body configuration which sets the vehicles apart from typical highway traffic, and (2) have a minimum attainable speed of 20 mph or less. The utility vehicles manufactured by Reformwerke Wels meet these criteria. Thus, the vehicles are not "motor vehicles" under our regulations and the manufacture of those vehicles is not regulated by this agency.

You might wish to contact the Consumer Project Safety Commission to learn if they have any Federal safety regulations applicable to the type of utility vehicle manufactured by Reformwerke Wels. Their address is: Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Consum er Product Safety Commission, 1111 18th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20207. Telephone: (202) 492-6980.

Please contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

Ms. Dierdre Hom Chief Counsel's Office Department of Transportation Room 5219 NHTSA 400 7th Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590 August 5 1987

Dear Ms. Hom,

Further to your telephone conversation this morning with Susan Schott from our office, we enclose a brochure from the Austrian firm, Reformwerke Wels.

We appreciate your office to review this brochure which describes the tractor. I understand that if you determine that the tractor qualifies as a motor vehicle, you can advise us of the corresponding regulations.

Thank you in advance for your assistance and we look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Walter Mayr Trade Commissioner

Enclosure omitted

ID: 1924y

The Honorable Butler Derrick
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Derrick:

Thank you for your July 11, l989 letter on behalf of one of your constituents in South Carolina, asking whether mandatory safety belt use laws are constitutional. I am pleased to have this chance to provide you with the following information.

Before addressing your specific question, I would like to emphasize that effectively enforced State laws requiring the proper use of safety belts offer our best opportunity to save lives today at virtually no cost to the consumer. We recognize that a safety belt use law requires an action that many people do not take voluntarily. However, all traffic laws involve some restraint on individual behavior. Most are accepted without a second thought: we drive on the right side of the road, instead of the left, we stop for red lights, and we obey speed limits. In many cases, the failure of motorists to obey these traffic laws will have an impact on motorists besides the violator.

The same is true when motorists fail to wear safety belts. Automobile accidents have many victims -- family, friends, employers, and taxpayers -- all of whom bear some measure of the human and economic cost. During the past decade, 470,000 persons have died on American highways. Each year, an estimated 300,000 are injured seriously enough to require hospital treatment. These traffic injuries and deaths have resulted in an annual cost to society of $57 billion, including such costs as workman's compensation, welfare payments and lost tax revenues. Because of the substantial societal burden imposed by vehicle-related deaths and injuries, we believe that State legislatures have more than adequate justification to impose the relatively small intrusion on individual liberties that results from mandatory safety belt use laws.

The constitutionality of State mandatory use laws has been upheld by the courts of three different States, Illinois, Nebraska, and New York. I have enclosed a copy of the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion on this issue (Illinois v. Kohrig, decided October 1, 1986). The Supreme Court of the United States dismissed an appeal from the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Kohrig, on the grounds that it did not present a substantial Federal question. This dismissal suggests that the United States Supreme Court also believes that State mandatory safety belt use laws are constitutional.

You also stated that your constituent believes that the Supreme Court has declared laws requiring the use of motorcycle helmets to be unconstitutional. This belief is inaccurate. Page 7 of the enclosed Kohrig decision lists 35 different State and Federal cases that have held that State laws requiring the use of motorcycle helmets are a valid exercise of a State's powers and not unconstitutional. That list shows that the Supreme Court has affirmed a lower court decision that the Massachusetts motorcycle helmet use law was a constitutional exercise of a State's power (Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972)). Additionally, the Supreme Court has refused to review decisions by State Courts in Lousiana, Massachusetts, Washington, and Wisconsin upholding the constitutionality of State motorcycle helmet use laws. There are no Supreme Court decisions suggesting that State motorcycle helmet use laws are unconstitutional exercises of the State's power.

I hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any further questions or need some additional information on this subject.

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure /ref:208 d:7/31/89

ID: 1982-3.34

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 12/14/82

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Tokai Rika Co. Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. T. Asai Manager Tokai Rika Co., Ltd. New York Office One Harmon Plaza Secaucus, New Jersey 07094

Dear Mr. Asai:

This responds to your letter of October 15, 1982, asking about Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 101, Controls and Displays. Your letter concerned the symbols specified by that standard for the windshield defrosting and defogging system control and the rear window defrosting and defogging system control. You asked whether it is permissible to use the symbols specified by EEC Directive 78/316/EEC for those controls, stating that there are only slight differences between the symbols specified by Standard No. 101 and the EEC directive. As explained below, the answer to your question is yes.

The preamble to the final rule establishing current Standard No. 101 explained that minor deviations are allowed from the symbols designated by the standard, as long as the symbol used substantially resembles that specified in the standard. 43 FR 27541, June 26, 1978. (This statement was noted in your letter.)

For the windshield defrosting and defogging system control, both our standard and the EEC directive specify three curving arrows (representing rising air) superimposed on a form representing a windshield. For the rear window defrosting and defogging system control, both documents specify three curving arrows superimposed on a form representing a rear window. The forms representing the windshield and the rear window are the same for both Standard No. 101 and the EEC directive. Further, the three curving arrows are superimposed over the windshield or rear window by both documents in the same manner. The only apparent difference between the symbols specified by the two documents is the number of curves in each of the three arrows. The arrows specified by the EEC directive have the curves each, while the arrows specified by Standard No. 101 have three curves.

In our opinion, the deviation you described falls within the intent of the June 1978 statement to permit symbols that are identical to the pictured ones except in some minor respect. The deviation is indeed minor since one must closely examine the two EEC symbols in question and those specified by Standard No. 101 to determine if there is any difference at all.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

October 15, 1982

Mr. Frank Berndt National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Sirs:

We wish to inquire about the identifying symbols of windshield and rear window defrosting and defogging system.

We are presently supplying vehicle manufacturers with defrosting and defogging switches which will be mounted on the vehicles intended for U. S. and European markets. As you may know, however, there are slight differences between the identifying symbol designated in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 101 - Controls and Displays and those in EEC Directive 78/316/EEC - Identification of Controls. Tell-Tales and Indicators. The waved arrows on the symbols bear much resemblance, but are not identical, as you can see from the attached copies, which were taken from the standards.

We would like to know if the identifying symbols designated in the above mentioned Directive are acceptable for use in the U.S., although, they vary slightly. In fact , it was stated in an early notice (Docket No. 1-18: Notice 13, 43 FR 27541, June 26, 1978) that "minor deviations are allowed as long as the symbol used substantially resembles that specified in the standard."

If our proposal proves unacceptable, hopefully, in the future steps will be taken to implement the harmonization of both these standards.

Your prompt consideration will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

TOKAI RIKA CO., LTD.

T. Asai Manager

TA:dt Attachment

ID: 09-004022 -- immediate answer for GM re WMIs -- 6 Jul 09 rsy